Strange story with General Samokhin
In the spring of 1942, in the Nazi-occupied Mtsensk, a Soviet military transport plane headed for Yelets landed. On board was the newly appointed commander of the 48 army, Major General A.G. Samokhin, en route to a new duty station. Pilots and passengers of the aircraft were captured. During the war years, this was not at all uncommon - such cases occurred in our own, and among the nazis, and allies of both sides. And therefore it would have been possible not to focus attention on this case, if not for one "but": Major General Alexander Georgievich Samokhin before the war was a Soviet military attaché in Yugoslavia and under the pseudonym Sofofl headed the "legal" residency of the GRU in Belgrade. Moreover, after a short - from July to December 1941 - command of the 29 rifle corps and tenure as deputy commander of the 16 army for the rear, in December 1941, Mr. Alexander Samokhin was again transferred to the GRU. At first, he was an assistant chief, and then - until 20 on April 1942, he was the head of the GRU 2 Office. Thus, a high-ranking Soviet military intelligence officer was imprisoned in Hitler captivity in the past. This is a genuine fact, and without that, clearly distorted rumors about which, by the malicious will of falsifiers, were again distorted, and this time almost beyond recognition! Well, to attach additional components that supposedly set off its authenticity to it is altogether easier. Something was dropped, something was added and - on you, not wanting to know and find out, but the supposedly enlightened "democratic opinion" of a new fake about Stalin! Strictly speaking, this is the answer, in particular, to the question of why / 480 / the Soviet-German secret talks allegedly took place between representatives of the intelligence services of both sides and "occurred" at the beginning of 1942 and it was in Mtsensk!
At the same time, it should be noted that story the capture of Major General Samokhin leaves a distinctly ambivalent impression. Firstly, due to the fact that the versions of the history of his captivity differ in details. For example, in the statement of the military historian Viktor Aleksandrovich Mirkyskin it sounds like this: "On the way to a new duty station, his plane landed in the German-occupied Mtsensk instead of Yelets." That is, understand how you want, whether it really is a mistake by the pilots that landed there, or intentionally, including maliciously, or something else. In turn, the authors of the extensive reference book “Russia in Persons. GRU. Affairs and People” went a strange way at all. On one page, they indicate that Samokhin "... because of a pilot error was captured by the Germans." It would seem that the unambiguous version ... However, after two hundred pages after this statement, the same authors, obviously, without batting an eyelid, reported that Samokhin "... flew to Yelets, but the pilot lost orientation, and the plane was hit over the Germans. Samokhin was captivated. " And during the preparation of this volume for publication, I had the opportunity to partially get acquainted with the materials of the interrogation of Samokhin in SMERSH of 26 on June 1946, during which he stated: “Three hours after departure from Moscow, I noticed that the plane had flown over the front edge of our defense. I ordered the pilot to fly back, he turned around, but the Germans fired at us and shot us down. "
Hardly having multiple versions helps to establish the truth. And, frankly, it is hard to believe that during landing, for example, during the day the pilots did not notice that they were landing on a German airfield: at least a couple of planes were standing at the airfield, and the Luftwaffe crosses on them were clearly visible from afar. By the spring of 1942, our pilots had plenty to look at them. So with regard to the first versions, the question immediately arises: why did the pilot, who could not help but notice that he was boarding a Hitler airfield, did not try to turn around and fly away from the Germans ?! And now, don’t take it for work to agree, naturally, by common sense that simply to land not where it is necessary is one thing; by mistake, the pilot would land not where it should be, another, but something completely different - to make a forced, emergency landing in addition, / 481 / that the plane was shot down because the pilot lost his course. And it is quite another that Samokhin showed during the interrogation. After all, during the interrogation in SMERSH, Samokhin showed that they did not sit in Mtsensk, but on some gentle slope of a hill.
According to the data that have become known to the author recently, the flight was carried out on the plane "PR-5". This is a passenger modification of the famous reconnaissance aircraft P-5. In this modification, a four-passenger cabin is installed. The maximum speed at the ground - 246 - 276 km / h, at the height of 3000 m - from 235 to 316 km / h. Cruising speed - 200 km / h. According to the testimony of Samokhin, it turns out that after three hours of flight, they covered a distance of 600 km. But at the helm of the aircraft was the pilot of the air group of the General Staff. And in this air group selected very experienced pilots. They knew the situation well and where the front line was. How could it happen that an experienced pilot did not notice that he had flown over the front line ?! Tea, not at the speed of the same fighter flew! And it was not the pilot who noticed the mistake, but Samokhin himself.
The only thing that could remove questions about this is the fact of a night flight. But in this case, another circumstance will certainly intervene. The fact is that during the war years, flights of commanders of armies and fronts were carried out, as a rule, accompanied by at least a fighter link, that is, three fighter planes. Especially if this flight was carried out from Moscow, and even with the Betting documents (if you believe these versions). Measure, as it is understandable, is far from superfluous, especially in war.
Then it is asked, how did the fighters allow this? This question becomes even more acute when you rest on the next question: how could it happen that our fighters, and this is fighting pilots, allowed the pilot of the ward plane to hell to know where it was going, besides it turned out to be also shot down over the German territory ?! No, something is wrong with these versions. Secondly, as after the war, in 1964, the former chief of staff of the 48 Army, subsequently Marshal of the Soviet Union, Sergey Semenovich Biryuzov, asserted, "the Germans seized then Soviet documents for the summer (1942) offensive campaign that allowed them to take countermeasures in a timely manner. " In the same year, Biryuzov died in a strange plane crash during a visit to Yugoslavia (482). The authors of the above-mentioned reference book about the GRU say roughly the same thing - “the enemy took possession of the operational map and directive of the UGCC”. If we take for granted these two versions, then, having excluded the more or less justified presence of an operational map at Samokhin, we immediately rest on a depressing question. Why did the newly appointed commander only have an army in his hands, by definition, especially secret documents - the directive of the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters and the documents of the Soviet military planning for the 1942 summer campaign?! After all, in principle, the directives of Stakes were addressed to the commanders of directions and fronts. But not armies! And Samokhin is not just a Bids directive, but "Soviet planning documents for the summer (1942) campaign"! To put it mildly, this is not his level, so that, as it is sung in a famous song, “know for all of Odessa” ?! Yes, and the Supreme Commander IV Stalin was not so simple as to send his directives in this way. During the war years, the rules of secret correspondence were extremely strictly observed, especially between the UGCC and the fronts, armies, etc. And without that, always the secret courier service carried out the transport of secret documents between the Stavka and the fronts under special armed guard of the NKVD (from 1943, the SMERSH).
Nevertheless, according to the data that have been established recently, Samokhin was supposed to introduce himself in Yelets to the commander of the Bryansk front, hand him a package of special importance from the Stavka and receive relevant instructions from the front commander. This is strange, because it does not fit in with the most severe secrecy regime that prevailed during the war. And it does not look like Stalin. And that's what's interesting. During interrogation in SMERSH, Samokhin claimed that he burned all the documents and trampled the rest into the dirt. Then on what basis did the statements of the GRU tragedy, the marshal of the Turks and the authors of the GRU handbook, make their statements tragically? Moreover. From the testimony of Samokhin it follows that the Germans seized his party card, the prescription of appointment as army commander, the ID of the GRU employee and the order book. What is most interesting is the presence of his identity as an employee of the GRU. Why did he not turn him in, having been appointed to the post of army commander ?! Why this important document was not destroyed by them? No replies. / 483 /
But depending on the version of the capture of Samokhin, the most depressing begins. From the inevitable suspicions that a military intelligence operation was thus carried out (by whom and for what purpose?) - the right to this is given by the rich history of such sophisticated reconnaissance of intelligence services in two world wars of the 20th century, rich in such examples, to criminal negligence, not excluding games under her, which, unfortunately, and then it was not uncommon. Suppose the most innocuous option. Assume that the pilot really lost his course and was within the reach of the German air defense system. But what were the cover fighters doing at this time? The plane was shot down and, suppose, under the coercion of Luftwaffe fighters, which, of course, sharply aggravates the above question regarding our “falcons”, as a result was forced to make an emergency landing at an enemy aerodrome. But in this case it is appropriate to raise the next question. Why didn’t the professional intelligence officer and the army commander destroy especially secret documents of the Stavka ?! Well, after all, he did not have a suitcase with documents on his hands? Just something package yes card. Under what category of negligence, and even negligence in general, would you order to include this option?
Doubts about whether negligence was in general, unfortunately, reinforce the following facts. In 2005, a very interesting book by V. Lot “The Secret Front of the General Staff. Exploration: Open Materials” was published. The 410 and 411 pages of this book are devoted to the fate of General AG Samokhina. I don’t know how this could have happened - after all, apparently, V. Lot is a very knowledgeable author in the history of military intelligence - but from the very first lines on the fate of A.G. Samokhina, a respected colleague straight leads into a frightened. V. Lot indicates that before being appointed 1942 to the position of 42 Army commander in mid-April, Samokhin held the post of the GRU Information Department - Assistant to the GRU Chief, and immediately adds that he had been in the military intelligence service for only about two months! But this is complete nonsense! Samokhin even before the war served in military intelligence and was a resident of the GRU in Belgrade. And they never appointed newbies to such posts at the GRU: the central apparatus of such a solid department as Soviet military intelligence is not the ice cream sales office, so that the newcomer could easily be appointed head of the Information Department of the GRU to the position of head of the GRU Information Department. . Therefore, if we consider the official biography of AG Samokhin in the first six months of the war, it was necessary to point out that these same “about two months” Samokhin served in the central apparatus of military intelligence, and not at all in the GRU system. So, obviously, it would be more correct, although this is inaccurate, because he was appointed 484 in December and, therefore, by the time he was appointed commander, he was already the fifth month of his tenure as assistant chief of the GRU - chief of 1941- Management (and not the Information Department) of the GRU.
Further. A.G. Samokhin was appointed the commander of a non-42 army operating near Kharkov, i.e. on the South-Western Front, and the 48-th Army of the Bryansk Front. Still, there is a difference, especially if one considers that there was no 42 army near Kharkov. Yes, and the fronts of the names are fundamentally different. V. Lot states that at first A.G. Samokhin flew to the front headquarters, however, does not indicate which one. If we proceed from his assertion about Kharkov, it turns out to be a nonsense - what was he to do at the headquarters of the South-Western Front if he was appointed commander of the Bryansk front ?! If you take the words of V.Loty seriously, then you’ll get something ominous. Because, according to him, in the front headquarters he received some instructions, then he was transferred to another plane and after that he was taken prisoner ...
However, in this case it is inexpedient to take V. Lot's words seriously, because A.G. Samokhin nevertheless flew to the Bryansk front, and not to the SWF. If you look at the map, then the question immediately arises of how it was possible to get to Mtsensk with the purpose of appointing Elets ?! The distance between them is over 150 km! The flight to Yelets, especially from Moscow, actually strictly south, the flight to Mtsensk - to the south-west, in the direction of Orel. By the way, it was there that they delivered him first, to the headquarters of the 2nd tank Wehrmacht groups. And only then they were sent by plane to the Letzen Fortress in East Prussia.
Because of this strange air of Samokhin, the Supreme Command was forced to cancel its decision from 20 on April 1942 to hold an operation in the Kursk-Lgov direction in early May of the same year using the forces of the two armies and the tank corps to seize the Kursk and cut off the railway . Kursk - Lgov (History of the Second World War. M., 1975. T. 5. C. 114). And, perhaps, this is one of those fatal prerequisites for the tragedy (485) of the offensive near Kharkov, because one of those two armies that should have attacked Kursk should have led Samokhin. By the way, apparently, he was holding the Directive of the Supreme Command Committee on the above-mentioned attack on Kursk (and Kursk-Agov), and not the documents of the Soviet military planning for the entire 1942 spring-summer campaign, as they usually write.
According to V. Aots, the fate of A.G. Samokhina cleared up after the Battle of Stalingrad. However, if one proceeds from his own words, it is too strange that it has become clear. On the one hand, he points out that Samokhin was unaccounted for 21 on April 1942, on the other he reports that only 10 on February 1943 was made by the Red Army’s Main Department for Losses, ordered N: 0194, according to which Samokhin was identified missing lead that, you see, does not bring any clarity. Because if the order was issued only on 10 in February of 1943, then it turns out that since 21 on April 1942, the fate of Samokhin was not known at all either way, even to be included in the list of the missing. And this is superstrange. The loss of the army commander, especially the newly appointed one, is an emergency of the highest level! This is the state of emergency, because of which the Special Divisions and foreign intelligence immediately turned to their ears and at least daily reported to Moscow on the results of the search for the missing person. This is not a joke - the army commander, who a few days ago was a very high-ranking member of the GRU, disappeared! Naturally, this was immediately reported to Stalin and, believe me, the relevant strict instructions from the state security organs and all military intelligence units immediately clarify the fate of the commander the Supreme Highway.
AT. Lot also reports that during the Stalingrad battle a certain Wehrmacht senior lieutenant was captured, who during interrogations revealed that he had participated in the interrogations of Major General Samokhin, emphasizing at the same time that the plane had accidentally landed on the airfield seized by the Germans. ". And what was the point to emphasize exactly this? According to the words of this Wehrmacht lieutenant, Samokhin allegedly hid his own, as indicated by V. Lot, "a short service in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, disguised himself as an army general who served all his life in the military, behaved with dignity / 486 / dew. I didn’t say anything special to the Germans, citing the fact that he had been appointed to the post in mid-March and had just arrived at the front. " It’s hard to say if V. noticed. Lot is obvious nonsense in his words or not, but it turns out that there were idiots in the Abwehr! Yes, like the Wehrmacht, the Abwehr suffered a crushing defeat — the Soviet state security organs (both intelligence and counterintelligence) and the GRU won outright that deadly duel on the invisible front. Deservedly proud of this indisputable fact, one should not nevertheless assume that the Abwehr was composed entirely of idiots. It was one of the strongest military intelligence of the world since the Second World War. And if a Soviet general, especially a newly appointed commander, was taken prisoner, the Abwehr also stood on his ears, trying to squeeze maximum information out of such a prisoner. Moreover, the capture of generals and especially of army commanders was immediately reported to Berlin. And if Samokhin could somehow inflate the military Abverians, hanging noodles on their ears, and even then it is unlikely, then the central apparatus of the Abwehr is a bald devil! All documents, including personal ones, were with him, and as soon as a special message was received in Berlin about the capture of the newly appointed commander of the 48 Army of the Bryansk Front, Major General A.G. Samokhina, they immediately checked him with their materials of the account of the Soviet generals, and the clumsy nonsense immediately got out. Samokhin was almost immediately identified as a former resident of the Soviet military intelligence in Belgrade! With an identification on a photo, as any military intelligence carefully collects photo albums on all military intelligence officers, especially those states which considers as the opponent. And Samokhin was the official military attache of the USSR in Belgrade and, naturally, his photo was in the Abwehr. Especially since the ID of the GRU officer was in his hands. By the way, when Samokhin was transported to the territory of Germany, his old acquaintance from the German ATF in Belgrade came in contact with him. So, according to the Wehrmacht lieutenant, he did not tell the Germans anything special during the first and second interrogations that he was immediately transported to Berlin (in fact, to East Prussia). This is a completely natural, normal practice of military intelligence. And not only the Abwehr - by the way, ours did the same and such important prisoners were immediately sent to Moscow. Yes, in / 487 / in general, it was also easy to expose his lies to the Abwereans because Samokhin had all his personal documents with him. Including the order of appointment to the post of commander 48 and the order of rates to arrive and take office as April 21 1942.
But here it is also in another. The Wehrmacht lieutenant who participated in the interrogations of Samokhin was interrogated after the Battle of Stalingrad. It ended February 2 1943. But why, then, with 10 February 1943 r. He, according to the above mentioned order N: 0194, was enrolled in the missing lists ?! And why this order was canceled only on 19 in May of 1945, if it became known even immediately after the Battle of Stalingrad, what happened to him? For all that the terrible war was still going on, there was no longer any confusion in the documents like the one that was going on in the first months of the war, at least on the scale that existed then. Not to mention the fact that it was still Major General, the commander, and their records were kept (and maintained) separately. B. Lot explains the abolition of this order (N: 0194 from 10.02.1943, only 19 in May, 1945, by that only then it became clear what happened to Samokhin. In fact, much was learned about the fate of Samokhin after the Battle of Stalingrad. In time of interrogation of Colonel Bernd von Petzold, captured in the surrounded Paulus group in Stalingrad; And although they were trying to prove with all their might, that during all the interrogations de Samokhin asserted that he didn’t know anything, didn’t remember, forgot because of the shock of capture, etc., however, SMERSH had an order from the commander 8- th 6 Tank Army of General Schmidt on April 29, which said: "... For the shooting down of the plane and the capture of General Samokhin, I express my gratitude to the personnel of the battalion. Thanks to this, the German command received valuable data that could favorably affect the future conduct of the military operations ". By the way, after Samokhin was captured with all his documents, our military intelligence and the army had such difficult problems that the Lord did not bring ... The Kharkov disaster in May / 2 / 22 alone is worth ?! Or the failure of the intelligence network, known as the "Red Chapel" ?! It should be borne in mind here that it was in 1942 that the massive failures of the agents of the Soviet military intelligence in Europe, including Germany (primarily Otto - Leopold Trepper, Kent - Anatoly Gurevich and others), as well as in the Balkans, also occur where he was resident. It should not be forgotten that Samokhin also headed the 488 Department of the GRU and therefore knew a great deal about many.
The fact that the order from 10.02.1943 was already canceled on 19 in May of 1945 was a fantastic phenomenon for the victorious May of 1945: only after 10 days after the Victory ?! Then millions of our compatriots were freed from captivity and that the gears of a squeaky personnel record in the army would quickly turn around so quickly! Yes, no zhist! And not because the idolatrous villains were sitting there. And just because in order to cancel such an order, a number of preliminary actions were necessary. First of all, Samokhin had to first go through the filtering of the Soviet counterintelligence and be fully identified and identified exactly as Samokhin. Then, to be delivered to Moscow, checked on all materials, and only then, according to the logic of the personnel work of that time, and taking into account all its specific features in wartime, could such an order be canceled. And ten days after the Victory, this is even too soon for the general. Especially if we recall those facts that concern the further fate of Samokhin in captivity and after release from captivity. According to the authors of the GRU reference manual mentioned above, Samokhin behaved with dignity in captivity, in May 1945 was liberated by Soviet troops. Upon arrival in Moscow, was arrested, and 25 March 1952g. was sentenced to 25 years of ITL. V. Lot and at all informs fiction that on December 2, the Samokhin was fired into the reserve, and on August 1946 - without specifying the year - the order of dismissal was canceled; Samokhin was enrolled in the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff, it really puts puzzles into a "corkscrew". The historian Mirkiskin points out that after returning home, the fate of Samokhin is not known.
Meanwhile, the authors of the GRU reference book indicated that in May 1945, General Samokhin was brought from Paris (?) To Moscow. The Soviet troops did not liberate France, and they were not in the territory of this beautiful country. There was only a co / 489 / veto military mission. Consequently, if it was precisely the Soviet troops who liberated him, then it must be assumed that if it happened in May 1945, this joyful thing for the prisoner of the Hitlerite Samokhin concentration camp took place in Germany. It is here that one asks why he was brought to Moscow from Paris, where there was only a Soviet military mission ?! Our generals, it happened, really flooded outright foolishness, but they were not as crazy in the euphoria of Victory, so that after the liberation of all of Europe from fascism, the compatriot-general rescued from Hitler's captivity to go to Moscow through Paris ?! From Berlin to Moscow, anyway, the path is shorter. But if indeed Samokhin was taken from Paris, then it is really bad. After all, the Nazis brought there all more or less important prisoners of war, especially from among the scouts, to organize reconnaissance and disinformation games against Soviet intelligence and the Soviet military command. True, according to the latest data, it turns out that Samokhin was liberated by the Americans from the last camp - Moosburg, which was located in 50 km from Munich, and it was they who sent him to Paris. This is also a rather strange story, because it was easier for the same Americans to hand it over to the Soviet command in Germany. Incidentally, the Americans took almost all the Soviet generals to Paris, whom they liberated from the indicated concentration camp. And there, in Paris, tried to work with them in the spirit of intelligence.
The group of generals that was brought from Paris consisted of 36 people. Already 21 December 1945, the Chief of the General Staff, General A. Antonov, and the Head of the SMERSH, V. Abakumov, presented a report to Stalin, which said: "In accordance with your instruction, having reviewed the materials on the 36 of the Red Army generals who were captured and delivered in May June 1945, at SMERSH Headquarters, we came to the following conclusions:
1. Send the Red Army generals to the disposal of the 25 NKO XUK.
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A small comment. GUK NKO - Main Department of Personnel NKO. After six months of checking / 490 / ki 69,5% of the generals of this group successfully passed the test and were returned to the Commissariat of Defense. This is to the fact that we usually like this and that way to incline the atrocities of the SMERSH who have taken it, including against the generals who were in captivity. And the real truth here it is - in half a year almost 70% of generals returned to the Commissariat. Is this atrocities ?!
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With these generals, upon their arrival at the NKO, Comrade. Golikov, and with some of them m. Antonov and Bulganin.
Through the HOOK of NPOs, the generals will be given the necessary assistance in the treatment and home appliance. With regard to each, the question of being sent to military service will be considered, and some of them, due to serious injuries and poor health, may be dismissed. During their stay in Moscow, the generals will be accommodated in the hotel and provided with food.
2. Arrest and judge 11 generals of the Red Army, who turned out to be traitors and, being in captivity, joined the enemy organizations created by the Germans and were active in anti-Soviet activities. A list of materials on persons scheduled for arrest is attached. We ask your instructions. "December 27 1945. Stalin approved this list.
The list (p. 2) got and General Samokhin. During the investigation, it was established that, while in captivity, Samokhin tried to substitute for the recruitment of German military intelligence, pursuing, as he noted in his testimony, the goal of returning home in any way and avoiding interrogations at the Gestapo. Strongly insisting on this version of his behavior, Samokhin stated at the court: “I took a rash step and tried to substitute myself for recruitment. It’s my fault, but I did it in order to escape from captivity and avoid giving any information to the enemy. I am guilty, but not of treason. In the hands of the enemy, I did not give anything, and my conscience is clear ... " 25 March 1952, General Samokhin was sentenced to 25 years ITL.
Currently, all this is being hailed as an indescribable atrocity by Lubyanka and Stalin. And on what basis, may I ask? Are not the indescribable naivety of the assertion of a professional military intelligence officer, a re- / 491 / zadent, that he tried to substitute for recruitment in order to escape from captivity, but did not tell the enemy anything ?! On Lubyanka, tea, not idiots were sitting! In the world of special services, especially intelligence services, from time immemorial the immutable law reigns - the only pass to the enemy is to surrender all known information about their intelligence! And what, the resident of the Soviet military intelligence did not know the basics of intelligence activities ?! And then where to put the catastrophic failure of the entire Krasnaya Kapella’s intelligence network, the failure of the intelligence network in the Balkans ?! Without even trying to assert that there is a direct connection between the stay of Samokhin in captivity and these failures, they could not but pay attention to temporary coincidence in Lubyanka. Therefore, the consequence went so long. As many as seven years. No matter how you feel about the state security organs of that time, it’s quite obvious that the case of Samokhin was from the category of “difficult nuts”. Obviously, time-consuming, painstaking verification was carried out, as a result of which something was managed to be established, but something was not. That is why the sentence, by the way, is not firing.
But it would be fine if the dramatic odyssey of General Samokhin would end there. No sooner had the sarcophagus with Stalin's body put into the Mausoleum, as early as May 1953g. sentence against Samokhin was canceled! And then, in May 1953, General Samokhin was rehabilitated! Incidentally, V. Lot justifies the fact of the rehabilitation of A.G. Samokhina materials interrogation of the most senior lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, who was captured during the Stalingrad battle. At that period of time, such a quick repeal of the sentence, and even on such a shaky basis as the testimony of a captive Fritz, is simply an unprecedentedly amazing fact. Well, what an incredible speed of action was given to the law enforcement bodies of the post-Stalinist USSR ?! What a tremendous credulity to the testimony of one captive Fritz was shown ?! This is what comes out? What were idiots everywhere?
But if not only the sentence against Samokhin was canceled, but the general’s rehabilitation took place, which, as of May 1953, was an unheard of case, especially against the military, then why didn’t the general be reinstated in military service ? After all, he was appointed to the post of only a senior lecturer in combined-arms training of the military department of Moscow State University! Yes, it can be assumed that such a decision was / 492 / taken on medical grounds, but the fact is that Samokhin then was only fifty-one years old (1902), and he, like others released from captivity and rehabilitated, it was possible to calmly heal, and then recover on active military service. According to the status of a general, they would be cured by an extra-class! So it was, for example, with Potapov. But no, they dragged out of the slammer and senior lecturers at the military department of Moscow State University! Understand what the whole "zagogulina"? On the one hand, the “reactive” speed of pulling out Samokhin from the Gulag and his rehabilitation — only 2 of the month and 25 days (!) Had passed since Stalin’s funeral, and on the other, he was immediately pushed into the hands of a citizen.
It turns out that someone very closely followed the case of Samokhin, but he could not do anything under Stalin, but as soon as the leader was sent to the next world, Samokhin was immediately pulled out of the gulag, the verdict was canceled, and even rehabilitated, but pushed aside on the citizen. What did he know, who was watching his case so closely, why was this “someone” so influential that he was able to instantly pull him out of the gulag, and even rehabilitate him less than three months after Stalin’s funeral ?! True, the air of freedom Samokhin left to breathe only two years - 17 July 1955, he died. Naturally, humanly it is sincerely regrettable that General Samokhin in 53 has passed away. This is all the more regrettable given that many of the prisoners in the Nazi concentration camps, as well as the sentences serving in those days in the Soviet penitentiary system, have survived to this day. But that's what the matter is. The next year, 1956, came the first explosion of the vile anti-Stalinism of Khrushchev's “bottling” - a dirty wave of Stalin’s vile accusations rolled, including for the 22 tragedy of June 1941, with simultaneous, but no less indiscriminate and silliest whitewash of all generality . Simultaneously with the filing of Khrushchev, mean-spirited chatter about some alleged attempts by Stalin to enter into separate negotiations with Hitler on the terms of colossal concessions went. Worse. At the 20th congress, Khrushchev isolated himself, trying to blame Stalin for the Kharkov catastrophe, to which, though not directly, Samokhin was involved.
You look at this chronology and involuntarily think about it - is it not too “timely”, so to speak in a preventive way, that the former high-ranking military intelligence officer, who did not take up the post of 493- / mandarma, did not take office? Major General Samokhin ?! And this thought will be all the more sadly depressing if it is imposed both on the chronology of the war and some events of the summer of 48.
If you return to the fact of the capture of Samokhin, you will be surprised to learn that soon after being captured by the Germans under strange circumstances, the Soviet pilots intercepted a German plane, from whose passengers documentation of plans for a summer (1942) campaign was seized German army. It is believed that "Moscow either drew the wrong conclusions from them, or ignored them altogether, which led to the defeat of the Soviet troops near Kharkov." It turns out something like the fact that there was a certain exchange of messages about plans for the 1942 summer campaign! At the same time, the following fact acquires an ominous significance.
After the war, the ex-head of the Nazi foreign policy intelligence, Walter Schellenberg, showed the following during the interrogation of the Americans. In his words, “in the spring of 1942, one of the Japanese naval officers in a conversation with the German ATA in Tokyo raised the question of whether Germany would not have gone to an honorable peace with the USSR, in which Japan could assist her. This was reported to Hitler.” The ominous significance of this fact manifests itself primarily in the time of its accomplishment - in the spring of 1942.
Why should this, in fact, a unique parallel-sequential coincidence of events occur? In the spring of 1942, the plane with Samokhin for some reason flies to the Nazis, and he has documents of the Soviet military planning for the 1942 summer campaign, including the directive of the national command and control system, as well as the operational map. A little later, it is not known why the Nazis fly in with their documentation about the plans for the Wehrmacht summer 1942 campaign. At the same time, a catastrophe occurs near Kharkov, and then in the Crimea, the tragic failures of the Red Kapella's intelligence networks occur in the Balkans. And at the same time, a strange sounding by a Japanese naval officer of his German counterpart in Tokyo overlaps with these events on the possibility of the Reich's consent to conclude a secret separate peace with the USSR on honorable conditions ?!
On the one hand, it seems that it was a serious provocation designed to drive a wedge between the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition (the Japanese, incidentally / 494 / tee, the same thing was started in the spring of 1943), first between the USSR and the USA. But, on the other hand, why she had, first, to coincide in time with the two strange encounters of our and Hitler high-ranking officers with the most important documents in their hands. And why it turned out to be connected with the catastrophes of our troops near Kharkov and in the Crimea, with the failures of the most valuable agents? Secondly, why in this connection the scenario of a triple military geopolitical conspiracy involving the German, Soviet (led by Tukhachevsky) and Japanese high-ranking military is almost not automatically reanimated ?! After all, the conspiracy of Soviet generals eliminated back in 1937 provided for a separate truce and a coup in the country in conditions of military defeat! Who would explain what is behind all this?
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Especially when you consider how insistently the USSR sought after the war to interrogate the same V. Schellenberg. And the former allies not only interfered with this, but in the end they arranged for the former oberspion of the Reich a “hurricane cancer”, as a result of which he very quickly “gave an oak”, without waiting for the honored meeting with the Soviet Chekists, which had frightened the Allies in the first place.
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Finally, about that. As the facts show, Samokhin really had something to do with the grand catastrophe of our troops near Kharkov in 1942. Formally, our troops “valiantly” brought Tymoshenko and the infamous Khrushchev to a strikingly reminiscent tragedy of 22 June. But the thing is that Tymoshenko and Khrushchev knew in advance, back in March 1942, that the Nazis would strike on the southern flank. And the source of their knowledge about this was precisely Samokhin! Here the whole "zagogulin" is that in March 1942, a classmate of Samokhina from the academy flew to Moscow from the front, the head of the South-West task force, Lieutenant-General Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan (later Marshal of the Soviet Union). Bagramyan, naturally, visited the GRU and from his acquaintance, Alexander Georgievich Samokhin, who was the head of the 2 Directorate of the GRU, learned reconnaissance / 495 about the Nazis' plans for the summer of 1942. Returning to the front, Bagramyan shared this information with Timoshenko and Khrushchev - after all, they were his direct superiors. Tymoshenko and Khrushchev immediately vigorously promised Stalin that they would crush the Nazis in the South, at the expense of promising great forces. But, alas, in the words of a bald cornman, they were embarrassed so much that, having ditched a lot of people and equipment, they suffered a crushing defeat, for which they then blamed Stalin.
Well, now is the time to compare. The investigation into the case of Samokhin lasted seven years. Although the others were sorted out quickly and the 25 generals were rehabilitated under Stalin for half a year. But as soon as the leader was gone, Samokhin was immediately torn out of the gulag, annulled, rehabilitated, but pushed out as a citizen, and after two years there was no longer Samokhin. The speed of accomplishment of these events is simply unthinkable for that time, for then there was a fierce squabble above the liberated throne and, in principle, few people could care about the rehabilitation of one of many.
Well, that's not all. In the case against Beria, faked by Khrushchev, 26 was still 1953 in June without trial of the illegally murdered Lavrentiy Pavlovich, in hindsight, impudently tried to “sew” the accusation that he was allegedly preparing for the defeat of Soviet troops in the Caucasus. But the Nazis broke through to the approaches to the Caucasus to a large extent thanks to the "valiant" command of Tymoshenko and Khrushchev by the Kharkov operation. But who always screams the loudest: “Hold the thief!”? Right...
And what then in this light should mean the facts of the unprecedented speedy cancellation of Samokhin’s harsh sentence, his rehabilitation, but pushing him to a civilian together with the incredibly accelerated death life for 53-year-old man on the eve of unbridled orgy of mean-spirited and vile accusations addressed to Stalin? ! Should this mean that Samokhin, who was sitting in a gulag, was an extremely dangerous witness for someone at the very top and that is why he was urgently pulled out of there, and then, after rehabilitating, he was sent to a citizen. Where only two years later he died. In 53 of the year ?! If you go further along the path of this logic, it turns out that someone at the top was extremely afraid that Beria who had returned to Lubyanka — he left there at the end of 1945 because of the workload on the atomic / 496 / project — would quickly establish that the investigation failed or did not want to establish for almost seven years. And then, in accordance with the law, use these data to punish the real perpetrators of military defeats.
So, isn't all this connected with the emergence of the myth just analyzed ?! Especially in its general form - about the alleged attempts by Stalin to enter into separate negotiations with Germany on conditions of concessions. Especially since a couple of myths have spawned on this subject. After all, it turns out that some kind of deeply echeloned slander on the same issue. And this is usually not accidental ...
At the same time, it should be noted that story the capture of Major General Samokhin leaves a distinctly ambivalent impression. Firstly, due to the fact that the versions of the history of his captivity differ in details. For example, in the statement of the military historian Viktor Aleksandrovich Mirkyskin it sounds like this: "On the way to a new duty station, his plane landed in the German-occupied Mtsensk instead of Yelets." That is, understand how you want, whether it really is a mistake by the pilots that landed there, or intentionally, including maliciously, or something else. In turn, the authors of the extensive reference book “Russia in Persons. GRU. Affairs and People” went a strange way at all. On one page, they indicate that Samokhin "... because of a pilot error was captured by the Germans." It would seem that the unambiguous version ... However, after two hundred pages after this statement, the same authors, obviously, without batting an eyelid, reported that Samokhin "... flew to Yelets, but the pilot lost orientation, and the plane was hit over the Germans. Samokhin was captivated. " And during the preparation of this volume for publication, I had the opportunity to partially get acquainted with the materials of the interrogation of Samokhin in SMERSH of 26 on June 1946, during which he stated: “Three hours after departure from Moscow, I noticed that the plane had flown over the front edge of our defense. I ordered the pilot to fly back, he turned around, but the Germans fired at us and shot us down. "Hardly having multiple versions helps to establish the truth. And, frankly, it is hard to believe that during landing, for example, during the day the pilots did not notice that they were landing on a German airfield: at least a couple of planes were standing at the airfield, and the Luftwaffe crosses on them were clearly visible from afar. By the spring of 1942, our pilots had plenty to look at them. So with regard to the first versions, the question immediately arises: why did the pilot, who could not help but notice that he was boarding a Hitler airfield, did not try to turn around and fly away from the Germans ?! And now, don’t take it for work to agree, naturally, by common sense that simply to land not where it is necessary is one thing; by mistake, the pilot would land not where it should be, another, but something completely different - to make a forced, emergency landing in addition, / 481 / that the plane was shot down because the pilot lost his course. And it is quite another that Samokhin showed during the interrogation. After all, during the interrogation in SMERSH, Samokhin showed that they did not sit in Mtsensk, but on some gentle slope of a hill.
According to the data that have become known to the author recently, the flight was carried out on the plane "PR-5". This is a passenger modification of the famous reconnaissance aircraft P-5. In this modification, a four-passenger cabin is installed. The maximum speed at the ground - 246 - 276 km / h, at the height of 3000 m - from 235 to 316 km / h. Cruising speed - 200 km / h. According to the testimony of Samokhin, it turns out that after three hours of flight, they covered a distance of 600 km. But at the helm of the aircraft was the pilot of the air group of the General Staff. And in this air group selected very experienced pilots. They knew the situation well and where the front line was. How could it happen that an experienced pilot did not notice that he had flown over the front line ?! Tea, not at the speed of the same fighter flew! And it was not the pilot who noticed the mistake, but Samokhin himself.
The only thing that could remove questions about this is the fact of a night flight. But in this case, another circumstance will certainly intervene. The fact is that during the war years, flights of commanders of armies and fronts were carried out, as a rule, accompanied by at least a fighter link, that is, three fighter planes. Especially if this flight was carried out from Moscow, and even with the Betting documents (if you believe these versions). Measure, as it is understandable, is far from superfluous, especially in war.
Then it is asked, how did the fighters allow this? This question becomes even more acute when you rest on the next question: how could it happen that our fighters, and this is fighting pilots, allowed the pilot of the ward plane to hell to know where it was going, besides it turned out to be also shot down over the German territory ?! No, something is wrong with these versions. Secondly, as after the war, in 1964, the former chief of staff of the 48 Army, subsequently Marshal of the Soviet Union, Sergey Semenovich Biryuzov, asserted, "the Germans seized then Soviet documents for the summer (1942) offensive campaign that allowed them to take countermeasures in a timely manner. " In the same year, Biryuzov died in a strange plane crash during a visit to Yugoslavia (482). The authors of the above-mentioned reference book about the GRU say roughly the same thing - “the enemy took possession of the operational map and directive of the UGCC”. If we take for granted these two versions, then, having excluded the more or less justified presence of an operational map at Samokhin, we immediately rest on a depressing question. Why did the newly appointed commander only have an army in his hands, by definition, especially secret documents - the directive of the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters and the documents of the Soviet military planning for the 1942 summer campaign?! After all, in principle, the directives of Stakes were addressed to the commanders of directions and fronts. But not armies! And Samokhin is not just a Bids directive, but "Soviet planning documents for the summer (1942) campaign"! To put it mildly, this is not his level, so that, as it is sung in a famous song, “know for all of Odessa” ?! Yes, and the Supreme Commander IV Stalin was not so simple as to send his directives in this way. During the war years, the rules of secret correspondence were extremely strictly observed, especially between the UGCC and the fronts, armies, etc. And without that, always the secret courier service carried out the transport of secret documents between the Stavka and the fronts under special armed guard of the NKVD (from 1943, the SMERSH).
Nevertheless, according to the data that have been established recently, Samokhin was supposed to introduce himself in Yelets to the commander of the Bryansk front, hand him a package of special importance from the Stavka and receive relevant instructions from the front commander. This is strange, because it does not fit in with the most severe secrecy regime that prevailed during the war. And it does not look like Stalin. And that's what's interesting. During interrogation in SMERSH, Samokhin claimed that he burned all the documents and trampled the rest into the dirt. Then on what basis did the statements of the GRU tragedy, the marshal of the Turks and the authors of the GRU handbook, make their statements tragically? Moreover. From the testimony of Samokhin it follows that the Germans seized his party card, the prescription of appointment as army commander, the ID of the GRU employee and the order book. What is most interesting is the presence of his identity as an employee of the GRU. Why did he not turn him in, having been appointed to the post of army commander ?! Why this important document was not destroyed by them? No replies. / 483 /
But depending on the version of the capture of Samokhin, the most depressing begins. From the inevitable suspicions that a military intelligence operation was thus carried out (by whom and for what purpose?) - the right to this is given by the rich history of such sophisticated reconnaissance of intelligence services in two world wars of the 20th century, rich in such examples, to criminal negligence, not excluding games under her, which, unfortunately, and then it was not uncommon. Suppose the most innocuous option. Assume that the pilot really lost his course and was within the reach of the German air defense system. But what were the cover fighters doing at this time? The plane was shot down and, suppose, under the coercion of Luftwaffe fighters, which, of course, sharply aggravates the above question regarding our “falcons”, as a result was forced to make an emergency landing at an enemy aerodrome. But in this case it is appropriate to raise the next question. Why didn’t the professional intelligence officer and the army commander destroy especially secret documents of the Stavka ?! Well, after all, he did not have a suitcase with documents on his hands? Just something package yes card. Under what category of negligence, and even negligence in general, would you order to include this option?
Doubts about whether negligence was in general, unfortunately, reinforce the following facts. In 2005, a very interesting book by V. Lot “The Secret Front of the General Staff. Exploration: Open Materials” was published. The 410 and 411 pages of this book are devoted to the fate of General AG Samokhina. I don’t know how this could have happened - after all, apparently, V. Lot is a very knowledgeable author in the history of military intelligence - but from the very first lines on the fate of A.G. Samokhina, a respected colleague straight leads into a frightened. V. Lot indicates that before being appointed 1942 to the position of 42 Army commander in mid-April, Samokhin held the post of the GRU Information Department - Assistant to the GRU Chief, and immediately adds that he had been in the military intelligence service for only about two months! But this is complete nonsense! Samokhin even before the war served in military intelligence and was a resident of the GRU in Belgrade. And they never appointed newbies to such posts at the GRU: the central apparatus of such a solid department as Soviet military intelligence is not the ice cream sales office, so that the newcomer could easily be appointed head of the Information Department of the GRU to the position of head of the GRU Information Department. . Therefore, if we consider the official biography of AG Samokhin in the first six months of the war, it was necessary to point out that these same “about two months” Samokhin served in the central apparatus of military intelligence, and not at all in the GRU system. So, obviously, it would be more correct, although this is inaccurate, because he was appointed 484 in December and, therefore, by the time he was appointed commander, he was already the fifth month of his tenure as assistant chief of the GRU - chief of 1941- Management (and not the Information Department) of the GRU.
Further. A.G. Samokhin was appointed the commander of a non-42 army operating near Kharkov, i.e. on the South-Western Front, and the 48-th Army of the Bryansk Front. Still, there is a difference, especially if one considers that there was no 42 army near Kharkov. Yes, and the fronts of the names are fundamentally different. V. Lot states that at first A.G. Samokhin flew to the front headquarters, however, does not indicate which one. If we proceed from his assertion about Kharkov, it turns out to be a nonsense - what was he to do at the headquarters of the South-Western Front if he was appointed commander of the Bryansk front ?! If you take the words of V.Loty seriously, then you’ll get something ominous. Because, according to him, in the front headquarters he received some instructions, then he was transferred to another plane and after that he was taken prisoner ...
However, in this case it is inexpedient to take V. Lot's words seriously, because A.G. Samokhin nevertheless flew to the Bryansk front, and not to the SWF. If you look at the map, then the question immediately arises of how it was possible to get to Mtsensk with the purpose of appointing Elets ?! The distance between them is over 150 km! The flight to Yelets, especially from Moscow, actually strictly south, the flight to Mtsensk - to the south-west, in the direction of Orel. By the way, it was there that they delivered him first, to the headquarters of the 2nd tank Wehrmacht groups. And only then they were sent by plane to the Letzen Fortress in East Prussia.
Because of this strange air of Samokhin, the Supreme Command was forced to cancel its decision from 20 on April 1942 to hold an operation in the Kursk-Lgov direction in early May of the same year using the forces of the two armies and the tank corps to seize the Kursk and cut off the railway . Kursk - Lgov (History of the Second World War. M., 1975. T. 5. C. 114). And, perhaps, this is one of those fatal prerequisites for the tragedy (485) of the offensive near Kharkov, because one of those two armies that should have attacked Kursk should have led Samokhin. By the way, apparently, he was holding the Directive of the Supreme Command Committee on the above-mentioned attack on Kursk (and Kursk-Agov), and not the documents of the Soviet military planning for the entire 1942 spring-summer campaign, as they usually write.
According to V. Aots, the fate of A.G. Samokhina cleared up after the Battle of Stalingrad. However, if one proceeds from his own words, it is too strange that it has become clear. On the one hand, he points out that Samokhin was unaccounted for 21 on April 1942, on the other he reports that only 10 on February 1943 was made by the Red Army’s Main Department for Losses, ordered N: 0194, according to which Samokhin was identified missing lead that, you see, does not bring any clarity. Because if the order was issued only on 10 in February of 1943, then it turns out that since 21 on April 1942, the fate of Samokhin was not known at all either way, even to be included in the list of the missing. And this is superstrange. The loss of the army commander, especially the newly appointed one, is an emergency of the highest level! This is the state of emergency, because of which the Special Divisions and foreign intelligence immediately turned to their ears and at least daily reported to Moscow on the results of the search for the missing person. This is not a joke - the army commander, who a few days ago was a very high-ranking member of the GRU, disappeared! Naturally, this was immediately reported to Stalin and, believe me, the relevant strict instructions from the state security organs and all military intelligence units immediately clarify the fate of the commander the Supreme Highway.
AT. Lot also reports that during the Stalingrad battle a certain Wehrmacht senior lieutenant was captured, who during interrogations revealed that he had participated in the interrogations of Major General Samokhin, emphasizing at the same time that the plane had accidentally landed on the airfield seized by the Germans. ". And what was the point to emphasize exactly this? According to the words of this Wehrmacht lieutenant, Samokhin allegedly hid his own, as indicated by V. Lot, "a short service in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, disguised himself as an army general who served all his life in the military, behaved with dignity / 486 / dew. I didn’t say anything special to the Germans, citing the fact that he had been appointed to the post in mid-March and had just arrived at the front. " It’s hard to say if V. noticed. Lot is obvious nonsense in his words or not, but it turns out that there were idiots in the Abwehr! Yes, like the Wehrmacht, the Abwehr suffered a crushing defeat — the Soviet state security organs (both intelligence and counterintelligence) and the GRU won outright that deadly duel on the invisible front. Deservedly proud of this indisputable fact, one should not nevertheless assume that the Abwehr was composed entirely of idiots. It was one of the strongest military intelligence of the world since the Second World War. And if a Soviet general, especially a newly appointed commander, was taken prisoner, the Abwehr also stood on his ears, trying to squeeze maximum information out of such a prisoner. Moreover, the capture of generals and especially of army commanders was immediately reported to Berlin. And if Samokhin could somehow inflate the military Abverians, hanging noodles on their ears, and even then it is unlikely, then the central apparatus of the Abwehr is a bald devil! All documents, including personal ones, were with him, and as soon as a special message was received in Berlin about the capture of the newly appointed commander of the 48 Army of the Bryansk Front, Major General A.G. Samokhina, they immediately checked him with their materials of the account of the Soviet generals, and the clumsy nonsense immediately got out. Samokhin was almost immediately identified as a former resident of the Soviet military intelligence in Belgrade! With an identification on a photo, as any military intelligence carefully collects photo albums on all military intelligence officers, especially those states which considers as the opponent. And Samokhin was the official military attache of the USSR in Belgrade and, naturally, his photo was in the Abwehr. Especially since the ID of the GRU officer was in his hands. By the way, when Samokhin was transported to the territory of Germany, his old acquaintance from the German ATF in Belgrade came in contact with him. So, according to the Wehrmacht lieutenant, he did not tell the Germans anything special during the first and second interrogations that he was immediately transported to Berlin (in fact, to East Prussia). This is a completely natural, normal practice of military intelligence. And not only the Abwehr - by the way, ours did the same and such important prisoners were immediately sent to Moscow. Yes, in / 487 / in general, it was also easy to expose his lies to the Abwereans because Samokhin had all his personal documents with him. Including the order of appointment to the post of commander 48 and the order of rates to arrive and take office as April 21 1942.
But here it is also in another. The Wehrmacht lieutenant who participated in the interrogations of Samokhin was interrogated after the Battle of Stalingrad. It ended February 2 1943. But why, then, with 10 February 1943 r. He, according to the above mentioned order N: 0194, was enrolled in the missing lists ?! And why this order was canceled only on 19 in May of 1945, if it became known even immediately after the Battle of Stalingrad, what happened to him? For all that the terrible war was still going on, there was no longer any confusion in the documents like the one that was going on in the first months of the war, at least on the scale that existed then. Not to mention the fact that it was still Major General, the commander, and their records were kept (and maintained) separately. B. Lot explains the abolition of this order (N: 0194 from 10.02.1943, only 19 in May, 1945, by that only then it became clear what happened to Samokhin. In fact, much was learned about the fate of Samokhin after the Battle of Stalingrad. In time of interrogation of Colonel Bernd von Petzold, captured in the surrounded Paulus group in Stalingrad; And although they were trying to prove with all their might, that during all the interrogations de Samokhin asserted that he didn’t know anything, didn’t remember, forgot because of the shock of capture, etc., however, SMERSH had an order from the commander 8- th 6 Tank Army of General Schmidt on April 29, which said: "... For the shooting down of the plane and the capture of General Samokhin, I express my gratitude to the personnel of the battalion. Thanks to this, the German command received valuable data that could favorably affect the future conduct of the military operations ". By the way, after Samokhin was captured with all his documents, our military intelligence and the army had such difficult problems that the Lord did not bring ... The Kharkov disaster in May / 2 / 22 alone is worth ?! Or the failure of the intelligence network, known as the "Red Chapel" ?! It should be borne in mind here that it was in 1942 that the massive failures of the agents of the Soviet military intelligence in Europe, including Germany (primarily Otto - Leopold Trepper, Kent - Anatoly Gurevich and others), as well as in the Balkans, also occur where he was resident. It should not be forgotten that Samokhin also headed the 488 Department of the GRU and therefore knew a great deal about many.
The fact that the order from 10.02.1943 was already canceled on 19 in May of 1945 was a fantastic phenomenon for the victorious May of 1945: only after 10 days after the Victory ?! Then millions of our compatriots were freed from captivity and that the gears of a squeaky personnel record in the army would quickly turn around so quickly! Yes, no zhist! And not because the idolatrous villains were sitting there. And just because in order to cancel such an order, a number of preliminary actions were necessary. First of all, Samokhin had to first go through the filtering of the Soviet counterintelligence and be fully identified and identified exactly as Samokhin. Then, to be delivered to Moscow, checked on all materials, and only then, according to the logic of the personnel work of that time, and taking into account all its specific features in wartime, could such an order be canceled. And ten days after the Victory, this is even too soon for the general. Especially if we recall those facts that concern the further fate of Samokhin in captivity and after release from captivity. According to the authors of the GRU reference manual mentioned above, Samokhin behaved with dignity in captivity, in May 1945 was liberated by Soviet troops. Upon arrival in Moscow, was arrested, and 25 March 1952g. was sentenced to 25 years of ITL. V. Lot and at all informs fiction that on December 2, the Samokhin was fired into the reserve, and on August 1946 - without specifying the year - the order of dismissal was canceled; Samokhin was enrolled in the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff, it really puts puzzles into a "corkscrew". The historian Mirkiskin points out that after returning home, the fate of Samokhin is not known.
Meanwhile, the authors of the GRU reference book indicated that in May 1945, General Samokhin was brought from Paris (?) To Moscow. The Soviet troops did not liberate France, and they were not in the territory of this beautiful country. There was only a co / 489 / veto military mission. Consequently, if it was precisely the Soviet troops who liberated him, then it must be assumed that if it happened in May 1945, this joyful thing for the prisoner of the Hitlerite Samokhin concentration camp took place in Germany. It is here that one asks why he was brought to Moscow from Paris, where there was only a Soviet military mission ?! Our generals, it happened, really flooded outright foolishness, but they were not as crazy in the euphoria of Victory, so that after the liberation of all of Europe from fascism, the compatriot-general rescued from Hitler's captivity to go to Moscow through Paris ?! From Berlin to Moscow, anyway, the path is shorter. But if indeed Samokhin was taken from Paris, then it is really bad. After all, the Nazis brought there all more or less important prisoners of war, especially from among the scouts, to organize reconnaissance and disinformation games against Soviet intelligence and the Soviet military command. True, according to the latest data, it turns out that Samokhin was liberated by the Americans from the last camp - Moosburg, which was located in 50 km from Munich, and it was they who sent him to Paris. This is also a rather strange story, because it was easier for the same Americans to hand it over to the Soviet command in Germany. Incidentally, the Americans took almost all the Soviet generals to Paris, whom they liberated from the indicated concentration camp. And there, in Paris, tried to work with them in the spirit of intelligence.
The group of generals that was brought from Paris consisted of 36 people. Already 21 December 1945, the Chief of the General Staff, General A. Antonov, and the Head of the SMERSH, V. Abakumov, presented a report to Stalin, which said: "In accordance with your instruction, having reviewed the materials on the 36 of the Red Army generals who were captured and delivered in May June 1945, at SMERSH Headquarters, we came to the following conclusions:
1. Send the Red Army generals to the disposal of the 25 NKO XUK.
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A small comment. GUK NKO - Main Department of Personnel NKO. After six months of checking / 490 / ki 69,5% of the generals of this group successfully passed the test and were returned to the Commissariat of Defense. This is to the fact that we usually like this and that way to incline the atrocities of the SMERSH who have taken it, including against the generals who were in captivity. And the real truth here it is - in half a year almost 70% of generals returned to the Commissariat. Is this atrocities ?!
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With these generals, upon their arrival at the NKO, Comrade. Golikov, and with some of them m. Antonov and Bulganin.
Through the HOOK of NPOs, the generals will be given the necessary assistance in the treatment and home appliance. With regard to each, the question of being sent to military service will be considered, and some of them, due to serious injuries and poor health, may be dismissed. During their stay in Moscow, the generals will be accommodated in the hotel and provided with food.
2. Arrest and judge 11 generals of the Red Army, who turned out to be traitors and, being in captivity, joined the enemy organizations created by the Germans and were active in anti-Soviet activities. A list of materials on persons scheduled for arrest is attached. We ask your instructions. "December 27 1945. Stalin approved this list.
The list (p. 2) got and General Samokhin. During the investigation, it was established that, while in captivity, Samokhin tried to substitute for the recruitment of German military intelligence, pursuing, as he noted in his testimony, the goal of returning home in any way and avoiding interrogations at the Gestapo. Strongly insisting on this version of his behavior, Samokhin stated at the court: “I took a rash step and tried to substitute myself for recruitment. It’s my fault, but I did it in order to escape from captivity and avoid giving any information to the enemy. I am guilty, but not of treason. In the hands of the enemy, I did not give anything, and my conscience is clear ... " 25 March 1952, General Samokhin was sentenced to 25 years ITL.
Currently, all this is being hailed as an indescribable atrocity by Lubyanka and Stalin. And on what basis, may I ask? Are not the indescribable naivety of the assertion of a professional military intelligence officer, a re- / 491 / zadent, that he tried to substitute for recruitment in order to escape from captivity, but did not tell the enemy anything ?! On Lubyanka, tea, not idiots were sitting! In the world of special services, especially intelligence services, from time immemorial the immutable law reigns - the only pass to the enemy is to surrender all known information about their intelligence! And what, the resident of the Soviet military intelligence did not know the basics of intelligence activities ?! And then where to put the catastrophic failure of the entire Krasnaya Kapella’s intelligence network, the failure of the intelligence network in the Balkans ?! Without even trying to assert that there is a direct connection between the stay of Samokhin in captivity and these failures, they could not but pay attention to temporary coincidence in Lubyanka. Therefore, the consequence went so long. As many as seven years. No matter how you feel about the state security organs of that time, it’s quite obvious that the case of Samokhin was from the category of “difficult nuts”. Obviously, time-consuming, painstaking verification was carried out, as a result of which something was managed to be established, but something was not. That is why the sentence, by the way, is not firing.
But it would be fine if the dramatic odyssey of General Samokhin would end there. No sooner had the sarcophagus with Stalin's body put into the Mausoleum, as early as May 1953g. sentence against Samokhin was canceled! And then, in May 1953, General Samokhin was rehabilitated! Incidentally, V. Lot justifies the fact of the rehabilitation of A.G. Samokhina materials interrogation of the most senior lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, who was captured during the Stalingrad battle. At that period of time, such a quick repeal of the sentence, and even on such a shaky basis as the testimony of a captive Fritz, is simply an unprecedentedly amazing fact. Well, what an incredible speed of action was given to the law enforcement bodies of the post-Stalinist USSR ?! What a tremendous credulity to the testimony of one captive Fritz was shown ?! This is what comes out? What were idiots everywhere?
But if not only the sentence against Samokhin was canceled, but the general’s rehabilitation took place, which, as of May 1953, was an unheard of case, especially against the military, then why didn’t the general be reinstated in military service ? After all, he was appointed to the post of only a senior lecturer in combined-arms training of the military department of Moscow State University! Yes, it can be assumed that such a decision was / 492 / taken on medical grounds, but the fact is that Samokhin then was only fifty-one years old (1902), and he, like others released from captivity and rehabilitated, it was possible to calmly heal, and then recover on active military service. According to the status of a general, they would be cured by an extra-class! So it was, for example, with Potapov. But no, they dragged out of the slammer and senior lecturers at the military department of Moscow State University! Understand what the whole "zagogulina"? On the one hand, the “reactive” speed of pulling out Samokhin from the Gulag and his rehabilitation — only 2 of the month and 25 days (!) Had passed since Stalin’s funeral, and on the other, he was immediately pushed into the hands of a citizen.
It turns out that someone very closely followed the case of Samokhin, but he could not do anything under Stalin, but as soon as the leader was sent to the next world, Samokhin was immediately pulled out of the gulag, the verdict was canceled, and even rehabilitated, but pushed aside on the citizen. What did he know, who was watching his case so closely, why was this “someone” so influential that he was able to instantly pull him out of the gulag, and even rehabilitate him less than three months after Stalin’s funeral ?! True, the air of freedom Samokhin left to breathe only two years - 17 July 1955, he died. Naturally, humanly it is sincerely regrettable that General Samokhin in 53 has passed away. This is all the more regrettable given that many of the prisoners in the Nazi concentration camps, as well as the sentences serving in those days in the Soviet penitentiary system, have survived to this day. But that's what the matter is. The next year, 1956, came the first explosion of the vile anti-Stalinism of Khrushchev's “bottling” - a dirty wave of Stalin’s vile accusations rolled, including for the 22 tragedy of June 1941, with simultaneous, but no less indiscriminate and silliest whitewash of all generality . Simultaneously with the filing of Khrushchev, mean-spirited chatter about some alleged attempts by Stalin to enter into separate negotiations with Hitler on the terms of colossal concessions went. Worse. At the 20th congress, Khrushchev isolated himself, trying to blame Stalin for the Kharkov catastrophe, to which, though not directly, Samokhin was involved.
You look at this chronology and involuntarily think about it - is it not too “timely”, so to speak in a preventive way, that the former high-ranking military intelligence officer, who did not take up the post of 493- / mandarma, did not take office? Major General Samokhin ?! And this thought will be all the more sadly depressing if it is imposed both on the chronology of the war and some events of the summer of 48.
If you return to the fact of the capture of Samokhin, you will be surprised to learn that soon after being captured by the Germans under strange circumstances, the Soviet pilots intercepted a German plane, from whose passengers documentation of plans for a summer (1942) campaign was seized German army. It is believed that "Moscow either drew the wrong conclusions from them, or ignored them altogether, which led to the defeat of the Soviet troops near Kharkov." It turns out something like the fact that there was a certain exchange of messages about plans for the 1942 summer campaign! At the same time, the following fact acquires an ominous significance.
After the war, the ex-head of the Nazi foreign policy intelligence, Walter Schellenberg, showed the following during the interrogation of the Americans. In his words, “in the spring of 1942, one of the Japanese naval officers in a conversation with the German ATA in Tokyo raised the question of whether Germany would not have gone to an honorable peace with the USSR, in which Japan could assist her. This was reported to Hitler.” The ominous significance of this fact manifests itself primarily in the time of its accomplishment - in the spring of 1942.
Why should this, in fact, a unique parallel-sequential coincidence of events occur? In the spring of 1942, the plane with Samokhin for some reason flies to the Nazis, and he has documents of the Soviet military planning for the 1942 summer campaign, including the directive of the national command and control system, as well as the operational map. A little later, it is not known why the Nazis fly in with their documentation about the plans for the Wehrmacht summer 1942 campaign. At the same time, a catastrophe occurs near Kharkov, and then in the Crimea, the tragic failures of the Red Kapella's intelligence networks occur in the Balkans. And at the same time, a strange sounding by a Japanese naval officer of his German counterpart in Tokyo overlaps with these events on the possibility of the Reich's consent to conclude a secret separate peace with the USSR on honorable conditions ?!
On the one hand, it seems that it was a serious provocation designed to drive a wedge between the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition (the Japanese, incidentally / 494 / tee, the same thing was started in the spring of 1943), first between the USSR and the USA. But, on the other hand, why she had, first, to coincide in time with the two strange encounters of our and Hitler high-ranking officers with the most important documents in their hands. And why it turned out to be connected with the catastrophes of our troops near Kharkov and in the Crimea, with the failures of the most valuable agents? Secondly, why in this connection the scenario of a triple military geopolitical conspiracy involving the German, Soviet (led by Tukhachevsky) and Japanese high-ranking military is almost not automatically reanimated ?! After all, the conspiracy of Soviet generals eliminated back in 1937 provided for a separate truce and a coup in the country in conditions of military defeat! Who would explain what is behind all this?
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Especially when you consider how insistently the USSR sought after the war to interrogate the same V. Schellenberg. And the former allies not only interfered with this, but in the end they arranged for the former oberspion of the Reich a “hurricane cancer”, as a result of which he very quickly “gave an oak”, without waiting for the honored meeting with the Soviet Chekists, which had frightened the Allies in the first place.
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Finally, about that. As the facts show, Samokhin really had something to do with the grand catastrophe of our troops near Kharkov in 1942. Formally, our troops “valiantly” brought Tymoshenko and the infamous Khrushchev to a strikingly reminiscent tragedy of 22 June. But the thing is that Tymoshenko and Khrushchev knew in advance, back in March 1942, that the Nazis would strike on the southern flank. And the source of their knowledge about this was precisely Samokhin! Here the whole "zagogulin" is that in March 1942, a classmate of Samokhina from the academy flew to Moscow from the front, the head of the South-West task force, Lieutenant-General Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan (later Marshal of the Soviet Union). Bagramyan, naturally, visited the GRU and from his acquaintance, Alexander Georgievich Samokhin, who was the head of the 2 Directorate of the GRU, learned reconnaissance / 495 about the Nazis' plans for the summer of 1942. Returning to the front, Bagramyan shared this information with Timoshenko and Khrushchev - after all, they were his direct superiors. Tymoshenko and Khrushchev immediately vigorously promised Stalin that they would crush the Nazis in the South, at the expense of promising great forces. But, alas, in the words of a bald cornman, they were embarrassed so much that, having ditched a lot of people and equipment, they suffered a crushing defeat, for which they then blamed Stalin.
Well, now is the time to compare. The investigation into the case of Samokhin lasted seven years. Although the others were sorted out quickly and the 25 generals were rehabilitated under Stalin for half a year. But as soon as the leader was gone, Samokhin was immediately torn out of the gulag, annulled, rehabilitated, but pushed out as a citizen, and after two years there was no longer Samokhin. The speed of accomplishment of these events is simply unthinkable for that time, for then there was a fierce squabble above the liberated throne and, in principle, few people could care about the rehabilitation of one of many.
Well, that's not all. In the case against Beria, faked by Khrushchev, 26 was still 1953 in June without trial of the illegally murdered Lavrentiy Pavlovich, in hindsight, impudently tried to “sew” the accusation that he was allegedly preparing for the defeat of Soviet troops in the Caucasus. But the Nazis broke through to the approaches to the Caucasus to a large extent thanks to the "valiant" command of Tymoshenko and Khrushchev by the Kharkov operation. But who always screams the loudest: “Hold the thief!”? Right...
And what then in this light should mean the facts of the unprecedented speedy cancellation of Samokhin’s harsh sentence, his rehabilitation, but pushing him to a civilian together with the incredibly accelerated death life for 53-year-old man on the eve of unbridled orgy of mean-spirited and vile accusations addressed to Stalin? ! Should this mean that Samokhin, who was sitting in a gulag, was an extremely dangerous witness for someone at the very top and that is why he was urgently pulled out of there, and then, after rehabilitating, he was sent to a citizen. Where only two years later he died. In 53 of the year ?! If you go further along the path of this logic, it turns out that someone at the top was extremely afraid that Beria who had returned to Lubyanka — he left there at the end of 1945 because of the workload on the atomic / 496 / project — would quickly establish that the investigation failed or did not want to establish for almost seven years. And then, in accordance with the law, use these data to punish the real perpetrators of military defeats.
So, isn't all this connected with the emergence of the myth just analyzed ?! Especially in its general form - about the alleged attempts by Stalin to enter into separate negotiations with Germany on conditions of concessions. Especially since a couple of myths have spawned on this subject. After all, it turns out that some kind of deeply echeloned slander on the same issue. And this is usually not accidental ...
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