Military Review

Operation Jihad - blood after elections

The 1996 summer of the year was the first after the second presidential election, which Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin won. One of the many promises of his company was the end of the Chechen war, for which the government was forced to sign an agreement in Nazran. According to the agreement, Russian troops were gradually withdrawn from the territory of the republic, and order was maintained by local internal affairs agencies. However, in fact, the separatists were not suppressed, and the command was well aware of the danger of the withdrawal of armed forces from a troubled region.

Nevertheless, the conclusion was planned, as the question of the cessation of hostilities was quite acute in society. The war has long ceased to be popular, so the government was obliged to maintain at least the appearance of the intentions of its termination. Thus, the government found itself in an extremely difficult situation: on the one hand, growing discontent and Yeltsin’s blatant lies about the possibility of ending the war in the near future, and on the other the objective need to continue the fight against the separatists. Having achieved re-election, in the first half of July, Boris Nikolayevich and his supporters decide to continue military operations in order to achieve more favorable terms of the agreement, and possibly the complete surrender of the enemy. A series of powerful blows are carried out in the foothill areas, and the 20 has already launched a campaign in the south of the republic.

The separatists used the fact of violation of the agreement by the Russian command as a reason for the attack. In principle, both parties understood that the agreement would not be implemented. As a result, Operation Jihad was planned and implemented (August 6 - August 22 of the year 1996).

Maskhadov’s calculation was simple but true. Russian military forces dispersed throughout the city at roadblocks in such a way that they could not control the entire territory, so the penetration of the armed enemy into the "blind" zones allowed to quickly block certain parts. Maskhadov’s detachments did not storm the city, they quietly entered it. Much of the militants arrived in Grozny earlier under the guise of civilians and refugees. The numerical advantage of the Russians was compensated by the intruders of surprise and targeted destruction of the roadblocks of the roadblocks, and then replenished by constantly restocking from other areas. The first failures of the Russian fighters are connected with the surprise of the attack, the lack of a unified command and the plan to fight the militants. In addition, the separatists actively used provocateurs who promise a safe way out of the city to surrender. About thirty people were shot after the surrender, the militants did not voluntarily release anyone from the city. The unexpectedness of the attack and the lack of organization of the military leadership in Grozny, for example, is indicated by the fact that during the offensive, Russian convoys were leaving Grozny to take part in a special operation in Alkhan-Yurt.

So, at dawn of 6 August, Chechen fighters launched a silent assault on the city simultaneously from three directions. The combatants recall that, shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, a suspicious-looking woman came to the location. Most likely, intelligence activities were carried out with the help of the local population. In addition, the local militiamen (“zavgayevtsy”) turned out to be secret supporters of the separatists, and during the clashes they assisted the militants.

The administrative buildings, as well as the locations of the Russian military, were surrounded by well-armed groups. In such difficult conditions, numerical superiority almost did not matter. In August 1996 remained in the city a few and poorly coordinated units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB and small detachments of specialized troops. Most of the people who remained in Grozny were staff members, investigators and support staff. To lead a full fight could not all. According to Commander Pulikovsky, many of the generals and colonels simply did not know how to fight and unfairly wore their shoulder straps. However, it is impossible to say that the fighters who remained at the checkpoints of Grozny could not be completely unarmed. Each administrative building had a supply of water, food, ammunition, and also had sufficient fortifications for fighting. The personality of Pulikovsky is ambiguous and deserves criticism in many ways, but it would be wrong to ignore his categorical opinion.

Views on the events of August 1996, the participants themselves are significantly different from those expressed by the commander in chief. So, according to the stories of combatants from the Vympel unit, their small group was forced to organize the defense of the hostel, relying solely on their own forces. Of the 87 people in the building, only 37 survived. The huge number of wounded and killed was due to the high degree of concentration of people in small locked rooms, which were opened for continuous fire. The hasty conclusions of the command about the death of the Vampelova left them without help from the federal government. Only thanks to competent and well-coordinated actions were the fighters able to leave their refuge under cover of night and unite with the forces of the FSB.

Events in Grozny can be presented in chronological form. For example, on August 6, in 5 hours, about two hundred militants blocked 50 for hours at a railway station, and a separate group descended down P. Musorov Street towards the center. Closer to the 12.30, the fire was already fought on administrative buildings, and the people inside them quickly sent messages to the center about the attack. When receiving information, Pulikovsky made a decision about the direction to the besieged assault detachments, and, according to him, he chose the most vulnerable and small checkpoints and points. However, any reinforcement immediately involved in street fighting and could not provide substantial support to the defenders.

Until the middle of August, fierce battles were fought, but the situation was not cleared up. Pulikovsky knew about Moscow’s inclination to peace agreements, albeit under obviously unfavorable conditions, so he put forward an ultimatum to the militants. Civilians were asked to leave the city within 48 hours, and the militants would immediately stop firing and surrender, it was said that otherwise they would drop bombs on the city. The decision assumed the death of not only the separatists themselves, but of all the blocked federal troops, which the Moscow government could not allow. Pulikovsky was removed from his post, and Lieutenant-General Tikhomirov returned to his place after a short leave.

During the offensive of the militants, the Russian armed forces lost only 2083 people, according to official data, of whom 494 died. Nevertheless, to assert that the Russian armed forces could not repel enemy attacks, we cannot. If from a political point of view, the assault of Grozny for Maskhadov turned out to be a victory and became a weighty argument in the negotiations for peace in Khasavyurt, then in terms of military victory, neither side achieved.
Shooting august

The story of the storming of the city of Grozny by Chechen separatist detachments, launched by 6 on August 1996, was Operation Jihad, as the events were called militants.

Dorm, August-96, FSB "Vympel"

6 August in 5: 00 am Chechen units began to enter Grozny from Chernorechye, Aldy and Staropromyslovsky district, and skillfully using the flaws in the location of roadblocks (many were trapped between houses, not controlling anything in reality), began to move along uncontrolled routes. Previously, parts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of Chechens, were withdrawn from the city, and Chechen roadblocks were also removed. The enemy did not set out to seize or destroy all urban objects. Upon entering Grozny, he blocked the Russian units of the internal troops at checkpoints and commandant’s offices, isolated them from each other and demoralizing them with constant “disturbing” fire.

6 August 23 groups of Chechen militants entered the city of Grozny.
The employees of the 2 department of the newly created Directorate "B" and FSB operatives who were in the FSB hostel building decided to keep the defense until the city was liberated by federal troops.


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  1. ward
    ward 20 March 2012 08: 32
    Conclusions ... Departmental disunity ... Parquet warriors in command ... and as a result we have what we have ... Fortunately, ordinary soldiers always correct command miscalculations, but they do it with their own blood ... By and large it a distinctive feature of military operations in Russian ...
    1. VAF
      VAF 20 March 2012 09: 14
      Quote: ward
      Parquet warriors in command ... and as a result we have that we have ..

      Absolutely accurately noticed!
      As the "good weather" sets in and we can fly to the fullest. so at once let's reconcile, agree, etc.
      We are "sitting", while the Czechs were "engaged" in fulfilling their plans!
      And then how with our help to knock them out of cities and towns?
      Inevitable losses among the civilian population!
      And if you tell "everything" what we were doing, or rather what tasks were performed, then the one who was not there will never believe !!!
      But the order is the order and executed, but at the same time .... eh, what to remember !!!
      Another "favorite" in the form of "Kvasha" was given orders!
      By the way, in August 2008, Taburetkin "commanded" the same first, God forbid !! am

      And nothing, everything got away with and is still "in business"! bully

      Where are we going? request
      1. Sergh
        Sergh 20 March 2012 17: 50
        Yes, Taburetkin in 08 was engaged in repairing the building of the Ministry of Defense, moving to another building, when they called from Tskhinval, more than one special-purpose telephone did not work, except for city-wide. On him, and conducted tactical negotiations, and then a few hours later dialed.
        Correctly Prometey says Swan, who was dreamily dreaming at the presidency and the birch with his business in Chechnya, they set up the whole army there.
        And half of the generals now do not know how to load a gun.
  2. schta
    schta 20 March 2012 10: 23
    Quote: ward
    By and large, this is a distinctive feature of hostilities in Russian ...

    Not in Russian, but just carelessly (if not treacherous). History knows many brilliant "Russian" victories.
  3. Prometey
    Prometey 20 March 2012 10: 24
    Shortly before the militants attacked, regular units of the federal forces were withdrawn from Grozny (conspiracy?) - only scattered OMON troops left, which were immediately surrounded and blocked in the area of ​​the checkpoints. According to the recollections of the participants in those events — there was practically no place to wait for help — the locals brought food and water to those around them at their own peril and risk.
    It is clear that Pulikovsky would not have been allowed to carry out the plan for the second assault on Grozny. The militants calculated everything clearly - there were many civilians in the city, the Chechens would not have let them out of the city. The use of artillery and aviation due to the possible large losses among the population was impossible. There was another plan - to take the city into a ring and slam the militants like in a mousetrap. But the "peacekeepers" Lebed and Berezovsky intervened in the matter in order to play chess with Basayev and once again drain our army.
  4. Viking
    Viking 20 March 2012 12: 10
    it was said that otherwise bombs would be dropped on the city. The decision involved the death of not only the separatists themselves, but also of all the blocked federal troops,

    What an amazing insane crap. Judging by the twists in the brains of the author, were they not going to throw a bomb like an atomic one? (or authors ???, which explains a lot).
    Quote: Prometey
    There was another plan - to take the city into a ring and slam the militants as in a mousetrap.

    Yes, it went down in history as the "Pulikovsky ring", he believed that, in general, he outwitted the militants, and instead of chasing small scattered groups throughout the republic, destroy them all in Grozny. But they didn't.

    But by August 13, according to General Troshev [5], the then commander of the 58th army, the situation was rectified - of all the surrounded roadblocks, only five were unblocked. The militants themselves suffered heavy losses. Maskhadov’s impudent but adventurous operation failed - the enormous forces pulled together by him in Grozny were themselves in the ring of Russian troops. General Pulikovsky presented the militants with an ultimatum - to surrender within 48 hours, otherwise he promised to deliver a powerful blow to the city using heavy artillery and aircraft. The population was given a corridor to exit through Old Sunzha. This decision was condemned by a number of Russian publicists, in particular the historian Boris Sokolov, who claimed in his book “100 Great Wars” that it would destroy not only the militants, but also the surrounded Russian soldiers and civilians who were unable to leave the city so quickly ( he does not argue in any way) [6]. Troshev noted that the militants believed Pulikovsky, his words caused them "confusion." The militants even asked them to give them a corridor, to which Pulikovsky answered: “Not for that I surrounded you to let you out. Either surrender, or you will be destroyed! ”
  5. SenyaYa
    SenyaYa 20 March 2012 13: 41
    Chechnya! How much of this word
  6. Yazov
    Yazov 20 March 2012 15: 15
    The article recalls 1941. Again, unexpectedly, again, the soldiers disintegrate for everything. Again .... Again ......
    But generals and colonels do not know how to fight .....
    In those days, I watched reports and I remember how the captain of the airborne forces defended a bunch of generals, but they did not even crawl out of the basement.
    It does not depend on the rank, but on the person. If a person is afraid of something all his life, he will not even attack the general, at least the general!
    There was a case, it seems in the first Chechen one, the general led the soldiers to attack. Everyone followed him. His wall after the explosion failed, died.
    It is necessary to drive out from the army and other structures such officers who do not know how to fight!
    All KMB passed in schools!
  7. Region71
    Region71 20 March 2012 18: 54
    In addition, the unofficial supporters of the separatists turned out to be local police officers (“Zavgaevites”), who helped the militants during the clash.
    You know, I understand them. On the one hand, they were pressed by the so-called illegal armed groups, and on the other they were abandoned by the then Russian false authorities. That’s where the Chechen cops had little choice, either die from the bottom and bury their families, or collaborate with militants .And in general, the first Chechen one is a disgrace to Russia. I do not want to say that it is a disgrace to all the Russians who voted for Yeltsin, God be their judge. But he never considered this person to be his president.
  8. moskal
    moskal 20 March 2012 20: 05
    S-ki! Bl-di! Prostitutes!
  9. dmitryg
    dmitryg 20 March 2012 21: 19
    Russian Private - a monument, glory and honor!
    Glory and honor to Russian Sergeants!
    Russian officers are honored!
    to the Russian high command staff headed by Boriska "UNDERSTAND" Yeltsin - shame, oblivion and execution!

    While in the war our own skin is more valuable than the lives of subordinates, we will suck deeply and selflessly from a bearded mountain rabble. Hate Russia.
  10. SF93
    SF93 21 March 2012 04: 55
    Good people in Russia are forced to die for Russia, and corrupt politicians, corrupt officials multiply, multiply and enrich themselves at the expense of simple and honest citizens. EBN, to him from century to century in a coffin to spin.
  11. kosmos84
    kosmos84 23 March 2012 20: 35
  12. AlexxxNik
    AlexxxNik 24 March 2012 13: 11
    it’s like a Russian curse, that it’s not a mess, the first thing the generals do on which the decision depends is to make it, all of them are strategists and politicians, there are no tactics, and organizers and even less, the vicious practice of years of service will bring the army to a pen, two or three battle generals two dozen pacifists
  13. in reserve
    in reserve April 21 2012 17: 51
    the leadership’s actions are an example of cowardice and incompetence, it’s a pity the soldiers thrown into the meat grinder by mediocre commanders ...