Military Review

Moscow - Warsaw: what the heirs of Mr. Pilsudski forgot

The other day, Warsaw, having kept silent about Kerch, in fact, once again voiced threats against the Russian-German gas pipeline Nord Stream 2. Something similar happened at the end of the 1930s, especially at the end of that decade. Then much in Poland changed with the demise of the long-term leader of the country and nation, Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, who preferred not to occupy even the official presidency.

The head of the Polish state Jozef Pilsudski and his successor, Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly

An ardent Russophobe, a former associate of the Russian revolutionaries, “pan Yozef” in his old age was by no means opposed to agreeing on many issues with the Soviets in one way or another. Most likely, by the end of his rule, the marshal understood that the “alliance” with Berlin or with London and Paris against Moscow and the permanent Polish-Soviet confrontation may well return to a boomerang re-established Poland. And even lead her to the repetition of the tragic fate at the end of the XVIII century.

However, Mark Aldanov, even during the life of the head of the Polish state, wrote that "Marshal Pilsudski lives at the same time as different, as if incompatible moods". But his much less authoritative comrades-in-arms, having buried the dictator, as if broke off the chain and openly competed in anti-Soviet rhetoric. The actual epilogue of the campaign was the statement of Marshal E. Rydz-Smigly (1886-1941), the commander-in-chief of the Polish army with 1936 g, made literally on the eve of the war with Germany. Then, in response to the proposal of the Soviet Defense Commissar K.E. Voroshilov on the supply of military materials to Poland, made by 26 August 1939, the Polish marshal said: "If we lose our freedom with the Germans, then with the Russians we will lose our soul." Is it worth reminding how it ended for the Second Commonwealth?

But are the indefinite strategic interests of Poland and the USSR-Russia, the issues of ensuring their security, diverging and diverging now? It is useful, in this regard, to recall that at the end of the 20-s - the first half of the 30-s of the last century, the trade, cultural, scientific ties between Poland and the USSR quickly grew. Traditional Polish efficiency has taken its toll - conquered, and you can bargain. At that time, the non-aggression pact was also signed; Soviet-Polish trade almost doubled. Moreover, the intelligence services of the USSR and Poland conducted about 10 successful joint operations against Ukrainian nationalists (OUN) on the southern and southeastern parts of the mutual border (on both sides of the border in Kamyanets-Podilsky region). It is clear that the higher ranks of modern Poland, with their compulsory support for Square, do not recall this, even when it is necessary to slightly besiege the overbearing Maidan politicians.

Documents show that the same OUN from the beginning of the 1930-ies "oversaw" not only Berlin: its representatives of different levels have long since been in contact with British, French, Italian intelligence services. In addition, the OUNists, from about 1934-35, were supported by neighboring Czechoslovakia and pro-German Hungary. Clement Gotwald wrote in great detail about this in his work “The Two-faced Beneš,” published in the 1951 year in Prague, including in Russian. About the same писал Ambassador in London, and then the Polish president in exile, already 80-s Edward Raczynski: E. Raczyński, “W sojuszniczym Londynie. Dziennik ambasadora Edwarda Raczyńskiego: 1939 – 1945; Londyn, 1960.

Today, he is even quoted by the Ukrainian press. In the coordinate system that developed in those years, the threat of the disintegration of Poland was quite real. The aging Polish leader Pilsudski could not leave calm the well-known interview with Hitler's London Sunday Express 12 February 1933, where the new German Chancellor did not even try to hide his plans: "... Polish corridor" (the territory of Poland between East Prussia and the main part of Germany in 1919 -1939 of the year. - Approx. Ed.) Hate all Germans, it must be returned to Germany. There is nothing more disgusting for the Germans than the current Polish-German border, the question of which should soon be resolved. ” In order to resist Germany, Pilsudski, like a real pragmatist, was ready to accept help not only from old allies, but also from old enemies such as Soviet Russia.

Moscow - Warsaw: what the heirs of Mr. Pilsudski forgot

In the Nazi plans of numerous annexations, the Danzig Corridor is not a trifle, occupying one of the first places.

But almost all the encouraging strategic trends in relations between Warsaw and Moscow were soon interrupted by the “heirs” of Pilsudski, who with enviable ease were now focused on London and Paris, now on Berlin. But not on Moscow. But at the turn of 20-30's, the Soviet side was leaning towards a long-term dialogue with Poland. Judging by the real cases, already before the National Socialists came to power in Germany, the peaceful nature of relations with the USSR was also part of the plans of the Polish leadership. In principle, having a very long joint border, passing near large industrial centers and transport hubs, the two countries in one way or another should have been interested in long-term cooperation. However, the heirs of Pilsudski tried to look at the matter quite differently.

But back to the beginning of the 30's. 30 August 1931 year I.V. Stalin sent a letter to L.M. Kaganovich: “... why don't you report anything about the Polish draft pact (about non-aggression) passed by Patek (then Polish ambassador in Moscow) to Litvinov? This is a very important, almost decisive (for the next 2-3 of the year) issue of peace with Warsaw. And I am afraid that Litvinov, succumbing to the pressure of so-called public opinion, will reduce him to a “dummy”. Pay close attention to this matter. It would be funny if in this case we succumbed to the commonplace fad of “antipolonism”, forgetting even for a moment the indigenous interests of revolution and socialist construction ”(Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931 – 1936. Moscow: ROSSPAN, 2001. 71-73; RGASPI, 81 Foundation. 3 Op. 99 Case (12 – 14 Sheet. Autograph).

I.V. Stalin and L.M. Kaganovich

Soon, on September 7, Stalin accused L.M. of a new letter to Kaganovich. Karakhan (the then deputy commander of foreign affairs of the USSR) and M.M. Litvinov, that they "... made a gross mistake with respect to the pact with the Poles, for the elimination of which it takes more or less long time." And on September 20, the Politburo, having duplicated this opinion of Stalin, made the final decision: to seek the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Poland. This document was signed in 1932 year.

Similar peaceful tendencies were also manifested from the Polish side. Thus, on the instructions of Pilsudski, the head of the Polish Foreign Ministry, Jozef Beck 27, March 1932, invited the Ambassador of the USSR in Poland V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko to a conversation. Beck expressed concern about the growing xenophobia in Germany; asked about the construction of the Dnieper, the Stalingrad tractor, "Magnitka". The interlocutors also spoke about the Russian and Polish participants in the 1905-1907 revolution.

Similar in nature was the visit of the representative of Pilsudski for special commissions, Bohuslav Medzinski, to Moscow in 1932 year. The transcript of his conversation with Stalin, who ultimately made a unique gesture, is especially impressive: he not only invited Medziński to the May Day parade: the Polish guest was given a place on the festive platform at the Lenin Mausoleum. A little later, already in 1934, Stalin noted that “who was caught between two fires (by fascist Germany and the Soviet Union), J. Pilsudski wanted to get out of this situation through the Polish-Soviet rapprochement. And it remains in the interests of the USSR. ”

The Polish dictator, contrary to the expectations of his subordinates, did not even try to prevent the Polish businessmen from moving closer to the Soviets. At the finish of the first Soviet five-year plan a number of mutually beneficial Polish-Soviet agreements on the development of trade were concluded. Operationally agreed not only on the fusion of timber on the Neman, but also on the transfer of most of the Polish archives in the USSR to Warsaw. Also documents of a scientific exchange, about tours of the Polish actors in the USSR and Soviet in Poland were signed. Plus, in August 1934, for the first time, the naval delegation of the USSR visited the port of Gdynia (the only port of Poland in the Baltic) for the first time.

And at the end of January 1935, Yu. Pilsudski, despite being seriously ill, invited Hermann Goering, then the Nazi no. 2, to go hunting. Goering, who was never ashamed of anyone, almost immediately offered the marshal to organize a campaign against Ukraine together, but received a clear answer from him: “Poland is interested in peaceful relations with the USSR, with which it has a thousand-kilometer common border”. Goering was taken aback, but in conversations with Pilsudski more did not return to this topic.

Goering settled in Belovezhskaya Pushcha before the occupation of Poland. In the photo - with the Polish President Mostsitsky, the second half of the 30-s.

In this sense, the reference of the embassy of the USSR in Poland about the Polish-Soviet relations from November 5 on November 1933 is very indicative:

“Further improvement of relations has created an environment favorable for the conclusion of contracts and agreements: an agreement on border status, a rafting convention, an agreement on the procedure for investigating and resolving border conflicts. A number of steps were taken along the lines of cultural interdependence; there were three of our exhibitions in Poland; Soviet delegations of historians, ethnographers and doctors were given a friendly welcome in Poland.
For the near future, Poland’s policy will be “balancing” between East and West. But continuing the line on rapprochement with us, Poland will continue to strive not to tie its hands ”.

After the death of J. Pilsudski (in May 1935), the Polish-Soviet relations, unlike the Polish-German relations, began to deteriorate again. Among other things, and because of Polish participation in the section of Czechoslovakia on the Munich Agreement. The appetites of the new Polish leaders immediately increased sharply, and they were already developing plans for a military invasion of Lithuania, which had not come to terms with the loss of Vilnius back in the year 1920. Then the USSR intervened for the small Baltic republic, which subsequently greatly facilitated the process of its accession to the Union.

Almost at the same time, the rejection of Memel, the present Klaipeda from Lithuania, coolly done by Germany in March 1939 of the year Klaipeda, which was carefully hushed up today, happened. It is significant that in Poland it did not cause a negative reaction, although, incidentally, the Western press, following the example of politicians, expressed its irritation very, very briefly. But perhaps more importantly, the top Polish leadership clearly underestimated the future consequences of Germany’s unilateral denunciation of 28 on April 1939 of the German-Polish non-aggression pact of April (1934 of the year) by Germany. Unfortunately, in Warsaw, as is obvious, in Moscow, by the end of the 30s, they made a serious miscalculation when they openly “trusted” the possibilities of developing peaceful relations with Germany. And they preferred not to pay due attention to the aggressive, chauvinistic plans and concrete actions of the Nazis. It is characteristic that Soviet-Polish relations themselves fell into this “trap” skillfully created by Berlin.

But the German “Drang nach Osten” did not make almost any differences between Poland and Russia. Not by chance, under the cover of a diplomatic fleur, Germany immediately after the death of Pilsudski, sharply intensified work with the Western Ukrainian nationalist underground in Poland. And later, in September, 39, it no longer only carried out a series of attacks, but also struck the rear of the Polish troops. Including during the evacuation of the defeated Polish troops and civilians in Romania. "Defensive" could not oppose anything to it, since its cooperation with the NKVD against the OUN had already stopped since the 1937 year.

Let us take the liberty to conclude that the ruling circles of both Poland and the USSR after the death of J. Pilsudski seem to lack understanding of the situation and a desire to rise above short-term mutual sympathies and antipathies. In any case, the constant concessions that Germany made on various issues from the USSR and Poland were actually on the verge of a world war, could not help but increase the influence of Berlin in Eastern Europe. We rightly do not stop criticizing England and France for such “peacemaking”, although we ourselves, trying to ward off the Nazi threat from ourselves, have, alas, left them in our foreign policy, very close.

According to many experts, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and even 1 of September 1939, could have been prevented if Warsaw and Moscow were aiming at even forced, but closer, military-political cooperation with each other in anticipation of the real German threat. Moreover, according to a number of assessments, the “pragmatic” defense pact of the USSR and Poland (in addition to their non-aggression pact) would completely allow German troops to be blocked in East Prussia and strengthen the defense capability of Gdansk (Danzig) - a “free city” before the German aggression against Poland.

Naturally, the September Polish catastrophe of 1939 of the year was most strongly influenced by the same strange, as the subsequent "strange war" policy of Great Britain and France during the military-political negotiations with the USSR. The British and French ruling circles deliberately delayed these negotiations, limiting themselves only to confirming Poland’s notorious guarantees. But how these guarantees are specifically embodied, London and Paris did not specify. Today it is well known that the delegation of our future allies did not even have the authority to sign a military agreement with the USSR, but the “strange war” only confirmed that London and Paris had deliberately “surrendered” Poland.

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  1. painter
    painter 4 December 2018 06: 11
    Poland, as it was a European gate to Russia, remains so, many march passed east
    1. Fisherman
      Fisherman 4 December 2018 09: 31
      Like the Russians through Poland west to Europe.
      1. Basil50
        Basil50 4 December 2018 10: 11
        There are a lot of assumptions in the article. Why so?
        From the fact that Pilsudski tried at least somehow to revive the economy of Poland, he did not cease to be an enemy of the RUSSIAN and the entire Soviet Union. His dreams in a colony with slaves remained with him until his death. Pilsudski's followers were simply no longer restrained by the statements.
        By the way, why do not they condemn the pact with the Poles? Where do all sorts of liberals with democracies look?
        1. credo
          credo 4 December 2018 13: 34
          I agree, a lot if only if only, like this ...
          "... According to many experts, both the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and even September 1, 1939, could have been prevented if Warsaw and Moscow set their sights on, albeit forced, but closer military-political cooperation with each other in anticipation of the already real German threats ... "

          But what a misfortune, World War II began not from 2/01.09.1939/1939, but earlier, and by September XNUMX, almost all countries of Western Europe, with the exception of England, and most of Eastern Europe, worked hard for Nazi Germany and were its allies. If you do not take into account the number of the armed forces of Germany, its allies and those who simply want to profit from the blood of the countries of "enlightened Europe", their economic potential, quantitative and qualitative characteristics of weapons, as well as how diligently American (British) capital and politicians participated in political life and the adoption of important decisions by fascist Germany, then you can theorize for as long as you like about the possible alliance of Poland and the USSR and their strength to resist fascist Germany, but history does not know the subjunctive mood. That was what happened and the current situation shows that Polish politicians still live in phantom pains and rave about the dreams of "Poland from sea to sea."

          By the way, if these experts really want to practice theory, I suggest they consider the question of the outbreak of war on the eastern front for Nazi Germany in the south from the territory of Romania or Hungary. These satellites and allies would provide fascist Germany with a warm welcome and complete hospitality with any bases for placing a powerful shock fist by the fascist Germany in the direction of Bessarabia and Ukraine, and then to the Caucasus and towards Moscow.
  2. Olgovich
    Olgovich 4 December 2018 07: 50
    Poland, the most profitable for Russia, is the one that was before 1916, i.e. nonexistent Poland, divided between neighbors.

    Therefore, it was erroneously declared by Stalin on February 6, 1945:
    : y "Russians in the past had many sins in front of Poland. Soviet government seeks to atone for these sins.".

    Poland itself did not atone for its innumerable sins before Russia.
    1. Vladimir K.
      Vladimir K. 4 December 2018 09: 01
      Are you sure that Stalin said that? Something I doubt. You can link to the source ...... only to non-narrative!
      1. BAI
        BAI 4 December 2018 09: 59
        Here taken out of context:
        The Yalta Conference of the Allied Powers (February 4 - 11, 1945) is the second of three meetings of the leaders of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, devoted to discussing the plan of the post-war structure of Europe.

        Record of the conversation of Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill on February 6, 1945:

        Comrade Stalin: As Churchill just stated, the question of Poland is a matter of honor for the British government. Stalin understands this. For his part, however, he must say that for the Russians the question of Poland is not only a matter of honor, but also a matter of security. A matter of honor because in the past the Russians had many sins before Poland. The Soviet government seeks to make amends for these sins. A security issue because the most important strategic problems of the Soviet state are connected with Poland.

        The point is not only that Poland is a border country with us. This, of course, matters, but the essence of the problem is much deeper. Throughout history, Poland has always been the corridor through which the enemy attacking Russia passed. It is enough to recall at least the last thirty years: during this period, the Germans crossed Poland twice to attack our country. Why have enemies still passed through Poland so easily? First of all, because Poland was weak. The Polish corridor cannot be closed mechanically from the outside only by Russian forces. It can be reliably closed only from within by Poland’s own forces. To do this, Poland must be strong. That is why the Soviet Union is interested in creating a powerful, free and independent Poland. The question of Poland is a matter of life and death for the Soviet state.
        It is better to watch the materials of the Yalta Conference in full:
        In these materials it is even better to see in what conditions these words were pronounced.
        Poland had to be included in the sphere of influence of the USSR - hence the search for ways of rapprochement with the eternal Russophobes.
        1. Olgovich
          Olgovich 4 December 2018 11: 06
          Quote: BAI
          Poland had to be included in the sphere of influence of the USSR - hence the search for ways of rapprochement with the eternal Russophobes.

          "It worked", yes! fool Especially in such ways
          : The Soviet Union is interested in creating powerful free and independent Poland. The question of Poland is a matter of life and death for the Soviet state.

          Yes, and Poland through these efforts again put a knife to Russia. Created sopowerful Russophobic the monster.
          This is HOW it was necessary NOT to know the story or to be self-confident in order to do this? request
          The top of shortsightedness and farsightedness, as well as in relation to persistence to preservation unified Germany.
          1. apro
            apro 4 December 2018 12: 30
            But did the king manage to integrate Poland into ri?
            The Soviets were able. Poland, both economically and militarily, was in the Soviet sphere of influence.
            1. Olgovich
              Olgovich 4 December 2018 13: 28
              Quote: apro

              But did the king manage to integrate Poland into ri?

              Yes, learn the story.
              Quote: apro

              But did the king manage to integrate Poland into ri?
              Advice could.

              What could? Could- create a Russophobic monster, endowing it with the resources and territories of Germany, obtained by Russian soldiers.
              Quote: apro
              Poland and economically and militarily was in the Soviet sphere of influence.

              You yourself are not funny, looking at the current situation, is it to say?
              It was your blind people hoping for it, and the Poles took advantage of all the preferences and spit-naturally.
              And only those who did not know the history of Poland could doubt other the outcome.
              1. apro
                apro 4 December 2018 14: 20
                We study .... and sections of Poland. And the actions of the tsarist administration. And the Russian-Polish war.
                But today it’s not funny. The Russian collapsed councils got what they wanted. And they didn’t do anything to create their sphere of influence. They have nothing to offer either in Europe or in the world. At home ....
                1. Olgovich
                  Olgovich 5 December 2018 10: 32
                  Quote: apro
                  We study .... and sections of Poland. And the actions of the tsarist administration. And the Russian-Polish war.

                  Everything was PEACEFUL and GOOD.
                  Quote: apro
                  But today it’s not funny. The Russian collapsed councils got what they wanted. And they didn’t do anything to create their sphere of influence. They have nothing to offer either in Europe or in the world. At home ....

                  Quote: apro
                  But today it’s not funny. The Russian collapsed councils got what they wanted. And they didn’t do anything to create their sphere of influence. They have nothing to offer either in Europe or in the world. At home ....

                  Yours created so that all shy away so far ....
      2. Olgovich
        Olgovich 4 December 2018 11: 07
        Quote: Vladimir K.
        Are you sure that Stalin said that?

        Put a quote in the search engine.
  3. bistrov.
    bistrov. 4 December 2018 08: 30
    Poland, as it was all its history Russophobic-minded, and remained. Moreover, with imperial ambitions. If there is not enough strength for "imperial ambitions", he goes to ordinary sixes.
  4. Molot1979
    Molot1979 4 December 2018 10: 30
    And what does Moscow have to do with it? This Poland in August 1939 did everything so that no agreements between the two countries took place. Sharing the guilt of one for two is not the right decision. The Poles did everything so that at the end of September there was nothing left of Poland. But, like, they saved the soul.
    1. apro
      apro 4 December 2018 12: 32
      Neither adding nor diminishing bourgeois Poland, the miscarriage of the Versailles system itself prepared itself for collapse.
  5. av58
    av58 4 December 2018 13: 02
    Conclusion from the article: dictators with a sense of common sense are much more pragmatic and more rational than democrats who have seized power, regardless of nationality.
  6. nivander
    nivander 4 December 2018 13: 15
    chaotic and ambiguous - by the way, the Fritz clearly distinguished Poland and the USSR in their drangs and did not pretend to the Polish Corridor. They only wanted their own, extraterritorial, transport corridor to Prussia. And by the way, hyenas, after Teshinsky bone, were ready to discuss this issue. However, Two-Bedroom Leva quickly reminded hyenas of their place in the food chain
  7. flavus
    flavus 4 December 2018 14: 25
    If with the Germans we lose our freedom, then with the Russians we lose our soul

    In principle, the marshal correctly said everything, but not with the Russians, but with the Soviet. When Poland lived under the Russians, then everything was in order with her soul.
    In general, it was difficult to expect from Poland love for the USSR after the Soviet-Polish war. And to make her extreme in the fact that she did not go, they say, to rapprochement with the USSR is an ordinary guile. A goat is unlikely to be friends with a wolf who has just tried to devour it.
    1. apro
      apro 4 December 2018 14: 47
      Do not remind who started the Polish-Soviet war?
      1. flavus
        flavus 4 December 2018 15: 20
        Quote: apro
        Do not remind who started the Polish-Soviet war?

        Well, your leaders clearly said this:
        V.I. Lenin: Destroying the Polish army, we are destroying the Versailles peace on which the entire system of current international relations rests. If Poland had become Soviet, the Versailles peace would have been destroyed and the entire international system that had been won by victories over Germany would have collapsed.
        L. D. Trotsky: Lenin had a firm plan: to finish the job, that is, to enter Warsaw to help the Polish working masses overturn the Pilsudski government and seize power.
        If Vladimir Ilyich himself desired and strove for Poland to become Soviet, then the question of who started the war is a rhetorical one.
        1. apro
          apro 4 December 2018 15: 46
          This was quite clearly done by the Poles by capturing Kiev. And all the actions of the Soviets are only an answer to aggression ...
          1. flavus
            flavus 4 December 2018 16: 12
            Quote: apro
            It was quite clearly made by the Poles capturing Kiev

            So Kiev had nothing to do with the Soviets. The Soviets recognized the UPR for the Brest Peace.

            The Fourth Union signed a peace treaty with Soviet Russia on March 3, 1918. The Russian side agreed to recognize the peace treaty signed with the Ukrainian People’s Republic, withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory, and cease all agitation and propaganda against the government or government agencies of the UPR.
        2. naidas
          naidas 4 December 2018 17: 29
          Lenin said this 2.10.20
          and then -You know that we did not engage in aggressive plans. At the beginning of my speech, I emphasized to you that in April 1920 we stood east of Minsk and offered peace on these conditions, just to save the workers and peasants of Russia from a new war. But since the war is imposed on us, we must end it victoriously.
          1. flavus
            flavus 5 December 2018 08: 41
            Quote: naidas
            You know that we didn’t deal with aggressive plans

            In the march of Budenny, where Berlin is mentioned, were they mistaken then?
            Didn't the Red Cossack know about Ilyich's lack of "plans of conquest"?
            And in a battle of ravishing
            Avalanche swift -
            Give Warsaw give Berlin -
            1. naidas
              naidas 5 December 2018 18: 32
              And in this speech he told about Warsaw and Berlin, enough to read and it will be clear.
    2. Aviator_
      Aviator_ 5 December 2018 08: 36
      Well, yes, from the generosity of the souls, the Poles arranged an uprising as part of the XI NUMX and 1831 years.
      1. flavus
        flavus 5 December 2018 08: 47
        Quote: Aviator_
        Well, yes, from the generosity of the souls, the Poles organized uprisings as a part of the Republic of Ingushetia in 1831 and 1863

        Do you blame them for this? An ancient nation with developed statehood falls under occupation. Quite naturally, his desire to throw off oppression.
        Put yourself in the shoes of the Poles.
        1. Aviator_
          Aviator_ 6 December 2018 00: 30
          There was a trifle - for some reason they in those parts that went to Prussia and Austria-Hungary after the partition did not rebel strongly, they behaved quietly. Only in RI decided that they can do anything. Ordinary corrupt girls with reduced social responsibility. For the money of the European Union of the XIX century - any desires.
  8. wax
    wax 4 December 2018 17: 03
    Arrogant Poland as a result always smears snot at its trough.
  9. andrew42
    andrew42 4 December 2018 17: 34
    Some strange speculation about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. It was already in 1939! And Poland completely fell into politics under the "Entente" (Britain + France) since 1936. De facto! It can be said that after Pilsudski Polska from “using” it became “used”. And participation
    Poland in the partition of Czechoslovakia is a tombstone for any failed and hypothetical Soviet-Polish relations. In the conditions of the "pacification" of the Nazis by Britain, plus the Polish flaunting British "guarantees", the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was an extremely necessary and paramount thing, as Ilyich, known to all, used to say. As subsequent events showed - the popularity of Nazism in Britain before 1939, the surrender of Poland, the British set-up of France, the "strange war" of 1940-1941 - the most dangerous option for the Union was an unspoken alliance between Britain and Germany by the end of 1941. The pact, one way or another, sowed the suspicions of a part of the British establishment in relation to the Reich, did not allow Britain to make peace with Germany completely, which saved us from the German-British "Drang nach Osten". And Poland never learned anything: instead of the British leash, having fed on the Soviet legacy, sat on the American leash. And bark at us.
  10. WarriorWolf
    WarriorWolf 4 December 2018 20: 40
    Poland is a great power, from sea to sea! The truth is that in the composition of the Republic of Ingushetia, then 3 Reichs, then the EU ...
  11. George
    George 30 January 2019 17: 11
    ... in response to the proposal of the Soviet People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilova on the supply of military materials to Poland, made on August 26, 1939, the Polish marshal said: "If we lose our freedom with the Germans, then with our Russians we lose our soul."

    Back in June, when there was no mention of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet side refused to transit military goods to Poland through its territory, and after the pact itself it suddenly offered supplies. It sounds a little strange.
    Moreover, it is not clear what relation Voroshilov has to this statement when it was made to the Ambassador of France.
  12. George
    George 30 January 2019 17: 53
    Quote: nivasander
    By the way, the Fritz clearly distinguished Poland and the USSR in their drangs and did not claim to be the Polish Corridor. They only wanted their own, extraterritorial, transport corridor to Prussia.

    And was it worth it to start a war with Poland because of this "transport corridor"? Maybe it was after all not only and not so much in the "corridor"?