Military Review

Strategic pendulum. Part of 2

31
M. Auffenberg believed that the decision to encircle the Russian 5 Army was overdue - it was necessary to carry out a covering flank maneuver. The command of the Austrian 4 Army decided to strike the first echelon of the army - before all the connections of P. A. Plehve had time to concentrate in a fist.


13 August The 25 and 19 corps of the 5 army (its right flank) collided with the forces of the advancing left flank of M. Auffenberg's 4 army. Subsequent events were called the Tomashevsky battle between the Russian 5 and the Austro-Hungarian 4 army, with the support of part of the forces of the 1 army and the group of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand who approached later.

Strategic pendulum. Part of 2

2 card. Austrian 4 and Russian 5 Army 10 - 13 August 1914

25-th korpuc subjected to a frontal impact of the Austro-Hungarian 4-th division and strike from the flank by 13-rd and 25-th divisions and 13-14 of August in the area of ​​Zamosc was defeated (the Austrians announced more than 20 seized guns and remnants the retreating regiments of the 3 Grenadier Division numbered the 4274 man, that is, the division lost up to ¾ composition). August 14 The 25 Corps retreated to Krasnostav.

On August 13-14, the 19 and 5 army corps fought to prevent the advancing enemy. The actions of these compounds made it possible for the 25 corps to detach from the enemy at 20 km.

The 19 Corps fulfilled the most important task - it opposed parts of the 6 and 9 Army Corps and Vitman Cavalry Corps. The battles of 13-14 in August at Tarnavatka were successful (the 39-division of the enemy left the Russians up to 1,3 thousands of prisoners, 2 guns and 5 machine guns). M. Auffenberg defined the loss of the 39 Division as equal to 50% [Auffenberg-Komarow M. von. Aus Österreichs höhe und niedergang; eine lebensschilderung. Műnchen, 1921. S. 296.]. Russian losses - over 2 thousand people.

August 14 Russian 17-I and 38-I divisions repulsed enemy attacks and captured up to a thousand prisoners. In the battles of August 15 also managed to repel all enemy attacks. And the 19 corps repeatedly turned into counterattacks, retaining its position, capturing several hundred prisoners and 1-2 guns.

Nevertheless, despite the tactical victories, the situation was difficult. The retreat of the 25 Corps created an 25-kilometer gap between it and the 19-corps. The last flanks were open. Fearing for the rear of the 19 Corps, P. A. Plehve on August 15 ordered the 25 Corps to advance on Zamost, to divert the Austrians.

At the same time, the 5 and 17 corps of the 5 army, despite the fact that they succeeded, defeating the Austro-Hungarian 10 cavalry division, to go to the rear of the entire 4 army [The Austrians wrote about this: “This division underwent a sudden attack of infantry or dismounted cavalry (Cossacks) in the dawn ... As a result, the division fled. Only her horse artillery along with horse artillery 6-th Kav. The divisions managed to counteract and cover the running horsemen. The composition of 10-th Kaval. divisions were very good shelves, which subsequently proved to be excellent. Golovin N.N. Iz stories 1914 campaigns on the Russian front. Galician battle. The first period. C. 279.]), impacted by the rescued group of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand.

The army, having suffered failure on the flanks, got into a difficult situation: it turned out to be divided into battle groups, and the 19 corps, remaining alone, fought against the enemy's 3 corps, which attacked it from all directions. In his memoirs, M. Auffenberg wrote that he had decided on a wide double coverage of Russians north of Tomashev - which almost led to Gangnam.

But in the new positions, P. A. Plehve consolidated the front, eliminating the dispersal of his troops (although for the present only in relation to the central corps). The left-handed 17 body was pulled closer to the 5, and thus managed to create a single group of three bodies. The right-flank 25 corps operated by Zamoć.

As a result, the 19 corps repelled the onslaught of the Austro-Hungarian 6 and 9 corps: the corps commander, Lieutenant General V. N. Gorbatovsky, with the help of an artillery maneuver, repulsed all enemy attacks, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and holding positions. So, at the Austrian 27 division, 800 prisoners were captured. The Austrian 15 Division of the 6 Corps, moving to the rear of the 19 Corps, itself came under the flank attack of the Russian 10 Infantry Division (more than 15 thousand lost the enemy’s Laschnow) several thousand killed and wounded. prisoners, Russian trophies became 4 guns, the defeat of the division was preceded by the destruction of the 22-Bosnia-Herzegovina battalion - lost 1 people). Russian units lost at Lashhov for two days of the 915 battle of a man.


23. The hero of the Tomashevsky battle - General of Infantry VN Gorbatovsky

On the flanks of P.A. Pleve’s army, the difficult situation remained: the 25 corps maintained a significant gap with the central corps group (withdrawal from Krasnostav allowed the Austrians to bypass it from the north), and the 17 corps of August 15 was attacked in the flank by Austro-Hungarians ( Joseph Ferdinand's group) and retreated. For example, the losses of the 35 division in a battle at Tarnoshin amounted to more than 1100 people and 18 guns. The most affected 137 infantry regiment Nezhinsky lost up to 70-80% of the personnel. The Austrians used armored cars - and the regiments of the 61 division began to retreat to Staroye Selo. 61-I artillery crew, reflecting the enemy attack, shot all the shells, suffered heavy losses in the calculations and left 40 guns on the battlefield (16 of them captured the 1 Tyrolean regiment). 61 Division I lost 21 machine gun from 32 [White A. Galicia battle. C. 124].


3 card. The contours of the Battle of Galicia. Austrian map. Dates - a new style.

By the evening of August 15 9,5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions of the army P. A. Plehve fought 12 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions of M. Auffenberg.


24. Austrian lancers.

The catastrophe of the central group of the 5 Army (5 and 19 buildings) of the “Samson” type loomed — the flanking corps (17 and 25) were defeated. The Austro-Hungarian 2 Corps carried out a deep bypass of the right flank of the central group. And in the 5 center, the Russian divisions (2 - 19, 2 - 5, and 1 - 17 units) opposed the 7,5 infantry divisions of the Austrian 6, 9, and 17 units. On the left flank, a Joseph Ferdinand division’s 3 maneuver was performed. To the east, units of the Austro-Hungarian 2 Cavalry Division were moving.


25. Austrian field battery in battle.

And by the evening of August 17, the situation seemed hopeless - M. Auffenberg put into practice the next beloved Austro-Germanic Cannes. The rear road of the 19 Corps was already under Austrian fire. The Russian corps on the 60-65-km front were covered by a semi-ring - and in order to close the ring, it was necessary to go no more than a transition (1-2 efforts of days).

But the success of the Russian southern armies (3 and 8), and, most importantly, the energetic and solid P.A. Pleve, was not A.V. Samsonov.

On August 17, the commander ordered the 25 Corps to take control of Zamo г.ć (by easing the position of the 19 Corps), knock out the enemy from Krasnostava and close the path to the Hill, and the 5, 17, and 19 corps were given the order back. " P. A. Plehve ordered his commors to act energetically and actively use artillery.

And although the battles for the town of Krasnostav ended in vain for the Russians (after the fire strike the Austrian 45 division advanced to Krasnostava, capturing more than 1 thousand prisoners, the city itself was occupied by the Austrian 24 division), leading the 19 corps, leading active defense and efficiently operating with reserves, acted successfully.


26. Galicia. Soldiers are stocking up water in the bins (photo piece-cap. Korsakov).

The cavalry in reserve (the 10 Don Cossack Regiment) took part in counterattacks against the Austrians and reached enemy artillery and took the gun and charging boxes (16 August). On the same day, Komarov was captured before the Austrians by 800 in a battle. On August 18, during the battles under the Oak, 3 Cossack batteries suddenly opened fire, shooting infantry and 5 enemy batteries. And then the 1-I Don Cossack Division captured 6 light guns, 4 howitzers and up to 350 prisoners.


27. Cossacks in the campaign.

The 19 Corps counterattack (by the time the most significantly bypassed by the enemy) 18 August has improved the situation. The compound, having shown combat stability, bound the 2,5 of the Austro-Hungarian corps, easing the situation on the front of the entire army. But the five-day continuous battle is very tired corps. The losses were very large: in the companies left on the 30-100 fighters (instead of 250), the command staff was knocked out. But the losses of the enemy were also great - for example, the composition of the enemy's 26 division consisted of only 35% of the regular strength.

The neighboring 5 Corps also led successful battles with parts of the Austro-Hungarian 6 Corps. 17-th corps repelled enemy attacks.

5-I army suffered heavy losses. In particular, the 17 and 38 divisions of the 19 corps had an average shortage of 25-30 officers and 2000 soldiers per regiment (i.e., losses up to 50-60%) [White A. Galicia battle. C. 145.].

Under these conditions, the commander adopted 18 on August, an operational decision to withdraw the army from enemy attacks - in order to regroup for further offensive.

A competent retreat maneuver was implemented under the cover of the rear guard and cavalry artillery fire: the army cavalry (1-I and 5-I Don Cossack divisions), in cooperation with the 25-corps, rejected the bypassing Austrian formations to Zamostyu, eliminating the threat of the environment. The Austro-Hungarian 2 Corps, bypassing the right flank of the 19 Corps, was hit in the rear. The divisions of the 2 corps in panic rushed back to Zamo, having lost 10 guns, the 5-I Don division captured more 400 prisoners and 2 machine guns. The forces of the enemy, bypassing the left flank of the army, were also rejected - Consolidated and 7-th cavalry divisions.

Thus, the 5 Army was able to break away from the enemy and safely withdraw to the north on the 3 transition. There was a regrouping. The departure was not a forced retreat, but a separation from the enemy in order to preserve the maneuverability [Golovin N. N. The Battle of Galicia. The first period. C. 505 .; He is. The days of the breakthrough of the Galician battle. C. 21].

The total losses of the 5 army during the Tomaszewski battles amounted to 30000 (including 10000 prisoners - mainly due to flanking corps), the "victorious" Austrian troops lost 40000 (including 20 thousand prisoners) people. The same figures were confirmed by the enemy. [Cm. Auffenberg-Komarow M. von. Aus Österreich-Ungarns Teilnahme am Weltkriege. S. 248.].

The losses were very significant, which characterized the stubbornness and military stability of the forces of both sides in the initial period of the war. The total loss of the 5 Army's infantry divisions was 40-50% of the composition. Thus, the main “birthday boy” of the Tomaszew Battle - 19 Corps - by the end of the first two days of the battle lost 7 thousand people (loss figures increased by the end of the fighting surrounded by only one 38 Division to 100 officers and 8 thousand soldiers, i.e. 35% command and 50% rank and file). But the trophies of the corps were great: 11 guns, 30 machine guns, up to 5 thousand prisoners.

The operation on the environment has turned into a repression - and the result did not justify the losses suffered by the Austrians.


14 card. Tomashevsky battle. 14 environment in August 1914

The plan of the Austrian command to encircle the Russian armies, which were able to forge the main enemy forces, was thwarted — this facilitated the rout of the Austro-Hungarian armies in the Lvov sector.

Nevertheless, the general situation on the northern flank of the battle is not in favor of the Russians - and the 4 and 5 armies suffered setbacks.

During the Lublin-Kholmsky battle, the Russian 4 Army in 10-13 battles with the troops of the Austrian 1 Army suffered a tactical defeat and retreated to Lublin, where 14-20-August was entrenched, successfully repelled the enemy’s attacks.

The Russian 5 Army during the Tomaszewski battle fell into a more difficult situation, and a number of its units were also defeated. But 5-I army escaped defeat and put herself in order, moving to the north and carrying out a regrouping. The withdrawal returned to the army the freedom of maneuver. 4-I army bravely defended at Lublin, fresh troops arrived on its flank, and gradually the advantage in this area went to the Russian. Redeployed reserves are structured in the form of a new 9 army under the command of P. A. Lechitsky. In this situation, the blow of the Germans from East Prussia to Sedlec could fundamentally turn the tide and lead to the disaster of the South-Western Front, but this did not happen.

The most important thing is that the 4 and 5 armies of the Southwestern Front managed to avoid the operational environment. Moreover, it gave the Russian command a gain in time, which was of paramount operational importance - after all, the priority during the “martyr” of the Galician battle was when success was achieved faster: from the actions of the Austro-Hungarian armies in the northern flank of the battle or the Russian 1-th and 4-th armies - on the south.

To be continued
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  1. XII Legion
    XII Legion 23 January 2018 06: 04
    20
    The actions of the 5th Army and its commander made it possible to rectify the situation on the northern flank of the operation and became the most important prerequisite for the successful outcome of the Battle of Galicia.
    Interestingly
    Thank you
    1. kipage
      kipage 23 January 2018 09: 38
      18
      Outstanding domestic analyst and historian Sergei Pereslegin, describing Schlieffen's plan and the place of Austria-Venria in it, wrote:
      The death of Austria-Hungary predetermined the victorious end of the war for the Entente, since Schlieffen himself admitted that Germany was unable to fight against the “Kaunitz coalition” and conduct military operations simultaneously on three fronts. The Russian General Staff correctly assessed the situation and decided to deliver the main blow to Austria-Hungary, with the goal of defeating its armed forces and withdrawing the dual monarchy from the war

      And as he rightly noted, the 1914 campaign was a pace game - Germany could knock down France earlier than Russia - Austria-Hungary. Those. Russia needed not only to defeat Austria-Hungary, but also to influence Germany, distracting it from France.
      And our country coped with such a doublet of tasks (in an atmosphere of insufficient mobilization of forces) - it pulled off the German corps and defeated the bulk of the Austrian troops.
      It was not possible to implement the maximum program for withdrawing Austria-Hungary from the war (due to insufficient forces and changes in the Austrian deployment) - but Russia did a lot, tipping the scales of the campaign and war to the side of the Entente
  2. Olgovich
    Olgovich 23 January 2018 07: 02
    +5
    energetic and firm P. A. Pleve was not A. V. Samsonov.

    But A-Hungary was not Germany ...
    1. XII Legion
      XII Legion 23 January 2018 08: 18
      19
      But A-Hungary was not Germany

      In this case, the Austro-German troops had serious superiority in manpower and artillery.
      The Austrian army supported on this flank the German corps.
      And a significant part of the troops of Austria-Hungary consisted of Austrian Germans and Hungarians (Magyars). The latter in many respects were stronger than the Germans.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 23 January 2018 10: 44
        +3
        Quote: XII Legion
        And a significant part of the troops of Austria-Hungary consisted of Austrian Germans and Hungarians (Magyars). The latter in many respects were stronger than the Germans.

        A significant part consisted of Czechs and Slovaks, Bosnians, Romanians (remember the many thousands of White Bohemian corps?), Which no one was more reliable than.
        And the weapons and they were worse than the Germans.
        The fact that the army of A-Hungary was weaker than the army of Germany is obvious to me. Which by the way, the not so long-standing war between them perfectly confirmed
        1. soldier
          soldier 23 January 2018 11: 18
          16
          12 the legion rightly had in mind, dear Olgovich, that the SIGNIFICANT part of the army consisted of Germans and Hungarians.
          And if we admit that the Slavic contingents are bad (by the way, the Austrian command was blamed for the reasons for the defeat of its 3rd army, where the Slavs were the most) - then why did the Russians and the Bulgarians fight well?
          The armament of the Austro-Germans (in particular artillery standards) for some variations was comparable, as was the structure of the formations. The Germans eagerly used the 305-mm Skoda howitzers, like the Austrian divisions on the French front in 1918.
          The outcome of the Austro-Prussian war was greatly influenced by the element of chance (under Sadovaya 1866. I mean, by the way, and under Waterloo).
          However, the Austro-Hungarian army has since been reformed, and its role should not be underestimated - the backbone of the Eastern Front, at least the first year of the war.
          1. soldier
            soldier 23 January 2018 12: 19
            16
            It was the Battle of Galicia, by the way, that the Austrians turned out to be an equal adversary, as evidenced by, in particular, the defeat of the Russians near Tomashev and Krasnik - and the merit of the Russian army was precisely in that it “broke the ridge” of the Austro-Hungarian army.
            But the latter showed an outstanding ability to recover. And then she acted actively (Ivangorod October 1914, Krakow November 1914, Karpaty, Limanov December 1914, summer 1915, Italian Front (regular victories over Italians) 1915 - 1918, actions on the French Front 1917-18.
            Certainly, the Austrian troops left their mark on the multinational composition (in this sense they are weaker than the monolithic German army) and the Austro-Hungarian landsturm was weaker than the German one.
            By the way - about the Hungarian troops. The Hungarian units were distinguished in both the First and Second World Wars by high stamina and fighting qualities. Hungarian infantry was equivalent to German. The 38th and 39th Honved divisions were one of the most illustrious front-line formations of the First World War, participating (the 39th division in the Gorlitsky breakthrough of 1915 along with the shock German divisions) in key operations.
            And more about the frontline elite. Recently, in one of the articles on VO (Broken Iron) it was rightly noted that during the war a number of elite FRONT units were advanced.
            For example, our 101st PD — it would seem secondary, but it became a shock — under the command of the talented K. L. Gilchevsky.
            So the Silesian Landver Corps - under the command of R. von Wojrsch became an elite front-line formation, distinguishing itself in the Warsaw-Ivangorod operation 1914., near Baranavichy in 1916, etc. Here is what General P. I. Izmestyev writes about him: "The Voirsch corps was called" firefighter "at our front, because they threw it everywhere where a strong spirit, shock and resistant part were needed."
            And at Tarnavka he suffered a heavy defeat - on the northern flank of the Battle of Galicia.
            1. Serge72
              Serge72 23 January 2018 18: 33
              15
              Moreover, the Austrians also collected the best in their 1st and 4th armies.
              For example, the regiments of the 1st Army consisted of: 1st — 82% of Germans, 4th — 95% of Germans, and 14th — 98% of Germans.
              The royal Tyrolean arrows are also an elite of elites.
          2. Olgovich
            Olgovich 23 January 2018 13: 29
            0
            Quote: soldier
            And if we admit that the Slavic contingents are bad (by the way, the Austrian command was blamed for the reasons for the defeat of its 3rd army, where the Slavs were the most) - then why did the Russians and the Bulgarians fight well?

            Russians and Bulgarians fought for themselves, Czechs, Slovaks, for their enslavers, the difference is obvious.
            Quote: soldier
            The armament of the Austro-Germans (in particular artillery standards) for some variations was comparable, as was the structure of the formations. The Germans eagerly used the 305-mm Skoda howitzers, like the Austrian divisions on the French front in 1918.

            German
            the infantry division, including the divisional and corps, had the following number of artillery: 12 field light 6-
            gun batteries (including 1/2 light howitzer batteries) - 72 guns, 2 field heavy 4-gun batteries -
            8 guns, i.e. a total of 14 batteries with 80 guns
            The Austro-Hungarian infantry division had: 6 field 6-gun cannon batteries - 36 guns, 2 light howitzers
            6-gun batteries - 12 guns, 1 heavy howitzer 4-gun battery - 4 guns, 1/2 mountain battery
            artillery - 2 guns, i.e. a total of 9 1/2 batteries with 54 guns.
            Those. -Saturation with Austria’s infantry weapons -A half times less than the German
            Quote: soldier
            The outcome of the Austro-Prussian war was greatly influenced by the element of chance (under Sadovaya 1866. I mean, by the way, and under Waterloo).

            A-Hungary did not have a single chance against Prussia - everything was lost in the shortest possible time - in 2 weeks
            Quote: soldier
            However, the Austro-Hungarian army has since been reformed, and its role should not be underestimated - the backbone of the Eastern Front, at least the first year of the war.

            The Germans have gone into rearmament since then much further, because they spent much more money on the army than the Austrians.
            1. soldier
              soldier 23 January 2018 14: 10
              16
              German
              infantry division, counting divisional and corps

              How to understand this? We consider only divisional artillery.
              German infantry division - 3 three-battery battalions of 6 guns + howitzers.
              Total 72 guns.

              The Austrian division had 42 light guns, not 36.

              Plus howitzer artillery.
              I said - which is comparable, but not equivalent.
              By the way, this is still more than in the Russian division, which did not have howitzer artillery.
              Russians and Bulgarians fought for themselves, Czechs, Slovaks, for their enslavers, the difference is obvious

              Well, this is how to look. Some Slavic peoples lived in AB well - the same Poles. Of the 3 empires of the enslavers AB they loved the most.
              A-Hungary did not have a single chance against Prussia - everything was lost in the shortest possible time - in 2 weeks

              Not everything is so simple with Sadovaya. If it were not for the entry of the 2nd Silesian Army into the battle - who knows (why did he compare it with Waterloo).
              The Germans have gone into rearmament since then much further

              Not much, but just further. Is Manliher much worse than Mauser or field guns very different? He wrote about heavy Austrian artillery - even the Germans appreciated it.
              spent much more money on the army than the Austrians.

              I do not argue with that.
              1. soldier
                soldier 23 January 2018 14: 18
                15
                I will repeat the scheme for Germanic PD
                And then I do not load
                1. Serge72
                  Serge72 23 January 2018 18: 25
                  15
                  Soldier
                  The Austrian division had 42 light guns, not 36.

                  This, as I understand it, is an extract from the Reichsarchive?
                  1. soldier
                    soldier 23 January 2018 19: 02
                    15
                    The second is so accurate.
                    1. Serge72
                      Serge72 23 January 2018 19: 18
                      15
                      1st grade source
              2. Olgovich
                Olgovich 23 January 2018 14: 33
                0
                Quote: soldier
                I said - which is comparable, but not equivalent.

                Sorry, but the difference of 1,71 times (72/42) does not seem comparable to me
                Quote: soldier
                Well, this is how to look. Some Slavic peoples lived in AB well - the same Poles. Of the 3 empires of the enslavers AB they loved the most.

                We are not talking about them (9% of the army), but we are talking about Czechoslovakians, who made up a significant part of the troops: 38% of the army- Chechs, Slovaks, Southern Slavs, Rusyns - none of them burned to fight for A-Hungary
                Quote: soldier
                Not everything is so simple with Sadovaya. If it were not for the entry of the 2nd Silesian Army into the battle - who knows (why did he compare it with Waterloo).

                Before that they had lost all the battles, and the company’s term of 2 weeks says a lot.
                1. soldier
                  soldier 23 January 2018 14: 47
                  15
                  Sorry, but the difference of 1,71 times (72/42) does not seem comparable to me

                  For Germans 72 (this is howitzer), and for Austrians - 42 + howitzer. That is, the gap is not 1,5 times less.
                  Czechoslovakians are not bad fighters in general. They just dreamed of an independent Czech Republic and that’s it. But they fought differently.
                  2-week company term says a lot

                  I don’t know what he’s talking about. The battles came with varying success, the same Sadova. This term speaks only about the birth of a new generation war, new strategies and operational art, and not only (and not so much) about the quality of troops.
                  The Allies in 1940, too, instantly lost to the Germans - but not because they had the worst troops and backward equipment
                  1. soldier
                    soldier 23 January 2018 14: 49
                    15
                    German howitzers had 54 field guns without howitzers
                    1. Olgovich
                      Olgovich 23 January 2018 15: 10
                      0
                      A Austrian frontier without howitzers-36 field guns-http: //wio.ru/galgrnd/artill/ww1/ww1art.htm
  3. soldier
    soldier 23 January 2018 08: 50
    18
    The Tomashevsky operation is an example of a successful parry by the Russian troops of the planned encirclement of the enemy. It is not known how events would unfold if the nucleus of the 5th army were encircled - it's hard to say. Perhaps the SWF was in disaster.
    P.A. Pleve and his comor V.N. Gorbatovsky is the color of the Russian generals and the heroes of WWI.
    1. soldier
      soldier 23 January 2018 09: 08
      17
      Certainly.
      And this speaks both of the maneuverability of the Russian troops, and of the quality of command, the level of generals.
  4. kipage
    kipage 23 January 2018 09: 42
    17
    And S. Pereslegin also wrote that the Galician operation is quote] one of the largest battles of the war, comparable in scale to the Battle of Marne, is almost unknown not only to the Western, but also to the Russian reader, although perhaps this is one of the most glorious pages of Russian weapons [ / quote]
    And thanks to the author for recalling these pages, bringing interesting facts and cool photos wink
  5. Horseman without a head
    Horseman without a head 23 January 2018 10: 36
    16
    Thanks to the author for continuing the informative and richly illustrated cycle.
    Who knows - why did Russia need Galicia?
    1. soldier
      soldier 23 January 2018 11: 21
      16
      Of the economic factors - oil areas. A very significant circumstance.
      Of the socio-political - ethnic and cultural kinship of Ruthenians. In general, upon the accession of Galicia, the Lviv version of 1939 was obtained - 25 years earlier.
      1. Horseman without a head
        Horseman without a head 23 January 2018 12: 39
        16
        Sp-bo for the answer
        But I would like more details
        Maybe the author will write in the future - about Galicia, Rusyns, etc. etc.
        1. soldier
          soldier 23 January 2018 13: 25
          15
          Yes it would be interesting
        2. OAV09081974
          23 January 2018 20: 49
          17
          Be sure to return to this issue.
          hi
  6. soldier
    soldier 23 January 2018 12: 31
    17
    About the mentioned generals.
    About P. A. Plev, the author published a series of articles and a chapter in the book "Successful Generals of the Forgotten War".
    VN Gorbatovsky was a match for him, a knight of the Order of Herogy of the 3rd degree - whose corps became the core of the defense of the 5th army, completely fulfilling the order "not a step back" and cementing the defense. Gorbatovsky distinguished himself in 1915 in the Baltic states and Poland (commander of the 13th and 12th armies).

    P. A. Pleve bowed before the valor and decisiveness shown by General Gorbatovsky in the Tomashevsky battle, and was full of gratitude to his comcor. And after the battle of Galicia ended, he expressed it to him personally - at a meeting with corps commanders in early September, in the region of Cieszanuv.
  7. Some kind of compote
    Some kind of compote 23 January 2018 16: 07
    16
    Hard battle
    But the glory page of Russian weapons.
    What to look for good
  8. Albatroz
    Albatroz 23 January 2018 17: 14
    +2
    I read about the high-quality strategic railway maneuver of the Stavka - the northern armies escaped from the enemy and, after transferring reserves at the 2nd stage of the battle, ran forward
    1. Serge72
      Serge72 23 January 2018 18: 24
      15
      Yes you are right. The High Command railroad castling was important for the northern flank of the battle. True, the armies needed to survive, to restrain the blow of the Austro-Germans until the approach of the third - 9th.
      It was possible, but in the balance ...
      That's the craving for “Gangnam” almost led to the return)
  9. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 25 January 2018 21: 23
    12
    Wonderful and very interesting article. Attention is drawn to both the restraint and composure of General Pleve, and the amazing stamina of the cadre Russian troops. If in the head of the 2nd Army instead of Samsonov there was a commander similar to Plehve, the outcome of the case in East Prussia would be completely different ...