Operation "Find" - a sample of an effective radio game
During World War II, the intelligence services of many European countries opened another environment for the confrontation - the radio broadcast. The whole vast territory from England to Russia was covered by radio games.Among all the operations that were conducted by the counter-intelligence units of the NKVD and the NKGB, a special place belongs to the radio game, which received the code name "Nakhodka".
10 February 1943 received a call to the NKVD Administration of the Moscow Region, informing that a paratrooper landed from a plane flying low above the ground in one of the settlements of Volokolamsk district. An operative group of security officers was immediately sent to the scene. As a result of the activities carried out, the group managed to detain the lieutenant, who called himself Mikhail Grigoriev. The first inspection showed nothing suspicious. But the fact that this was a German saboteur was indicated by a radio station found in him, packed in a suitcase, as well as a large amount of money. From where he had all this come from, the lieutenant could not explain.
During the interrogation, Soviet intelligence officers found out that Grigoriev was one of the landed paratroopers. We also managed to find out that he was the radio operator of the Abwehr and used the pseudonym “Gaidar”. All members of this sabotage group were supplied with the uniform of the junior commanding staff of the Soviet Army, a credible legend and the necessary documents. According to Grigoriev, the parachutists disembarked at long intervals, so much time was spent searching for each other. Two of them met, but the third did not wait. It was decided not to wait any longer and get out of the landing area, since it was dangerous to be there. Before they break up, they agreed that, for safety reasons, they would not tell each other about a permanent location.
It should be immediately noted that the third paratrooper was never found. Most likely, once in his native land, he simply abandoned his espionage mission.
The interrogation of Grigoriev gave certain results. It was found that the leadership of the Abwehr set a very specific task for this sabotage group: they were to land in the Moscow region closer to the roads, and continuously monitor the movements of the Soviet military echelons from Moscow to Rzhev. It was also planned that the first access to the airwaves was to be carried out either immediately after landing, or after the saboteurs settled in place.
Mikhail Ivanovich Zhuravlev, head of the NKVD administration, state security commissar of the 3 rank, analyzed the data obtained as a result of the interrogations, as well as evaluated Grigoriev’s identity and decided to start a radio game with the German Abwehr.
The German radio operator willingly agreed to cooperate with the Soviet counterintelligence agencies. There was no doubt that he genuinely wanted to help. Proof of this was the fact that he volunteered about the Abwehr Katyn and Borisov Reconnaissance Schools and their personnel, and also reported on the locations of the German sabotage groups in the Soviet rear that were known to him. On February 13, at the appointed time, the radio operator appeared on the radio and contacted the center. He conveyed information that the landing was quite successful, however, he managed to meet only with one of two paratroopers, but he could not find the second one. In the end, he assured the German leadership that he was ready to start work, and that he would soon try to get in touch and report on the results of the assignment.
The response cryptogram contained the question whether the radio operator fell into the hands of the Soviet Chekists, and whether he was acting under their dictation. Understandably, the Soviet counterintelligence alert. Did Abwehr solve their cunning, and his management understood that the agent had been turned over and was transmitting disinformation? In the conditions of war it was very difficult to understand the problem.
However, the fact that the information that was transmitted to the German intelligence center, still underwent a thorough test, reassured the Soviet leadership a little. The Soviet counterintelligence officers especially tried to make the misinformation look believable, therefore the Operational Directorate of the General Staff created a sound and effective system. It consisted of a group of “targets” - highly qualified specialists, who thought carefully and processed disinformation, which had to be passed on to the Germans in order to mislead them regarding further actions of the Soviet military command. The scope of this information was very extensive. The deputy chief of the counter-intelligence directorate of the NKVD, General L.F. Raykhman, was responsible for ensuring communication with this department.
Perhaps the only weak point of the entire operation was the fact that the third parachutist was never found, which created a certain risk of exposure. The Soviet military command was well aware that the loss of a saboteur could not but be disturbed by the Abwehr, who could well stop radio broadcasts. That is why it decided not to touch the second radio operator, to leave him free, not to openly prevent him, but to keep all his actions under control. When he came to Grigoriev in order to convey the information he had collected, he was monitored. Soviet intelligence officers were able to establish its exact location, so further surveillance of it was conducted by unofficial assistants from among the railway workers.
Thus, it can be argued that the main goal pursued by the “Nakhodka” radio game is to create additional channels for transmitting disinformation.
Since during the operation Grigoriev showed himself from the best side, he earned confidence and, accordingly, could go on the air, albeit under control, but without the physical presence of Soviet intelligence agents. He independently found a place to live with a lonely elderly nun, whose home was immediately monitored. In the neighborhood with him settled officer SKRO NKVD Nikolai Grachev. And between the two young people even established friendly relations.
February 16 received a new cipher from the German intelligence center, in which the leadership of the Abwehr congratulated radio operator with a safe arrival. Therefore, the KGB were confident that everything was going according to their plan, and nothing could foretell failure.
In late February, Grigoriev handed over the cipher that he had changed his place of residence. From this point on, radio broadcasts became regular — once every three days, the Germans were given misinformation about the movement of cargo, the state of air defense, and all possible changes in the local military garrison. Almost every time weather data was transmitted, which the enemy was very interested in. It was obvious that German intelligence began to treat the activities of its saboteurs with great confidence, as evidenced by the March cipher from 21, which stated that both scouts were awarded the Order For Bravery of the 2 class.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the NKVD decided to continue the radio game in order to withdraw and capture a fascist courier. However, this was not so easy to do, since there were no reports of any appearance on the territory of the Soviet Union. In case of the need for any documents, money or food, the scouts had to prepare the site so that the plane could reset everything necessary and communicate the coordinates of this site in encryption.
March 26 Grigoriev sent to the center a cryptogram in which he mentioned that the validity of fictitious documents expired, as well as the fact that new batteries are needed. A week later came the answer that the documents will be dropped from the plane. But Grigoriev managed to convince the management of the need to send a courier with all necessary.
Quite unexpectedly for the security officers "Find" attracted the attention of I.Stalin. Therefore, specially for him was prepared a certificate of ways to develop the operation.
Two days later, a courier appeared in the house where Grigoriev lived, dressed in the uniform of a lieutenant of the Soviet Red Army. He told the radio operator that he had brought everything he needed, but in order not to attract too much attention to himself, he hid his bags near the Volokolamsk station.
The arrival of the courier was immediately reported to Abakumov. He decided to arrest him only when he crossed the front line, because it was necessary to find out where and how this was happening.
Meanwhile, in the Abwehr was sent a encryption about the successful execution of the task. Later, the radio operator, who remained beyond all suspicion, was ordered to move to the west, and Operation Nakhodka itself was transferred to the jurisdiction of the military counterintelligence of the Soviet Army.
The operation not only contributed to supplying the Germans with disinformation, but also made it possible to neutralize the network of fascist saboteurs.
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