The mystery of the "Nord Stream - 2"
If you look closely at what is happening around the construction of the Nord Stream 2, there are too many questions for this to be a mere coincidence. Why did SP-2 become a stumbling block in the European Union and between Germany and the USA? At the same time, it seems that all the participants in these vicissitudes hold back something very important.
In principle, the meaning of this project is to get away from the politically dangerous Ukrainian gas transit, given the announcement by the Bandera regime of Russia an “aggressor country” in order to put the same volumes of Russian gas along a safe Baltic route. The dependence of Germany and Europe on Russian gas remains at the same level, simply the Ukrainian transit is being replaced by the Baltic.
It is clear why Ukraine is against SP-2: it loses gas transit revenues and the transit position of the transit country, the limit-countries of Eastern Europe simply show anti-Russian solidarity, the United States, until recently, was “against” to economically support its newly-acquired Ukrainian colony.
President Donald Trump opposes the new Baltic gas transit for more fundamental reasons: he is outraged in principle by the gas relations between Russia and Europe and Germany: "Russia fully controls Germany through gas supplies, up to 70% of the market." Build SP-2 and at the same time talk about the need to defend against "aggressive Russia"! Trump and his closest advisers seem to suspect Chancellor Merkel in collusion with President Putin behind America’s back. After Merkel after a visit to Washington to Trump, like a traveling salesman, flies to Sochi to Putin.
Yes, Germany has grabbed a deadly grip on the SP-2, and even the obvious threats of US sanctions cannot do anything about it. This is a commercial project, and a point. Although it is clear that the political too. At the same time, Germany makes a nod to the United States and, as it were, a Euro-associated Ukraine: it insists on the preservation of the Ukrainian transit.
Gazprom, in words, is not against the continuation of the Ukrainian transit, but on commercial terms, if Naftogaz of Ukraine proves the economic viability of the transit, will present the corresponding arguments. It seems that this is an excuse, because Naftogaz cannot provide any arguments for the continuation of the transit. This is just a nod to Germany, to formally agree with its demand to preserve Ukrainian gas transit.
Naftogaz cannot agree on anything with the Russian Gazprom, because the relations between them are completely spoiled, plus another well-known obstacle was the unbalanced decision of the Stockholm arbitration. Gazprom will demand to balance all relations unbalanced by an asymmetric decision of the Stockholm arbitration, without any conditions. Since this is an unacceptable precedent: a new transit agreement may also be revised by arbitration under some absurd pretext. This is a politically impossible condition for Ukraine. By the way, in Helsinki, Vladimir Putin said about the condition for the continuation of the Ukrainian transit: “in the event of a settlement of a dispute between business entities in the Stockholm Arbitration Court.”
These are all verbal battles, and what do we actually have today? Gazprom terminates all contracts with Naftogaz in a judicial proceeding, in the same Stockholm at the suit of Gazprom a tribunal has already been established to terminate gas contracts. By the end of 2019, these contracts will be terminated or simply completed, and will new ones be concluded? They will not, and all interested persons guess about it.
It may very well be that Putin said Merkel long ago, unofficially: if you want - build a joint venture 2, if you do not want it, do not build it, but there will not be Ukrainian gas transit after the end of the contracts in 2019. Then it is clear why Germany insists on building JV-2 with such persistence. However, it is not clear why Russia is keeping the Olympic calm, and President Putin just notices that the new Baltic transit is also a matter of business entities. Build - well, not built - is it okay too?
Russia, after all, will need to somehow compensate for the falling revenues if the construction of the SP-2 is disrupted and the Ukrainian gas transit stops. Can she do it? What can Russia count on here? In the 2020, the Turkish Stream and the Power of Siberia gas pipeline should earn, but they only partially compensate for the income from the loss of the Ukrainian transit. It seems that Russia is calm about the twists and turns around SP-2, because it has a “plan B” in case of a breakdown of this project, and it has not yet thrown its main gas trump card into the game. What could it be a trump card?
The Yamal LNG complex has recently been commissioned; it is already supplying liquefied gas to Europe, India, and China. Vladimir Putin personally supervised, forced his construction, went even to a certain risk, sending at his critical moment funds for his financing from the Welfare Fund, from the inviolable treasury of the sovereign. Due to the great importance of this LNG project for Russia.
Putin found time to come for the ceremonial launch of the Yamal LNG complex, and then there was a message in the press that the Russian industry had mastered technologies for the production of LNG and could now build an LNG complex "entirely on Russian technologies." This is what I?
What prevents Russia from building a LNG complex at the exit of the gas pipeline to the Baltic to the same year’s 2 in the event of a breakdown of the SP-2020 construction? The pipeline’s exit to the Baltic Sea is already under construction or is being built; LNG technologies have been mastered in Yamal. It is possible, instead of SP-2, to build an LNG complex and supply Russian LNG to the same Germany, but at a higher price. And for Europe it will be cheaper than American LNG due to lower transportation costs.
At the same time, Germany loses cheap Russian pipeline gas and changes to expensive liquefied gas. Is that why Germany so grabbed the SP-2? And Russia calmly looks at the conflicts of business entities, apparently preparing a “plan B”: the construction of an LNG complex in the Baltic.
Monument to the Russian-German friendship. Pipes of both "Streams" in a section. Germany. Michielverbeek, commons.wikimedia.org
In principle, the meaning of this project is to get away from the politically dangerous Ukrainian gas transit, given the announcement by the Bandera regime of Russia an “aggressor country” in order to put the same volumes of Russian gas along a safe Baltic route. The dependence of Germany and Europe on Russian gas remains at the same level, simply the Ukrainian transit is being replaced by the Baltic.
It is clear why Ukraine is against SP-2: it loses gas transit revenues and the transit position of the transit country, the limit-countries of Eastern Europe simply show anti-Russian solidarity, the United States, until recently, was “against” to economically support its newly-acquired Ukrainian colony.
President Donald Trump opposes the new Baltic gas transit for more fundamental reasons: he is outraged in principle by the gas relations between Russia and Europe and Germany: "Russia fully controls Germany through gas supplies, up to 70% of the market." Build SP-2 and at the same time talk about the need to defend against "aggressive Russia"! Trump and his closest advisers seem to suspect Chancellor Merkel in collusion with President Putin behind America’s back. After Merkel after a visit to Washington to Trump, like a traveling salesman, flies to Sochi to Putin.
Yes, Germany has grabbed a deadly grip on the SP-2, and even the obvious threats of US sanctions cannot do anything about it. This is a commercial project, and a point. Although it is clear that the political too. At the same time, Germany makes a nod to the United States and, as it were, a Euro-associated Ukraine: it insists on the preservation of the Ukrainian transit.
Gazprom, in words, is not against the continuation of the Ukrainian transit, but on commercial terms, if Naftogaz of Ukraine proves the economic viability of the transit, will present the corresponding arguments. It seems that this is an excuse, because Naftogaz cannot provide any arguments for the continuation of the transit. This is just a nod to Germany, to formally agree with its demand to preserve Ukrainian gas transit.
Naftogaz cannot agree on anything with the Russian Gazprom, because the relations between them are completely spoiled, plus another well-known obstacle was the unbalanced decision of the Stockholm arbitration. Gazprom will demand to balance all relations unbalanced by an asymmetric decision of the Stockholm arbitration, without any conditions. Since this is an unacceptable precedent: a new transit agreement may also be revised by arbitration under some absurd pretext. This is a politically impossible condition for Ukraine. By the way, in Helsinki, Vladimir Putin said about the condition for the continuation of the Ukrainian transit: “in the event of a settlement of a dispute between business entities in the Stockholm Arbitration Court.”
These are all verbal battles, and what do we actually have today? Gazprom terminates all contracts with Naftogaz in a judicial proceeding, in the same Stockholm at the suit of Gazprom a tribunal has already been established to terminate gas contracts. By the end of 2019, these contracts will be terminated or simply completed, and will new ones be concluded? They will not, and all interested persons guess about it.
It may very well be that Putin said Merkel long ago, unofficially: if you want - build a joint venture 2, if you do not want it, do not build it, but there will not be Ukrainian gas transit after the end of the contracts in 2019. Then it is clear why Germany insists on building JV-2 with such persistence. However, it is not clear why Russia is keeping the Olympic calm, and President Putin just notices that the new Baltic transit is also a matter of business entities. Build - well, not built - is it okay too?
Russia, after all, will need to somehow compensate for the falling revenues if the construction of the SP-2 is disrupted and the Ukrainian gas transit stops. Can she do it? What can Russia count on here? In the 2020, the Turkish Stream and the Power of Siberia gas pipeline should earn, but they only partially compensate for the income from the loss of the Ukrainian transit. It seems that Russia is calm about the twists and turns around SP-2, because it has a “plan B” in case of a breakdown of this project, and it has not yet thrown its main gas trump card into the game. What could it be a trump card?
The Yamal LNG complex has recently been commissioned; it is already supplying liquefied gas to Europe, India, and China. Vladimir Putin personally supervised, forced his construction, went even to a certain risk, sending at his critical moment funds for his financing from the Welfare Fund, from the inviolable treasury of the sovereign. Due to the great importance of this LNG project for Russia.
Putin found time to come for the ceremonial launch of the Yamal LNG complex, and then there was a message in the press that the Russian industry had mastered technologies for the production of LNG and could now build an LNG complex "entirely on Russian technologies." This is what I?
What prevents Russia from building a LNG complex at the exit of the gas pipeline to the Baltic to the same year’s 2 in the event of a breakdown of the SP-2020 construction? The pipeline’s exit to the Baltic Sea is already under construction or is being built; LNG technologies have been mastered in Yamal. It is possible, instead of SP-2, to build an LNG complex and supply Russian LNG to the same Germany, but at a higher price. And for Europe it will be cheaper than American LNG due to lower transportation costs.
At the same time, Germany loses cheap Russian pipeline gas and changes to expensive liquefied gas. Is that why Germany so grabbed the SP-2? And Russia calmly looks at the conflicts of business entities, apparently preparing a “plan B”: the construction of an LNG complex in the Baltic.
Information