Russia's political orientation: development or stagnation
The political confrontation of Westerners and Slavophiles in Russia has been known for several centuries. A certain part, let's say, of the political elite was convinced that Russia is an integral part of a larger Europe, and therefore only planned integration into a single European space should provide Russia with an opportunity for development. Chaadaev, Botkin, Turgenev, Annenkov are bright representatives of the Westernist idea of the historical movement of Russia, who are considering the formation of a new, active Russian society based on the European ideals of humanism and the immutability of the legal system.
At the same time, the 19th century became the century of the simultaneous formation of another political force, Slavophilism, whose representatives were sure that Russia had, has and will have its own historical a path that differs from both Western principles and Eastern radical absolutism. The path based on the inviolability of the Orthodox faith, autocracy and nationality. These three maxims, as the Slavophiles called them, were obviously a kind of European opposition to “freedom, equality, fraternity”. Representatives of the Slavophile idea at an early stage of its development were Aksakov, Samarin, Kireevsky.
In connection with the emergence of practically diametrically opposed social and political ideas, the first beginnings of a real political struggle appeared in Russia. A new era of confrontation of elites has begun, which in one form or another has reached our days. Different views on the vector of movement of Russia forward led to the fact that the Slavophils accused the Westernizers that they preach anti-patriotic thoughts, and the Westernizers, rejecting such accusations, put forward in turn claims to the Slavophiles that they suffer from a complex of retrograde, which can destroy Russia .
In this case, it is noteworthy to consider how the emerging internal political rivalry in Russia was perceived in the West. Perhaps, Russian affairs would have turned out to be for Europe at that time abroad of its interests if it were not for the established continental-wide policy, about which it is worth saying a few words.
After the victory of Napoleon’s army by the Russian army in 1814-1815, the so-called Congress of Vienna was held. This is, in fact, an epochal event, which for many years has determined the paths for the further development of Europe. Russia, as the winner of the war, insisted on adopting a new legislative base, based on the fact that European liberties of the 1789 model of the year must be ended once and for all. A massive reincarnation of monarchical absolutism in Europe was carried out, bringing to the fore the principles of inviolability of the nobility, ideas of unconditional support of the ruling dynasties and restoration of the economic system based on the class superiority of one social layer over others. In other words, the post-war Russia simply said its word that if we won, then our development concept is the only correct one, and therefore, be so kind as to take it for granted.
Naturally, such principles pleased European monarchists and completely disappointed those who are already accustomed to the fact that development should be carried out on principles close to the principles of open equality (as they would say now, partnership).
Perhaps it was the Congress of Vienna that laid the foundation for all modern European stereotypes about Russia as a country that is trying with all its might to go along the track that was once chosen and does not want to be aware of the need for change. At the same time, the stereotype that Russia should be absolutely afraid to remain is also preserved, because it can again try to bring its vision of the situation to the West using its own methods. It turns out that all modern problems of the West and Russia, open or smoldering in the depths of the confrontation, did not appear after the 1917 year, or even after the Second World War. The birth of a kind of barrier took place just then - in 1815.
But is it worth criticizing the position adopted in relation to Europe by the leadership of Russia at that time. Firstly, we have no moral right to this, and secondly, we should not forget that in 1812, Russia itself was in the balance from a grandiose national catastrophe. And after the invasion of Napoleon’s army, Alexander I was clearly not inclined to confine himself to “peace enforcement,” bringing his troops exclusively to the border with the enemy. He did what he had to do militarily, and he did what he had to do in political terms - he forced the Europeans to live by the laws of the victorious country. And the fact that Europe, to put it mildly, did not like it, well, so here, as they say, Moscow had nothing to burn ... And it would be completely strange to suppose that, bringing the Cossacks to the Elysian Fields, Alexander I would have let the political process in the path that he (the process) was walking before and led to aggression towards Russia. The act of Alexander I, who even condemn somehow, neither the hand nor the tongue does not turn.
But the opposition of Westerners and Slavophils arose precisely on this basis. Both trends attributed themselves to patriots, both trends preached the principles of development, but views on the socio-political system dictated the need for a very active opposition to each other.
Based on this, we can analyze the current situation in our country. There are Westernizers, there are Slavophiles, there are those who manage to intercept air on one and the other side of the dividing line. Some see the conflict between Russia and the West as the inevitable extinction of Russia; others see this as the only correct option for our country to demonstrate its high status. Some are convinced that only European norms are capable of pulling Russia out of its current state by the ears, others are sure that it is better to sit in its place than to look for ghostly ways. A situation that fully recalls the historical stage of the 40-60-s of the nineteenth century with the only difference that today the West has much more opportunities to put pressure on Russia.
After Vladimir Putin was elected president, talk about the vector of Russia's development turned into a new big dispute. In the midst of this discord, one can hear the words that Putin can forever bury the partnership with the West and send Russia along a siding leading to deep stagnation. However, to say this today you can afford, if you completely neglect the historical facts. First you need to recognize that, yes - of course, Putin for the West was seen as far from an ideal figure with whom he would have dreamed of cooperating. But for all that, Putin received a public message from the Russians, which means that you (the candidate-president Putin) was awarded the support of the majority, which means you must do everything so that this majority does not experience fatal disappointment. With such a promise in the chair you will not zeditsya, but will have to work with tripled energy. Was there such a situation at the time when Brezhnev was at the helm of power, with whom they now like to compare Putin? Obviously not! Leonid Ilyich did not receive any public messages, and could not receive them, because, as you know, our society and the party were almost not a single whole, and therefore any nomination of claims turned into nomination of claims to ourselves ...
Putin is being blamed for the fact that he does not have the mood for rapprochement with the West, and with Western democratic values. But this judgment can hardly be called objective. And then what to call Russia's participation in European conventions, what to call the emerging mood to reform the political system, what to call possible cooperation with NATO, which, by the way, causes serious disputes even among the ardent supporters of Vladimir Putin. To say that Putin wants to implant the principles of the Congress of Vienna in Europe with a focus on the inviolability of borders and turn to stagnant stability is also quite adventurous. In this sense, in the most democratic Europe, as they say, the stigma of a cannon: where it is beneficial (Georgia, for example), the borders are considered immutable, and where it is not profitable (Serbia), the borders can be moved as long as necessary. Yes, and with the stagnation of the Western world today he clearly overdo it. What is worth one famous amendment of Jackson-Vanik, which the United States "hold" active for every fireman. By the way, there are certain forces in Russia today that urge the United States Congress not to abandon this amendment - for example, Boris Nemtsov ... And there are also many complaints about the Western economic model inflating mutual debts. Therefore, there is still a grandmother in two said, who is now stagnant.
At the same time, we will say so, modern Slavophiles also occupy a far from unequivocal position. It lies in the fact that it is necessary to exert unconditional trust in the Russian government, because it allegedly always knows what to do in a given situation. This position looks strange, because any modern (or self-modern) power is not a priori immutable formation, which should be cooked only in its own juice, not accepting public complaints, and not allowing even a hint of self-criticism. Power, at least from the Slavophile, at least from the Westernist point of view, is a group of people who must stand in defense of the interests of any of the citizens. In no case should power be perceived as a public taboo, otherwise we ourselves will be guaranteed to send our staff on the path that leads nowhere.
As a result, it must be said that the multipolarity of opinions is an excellent tool for the social and political development of the country. The confrontation of socio-political formations gives rise to confidence that the country will not grow into the ground. Any one-sided position leads to moral degradation, but at the same time frantic liberalism is the path to endless self-shattering. It turns out that in the near future we are awaited the search for that most cherished golden mean, which for centuries has eluded Russia. But so eager to believe that utopia at least once in our country become a reality ...
I.E. Repin. Plowman. L.N. Tolstoy on arable land. Xnumx
At the same time, the 19th century became the century of the simultaneous formation of another political force, Slavophilism, whose representatives were sure that Russia had, has and will have its own historical a path that differs from both Western principles and Eastern radical absolutism. The path based on the inviolability of the Orthodox faith, autocracy and nationality. These three maxims, as the Slavophiles called them, were obviously a kind of European opposition to “freedom, equality, fraternity”. Representatives of the Slavophile idea at an early stage of its development were Aksakov, Samarin, Kireevsky.
In connection with the emergence of practically diametrically opposed social and political ideas, the first beginnings of a real political struggle appeared in Russia. A new era of confrontation of elites has begun, which in one form or another has reached our days. Different views on the vector of movement of Russia forward led to the fact that the Slavophils accused the Westernizers that they preach anti-patriotic thoughts, and the Westernizers, rejecting such accusations, put forward in turn claims to the Slavophiles that they suffer from a complex of retrograde, which can destroy Russia .
In this case, it is noteworthy to consider how the emerging internal political rivalry in Russia was perceived in the West. Perhaps, Russian affairs would have turned out to be for Europe at that time abroad of its interests if it were not for the established continental-wide policy, about which it is worth saying a few words.
After the victory of Napoleon’s army by the Russian army in 1814-1815, the so-called Congress of Vienna was held. This is, in fact, an epochal event, which for many years has determined the paths for the further development of Europe. Russia, as the winner of the war, insisted on adopting a new legislative base, based on the fact that European liberties of the 1789 model of the year must be ended once and for all. A massive reincarnation of monarchical absolutism in Europe was carried out, bringing to the fore the principles of inviolability of the nobility, ideas of unconditional support of the ruling dynasties and restoration of the economic system based on the class superiority of one social layer over others. In other words, the post-war Russia simply said its word that if we won, then our development concept is the only correct one, and therefore, be so kind as to take it for granted.
Naturally, such principles pleased European monarchists and completely disappointed those who are already accustomed to the fact that development should be carried out on principles close to the principles of open equality (as they would say now, partnership).
Perhaps it was the Congress of Vienna that laid the foundation for all modern European stereotypes about Russia as a country that is trying with all its might to go along the track that was once chosen and does not want to be aware of the need for change. At the same time, the stereotype that Russia should be absolutely afraid to remain is also preserved, because it can again try to bring its vision of the situation to the West using its own methods. It turns out that all modern problems of the West and Russia, open or smoldering in the depths of the confrontation, did not appear after the 1917 year, or even after the Second World War. The birth of a kind of barrier took place just then - in 1815.
But is it worth criticizing the position adopted in relation to Europe by the leadership of Russia at that time. Firstly, we have no moral right to this, and secondly, we should not forget that in 1812, Russia itself was in the balance from a grandiose national catastrophe. And after the invasion of Napoleon’s army, Alexander I was clearly not inclined to confine himself to “peace enforcement,” bringing his troops exclusively to the border with the enemy. He did what he had to do militarily, and he did what he had to do in political terms - he forced the Europeans to live by the laws of the victorious country. And the fact that Europe, to put it mildly, did not like it, well, so here, as they say, Moscow had nothing to burn ... And it would be completely strange to suppose that, bringing the Cossacks to the Elysian Fields, Alexander I would have let the political process in the path that he (the process) was walking before and led to aggression towards Russia. The act of Alexander I, who even condemn somehow, neither the hand nor the tongue does not turn.
But the opposition of Westerners and Slavophils arose precisely on this basis. Both trends attributed themselves to patriots, both trends preached the principles of development, but views on the socio-political system dictated the need for a very active opposition to each other.
Based on this, we can analyze the current situation in our country. There are Westernizers, there are Slavophiles, there are those who manage to intercept air on one and the other side of the dividing line. Some see the conflict between Russia and the West as the inevitable extinction of Russia; others see this as the only correct option for our country to demonstrate its high status. Some are convinced that only European norms are capable of pulling Russia out of its current state by the ears, others are sure that it is better to sit in its place than to look for ghostly ways. A situation that fully recalls the historical stage of the 40-60-s of the nineteenth century with the only difference that today the West has much more opportunities to put pressure on Russia.
After Vladimir Putin was elected president, talk about the vector of Russia's development turned into a new big dispute. In the midst of this discord, one can hear the words that Putin can forever bury the partnership with the West and send Russia along a siding leading to deep stagnation. However, to say this today you can afford, if you completely neglect the historical facts. First you need to recognize that, yes - of course, Putin for the West was seen as far from an ideal figure with whom he would have dreamed of cooperating. But for all that, Putin received a public message from the Russians, which means that you (the candidate-president Putin) was awarded the support of the majority, which means you must do everything so that this majority does not experience fatal disappointment. With such a promise in the chair you will not zeditsya, but will have to work with tripled energy. Was there such a situation at the time when Brezhnev was at the helm of power, with whom they now like to compare Putin? Obviously not! Leonid Ilyich did not receive any public messages, and could not receive them, because, as you know, our society and the party were almost not a single whole, and therefore any nomination of claims turned into nomination of claims to ourselves ...
Putin is being blamed for the fact that he does not have the mood for rapprochement with the West, and with Western democratic values. But this judgment can hardly be called objective. And then what to call Russia's participation in European conventions, what to call the emerging mood to reform the political system, what to call possible cooperation with NATO, which, by the way, causes serious disputes even among the ardent supporters of Vladimir Putin. To say that Putin wants to implant the principles of the Congress of Vienna in Europe with a focus on the inviolability of borders and turn to stagnant stability is also quite adventurous. In this sense, in the most democratic Europe, as they say, the stigma of a cannon: where it is beneficial (Georgia, for example), the borders are considered immutable, and where it is not profitable (Serbia), the borders can be moved as long as necessary. Yes, and with the stagnation of the Western world today he clearly overdo it. What is worth one famous amendment of Jackson-Vanik, which the United States "hold" active for every fireman. By the way, there are certain forces in Russia today that urge the United States Congress not to abandon this amendment - for example, Boris Nemtsov ... And there are also many complaints about the Western economic model inflating mutual debts. Therefore, there is still a grandmother in two said, who is now stagnant.
At the same time, we will say so, modern Slavophiles also occupy a far from unequivocal position. It lies in the fact that it is necessary to exert unconditional trust in the Russian government, because it allegedly always knows what to do in a given situation. This position looks strange, because any modern (or self-modern) power is not a priori immutable formation, which should be cooked only in its own juice, not accepting public complaints, and not allowing even a hint of self-criticism. Power, at least from the Slavophile, at least from the Westernist point of view, is a group of people who must stand in defense of the interests of any of the citizens. In no case should power be perceived as a public taboo, otherwise we ourselves will be guaranteed to send our staff on the path that leads nowhere.
As a result, it must be said that the multipolarity of opinions is an excellent tool for the social and political development of the country. The confrontation of socio-political formations gives rise to confidence that the country will not grow into the ground. Any one-sided position leads to moral degradation, but at the same time frantic liberalism is the path to endless self-shattering. It turns out that in the near future we are awaited the search for that most cherished golden mean, which for centuries has eluded Russia. But so eager to believe that utopia at least once in our country become a reality ...
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