Military Review

So, was the Bosphorus expedition a chance? Part of 3. Implementation technology

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How was the Bosphorus operation to be carried out?


In the spring of 1915, it was planned as an auxiliary operation, synchronized with the actions of forces breaking through the Dardanelles fleet and the expeditionary corps of the allies. At this time, the Black Sea Fleet did not yet have dominance at sea (disputed it with the Goeben), and the composition of the landing corps was largely random in nature. In 1916 - 1917 The Bosphorus expedition was planned as an independent operation of the Russian armed forces - and although there was no one to interact with, the Black Sea Fleet seized dominance at sea, and the landing corps consisted of strike formations specially prepared and intended for the assault operation in the Straits.

How was it possible to implement Bosphorus planning in the operational-tactical aspect?

As the documents noted, this was achieved: either by moving troops along the western coast of the Black Sea - through Romania and Bulgaria or by joint actions of the army and navy - that is, the landing of the landing corps on the Turkish coast near the Bosphorus with the support of the fleet forces.

Optimal was the second option, which included a combined land-sea operation. In the course of its implementation, the fleet had to ensure the protection of the transports with the troops, prepare the landing area with fire, ensure the safety of disembarking and transporting supplies, as well as replenishing and evacuating the wounded.

The minimum was recognized as the number of troops landed, which could be held at the landing point, not allowing itself to be thrown into the sea until the arrival of its reinforcements. Accordingly - the more troops will be immediately landed, the better. In this case, a strong transport fleet was needed. The transport fleet of the Black Sea Fleet included about 100 transports (on average, 5000 each - 6000 tonnes of displacement). This flotilla could immediately raise the army corps 3-divisional personnel (40000 people). And as practice has shown in the future (the experience of the Black Sea transportation during the war), this transport fleet could take on board more troops - up to the 1,25 corps. So, 23. 03. During the disembarkation in Rize, 1916 transports were deployed by 25 - they came with a landing force from Novorossiysk to Reese, landing 2 plastunian brigades and a mountain division (18000 man), and then the same transports landed an infantry division (17500 man) in Trapezund. It's about 25 transports - that is, only about a quarter of the available transport tonnage.

In addition to the transports with the landing force, the means of landing troops from transports to the shore (tugs, self-propelled barges, etc.) also moved to the landing point - some of them were also loaded onto transports.

It was extremely important to reliably protect this armada from attacks by the enemy fleet, both during the transition and during the landing. Supporting the landing, the fleet had to fight enemy coastal batteries and support its troops with artillery fire.

Thus, the forces of the fleet were to protect the transports, conduct fire support for the landing force and ensure communications. It required a serious superiority in power - and, accordingly, dominance at sea. The Turkish fleet had a high-speed strike force (battlecruiser Geben, light cruiser Breslau and destroyers of the type Milet) and could intercept the transport fleet. After the breakthrough of “Goeben”, the Black Sea Fleet did not have dominance at sea.

A comparison of the forces of the opponents in the early spring of 1915 shows that they were approximately equal. The Black Sea Fleet launched the 4-5 old battleships, 2 cruisers, auxiliary cruisers and destroyers in the sea, trying to stay as compact as possible. The enemy went to sea "Goeben", 3 light cruiser and 4 destroyer. Remained in the bases: the BlackNights 2 obsolete battleship ("George the Victorious" and "Sinop"), the enemy - 3 old battleship ("Messudie" and 2 type "Hayreddin Barbarossa").

The “Goeben” was opposed by the whole team of the Black Sea battleships. Having the advantage in speed, the battlecruiser, when meeting with the brigade, could act as he wished - to accept battle or withdraw. In light cruisers, the enemy fleet was slightly stronger than the Russian — the Breslau and 2 cruisers of the Hamidie type against the 2 cruisers of the Cahul type and the auxiliary cruiser Almaz. In the destroyers, the Russians were stronger than the enemy (especially after the entry into service of the Novikov - Restless type destroyers), but the enemy Milet type destroyers were faster.

The enemy command did not want to risk "Goeben" - after all, after its loss, it lost the opportunity to fight for supremacy at sea. While “Goeben” acted, it was possible with almost impunity to strike at any part of the Russian coast, and in case of luck (when the “Goeben” met with a brigade of battleships not in full force) there was hope for the destruction of the Russian fleet in parts. The contact of "Goeben" with the 5 brigade in November 1914 convinced him of the strength of the Russian unit as a whole. This fact, as well as the realization that the dreadnoughts "Empress Maria" and "Empress Catherine the Great" would soon come into operation, forced the battlecruiser to avoid a decisive battle. That is why the "Goeben" never went to sea together with the old battleships of the Turks - the latter, by linking it with low-speed, could force the battlecruiser to fight in adverse conditions. The absence of a dock in Constantinople for “Goeben” made the command of the enemy even more cautious.

But the fact of the presence of "Goeben" meant that the Russians could not force the enemy to fight without his desire.

Once the Russians couldn’t destroy the main enemy forces in a sea battle, all they could do to gain dominance at sea was to block it in the base (Bosphorus). It was about blocking the main Turkish naval forces - and the Bosporus was supposed to have the core of the Black Sea Fleet, which was based on a brigade of battleships. And since the Black Sea Fleet had a base in Sevastopol (there was no intermediate base), the old ships and ships at the Bosporus could not act, while the proximity to the line of the enemy’s blockade allowed it to use all its forces. The remoteness of the blockade area could lead to the fact that in the event of damage the Russian ships could not reach the base. There were high fuel costs, there were problems with the repair mechanisms and the rest of the personnel. And the need to inevitably leave to the base of the blocking core of the fleet without replacing it with a position made the execution of the blockade of the Bosphorus when stationed at Sevastopol impracticable. An intermediate base was required, which allowed minimizing the time and resource costs - near the blockade area.

As we noted earlier, the command of the Black Sea Fleet considered Burgas as the most suitable intermediate base, which was approximately at the same distance both from Sevastopol and from the Bosporus. But for the retention of Burgas (even without taking into account the fact that Bulgaria had not yet entered the war) large forces were required - the Russians at that point were dangerous for Germany, creating a threat to the Berlin-Constantinople communication line.

Alternatives (Zonguldak, Eregli, Inaid) for the intermediate base were operatively less preferred, although more realistic.

Thus, at the first stage, the Bosporus operation was problematic for the Black Sea Fleet - it was not strong enough to fight at the Bosphorus, and the remoteness of the base (Sevastopol) prevented the full blockade of the Bosporus - it was necessary to resolve the issue of the intermediate base.

A fundamentally different situation has developed in the future.

In the second period of the war, the balance of forces on the Black Sea (for Russians, the launch of the 2 dreadnoughts, 7 destroyers of the Novik type and 6 new submarines; the enemy’s arrival of 6 - 8 of the German submarines, the death of the battleship Messudie and the cruiser Medzhidiye) changed in favor of the Russian fleet. Yes, and "Goeben" from "Breslau", repeatedly undermined by mines, long defended on the bases.


12. The battleship "Empress Maria" off the coast of the Crimea. 1915-1916 Lukin V. K. Notes on the combat activities of the Black Sea Fleet

The superiority in forces was so great that the Russian command created 2 maneuverable groups - EVERY one of which turned out to be stronger than the enemy (with the brigade of the old battleships the 3 groups were obtained).

One maneuverable group was to be located near the Bosphorus, while the other managed to go to Sevastopol (refuel, carry out the necessary repairs and allow the personnel to rest) and return to the position. Thus, the question of the intermediate base has lost its former relevance.

The reserve of fuel allowed each group to be at sea on 5 - 6 days - 2 days went back and forth, and 3 - 4 days - duty from the Bosphorus. The schedule though was quite stressful, but realistic. Destroyers could refuel at sea.

In the summer of 1916, in the Bosphorus region, the Turks had a 1 division. Railway transport allowed to transfer (but only after 2 days) another 2 divisions (one of the Dardanelles and one of Smyrna).

The Black Sea Fleet had the necessary number of vehicles to carry out the simultaneous landing of 3 airborne divisions (with artillery and a full set of special and logistical services and institutions) - the available tonnage allowed (subject to calm weather) to land these forces in 12-hour time (experience of large-scale disembarking the fleet and the Caucasian army already had).


13. The battleship "Empress Maria" escorts transports with a landing force. 1915 year. Lukin V. K. Notes on the combat activities of the Black Sea Fleet

Parts of the fleet, in preparation for the support of the landing force, were undergoing artillery firing on coastal targets; instruction for amphibious operations appeared. [Instructions for the production of amphibious operations // Foreign marine collection. Pilsen. 1930. No. 11. C. 42-79], the necessary materials were prepared for the network fencing of the landing point from enemy submarines.

Thus, the 1 echelon (3-division corps) landed immediately.

The transfer of the 2 corps was required up to 2 weeks of time (this included the time for landing the 1 echelon, transfer of transports to the landing point, loading of fuel, loading of the 2 echelon and its transfer from Sevastopol and Odessa). As Gallipoli’s experience has shown, in the presence of fire support from the sea (from the Black Sea Fleet’s maneuverable group), the 2 airborne assault force could have lasted a week until the arrival of the 2 echelon.

But after all, the landing could have been made not in the Bosporus itself (this is optional), but in an area remote from the Strait for a reasonable distance - for a safer concentration of the landing army. And the purpose of the first landing could be both an attack on the Bosphorus, and the retention of a bridgehead until the arrival of troops of the 2 echelon.

Realistic was not only the transfer of troops and his support, but also the blockade of the Bosphorus. 2 - 3 maneuverable groups (2 were headed by dreadnoughts, and 3-I consisted of 5 dodrednaught battleships), replacing each other, could block Bosphorus very tightly. The widespread use of mines barriers (to act as trawlers of the enemy interfere with the ships of maneuverable groups), and the submarines made the blockade even more dense. Fuel supplies are replenished by expeditions to Sevastopol (for battleships and cruisers) and into the sea (from a floating base and transports for small ships and ships). Fighting enemy submarines includes striking their base and guarding the blockade area and landing point.

But the blockade of the Bosphorus - is the rule of the sea, and the landing troops from the Caucasian army, already accustomed to beating the Turks, could begin to perform combat missions.

Thus, since the spring of 1916, the Bosphorus operation had every chance of a successful outcome. So why nothing happened?

As A. Kersnovsky rightly noted, during the years of the First World Turkey in Russia they were considered the secondary adversary who imposed a secondary theater of operations on us. But having captured Constantinople, the Russians nullified all the successes of the Austro-Germans. It is more than likely that a revolution would not have occurred - the “climate” in the country would have changed, and the war would not have lasted until the 1917 year. They did not notice the most important thing - that the Turkish front became the main one for Russia, and on the secondary Austro-German front it was necessary only to “hold out” [Kersnovsky A. A. World War (short essay). Missed opportunities. Belgrade, 1939. C. 198].

Not only the admiralty and the generals of the allies (during the Dardanelles operation) was not up to par, but their colleagues in Russia. As A. D. Bubnov noted, before the war, the leadership of the General Staff adhered to a dogmatic postulate about concentrating the maximum of forces on the main theater of military operations and on the strictest economy of forces for secondary theaters. The Bosphorus operation was also ranked among the latter - it was mistakenly thought that the allocation of the required landing forces for it would uselessly weaken forces on the main thing - the Austro-German theater of operations - where no battalion would be superfluous. Moreover, the General Staff did not see direct assistance from the Bosporus operation to the Austro-German front - the issue of providing sea communications in the event of blockade was considered insignificant by the enemy of Russia, because they believed in the short duration of the coming war, believing that it would be completed with the existing ammunition and material supply[Bubnov A.D. Decree. cit. C. 190].

Probably, the Bosporus operation should have been included in Russia's overall strategic planning - long before the war with the German bloc. This, firstly, would allow to prepare for it in a qualitative and systematic manner, and, secondly, the operation would not have looked impromptu in the eyes of the high command.

Thus, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles became the underestimated strategic key of the First World War - it is obvious that the implementation of the Bosphorus operation, shortening the duration of the war, would allow a radical change in the course of the war in favor of Russia and the Entente. That is why the lack of implementation of this operation is a serious strategic miscalculation, the fruits of which Russia and Europe are reaping until now.
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  1. parusnik
    parusnik 13 October 2017 07: 40 New
    12
    Why so .. you can’t rewrite the story ....
  2. XII Legion
    XII Legion 13 October 2017 08: 18 New
    18
    Detailed analysis is always clear
    Evaluation of opportunities and missed options allows you to try not to make the same mistakes - in the expectation of the future. Who knows?...
    Interestingly
  3. antivirus
    antivirus 13 October 2017 08: 28 New
    +2
    power saving for secondary theater. The Bosphorus operation was also ranked among the latter - it was mistakenly believed that the allocation of the required landing forces for it would uselessly weaken the forces on the main - the Austro-German theater of operations

    and someone calculated the German breakthrough in response to the landing?
    "fear" is not equivalent to "cowardly"
    from the memoirs of M Paleolog: “the prince (?) led upon arrival from the front-line said“ we will not be able to defeat the Germans ”- this is autumn 16g
    1. BRONEVIK
      BRONEVIK 13 October 2017 08: 48 New
      19
      It’s impossible to calculate everything at all. And what is the German breakthrough during the positional war in 1916? They spread the forces already - Verdun, Somme, localization of the Offensive of the Bgo-Western Front, the transfer of troops to the Romanian Front.
      You should always try to highlight the nodal sites. Obviously, a positional war on the Austro-German front did not bring any special results. And the Bosphorus operation could be a breakthrough.
      led the prince (?) upon arrival from the front said "we can not defeat the Germans" - this is autumn 16

      But we didn’t have to defeat the Germans alone - the matter went to the victory of the Entente over the entire German bloc
      1. antivirus
        antivirus 13 October 2017 10: 08 New
        +2
        And the Bosphorus operation could be a breakthrough.

        I am not a stratig
        - BUT, in 16 g the Western Front of Evert (?) Could not support the so-called “Brusilovsky breakthrough” and even retreated in the fall
        including from Riga and further on the map.
        you can capture Turkey-fulfill the aggressive goals of the WWII and retreat to Smolensk.
        And there in Versailles (17g?) To turn everything back (and Poland would also be returned?)

        STRENGTH NEEDS AGAINST ALLIES.
        RI WOULD GO OUT OF WWII WINNER,
        WITH WEAK POSITIONS FOR ANTANTA TRADE
        - THEREFORE, AND DID NOT DECIDE TO SPEND (ANOTHER THOUSAND THOUSAND HOURS TO BE SUBSTITUTED BY THE BULLETS) RESERVES.
        1. BRONEVIK
          BRONEVIK 13 October 2017 11: 02 New
          18
          BUT, in 16 g Zap Front Evert (?) Could not support the so-called "Brusilovsky breakthrough"

          So I’m talking about that. What is an Austro-German breakthrough?
          In the campaign of 16 years, WE were advancing on the Russian front. The Austro-Germans defended themselves - they attacked on the French and Italian fronts.
          including from Riga and further on the map

          This is the reality of another year - the 17th, and then August and so on. Revolutionary devastation and anarchy.
          and retreat to Smolensk

          During the position period of the WWII with the resources available at that time, one should try very hard not only to get to Smolensk, but simply to make a more or less decent breakthrough
          can capture Turkey

          That's just the fact that this is the key to victory - if Turkey left the war, the Caucasian Front collapsed (an entire army was liberated), the Palestinian and other Entente peripheral fronts (Anglo-French troops found themselves in France). Germany and Austria-Hungary found themselves in the ring (complete blockade), etc.
          The war simply ended earlier - there would be not only Smolensk, but also 17 years old in the editorial office we knew
          1. antivirus
            antivirus 13 October 2017 11: 38 New
            +1
            they said everything correctly
            BUT
            STRENGTH NEEDS AGAINST ALLIES.
            RI WOULD GO OUT OF WWII WINNER,
            WITH WEAK POSITIONS FOR ANTANTA TRADE
            I didn’t want VBR to let RI into the Balkans and the Mid Sea and didn’t let them “fight with our weapons where the Germans can be strained more”
            RI goals - not VBR goals
            1. BRONEVIK
              BRONEVIK 13 October 2017 11: 57 New
              18
              Agree that in the event of the successful completion of the WWII by the end of 16 Russia turned out to be: 1) the owner of the largest army in Europe, the army with combat experience; 2) a balanced and undisturbed fleet (fresh dreadnought; light cruisers, on the way - "Ishmaels").
              Would the Anglo-French really decide on a new conflict? Hardly. And so after all, according to the results of the WWII EVEN, Italians didn’t offend the Italians with the Serbs - to say nothing of the system-forming Entente players.
              Russia avoided shocks in the form known to us - they could be softer or not come at all.
              And Europe avoided the first American invasion. The USA did not have time to enter the war, did not land a millionth army in Europe. Accordingly, the Atlantic peace system (as a consequence of the First and Second Wars) either did not line up, or began to line up later.
              The price of the issue is 5 divisions (from the composition of the Caucasian Army or a special Airborne Corps), implementation energy and a clear vision of prospects. On the Austro-German theater of operations, 5 divisions do little to decide, but here we are talking about geopolitics.
              1. antivirus
                antivirus 13 October 2017 18: 17 New
                +1
                You and others are right about everything
                after the Napoleonic Wars, after 25 years, the Republic of Ingushetia became the enemy of Europe, the gendarme of Europe (scribbling spit in the right direction)

                Your words --- Would the Anglo-French decide on a new conflict? Hardly. And so after all, according to the results of the WWII EVEN, Italians and Serbs were not offended
                my answer is that in 5 years the colossus would have blown away on clay feet-- debts for everything, export - only to Europe (the blockade in the Aegean Sea deprived everything, etc.)
                would poison Japan and China (Mao - "RI received the most from China")
                + the influence of the Anglophiles on the king
                WASN'T VALID WITH THE BRAKE WORK AND DO NOT LAND ON THE BOSPHORUS
                + IT IS NECESSARY TO ALWAYS LEAVE A NEUTRAL LAYER TO DR. GREAT POWER, in the Wed Sea where is this gasket?
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 13 October 2017 11: 56 New
          +3
          Quote: antivirus
          And there in Versailles (17g?) To turn everything back (and Poland would also be returned?)

          Everything was interesting with Poland ... During the war, Nicholas II promised that after the war the Polish lands would be gathered back to Poland, which would be given maximum autonomy. In reality, taking into account the traditional support of Poland from France and Britain, maximum autonomy turned into independence.
          1. Cartalon
            Cartalon 13 October 2017 13: 38 New
            +8
            Independence of Poland would be great, but rather there would be a Finnish option, and independent Poland is the Russian-German Union, not exactly what Britain needs and France’s nightmare.
          2. antivirus
            antivirus 13 October 2017 18: 24 New
            0
            I wrote about this "carton" 1 \ 2 years ago
            MY OPINION:
            THE IMPERIAL HOUSE OF THE ROMANOVS (ALL GREAT AND SIMPLE (?) PRINCIPLES) AT THE LEVEL OF SUBCONSCIOUSNESS WERE RESISTANT OF INDEPENDENCE (AND EXITING UNDER CONTROL) POLAND, THEIR Dynasty reigned a little bit of a sense of wisdom. "STrangle in the arms" 20 AND AS ONCE LEAVE SO IMMEDIATELY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF FR AND OVER BRIT WILL GET.
            it is not the reformability of tsarism.
            dynasty - one, the logic of changes in the world - in the other direction.
            This is a sanitary cordon against RI, without power owls (see above will incite)
            1. Cartalon
              Cartalon 13 October 2017 21: 21 New
              +1
              I’m writing to you for the last time, don’t yell with a capsule, this is rudeness, but on the topic for the fifth time you’re not going to repeat the same thing.
              1. antivirus
                antivirus 13 October 2017 23: 15 New
                0
                I did not answer you
  4. Olgovich
    Olgovich 13 October 2017 09: 34 New
    +7
    In the 14th and 15th operation was impossible due to lack of resources and funds. Since the spring of the 16th, it has become possible, but still quite unpredictable and risky (we look at the defeat of the allies in the Dardanelles), and therefore it was being prepared for its 17th year.
    Therefore, there were no mistakes in planning its terms, I think. There was caution, careful preparation, to act for sure, everything was right. .
    The revolution prevented, but this is from another area ....
    1. Cartalon
      Cartalon 13 October 2017 11: 11 New
      10
      Only now, the Bosphorus operation prevented the revolution and gave the key to victory in the war at the end of 16goda
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 13 October 2017 11: 51 New
        +3
        Quote: Cartalon
        Only now, the Bosphorus operation prevented the revolution and gave the key to victory in the war at the end of 16goda

        With success. And failure led to a revolution in the 16th.
        1. Cartalon
          Cartalon 13 October 2017 12: 51 New
          11
          If in the 16th year the Bosphorus was guarded precisely by the forces referred to in the article, then under normal management success would have been.
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 14 October 2017 10: 02 New
            +3
            Quote: Cartalon
            If in the 16th year the Bosphorus was guarded precisely by the forces referred to in the article, then under normal management success would have been.

            The Dardanelles Allied operation has just passed, ending in a terrible defeat of them. but they also thought that they would easily beat the Turks ....
            Ours did the right thing, that they were not in a hurry.
        2. antivirus
          antivirus 13 October 2017 18: 25 New
          0
          I agree, with a faster collapse in the spheres of influence of the Entente, there would be no Bolsheviks
      2. Curious
        Curious 13 October 2017 13: 03 New
        +2
        "Only now, the Bosphorus operation prevented the revolution and gave the key to victory in the war at the end of the 16th year"
        A revolution was inevitable. The same representatives of the Russian aristocracy, generals and the political elite dreamed of returning the Bosporus and Dardanelles and Constantinople Straits to Russian control and at the same time plotted to overthrow the Tsar - the Anointed of God. The political elite is preparing the overthrow of the monarchy and at the same time in the near-Orthodox categories reflects on the control of the Straits, on the transformation of Russia into a world hegemon! This testifies not only to the political blindness of the Russian aristocracy on the eve of the Revolution, but also to the lack of an adequate worldview among the representatives of the top of the Russian establishment.
        1. Cartalon
          Cartalon 13 October 2017 13: 12 New
          10
          Occupation of Constantinople would dramatically change the moral climate in the country, and especially among the elite.
          1. Curious
            Curious 13 October 2017 13: 22 New
            +2
            Further, did they occupy Turkey with Russia?
            1. Cartalon
              Cartalon 13 October 2017 13: 34 New
              11
              The partition cards of Turkey have already been drawn, Russia received the Straits and Armenia, the rest of Anatolia was divided by the French and Italians, they would have suffered with Kemal.
              1. Curious
                Curious 13 October 2017 13: 48 New
                +4
                And would England and France agree to this? Or would Russia get a cold, if not a "hot" war at the beginning of the century?
                1. Cartalon
                  Cartalon 13 October 2017 14: 28 New
                  11
                  So they already agreed to this, at Versailles England and France to death held on to military agreements on the division of the colonies.
                2. antivirus
                  antivirus 13 October 2017 18: 29 New
                  +2
                  I agree. I proceed from the worst - the Entente envies RI and becomes an enemy

                  cold war without communism
                  1. Curious
                    Curious 13 October 2017 19: 03 New
                    +2
                    It’s not about envy. It is enough to recall the foreign European policy of the same England in recent years, at least three hundred, to see that Russia is not even visible on the Bosphorus. And some agreements reached in difficult times for England, so England has no permanent allies ...
                    It’s like in a joke. "You promised to marry me!" "You never know what I promised on you."
                    1. Cartalon
                      Cartalon 13 October 2017 21: 18 New
                      +8
                      Well, and how do you imagine this is not to give Russia straits? if Russia occupied them, England agrees to this under military treaties. And here, at a peace conference, the British say, we take everything that is appropriate for us, and you Russians go to the garden or get out or war.
                      1. Curious
                        Curious 13 October 2017 21: 48 New
                        +2
                        To answer your questions, just read the book: Francis B. The diary of Lord Bertie of Thame, 1914-1918. - London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924.
                        Russian translation by Berti F. L. Behind the scenes of the Entente. Diary of the British Ambassador in Paris. 1914-1919. - M.-L.: State Publishing House, 1927.

                        A few quotes.
                        “December 17th. I also spoke with Gray about the situation in France, about American mediation, about the future of Belgium, about Italy, etc. I pointed out Russian claims regarding Constantinople and the Straits. Gray said that we must fulfill the promises made by us, namely, Russia should receive the right of free passage of its military vessels from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and back in peacetime, in wartime the participants in the war will enjoy equal rights. I noticed that if the Turks left Constantinople, a situation was created that was completely different from the one at which all these promises were made; that the rights and privileges granted to Russia cannot be denied to Romania, which has a border along the Black Sea, or Bulgaria. The correct decision would be as follows: Constantinople turns into a free city, all forts on the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus are destroyed, the Suez Canal regime is applied to the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Gray doubts Russia's consent to such conditions. In general, the question of the disposal of Constantinople and the Straits will be a stumbling block when the time comes to discuss such subjects. "
                        February 22 ... I hope that public opinion in England and abroad will force the powers to reject, in principle, the Russian point of view on the rights of Muscovites regarding Constantinople and the straits between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. I am afraid that Gray does not take such a firm stance on this issue as I would have wished; I mean internationalization according to the principles of the Suez Canal regime; this would not satisfy Izvolsky (after Russia in France - BT) and its owner. Our newest and largest ship, Queen Elizabeth, in the Dardanelles; we have very large forces there.

                        February 26 ... Here, suspicion about Russia's intentions towards Constantinople is growing more and more. They consider it expedient that England and France (in this matter England is placed outside of France) occupied Constantinople before Russia, so that Muscovite would not be able to completely independently decide the question of the future of this city and the straits - the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. ”

                        As you can see, the question “how not to give” was on the agenda and was discussed at the highest level.
                        In general, the book is interesting for understanding the attitude of "allies" to Russia and the illusions of "as it were."
  5. Some kind of compote
    Some kind of compote 13 October 2017 11: 14 New
    18
    a serious strategic miscalculation, the fruits of which Russia and Europe are still reaping

    Ento right
    The Turkish corridor is the key to the clutter of Europe by Asians and Africans (including ISIS militants).
  6. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 13 October 2017 11: 55 New
    14
    A wonderful and objective article! The author - my sincere gratitude for the work done! hi Unfortunately, as was correctly noted in the article, the Russian Headquarters in those years suffered from one drawback that was very painful for the military command - excessive caution, which in essence is a hypertrophy of reasonable precaution. It is one thing when a commander prefers not to get into trouble because of a lack of information or other factors, and another when an excessive fear of error fetters the commander’s initiative and thinking. Fortunately, Nicholas II was relieved of this ailment, due to which he managed to see prospects and insist on the implementation of the Bosphorus operation. It is only a pity that he did not worry about ensuring his own safety and went to the rebellious Petrograd almost without personal protection ...
  7. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 13 October 2017 12: 21 New
    +3
    The transport flotilla of the Black Sea Fleet included about 100 transports (on average each of 5000 - 6000 tons of displacement). This flotilla could immediately raise the army corps of a 3-division composition (40000 people). And as practice further showed (experience of the Black Sea transportation during the war), this transport flotilla could take on board a larger number of troops - up to 1,25 corps. So, on 23, during the landing in Riesa, 03 transports were involved - they left the landing group from Novorossiysk to Riza, landing 1916 Plastun brigades and a mountain division (25 people), and then the same transports landed an infantry division (2 person) in Trebizond. We are talking about 18000 vehicles - that is, only about a quarter of the available transport tonnage.

    There is one problem - you need to clearly distinguish between the landing and the unloading of forces.
    In the Rize area were landed only three battalions. On March 5 and 6, two "Elpidifora" and one TR were landed, removed and again landed two battalions in the rear of the Turkish positions. March 7 from the "Elpidiforov" was landed troops (one battalion) at Rize.
    And two brigades and a mountain art division were unloaded already in the seized port of Rize - from transports.
    In Trebizond there was a landing - but already on its territory. At the same time, the weather said its word: it turned out that the boulders and boats could not work on the excitement. As a result, the landing of the 127th division was delayed until late at night. But the 123rd division was not completely landed at all - 8 TRs with horses, wagons and supplies went to Batum.

    And here we come to the main problem of the landing at the Bosphorus - the problem of landing facilities, landing and supply. 100 TR transport fleet of the Black Sea Fleet is, of course, great. But the landing capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet are determined not by them, but by the availability of landing means and the ability to transfer l / s and transfer weapons from the TR to landing means, and then - from landing means to land through the coastal strip. Given the possible deterioration of the weather.
    Plus, after landing there is an even more serious problem - the supply of troops. It is necessary either to organize this through the coastal strip, or to carry out a landing with an eye to capture the more or less equipped port.

    And now we add to this the enemy’s opposition - which was practically absent in the Caucasian landings (the Turks fled either at the sight of the landing, or after shelling their positions with naval artillery - since they could run very far). And the possible shelling of the landing zone with Turkish howitzers with a PDO (which the same Allies in the Dardanelles could not cope with). And then everything becomes even more fun.
    1. Curious
      Curious 13 October 2017 12: 58 New
      +1
      The author in vain put an end to the topic. After all, having won something, it is necessary to keep it. Having carefully worked out the issue of capturing the Black Sea straits, the author should at least outline the chances of Russia holding them in a more or less long-term perspective. Without this, the capture of straits does not matter.
    2. Cartalon
      Cartalon 13 October 2017 13: 08 New
      12
      If all the forces of the Turks consisted of 3 divisions, you have 27 battalions, then the question of resistance can not be raised, pure logistics remains
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 13 October 2017 13: 16 New
        +1
        Quote: Cartalon
        If all the forces of the Turks consisted of 3 divisions, you have 27 battalions, then the question of resistance can not be raised, pure logistics remains

        I'm afraid that Hamilton and De Robek thought the same way.
        1. Cartalon
          Cartalon 13 October 2017 13: 31 New
          11
          Um, can you refute this data, did the Turks have anything else?
        2. Lieutenant Teterin
          Lieutenant Teterin 13 October 2017 13: 52 New
          13
          If they thought so, then with intelligence before the Dardanelles operation they had, to put it mildly, not really. The 5th army defending the Dardanelles consisted of 2 corps. https://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/ruwiki/1417151
          And speaking of the landing on the Bosphorus, one must take into account the fact that by 1917 the Turks suffered considerable losses, primarily in the officer corps. Correct me if I am mistaken, but parts of the Istanbul garrison were transferred to the Caucasus in 1916, where they fell under the steam rink of the offensive of the Russian Caucasian army, after which their combat effectiveness decreased.
          The Bosphorus airborne corps, which was formed on the Black Sea for good reason by order of Nicholas II, was equipped with St. George cavaliers - these were people who distinguished themselves in battles on the Austrian and German fronts, whose level of combat training was obviously higher than Turkish. So there were chances to hold the bridgehead until the new forces arrived.
        3. antivirus
          antivirus 13 October 2017 18: 33 New
          0
          the seizure of the capital and there will be no Turkish people's militia?
          - it’s all a little closer to St. Sophia than Halippoli
          1. Lieutenant Teterin
            Lieutenant Teterin 13 October 2017 18: 59 New
            12
            Of course it will. That's just the quality of combat training of both lower ranks and officers will be extremely low, especially if an attempt to counter-attack will follow immediately after the landing. Poor command of weapons, lower ranks, lack of communication skills between officers, officers ... In short, they have no chance against personnel units consisting of veterans who distinguished themselves in battles, especially given the support of naval guns. 12-inch (305 mm) “suitcases” do not add health to anyone, not to mention the demoralizing effect. So the militia in this version, having suffered significant losses, will roll back in a panic.
            1. antivirus
              antivirus 13 October 2017 23: 39 New
              +1
              will carry - yes, but fanaticism? how to defend Stalingrad - it turned out well, but to take Istanbul - "excellence, easy walk"
              1. antivirus
                antivirus 13 October 2017 23: 43 New
                +1
                and Nick 2 and everyone in the hands of RI looked to the complex (3D picture) of global processes for 5-10 years ahead
                and saw - "do not go where they do not ask you"

                THIS IS THE RESULT OF PMV
                AND 40 YEARS OF PREPARATION FOR A BOUND OF THE WORLD (from the Russian-Turkish war and the Franco-Prussian war and China-Japan)
    3. BRONEVIK
      BRONEVIK 13 October 2017 15: 06 New
      18
      Alexey RA
      There is one problem - you need to clearly distinguish between the landing and the unloading of forces.

      The case of Rize-Trebizond in the text is mentioned not as a mixture of the concepts of landing and unloading of forces - but as an illustration of the fact that the transport flotilla could take more troops
      the transport flotilla could take on board even more troops - up to 1,25 hulls

      As for the heavy and howitzer artillery of the Turks - we must remember HOW the Dardanelles strengthened them. They brought everything they could there. Moreover, the allies, it is not clear why they fired on this area in November 1914, demonstrated to the Turks both the INTENTIONS and the AREA of their actions. And those six months strengthened.
      And on the Bosphorus we are talking about 1 Turkish field division versus 3 first-tier landing divisions - with the support of fire from the sea. Let us recall how the forces of the Gulf of Riga in the autumn of 1915 effectively supported their infantry - even a counter-offensive took place.
      But even if you fear hypothetical Turkish howitzers, then
      landing could not be carried out in the Bosphorus itself (this is optional), but in an area remote from the Strait at a reasonable distance

      Then already - really not a landing - but a HUGE landing of forces with the subsequent offensive.
      After all, the Caucasian army successively gouged the Turkish 3rd (Erzurum, Erzincan) and 2nd (from Gallipoli divisions - Ognot) armies. And here would have begun the usual for her bd - only in a different area, but with the same enemy
  8. antivirus
    antivirus 13 October 2017 23: 35 New
    +1
    Curious,
    force the powers to reject, in principle, the Russian point of view on the rights of Muscovites regarding Constantinople and the straits between the Black and Mediterranean Seas.

    HERE AND THE WHOLE CAPSES ONION.
    for centuries, the valor of sea pirates-lords has been brought up and to admit to them a squadron to the cut from the north - SHAME !!!

    STRAIN EXERCISE - CONTROL OVER THE BALKANS
    and (?) the Adriatic
    + influence in Italy (how do the Romans see this?)
    + control of navigation on the Danube (taking into account the defeat of AvVengr) - to Budapest (entered there in 1945)
    Whose Greece is it?
    + Rhodes and Crete whose?
    And MALTA?
    is it difficult to base from Sevastopol to Istanbul, and more difficult from Crete to Alexandria?
    IT IS EASIER NOT TO LET THE BEAR ON, ON THE FIRST STEP, DEPLOY IT IN THE LAPTIC SEA (THE BELL IS THE POLAR, "HERE AND GO THERE")

    I’m neither a strategist nor a military specialist. I can’t correlate the speed of knots and the rate of fire of a caliber with superiority in trade and control over the production of hemp and oil.

    BUT 200 YEARS TO CARE THE ARABS (THE TOP - LAURENCE OF ARABIA) AND FROWN THE WORLD (Suez Canal for whose money they built?) BECAUSE OF 30-40 OR 70 THOUSAND airborne hull ????
    and some in capital letters
  9. antivirus
    antivirus 14 October 2017 00: 47 New
    0
    I wrote about the straits
    even the term Big Letters was coined
    RESULT: "do not go where they do not ask" - to RI
    and many other objections of political and geopolitical,
    and not "how many spoons of each St. George cavalier in the landing?"
    "Will there be enough cabbage soup and porridge to eat to Istanbul?"
    1. HOW (BB Went) THE FIRST ROME WILL BE RELATED (PAPE THRESHOLD (TO CAPTURE OF THE SECOND ROME? –– WHEN DIDN'T WAR FROM THE Crusades (?), AND WHAT DID I DO IN WWII?
    2. HOW DOES NEUTRAL SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND APPLY TO THIS CAPTURE?
    3. HOW IS FOOD EXPORTERS - ARGENTINA, USA, CANADA) AND WHO ELSE? (WILL TAKE THIS JOY?
    4. WHAT SUNNI? AND SHIET?
    5. ON THE CREATION OF SAUDI ARABIA WE COULD NOT INFLUENCE? 6. WHAT VALUE HAVE SOPHIA HAD AFTER MECCA AND MEDIN?
    7. CUT W / D BASRA-BERLIN IS GOOD FOR THE BRIT AND FRANCE? AND FOR THE WHOLE WORLD TRADE (BANKERS)?
    8. You can add your own thoughts against the landing

    Thank you for your patience
  10. alatanas
    alatanas 16 October 2017 09: 53 New
    0
    Thus, since the spring of 1916, the Bosphorus operation had every chance of a successful outcome. So why nothing happened?

    Until some time there was an inter-base - Kyustendzha (Constanta), but on the 22 of October 1916. she was taken by the Bulgarian troops. After that, there simply could not be any talk of any Bosphorus operation.
    1. Rotmistr
      Rotmistr 18 October 2017 15: 15 New
      16
      How did you read the article?
      After the entry into operation of 2 Black Sea dreadnoughts
      [quote] Russian command creates 2 maneuverable groups - EVERY of which turned out to be stronger than the enemy (with the brigade of old battleships 3 groups were obtained).
      One maneuvering group was supposed to be near the Bosphorus, and the other managed to go to Sevastopol (to refuel, carry out the necessary repairs and allow the personnel to rest) and return to the position. / Quote]
      И
      [quote] T. about, and the question of an intermediate base has lost its former relevance. [[/ quote]
      She was no longer NEEDED
      1. alatanas
        alatanas 19 October 2017 11: 20 New
        0
        “If only, if only ...” At the end of 16, they were already sitting at Seret and the Bosphorus was already far away.
        1. Rotmistr
          Rotmistr 20 October 2017 10: 00 New
          16
          alatanas
          At the end of the 16th, they were already sitting at Seret and the Bosphorus was already far away.

          What does it have to do with it? Who cares where the land fronts were?
          The blockade of the Bosphorus was needed to ensure supremacy at sea - as a prerequisite for the landing operation
      2. alatanas
        alatanas 19 October 2017 11: 28 New
        0
        There is not enough coal from Sevastopol to Constantinople than from Voikovskaya to Mayakovskaya.
        1. Rotmistr
          Rotmistr 19 October 2017 19: 39 New
          16
          I say - they read the article badly)
          It is not necessary to sail to Constantinople - it was a question of the blockade of the Bosphorus. Enough there - there were corresponding calculations
          The fuel reserve allowed each group to be at sea for 5-6 days - 2 days took a round trip, and 3-4 days - duty on the Bosphorus