Was it possible to reform the Soviet industry?
I would like to speak about the "lost plants". From this point of view, look at the ex-USSR. After all, the USSR, after all, was above all an industrial superpower. Not commercial, not agricultural, but industrial. It is logical to look at the basis of his, so to speak, power, that is, on that very industry. And above all to the pride of the USSR - industrial giants. There were a lot of them, and each of them was a kind of “state within a state.” Many of them have disappeared in the flame of reform, but there are some that have survived.
And this is where serious questions arise (based on even a superficial analysis of their activities). They work today, but as far as profitability and profitability are concerned, then, as they say, everything is not so simple. More specifically, they constantly work in the negative. (I live in the Urals and am familiar with some of these giants.) That is, it is clear that in a few years it was difficult to restructure their work on market rails. And even ten years is not so easy.
But time passes, life does not stand still, the country is developing, and they ... everything is there. For some reason, these giants (but not only them) are characterized by low wages of workers and engineers, outdated equipment and permanent debts to suppliers. The enterprise is strategic, the enterprise performs an important social function, the enterprise is in dire need of state support ... Well, and how many times have we heard all this?
State support was provided, for some time it was possible to remove the problems, then they again crawled to the surface. And again beautiful words about the social role of the enterprise, about its rich history etc. And so on without end. By cycle. And then, you know, one most unpleasant question arises: what was the real effectiveness of the Soviet industrial system? In the sense of not "coal to the mountain" or "plan for the shaft / shaft according to the plan," but so to speak, what was the financial return from it? Stealing, say a lot? Well, compared to the 90-mi is not so much. Modestly stolen.
The role of the nesuns in the collapse of socialism is clearly exaggerated. Yes, and the authorities behaved quite modestly compared with the subsequent period. Then forgive where was everything going? . The question is not idle. Already in 80's (in 80, Karl!), Co-citizens faced a rather strange paradox: the country is de facto a superpower and controls almost half of the planet, there is no war for a long time, in every city and town working plants. But there is no happiness in life and goods on the shelves.
Goods, in the sense of the most elementary and primitive, no longer exist. In 80, everything was in short supply. And somehow this raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of the very Soviet industrial super-system. Of course, I am very sorry, but in the same US cheap Fords and household appliances (!) Parts of the middle class became available even before the First World War. Europe, the world’s two, was literally plowed up, but by the 60 years, and there, the car became quite accessible to almost everyone.
What did we have for 80 years? By car availability?
Here they love to curse thievish and stupid partocrats, I somehow do not quite agree with that. The quality of the Soviet government (taking into account the income of the managing class!) Was very good. But there was no happiness in life, but there were endless queues. By the end of 80's, the situation had already acquired a frankly idiotic character: the factories were still working "to the fullest" and overfulfilled, but in stores it was just a rolling ball.
Exactly so, and nothing else. Here workers begin to kick workers: allegedly they were the ones who plundered everything. Rather, they took it away at officially fixed prices. The “commercial” activity of trade was precisely the result, not the cause. Exactly. Everything is exactly the opposite. Here they begin to curse "international assistance." Yes, she had a place, helped. And mostly for free. However, the fact of the presence of the Soviet bloc had obvious advantages, including economic ones. Yes, and in the CMEA countries, too, the plants worked. It was, it was.
You know, it is precisely by looking at the modern “former Soviet flagships” who have remained afloat, a nasty suspicion about the true economic efficiency of the Soviet industrial system creeps in. That is, I am not talking about the “turnover” (it was just monstrous!) But about the financial return it gave, this is the industry. It seems to me that the tragedy of the Soviet leaders was precisely that they managed a very large, very complex system with a very small “surplus product”. And the quality of management was just good enough, and these “guys” not only pushed speeches from the stands, but also worked.
Just even today, after almost 30 anniversary of economic reforms, these same former giants are very poorly adapted to the market environment. No, you understand, they cannot adapt, they need all the help they need and they do not pay the bills. What, interestingly, did the “economy” look like, consisting of such “giants” (“middle peasants”)? What could she earn? An interesting "experiment" in this area was conducted after the collapse of the USSR, A.G. Lukashenko. He 25 years continued to invest in the Soviet giants. Return, he did not wait.
Comrades, twenty-five years more! I agree, the experiment is not quite "clean", but it had a place to be. What has grown, has grown. And, for example, “Gomselmash” or “Motovelo” are just “legends” of the Belarusian economy. "Amkador", "MAZ" ... He honestly tried to save them and even develop. Did not work out. Again, if someone does not know, then the 90's Chinese industrialization was quite specific: it was built NewIt is new factories in southeastern China. And many old enterprises built during the time of Comrade Mao turned out to be simply unnecessary (in particular, northeast China). In the new economy, they refused to fit.
That is, the market was sort of for them, and money ... but not destiny. No, someone fit in, and someone not so, although the CCP worked with all its might. That is, the true commercial value of all these "giants of the industry" is rather doubtful. It’s just that when creating them, the question wasn’t so posed and wasn’t considered at such an angle: the task was to produce maximum output as quickly as possible. As part of the planned economy, everything could be “profitable”, even “counter transport” of similar goods.
Just an illusion is taking place to be so obsessive: if a giant industrial flywheel rotates, then the return from it should be gigantic. Not a fact, not a fact. And it seems that in 70-e / 80-e years the best minds of the Soviet leadership fought over this “mystery of the sphinx”: everything works, but there are problems with money and there are no goods on the shelves. Once again: do not need about the theft and poverty of the Soviet system. Just the same theft was not so much and the system was quite a good one.
Profit, of course, can not be the only criterion in organizing the work of the enterprise, but without it, nowhere. For some reason, in recent decades, the word “profit” has become perceived as some kind of “low-labor” super-profits that are spent for cynical purposes. But after all, if we argue in a simple way, then the profit is something that we can take from the enterprise without disrupting its activities. That is, the profit is needed not to “over-enrich”, but simply by the fact of the economic activity of the society — someone has to earn money for it.
So, there are serious doubts that the Soviet industrial system “earned well”. The reason is simple: the constant shortage of everything and everything in peacetime within the framework of the USSR. That is, if it was still possible to employ everyone and give them pay, then for some reason it was unrealistic to fill these (very small!) Paychecks with real goods. That is, a logical version arises that the point was not so much in the partycrats and post-sales, as in the lowest profitability of the Soviet economy. That is, everyone worked, but the rich life did not work. Paradox.
For some reason, the giant industrial machine of the Soviet industry could not provide the population even with a basic set of the same manufactured goods (we silently keep silent about products, the topic is separate). But why? By the way, an ingenious “solution” to this problem was found just at large industrial enterprises: “enter” the household expenses of workers into the cost of products (since everything works and products are needed by the country!) - their houses of culture, rest houses, their own housing, their greenhouses and pig farms, their production of consumer goods.
Lord, all this nonsense ... The giant plant was turning into a small state. And in fact, the supply of real benefits to a person from the street and a large defense plant worker could be very different. And the apartment could be obtained quickly, and it was possible to stand in line all my life. But, let us ask ourselves, what was the cost of production of such an “enterprise”? Taking into account all the "social costs"? Very bad suspicions creep in ... And by the profitability / profitability of his work, too, which is typical.
That is, de facto in a poor, scarce economy, a large plant further worsened the situation for all as a whole, providing social benefits to its employees. Today we are well aware that a giant business (shopping even!) Can bring great losses. Today it is not a secret to anyone that turnover is one thing, but profit is another.
Having dived into the market, the giants' plants first of all threw off all the "social programs", loading and overloading local budgets, but they did not become profitable from this (for the most part!). And even the rent of "extra space" helped the case a little. No, if everyone were “hovering” at once, then there’s an end to this fairy tale, but quite a few large Soviet enterprises continued to work and continued to generate losses. At the same time, without already bearing the social burden in the form of various social and cultural facilities and paying workers a paltry salary. And generating endless debts.
In Belarus, they were actually allowed not to pay these debts. As a matter of fact, the Soviet giants turned out to be the “white elephants” that killed the Belarusian economy. Well, as argued, looking at them, the Belarusian leadership: well, there can not be such a large object not to bring profit! And for years, 25 was poured into them by state subsidies, created preferential conditions and allowed not to pay debts to merchants. "Constellation of black holes" happened. They sucked the Belarusian economy to the bottom, after which they quietly “huddled”.
It is difficult to believe this to an untrained person, but this can be quite possible: the huge system works, works as hard as possible, works ... in the negative. And to change something is impossible. Any attempts to “reform” first cause small fluctuations, and then the system returns to its original stable state. Indirectly, one can guess the “economic reserve of buoyancy” of the USSR by talking about “terrible expenses for the Olympics-1980”. Well ... as if the USSR was a superpower. And the Olympics were held and just very different very average states like Canada or Italy. Something somehow strange statement sounds.
Suspicions causes. Quite a "passing thing." From the same series, the Afghan war and the costs are already on it ... which allegedly formed an "overwhelming burden." Again, the war was not so very big and it was not going near Omsk. And the same Russian Empire waged similar wars all the time, without claiming the loud title of the "industrial superpower". The Afghan war is, of course, a big expense, but, again, looking for whom ...
The USSR is an industrial superpower with a population of millions of people in 280 ... And there was a place for the CMEA, and the Warsaw bloc. And if such a limited war right next to the border caused such great economic problems, serious doubts arise about the real money earned by the Soviet industry. How stable was the Soviet economy in general (what was its supply of "buoyancy")? Somehow against the background of all these "deficiencies" with relatively small paychecks, it is suspicious that the system worked "by itself". That is, the flywheels and gears, of course, were spinning, but it was not so easy to pick up and spend something from there.
And then they begin to "kick" the bloated military budget. It is, of course, so. Nevertheless, there were many large defense expenditures. In itself, this still does not mean anything. Yes, and the issue of defense nobody took off the agenda, that is, in a kind, good way, the army had to be reduced, as was the “defense industry”, but not military spending as a whole, they couldn’t be hard pressed (it would be better to finance smaller number). Such a paradox: a good modern army is expensive. One gets the impression that the “leaders of industrialization” of the Soviet leaders turned out to be exactly halfway: they managed to create a powerful, working industry, but they didn’t make it profitable. As a result, Soviet citizens of the late USSR (and even foreigners) had a “cognitive dissonance”: a super-powerful industrial economy and a rather modest, if not poor, life.
Good it could not end. The idea of the article is, of course, not that the economy of a major power should be based solely on kiosks selling shavarma and flower kiosks, as well as travel agencies, but the largest and most interesting company with the most demanded products should “work in plus”. And, quite logically, the larger the enterprise, the more this plus should be. Otherwise, everything is sad (very sad). I understand that the idea that for a good, rich life it is necessary to earn money for it is more than trivial, but for some reason it is often completely ignored.
It is clear that there are spheres of human activity where money is only spent (science, culture, medicine, education, etc.) But production is the very area where money should not be wasted, but ... earn money, someone has to earn them in the end? This is the problem we still have. Like 30 years ago. How to work in the factories still turns out, but seriously earn - not very. And this is despite the fact that, as has already been said, they have thrown off all the “social programs” long ago.
They work either in zero or in minus, to understand it is quite simple: the old buildings that nobody repaired 40 for years, the old equipment, the filthy workers ... but still “hope and count” on them. In vain. Absolutely nothing. But recently, it was precisely of them that a large part of the then Soviet economy consisted. And many factories, in fact, were some kind of “magic pumpkin”, that is, it was possible to “invest” in them endlessly, but it was impossible to pick something up. Then it was all “hid” by the “common pot” of the planned economy, within which they could well “flourish”, but many of the “flagships” and “giants” left to themselves were cast ashore. Or erect a truly miserable existence.
Once again: small wages and a complete shortage of everything and everything is not a minor nuisance against the background of universal splendor, but a sign of the serious problems of building an economic system. Social benefits, speak? But just then they all had very various. Access to them. Just someone (the most cunning) inscribed the cost of them in the production cycle itself. Someone just didn’t do it very well (there was simply nowhere to write them!). In any case, these same “benefits” were not enough for everyone and not always. The cunning Soviet system of “distribution”, queuing for everything and coupons is explained by just this. After all, the needs of a Soviet person were quite primitive: just shoes, just clothes, just furniture, just cheese, just sausage. No frills. Having in the store one sort of sausage and one sort of cheese, a Soviet person would be happy. But did not grow together, not "fartanulo."
And it's not about the storekeepers and party organizers, the problem lay deeper. That is, roughly speaking, from the point of view of the author, the Soviet system would be just perfect ... if it would still make money. But just with this there were fundamental problems that could not be resolved. And always “pushing” in endless lines for a completely “final” sausage (Tanya, don't break through the sausage anymore!) Or for “imported shoes” was not as interesting as it might seem today.
That is, we must pay tribute to the Soviet leaders 70-x / 80-x: they are actively working on the problem. But they could not solve it. Doesn't it seem very suspicious for the industrial superpower that such a global interest in some kind of “petrodollars”? Well, there are / no them ... after the United States, the USSR at that time is the largest manufacturer of various industrial products. We are not Saudi Arabia, after all? And not the Arab Emirates.
But the paradox was precisely this: the oil turned out to be just the same “manna from heaven,” just like gas. Sell raw materials and buy the cherished consumer goods. And the industrial giants are buzzing day and night ... the picture is truly surreal ... That is, on the whole, it can be said that not everything was so simple, so unequivocally with the very "lost" Soviet economy. And it seems that by the end of 80's it really “went under the water”, that is, the factories were still working, but any goods from the sale disappeared completely and irrevocably.
And this is where serious questions arise (based on even a superficial analysis of their activities). They work today, but as far as profitability and profitability are concerned, then, as they say, everything is not so simple. More specifically, they constantly work in the negative. (I live in the Urals and am familiar with some of these giants.) That is, it is clear that in a few years it was difficult to restructure their work on market rails. And even ten years is not so easy.
But time passes, life does not stand still, the country is developing, and they ... everything is there. For some reason, these giants (but not only them) are characterized by low wages of workers and engineers, outdated equipment and permanent debts to suppliers. The enterprise is strategic, the enterprise performs an important social function, the enterprise is in dire need of state support ... Well, and how many times have we heard all this?
State support was provided, for some time it was possible to remove the problems, then they again crawled to the surface. And again beautiful words about the social role of the enterprise, about its rich history etc. And so on without end. By cycle. And then, you know, one most unpleasant question arises: what was the real effectiveness of the Soviet industrial system? In the sense of not "coal to the mountain" or "plan for the shaft / shaft according to the plan," but so to speak, what was the financial return from it? Stealing, say a lot? Well, compared to the 90-mi is not so much. Modestly stolen.
The role of the nesuns in the collapse of socialism is clearly exaggerated. Yes, and the authorities behaved quite modestly compared with the subsequent period. Then forgive where was everything going? . The question is not idle. Already in 80's (in 80, Karl!), Co-citizens faced a rather strange paradox: the country is de facto a superpower and controls almost half of the planet, there is no war for a long time, in every city and town working plants. But there is no happiness in life and goods on the shelves.
Goods, in the sense of the most elementary and primitive, no longer exist. In 80, everything was in short supply. And somehow this raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of the very Soviet industrial super-system. Of course, I am very sorry, but in the same US cheap Fords and household appliances (!) Parts of the middle class became available even before the First World War. Europe, the world’s two, was literally plowed up, but by the 60 years, and there, the car became quite accessible to almost everyone.
What did we have for 80 years? By car availability?
Here they love to curse thievish and stupid partocrats, I somehow do not quite agree with that. The quality of the Soviet government (taking into account the income of the managing class!) Was very good. But there was no happiness in life, but there were endless queues. By the end of 80's, the situation had already acquired a frankly idiotic character: the factories were still working "to the fullest" and overfulfilled, but in stores it was just a rolling ball.
Exactly so, and nothing else. Here workers begin to kick workers: allegedly they were the ones who plundered everything. Rather, they took it away at officially fixed prices. The “commercial” activity of trade was precisely the result, not the cause. Exactly. Everything is exactly the opposite. Here they begin to curse "international assistance." Yes, she had a place, helped. And mostly for free. However, the fact of the presence of the Soviet bloc had obvious advantages, including economic ones. Yes, and in the CMEA countries, too, the plants worked. It was, it was.
You know, it is precisely by looking at the modern “former Soviet flagships” who have remained afloat, a nasty suspicion about the true economic efficiency of the Soviet industrial system creeps in. That is, I am not talking about the “turnover” (it was just monstrous!) But about the financial return it gave, this is the industry. It seems to me that the tragedy of the Soviet leaders was precisely that they managed a very large, very complex system with a very small “surplus product”. And the quality of management was just good enough, and these “guys” not only pushed speeches from the stands, but also worked.
Just even today, after almost 30 anniversary of economic reforms, these same former giants are very poorly adapted to the market environment. No, you understand, they cannot adapt, they need all the help they need and they do not pay the bills. What, interestingly, did the “economy” look like, consisting of such “giants” (“middle peasants”)? What could she earn? An interesting "experiment" in this area was conducted after the collapse of the USSR, A.G. Lukashenko. He 25 years continued to invest in the Soviet giants. Return, he did not wait.
Comrades, twenty-five years more! I agree, the experiment is not quite "clean", but it had a place to be. What has grown, has grown. And, for example, “Gomselmash” or “Motovelo” are just “legends” of the Belarusian economy. "Amkador", "MAZ" ... He honestly tried to save them and even develop. Did not work out. Again, if someone does not know, then the 90's Chinese industrialization was quite specific: it was built NewIt is new factories in southeastern China. And many old enterprises built during the time of Comrade Mao turned out to be simply unnecessary (in particular, northeast China). In the new economy, they refused to fit.
That is, the market was sort of for them, and money ... but not destiny. No, someone fit in, and someone not so, although the CCP worked with all its might. That is, the true commercial value of all these "giants of the industry" is rather doubtful. It’s just that when creating them, the question wasn’t so posed and wasn’t considered at such an angle: the task was to produce maximum output as quickly as possible. As part of the planned economy, everything could be “profitable”, even “counter transport” of similar goods.
Just an illusion is taking place to be so obsessive: if a giant industrial flywheel rotates, then the return from it should be gigantic. Not a fact, not a fact. And it seems that in 70-e / 80-e years the best minds of the Soviet leadership fought over this “mystery of the sphinx”: everything works, but there are problems with money and there are no goods on the shelves. Once again: do not need about the theft and poverty of the Soviet system. Just the same theft was not so much and the system was quite a good one.
Profit, of course, can not be the only criterion in organizing the work of the enterprise, but without it, nowhere. For some reason, in recent decades, the word “profit” has become perceived as some kind of “low-labor” super-profits that are spent for cynical purposes. But after all, if we argue in a simple way, then the profit is something that we can take from the enterprise without disrupting its activities. That is, the profit is needed not to “over-enrich”, but simply by the fact of the economic activity of the society — someone has to earn money for it.
So, there are serious doubts that the Soviet industrial system “earned well”. The reason is simple: the constant shortage of everything and everything in peacetime within the framework of the USSR. That is, if it was still possible to employ everyone and give them pay, then for some reason it was unrealistic to fill these (very small!) Paychecks with real goods. That is, a logical version arises that the point was not so much in the partycrats and post-sales, as in the lowest profitability of the Soviet economy. That is, everyone worked, but the rich life did not work. Paradox.
For some reason, the giant industrial machine of the Soviet industry could not provide the population even with a basic set of the same manufactured goods (we silently keep silent about products, the topic is separate). But why? By the way, an ingenious “solution” to this problem was found just at large industrial enterprises: “enter” the household expenses of workers into the cost of products (since everything works and products are needed by the country!) - their houses of culture, rest houses, their own housing, their greenhouses and pig farms, their production of consumer goods.
Lord, all this nonsense ... The giant plant was turning into a small state. And in fact, the supply of real benefits to a person from the street and a large defense plant worker could be very different. And the apartment could be obtained quickly, and it was possible to stand in line all my life. But, let us ask ourselves, what was the cost of production of such an “enterprise”? Taking into account all the "social costs"? Very bad suspicions creep in ... And by the profitability / profitability of his work, too, which is typical.
That is, de facto in a poor, scarce economy, a large plant further worsened the situation for all as a whole, providing social benefits to its employees. Today we are well aware that a giant business (shopping even!) Can bring great losses. Today it is not a secret to anyone that turnover is one thing, but profit is another.
Having dived into the market, the giants' plants first of all threw off all the "social programs", loading and overloading local budgets, but they did not become profitable from this (for the most part!). And even the rent of "extra space" helped the case a little. No, if everyone were “hovering” at once, then there’s an end to this fairy tale, but quite a few large Soviet enterprises continued to work and continued to generate losses. At the same time, without already bearing the social burden in the form of various social and cultural facilities and paying workers a paltry salary. And generating endless debts.
In Belarus, they were actually allowed not to pay these debts. As a matter of fact, the Soviet giants turned out to be the “white elephants” that killed the Belarusian economy. Well, as argued, looking at them, the Belarusian leadership: well, there can not be such a large object not to bring profit! And for years, 25 was poured into them by state subsidies, created preferential conditions and allowed not to pay debts to merchants. "Constellation of black holes" happened. They sucked the Belarusian economy to the bottom, after which they quietly “huddled”.
It is difficult to believe this to an untrained person, but this can be quite possible: the huge system works, works as hard as possible, works ... in the negative. And to change something is impossible. Any attempts to “reform” first cause small fluctuations, and then the system returns to its original stable state. Indirectly, one can guess the “economic reserve of buoyancy” of the USSR by talking about “terrible expenses for the Olympics-1980”. Well ... as if the USSR was a superpower. And the Olympics were held and just very different very average states like Canada or Italy. Something somehow strange statement sounds.
Suspicions causes. Quite a "passing thing." From the same series, the Afghan war and the costs are already on it ... which allegedly formed an "overwhelming burden." Again, the war was not so very big and it was not going near Omsk. And the same Russian Empire waged similar wars all the time, without claiming the loud title of the "industrial superpower". The Afghan war is, of course, a big expense, but, again, looking for whom ...
The USSR is an industrial superpower with a population of millions of people in 280 ... And there was a place for the CMEA, and the Warsaw bloc. And if such a limited war right next to the border caused such great economic problems, serious doubts arise about the real money earned by the Soviet industry. How stable was the Soviet economy in general (what was its supply of "buoyancy")? Somehow against the background of all these "deficiencies" with relatively small paychecks, it is suspicious that the system worked "by itself". That is, the flywheels and gears, of course, were spinning, but it was not so easy to pick up and spend something from there.
And then they begin to "kick" the bloated military budget. It is, of course, so. Nevertheless, there were many large defense expenditures. In itself, this still does not mean anything. Yes, and the issue of defense nobody took off the agenda, that is, in a kind, good way, the army had to be reduced, as was the “defense industry”, but not military spending as a whole, they couldn’t be hard pressed (it would be better to finance smaller number). Such a paradox: a good modern army is expensive. One gets the impression that the “leaders of industrialization” of the Soviet leaders turned out to be exactly halfway: they managed to create a powerful, working industry, but they didn’t make it profitable. As a result, Soviet citizens of the late USSR (and even foreigners) had a “cognitive dissonance”: a super-powerful industrial economy and a rather modest, if not poor, life.
Good it could not end. The idea of the article is, of course, not that the economy of a major power should be based solely on kiosks selling shavarma and flower kiosks, as well as travel agencies, but the largest and most interesting company with the most demanded products should “work in plus”. And, quite logically, the larger the enterprise, the more this plus should be. Otherwise, everything is sad (very sad). I understand that the idea that for a good, rich life it is necessary to earn money for it is more than trivial, but for some reason it is often completely ignored.
It is clear that there are spheres of human activity where money is only spent (science, culture, medicine, education, etc.) But production is the very area where money should not be wasted, but ... earn money, someone has to earn them in the end? This is the problem we still have. Like 30 years ago. How to work in the factories still turns out, but seriously earn - not very. And this is despite the fact that, as has already been said, they have thrown off all the “social programs” long ago.
They work either in zero or in minus, to understand it is quite simple: the old buildings that nobody repaired 40 for years, the old equipment, the filthy workers ... but still “hope and count” on them. In vain. Absolutely nothing. But recently, it was precisely of them that a large part of the then Soviet economy consisted. And many factories, in fact, were some kind of “magic pumpkin”, that is, it was possible to “invest” in them endlessly, but it was impossible to pick something up. Then it was all “hid” by the “common pot” of the planned economy, within which they could well “flourish”, but many of the “flagships” and “giants” left to themselves were cast ashore. Or erect a truly miserable existence.
Once again: small wages and a complete shortage of everything and everything is not a minor nuisance against the background of universal splendor, but a sign of the serious problems of building an economic system. Social benefits, speak? But just then they all had very various. Access to them. Just someone (the most cunning) inscribed the cost of them in the production cycle itself. Someone just didn’t do it very well (there was simply nowhere to write them!). In any case, these same “benefits” were not enough for everyone and not always. The cunning Soviet system of “distribution”, queuing for everything and coupons is explained by just this. After all, the needs of a Soviet person were quite primitive: just shoes, just clothes, just furniture, just cheese, just sausage. No frills. Having in the store one sort of sausage and one sort of cheese, a Soviet person would be happy. But did not grow together, not "fartanulo."
And it's not about the storekeepers and party organizers, the problem lay deeper. That is, roughly speaking, from the point of view of the author, the Soviet system would be just perfect ... if it would still make money. But just with this there were fundamental problems that could not be resolved. And always “pushing” in endless lines for a completely “final” sausage (Tanya, don't break through the sausage anymore!) Or for “imported shoes” was not as interesting as it might seem today.
That is, we must pay tribute to the Soviet leaders 70-x / 80-x: they are actively working on the problem. But they could not solve it. Doesn't it seem very suspicious for the industrial superpower that such a global interest in some kind of “petrodollars”? Well, there are / no them ... after the United States, the USSR at that time is the largest manufacturer of various industrial products. We are not Saudi Arabia, after all? And not the Arab Emirates.
But the paradox was precisely this: the oil turned out to be just the same “manna from heaven,” just like gas. Sell raw materials and buy the cherished consumer goods. And the industrial giants are buzzing day and night ... the picture is truly surreal ... That is, on the whole, it can be said that not everything was so simple, so unequivocally with the very "lost" Soviet economy. And it seems that by the end of 80's it really “went under the water”, that is, the factories were still working, but any goods from the sale disappeared completely and irrevocably.
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