Military Review

The defeat of the German army near Moscow

38
Day of Military Glory of Russia - The day the Soviet troops began a counter-offensive in the battle of Moscow in 1941 year.


The general setting

In October – November 1941, the German army tried to break through to the Soviet capital, Moscow, defeat the main forces of the Red Army and thereby end the war in its own favor. In the near approaches to Moscow furious battles were seething. The enemy in these battles was exhausted and drained of blood. On November 27, Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Wagner reported to Halder: "Our troops are on the eve of a complete depletion of material and human forces." During the second stage of the general offensive against Moscow, the Germans lost over 155 thousand killed, wounded and frostbite. There were high losses in the material part.

There was a turning point in the battle for Moscow. Later, recalling this moment of the war, G. Guderian wrote: “The attack on Moscow failed. All the sacrifices and efforts of our valiant troops were in vain. We suffered a serious defeat ... ". But Hitler did not want to accept the failure of the idea of ​​a Blitzkrieg, he insisted on continuing the offensive. The front command also proceeded from the fact that the forces of the Red Army were exhausted in a hard struggle. The commander of the Army Group "Center" von Bock, in an order from 2 December 1941, noted that "the defense of the enemy is on the verge of its crisis." However, the military-political elite of the Third Reich was wrong. Despite the great sacrifices suffered by the Soviet country and the army near Moscow, the crisis in the defense of the capital has already been overcome. The mobilization possibilities, the socialist system and the national economy of the USSR proved to be much more stable than they were expected in the West. The USSR model of the end of 1930 - the beginning of 1940 - s was much stronger than the Soviet Russia of the period 1920 - the beginning of 1930 – s.

The Soviet Union withstood the first, strongest and most terrible blow, and gradually began to rebound, building up military and economic opportunities, mobilizing all its enormous potential for future victory. This led to a change in the overall situation on the whole front. The enemy could not successfully attack on the entire front. In the second half of November, the Red Army launched strong counterattacks in the north and south of the country, freeing Tikhvin and Rostov-on-Don. The German High Command could no longer withdraw troops from the northern and southern strategic directions in order to strengthen the position in the central (Moscow) sector. And at the front near Moscow, the German troops were stretched over a thousand-kilometer front, a significant part of them (9-I and 2-I field armies) was involved in the fight against the troops of the Kalininsky and the right wing of the South-Western fronts. This eased the pressure of Army Group "Center" on the Western Front, directly covering the capital. Not having serious reserves, the Germans by the end of November lost the opportunity to continue the offensive. And their shock mobile groups were weakened, exsanguinated by protracted heavy fighting, they lost their initial penetrating, mobile capabilities. At the same time, the forces of the Soviet fronts strengthened and increased. The headquarters, in spite of the complexity of the situation near Moscow and in general at the front, sought the opportunity to reinforce the Western front, to create reserves in its rear and to form strategic reserves.

Thus, during the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, the Wehrmacht achieved impressive success - captured the Baltic States and blocked Leningrad in the north, occupied the western regions of the country and went to the near approaches to Moscow, captured Ukraine, Kharkov, a significant part of the Donbass and almost all of Crimea. However, the German army could not immediately take Leningrad, moved to its long siege, immediately break through to the Caucasus, take Sevastopol. German troops could not and take the Soviet capital - Moscow. As a result, the German plan for a “blitzkrieg” against the Soviet Union was thwarted by the stubborn resistance of the Red Army and the people as a whole.

The socialist system showed high efficiency and stability, continuing to work and even increase the basic indicators even in the conditions of the most severe war and occupation by the enemy of the most important industrial and agricultural areas of the Western Union. The German military-political elite (as well as the masters of England and the United States, who created the Third Reich project) miscalculated and underestimated the spiritual, military, economic, and scientific potential of Soviet civilization. Already in 1941, the collapse of Nazi Germany became apparent. The heroes of Brest, Odessa, Sevastopol, Moscow, Leningrad and many other cities, towns and unknown places showed the invincibility of the Soviet Union (Russia) and the people in open battle. Hitler signed the death sentence of the Reich, starting a war with the Russians.

The defeat of the German army near Moscow

A burning Soviet T-34 tank shot down during a battle near the town of Klin

Preparing the offensive

With the beginning of winter and the vast expanses of Russia, the enemy was not expected to win, but to a catastrophe, a harbinger of a future defeat in the war. The Soviet Stavka, having waited for the exhaustion of the forces of the enemy near Moscow and correctly assessing the existing correlation of forces, at the end of November set about preparing a counteroffensive. The main role was assigned to the troops of the Western Front. The stake transferred 1 shock, 10 and 20 armies to the front from their reserves. The immediate task of the counterattack was to smash the attack groups of the Army Group Center on the flanks of the Western Front and eliminate the immediate threat to the Soviet capital, and to tie down enemy troops in the center of the front, and then go over to a general offensive.

By early December 1941, the Army Group Center had more than 800 thousand people, about 10,4 thousand guns and mortars, 1 thousand tanks and over 600 aircraft. Taking into account the reinforcements received, the Soviet fronts defending the capital had about 720 thousand people, 5900 guns and mortars, 415 rocket artillery installations, 670 tanks and 760 aircraft. The Western Front, despite the transfer of the new three armies, did not have an advantage over the enemy. The Kalinin and Southwestern fronts also did not have superiority over the enemy, even in the directions of the main attacks.

However, the psychological factor was on the side of the Red Army. The brutal massacre under the walls of Moscow broke down the morale of the “invincible” Wehrmacht. The Germans in Europe have not yet had to deal with such fierce resistance and resilience of the enemy. Russians stood to death. I had to forget about the blitzkrieg, the war was dragging on and carrying off more and more people. The diaries and letters found and killed or captured by German soldiers and officers often indicated a radical change in the mood of the German troops. Thus, the corporal Otto Saalfinger, in a letter to his parents, noted: “Very little is left to Moscow. And yet it seems to me that we are infinitely far from her. We have been marking time in more than a month. How many during this time lay our soldiers! And if you collect the corpses of all the dead Germans in this war and put them shoulder to shoulder, then this endless ribbon will stretch, perhaps, to Berlin itself. We walk along German corpses and leave our wounded in the snowdrifts. Nobody thinks about them. Wounded is ballast. Today, we are walking over the corpses of those who have fallen ahead: tomorrow we will become corpses, and the tools and the caterpillars will also crush us. ”

The Soviet high command systematically prepared for a counteroffensive. Strategic reserves were created and maintained well in advance, they were promptly pushed onto the flanks of the German strike forces and thrown into a counteroffensive. The strike followed when the Wehrmacht, exhausted and bloodless in long and heavy offensive battles, did not have time to regroup their troops for defense, nor to consolidate themselves on the lines reached. The Germans did not have time to get reinforcements from Western Europe.



Offensive

5 December 1941, the Kalinin Front troops launched an offensive and wedged into the enemy defenses. On December 6, the troops of the Western Front launched an offensive, striking the enemy north and south of the capital, and in the Yelets area, troops of the right wing of the Southwestern Front attacked. A large-scale offensive of the Soviet troops was launched near Moscow. His training was well disguised, and the German command was taken by surprise. The Germans believed that the Russian troops were completely bloodless and incapable of a strategic offensive. Halder, Commander-in-Chief of the German Land Forces Brauchitsch and Commander of the Army Group Center, Bock until the last moment thought that Soviet troops were completely exhausted, that they did not have large reserves and their resistance was already at the limit of capabilities. It was widely believed that the fate of the Moscow battle would be decided by the “last battalion” thrown into battle. Therefore, the Germans attacked to the last, trying to take Moscow. However, as subsequent events showed, the German military-political leadership made a fatal miscalculation.

As a result, the Germans were forced to admit the failure of their assault on the Moscow positions. 8 December 1941, the German High Command ordered his troops to go on the defensive. In the directive No. 39, the German Headquarters ordered: "The main forces of the troops in the East as soon as possible go on the defensive." However, the strategic initiative was already in the hands of the Red Army. On December 16, the German General Headquarters demanded that the Army Group Center not allow a significant retreat, army commanders, formation commanders and all officers were asked to “force the troops to defend their positions with fanatical persistence” in order to gain time before the reinforcements arrived.

The main blows struck the troops of the Western Front. On its right wing, acting against the German 3 and 4 tank groups in the general direction of Klin, Solnechnogorsk and Istra, attacked the 30-I, 1-I shock, 16-I and 20-I armies, as well as part of the forces 5 th shock army. German defense could not withstand the onslaught of Soviet troops. The retreating German troops, trying to hinder the movement of the enemy, used the "scorched earth" tactics, burned settlements, houses, or mined them. December 15 The 1 shock and the 30 armies liberated Klin. The troops of the 16 Army by the end of 8 December drove the enemy out of Kryukov, 11 December - the destroyed city of Istra. During the withdrawal to the western coast of Istria and the Istra reservoir, the Germans destroyed all the crossings, blew up the reservoir dam, which led to serious problems in forcing the water barrier. The West Coast Germans mined and organized a strong fire cover. However, the command of the 16 Army prepared in advance the mobile groups of troops, which bypassed the enemy from the flanks and provided rifle divisions with the crossing of the Istrian border.

The troops of the 20 Army advancing to the north liberated Krasnaya Polyana, December 11 - Solnechnogorsk. The troops of the right wing of the 5 Army, advancing south of the 16 Army, by their offensive contributed to the development of its success in the Istra-Volokolamsk area. Particularly successful was the 2 Guards Cavalry Corps of L. M. Dovator. After passing through the front line through a dense forest southwest of Zvenigorod, the Soviet cavalry made a breakthrough, cutting off the German troops' withdrawal routes to Volokolamsk and Ruza. In these battles of December 19, General Lev Mikhailovich Dovator was killed.

The troops of the Kalinin front 16 December liberated Kalinin and advanced to Staritsa and Rzhev. By the end of the month, rejecting the enemy on 50 - 100 km, they reached the line of Volga, Rzhev, Zubtsov, Pogorelo Mound. Here the front has stabilized. The troops of the right wing of the Western Front in the second half of December captured the cities of Vysokovsk, Teryaev Sloboda, Volokolamsk and the main forces reached the line of the Lama and Ruza rivers, where the enemy prepared a strong defense.

Thus, during the December battles, the 9-I field 3-I and 4-I tank armies suffered a serious defeat. The threat to the Soviet capital from the northwest was eliminated. The advancing Soviet troops liberated hundreds of settlements in the Moscow Region and cleared the important Kalinin-Moscow railway.


The Red Army in the German tank Pz.Kpfw. III, captured in Kryukovo near Moscow

The cavalrymen of the 2 Guards Cavalry Corps of the 16 Army of the Western Front, in the center with a map in their hands, the commander of the Guard Corps, Major General Lev M. Dovator

Against the southern wing of the Army Group Center, the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops also developed successfully. Part of the left wing of the Western Front, the 49, 50 and 10 armies, the 1 Guards Cavalry Corps, interacting with the troops of the right wing of the Southwestern Front, attacked Guderian’s 2 tank army and covered it with south of the 2-th Weihs field army. German troops in this area did not manage to completely surround and take Tula, which was held by units of the 50 Army. The troops of the German 2 Tank Army that were broken into Kostrovo and Revyakino along the Tula-Moscow highway were defeated by the 49 and 50 armies that had switched to the counterattack. The 1-th Guards Corps of General A.P. Belov was active. The cavalrymen on the night of December 7 broke into Mordves. In the morning of December 6, the fresh 10 Army under the command of Lieutenant-General F. I. Golikov launched an offensive. December 7 was released the city of Mikhailov.

As a result, in the very first days of the counter-offensive of the left wing of the Western Front, Soviet troops captured the cities of Mordves, Mikhailov, Venev, Stalinogorsk, Epifan. The German 2 Tank Army defeated in the Tula region retreated, throwing heavy weapons and equipment. Developing success, our troops drove the enemy out of Bogoroditsk, Dedilovo, Aleksina, Plavsk. December 15 50 Army troops liberated Yasnaya Polyana. At the same time, the right wing of the South-Western Front 9 December, after four days of hard fighting, occupied Elec. Developing the offensive, our troops liberated Chern, Efremov, Livny and hundreds of other settlements. German 2-I field army suffered a defeat. 18 December The headquarters restored the Bryansk Front, which launched an offensive in the general direction of Bolkhov and Orel, supporting the movement of the Western Front. 2-I tank army was defeated and on a broad front was rejected for Oka. The approaches to the capital were provided from the south.


Soviet T-40 tanks with assault rifles in machine guns in the winter forest

During the retreat of the German troops, an 30-kilometer gap appeared between the left flank of the 2 Tank Army and the right flank of the 4 th Field Army. The command of the Western Front from the 50 Army formed the operational group of troops V. S. Popov. Speaking on the night of December 18 from the area east of Tula, the group’s forces overcame 90 km in three days and by the evening of December December 20 unexpectedly reached the enemy for Kaluga. The struggle for this large knot of roads and an important supply base of the German army continued for 10 days. 30 December Kaluga released. Soviet troops also occupied Kozelsk and Belev.

In the second half of December, the counteroffensive unfolded in the center of the western front. The troops of the 33 and 43 armies broke through the enemy defenses at the line of the r. Nara and freed Naro-Fominsk, Maloyaroslavets and Borovsk. 49-I army, advancing from the Serpukhov region, crossed the Oka River and, coming to the west bank of the river, took the battle with Tarusa.

Thus, the first stage of the counteroffensive near Moscow by the beginning of January 1942 was successfully completed. German Army Group “The center that had previously attempted to take Moscow, the Soviet capital, the country's largest industrial center and communications hub, was defeated and thrown back from the city on 100-250 km, and the troops of the Soviet fronts swept it from the north, east and south. The Moscow and Tula regions, a number of districts of other regions and hundreds of settlements were freed.

The Red Army won up in the largest and most difficult battle for Moscow. Germany suffered the first major defeat in World War II and the Great Patriotic War. The enemy’s plan for a “lightning war”, with the aim of destroying Soviet civilization and the people, was finally buried in the fields of the Moscow Region. "Historical victory in the Moscow battle, - noted Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, - which became a triumph of the Soviet Armed Forces, marked the beginning of a radical turn not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the entire Second World War. The defeat of the Nazis near Moscow triumphantly ended the first, most difficult stage of the struggle on the path to a complete and final victory over fascist Germany. "

The Moscow battle finally dispelled the myth of the “invincibility” of the Wehrmacht. Germany faced the threat of a protracted war for which it was not ready. The Wehrmacht had to prepare for the new “decisive” 1942 campaign of the year. Hitler cleared the command - from December 1941. April 1942 r. Removed generals from the occupied positions of 35, including the commanders of the tank armies of Guderian and Göpner. Field Marshal Brauchitsch was removed from the command of the land forces, the Führer took over this post. Field commanders Leeb, Bock, and Rundstedt were displaced from their posts and the commanders of Army Groups North, Center and South.

The victory near Moscow forced Britain and the United States to intensify cooperation with the USSR in the framework of the anti-Hitler coalition. Japan and Turkey, who were preparing to attack the Soviet Union in the event of Moscow’s fall, in order to get their share of the “Soviet bear” skins, postponed their aggressive plans until the best moment, which never came. This allowed the Soviet government to continue building up forces and assets on the Soviet-German front.


Broken German vehicles abandoned near Moscow

Killed German soldiers and abandoned German artillery during the December counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow. For an extra effect, a flock of crows has been added to the photo editing. Photo source: http://waralbum.ru/
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  1. venaya
    venaya 4 December 2017 06: 39
    +7
    Victory near Moscow forced England and the USA step up cooperation with the USSR in the framework of the anti-Hitler coalition. Japan and Turkey, preparing to attack the Soviet Union in the event of the fall of Moscow .. postponed their aggressive plans until the best moment ..

    Perhaps it’s true: the main success of the Battle of Moscow primarily consisted on the political plane, that is, at the international level. After such a victory in the world, it is already different. more respectfully, they began to relate to our country, and from here and as a result of this victory there was already real and effective assistance from countries and their peoples not occupied by Hitler.
    1. bistrov.
      bistrov. 4 December 2017 09: 37
      +3
      Quote: venaya
      already real and effective assistance from countries not occupied by Hitler

      Yes, they “helped”, “God” is on you, that I’m not worth the harricanes and other “churchilli” who skidded on the smallest rise. My father told me about these "churchillas"; he had to deal with them near Stalingrad. And the best US tank, the Sherman, was not for nothing called a “lighter,” it could catch fire even from a small-caliber projectile. And the USSR paid for this shit with gold and precious stones.
      1. dzvero
        dzvero 4 December 2017 10: 20
        +9
        They had what they shared. The Anglo-Saxons did not have suitable equipment at that time. The English had one Spitfire, but they themselves lacked it. I’m silent about tanks - only Valentine showed himself more or less. Amers at the 41st year was even sadder with both aviation and tanks. Japanese Zero drove their Air Force in the tail and mane. I’m also silent about their “medium” tanks. But against the background of the huge initial losses of the Red Army and the still unimpaired production of equipment, even these funds were important and necessary. The Lend-Lease helped not only and not so much with weapons, but also with duralumin, explosives, trucks, machine tools, uniforms, canned goods, and any such “trifle”. Lend-lease can be called a drop in the bucket for the total cost of materials, but the contribution was very noticeable for some items.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 4 December 2017 15: 45
          +3
          Quote: dzvero
          Lend-lease can be called a drop in the bucket for the total cost of materials, but the contribution was very noticeable for some items.

          Moreover, these some positions were often critical.
          Gasoline:
          In total, Lend-Lease deliveries amounted to approximately 2 million 727 thousand short tons or 2 million 479 thousand metric tons of jet fuel.
          ... aviation gasoline and high-octane components imported from abroad were largely included in the Soviet production of aviation gasoline, which amounted to 4 million 900 thousand tons during the war years. From this it can be seen that the supply of aviation gasoline by Lend-Lease was close in volume to the total domestic aviation fuel production.

          The last sentence shows all the subtleties of Soviet statistics: aviation gasoline obtained by mixing domestic and Lend-Lease fuel was considered to be produced in the USSR in full. However, in our country, the “students”, assembled from LL machine kits, were considered domestic.
          Powder:
          In total, from 1942 to the 1945st quarter of 123350, the Allies supplied the USSR powder industry with a lend-lease of 2000 tons of gunpowder. These data should be considered minimal, since they do not include gunpowder received in the USSR as part of the complete shots, gunpowder, shipped directly to the equipment bases and warehouses of the GAU, to the cartridge plants of the USSR People's Commissariat for weapons (about 2500 ... XNUMX tons of gunpowder) and others to consumers.
          For comparison, 356760 tons of gunpowder were produced in the USSR over the same period of time. The proportion of used imported gunpowders in the total output of the USSR powder industry was 14.8% in 1943, 40.8% in 1944 and 28% in the first quarter of 1945.

          But in addition to gunpowder, components were also supplied for their production, for some of which LL covered the needs of the USSR by 80-90%.
          1. mat-vey
            mat-vey 4 December 2017 17: 24
            +2
            Oct 2 1941 - Jan 7 1942 by what percentage did Lisa cover "needs"?
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 4 December 2017 17: 53
              +5
              Quote: mat-vey
              Oct 2 1941 - Jan 7 1942 by what percentage did Lisa cover "needs"?

              Until the end of 1941, 145 Matilds and 216 Valentines arrived in the USSR. From the beginning of October until the end of the year, our industry gave the front 438 kW. Our tanks did not produce other tanks with an armor thickness of 60-78 mm. smile
              1. mat-vey
                mat-vey 4 December 2017 18: 28
                +2
                How interesting ... but do you know what the difference between "entered the USSR" and how many of them really were at the front near Moscow?
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 5 December 2017 01: 33
                  +3
                  I know.
                  But this does not negate the fact that the USSR received 1941 British tanks in 341. Exactly the same as received from ChKZ and LKZ for October-December 438 KV.
                  Britain cannot answer for the use of the received LL tanks by the USSR at the front and their distribution among brigades and battalions. smile
                  Here is the first photo "Wali" at the front - 22.11.41

                  And here is a German winter photo 41-42 from the same places.
                  1. mat-vey
                    mat-vey 31 December 2017 10: 26
                    0
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    Britain cannot answer for the use of the received LL tanks by the USSR at the front and their distribution among brigades and battalions. smile

                    And what, is someone presenting?
        2. voyaka uh
          voyaka uh 5 December 2017 17: 08
          +3
          Tank Walentine was so liked by Soviet tankmen that
          It was released in Canada specifically for the USSR right up to 1945.
          And in the offensive near Moscow, Walentine and Matilda were significant
          percentage of tanks (they began to be delivered from September 1941, long before
          offensive near Moscow).
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 5 December 2017 23: 07
            0
            The first caravan PQ-1 arrived in Arkhangelsk on October 11, 1941, delivered the first 20 MK.II MATILDA tanks!
      2. novel66
        novel66 4 December 2017 10: 48
        +7
        when there is no one, the factories are evacuated, at least something must be fought. and on the "Hurricanes" shot down
      3. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 4 December 2017 11: 34
        +8
        Quote: bistrov.
        Yes, they “helped”, “God” is on you, that I’m not worth the harricanes and other “churchilli” who skidded on the smallest rise.

        Actually, at first, the British themselves flew the “persimmons” - 151 air wings in Murmansk.
        As for Churchill, was lime something better? Or were we forced to fill holes in the teh-berry technique with “overgrown bugs” T-30/40/60, who were sitting on their belly already on 30 cm snow?
        On February 1, 6 T-30 27 OTB tanks, making a march from Sukonniki to Burtsevo on a road with snowdrifts, stopped on the road and could not arrive without outside help.
        13.1.42 when attacking the Ilyinskoye tank, 145 TBRs in the amount of 17 T-60s, as soon as they turned off the road for deployment, were stuck at the edge of the forest at 180,5 and did not take part in the attack. 7 T-40 tanks 24 TBRs were operating with 40 SBR in the offensive on the Landing. Tasks have not been completed - stuck in the snow. As a result of the battle, 2 tanks burned down, 1 tank was destroyed.
        The above examples show that T-30-40-60 tanks with a snow depth of 30-40 cm cannot be used when moving or in battle

        Quote: bistrov.
        And the best US tank "Sherman" was not for nothing called the "lighter", it could catch fire even from a small-caliber projectile.

        Diesel Shermans were supplied to the USSR. Only diesel.
        But our T-60/70 and SU-76 ran on aviation gasoline.
        Quote: bistrov.
        And the USSR paid for this shit with gold and precious stones.

        Have you decided to collect all the myths? wink
        According to the Lend-Lease Act, the United States could supply equipment, ammunition, equipment, etc. countries whose defense was vital to the States themselves. All deliveries were free. All machinery, equipment and materials spent, consumed or destroyed during the war were not payable. Property remaining after the end of the war and suitable for civilian purposes should have been paid.
        1. mat-vey
          mat-vey 4 December 2017 17: 20
          +3
          Quote: Alexey RA
          But our T-60/70 and SU-76 ran on aviation gasoline

          But did they know at GAZ that their GAZ-202 was working on an aircraft?
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 4 December 2017 17: 41
            +3
            Quote: mat-vey
            But did they know at GAZ that their GAZ-202 was working on an aircraft?

            Naturally.
            Fuel grade: KB-70 or B-70.
            © Z.N. Kozak. "TO SU-76 and T-70." 1944
            The T-70 manual stated even more specifically:
            Applicable fuel Aviation gasoline KB-70 or B-70. In exceptional cases Work on cracked gasoline of the 2nd grade (gasoline) is allowed. In no case can you use Grozny first-class gasoline, as well as gasoline mixed with ligroin or kerosene ...

            B-70 / KB-70 in the 40s was precisely gasoline. And the GAZ-202 worked precisely on it. In general, all domestic gasoline tank engines of light tanks of the 30s and 40s worked precisely on gasoline - both on the T-26 and BT.
            1. mat-vey
              mat-vey 4 December 2017 18: 21
              +2
              For installation on a light floating tank T-40, a modification of the GAZ-202 was developed. From the basic version, this engine differed only in electrical equipment - the basic one is the GAZ-11, the most that is not an aircraft engine ..
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 4 December 2017 22: 29
                +1
                Ilya Borisovich Moshchansky
                Light tanks of the T-40 family. "Red" scouts

                On the T-38 light tank and other light tracked combat vehicles, the weak point was the outdated GAZ-A engine (42 hp) or its more powerful GAZ-M engine, which had low reliability and economy in tense "tank" working conditions and not having significant reserves for improvement. They almost could not be forced without a noticeable reduction in the already small motor resource, with an obvious, even for light class tanks, lack of power. The design of the new machine included the installation of a domestic, though still at the stage of mastering the production of the GAZ-PA 6-cylinder engine, which is quite perfect and reliable. Its forced tank modification 202 was created according to the technical specifications of the plant number 37 at GAZ under the leadership of Deputy Chief Designer E.V. Agitova. She had the following performance characteristics: 85 hp at 3600 rpm., displacement of 3,485 l, aluminum cylinder head with a compression ratio of 6,5, which required the use of B-70 gasoline or KB-70 cracked gasoline, as well as high-quality Surahan and Embin engine oils. This choice turned out to be successful and promising, however, there was no alternative to it. The GAZ-11 type engine reliably worked on high-speed light tracked vehicles throughout the war and later, up to the 70s, having undergone many modernizations, which allowed it to withstand overloads not designed by the developers. Its main difference from the automobile prototype, due to tank specifics and very intense operation, was a significant strengthening of the cooling system. It consisted in the use of increased sizes of a cellular radiator in a closed circuit (under pressure) with an additional outboard water heat exchanger when working afloat with an oil-water radiator, a powerful 6-blade fan. The air flow through the adjustable suction and output louvers was well organized. Henceforth, water and oil aerothermometers also became mandatory.

                Tank ENGINE on aircraft gasoline !!!
              2. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 5 December 2017 00: 50
                +2
                Feet in boots and windings froze to insensibility. The right shoulder was hot, the left - from the proximity of tanks with 400 liters of B-70 gasoline - was chilling. Antifreeze was poured into the cooling system, the most dangerous thing was to miss the moment when the thermometer needle (after stopping the engines) passed the mark of minus 35 ° C: at a lower temperature it could not start.
                © Ulanov Rem Nikolaevich, mechvod and, later, the commander of SU-76
                The device of the T-70M tank.
                The power unit of the tank, GAZ-203, consisted of two four-stroke six cylinder carburetor engine blocks of the GAZ-202 type (GAZ 70-6004 front and GAZ 70-6005 rear) with a total capacity of 140 hp on a common frame, which was first implemented in domestic tank building. The engine units were equipped with carburettors of the "M" type. The crankshafts of the engines were connected by a coupling with elastic bushings.
                (...)
                The engines worked on aviation gasoline KB-70 or B-70. Two fuel tanks with a total capacity of 440 liters were placed on the left side of the aft compartment of the hull in a compartment isolated by armored partitions.
                © Svirin Mikhail Nikolaevich. Steel fist of Stalin. The history of the Soviet tank 1943-1955.
      4. hohol95
        hohol95 4 December 2017 12: 31
        +4
        You are right - T-60, T-70 they were better than “Sherman” and “Churchill”, “Matilda” and “Valentine” the same ...
        On March 22, 1943, five Churchill tanks from this regiment under the command of the captain Belogub Guard attacked the enemy. Fighting vehicles broke into German positions, where four of them were shot down, and one stepped back. The crews did not leave the tanks, and from March 22 to 25 were in them and fired from a place. Every night, machine gunners of the 50th regiment delivered ammunition and food to the tankers. In three days, Churchill destroyed an artillery battery, four bunkers, an ammunition depot, and up to two infantry platoons. The Germans repeatedly offered the crews of the wrecked tanks to surrender, to which ours responded with fire. On March 25, the tankers succeeded in hooking Belogub’s tank with a tractor and towing it to the rear. The crews of three other tanks withdrew with the infantry. Not evaluating the organization of the battle that led to this result, it should be emphasized that the crews, who sat in tanks for three days, did not lose a single person killed. The life of the tankers was saved by the Churchill armor, which German artillery could not break through during this time.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 4 December 2017 14: 32
          +7
          “Valentine” by the standards of the first year of the war is generally a very funny little animal: a formally light tank with armor protection, approaching the KV-1C. In the winter of 1941-1942, did we have many tanks with a 60 mm forehead and side?
          Although the absence of fragmentation PSUs spoiled everything ... I had to wait for the Canadian "vali" with 6 pounds and the OS.
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 4 December 2017 14: 47
            +1
            So to the 6-pound fragmentation was not! Only putting 76,2mm "American" (so as not to be confused renamed to 75mm) did the British tanks get high-explosive shells!
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 4 December 2017 14: 56
              +3
              Quote: hohol95
              So to the 6-pound fragmentation was not! Only putting 76,2mm "American" (so as not to be confused renamed to 75mm) did the British tanks get high-explosive shells!

              SW M. Svirin wrote that the OS was not to the British 6 pounds. But Canadians made an OS for it - and the Canadian “vali” came to us from the OS in BC.
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 4 December 2017 15: 13
                0
                Thanks to the Canadian proletariat !!!
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 4 December 2017 16: 53
                  +3
                  Impact labor strengthened the power of the Red Army. smile

                  By the way, I found a wonderful quote about the Germans in our captivity:
                  Crimea, April 1944. A case of a shoot-out between the advanced detachment of the Soviet 315 sd and the Soviet 19 tk is being investigated. Quote: "This was due to the fact that the head of the reconnaissance division in a trophy car, under the leadership of a German driver, rode ahead of the detachment" (F.4UF. Op.3004. D.33. L.84).
                  © Isaev
                  Head of Intelligence. Ahead of the advance squad. In a German car with a German driver. Not afraid that the German would take him to his own. Ordnung, which is already there. laughing
              2. hohol95
                hohol95 4 December 2017 15: 25
                +1
                In 1942, a Bofors high-explosive fragmentation shell was installed in a shell shell for a 2-pound gun. Tests were carried out, but it never came to mass production.
                Around the same time, on the other side of the globe, a similar problem was solved by the Australians. Their deal with the new ammunition has moved much further. Since January 1943, production of 2-pound high-explosive fragmentation shells was launched. They were successfully used on the Australian Matilda and Valentine until the end of the war. As for the British, the high-explosive fragmentation ammunition for 2-pounds they bothered to do only in 1944.
                History has preserved an extensive correspondence between representatives of the GABTU KA and the British military mission in the USSR, the head of which in 1941–42 was General Frank Noel Mason-MacFarlane (the spelling of the name "MacFarlan" appears in the correspondence). This correspondence had quite tangible results. Starting in December 1941, tanks arriving in the USSR were refueling with antifreeze in advance, which greatly reduced the number of cases of engine defrosting. At the same time, greases that were more suitable for winter use were introduced. Similar changes affected the batteries and oils for the rollback system of tank guns. And since December, the amount of ammunition for each arriving Valentine has grown to 520 rounds.

                Valentine on pumping. Yuri Pasholok
      5. BAI
        BAI 4 December 2017 14: 48
        +5
        Yes, they "helped", "God" is on you, that I am worthless

        In the fall of 41, American Lend-Lease gunpowder saved the Soviet production of cartridges and shells. And during the war - the production of aircraft, tanks: 90% of the need for bearings was satisfied by Lend-Lease. Now imagine - 90% of the produced engines, at least without one bearing. What would happen to the release of tanks and aircraft?
      6. Conductor
        Conductor 5 December 2017 00: 00
        +4
        But they wouldn’t help, as much as possible we would have suffered more losses, it’s better to be on a bad tank than without a tank at all.
        1. parma
          parma 5 December 2017 14: 41
          +1
          Enough Uryakov to call for the voice of reason to study historical documents ... Did you pay for deliveries (for a small part of deliveries that were not included in the land lease or exceeded the agreed sizes)? They took it ... And the rest is not important for them ... Everyone who talks about the role of LL for them a heretic and an enemy ... In 1945, the supply of equipment did not play a role anymore .. Although about special shelves on "foreign cars", as free equipment (which, in theory, must be returned after the war), which were safely forgotten by everyone at the very front ... And about the fact that they returned 0 from LL deliveries (although this was stated in the agreements), they also forget ...
          1. mat-vey
            mat-vey 31 December 2017 10: 31
            0
            Quote: parma
            And about the fact that they returned 0 from LL deliveries (although it was prescribed in the contracts), too, everyone forgets ...

            How easy it is to lie in ostentatious "righteous" anger ..
      7. verner1967
        verner1967 5 December 2017 22: 04
        +2
        Quote: bistrov.
        Yes, they "helped", "God" is on you, that I am worthless

        and what was better with them, which they did not give us? Or do you think that the T-40 or T-26 were super-tanks, and the "donkeys" with the "gulls" were superplanes? The Charitons won the war for Britain, by the way.
  2. 210ox
    210ox 4 December 2017 06: 57
    11
    Let us bow to those soldiers and officers, people working in the rear in the name of our Victory ....
  3. parusnik
    parusnik 4 December 2017 07: 30
    +3
    The Soviet high command was systematically preparing for the transition to a counteroffensive. Strategic reserves were created and maintained in advance, they were promptly put forward on the flanks of German strike groups and thrown into a counteroffensive.
    ... Here we must pay tribute to intelligence and counterintelligence ...
  4. BAI
    BAI 4 December 2017 09: 45
    0
    during the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, the Wehrmacht achieved impressive success

    I would say that these successes for the USSR were close to catastrophic. And so little experience was - near Moscow (in my opinion) we stopped late - our troops were tired and communications were stretched, and the Germans, on the contrary, were compressed like a spring.
    1. gafarovsafar
      gafarovsafar 4 December 2017 10: 27
      +2
      and this spring burst
      1. BAI
        BAI 4 December 2017 14: 58
        0
        Where? On the Kerch Peninsula, in Sevastopol, Kharkov, near Leningrad? Or in March 42 near Vyazma? - Tell General Efremov about this.
        G.K. Zhukov recalled: “We introduced many divisions into the battle, which
        were completely unprepared, were poorly armed, came today
        to the front - tomorrow we pushed them into battle; of course, and the return was appropriate. " The German Army Chief of Staff wrote:
        “There is a staffing of the broken Soviet divisions untrained
        contingents. Divisions enter the battle with a march, small fragmented
        forces and suffer huge losses. "
  5. Evgenijus
    Evgenijus 4 December 2017 13: 43
    +2
    Good stuff, I liked it, and the photos are quality, in the subject. In the history textbooks in schools it should be placed. Then the speeches of our students in the Bundestag will be different ...
    Thanks to the author.
  6. Conductor
    Conductor 5 December 2017 00: 02
    0
    After all, the first strategic defeat of the Germans. Glory to our soldiers.
  7. IGOR GORDEEV
    IGOR GORDEEV 5 December 2017 06: 40
    +1
    It was widely believed that the fate of the Battle of Moscow would be decided by the "last battalion" thrown into battle. Therefore, the Germans attacked to the last, all trying to take Moscow. However, as subsequent events showed, the German military-political leadership made a fatal miscalculation.

    They made a fatal miscalculation by attacking the USSR, without properly calculating the capabilities of the USSR and their own capabilities. And these are pragmatic Germans request This topic needs to be explored ...
    I believe that they would not attack the USSR, not being sure that England and the USA would not attack them during their so-called “blitzkrieg”.