Military Review

Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 5. How to shoot the Russian commanders

56
This article will be devoted to the issue of the effectiveness of the shooting of Russian ships at the ships of the detachment I. Karf - the light cruiser Augsburg, three destroyers, and, of course, the minelayer Albatros.


As is known, the shooting of Russian cruisers on the Albatross has become the object of criticism of numerous researchers. So, MA Petrov (“Two Fights”) writes:

“Thus, due to the exceptional, unreasonable complexity of tactics and maneuvering techniques, in this case completely unnecessary“ course corners ”,“ reach ”and so on, due to excessive concentration of fire against one target, overwhelming, unsystematic, from different sides of the firing on the distances at which the target was poorly visible at times, it took almost an hour and a half to set up a small, poorly protected cruiser, effectively giving him the opportunity to take shelter in neutral waters. ”


N.V. adhere to the same point of view. Novikov (notes to the Russian edition of the book by G. Rollman), and the authors of the monumental work “Fleet in the First World War” and many others.

Well, let's try to figure it out. Unfortunately, there is no way to estimate the accuracy of shooting 152-mm guns, but we can, with certain reservations, calculate the percentage of hits of 203-mm guns. To do this, we first determine the consumption of shells of Russian cruisers on the minelayer Albatros. The best known amount of ammunition consumed by the Bayan cruiser. According to the memoirs of his commander, A.K. Weiss, after the battle with "Roon":

“We still have the shells left after this battle: 6-inch 434, 8-inch 120, and the same 6-inch 366 and 8-inch 80. Here, it is clear that only everyone understood why I did not allow the shells to be thrown aimlessly. ”


Unfortunately, an error is probably hidden in these words of the commander of “Bayan” - the fact is that 366 spent 152-mm shells + 434 remaining give 800 shells in total, 80 spent eight-inch shells + 120 remaining give, respectively, 200. It turns out as if the cruiser had 100 ammunition for shells (2 203 mm cannons in towers and 8 152-mm in casemates), but in fact the ammunition consisted of 110 shells for both 8-inch and 6-inch guns.

Accordingly, we have three different probabilities. Perhaps the Bayan cruiser went into operation, having a shortage of projectiles (this is, in principle, possible, though unlikely) and really spent 80 203-mm projectiles on the enemy, after which he had 120 left. It is possible that the cruiser commander correctly indicated the consumption of shells, but he was mistaken with the remnants, and then, after two skirmishes, in fact, at the disposal of the artillerymen AK Weiss left 130 203-mm and 514 152-mm. In this case, the flow rate of the projectiles is also equal to 80. And there is a possibility that a greater number of projectiles were actually consumed than indicated by A.K. Weiss., That is, the remnants are true, but according to the Albatross and Augsburg 90 shells were spent, not 80. In any case, we will not be mistaken, assuming that in a battle with Augsburg and Albatross, and then in a duel with Roon, Bayan used 80-90 X-shells to 203-20. As it is known, according to “Roon”, “Bayan” gave 40 two-gun salvoes, respectively, the share of “Augsburg” and “Albatross” remains 50-XNUMX shells.

At the same time, Bayan shot at Augsburg at about 07.40-07.41 and at least 08.00, and it is possible that he fired at that, at least 20 minutes, at the same time according to Albatross - only 10 minutes. Consequently, the “Bayan” fired at Augsburg twice as long and probably spent more ammunition, but for the “purity of the experiment” we assume that according to the “Augsburg” and “Albatross”, “Bayan” fired the same number of shells. If our assumption is true, then Bayan fired no more than 20-25 shots on the Albatross.

As for “Admiral Makarov,” it is indicated that by the time he met with “Roon” he had consumed 61% of his ammunition load of 203-mm shells, which is confirmed by GK’s memories. Count:

"The reason why the admiral did not join the battle with Roon was that there were too few large projectiles left at Makarov, for example, near 90 8-inch and only half of the stock of 6-inch."


The fact is that 61% of 220 gives 134-135 consumed projectiles, respectively, the remainder should be 85-86 projectiles, exactly those “about 90 projectiles” indicated by G.K. Count The only thing that inspires some doubts is whether these 61% consumption of residuals are calculated, according to GK memoirs. Count? But in any case, it is generally accepted that the "Admiral" Makarov "spent more than half of the ammunition and the figure in 135 shells for (roughly) an hour and a half battle (combat rate of fire - 90 shells per hour) looks reasonable - taking into account the fact that" Bayan "in half an hour Roon 40 shells (80 shells per hour), and even, perhaps, slightly overestimated.



So, assuming that Admiral Makarov used the same amount of shells as Bayan (that is, 20-25 203-mm shells) at Augsburg, we get that, according to Albatross, only 130- 140 eight-inch projectiles, including 20-25 from Bayan and 110-115 from Admiral Makarov.

Sources indicate that Albatross received 6 203-mm projectiles, which gives us, in general, a very good percentage of hits - 4,29-4,61%. At the same time, in reality, these figures may be more, because in our calculations we made all the assumptions that increase the consumption of shells on the Albatross. Therefore, the percentage of hits in the size of 4,29-4,61% can be considered as the minimum possible value. Nevertheless, it, generally speaking, already puts an end to the version of bad shooting of Russian cruisers.

But what is interesting ...

Where do we get six hits with eight-inch shells at the Albatross? After the battle, the Germans sent their commission to the wrecked mine layer, in order to assess the extent of its damage. This commission worked for a couple of days, and then it just counted 6 hits eight-inch and 20-six-inch in a German ship. It can be assumed that the first in historical G. Rollman brought them to the literature, the remaining authors subsequently copied these data.

But as you know, based on the results of the survey, it was concluded that the restoration of the Albatross was advisable. Naturally, the Swedes did it, because the ship was considered interned. And now, according to Swedish data, the Albatross received not six hits from 203-mm projectiles, but twice as many, that is, twelve. It is possible that in fact there were fewer of them, that the Swedes were wrong about something, yet they didn’t have much experience in identifying damage, but on the other hand, they didn’t have much more time to figure out the hits. in the Albatross. The fact is that the true number of eight-inch shells hit the Albatross is between six and twelve.

Accordingly, the accuracy of the Russian cruisers firing at the Albatross minelayer is in the range from 4,29% to 9,23%, and this, generally speaking, is not that “inept” but a very good result. Especially if you consider the conditions in which the Russian gunners reached these hits.

Probably, the previous articles turned out to be unnecessarily detailed and not easy to understand, therefore we will give below a short “timeline” of that battle:

07.30 Opponents noticed the smoke, I. Karth immediately turned to the west, toward neutral Swedish waters;

07.35 The Russian flagship identified the enemy as the light cruiser Albatross, a Undine-type cruiser and three destroyers. "Admiral Makarov" turned, leading the enemy on the course angle 40 hail. and he cut him off;

07.37-07.38 (tentatively) “Admiral Makarov” opened fire on the “Augsburg”;

07.40-07.41 (tentatively) "Bayan" opened fire on "Augsburg";

07.45 "Bogatyr" and "Oleg" opened fire on the "Albatross";

07.50 (tentatively) Three German destroyers launch a torpedo attack;

07.55 (tentatively) Commodore I. Karf, seeing that he has sufficiently pulled away from the Russian cruisers, lies down to intercept their course in order to break past them to the south-west;

07.57-07.59 - On the destroyers they see that their flagship is retreating, and they “turn off” the attack - they put up a smoke screen that hides the Albatross and Augsburg and begins to retreat after Augsburg. From this point on, the shooting on the Albatross stops, on the Augsburg - it resumes sporadically, during the period when the cruiser becomes visible;

08.00 Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev orders the 2 th cruiser brigade (Bogatyr and Oleg) to act independently. As a result, the armored cruisers of the Russian detachment ("Admiral Makarov" and "Bayan") begin to bypass the "smoke cloud" delivered by the destroyers from the south, and the armored ones from the east;

08.08-08.09 (tentatively) "Admiral Makarov" bypasses the smoke screen, sees the Albatross and opens fire on it;

08.10 "Bogatyr" and "Oleg", bypassing the smoke screen, resume fire on the "Albatross";

08.20 Several events happen at once. Russian seek first hit in the Albatross. At this time, the “Augsburg” seemed to resume shooting at the “Admiral Makarov,” but they either did not notice it on the Russian ships, or did not consider it necessary to mention it. "Bayan" opens fire on the "Albatross" - until that time his guns were silent, as three German cruisers fired at one German ship and so, and the Augsburg, it seems, was not visible from Bayan;

08.30 Russian sailors are seeing severe destruction on the Albatross - damage to superstructures, knocked down foremast, fire. "Bayan" stops firing;

08.33 "Augsburg" ceases fire;

08.35 Contact with Augsburg and the destroyers is completely lost. "Admiral Makarov" turns to the north, leading the Albatross to port, with M.K. Bakhirev orders the "Bayan" to "cut off the enemy from the south";

08.45 In flames, the Albatross describes two complete circulations near the very edge of Swedish waters. According to the Russian sailors, the Albatross lowered the flag, according to the categorical statement of the Germans, the Albatross did not lower the flag. According to another version of Russian eyewitnesses, the Albatross lowered the flag later, after it was thrown onto the rocks;

09.07 - The shelling of the Albatross stopped. It should be noted that in 09.07 the Albatros stopped shooting Oleg, but the time when Admiral Makarov and Bogatyr stopped fire was unfortunately unknown. The only thing that can be argued for sure is that this happened in the interval between 08.30 (when Bayan ceased fire) and 09.07;

09.12 "Albatross" threw himself on the rocks.

At the beginning of the battle, armored Russian cruisers did not shoot at the Albatross at all, only the Bogatyr and Oleg fired at the German minelayer. Starting to shoot at 07.45, they stopped firing near 08.00, because the German destroyers put up a smoke screen, so shooting was even less than 15 minutes.

Of course, if we recall the fire of the Russian squadron in Tsushima, which from a slightly shorter distance (37-40 kbt) during the first 15 minutes of the battle with the forces of five head battleships and, possibly, Navarina, “threw” 5 twelve-inch and 14 six-inch shells into the Japanese “Mikasu”, and even 6 hits in other ships (all in all, it turns out, 24 hits) and we compare the results with the shooting of “Oleg” and “Bogatyr”, it turns out somehow awkward. But you need to understand that in the battle of Gotland, Russian ships fired at the limit of visibility, captain 2nd rank Svinin (the flagship artilleryman of the Baltic headquarters fleet) characterized them as follows:

“The shooting conditions were exceptionally difficult ..., often the fall is not at all visible (own shells - author's note).”



Photo taken from the bridge of the armored cruiser Bayan in the battle of Gotland


In addition, the shooting of the Russian ships seemed to the Germans accurate enough to immediately begin to maneuver, zigzagging in order to constantly shoot down the tip to the Russian artillerymen. Of course, the Japanese did not do anything like this. It is possible that the supply of oil to the nozzles of the “Augsburg” helped with something: as we know, in the battle of the Falklands, the mixed heating of the boilers of the British battlecruisers (when oil was sprayed onto the burning coal) produced thick smoke interfering with the shooting, so that later the commanders preferred to use pure coal heating. Accordingly, it cannot be ruled out that the smoke of the “Augsburg” for some time additionally worsened the already disgusting visibility.

Visibility is a very important factor that must be taken into account when comparing the accuracy of shooting in a particular battle. Let us recall the Battle of Jutland - the battle cruisers Hipper showed excellent results at distances of 65-80 KB. at the beginning of the battle. But then, closer to the first collision of the linear fleets, the Lutz and Derfling for some time couldn’t oppose the 3 squadron of British battlecruisers with it, which shot them from the 40-50 cable course. Well, did the German artillerymen suddenly lose their qualifications? Not at all - they just did not see the enemy. Looking ahead, we note that a little later, the German armored cruiser Roon fought the Bayan cruiser under the same conditions as the Russian cruisers with the Augsburg and Albatross. In this episode of the battle in Gotland, the “Bayan” was located north-west of “Roon”, that is, where the German ships were in relation to the cruisers M.K. Bakhireva. At the same time, "Bayan" also kept at the limit of visibility and went zigzag, in order to bring down a tip to the German artillery. And now, being in similar conditions, in half an hour of the battle, Roon achieved a single hit. You can, of course, assume that the Roon gunners were stupid, but, generally speaking, the Germans always trained their commander well, so it would be much more logical to assume that poor visibility and maneuvers of the Russian cruiser are to blame for his unimportant shooting. Against this background, the fact that the Russian ships did not achieve hits on the Albatross and Augsburg during the first 15 minutes of the battle (and even less) can no longer be surprising.

Then, in 08.00, the smoke screen was installed, the Albatross disappeared from view, and the shooting at it stopped, and according to available data, it was conducted sporadically, that is, only when the German cruiser appeared due to smoke. And only in 08.10 cruisers resume fire on the Albatross ... but how?

The battle began at a distance of the order of 44 KBT, and then the distance somewhat decreased, because M.K. Bakhirev led his ships across the path to the Germans. But from 08.00 to 08.10, the distance between Albatross and Bogatyr with Oleg increased again, because after setting up the smoke curtains, Albatross ran west, and the 1 half-crew of Russian cruisers was forced to turn north, bypassing the smoke . Thus, in 08.10, the Albatross was again at the limit of visibility from the Russian armored cruisers, and only Admiral Makarov was able to observe and correct the fire of his artillery on the Albatross more or less well.

And the results were not long in coming - after 10 minutes the first hit followed and the German ship was beaten for 25 minutes - it is not known how many shells fell into it in this period, but the damage was extremely great (this is acknowledged by both Russian and German sources) - the ship loses the mast, burns, enters uncontrolled circulation ... That is, in 35 minutes of battle, the Russian cruisers achieved a noticeably better result than Roon did. Unfortunately, we don’t know when Admiral Makarov and Bogatyr ceased fire to draw conclusions on the time of fire impact on Albatross, but it is likely that they ceased fire somewhere between 08.45 and 09.00, i.e. when the Albatross entered the Swedish territorial waters. In principle, these cruisers could stop shooting at 08.45 when they saw that the Albatross had lowered the flag - no doubt we will never know whether the flag was lowered on the German cruiser or not, but what’s important here is not in fact, but what seemed to Russian sailors.

Therefore, speaking of the "hour and a half" shooting of "Albatross", it would be nice to note that the critical damage to the ship was inflicted during 35 minutes (from 08.10 to 08.45) by three Russian cruisers ("Bayan" was joined to them only by 10 minutes) .

What was the distance of the fight? Most likely, at the time when Admiral Makarov transferred fire to the Albatross, the distance between them was on the order of 40 cables, perhaps a little more, and before Bogatyr and Oleg it was even greater, and this with 5 miles True, it should be noted that “on the way” to Gotland, it was improving. At the same time, the Russian cruisers did not approach the Albatross closer to 3 miles: this follows from the report of the captain of the 2 rank, Prince MB. Cherkasov, who, in response to a request from the Chief of the Naval General Staff A.I. Rusina:

“The cruisers did not approach the Albatross closer than three miles during the battle, fearing mine shots”


From myself, we add that to reduce the distance to KBN 30. Russian cruisers could only by the end of the battle, because, generally speaking, the Albatross was practically not inferior to them in speed. And at this point, further rapprochement did not make much sense - "Augsburg" was well observed and was badly damaged.

In this episode of the battle, the Russian cruisers also bombarded German destroyers. But it should be understood that this was fired from 75-mm guns, moreover, when larger calibers fired at the Augsburg. In other words, the fire control system at that moment "worked" on the German light cruiser, and the mine artillery fired "by eye" - of course, the effectiveness of such a fire could not be high.

If the Albatross 12 or about eight-inch shells, then why a small (full displacement 2 506 t) German mine layer was not shattered? Alas, Russian shells are to blame for this for the umpteenth time. The fact is that the Russian fleet in the Russian-Japanese war used lightweight shells weighing 87,8 kg and post-war cruisers of the Admiral Makarov type, built in the image and manner of the port-artur Bayan, had outdated 203-mm / 45 guns, and feed mechanisms, designed for lightweight projectiles. And so, at that time, the very powerful 203-mm / 50 cannons, which fired 112,2 kg high-explosive shells carrying XNUM X-kg-kg-kg-kg-kH-15 kg-kH-6K-6K-6K-6K-6K-6K-6K-6K-10K-6K-6K-10K-1K-18K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-10K-403 kg types were used for the armament of the Dodrednouk battleships of the "Andrey Pervozvanny" and "John Chrysost" types, as well as the armored cruiser "Rurik". "Bayan" had to be content with 14,1 kg shells with 87,8 kg of explosives. If we recall that, for example, British six-inch high-explosive shells carried 9,3 kg of explosives, the conclusion is that the Admiral Makarov and Bayan's 6-mm projectiles occupied an intermediate position between six-inch and “normal” eight-inch shells in their combat power. Hence, in fact, the "intermediate" result of their fire impact on the Albatross.

Why did the author of this article "by the minute" analyze the maneuvering of the ships I.Karf and M.K. Bakhirev before the resumption of fire on the "Albatross" (approximately 08.10), but did not write anything about their future movement? The fact is that during the 08.10 - 08.45 period there were no tactical delights - the Albatross ran at full speed to Gotland, and the Russian cruisers were catching up at full speed. But the maneuvering of ships in the last phase of the battle (approximately from 08.45) is completely beyond reconstruction. According to the German scheme, ed. G. Rollman, the Russian cruisers (all four) brazenly invaded the Augsburg in the territorial Swedish waters and finished off it already there. According to the Russian maneuvering scheme, they simply cut off Augsburg all exits from Swedish waterways (Bayan from the south, Admiral Makarov from the east, and Bogatyr and Oleg from the north) and shot him without disturbing the sovereignty of Sweden - unless the shells flew.

Who is right? Without a doubt, it would have been beneficial for the Germans to imagine that the Russians invaded the territorial waters of Sweden, even if this was not the case. And vice versa - it made sense for Russians to refrain from violating Swedish sovereignty in every possible way, if such was the case. This is not a question of honesty reports, it is a question of politics, and in it, as we know, all means are good. Nevertheless, the Russian version of events seems to be more reliable, and here's why. If the Russian ships really entered tervoddy, it would not be difficult for them to get close to the Albatross thrown onto the stones and examine it in detail. But in this case the subsequent dispatch to the German minzagu of the submarine “for clarification” lost all meaning - however, the submarine was sent, moreover, according to the wish of M.K. Bakhireva. In his report, the Russian commander indicates:

"Having made sure that the Albatross was badly shot down and rushed ashore, I informed the telegram:" After the battle, after being damaged, the enemy cruiser rushed ashore on the opposite side of Fr. Gotland, behind the Östergarn lighthouse. I consider it useful to send a submarine to the place of the accident. "


And why, in fact, was Russian not to violate the sovereignty of Sweden, not to break into its territorial waters and absolutely not destroy the Albatross? The fact that M.K. Bakhirev did not do this, he was blamed by many researchers. Usually they refer to Germans who respected the territorial right of other countries only when it was beneficial for them. AG spoke very figuratively and emotionally on this issue. Patients:

“Talking about some kind of neutrality is nothing more than a fig leaf. Neutrality is respected when it is beneficial. Remember the story of the destruction of Dresden. The Germans spat on Chilean neutrality until a British squadron arrived. Here Ludeke has become a champion of the purity of international laws. But Luce was absolutely right, who said: "My business is to destroy the enemy, and let diplomats understand the intricacies of the laws." "Bakhirev did not dare say so, again demonstrating cowardice and lack of will of the highest command staff of the Russian fleet."


But it should be understood that this issue is much deeper than it might seem at first glance, and can in no way be considered solely within the framework of “decisiveness” or “lack of will”. Let us quote a fragment of the monograph by D.Yu. Kozlov, dedicated to the Memel operation, relating to the beginning of the First World War:

“The higher command did not tire to remind the Baltic command that its main task was to prevent the breakthrough of the superior German naval forces in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland ... ... and demanded that the fleet be protected from the slightest risk and retained for the decisive battle in the central mine-artillery position. However, such close attention to the rate was initiated by the commander of the Baltic fleet, von Essen, who, in the first days of the war, on his own initiative almost provoked a war with neutral Sweden. The Supreme Commander, who managed to stop Nikolai Otovich’s escapade at the last moment, considered the admiral’s actions “to be a defiant act and an undeserved insult to the Swedes loyal to Russia”.


Unfortunately, the author of this article did not understand what kind of Nikolai Ottovich’s “escapade” was meant, but the fact is that after such an “affront” the sailors could have received the order in an official or unofficial manner: “In no case will the neutrality of Sweden violate!". And if they received such instructions, then, of course, they were obliged to carry it out. At the same time, German or English sailors could have completely different orders, or no orders at all, which untied their hands. In other words, today we do not have complete information on this issue, we do not know what instructions M.K. Bakhirev and, accordingly, can not make judgments on this.

The only thing that we can say for sure is that the “Gotland incident” did not entail serious political consequences - the diplomats of Russia worked well and the Swedish Crown was completely satisfied with the Russian explanations. A.K. wrote very ironically about this. Weiss:

“... and even then we were so enthusiastic about shooting that we didn’t notice that Albatross entered the area of ​​Swedish waters, and several of our shells almost hit the island of Gotland. Subsequently, this left a whole correspondence with the Swedish government, almost a diplomatic gap. But, in the end, everything was somehow settled: a fog was dragged here and all the inevitable accidents at sea. In a word, it turned out that almost Sweden itself was to blame for all this, since their island Gotland at the moment was not only standing in the wrong place, but in addition got on our shots. ”


So, completing the description of the first episode of the battle in Gotland, we conclude that the Russian commander has absolutely nothing to reproach. Say that M.K. Bakhirev "did not decisively move closer to the German ships, but" started complicated maneuvering ", because his ships always went either to intercept the course of the enemy minelayer, or else they were catching up on a parallel course (the exception is bypassing the smoke of the 2 th cruiser brigade ). That is, M.K. Bakhirev did just that in order to get closer to the enemy as quickly as possible, and the fact that the Germans surpassed his ships in speed and even the Albatross, developing to 20 knots, was almost as good as Russian cruisers. Formally, of course, the Bogatyr-type cruisers could go 23 bonds, but in practice the “Oleg” did not develop so much. Russian artillerymen showed excellent possession of the material part, giving a “high percentage” of good hits. M.K. Bakhirev in this episode of the battle made few decisions, but none of them can be considered erroneous. The fact that he did not order to focus the fire on the enemy destroyers going into the attack, but continued to pursue Augsburg, concentrating on it the 203-mm and 152-guns, should be considered not only a faithful, but also a bold act of the commander. Chances to destroy the "Augsburg" from M.K. There was practically no Bakhirev, unless an accidental and very successful hit knocked him a move: the Russian commander tried to realize this opportunity — not his fault that the miracle did not happen.

In general, it can be stated that neither the 1 brigade of cruisers, nor its admiral for their actions deserve any reproach. But now the Russian ships were waiting for a meeting with the armored cruiser "Roon".

Продолжение следует ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 1
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 2
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 3. Cruisers opened fire
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 4. Carfat Retreat
56 comments
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  1. Cat
    Cat April 10 2018 05: 23
    +6
    Thanks Andrew for continuing the cycle, not an article but a song !!!
    I sincerely wait for what will happen next ........
  2. SASHA OLD
    SASHA OLD April 10 2018 06: 53
    +3
    gorgeous analysis, thanks again, I just recently got carried away by the marine theme, so it’s doubly interesting
  3. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich April 10 2018 06: 57
    +6
    The author is a gorgeous plus !!! good yes
    Everything for me personally is clear, the thought has been brought up and it coincides with mine. In the battle, WHERE the projectile hit and what are the consequences of hitting the projectile (hence what the projectile was). In terms of accuracy, after Tsushima, I don’t think that the quality of fire would be neglected in the RIF. On the contrary, in order to increase the combat effectiveness of the Fleet, what was left was required to be brought into proper condition, and this could only be done with quality.
    So, the author very intelligibly explains why the result of the battle at that time was just that. Because besides the senior artilleryman of the ship and its subordinates, there are also many other factors influencing the overall picture ... And as an example, we can cite the words of Pashen, senior artilleryman “Lyuttsov” that they did not see the ships of the 3rd squadron of Hood, only flashes of shots, but the British saw them very well, the proof of which was 8 armor-piercing shells received in 8 minutes, which became fatal for the flagship of Hipper.
    Bravo again, Andrei Nikolaevich hi
    1. avt
      avt April 10 2018 08: 28
      +7
      Quote: Rurikovich
      So, the author very clearly explains

      Well, she really tries not to express her vision of the issue on facts with a digital figure, but on facts. good And in this cycle, not Pikul even once. bully
      1. volodimer
        volodimer April 10 2018 18: 37
        +2
        Andrei, as always, very competently and superbly describes the essence of the issue. Argumentation is at the highest level, and accordingly, refutation requires a serious level of argumentation. And therefore, there is no place for emotions and chatter, only facts and evidence.
  4. parusnik
    parusnik April 10 2018 07: 21
    +5
    Captures with each article, we look forward to continuing
  5. Russian jacket
    Russian jacket April 10 2018 08: 25
    +3
    Great article, thanks! hi
  6. Captain45
    Captain45 April 10 2018 09: 54
    +1
    However, now the Russian ships were waiting for a meeting with the armored cruiser Roon.

    Продолжение следует ...

    We look forward to seeing you !!! hi
  7. arturpraetor
    arturpraetor April 10 2018 11: 12
    +8
    By the way, when determining the accuracy of Russian shooting under Gotland, one should also not forget about the design features of the Bayans, namely that they have only eight eight-inches, i.e. the maximum quantity in a salvo is 2 pieces. That is, of course, the pursuit of their German ships was terrible for the Germans, but in fact the 3 "Bayan" were equal to the 1,5 normal armored cruisers of their time in terms of weapon power, and in terms of fire efficiency they were approaching one (from three different ships the fire is much heavier than with one). Besides firing at all 2 shells in a salvo, it’s not so convenient, but also constant maneuvering, and also fog ... In general, even if the Russians fired worse than colleague Andrei from Chelyabinsk pointed out, call it poor shooting would be difficult - the Bayans themselves did not contribute to high accuracy, so 4,29-9,23% of the eight-inch hits on Albatross is a very good result.
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich April 10 2018 18: 49
      0
      Quote: arturpraetor
      but in fact 3 “Bayan” equaled 1,5 normal armored cruisers of their time in terms of armament power,

      Artyom hi At the same time as the button accordions laid down after the REV, armored cruisers such as Amalfi and San Giorgio in Italy, Montana in the USA, Tsukuba in Japan, and Minotaurs in England were laid in other fleets at the same time. . Therefore, in what proportions to compare "Bayan - request ... The only thing they could really compete with was not the last Germans (the last two Scharnhorsts and Blucher would not have left stone upon stone ...) so all these types were built simultaneously with the Bayans "...
      Quote: arturpraetor
      (firing from three different ships is much harder than firing from one

      So one in three is also not able to shoot - while you fire at one target, the other two calmly shoot at you wink And despite the fact that rangefinders with artillery trained, the work of three shelling one will not be
      Quote: arturpraetor
      It is also worth not to forget about the design features of the "Bayans", namely that they have only eight eight-inches, i.e. the maximum amount in a salvo is 2 pieces.

      So they knew when they built them, about these design features! It’s another matter that they ordered to make up for the losses incurred during the RVE, although they were still not built quickly and de facto went into operation as obsolete request
      1. arturpraetor
        arturpraetor April 10 2018 18: 54
        +1
        Quote: Rurikovich
        Artyom, simultaneously with the “button accordions” laid down after the REV, armored cruisers like “Amalfi” and “San Giorgio” in Italy, “Montana” in the USA, “Tsukubi” in Japan, and “Minotaurs” in England. Therefore, in what proportions to compare "button accordions - ...

        So I’m figurative)) In any case, there are few 2 guns in a salvo for effective shooting - at least 4 is needed. If there were 4 203-mm guns - it would have been bearable for shooting, but 2 ... Although you can compete, you won’t get optimal 4 shells in a salvo. Well, as for the direct comparison with classmates, then yes, I completely agree: Russia made a unique economic move, having received one (theoretically) sensible armored cruiser at a price of three laughing It would be better if they built another "Rurik", by golly. It will be necessary, by the way, to compare the price tags - maybe 2 would be enough ...
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich April 10 2018 19: 00
          0
          Quote: arturpraetor
          In any case, 2 cannons in a salvo for effective shooting are few - you need at least 4.

          I agree yes At the time of the construction of the first “Bayan,” the battle distances were not even longer (they thought so), therefore it was considered not to be shameful to have thrashing with analogues on 20-25 cable ones and with two 8 ”mi
          Quote: arturpraetor
          Russia made a unique economic move, having received one (theoretically) sensible armored cruiser at the price of three

          “They wanted the best - it turned out as always” (E.M. Primakov)
          Quote: arturpraetor
          It would be better if they built another "Rurik", by golly. It will be necessary, by the way, to compare the price tags - maybe 2 would be enough ...

          From, by the way, a wise offer fellow If not laziness and then for the sake of interest it was possible to compare wink If you, of course, do not bother repeat
          1. arturpraetor
            arturpraetor April 10 2018 19: 25
            +1
            Quote: Rurikovich
            From, by the way, a wise offer. If not laziness, and then for the sake of interest it was possible to compare. If, of course, it does not bother you

            Yes, it’s pointless to write a lot of text, because I’ll just give the numbers right away:
            "Rurik" II - the full contract value of 1,5 million pounds, or 14,685 million rubles;
            French Bayans - about 7,3 million rubles with weapons (according to the Ship List and the lead ship, Admiral Makarov cost about the same), Russian Bayans - each cost 637500 more, i.e. about 7,945 million rubles. In total, the entire trinity of post-Ryavsky "Bayans" cost about 23,19 million rubles.
            Two “Ruriks” cannot be built, but there is definitely enough for one, and there will still be 8 millions. Actually, the Bayans of Russian construction cost about the same as the Rurik.
            1. Rurikovich
              Rurikovich April 10 2018 19: 34
              +1
              Thank you hi
              Well, let's estimate how much the “Rurik” in terms of firepower exceeded the trinity of “Bayans”? And this despite the fact that the obsolete "Bayan" was built at the same time with the "Rurik"
              "Prudently" Mother Russia Handled Finances what
              1. arturpraetor
                arturpraetor April 10 2018 19: 40
                +1
                Quote: Rurikovich
                Well, let's estimate how much the “Rurik” in terms of firepower exceeded the trinity of “Bayans”? And this despite the fact that the obsolete "Bayan" was built at the same time with the "Rurik"

                Better not laughing
                And if necessary - the “Rurik” only in the airborne volley eight-inch twice as much as the “Bayan”. But still 4 254-mm guns ... In total, one "Rurik" will be stronger than even all three "Bayan" combined, and more caliber guns GK can still resolve faster than eight inches.

                And after all, “Bayan” could still not be so bad, if they had at least more speed, or the caliber of the GK is thicker - there would be a completely different conversation! And so - even the lead ship is rather dubious, and the subsequent ones at the time of commissioning - full am
                1. Rurikovich
                  Rurikovich April 10 2018 20: 40
                  0
                  Quote: arturpraetor
                  And if necessary, “Rurik” has only twice as many eight-inch volleys in the airborne volley as “Bayan”

                  Yes, I don’t even take how much quantitatively, but how much more qualitatively - the Rurik’s artillery Gk and SK are much longer range with heavier shells than the Bayans smile
  8. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer April 10 2018 15: 18
    +1
    Why is it necessary to consider the percentage of hits on one ship?
    Is there any certainty that most of the shells hit the 40 cable distance?
    “Ships did not come closer than 3 miles” (from the report of the captain of the 2nd rank, Prince MB Cherkasov), what was the visibility at that moment?
    From a distance of 3-4 miles - the average percentage of hits should be under 45-50% and increase the overall percentage of hits - i.e. to draw conclusions about accuracy without having data on the distance is counter-productive.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      April 10 2018 15: 58
      +5
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      Why is it necessary to consider the percentage of hits on one ship?

      Because the consumption of shells for the second (20-25 shots from the cruiser for the target periodically disappearing from the visibility) is irrelevant
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      Is there any certainty that most of the shells hit the 40 cable distance?

      From 30 to 40.
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      From a distance of 3-4 miles - the average percentage of hits should be under 45-50% and

      My jaw dropped under the table. Please name the ship that in combat conditions achieved such a feat
      1. alsoclean
        alsoclean April 10 2018 18: 43
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

        My jaw dropped under the table. Please name the ship that in combat conditions achieved such a feat

        27 March 1941 years at Cape Matapan HMS WARSPITE hi
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA April 10 2018 18: 48
          +1
          Quote: alsoclean
          27 March 1941 years at Cape Matapan HMS WARSPITE

          There the distance was half as much:
          The Worspite and Valiant simultaneously fired at the Fiume of 15 "guns. The distance to the target was 2900 yards for the Worspite and 4000 yards for the Valiant. At the same time, the Valiant launched its 4,5" guns . Fiume quickly caught fire - from the bridge to the aft tower. This tower got a direct hit and flew overboard.
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          April 10 2018 18: 58
          +2
          Quote: alsoclean
          27 March 1941 years at Cape Matapan HMS WARSPITE

          Alas, we can not say this for sure, since the exact number of hits in Italian ships is unknown. In addition, the shooting was conducted not at 3-4 miles, but at 3 000 yards, it is less than 1,5 miles
          1. alsoclean
            alsoclean April 11 2018 00: 11
            +3
            Well then, November 1942 - Guadalcanal. Tacao + Atago vs South Dakota. 16 - 203mm gifts in 15 minutes from 20 trunks in total. There are about 29 cables ....
            1. arturpraetor
              arturpraetor April 11 2018 00: 24
              +3
              Yeah, that's just for 15 minutes 20 203-mm guns fired the smallest 300 shells, i.e. their accuracy is 5,3 percent. Somehow not very similar to the declared 45-50% wink
              1. alsoclean
                alsoclean April 12 2018 20: 33
                +2
                Well, if you take the nominal rate of fire "type3 No. 2" then for 15 minutes there will be up to 1200 (!) Shells. But....
                1) Night (lighting problems)
                2) Heading angle - not all guns in these 15 minutes
                3) The ammunition of the Japanese came to a logical conclusion
                So information about 70-80 shells from the lips of the Japanese may well be true
                This is only 20% percent, but if you consider that Takao could shoot more than Atago - who knows, maybe Takao came out at 40% ....
                1. arturpraetor
                  arturpraetor April 12 2018 20: 47
                  +1
                  Yes, it turns out painfully tight. In any case, even if this is so - one case out of many, on 3-4 miles the accuracy in 45-50% is somewhere between wild luck, phenomenal craftsmanship and science fiction, it’s by no means the norm and “should be” like said a colleague.
                  1. alsoclean
                    alsoclean April 12 2018 21: 01
                    +2
                    Well, of course you are right. For PMV, an efficiency of 4-4,5% is considered very, very good. The prize ships of Spee or Eberhard could give both 6 and 7%. The rest is “from the evil one.” Sudden attacks, golden salvos, etc.
          2. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA April 11 2018 13: 26
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Alas, we can not say this for sure, since the exact number of hits in Italian ships is unknown.

            Chihiks ... for the British it was important not the number of hits but the fact itself: smile
            Great God, but we got!
            © The commander of the LC "Worthspite".
        3. Comrade
          Comrade April 11 2018 04: 53
          0
          Quote: alsoclean
          27 March 1941 years at Cape Matapan HMS WARSPITE

          Even if this is so, let's not forget that different calibers have different accuracy of fire at the same distance.
      2. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer April 11 2018 14: 21
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        My jaw dropped under the table. Please name the ship that in combat conditions achieved such a feat


        I believe that Nuremberg shot better than 8% finishing Monmouth. Like the entire German squadron in the battle of Coronel.
        Around 21:00, the Monmouth banked on the port side was accidentally found lagging behind the German squadron by the Nuremberg. The German cruiser approached from the port side and after the offer to surrender opened fire, reducing the distance to 33 cable ones. The Nuremberg interrupted the fire, giving Monmouth time to lower the flag and surrender, but the British cruiser continued the battle. A torpedo fired by the Nuremberg passed by, and the Monmouth tried to turn around to use the starboard guns. But the German shells turned him round, and at 21:28 the Monmouth rolled over and went down.


        Cruiser Monmouth.

        Those. the light German cruiser Nürnberg 10 × 105-mm L / 40 SK guns finished off the English light cruiser in 28 minutes at intervals. obviously its accuracy was "somewhat" higher. At the same time, he had in the side salvo 6 not the most powerful 105 mm guns with a barrel length of 40 calibers.
      3. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer April 11 2018 14: 52
        +1
        [quote = Andrey from Chelyabinsk] My jaw fell under the table. Please name a ship that achieved such a feat in combat conditions [/ quote]

        I suppose the battle between the rags with Sydney and the raider “Cormoran” is not quite, but it fits.
        It really began at a distance of 1300m and lost Sydney half of the artillery in the first minutes of the battle, ended at 6 km.
        Most sources report that the first salvos of all eight Sydney guns passed over the Kormoran, although some Germans stated that the shells passed without exploding through a pipe and a radio room on the bridge and fell into the water behind the raider. One analysis stated that it was only a warning shot over the raider's add-ons or an attempt to destroy the raider’s bridge in order to force his team to surrender ...
        When two Kormoran guns fired a salvo (two center raider guns were not yet ready to fire due to a delay in unmasking), the gun officer tried to cover the cruiser’s bridge, but failed, shells hit the cruiser’s side or passed over the pipes. At the same time as the “Kormoran” gun salvo, it launched a simultaneous torpedo salvo from two starboard vehicles. The close range allowed the raider team to launch anti-aircraft weapons, which did not allow the Sydney team to use additional weapons ....
        ... Stopping, “Cormoran” continued to conduct intense fire, some sailors claimed that 450 shells were fired during the second phase of the battle and noted hits in the cruiser, although with the increase in the distance between the ships many shells passed the target. The raider fired the last shot at 17.50, being at a distance of 6 km from the cruiser, at 18.00 a torpedo was fired, but it did not hit the Sydney.

        Stopping, “Cormoran” continued to conduct intense fire, some sailors claimed that 450 shells were fired during the second phase of the battle and noted hits in the cruiser, although with the increase in the distance between the ships many shells passed the target. The raider fired his last shot at 17.50, being at a distance of 6 km from the cruiser, at 18.00 a torpedo was fired, but it did not hit the Sydney. [/ Quote]
  9. Comrade
    Comrade April 11 2018 04: 27
    +1
    Dear Andrey, once again you touched on an interesting topic, thanks +!

    The analysis is interesting, especially regarding the possible number of shells fired. However, there are several places that need clarification. Sorry, if something is wrong, dear colleague, I always criticize your work :-) However, I will try to rehabilitate myself in your eyes, on the anniversary of Tsushima I will try to post a thematic article dedicated to the death of one of the battleships. The main thing is that there is enough time :-)

    After the battle, the Germans sent their commission to the wrecked mine layer, in order to assess the extent of its damage. This commission worked for a couple of days, and it was just that it counted 6 hits eight-inch and 20-six-inch hits in a German ship.

    Dear colleague, this data is from the report of the ship's commander, Fregattenkapitän West.

    Unfortunately, there is no way to evaluate the accuracy of the 152-mm guns

    According to West's report, the minimum number of shells (as estimated by ship officers) fired at Albatross is 3 000. Based on the assumption that "130-140 eight-inch shells fired at Albatross", then the share of six-inch falls from 2 860 to 2 870 shells. It really got into the mine layer nine 6 "shells, which gives us 0,31%. Or 0,62%, if the number in 3 000 shells is doubled.

    Russian ships failed to hit Albatross and Augsburg during the first 15 minutes of the battle

    According to German data, the first shell hit the Albatross forty-five minutes after the start of the battle.

    It is possible that in fact there were fewer of them, that the Swedes were mistaken in something

    Dear colleague, the charge weight of an 8 '' projectile is 33,4 kg, of an 6 '' projectile from 11,5 to 12 kg. Accordingly, the nature of the damage will be different, which is clearly visible in photographs taken in close-up. Well, the diameter of the inlets, of course. In addition, some of the shells already at the shipyard in Oskarhamn, the Swedes found unexploded.

    If the Russian ships really entered the tervods, it would not have been difficult for them to get close to the Albatross that had thrown to the stones and to examine it in detail.

    There was fog and unfamiliar waters, one could easily run aground next to the Albatross.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      April 11 2018 19: 00
      +1
      Greetings, dear Valentine!
      Quote: Comrade
      Sorry, if something is wrong, dear colleague, I always criticize your work :-)

      The only thing I can complain about is that you, alas, are inattentive to my argument. But I am not in any way in a claim to you, because I understand perfectly well - despite the time pressure in which you are now thoughtfully reading articles for you - an impermissible luxury. I sincerely hope that over time your working day will come to some reasonable limits, and repair ... well, here, alas, because it is eternal. It can be started, but never finished ....
      Quote: Comrade
      Dear colleague, this data is from the report of the ship's commander, Fregattenkapitän West.

      Then, unfortunately, they have even less faith. The commander had 100500 affairs other than how to calculate where which projectile hit and determine their calibers. Of course, he did it, and of course, the accuracy was slightly higher than that of Kostenko, but ...
      Quote: Comrade
      According to West's report, the minimum number of shells (as estimated by ship officers) fired at Albatross is 3 000

      Dear colleague, I do not see a single source from which West could receive such information. Accordingly, I have to believe that his estimate was taken by the method of "half-finger-ceiling, adjusted for the azimuth of the North Star." Yet the memories of Earl and Weiss look much more reliable.
      Quote: Comrade
      According to German data, the first shell hit the Albatross forty-five minutes after the start of the battle.

      That's right. And during these 45 minutes, the first 10 minutes were not fired at Albatross (the battle started at 07.35, and Bogatyr and Oleg opened fire at 07.45), then the 15 minutes of shooting mentioned by me, after which Albatros was hidden at about 08.00 (or earlier) behind the smoke screen. Again 10 minutes on the ship no one shoots. Albatross fire resumes in 08.10 and the first hit follows in 08.20.
      In other words, “45 minutes after the start of the battle” and “45 minutes after the start of firing on the Albatross” - these are not synonyms.
      Quote: Comrade
      Dear colleague, the charge weight of an 8 '' projectile is 33,4 kg, of an 6 '' projectile from 11,5 to 12 kg. Accordingly, the nature of the damage will be different,

      :))) Dear colleague, the charge is the weight of gunpowder in sacks that send the projectile on the flight :))))
      Quote: Comrade
      There was fog and unfamiliar waters, one could easily run aground next to the Albatross.

      Hardly - visibility was of the order of 5 miles.
      1. Comrade
        Comrade April 12 2018 03: 46
        +3
        My respect, dear Andrew!
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I sincerely hope that over time your working day will come to some reasonable limits

        Alas, it’s like in the song “And the point grinned, and became a comma”. A year ago, I thought it was time to relax, today I understand how naive it was to think so.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Then, unfortunately, they have even less faith.

        However, this information has become canonical :-)

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I do not see a single source from which West could receive such information

        This is a subjective assessment of officers who monitored the shelling of their ship.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        “45 minutes after the start of the battle” and “45 minutes after the start of firing on the Albatross” - these are not synonyms.

        I agree, you are right.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Dear colleague, the charge is the weight of the gunpowder in the cap, which sends the projectile in flight

        Yes, I got complete nonsense :-)

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Hardly - visibility was of the order of 5 miles.

        I will not insist, but there was information that when the Albatross sat aground, it was partially hidden by a low-lying fog.

        Dear colleague, I post some of my thoughts on the topic of the title of your article, maybe they will interest you or someone else.
        In your article, you suggested that Admiral Makarov released 135and "Bayan" - 80- 90 shells caliber 8 ". Total 559032-5386 eight inch shells. Of these, twelve found a target, according to Swedish repairmen. Accuracy of fire from 8 caliber guns ranged from 5,58 to 5,33%. It makes sense to correct the result, since, on the one hand, one of the eight-inch Bayan shells hit the radio antenna of the cruiser Roon, and on the other, the cruiser Rurik released 102 an eight-inch shell, without achieving a single hit.
        So the three cruisers fired 559032-5386 8 caliber projectile, having achieved (including a radio antenna) 13 hits. Shooting accuracy amounted to 4,1-3,97%.
        We pass to 6 "shells. Quote"During the three phases of the battle between the Russian cruisers and the German ships, the first 3 640 shells were first consumed. Of this number, 1750 was fired in the first phase of the battle, 1580 in the second phase and 310 shells in the third phase. It is necessary, however, to make a reservation that if the total figure regarding the number of shells fired during all three phases of the battle can be considered reliable, then the figures relating to each phase separately should be considered approximate due to the lack of accurate data.».
        Subtracting from the total number in 3 640 shells 559032-5386 eight inch and 163 projectile caliber 120 mm, we get 3 150-3 160 6 caliber shells fired at the battle of Gotland.

        Summarize. Accuracy of fire 120 mm guns - 163 shell fired, no hits; shooting accuracy 6" guns - nine hits (0,28%); shooting accuracy 8" guns –13 hits (4,1-3,97%); shooting accuracy 10 " guns - 46 shells fired, no hits.
      2. Comrade
        Comrade April 12 2018 04: 06
        +1
        Sorry, Andrei, I noticed a mistake, 10 '' missiles did not take into account, here is the correct text.

        Subtracting from the total number of 3 640 shells 46 ten inch, 317-327 eight-inch and 163 shells of caliber 120 mm, we get 3 114-3 104 shells of caliber 6 ", fired in the battle of Gotland.
      3. Comrade
        Comrade April 12 2018 04: 46
        +3
        And just in case, the source where the number of 3 640 shells was gleaned. Captain 2 of rank P. V. Lemishevsky "The raid of Russian cruisers on Memel and the battle of Gotland on 19 on June 1915."
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          April 14 2018 10: 15
          0
          Greetings, dear Comrade!
          Quote: Comrade
          However, this information has become canonical :-)

          Colleague, they became canonical because of the lack of other information, that's all. At the same time, I cannot but note the strangeness in your reasoning.
          When on the Bayan they see that the Roon shoots at them with four-weapon volleys, and the Germans write that the volleys were single-armed, then the Germans are right. When the Germans on the “Albatross” counted 3 000 shells that were fired at them, and Lemishevsky writes about the 1750 shells that were fired during the first phase, and for all German ships, and not just for Albatross, are the Germans right again? :))) )
          Quote: Comrade
          Subtracting from the total number of eight-inch 3-640 shells of 317 mm caliber in 327 163 shells, we get 120 3-150 3 160 caliber shells fired in the battle of Gotland.

          You forgot to exclude the 75 mm shells used by the destroyers on the cruiser Bakhirev :)))))
          Colleague, your calculations ... they are very general and do not take into account many factors. For example, between the first and second phases, the Russians fired at the allegedly seen submarines. After Augsburg and destroyers hid in the fog on Russian cruisers, the returning destroyers noticed and fired several shots at them - it was an illusion, in fact, the destroyers did not return, etc.
          And then, your numbers show just magnificent Russian shooting (if you take the general Chokh)
          The total number of projectiles of the main caliber 317-327 of eight-inch + 46 of ten-inch for 12 hits (excluding the antenna) gives 3,48-3,58%, that is, better than the result of the firing of the British and German civilians in Jutland :)))
          1. Comrade
            Comrade April 15 2018 05: 03
            +1
            Dear Andrey!
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Colleague, they became canonical because of the lack of other information, that's all.

            It is unlikely that the information of the Swedish ship repairmen was classified, it was just that nobody needed it. There is a report from the ship's commander, okay.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            At the same time, I cannot but note the strangeness in your reasoning.
            When on the Bayan they see that the Roon shoots at them with four-weapon volleys, and the Germans write that the volleys were single-armed, the Germans are right

            And where in my discussion is the subject of the Roon volleys raised?

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            When the Germans on the “Albatross” counted 3 000 shells that were fired at them, and Lemishevsky writes about the 1750 shells that were fired during the first phase, and for all German ships, and not just for Albatross, are the Germans right again?

            1750 Lemishevsky, as follows from his own words, the same IMHO, as IMHO officers "Albatross" from their 3 000. So why should we discard one IMHO, and take the second on faith? wink
            And let's not forget that the "first phase" of the shelling of "Albatross" was not limited.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            You forgot to exclude the 75 mm shells used by destroyers to cruise Bakhirev’s cruiser

            And when I remembered, it was already impossible to change the comment. Unfortunately, I only have data on "Oleg" who has used up twelve 75 mm shells. How many other three cruisers have fired, I do not know, therefore, for reliability, we multiply the expense of “Oleg” by three for each of them. In this case, it turns out that the even cruisers fired 120 shells of 75 mm caliber. (3 x 12) 3 + 12 = 120.
            In this case, the number of 6 shells fired will decrease from 3 114 - 3 104 to 2 994 - 2 984. A shooting accuracy will increase from 0,28% to 0,3%.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Colleague, your calculations ... they are very general and do not take into account many factors.

            Dear colleague, such “factors” have taken place in any more or less noticeable battle. So, in one episode of the Battle of Jutland, the British battlecruisers fired into the water to shoot down the Germans fire, and in the battle at Cape Shantung, the battleship "Sikishima" spent hundreds of medium-caliber shells on fire.
            Since it is impossible to take into account the consumption of shells in such cases, historians simply neglect them when determining the overall accuracy of firing.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Your numbers demonstrate simply excellent Russian shooting (if you take the general Chokh)

            On the contrary.
            In the battle in the Korean Strait of 1 on August 1904, Russia and Stormbreaker released 1 499 shells caliber 6 '', while hit more than ten times. And here four cruisers release twice as much, but get nine times. The facts are such that Rear Admiral Bahirev's cruiser was fired from medium-caliber guns two times worse than Rear Admiral K.P. Jessen's cruiser. Despite the fact that the Vladivostok cruisers had neither rangefinders nor optical sights, and they themselves suffered greatly from the Japanese fire, unlike the Baltic cruisers, who fired at the enemy, as at a firing range.
            It is not correct to compare the main caliber with the Battle of Jutland, since no one will ever know the general accuracy of shooting in that battle. And in private episodes shooting accuracy can be set only in some cases, and then mostly speculatively.
            Therefore, to compare firing from 8 '' guns, it is better to take more mundane options, where both the consumption of shells and the number of hits are precisely known. It is desirable to choose a similar situation, the strongest with impunity “hammer” the weakest.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              April 15 2018 11: 13
              0
              Good afternoon, dear Valentine!
              Quote: Comrade
              It is unlikely that the information of the Swedish ship repairmen was classified, it was just that nobody needed it. There is a report from the ship's commander, okay.

              And what does the Swedish ship-repairmen have to do with it, are we talking about 3000 shells fired at Albatross? :))))) Well, did the ship-repairmen count them too?
              Quote: Comrade
              And where in my discussion is the subject of the Roon volleys raised?

              In our discussion on althistory, where we examined the accuracy of firing Russian and German ships :)))
              Quote: Comrade
              1750 Lemishevsky, as follows from his own words, the same IMHO, as IMHO officers "Albatross" with their 3 000. So why should we discard one IMHO, and take the second on faith?

              And here is the 2 option. First - we are trying to determine whose IMHO is more realistic. In this regard, the opinion of German officers is absolutely not worthy of attention - as a rule, eyewitnesses were not even able to correctly get into their ship, and let alone the number of shells fired on the ship - I'm sorry, but this is not even funny.
              The second aspect - if we adopt some method of determining the correct IMHO, it should be the same for both parties. If we believe that the ship can accurately determine the number of shells fired at it, then the data on the consumption of Roon shells should be declared false.
              Quote: Comrade
              And when I remembered, it was already impossible to change the comment. Unfortunately, I only have data on "Oleg", who used up twelve 75 mm shells. How many other three cruisers have fired, I do not know, therefore, for reliability, we multiply the expense of “Oleg” by three for each of them

              This is completely unreliable, since the Oleg closed the column - the distance and angle to the German destroyers were such that its projectile consumption was completely not indicative.
              Quote: Comrade
              Since it is impossible to take into account the consumption of shells in such cases, historians simply neglect them when determining the overall accuracy of firing.

              So we write :)))
              Quote: Comrade
              In the battle in the Korean Strait of 1 on August 1904, Russia and Gromoboy fired 1 499 shells of the caliber 6, '' they hit more than ten times.

              Dear colleague, you are comparing too different things. You take one combat episode, and only part of it (without Rurik) and compare it with the TOTAL battle result from Gotland.
              Quote: Comrade
              Despite the fact that the Vladivostok cruisers had neither rangefinders nor optical sights, and they themselves suffered greatly from the Japanese fire, unlike the Baltic cruisers, who fired at the enemy, as at a firing range.

              With excellent visibility and ... from what distances? By the way, 203-mm shells of the Japanese hit 4 times, and not all hits were made by Russia and Gromoboy.
              Quote: Comrade
              The facts are that Rear Admiral Bahirev's cruiser was fired from medium-caliber guns two times worse than Rear Admiral K.P. Jessen's cruiser

              A colleague, let me draw you a place no less logical picture. Gotland fired 1 shells for all ships in the 1750 phase. Bayan used up 80 203-mm, 366 152-mm and an unknown number of 75 mm shells, but taking into account the ten-minute shooting at destroyers, there were hardly less than a hundred of them. 40 shells went to Roon, 20 to albatross, 20 to Augsburg. Subtract 366 from the 50 shells - "frantic shooting" at the submarines before meeting with Roon, subtract 12 - the very few volleys at the destroyers (three airborne) total 304 shells remain - once according to our estimates the flow to Albatross / Augsburg 50 for 50 - Albatross released 152 6-dm projectile.
              Makarov - 135 203 mm shells, of which 20 to Augsburg, half a set of 152 mm (that is, 440 152 mm) a hundred 75 mm - before the battle with Roon minus 50 and minus 12 on submarines and destroyers - 378 shells, we take the expense on the same proportion is the consumption of 203-mm - in total, six-inch 322 were released for Albatross
              A total of 2 cruisers fired an 1221 shell. Oleg and Bogatyr, respectively, 529 shells, including 24 75 mm (12 each) six-inch means 505. Of these, 100 - on submarines (for two cruisers), well, let's say they did not shoot at destroyers - total 405 152-mm
              Total Albatross consumed 405 + 322 + 152 = 879 shells, reached 9 hits, accuracy - 1,02%, Russia and Gromoboy nervously smoke aside.
              In general, a very simple example, as for a few other assumptions that have absolutely the same right to life as those made by you, we get a diametrically opposite result - a very good shooting
              That is why I refused in the article the idea of ​​calculating% on 152-mm shells. You make one assumption - one result, the other - diametrically opposite. In general, there is no fact that under Gotland they shot twice as bad as in the Korea Strait - this is a “selection of the parameter”, take the other initial ones - everything will change.
              Quote: Comrade
              It’s not correct to compare the main caliber with the battle of Jutland, since no one will ever know the general accuracy of shooting in that battle

              ??? Very famous. There are, of course, hits on German and English ships, the consumption of shells, of course, somewhere they calculated something, but this will not affect the overall result - hundredths, well, maybe one tenth of a percent
              Quote: Comrade
              Therefore, to compare the firing of 8 '' guns, it is better to take more mundane options, where both the consumption of shells and the number of hits are exactly known

              I took a specific episode of the battle from Gotland, which can be calculated reliably enough :))) You do not like :)
              1. Comrade
                Comrade April 19 2018 01: 27
                +1
                Dear Andrew,
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                And what does the Swedish ship repairmen have to do with it, are we talking about 3000 shells fired at Albatross? :)

                This is probably a misunderstanding. I got the impression that we are talking about the number and caliber of shells received by Albatross. Swedish data refute the canonical figures from the report of the ship's commander.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                In our discussion on althistory, where we examined the accuracy of firing Russian and German ships :)

                Sorry, forgot :-(
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                and ... from what distances?

                We started with 8 400 meters, there were distances and 6 000 meters, and seven thousand meters.

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                This is completely unreliable, since the Oleg closed the column - the distance and angle to the German destroyers were such that its projectile consumption was completely not indicative.

                Well, offer your reasonable numbers.

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                You are comparing too different things. You take one combat episode, and only part of it (without Rurik) and compare it with the TOTAL battle result from Gotland.

                I would take it with Rurik, but there is no data on the consumption of 6 "ammunition. But nothing, as you probably noticed, the number of hits by 6 shells" has been reduced. So that it doesn’t turn out that three shot, and counted only two.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                In general, there is no fact that under Gotland they shot twice as bad as in the Korea Strait - this is a “selection of the parameter”, take the other initial ones - everything will change.

                Of course it will. But when compared with August 1 1904, they shot from six-inch guns badly, very badly. And you don’t even want to compare with the cruisers of Kamimura :-)
                Here, of course, the matter lies in the unsuitability of a profession, or of Bakhirev, or of his artillerymen.

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                ??? Very famous. Hit in the German and English ships - is

                To the surviving ships - according to reports, and that is not all. To the dead - only presumably.
                And as we saw with the example of Albatross, it is far from always possible to trust these very reports, here the documents of the repairmen are needed.

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                shell consumption - is

                Sorry, how do you know the consumption of shells on the dead battlecruisers, and who counted getting into the unfortunate Wiesbaden?

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                I took a specific episode of the battle from Gotland, which can be calculated reliably enough :)

                In Jutlandsoks battle you can also find episodes where accuracy be healthy :-)
                Speaking of the accuracy of shooting from 8 '' guns, eight-inch guns should be taken for comparison.
  10. bone1
    bone1 April 11 2018 21: 54
    +2
    I didn’t understand- "Albatross threw himself on stones in Swedish territorial waters, that is, he had to be interned right away, what kind of Germans examined him there?" Were they planning to restore it?
    1. Comrade
      Comrade April 12 2018 04: 35
      +1
      Quote: Bone1
      Albatross threw himself on stones in Swedish territorial waters, i.e. had to be interned right away

      From what ? Once the Germans seriously gathered, if the technical condition allows, to tow the Albatross to Germany, then the rules of Swedish neutrality allowed this. Let us recall, for example, the situation with Russian ships that came to foreign ports after the battle at Cape Shantung. They were not interned instantly anywhere, but were given some time to repair and load coal.
      1. bone1
        bone1 April 12 2018 19: 37
        +1
        Yes, they gave it for some time, but then they interned, otherwise the country can be accused of participating in the war. But, “Albatross” in every possible way for the usual 24-72 hours could hardly be removed from the stones and repaired.
        1. Comrade
          Comrade April 13 2018 03: 24
          +1
          Quote: Bone1
          But, “Albatross” in every way for the usual 24-72 hours could hardly have been removed from the stones and repaired.

          They would begin to repair it at home, the main thing is that it stay on the water when towing. Apparently, the commission came to a disappointing conclusion, since they left the Albatross to the Swedes to repair.
        2. Comrade
          Comrade April 13 2018 03: 37
          +1
          "Albatross" during a renovation in Oscarhamn.
  11. geniy
    geniy April 13 2018 18: 51
    +1
    Quote: Comrade
    Summarize. Accuracy of fire of 120 mm guns - 163 shells fired, no hits; accuracy of 6 "guns - nine hits (0,28%); accuracy of 8" guns –13 hits (4,1-3,97%); accuracy of shooting 10 "guns - 46 shells fired, no hits.

    For some reason, none of the experts pays close attention to this fact: that the larger the caliber of the gun, the higher the accuracy of its fire. No, I'm not talking about the fact that you clearly see all this circumstance. I pay attention to the fact that no one gives an explanation for this! After all, it turns out that a large number of medium-caliber guns (for example, on armadillos) are actually very ineffective - because they simply do not fall. And the admirals and shipbuilders of the early twentieth century (that is, the time of the Russo-Japanese war) believed quite the opposite - that the middle caliber seems to play a major role. You walk that all of them were mistaken? And indeed it is. So not only that, even when the REV passed, the German admirals ordered and built a large number of light cruisers armed with 105 mm guns. And as soon as the First World War began, these guns began to be removed and installed instead of their 152 mm guns, which weigh much heavier than 105 mm, and shoot slower. This suggests that not only modern "experts", but even admirals, when ordering ships, do not take into account the fact that large-caliber guns fire more accurately. But modern "experts" and even more so do not understand anything.
    1. arturpraetor
      arturpraetor April 13 2018 19: 28
      0
      Quote: geniy
      I draw attention to the fact that no one gives an explanation for this!

      There is an explanation - a heavier projectile is ballistically more resistant, it is less affected by air resistance, the speed is extinguished much more slowly, therefore it flies further and deviates less from the initial trajectory.
      Quote: geniy
      It turns out that a large number of medium-caliber guns (for example, on armadillos) are actually very ineffective - because they simply do not hit. And the admirals and shipbuilders of the early twentieth century (that is, the time of the Russo-Japanese war) believed quite the opposite - that the middle caliber seems to play a major role. You walk that all of them were mistaken?

      Admirals of that time were going to fight at pistol distances, where the six-inch guns still had good accuracy. Theoretically, they were right. In practice, the progress of heavy artillery and the resulting increase in battle distances reduced the benefits of numerous SKs.
      Quote: geniy
      So not only that, even when the REV passed, the German admirals ordered and built a large number of light cruisers armed with 105 mm guns. And as soon as the First World War began, these guns began to be removed and installed instead of their 152 mm guns, which weigh much heavier than the 105 mm, and shoot more slowly.

      It’s just that the German bet on faster-firing light guns didn’t pay off - in practice, it turned out that an enemy with heavier guns could impose a battle distance, plus the power of the shells nevertheless compensated for the lower rate of fire of caliber guns.
      Quote: geniy
      This suggests that not only modern "experts", but even admirals, when ordering ships, do not take into account the fact that large-caliber guns fire more accurately. But modern "experts" and even more so do not understand anything.

      Everything is much simpler - no plan survives a collision with the enemy yes And in peacetime, admirals are exactly what they are planning, they are engaged in theoretical work, and it is not always possible to practically experience theoretical developments. Meanwhile, only practice can determine whether certain ideas are consistent or not.
  12. geniy
    geniy April 13 2018 20: 29
    +1
    Quote: arturpraetor
    There is an explanation - a heavier projectile is ballistically more resistant, it is less affected by air resistance, the speed is extinguished much more slowly, therefore it flies further and deviates less from the initial trajectory.

    Your explanation is wrong. Although a larger-caliber projectile does indeed lose speed more slowly, we are talking about firing accuracy! So if you look at the magnitude of the ballistic dispersion of projectile drops, then it does not differ much between guns of different calibers. Although there is of course a difference, it is not great. For example, if a twelve-inch gun has dispersion of the order of 10 meters, a six-inch gun of about 15 m - the difference is small, given the width of the hull, for example, an armadillo of 23 meters - then the ode of the guns should fall. However, in reality, firing accuracy six inches several times worse!
    I will not give my personal explanation now, because you still won’t believe it. But I would like to suggest you find official explanation for this phenomenon. That is not yours personal notions which I have the right not to believe as well as you are mine, but such an explanation as given by high-ranking admirals. And why is this a matter of backfill - yes, because high-ranking admirals and artillery apparently did not even know about this paradox, and no official You certainly will not find an explanation.
    1. arturpraetor
      arturpraetor April 13 2018 20: 37
      0
      Quote: geniy
      Your explanation is wrong

      My explanation is correct. The projectile goes astray from the initial predetermined trajectory under the influence of external factors (in addition to barrel wear). A heavier projectile is more resistant to such influences, because at comparable distances a heavier projectile deviates less from the target than a light one, and therefore has higher accuracy.
      Quote: geniy
      I will not give my personal explanation now, because you still won’t believe it.

      It’s scary to imagine what it is))
      Quote: geniy
      But I would like to offer you backfill to find an official explanation for this phenomenon.

      I saw this explanation on the Internet. This was told to me by a friend who used to be an artilleryman in the USSR. This was claimed by other knowledgeable people. So I dare to assume that you are mistaken.
  13. geniy
    geniy April 13 2018 20: 37
    +1
    Quote: arturpraetor
    Admirals of that time were going to fight at pistol distances, where the six-inch guns still had good accuracy. Theoretically, they were right. In practice, the progress of heavy artillery and the resulting increase in battle distances reduced the benefits of numerous SKs.

    And this is your explanation too wrong. Because the amount of dispersion worsens in proportion to that of large, that of medium, that of small guns. That is, if we take the accuracy of the guns arbitrarily as a unit, then with increasing distances it should equally decrease for guns of all calibers.
    Moreover, despite the fact that the angles of the vertical guidance mechanisms, for example, of the six-inch 1900s were such that the distance of the sow was limited to 60 cable, then as a friend proved to me, six-inches even fifty years later had no better ballistic data than the six-inch Varyag or Aurora, and their firing range increased only due to an increase in the elevation angle of the guns. So: if the six-inch Varyag or Aurora were given such an elevation angle that they could shoot at 100 cable, for example, then the accuracy of their shooting even at this distance is very good and no worse than the accuracy of twelve-inch ones. That is, your explanation is wrong. Look for another.
    1. arturpraetor
      arturpraetor April 13 2018 20: 45
      0
      Quote: geniy
      And this is your explanation too wrong. Because the amount of dispersion worsens in proportion to that of large, that of medium, that of small guns.

      You are mistaken. The dispersion increases for different shells to different degrees, I do not know where you read that shells of different weights have the same ballistics.
      Quote: geniy
      So: if the six-inch Varyag or Aurora were given such an elevation angle that they could shoot at 100 cable, for example, then the accuracy of their shooting even at this distance is very good and no worse than the accuracy of twelve-inch ones.

      Unjustified and clearly erroneous statement.
  14. geniy
    geniy April 13 2018 20: 40
    +1
    Quote: arturpraetor
    It’s just that the German bet on faster-firing light guns didn’t pay off - in practice, it turned out that an enemy with heavier guns could impose a battle distance, plus the power of the shells nevertheless compensated for the lower rate of fire of caliber guns.

    What's the problem? Just increase the elevation angle of the 105-mm guns, and they can shoot at the same distances as six-inch guns, and six-inch guns with an increased angle can shoot at the same distance as the twelve-inch guns. And this is your explanation wrong.
    1. arturpraetor
      arturpraetor April 13 2018 20: 48
      0
      For God's sake, go through at least the basics of ballistics before starting to discuss these topics. In the future I will not answer you until you pull up the materiel - time and so little, spend it on a person who has 152-mm, 305-mm and 381-mm shells weighing 50, 400 and 900kg have the same ballistic properties , I am not going to.
  15. geniy
    geniy April 13 2018 20: 43
    +1
    Quote: arturpraetor
    Everything is much simpler - not a single plan survives a clash with the enemy. And in peacetime, admirals do exactly what they plan, do theoretical work, and it’s not always possible to experience theoretical experience. Meanwhile, only practice can determine whether certain ideas are consistent or not.

    And what is the problem of testing the accuracy of guns in peacetime? You will argue that ship gunners all over the world, before the start of any war, supposedly knew that the accuracy of firing smaller calibers is worse than larger ones? But the gunners of the whole world wanted to deceive the admirals (for example, German) and did not inform them of this? This is your explanation too wrong.
  16. geniy
    geniy April 13 2018 20: 51
    +1
    Quote: arturpraetor
    My explanation is correct. The projectile goes astray from the initial predetermined trajectory under the influence of external factors (in addition to barrel wear). A heavier projectile is more resistant to such influences, because at comparable distances a heavier projectile deviates less from the target than a light one, and therefore has higher accuracy.

    It would seem that this is indeed so.
    But the fact is that if you take the average firing distance - for example, about 50 cable ones, then the ballistic dispersion there with large-caliber guns is about 10-20 meters. And for medium-sized guns, even under the influence of wind (of the same force), the dispersion is not much more. That is, in principle, they should equally fall into a large target - into an enemy ship. But in reality - the percentage of hits varies many times. 4% - 0,28%
  17. geniy
    geniy April 13 2018 21: 01
    +1
    Quote: arturpraetor
    152 mm, 305 mm and 381 mm shells weighing 50, 400 and 900 kg have the same ballistic properties, I'm not going to.

    Do not mislead readers. This is not about the ballistic properties of shells of different calibers, which of course are very different, but about dispersion value! And more precisely, not even the magnitude of the dispersion, but whether there is a difference in the magnitude of the ballistic dispersion with an increase in the distance of shells of different calibers, or she is the same this difference.
  18. Evgesha
    Evgesha 8 September 2018 00: 20
    0
    To solve this issue I suggest meeting in a tavern!
    Take a box of cognac and discuss all the nuances of the behavior of falling bodies in the atmosphere of planet Earth.
    We discuss ballistics, as well as the aerodynamic properties of shells.
    And after that, we will try to formulate the final document of our conference - and to make this document recognized by everyone as OFFICIAL.
    Well then .... what am I going to do with cognac tomorrow ???
    If I'm in Chelyabinsk.