There is no right to error. Will the C-300 be saved from the new IDF tactics?
Information about the beginning of the supply of C-300PMU-2 long-range anti-aircraft missile systems to the air defense forces of the Syrian Arab Republic provoked a real flurry of positive emotions not only from the majority of sensible political scientists, military experts and bloggers acting in the single Russian media space, but also adequately perceive the real situation cases of journalists, whose field of activity is side by side with the enemy camp.
Such a brief description most closely matches the permanent journalist-expert of the rather neutral Israeli newspaper “Haaretz” Gideon Levy. In one of his latest publications, a well-known Israeli political analyst expressed his gratitude to Moscow for the clear holding of the “red line” before the actions of the Israeli air force in Syrian airspace, as well as at the closest approaches to it. Levi reflected his vision of the September 17 tragedy and the consequences for Tel Aviv in a sensational article, “Finally, someone pointed out to Israel the boundaries of what is permitted.”
The main message of this article was to focus the attention of ordinary readers and experts on the correctness of the new Russian concept of communication with the Israeli leadership "in the language of force", which came into force after provoking Hel Haavir with the "friendly fire" of the Syrian C-200B on our aircraft of radio engineering and electronic intelligence intelligence IL-20M. According to him, against the background of an even more dense and comprehensive support from the new American administration, "the red flags from Russia will calm down a little the intoxication of the power and military-political influence of the current Israeli elite."
Indeed, the recent ratification by the US Congress of a bill stipulating the allocation of a defense support package worth 38 billion dollars over 10 years to the Israeli Ministry of Defense is an “iron” incentive to ignore any obligations imposed on Bibi Netanyah and his environment in the course of negotiations with high-ranking representatives of the General Staff and the defense department of Russia. The clearest example of this is the fact that it was three days after the announcement of the military assistance package, despite the commitment by the Russian side to withdraw Iranian units of the IRGC and Hezbollah units more than 100 km from the Golan Heights, the Israeli Air Force commanded an audacious and a sudden rocket-bombing attack on industrial and military facilities in the province of Latakia with simultaneous provocation against our IL-20M, to which, unfortunately, the Russian Aerospace Forces os do not have time to advance without raising on alert A-50U not giving "coot" escorting at least a pair of Su-30SM.
Mr. Levy is really right: the supply of “three hundred” air defense units of the Syrian Arab Army (this subtext is hidden in the quotation “red flags from Russia, perhaps a little reassured by the power intoxication that engulfed Israel”) are really able to cool the hot heads in the IDF. But the key here is the very “little” that deliberately points to the continued development by Israel of a new concept of launching rocket-bombing attacks on military CAA objects, taking into account their cover with several C-XNUMPPMU-300 air defense missile systems linked by automated anti-aircraft missile control systems teams, as well as numerous means of electronic countermeasures. About a change in the tactics of the shock squadrons of the Israeli air force just a few days ago, said Syrian military specialist Turki al-Hassan.
According to him, "Israeli fighter pilots will launch missiles from outside the Syrian airspace, while the IDF is already developing additional tactics involving the use of operational-tactical ballistic missiles and large-caliber guided missiles." Nevertheless, the withdrawal of Al-Hassan gives only a vague idea of the tactics developed by Israeli specialists for leveling the capabilities of the Syrian air defense system, which has received the Favorites. We are also interested in the operational-tactical details of the future aggressive attacks of Hel Haavir, announced by Avigdor Lieberman, as well as the gaps that can exist in the anti-missile umbrella of the Syrian air defense forces and the Russian Aerospace Forces even after the necessary number of C-300PMU-2 and Solyanka teams arrive in the republic from EW complexes (it is on them that the Israeli Air Force can bet).
Let's start with the fact that most of the airspace of the Syrian Arab Republic (from low-altitude sites to the upper stratosphere) will indeed become deadly dangerous for enemy aircraft (air forces of the USA, Israel, France and the UK), a non-flying zone, the 4 will play a primary role in the formation of which or more anti-aircraft missile battalions C-300PMU-2, based on data from the Kommersant newspaper. This amount can be easily judged against the background of the fact that over the past week and a half the main military transport aircraft of the Syrian Air Express (An-124-100) made more than 7 flights from our air bases to AvB Hmeimim. Moreover, according to Flightradar24 and the ANNA-News news agency, citing Syrian eyewitnesses, virtually all flights were escorted by 4 — 8 by Su-30CM and Su-35C fighters during a flight over the Deir-ez-Zor, Homs and Damascus, up to the entrance to the “umbrella” of the air defense system of the С-300В4 complex deployed near Tartus. This only shows that the cargo compartments of the Ruslans contained the most important elements of Favorites - the launch of the 9th 9th 9th March 2010, the 9th 9th 9th, 2014 9th, 2014 9th 9th 9th, 2014 30HxNumx-Xnumx radars with universal 6Bxnumxmd towers, low-altitude Xnumxnxnumx detectors, as well as 2-Xnumhmxnmx combat control points, 40xnumx detectors, as well as 6-Xnumhmx Combat control points XNUMxnxnumx and C-76BE, C-6PS and C-54PMU-6. Moreover, the Sparta III container ship is involved in the delivery of equipment.
Can the 4 of the C-XNUMPPMU-300 division create a full-fledged no-fly zone over most of the west coast of the Euphrates? Naturally, yes. But for this, the distance between the divisions deployed along the western border of Syria (between Tartus and Essaouida) should be of the order of 2 — 70 km, given that the radio horizon along low-flying Israeli F-76I, F-16I and the Delhi tactical missiles for radars 15Н30Е6 (located on 2В40МД towers) is 6 — 35 km. With such an arrangement for the Israelis, there will be practically no “blind spots”. At the same time, the total target channel for 38 "Three Hundreds" will be the total 4 simultaneously intercepted targets (24 targets for each PFAR 6X30X6 radar), which may not be enough to repel a joint strike by the Israeli Air Force and the United Air Force of the Western coalition, which can simultaneously apply a few hundred tactical missiles "Delilah-AL" ("Air Launched"), AGM-2B JASSM-ER, "Shtorm Shadow" and "SCALP Naval".
In this case, all bets must also be made on more than 50 anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems "Pantsir-S1", as well as a couple of dozen military air defense systems "Buk-M1 / 2", which can not only add 320 — 350 additional target channels for the Syrian air defense, but also cover the “dead zones” of the deployed C-300PMU-2 “Favorite”, extending to 3-5 km from the positions of the 30Н6ХXUMUMX radar. Naturally, such ZRK / ZRSK, such as C-2 Pechora-125M, Tor-M2U, and Osa-AKM, also capable of working on small-sized targets after modernization, will also contribute. All of the above complexes will operate in the system coordination provided by the automated control system of the Polyana-D2М4 and Baikal-1МЭ anti-aircraft missile brigades. As a result of this erroneous fire on the same targets from several anti-aircraft missile systems and irrational consumption of ammunition should not be expected.
A very important moment in the creation of a network-centric air defense system based on C-300PMU-2 is that the range of anti-aircraft missiles 48N6E2 in 200 km will not allow Israeli jets "Sufa" and "Raam" climb to a height of 7-12 kilometers with simultaneous access to the The 100-kilometer range is the discharge of small-sized planning glide air bombs GBU-39 / B “Small Diametr Bomb” (developed by the “Boeing Integrated Defense System” division) and the Israeli “Spice-250” (from the “Rafael” company). And even if the Israeli F-16I pilots try to use the Elisra SPJ-40 airborne counter-electronic complex to reduce the “capture” range by 30НХNUMXХ6 radars, the range of the complex will decrease only to 2 — 120 km; the application of the aforementioned aerial bombs from such a distance will either be extremely difficult due to the need to climb to the launch altitude in 130 — 14 km, or it is completely unrealizable. For the Israeli Air Force this will be a very unpleasant surprise, because “narrow bombs” and “Spice-16”, in view of the ultra-small EPR in 250 — 0,01 square. m previously (before delivery C-0,015) were the only “percussion instrument” Hel Haavir, capable in some cases to overcome the layered Syrian missile defense system formed by Buk-M300 / 1E and Pantsiriami-S2 complexes. Now this feature is reduced to zero. A small number of F-1I fighters capable of reaching the C-35PMU-300 at the launching distance of planning bombs at 2 — 90 km will also not allow to achieve the desired result, because even the 110 XRNXX XRUMX 16 “Spices” can easily cope Armor-С20 ".
Regarding the possibility of the Israeli Air Force carrying out a massive anti-radar attack on the Three Hundreds radar equipment using the AGM-88E AARGM radar system, theoretically this turn of events is possible. These anti-radar missiles have a range of about 70 km at launch from very low altitudes, or 170 km - from high altitudes. Consequently, the Israeli tactical fighter F-16I will be able to launch AGM-88E both from the “shadow” of the Antilivan mountain ranges along the C-300 divisions located in the provinces of Damascus, Hama and Tartus, and from a distance of 150 — 170 km (when flying on a large height and subject to the use of airborne complexes EW "Elisra"). Moreover, the active-passive radar homing head of this WGU-48 / B rocket has an active mode of operation in the millimeter Ka-band, which is invulnerable not only for the 1L269 “Redneck-2”, 1L257 radio-electronic countermeasures system, which is deployed to Syria, Radar-4, Radar-330, 2, Radar-4-Radar , Р-8Ж "Resident", but also for higher-frequency stations of powerful noise interference SPN-17,544 / 88 (frequency ranges of X and J, from XNUMX to XNUMX GHz), designed to suppress the operation of on-board radar fighters, as well as active radar heads hush Denia anti-aircraft guided missiles and air-to-air missiles. In practice, the possibilities of AGM-XNUMXE AARGM (advanced HARMs) in the confrontation with the Syrian air defense will be extremely mediocre.
First, despite the noise immunity of the active-passive three-band seeker WGU-48 / B, the radio-correction channel module installed on its board will not be able to receive updated tactical data from the carrier or the Rivet Joint radio reconnaissance aircraft, since this channel is in frequency Link-16 information exchange network (from 960 to 1215 MHz), which means it can be easily suppressed by means of an EW complex such as R-330М1П Diabazol and other electronic countermeasures operating in UHF-, VHF- and L-ranges, k Recently, CAA and VKS of Russia were supplied to Syria. Without the stable operation of the correction channel, AGM-88E will not be able to work on radars that have turned off the radiation, which will turn these missiles into useless scrap metal on the F16I “Sufa” suspension nodes.
Secondly, AGM-88E AARGM anti-radar missiles with 250 mm case diameter, ARGSN radio array reflector web with a diameter of about 200 mm and huge aerodynamic control surfaces with 1,13 m span have an effective reflecting surface around 0,1 — 0,15 square. m, so that the Syrian C-300PMU-2 radars will be able to “capture” them for accurate auto tracking at a distance of about 100 — 120 km and begin the interception process. Thirdly, the flight speed of the RLPR AGM-88E is only 2,1М (as in the early version of the HARM), and therefore they will be able to intercept not only the C-300PMU-2, but the troop air defense missile systems Buk-M1 / 2E, as well as anti-aircraft missiles -Panzir-С1 cannon complexes.
In such difficult operational and tactical conditions (taking into account the most powerful “backbone” of EW delivered to the SAR by means of Il-76MD military transport aircraft), the Israel Defense Forces can trick by trying to overcome the “barrier” of “Favorites” using non-viewable radars The 30H6EX2 dead-funnel zones, covering the 48-degree sector directly above each radar of illumination and targeting. For this, American MGM-140 / 164B ATACMS Block I / IIA American tactical ballistic missiles (urgently purchased from the USA via the FMS line) with a range from 150 to 300 km (depending on the type of equipment) or Israeli DTRBs can be used LORA with a range of 300 to 450 km. Moving along a ballistic trajectory with the highest point at the apogee of the order of 50 — 60 km, the ATACMS and LORA missiles are able to pass over the maximum height of interception of the C-300PMU-2 complex (27 — 32 km), successfully entering the very “dead funnel” with the angle of the peak to the position of the anti-aircraft missile battalion of order 80 — 85 degrees. Most importantly, the march section of the trajectory with a height of 50 km will allow the ATACMS missile GPS correction module to be used without fear of the detrimental influence of the Resident and P-330М330П Diabazol complexes deployed on the surface for precise guidance.
As for the near-track section of the trajectory (at an altitude of about 10 — 7 km), then there may not be a need for super-precise guidance (with a QUO of 10 m), since OTBR ATACMS and LORA can be used as combat equipment, firstly, self-aiming combat elements (SPBE) of type P3I BAT with infrared-acoustic guidance system capable of focusing on the thermal and acoustic portraits of the operating antenna post with 30H6EXNNXX radar, secondly, Israeli 2-mm self-guided anti-tank elements “SADARM” with combi hydrochloric infrared-millimeter wave radar seeker (protected from EW), thirdly, several hundred conventional unmanaged combat fission M147 APAM, one of which will hurt radar illumination 74PMU C-300 with high probability. All this must be taken into account by the commands of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the Syrian air defense forces in the course of the distribution of the 300th to the corresponding positions in the Syrian Arab Republic.
Conclusion: the main goal in building the updated Syrian air defense system should be to overlap the “dead craters” of the C-300PMU-2 C-40 anti-aircraft missile divisions with the assumption that the ballistic targets for the Favorites are only 40 km. The divisions' positions must be located no more than 6 km from each other, and therefore the required number of complexes to protect the airspace from Tartus to the Golan Heights must be brought to 8 — 300 units plus additional separation of the defense of each C-2PMU-10 with several “Pantyri », For which the“ dead funnel ”sector does not exceed XNUMX degrees. And this is not a fantastic scenario, since we all know firsthand about the operational-tactical subtleties, skill and cunning of the Israel Defense Forces in general and Hel Haavir in particular. And you should not forget about maneuvers with the “probing” of the Greek “300ths”.
Information sources:
https://oleggranovsky.livejournal.com/113198.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c300pmu2/c300pmu2.shtml
https://ak-12.livejournal.com/77329.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/news/kompaniya-atk-obyavila-o-zaklyuchenii-kontrakta-na-proizvodstvo-raket-agm-88e-aargm/
https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/5615656
Such a brief description most closely matches the permanent journalist-expert of the rather neutral Israeli newspaper “Haaretz” Gideon Levy. In one of his latest publications, a well-known Israeli political analyst expressed his gratitude to Moscow for the clear holding of the “red line” before the actions of the Israeli air force in Syrian airspace, as well as at the closest approaches to it. Levi reflected his vision of the September 17 tragedy and the consequences for Tel Aviv in a sensational article, “Finally, someone pointed out to Israel the boundaries of what is permitted.”
The main message of this article was to focus the attention of ordinary readers and experts on the correctness of the new Russian concept of communication with the Israeli leadership "in the language of force", which came into force after provoking Hel Haavir with the "friendly fire" of the Syrian C-200B on our aircraft of radio engineering and electronic intelligence intelligence IL-20M. According to him, against the background of an even more dense and comprehensive support from the new American administration, "the red flags from Russia will calm down a little the intoxication of the power and military-political influence of the current Israeli elite."
Indeed, the recent ratification by the US Congress of a bill stipulating the allocation of a defense support package worth 38 billion dollars over 10 years to the Israeli Ministry of Defense is an “iron” incentive to ignore any obligations imposed on Bibi Netanyah and his environment in the course of negotiations with high-ranking representatives of the General Staff and the defense department of Russia. The clearest example of this is the fact that it was three days after the announcement of the military assistance package, despite the commitment by the Russian side to withdraw Iranian units of the IRGC and Hezbollah units more than 100 km from the Golan Heights, the Israeli Air Force commanded an audacious and a sudden rocket-bombing attack on industrial and military facilities in the province of Latakia with simultaneous provocation against our IL-20M, to which, unfortunately, the Russian Aerospace Forces os do not have time to advance without raising on alert A-50U not giving "coot" escorting at least a pair of Su-30SM.
Mr. Levy is really right: the supply of “three hundred” air defense units of the Syrian Arab Army (this subtext is hidden in the quotation “red flags from Russia, perhaps a little reassured by the power intoxication that engulfed Israel”) are really able to cool the hot heads in the IDF. But the key here is the very “little” that deliberately points to the continued development by Israel of a new concept of launching rocket-bombing attacks on military CAA objects, taking into account their cover with several C-XNUMPPMU-300 air defense missile systems linked by automated anti-aircraft missile control systems teams, as well as numerous means of electronic countermeasures. About a change in the tactics of the shock squadrons of the Israeli air force just a few days ago, said Syrian military specialist Turki al-Hassan.
According to him, "Israeli fighter pilots will launch missiles from outside the Syrian airspace, while the IDF is already developing additional tactics involving the use of operational-tactical ballistic missiles and large-caliber guided missiles." Nevertheless, the withdrawal of Al-Hassan gives only a vague idea of the tactics developed by Israeli specialists for leveling the capabilities of the Syrian air defense system, which has received the Favorites. We are also interested in the operational-tactical details of the future aggressive attacks of Hel Haavir, announced by Avigdor Lieberman, as well as the gaps that can exist in the anti-missile umbrella of the Syrian air defense forces and the Russian Aerospace Forces even after the necessary number of C-300PMU-2 and Solyanka teams arrive in the republic from EW complexes (it is on them that the Israeli Air Force can bet).
Let's start with the fact that most of the airspace of the Syrian Arab Republic (from low-altitude sites to the upper stratosphere) will indeed become deadly dangerous for enemy aircraft (air forces of the USA, Israel, France and the UK), a non-flying zone, the 4 will play a primary role in the formation of which or more anti-aircraft missile battalions C-300PMU-2, based on data from the Kommersant newspaper. This amount can be easily judged against the background of the fact that over the past week and a half the main military transport aircraft of the Syrian Air Express (An-124-100) made more than 7 flights from our air bases to AvB Hmeimim. Moreover, according to Flightradar24 and the ANNA-News news agency, citing Syrian eyewitnesses, virtually all flights were escorted by 4 — 8 by Su-30CM and Su-35C fighters during a flight over the Deir-ez-Zor, Homs and Damascus, up to the entrance to the “umbrella” of the air defense system of the С-300В4 complex deployed near Tartus. This only shows that the cargo compartments of the Ruslans contained the most important elements of Favorites - the launch of the 9th 9th 9th March 2010, the 9th 9th 9th, 2014 9th, 2014 9th 9th 9th, 2014 30HxNumx-Xnumx radars with universal 6Bxnumxmd towers, low-altitude Xnumxnxnumx detectors, as well as 2-Xnumhmxnmx combat control points, 40xnumx detectors, as well as 6-Xnumhmx Combat control points XNUMxnxnumx and C-76BE, C-6PS and C-54PMU-6. Moreover, the Sparta III container ship is involved in the delivery of equipment.
Can the 4 of the C-XNUMPPMU-300 division create a full-fledged no-fly zone over most of the west coast of the Euphrates? Naturally, yes. But for this, the distance between the divisions deployed along the western border of Syria (between Tartus and Essaouida) should be of the order of 2 — 70 km, given that the radio horizon along low-flying Israeli F-76I, F-16I and the Delhi tactical missiles for radars 15Н30Е6 (located on 2В40МД towers) is 6 — 35 km. With such an arrangement for the Israelis, there will be practically no “blind spots”. At the same time, the total target channel for 38 "Three Hundreds" will be the total 4 simultaneously intercepted targets (24 targets for each PFAR 6X30X6 radar), which may not be enough to repel a joint strike by the Israeli Air Force and the United Air Force of the Western coalition, which can simultaneously apply a few hundred tactical missiles "Delilah-AL" ("Air Launched"), AGM-2B JASSM-ER, "Shtorm Shadow" and "SCALP Naval".
In this case, all bets must also be made on more than 50 anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems "Pantsir-S1", as well as a couple of dozen military air defense systems "Buk-M1 / 2", which can not only add 320 — 350 additional target channels for the Syrian air defense, but also cover the “dead zones” of the deployed C-300PMU-2 “Favorite”, extending to 3-5 km from the positions of the 30Н6ХXUMUMX radar. Naturally, such ZRK / ZRSK, such as C-2 Pechora-125M, Tor-M2U, and Osa-AKM, also capable of working on small-sized targets after modernization, will also contribute. All of the above complexes will operate in the system coordination provided by the automated control system of the Polyana-D2М4 and Baikal-1МЭ anti-aircraft missile brigades. As a result of this erroneous fire on the same targets from several anti-aircraft missile systems and irrational consumption of ammunition should not be expected.
A very important moment in the creation of a network-centric air defense system based on C-300PMU-2 is that the range of anti-aircraft missiles 48N6E2 in 200 km will not allow Israeli jets "Sufa" and "Raam" climb to a height of 7-12 kilometers with simultaneous access to the The 100-kilometer range is the discharge of small-sized planning glide air bombs GBU-39 / B “Small Diametr Bomb” (developed by the “Boeing Integrated Defense System” division) and the Israeli “Spice-250” (from the “Rafael” company). And even if the Israeli F-16I pilots try to use the Elisra SPJ-40 airborne counter-electronic complex to reduce the “capture” range by 30НХNUMXХ6 radars, the range of the complex will decrease only to 2 — 120 km; the application of the aforementioned aerial bombs from such a distance will either be extremely difficult due to the need to climb to the launch altitude in 130 — 14 km, or it is completely unrealizable. For the Israeli Air Force this will be a very unpleasant surprise, because “narrow bombs” and “Spice-16”, in view of the ultra-small EPR in 250 — 0,01 square. m previously (before delivery C-0,015) were the only “percussion instrument” Hel Haavir, capable in some cases to overcome the layered Syrian missile defense system formed by Buk-M300 / 1E and Pantsiriami-S2 complexes. Now this feature is reduced to zero. A small number of F-1I fighters capable of reaching the C-35PMU-300 at the launching distance of planning bombs at 2 — 90 km will also not allow to achieve the desired result, because even the 110 XRNXX XRUMX 16 “Spices” can easily cope Armor-С20 ".
Regarding the possibility of the Israeli Air Force carrying out a massive anti-radar attack on the Three Hundreds radar equipment using the AGM-88E AARGM radar system, theoretically this turn of events is possible. These anti-radar missiles have a range of about 70 km at launch from very low altitudes, or 170 km - from high altitudes. Consequently, the Israeli tactical fighter F-16I will be able to launch AGM-88E both from the “shadow” of the Antilivan mountain ranges along the C-300 divisions located in the provinces of Damascus, Hama and Tartus, and from a distance of 150 — 170 km (when flying on a large height and subject to the use of airborne complexes EW "Elisra"). Moreover, the active-passive radar homing head of this WGU-48 / B rocket has an active mode of operation in the millimeter Ka-band, which is invulnerable not only for the 1L269 “Redneck-2”, 1L257 radio-electronic countermeasures system, which is deployed to Syria, Radar-4, Radar-330, 2, Radar-4-Radar , Р-8Ж "Resident", but also for higher-frequency stations of powerful noise interference SPN-17,544 / 88 (frequency ranges of X and J, from XNUMX to XNUMX GHz), designed to suppress the operation of on-board radar fighters, as well as active radar heads hush Denia anti-aircraft guided missiles and air-to-air missiles. In practice, the possibilities of AGM-XNUMXE AARGM (advanced HARMs) in the confrontation with the Syrian air defense will be extremely mediocre.
First, despite the noise immunity of the active-passive three-band seeker WGU-48 / B, the radio-correction channel module installed on its board will not be able to receive updated tactical data from the carrier or the Rivet Joint radio reconnaissance aircraft, since this channel is in frequency Link-16 information exchange network (from 960 to 1215 MHz), which means it can be easily suppressed by means of an EW complex such as R-330М1П Diabazol and other electronic countermeasures operating in UHF-, VHF- and L-ranges, k Recently, CAA and VKS of Russia were supplied to Syria. Without the stable operation of the correction channel, AGM-88E will not be able to work on radars that have turned off the radiation, which will turn these missiles into useless scrap metal on the F16I “Sufa” suspension nodes.
Secondly, AGM-88E AARGM anti-radar missiles with 250 mm case diameter, ARGSN radio array reflector web with a diameter of about 200 mm and huge aerodynamic control surfaces with 1,13 m span have an effective reflecting surface around 0,1 — 0,15 square. m, so that the Syrian C-300PMU-2 radars will be able to “capture” them for accurate auto tracking at a distance of about 100 — 120 km and begin the interception process. Thirdly, the flight speed of the RLPR AGM-88E is only 2,1М (as in the early version of the HARM), and therefore they will be able to intercept not only the C-300PMU-2, but the troop air defense missile systems Buk-M1 / 2E, as well as anti-aircraft missiles -Panzir-С1 cannon complexes.
In such difficult operational and tactical conditions (taking into account the most powerful “backbone” of EW delivered to the SAR by means of Il-76MD military transport aircraft), the Israel Defense Forces can trick by trying to overcome the “barrier” of “Favorites” using non-viewable radars The 30H6EX2 dead-funnel zones, covering the 48-degree sector directly above each radar of illumination and targeting. For this, American MGM-140 / 164B ATACMS Block I / IIA American tactical ballistic missiles (urgently purchased from the USA via the FMS line) with a range from 150 to 300 km (depending on the type of equipment) or Israeli DTRBs can be used LORA with a range of 300 to 450 km. Moving along a ballistic trajectory with the highest point at the apogee of the order of 50 — 60 km, the ATACMS and LORA missiles are able to pass over the maximum height of interception of the C-300PMU-2 complex (27 — 32 km), successfully entering the very “dead funnel” with the angle of the peak to the position of the anti-aircraft missile battalion of order 80 — 85 degrees. Most importantly, the march section of the trajectory with a height of 50 km will allow the ATACMS missile GPS correction module to be used without fear of the detrimental influence of the Resident and P-330М330П Diabazol complexes deployed on the surface for precise guidance.
Testing start-up of the prototype OTB "LORA"
As for the near-track section of the trajectory (at an altitude of about 10 — 7 km), then there may not be a need for super-precise guidance (with a QUO of 10 m), since OTBR ATACMS and LORA can be used as combat equipment, firstly, self-aiming combat elements (SPBE) of type P3I BAT with infrared-acoustic guidance system capable of focusing on the thermal and acoustic portraits of the operating antenna post with 30H6EXNNXX radar, secondly, Israeli 2-mm self-guided anti-tank elements “SADARM” with combi hydrochloric infrared-millimeter wave radar seeker (protected from EW), thirdly, several hundred conventional unmanaged combat fission M147 APAM, one of which will hurt radar illumination 74PMU C-300 with high probability. All this must be taken into account by the commands of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the Syrian air defense forces in the course of the distribution of the 300th to the corresponding positions in the Syrian Arab Republic.
Conclusion: the main goal in building the updated Syrian air defense system should be to overlap the “dead craters” of the C-300PMU-2 C-40 anti-aircraft missile divisions with the assumption that the ballistic targets for the Favorites are only 40 km. The divisions' positions must be located no more than 6 km from each other, and therefore the required number of complexes to protect the airspace from Tartus to the Golan Heights must be brought to 8 — 300 units plus additional separation of the defense of each C-2PMU-10 with several “Pantyri », For which the“ dead funnel ”sector does not exceed XNUMX degrees. And this is not a fantastic scenario, since we all know firsthand about the operational-tactical subtleties, skill and cunning of the Israel Defense Forces in general and Hel Haavir in particular. And you should not forget about maneuvers with the “probing” of the Greek “300ths”.
Information sources:
https://oleggranovsky.livejournal.com/113198.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c300pmu2/c300pmu2.shtml
https://ak-12.livejournal.com/77329.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/news/kompaniya-atk-obyavila-o-zaklyuchenii-kontrakta-na-proizvodstvo-raket-agm-88e-aargm/
https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/5615656
Information