C-300 for the nose can not hold! Technical gaps in the shock squadrons of the Israeli Air Force
The beginning of the last week of September, 2018, can be safely described as a very short-term and exponential period of reformatting Moscow’s strategy with regard to the primary military-political problems in the Middle Eastern and Eastern European areas of responsibility of Russia. Every year they are increasingly ardently challenging our superpower status, creating a considerable amount of operational-tactical troubles in the Syrian and Donbas theaters of war, as well as in the waters of the Mediterranean, Black and Azov seas.
Against the background of the inevitable strengthening of the sanctions pressure on our state and the new anti-Russian attacks of Ukraine and Israel, regardless of the concessions to which the Kremlin has repeatedly walked both on resolving the situation in the Donbass and on the presence of Hezbollah units in the south of Syria that are disturbing Tel Aviv ", The IRGC and Al-Quds, the top Russian leadership (having made some efforts to get rid of the" dollar trap ") finally made the decision to tighten diplomatic and military-political levers rotivodeystviya aggressors. The times of the toothless and vague responses of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense to the ugly actions of the enemy are coming to an end.
A peculiar bifurcation point in Russian-Ukrainian relations, which eventually tipped the balance in the direction of strong diplomatic pressure on Kiev and the recent warning of the junta to immediately recognize the Donetsk and Lugansk people's republics in the event of an attempt to conduct an offensive operation against the 1 and 2 army corps (Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots Konstantin Zatulin) stated about this version of the development of events on the Russia 1 channel; a hodgepodge of several incidents Comrade
These include: the attack of the Ukrainian militants on the Russian military unit near the Armyansky KPVV, the seizure of the fishing vessel Nord and the Mekhanik Pogodin motor ship, an attempt to cover the Donbass sweep under cover of Western PMCs, the UN contingent and NATO instructors from the armies of the republics and the dissident population and, of course, the recent start of militarization by the Ukrainian artillery units of the Northern Azov Sea, which threatens navigation in the waters of the Sea of Azov and creates a significant threat to the Coast of the national security service of the FSB of Russia. The absence of any measures to prevent the Black Sea Fleet and the State Border Service of the FSB of Russia from entering the Sea of Azov of the Ukrainian search and rescue ship Donbass and the sea-going tug Koretz has a very serious "deep" trick, the details of which we will consider in our next reviews, and therefore we advise the observers of Runet not to rush to criticize our leadership in this situation. Everything is going well according to a verified plan. We will return to the consideration of the effectiveness of the response of Moscow to the recent Israeli outburst, the result of which was the death of the crew of the IL-20M video camera of Russia.
And in a scary dream did not despair. WITH “FAVORITE” WILL BE EASY
For provocative and pre-agreed with the command of Hel Haavir actions of the pilots of the Israeli tactical fighter F-16I Sufa, which led to the tragic incident with the loss of our aircraft, radio engineering and electronic intelligence Il-20M anti-aircraft guided 5B21 / 28 anti-aircraft missile, an anti-aircraft missile 300ВХNUMX / 2, and already, in line with the 4В1 / 1 anti-aircraft reconnaissance aircraft of the IL-2 anti-aircraft reconnaissance tactical fighter jets. response ”in the form of several full-fledged anti-aircraft missile battalions C-XNUMPPMU-20 (or“ PS ”), as well as automated control systems for anti-aircraft missile brigades of the Polyana-D39М or Baikal-300МE type, which ie combined into a single high-performance network-centric defense "trohsotki" network "armor-SXNUMX" and "Buki-MXNUMXE". Some pro-Israeli observers who are in every way blocking Hel Haavir’s command in the incident with the loss of IL-XNUMX, as well as Israeli analytical sources, continue to rely on the tactical CD "Delila" and UAB GBU-XNUMX / B in the hope of the early destruction of the S- XNUMX. But we "chop off" their hopes in the bud with extremely disappointing details.
Earlier, the pilots of the Israeli F-15I "Ra'am" and F-16I "Sufa" due to the long reaction time of the Syrian air defense systems S-200, as well as the possibility of suppressing the target channel of the outdated guidance radar (ROC) 5N62V using the onboard electronic warfare station Elisra SPJ- 40, could safely climb to a height of more than 7-8 km above the Anti-Lebanon for dropping GBU-39 / B planing unobtrusive bombs at a distance of 80-110 km (without fear for their lives), then with the S-300PMU-1/2 and quite advanced anti-aircraft guided missiles 48N6 and 48N6E2 such a trick will not work.
So, one of the main firing elements of the C-300PMU-2 “Favorit” air defense missile system is a powerful 30H6X2 radar for illumination and targeting, built on the basis of a passive phased antenna array with high noise immunity. It is capable of capturing an F-16I type target (with an EPR suspension about 2,5 sq. M) for precise auto-tracking at a distance of 170 — 180 km and ensuring the launch of 48H6EXNNX XUR from a similar distance. Taking into account the use of the EW Elisra SPJ-2 EW complex by Israeli pilots, this range may be reduced to 40 — 110 km, which, although not bad, will still not allow the use of “narrow bombs” (GBU-130 / B) safely. Conclusion: F-39I will be forced to work on the Syrian theater of operations exclusively in the following mode of terrain, which excludes the possibility of launching “narrow bombs” with the 16 ESR. m over long distances, as has happened until recently. It will require the most famous long-range tactical missiles “Delilah-AL”, developed by IMI corporation (which Israeli information sources like to boast of).
Despite the fact that the range of this rocket is about 250 km, the speed and maneuverability of the product leaves much to be desired: the flight speed varies from 400 to 850 km / h, and anti-aircraft maneuvers can be performed with an overload of no more than 5 units. Consequently, the Syrian calculation of the C-300PMU-2, located in the 54K6X2 PBU, firstly, will have plenty of time for detection, launch of the route, capture and shelling of the Delila, and secondly, sufficient confidence in its destruction, since the anti-aircraft missile 48H6X2 is capable of intercepting objects with overloads of order 12 — 15G, possessing its own G-limit in 30 — 35-units.
Someone may say about the sudden appearance of “Delilah” because of the radio horizon, which will deprive the “three hundred” operators of time to respond. This moment in our complex is perfectly compensated by the universal 39ВХNUMXМД 40 tower, the 6НХNNXXX30 antenna post raised on which receives a radio horizon in 6 km along the target flying at an altitude 2 m. mm, as well as a protruding air intake, we can talk about the radar signature (EPR), equal to 38 — 20 square. m, while the minimum limit of this value for C-330PMU-0,04 is 0,05 sq. Yes, and the thermal radiation from the main engines of these missiles will be perfectly recorded by the 300EC2-E optic-electronic systems installed on the Syrian Armor-C0,02, and even if the Favorite with the Delila has any difficulties, their rocket - cannon partners accomplish the task.
Information sources:
http://www.airwar.ru/enc/fighter/f16i.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c200/c200.shtml
https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/delilah/
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c300pmu2/c300pmu2.shtml
Information