They know better there. Will the South Kuril Islands become "northern territories"?
It seems we have the right to pre-announce two at once. news. One is good and the other is not very. First: it seems that the territorial dispute with Japan will nevertheless be resolved, the countries will sign a peace treaty. Second, everything goes to the point that it will not be possible to save all the disputed islands, and no one is going to ask us what to give and how to give.
Such conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of Vladimir Putin’s statement made after his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. He recall, with visible enthusiasm, said that Japan was finally ready to return to the discussion of the territorial problem on the basis of the agreements set forth in the Soviet-Japanese declaration of the 1956 of the year.
True, it should be noted that Putin did not cut off his path to retreat. He also mentioned the not quite accurate formulations in that declaration, and that all this needs to be clarified. But, on the other hand, it can also be a game for the Russian audience: after all the government initiatives of the current year, the rating has to be treated carefully.
Putin probably would like to settle a territorial dispute with Japan. Partly due to the fact that he has experience in resolving a similar dispute with China, as a result of which we have got quite strong, positive relations with our largest neighbor. At that time, there was also a lot of debate about whether we need such a demarcation of the border, but now, it seems, there are fewer doubters. Japan is also a major regional (and global) political and economic player. And for us, it can also become a figure balancing China, which in itself has some value.
On the other hand, Japan could indeed become a major investor in the Russian economy, in particular, in the Far East. This is a powerful financial, industrial and technological center, normal relations with which could more than compensate us for the loss of several islands.
But here "everything is not so clear." And the simplest argument is that not everything that looks good on paper is just as good in practice.
Let's start with the issue of economic cooperation. We are often often slipped this argument as the main advantage of the transfer of the islands of Japan. But the fact is that a free, market economy does not tolerate dictation. And it is hard to believe that at the first click of the fingers of the Prime Minister of Japan, thousands of Japanese businessmen will rush to invest in Russia. By the way, they have such an opportunity even now. And they even invest something. But more and more in oil and gas projects like Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, in which even without the Japanese, investors stood in a queue.
In fact, this argument is very doubtful. Maybe there will be an investment. Maybe not. Or maybe a peace treaty and the return of at least part of the “northern territories” to the Japanese will have a counterproductive effect: if now, not wanting to quarrel strongly with Russia (otherwise they will not give anything at all), the Japanese have very carefully, symbolically supported anti-Russian sanctions, then with their hands untied they can enter the vanguard of the sanctions front. And why not, really: there is nothing left to lose, and it is always good to support the “traditional partner” from overseas.
They buy fish without any peace treaties in any quantities. Moreover, they quite consciously encourage Russian poachers who carry whole holds of unaccounted fish, crabs, shrimps and other seafood delicacies across the border. Round wood we supply them without question. Coal? Oil? Liquefied gas? Yes, whatever, just to pay!
That is, hopes for a deep river of Japanese investment may not justify themselves. And this must be borne in mind first.
In general, what is the 1956 declaration of the year? According to this document, the USSR undertook (after signing a peace treaty, and not a minute earlier!) To hand over to Japan about. Shikotan and Habomai Islands. And this, it must be admitted, is a very favorable compromise for us, if we are basically ready for these very compromises.
First, these islands are located on the oceanic, eastern side of the South Kuril ridge. They are purely geographically incapable of influencing whether we can regard the Sea of Okhotsk as our inland water body. That is, this problem in this case disappears automatically.
Secondly, the military-strategic importance of these islands is greatly exaggerated. If nearby, in a few kilometers, there would not be a bulk of Hokkaido Island, on which at least ten military bases can be located, the question would be of fundamental importance. But in this case, perhaps, anxiety is unnecessary - we already have something to fear there.
Thirdly, the really large islands of Kunashir and Iturup (the largest island of the Kuril ridge) remain behind us. They are quite sufficient for organizing a serious military presence there, and economically it is still significantly more valuable than Kunashir and Habomai. This and the deposit of rhenium on about. Iturup, and quite a significant water area, rich in salmon and other commercial varieties of fish and other aquatic bioresources.
Once again I focus on this attention: if we are in principle ready to compromise in a territorial dispute with Japan, then conditions are better than in the 1956 Declaration of the year, we probably just won’t think of it.
However, the question remains: do we really need this compromise? Its economic value, as we have already found out, is rather doubtful. Maybe we can compensate for this with the benefits of a military-political alliance with Japan?
Alas, this is also unlikely. More precisely, the probability of such an alliance is almost zero. And the reason lies on the surface - the place of the main military-political partner of Japan is firmly occupied by the Americans.
Currently, Japan is the main ally of the United States in the APR. It is, without exaggeration, the unsinkable aircraft carrier of America, geographically located in a place where you can control the entire maritime trade in China. And this is now the most valuable geopolitical resource for the United States.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that the trajectories of Chinese and North Korean missiles, which are launching towards the United States, pass over Japan. With the advent of the missile defense system, Washington’s interest in the Land of the Rising Sun has only intensified, and with the advent of ICBMs, North Korea has reached its apogee.
But it must be admitted that Japan is interested in strengthening military cooperation with the United States. It is already obvious that Tokyo is not in a position to hold back the rapidly growing China on its own. A quarrel with the United States means for the Japanese, at a minimum, the loss of the Senkaku Islands (whale. Diaoyuidao) in the East China Sea. It is unlikely that Tokyo is inspired by the military-technical successes of Pyongyang, and especially its nuclear program.
All this rather clearly indicates to us that none of our attempts to “tame” Japan and make it its military partner will be crowned with success either in the near or in the medium term.
So, the deal looks too dubious for Russia, if we ignore general considerations about good-neighborliness and the growing friendship of nations. The islands, though not the most valuable, we still give, and in return we receive only promises and tapping on the shoulder. Exchange, you see, is not the most equivalent ...
Probably, someone will say that at the level of heads of state the issue is discussed more substantively, and there certainly will be some guarantees of investment, technological cooperation and other wonderful things. And this is probably the case ...
Still, we had enough cases to make sure that our leaders do not always make wise decisions aimed at the benefit of the people and the state. Therefore, sorry, I would like to see all the cards on the table. And only then, after appropriate discussion, to authorize our authority to this or that decision.
But so, of course, will not. Because they are there, as always, know better.
Such conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of Vladimir Putin’s statement made after his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. He recall, with visible enthusiasm, said that Japan was finally ready to return to the discussion of the territorial problem on the basis of the agreements set forth in the Soviet-Japanese declaration of the 1956 of the year.
Yesterday during our meeting, the Prime Minister actually said that Japan would be ready to return to the discussion of that problem on the basis of the 1956 Declaration of the Year. But this requires, of course, a separate, additional serious study.
True, it should be noted that Putin did not cut off his path to retreat. He also mentioned the not quite accurate formulations in that declaration, and that all this needs to be clarified. But, on the other hand, it can also be a game for the Russian audience: after all the government initiatives of the current year, the rating has to be treated carefully.
Putin probably would like to settle a territorial dispute with Japan. Partly due to the fact that he has experience in resolving a similar dispute with China, as a result of which we have got quite strong, positive relations with our largest neighbor. At that time, there was also a lot of debate about whether we need such a demarcation of the border, but now, it seems, there are fewer doubters. Japan is also a major regional (and global) political and economic player. And for us, it can also become a figure balancing China, which in itself has some value.
On the other hand, Japan could indeed become a major investor in the Russian economy, in particular, in the Far East. This is a powerful financial, industrial and technological center, normal relations with which could more than compensate us for the loss of several islands.
But here "everything is not so clear." And the simplest argument is that not everything that looks good on paper is just as good in practice.
Let's start with the issue of economic cooperation. We are often often slipped this argument as the main advantage of the transfer of the islands of Japan. But the fact is that a free, market economy does not tolerate dictation. And it is hard to believe that at the first click of the fingers of the Prime Minister of Japan, thousands of Japanese businessmen will rush to invest in Russia. By the way, they have such an opportunity even now. And they even invest something. But more and more in oil and gas projects like Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, in which even without the Japanese, investors stood in a queue.
In fact, this argument is very doubtful. Maybe there will be an investment. Maybe not. Or maybe a peace treaty and the return of at least part of the “northern territories” to the Japanese will have a counterproductive effect: if now, not wanting to quarrel strongly with Russia (otherwise they will not give anything at all), the Japanese have very carefully, symbolically supported anti-Russian sanctions, then with their hands untied they can enter the vanguard of the sanctions front. And why not, really: there is nothing left to lose, and it is always good to support the “traditional partner” from overseas.
They buy fish without any peace treaties in any quantities. Moreover, they quite consciously encourage Russian poachers who carry whole holds of unaccounted fish, crabs, shrimps and other seafood delicacies across the border. Round wood we supply them without question. Coal? Oil? Liquefied gas? Yes, whatever, just to pay!
That is, hopes for a deep river of Japanese investment may not justify themselves. And this must be borne in mind first.
In general, what is the 1956 declaration of the year? According to this document, the USSR undertook (after signing a peace treaty, and not a minute earlier!) To hand over to Japan about. Shikotan and Habomai Islands. And this, it must be admitted, is a very favorable compromise for us, if we are basically ready for these very compromises.
First, these islands are located on the oceanic, eastern side of the South Kuril ridge. They are purely geographically incapable of influencing whether we can regard the Sea of Okhotsk as our inland water body. That is, this problem in this case disappears automatically.
Secondly, the military-strategic importance of these islands is greatly exaggerated. If nearby, in a few kilometers, there would not be a bulk of Hokkaido Island, on which at least ten military bases can be located, the question would be of fundamental importance. But in this case, perhaps, anxiety is unnecessary - we already have something to fear there.
Thirdly, the really large islands of Kunashir and Iturup (the largest island of the Kuril ridge) remain behind us. They are quite sufficient for organizing a serious military presence there, and economically it is still significantly more valuable than Kunashir and Habomai. This and the deposit of rhenium on about. Iturup, and quite a significant water area, rich in salmon and other commercial varieties of fish and other aquatic bioresources.
Once again I focus on this attention: if we are in principle ready to compromise in a territorial dispute with Japan, then conditions are better than in the 1956 Declaration of the year, we probably just won’t think of it.
However, the question remains: do we really need this compromise? Its economic value, as we have already found out, is rather doubtful. Maybe we can compensate for this with the benefits of a military-political alliance with Japan?
Alas, this is also unlikely. More precisely, the probability of such an alliance is almost zero. And the reason lies on the surface - the place of the main military-political partner of Japan is firmly occupied by the Americans.
Currently, Japan is the main ally of the United States in the APR. It is, without exaggeration, the unsinkable aircraft carrier of America, geographically located in a place where you can control the entire maritime trade in China. And this is now the most valuable geopolitical resource for the United States.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that the trajectories of Chinese and North Korean missiles, which are launching towards the United States, pass over Japan. With the advent of the missile defense system, Washington’s interest in the Land of the Rising Sun has only intensified, and with the advent of ICBMs, North Korea has reached its apogee.
But it must be admitted that Japan is interested in strengthening military cooperation with the United States. It is already obvious that Tokyo is not in a position to hold back the rapidly growing China on its own. A quarrel with the United States means for the Japanese, at a minimum, the loss of the Senkaku Islands (whale. Diaoyuidao) in the East China Sea. It is unlikely that Tokyo is inspired by the military-technical successes of Pyongyang, and especially its nuclear program.
All this rather clearly indicates to us that none of our attempts to “tame” Japan and make it its military partner will be crowned with success either in the near or in the medium term.
So, the deal looks too dubious for Russia, if we ignore general considerations about good-neighborliness and the growing friendship of nations. The islands, though not the most valuable, we still give, and in return we receive only promises and tapping on the shoulder. Exchange, you see, is not the most equivalent ...
Probably, someone will say that at the level of heads of state the issue is discussed more substantively, and there certainly will be some guarantees of investment, technological cooperation and other wonderful things. And this is probably the case ...
Still, we had enough cases to make sure that our leaders do not always make wise decisions aimed at the benefit of the people and the state. Therefore, sorry, I would like to see all the cards on the table. And only then, after appropriate discussion, to authorize our authority to this or that decision.
But so, of course, will not. Because they are there, as always, know better.
Information