A or G?
War 1914 - 1918 was a clash of powerful coalitions 2 - the Entente and the Central (German) bloc. Germany concluded a military coalition with Austria-Hungary in 1879, and Italy joined it in 1882. A Triple Alliance was launched against France and Russia, which, after Italy joined the Entente in 1915, and Turkey and Bulgaria took the side of Austria-Hungary and Germany, became the Fourth. The opponent of the German bloc, the Entente, was basically a predominantly defensive alliance, being a reaction to the knocking together of the Triple Alliance and an attempt to prevent German hegemony in Europe. In 1891, after the signing of the relevant agreement, the Franco-Russian Union appeared. The basis for the military interaction of the Allies was the military convention concluded on August 5 1892. French-English was signed in 1904, and Russian-English agreements were signed in 1907.
The sign for the Entente Franco-Russian military convention was signed by the Chief of the General Staff of Russia N. N. Obruchev and the Assistant Chief of the General Staff of France R. Sh. F. Bouadeffre.
According to this convention, Russia was obliged to advance an 800-thousandth army against Germany, thereby easing the position of the French army, whose number was to be 1 million. 300 thousand people. The convention declared the mutual assistance of the allies to each other with all the power of free forces and means, and assumed the simultaneous mobilization efforts of the allies. The main enemy of the Allies declared Germany.
The Franco-Russian military agreement, restoring the military balance of power in Europe, was an effective counterbalance to the Tripartite Alliance. Its main drawback was that it was of a general nature.
England also attached great importance to partnership with Russia. She understood perfectly well that France, even with the support of the British expeditionary forces, would not be able to resist German military might. Anglo-Russian contradictions, respectively, were leveled: the Anglo-Russian agreement 1907 addressed the problems of Afghanistan, Tibet and the delimitation of spheres of influence in Persia.
For France, the alliance with Russia not only changed its position in Europe to a more favorable one compared to other states, it became the most important prerequisite for the existence of this country as a great European power [History First World War. M., 1975. C. 56].
The First World War was a coalition war, and in it its participants had to “break up” between the fulfillment of their own strategic tasks and the realization of allied debt. Given that the bulk of the German army - a key player of the German bloc - was very likely to be on the French front, Russia had to give special importance to the issue of strategic influence on Germany at the beginning of the war. It was necessary to maximally influence the situation on the French front, not allowing the enemy to bring the French and British expeditionary forces out of action at the very beginning of the war.
Accordingly, the French General Staff wanted to get the fastest offensive on the German theater of operations from the Russian army. The time needed for the efforts of the Russian troops to seriously influence the situation on the French front was calculated. It was assumed that the Russian army would be able to enter first combat contact with the German troops on 14 day, the offensive against Germany would begin on 23 day, and the influence of the actions of the Russian army on the French front would begin to be felt around 35 day after the start of mobilization - when the Russian troops on the German front reached the turn of Thorn - Allenstein [Emets V. A. On the role of the Russian army in the first period of the world war 1914 - 1918. // Historical notes. Issue 77. M., 1965. C. 61].
Considerable attention was paid to the reduction of mobilization time [Sukhomlinov V.A. Memoirs. Plural 2005 C. 21]. The French, wanting Russia to keep the 5 - 6 of the German corps on its front, in turn, promised to launch a decisive offensive when the Germans launched the main attack on the Russian front.
But the norms of the Convention were too general in nature, subject to discussion and clarification - it concerned the amount of assistance, timing, organization of communication between allies, transport issues, etc. The defensive nature of the agreement remained unshakable - it entered into force only under the condition of "hostile initiative" side of germany. The problem of ensuring the unity of actions of the allies was not affected, which led to inconsistency of efforts, creating a favorable strategic environment for the powers of the German bloc. Discussion and clarification of the provisions of the military Convention, held at secret meetings of the chiefs of general staffs of Russia and France, could not solve these issues [Danilov Yu. N. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. M., 2006. C. 138].
All of the above has affected Russian strategic planning, which attempted to reconcile the general coalition interests with the Russian ones. Adopted in 1912, the Strategic Army’s strategic deployment plan included two options: “A” (Austria) - according to which the main attack was directed against Austria-Hungary, and “G” (Germany) - when the main military efforts of the Russian army were directed against Germany . The decisive factor in choosing the option was where the main part of the German military power would go — against the Russian Empire (in this case, option “G” came into effect) or the French republic (then option “A” came into effect).
According to variant “A”, Russian troops on the German front were to defeat the German forces in East Prussia, to seize this region as a springboard for subsequent actions. Austria-Hungary was to be crushed. Thus, an operation with limited targets against Germany and an operation with decisive targets against Austria (by attacking converging directions to Przemysl-Lviv with a further attack on Krakow) was envisaged.
In accordance with option “G”, it was planned to launch a decisive offensive against the German forces in East Prussia, while the actions of the Russian troops on the Austrian front were only to restrain the enemy, preventing him from being in the rear of the forces operating against Germany.
Based on the quantitative criteria for concentrating Russian troops, it should be noted that, contrary to the agreements at the pre-war meetings, Russian strategic planning saw the main enemy not in Germany, but in Austria-Hungary - this was dictated by the Russian strategic interests proper. The military historian and participant in the war, Lieutenant General N. N. Golovin rightly believed that the main blow against Austria did not in the least contradict the norms of the Franco-Russian Convention, since the first blow against Austria was an indirect strategic impact on the main enemy - Germany [ Golovin N.N. From the history of the 1914 campaign on the Russian front. The plan of war. Paris, 1936. C. 36]. And the threat of the defeat of Austro-Hungarian troops operating in a more favorable theater for military operations (Galicia) is more likely to cause the transfer of German troops from the French front to help their ally than the invasion of Russian troops in a less maneuverable theater of operations (East Prussia).
And really - the Germans could not ignore the defeat of an ally under the threat of losing the war to the whole bloc. In the long run, this is exactly what happened - the Germans had to build up their forces against Russia under the threat of a military weakening of Austria.
But at the same time, in the short term, it was the Russian invasion of East Prussia that led to the fastest reaction of the enemy, which in the shortest possible time affected the situation on the French front.
Russia was reproached (and reproached) for the spread of the available forces - 2 armies (35% forces) against Germany and 4 armies (55% forces) against Austria, forgetting about the coalition nature of the war - after all, it was also impossible for Russia to defeat France, like Germany - Austria. In the event of the defeat of France, Germany threw all the liberated troops on the Russian front and together with the Austrians crushed the Russians. Moreover, the Russian successes achieved in the confrontation with Austria could not compensate for the withdrawal of France from the war by Germany. Having crushed Austria-Hungary, Russia turned out to be one-on-one with the German and the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian (and also Turkish in the near future) armies, while the French front no longer exists. A. Svechin, a professor and military expert, also noted that the invasion of East Prussia was dictated by the instinct of self-preservation - after all, Germany had turned its back on the Russian army at the beginning of the war, and the more painful it would be for the enemy to bite the latter, the sooner German hands would release France [Svechin A. A. "A" or "G"? // Warfare. 1918. No. 25. C. 12].
But in the prewar period in Russia, among the competent circles there was discontent with strategic planning, and already during this period it was believed that the plan of war was in many respects unprofitable for Russia, part of whose forces were concentrated against the almost empty space of the German front, while Austria-Hungary sent at this time its main forces against Russia [Valentinov N. A. Relations with allies on military issues during the war 1914 — 1918. CH 1. M., 1920. C. 13].
But Russia deliberately sacrificed the possibility of inflicting a quick and decisive defeat on one of its opponents for the sake of the interests of the entire coalition.
At the same time, for objective reasons (issues of mobilization and transport infrastructure), it could not fulfill its obligations to concentrate on the German front of the 800-thousandth army.
Thus, in accordance with the 1912 plan, the German (North-Western Front) was supposed to have only 450 thousand bayonets and sabers (and only by the 40 mobilization day). By the 15-th day, it was planned to concentrate up to 350 thousand people (actually it was even less).
Under the terms of deploying their armed forces, Russia on 15-th day of mobilization could simultaneously concentrate against Austria-Hungary and Germany only 27 infantry and 20 cavalry divisions (that is, a third of forces; 8 was needed for the next third, and the last troops mobilized arrived to the front until November 1914 g.) [Emets V.A. Decree. cit. C. 64].
Military science demanded to wait for the concentration of all troops - otherwise, hastily the advancing troops remained without secondary units and formations, rear structures and heavy artillery. But the real prospect of a quick defeat of an ally obliged the leadership of Russia to sacrifice national interests for the sake of all-union ones. And the basis of the Russian operational and strategic plans was the help of the Allies for the Entente [Ibid. C. 65].
The plan adopted by the General Staff of Russia at the same time striking Austria-Hungary and Germany, seemed to respond to the task of delivering a decisive defeat to the main forces of the Austrian army and rendering effective assistance to France through a rapid offensive in East Prussia. But this planning came up against insurmountable difficulties - the main one of which was the lack of strength of the Russian army in the initial phase of the war. The huge theater of military operations, the gradual supply of the concentrated troops during maneuverable military operations - left a significant imprint on the first operations of the Russian army in the field. The lack of strength and the lack of mobilization of the Russian troops led to a more modest than planned result in the Battle of Galicia and defeat in East Prussia.
So, it was expected that the troops of the North-Western Front, which counted on paper 30 divisions (in reality - a third less), would oppose 16 - 25 German divisions. In fact, the 16 of the German divisions, in terms of firepower equivalent to the 20 - 22 of the Russian divisions and relying on the East Prussian defensive lines, could easily withstand the attack of a more numerous enemy. On the South-Western Front, the 42,5 Russian divisions (and with later readiness dates) were to confront 44 - Austro-German 47. To ensure superiority over the Austrian armies, the Russian command planned to carry out troop transfers from the Middle Neman.
Obviously, with such an alignment of forces, it was difficult to expect decisive success even in one operational direction, not to mention both. But allied debt obliged to act actively.
The Soviet military specialist N. A. Talensky, describing the “strategic duality” of Russian operational-strategic planning, noted that the importance of the North-Western Front in terms of Russia's own interests allowed the reduction of forces opposing Germany, carrying out defensive actions on this front, and increase the forces acting against Austria-Hungary. But the General Staff was bound by the terms of the Convention, which defined the minimum composition of the group deployed against Germany in 700-800 thousand people [Talensky N. A. World War I 1914 — 1918. M., 1944. C. 15].
But it was precisely this “strategic divide” that actually led to the breakdown of the pre-war strategic planning of the German bloc. After all, Germany and its allies had a chance to win the war on two fronts, realizing the advantages of actions along internal operational lines, defeating opponents in parts. Simply put, to withdraw from the war France, taking advantage of the difference in terms between the Russian and French mobilization. The main calculation was on this - after all, based on both economic and political prerequisites, Germany (and even more so Austria) could not carry on a long war of attrition.
Russia, knocking over all enemy calculations, carried out a quick invasion of East Prussia, while delivering a severe blow to the Austrians in Galicia - and this more than significantly influenced Austro-German pre-war strategic planning.
1. Place of Russia in the Entente.
2. The military-political leadership of the allied powers of Russia in the First World War.
The sign for the Entente Franco-Russian military convention was signed by the Chief of the General Staff of Russia N. N. Obruchev and the Assistant Chief of the General Staff of France R. Sh. F. Bouadeffre.
According to this convention, Russia was obliged to advance an 800-thousandth army against Germany, thereby easing the position of the French army, whose number was to be 1 million. 300 thousand people. The convention declared the mutual assistance of the allies to each other with all the power of free forces and means, and assumed the simultaneous mobilization efforts of the allies. The main enemy of the Allies declared Germany.
The Franco-Russian military agreement, restoring the military balance of power in Europe, was an effective counterbalance to the Tripartite Alliance. Its main drawback was that it was of a general nature.
England also attached great importance to partnership with Russia. She understood perfectly well that France, even with the support of the British expeditionary forces, would not be able to resist German military might. Anglo-Russian contradictions, respectively, were leveled: the Anglo-Russian agreement 1907 addressed the problems of Afghanistan, Tibet and the delimitation of spheres of influence in Persia.
For France, the alliance with Russia not only changed its position in Europe to a more favorable one compared to other states, it became the most important prerequisite for the existence of this country as a great European power [History First World War. M., 1975. C. 56].
The First World War was a coalition war, and in it its participants had to “break up” between the fulfillment of their own strategic tasks and the realization of allied debt. Given that the bulk of the German army - a key player of the German bloc - was very likely to be on the French front, Russia had to give special importance to the issue of strategic influence on Germany at the beginning of the war. It was necessary to maximally influence the situation on the French front, not allowing the enemy to bring the French and British expeditionary forces out of action at the very beginning of the war.
Accordingly, the French General Staff wanted to get the fastest offensive on the German theater of operations from the Russian army. The time needed for the efforts of the Russian troops to seriously influence the situation on the French front was calculated. It was assumed that the Russian army would be able to enter first combat contact with the German troops on 14 day, the offensive against Germany would begin on 23 day, and the influence of the actions of the Russian army on the French front would begin to be felt around 35 day after the start of mobilization - when the Russian troops on the German front reached the turn of Thorn - Allenstein [Emets V. A. On the role of the Russian army in the first period of the world war 1914 - 1918. // Historical notes. Issue 77. M., 1965. C. 61].
Considerable attention was paid to the reduction of mobilization time [Sukhomlinov V.A. Memoirs. Plural 2005 C. 21]. The French, wanting Russia to keep the 5 - 6 of the German corps on its front, in turn, promised to launch a decisive offensive when the Germans launched the main attack on the Russian front.
But the norms of the Convention were too general in nature, subject to discussion and clarification - it concerned the amount of assistance, timing, organization of communication between allies, transport issues, etc. The defensive nature of the agreement remained unshakable - it entered into force only under the condition of "hostile initiative" side of germany. The problem of ensuring the unity of actions of the allies was not affected, which led to inconsistency of efforts, creating a favorable strategic environment for the powers of the German bloc. Discussion and clarification of the provisions of the military Convention, held at secret meetings of the chiefs of general staffs of Russia and France, could not solve these issues [Danilov Yu. N. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. M., 2006. C. 138].
All of the above has affected Russian strategic planning, which attempted to reconcile the general coalition interests with the Russian ones. Adopted in 1912, the Strategic Army’s strategic deployment plan included two options: “A” (Austria) - according to which the main attack was directed against Austria-Hungary, and “G” (Germany) - when the main military efforts of the Russian army were directed against Germany . The decisive factor in choosing the option was where the main part of the German military power would go — against the Russian Empire (in this case, option “G” came into effect) or the French republic (then option “A” came into effect).
According to variant “A”, Russian troops on the German front were to defeat the German forces in East Prussia, to seize this region as a springboard for subsequent actions. Austria-Hungary was to be crushed. Thus, an operation with limited targets against Germany and an operation with decisive targets against Austria (by attacking converging directions to Przemysl-Lviv with a further attack on Krakow) was envisaged.
In accordance with option “G”, it was planned to launch a decisive offensive against the German forces in East Prussia, while the actions of the Russian troops on the Austrian front were only to restrain the enemy, preventing him from being in the rear of the forces operating against Germany.
Based on the quantitative criteria for concentrating Russian troops, it should be noted that, contrary to the agreements at the pre-war meetings, Russian strategic planning saw the main enemy not in Germany, but in Austria-Hungary - this was dictated by the Russian strategic interests proper. The military historian and participant in the war, Lieutenant General N. N. Golovin rightly believed that the main blow against Austria did not in the least contradict the norms of the Franco-Russian Convention, since the first blow against Austria was an indirect strategic impact on the main enemy - Germany [ Golovin N.N. From the history of the 1914 campaign on the Russian front. The plan of war. Paris, 1936. C. 36]. And the threat of the defeat of Austro-Hungarian troops operating in a more favorable theater for military operations (Galicia) is more likely to cause the transfer of German troops from the French front to help their ally than the invasion of Russian troops in a less maneuverable theater of operations (East Prussia).
And really - the Germans could not ignore the defeat of an ally under the threat of losing the war to the whole bloc. In the long run, this is exactly what happened - the Germans had to build up their forces against Russia under the threat of a military weakening of Austria.
But at the same time, in the short term, it was the Russian invasion of East Prussia that led to the fastest reaction of the enemy, which in the shortest possible time affected the situation on the French front.
Russia was reproached (and reproached) for the spread of the available forces - 2 armies (35% forces) against Germany and 4 armies (55% forces) against Austria, forgetting about the coalition nature of the war - after all, it was also impossible for Russia to defeat France, like Germany - Austria. In the event of the defeat of France, Germany threw all the liberated troops on the Russian front and together with the Austrians crushed the Russians. Moreover, the Russian successes achieved in the confrontation with Austria could not compensate for the withdrawal of France from the war by Germany. Having crushed Austria-Hungary, Russia turned out to be one-on-one with the German and the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian (and also Turkish in the near future) armies, while the French front no longer exists. A. Svechin, a professor and military expert, also noted that the invasion of East Prussia was dictated by the instinct of self-preservation - after all, Germany had turned its back on the Russian army at the beginning of the war, and the more painful it would be for the enemy to bite the latter, the sooner German hands would release France [Svechin A. A. "A" or "G"? // Warfare. 1918. No. 25. C. 12].
But in the prewar period in Russia, among the competent circles there was discontent with strategic planning, and already during this period it was believed that the plan of war was in many respects unprofitable for Russia, part of whose forces were concentrated against the almost empty space of the German front, while Austria-Hungary sent at this time its main forces against Russia [Valentinov N. A. Relations with allies on military issues during the war 1914 — 1918. CH 1. M., 1920. C. 13].
But Russia deliberately sacrificed the possibility of inflicting a quick and decisive defeat on one of its opponents for the sake of the interests of the entire coalition.
At the same time, for objective reasons (issues of mobilization and transport infrastructure), it could not fulfill its obligations to concentrate on the German front of the 800-thousandth army.
Thus, in accordance with the 1912 plan, the German (North-Western Front) was supposed to have only 450 thousand bayonets and sabers (and only by the 40 mobilization day). By the 15-th day, it was planned to concentrate up to 350 thousand people (actually it was even less).
Under the terms of deploying their armed forces, Russia on 15-th day of mobilization could simultaneously concentrate against Austria-Hungary and Germany only 27 infantry and 20 cavalry divisions (that is, a third of forces; 8 was needed for the next third, and the last troops mobilized arrived to the front until November 1914 g.) [Emets V.A. Decree. cit. C. 64].
Military science demanded to wait for the concentration of all troops - otherwise, hastily the advancing troops remained without secondary units and formations, rear structures and heavy artillery. But the real prospect of a quick defeat of an ally obliged the leadership of Russia to sacrifice national interests for the sake of all-union ones. And the basis of the Russian operational and strategic plans was the help of the Allies for the Entente [Ibid. C. 65].
The plan adopted by the General Staff of Russia at the same time striking Austria-Hungary and Germany, seemed to respond to the task of delivering a decisive defeat to the main forces of the Austrian army and rendering effective assistance to France through a rapid offensive in East Prussia. But this planning came up against insurmountable difficulties - the main one of which was the lack of strength of the Russian army in the initial phase of the war. The huge theater of military operations, the gradual supply of the concentrated troops during maneuverable military operations - left a significant imprint on the first operations of the Russian army in the field. The lack of strength and the lack of mobilization of the Russian troops led to a more modest than planned result in the Battle of Galicia and defeat in East Prussia.
So, it was expected that the troops of the North-Western Front, which counted on paper 30 divisions (in reality - a third less), would oppose 16 - 25 German divisions. In fact, the 16 of the German divisions, in terms of firepower equivalent to the 20 - 22 of the Russian divisions and relying on the East Prussian defensive lines, could easily withstand the attack of a more numerous enemy. On the South-Western Front, the 42,5 Russian divisions (and with later readiness dates) were to confront 44 - Austro-German 47. To ensure superiority over the Austrian armies, the Russian command planned to carry out troop transfers from the Middle Neman.
Obviously, with such an alignment of forces, it was difficult to expect decisive success even in one operational direction, not to mention both. But allied debt obliged to act actively.
The Soviet military specialist N. A. Talensky, describing the “strategic duality” of Russian operational-strategic planning, noted that the importance of the North-Western Front in terms of Russia's own interests allowed the reduction of forces opposing Germany, carrying out defensive actions on this front, and increase the forces acting against Austria-Hungary. But the General Staff was bound by the terms of the Convention, which defined the minimum composition of the group deployed against Germany in 700-800 thousand people [Talensky N. A. World War I 1914 — 1918. M., 1944. C. 15].
But it was precisely this “strategic divide” that actually led to the breakdown of the pre-war strategic planning of the German bloc. After all, Germany and its allies had a chance to win the war on two fronts, realizing the advantages of actions along internal operational lines, defeating opponents in parts. Simply put, to withdraw from the war France, taking advantage of the difference in terms between the Russian and French mobilization. The main calculation was on this - after all, based on both economic and political prerequisites, Germany (and even more so Austria) could not carry on a long war of attrition.
Russia, knocking over all enemy calculations, carried out a quick invasion of East Prussia, while delivering a severe blow to the Austrians in Galicia - and this more than significantly influenced Austro-German pre-war strategic planning.
1. Place of Russia in the Entente.
2. The military-political leadership of the allied powers of Russia in the First World War.
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