Military Review

How Ravu Russian stormed. Part of 4

12
Fortunately for the fate of the operation, on the northern flank of the Battle of Galicia, where, after the end of the railway maneuver, the 26,5 headquarters of the Russian divisions acted against the Austrian 15,5, a turning point occurred.


On August 28, Russian troops captured Tomashev and threatened the rear of the enemy’s attack force. The group of Joseph Ferdinand, covering the rear of the army M. Auffenberg, was defeated. From the north to the rear of the Austrian 4 Army, the 5 and 17 Russian Army Corps were already leaving the 5 Army. Formed by P.A. Plehve, commander of the 5 Army, the cavalry corps was sent to the rear of the enemy's 4 Army: near Frampol and Krasnobrod, he struck the enemy rear, defeating part of the cover and transports, and then, helping the 3 Army, helped defeat groups of Joseph Ferdinand. The 2 corps groups of P. A. Pleve, acting in divergent directions, helped the neighbors: 25 and 19 - 4, and 5, 17 and Equestrian - 3 armies. The connections of the 5 Army went around the right flank and reached the rear of the Austrian 1 Army — which led to the command of the latter deciding to withdraw operational consolidation over the river. San

The general attack of the South-Western Front, the exit of large forces of the 5 Army to the rear of M. Auffenberg's troops was "broken" by the Austrians, and from 30 August - a general retreat of the enemy.

The battles of Rava Ruska are the most important element of the Gorodok battle. It was the final operation of the Battle of Galicia.

The total losses of the Austrian 3 and 4 armies in the Battle of Galicia were:
3 A - up to 109000 people;
4 A - to 90000 people.
A significant part of these losses accounted for the operation of Rava Ruska - Gorodok - during this battle the Austrians lost up to 50% of the combat strength of their troops.

M. Auffenberg recognized that many units of his army lost up to half of their composition. The Austrian 4-I army only prisoners lost 28 thousand people.

3 guns, several machine guns and over 30 thousand captured soldiers and officers of the enemy during the operation of the Rava of the Russian steel 8 guns became trophies of the Russian XNUMX army.


Trophy Austrian guns, August 1914

The enemy’s losses in the Battle of Galicia were such that M. Hoffmann wondered how the Austrian 40 divisions fit between the Carpathians and the Vistula, and E. Ludendorff wrote that the color of the front officers and the best soldiers were killed on the battlefields. And the German historian O. von Moser stated that the bold strategic chess moves of the command of the Austro-Hungarian army and the transfer of reinforcements from the Balkans (albeit late) did not bring success. The best forces were unsuccessfully donated to the super-bold enterprise, and as a result the Russian armies pursued the Austro-Hungarian troops, exhausted and shaken, threatening the Carpathian passes.

During the operation, the 25-th Selenga infantry regiment of the 1914 division fought at the Rava of the Russian 41 on August 11 of the 2-division of the Army of the Dual Empire - the 500 of the Tyrolean rifle regiment. 2 soldiers were also captured by this unit. The commander of the XNUMX regiment, Colonel Brosh von Arena, died with a banner in his hands.


The 2 Imperial Tyrolean Infantry Regiment received a new regimental banner. February 1915

The operation of the Rava of Russia proceeded in an atmosphere of highly mobile intense battles, was characterized by a struggle for the flanks, and the firefights were complemented by bayonet attacks. Counter battles take place quite intensely and with varying success. Personnel Austrian units are a formidable opponent, the high fighting spirit of which is evident also from a relatively small number of prisoners. The Austro-Hungarian infantry aggressively attacked with thick chains, representing a grateful target for Russian artillery. Often, the Austrian infantry carried out attacks without sufficient artillery preparation, suffering heavy losses. The Austrian command did not take into account, as A. Belaya, researcher of the Galician battle, rightly noted, unsatisfactory political preparation for war and not always proper adhesion in different parts. The mass surrenders under the Russian counterattacks of the Austrian Slavs confirmed the fact of the moral depletion of part of the Austrian infantry - the necessary resilience as part of which was preserved above all by the Hungarian and German parts.

In operation, many Russian units distinguished themselves. So, D. G. Shcherbachev noted the actions of the 176 Infantry Regiment of the Infantry Division of the 44 Division: being assigned to support the 11 Cavalry Division, he kept the 3 of the day alone until the approach of parts of the 10 corps and 5 days he fought on the flank of 5 Division, without wagons (on breadcrumbs) - so also under heavy fire of heavy artillery advanced aggressively forward. The morale in the Russian troops was at the height. Artillery acted with success, paving the way for the infantry.

From the point of view of the tactical activity of the troops, intense, replete with increased activity of opponents, the battle of Rava Ruska is especially interesting. So, the 6-day offensive of the Russian 11 and 9-th army corps (5 divisions) to the fortified position of Rava Rus, which was carried out inconsistently, as noted, was not successful. And this despite the fact that the divisions were given a relatively narrow front of attack - 3 - 3,5 km. The enemy’s battle formations (6-I cavalry, 3-I, 19-I infantry, 41-I drove infantry divisions) occupied the 13-km front, being echeloned in depth. The average density of Austrian troops on 1 km of the front is up to 800 people, 4 machine guns and 7 guns on the Russian 11 corps and up to 3 thousand people, 7 machine guns and 15 guns on the Russian 9 corps front. Owing to the depth of the Austrian positions, the advancing Russian divisions could only approach the leading edge of the main line of defense. And this despite the fact that the defense of the enemy wore a field character, was organized during the period of maneuverable military operations.

The accidental success of the breakthrough achieved by Waldorf on August 27 (the main blow was inflicted by the Austrian 23 th Infantry Infantry and 25 th Infantry Division 9 th Army Corps) could not be developed due to the lack of forces introduced for the development of the breakthrough. The rapid concentration by the Russian command on both flanks of the breakthrough section (length up to 7 km) of strong reserves was eliminated by a poorly organized Austrian maneuver. Three Austrian divisions also operated on the 13-km front. An interesting tactical move by the Russian command was the use of cavalry masses for localizing a breakthrough.

Strategically, the Austrians made a huge mistake in August 1914 on the 2 front against Russia and Serbia. As a result, the 2 army was not enough in Galicia.

F. Konrad Gettsendorf fought hard, and if the German command had chosen coalition interests over the German, the results of the Battle of Galicia could have been different. F. Conrad von Gettsendorf noted that the Germans had pledged to assemble at least north of Thorn 12 divisions, which were supposed to advance on Siedlce, at that time, the Austrians - to Lublin. The Austrians fulfilled their obligations, and the Germans moved their forces not to the south, but to the northeast - to Gumbinnen. And all the power of the South-Western Front fell on the Galician armies of Austria-Hungary - the balance of forces east of Lviv was especially pernicious for the Austrians.



During the battles of Rava Russkaya, according to General Yu. N. Danilov: “For six days ... the Austrians disputed the victory of our troops.” The participant of the operation M. D. Bonch-Bruevich wrote: “... around 4 hours of the day 30 in August, the gray-blue mass of prisoners began to move towards Zholkiev, and soon the square and the neighboring streets of this small town were literally slaughtered by captured prisoners ... Reports from corps soon confirmed that the enemy was in full retreat ... Thus ended the seven-day battle of Magirov - Rava Russian with the victory of the 3 army, and the Great Galician battle in the space between the Vistula and the Dniester subsided with it ... ”.

In the operations of Rava Ruska - Gorodok, the talk was about the fate of the Battle of Galicia - a key battle not only on the Russian front, but also of the whole world war.

The operation of Rava Ruska contributed to the collapse of the counter-maneuver of the Austrian command, did not allow the initiative to be wrested from the hands of the Russians, and secured the victory in the Battle of Galicia.



Sources of
RGVIA. F. 16180. Op. 1. D. 62;
RGVIA. F. 2007. Op. 1. D. 42. H. 1;
RGVIA. F. 2007. Op.1. D. 42. H. 2;
Year of war from 19 July 1914 to 19 July 1915. The highest manifestos. Appeals of the Supreme Commander. Reports: from the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander, from the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army, from the Naval Headquarters. M., 1915;
Chronicle of war. 1914. №№ 2, 3, 4.
Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914 -1918. Band. Ii. Wien, 1931;
Bonch-Bruyevich The Truth About Operation 3 of the Army “Lviv - Russian Rava” 6-30 August 1914 / / Military Affairs. 1918. No. 23-24, 25, 27, 29; 1919. №№ 1, 2;
Hoffman M. The war of missed opportunities. M. - L.: 1925;
Shcherbachev D. G. Lvov - Rava Russkaya - Przemysl. The 9 Corps and the 3 Army in Galicia in 1914. // Military Collection. Belgrade. 1929 - 1930. Prince 10 - 11;
Ludendorff E. background. My memories of the war 1914 — 1918. M. - Mn., 2005;
Auffenberg-Komarow M. von. Aus Österreich-Ungarns Teilnahme am Weltkriege. Berlin und Wien, 1920;
Auffenberg-Komarow M. von. Aus Österreichs höhe und niedergang; eine lebensschilderung. München, 1921;
Feldmarchal Conrad. Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906-1918. Band IV. Wien, 1923.


Literature
Russian conquest of eastern Galicia. M., 1914;
The Great War in 1914. Sketch of the main operations. Russian Western Front. Pg., 1916;
A brief strategic outline of the 1914-1918 war. Russian Front Events from July 19 to September 1 1914 of Ch. 1 M., 1918;
Short historical sketch of the war 1914 - 1918 // Warfare. 1918. - No. 26; 1919. No. 1;
Strategic sketch of the 1914-1918 war. CH 1. M., 1922;
Moser O. von. A brief strategic overview of world war 1914 - 1918's. M., 1923;
Yu. N. Danilov. Russia in World War 1914-1915 Berlin, 1924;
White A. Galicia battle. M.-L., 1929;
Domanevsky V.N. World War. Campaign 1914 of the year. Paris, 1929;
Golovin N. N. From the history of the 1914 campaign on the Russian Front. Battle of Galicia. The first period until 1 September is a new style. Paris, 1930;
Golovin N.N. From the history of the 1914 campaign. The days of the breakthrough of the Galician battle (September 1-3). Paris, 1940;
A. Kolenkovsky. Maneuvering period of the first world imperialist war 1914, M., 1940;
Kersnovsky A. A. History of the Russian army. T. 3. M., 1994;
Karpeev V.I. The Cavalry: divisions, brigades, corps. Connection of the Russian army. 1810-1917. M., 2012.
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Articles from this series:
How Ravu Russian stormed. Part of 1
How Ravu Russian stormed. Part of 2
How Ravu Russian stormed. Part of 3
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  1. 210ox
    210ox 5 May 2018 05: 55
    +14
    Thanks for the article. For us, there are fewer "white spots" in history ..
  2. Olgovich
    Olgovich 5 May 2018 06: 09
    +12
    The enemy’s losses in the Battle of Galicia were such that M. Hoffmann was amazed at how 40 Austrian divisions fit between the Carpathians and the Vistula, and E. Ludendorff wrote that the color of military officers and the best soldiers were killed on the battlefields.

    They fought wonderfully, and this is in the FIRST month of the war!
    Strategically, the Austrians made a huge mistake in August 1914 on the 2 front against Russia and Serbia. As a result, the 2 army was not enough in Galicia.

    So the war against Serbia and the war began, how could Austria not fight on 2 fronts? There was no other way out.
    The 2 Imperial Tyrolean Infantry Regiment received a new regimental banner. February 1915

    This banner was issued instead, as I understand it, captured by the Russian ordinary Alekseev, Kovalchuk in the battle of Ravvo-Russian. recourse
    Thank you Alexey Vladimirovich!
    1. Cheburator
      Cheburator 5 May 2018 07: 44
      +23
      Probably, dear Olgovich, the author had in mind that the strategic situation itself, in which G. and A.-V. in the summer of 1914 it was disastrous.
      They deliberately laid the war on 2 fronts in their strategic plans and went for it - but it was like death for the middle empires. What is it - arrogance (we can do everything) or belief in luck (maybe we will be in time in France and in Serbia while the Russian bear sways)?
      Or maybe both taken together, expressed in one phrase - strategic adventurism probably.
      As for the banner - exactly so. By the way, the banners of the 2 Tyrolean imperial rifle regiments (out of the 4 available regiments) fell into the hands of the Russians.
      1. heavy division
        heavy division 5 May 2018 09: 41
        +7
        Tyrolean rifle regiments were equipped to a large extent (or even mainly) with Tyrolean Germans, mountain craftsmen and excellent shooters.
        The rifle units of all countries of the Great War are the elite of the army infantry. Not in vain, by the way, the Red Army took as its basis precisely the rifle units - the flesh to instrument colors (raspberry).
        In the beautiful illustration of Professor Samokish "In Galicia. At the gates of the castle", which is given in the text, the Russian soldiers who climb over the fence, judging by the raspberry epaulettes, are exactly arrows.
        1. BRONEVIK
          BRONEVIK 5 May 2018 13: 50
          +19
          Yes, our rifle formations in the WWI flashed. Both ordinary rifle divisions (one 4th Iron what was worth), and Turkestan, Finnish and Siberian riflemen.
          Incidentally, the special power of the Siberian rifle divisions (retained in many respects the spike even during the general decomposition of 1917) was explained by the following: almost the entire command staff and the majority of the riflemen had combat experience in 1914, while in peacetime they were kept in reinforced states close to the wartime states - and, accordingly, were almost not diluted with the called-up spare.
          1. heavy division
            heavy division 5 May 2018 14: 23
            +6
            I read memoirs of V. Gurko and V. Littauer about the actions of the Gurkin detachment (1st Cavalry Division and 5th Rifle Brigade) in East Prussia in August 1914. They also write about the staff of rifle regiments a, la wartime - as for cavalry. That is, the arrows and cavalry were parts of the increased combat readiness of peacetime, requiring a minimum of time for mobilization. Although the infantry regiments went to war 2-battalion (as opposed to the 4-battalion infantry) - but they were immediately staffed.
  3. Cheburator
    Cheburator 5 May 2018 07: 35
    +20
    The Germans pulled the blanket over themselves, their shirt closer to the body
    Unlike ours by the way
    The result was not long in coming
    1. Brutan
      Brutan 5 May 2018 11: 12
      +5
      The Germans were amazed at what remained of the 40 Austrian divisions ...
      And they might not be surprised - in many respects their work. More precisely, the lack of work agreed ahead of time
      1. heavy division
        heavy division 5 May 2018 18: 42
        +4
        Maybe the Germans throw the Austrians was special - in order to weaken and further clutch the Austrians? No, probably not likely - because it was about the fate of the war.
        Most likely really ordinary egoism - since for the sake of the East Prussian estates the Germans were not too lazy to weaken the French front. And some Austrians there ...
        It, mindful of the level of "strategy" of young Moltke and then of old Hindenburg, is not surprising
  4. XII Legion
    XII Legion 5 May 2018 08: 41
    +20
    The battle of Galicia is one of the central throughout the war.
    We got the core of the Austrian army to our front and broke it. The consequences rang out on all fronts - the Serbs held out for a whole year, the Germans were forced to gradually pump up the Russian front with troops, abandoning activity in the west, etc.
    And the Russian strategic planning on the theater was so successful that it was not spoiled by the change in the deployment of the Austrians (although it was pretty messed up), nor by the activities of such persons N. V. Ruzsky.
    But a change in deployment has led to options. And Getzendorf tried to realize the opportunity. The man was unlucky - not only the railway maneuver of the Russian commander-in-chief Nikolai Nikolayevich (strengthening the 4th army and the new 9th army on the northern flank of the battle) turned out to be more successful than the Getzendorf railway maneuver (2nd army from the Balkans to the southern flank of the battle), but also the allies of the Germans were far-sighted egoists.
    Thank you!
  5. heavy division
    heavy division 5 May 2018 10: 10
    +7
    The armies were beautiful
    There are more, according to the just remark of one historian, Europe no longer had. And from the heroes of bygone days, sometimes there are no names left ...
  6. Grandfather Barsik
    Grandfather Barsik 5 May 2018 16: 04
    +5
    Rava has definitely become Russian!
    Thank you for the interesting cycle.