Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 14. Little alternative
The long 13 articles of this series, we understood the descriptions of the battle of July 28 and the events preceding it, which are historical part of this work. We studied the facts and looked for explanations for them, identified causal relationships in an attempt to understand - why did this happen, and nothing else? And now the thirteenth, final article of the series, which is brought to your attention, is devoted not to facts, but to unrealized opportunities that can be described by the question: “What would happen if ...?”
Of course, this is already an alternative story, and everyone who is jarred by this phrase, I ask you to refrain from further reading. Because below we will try to find answers to questions about what could happen if:
1) V.K. Witgeft accepted Matusevich's proposal and, upon leaving the squadron to the sea, sent the low-speed "Poltava" and "Sevastopol" to Bitszyvo, and he himself would go on a breakthrough with only the four fastest battleships.
2) After the 1st phase, when V.K. Witgeft separated Poltava and Sevastopol from the squadron and sent them to Port Arthur or neutral ports, while he himself developed full speed and would go on a breakthrough with the rest of the squadron.
3) V.K. Witgeft in the 2nd phase of the battle, with an energetic maneuver, approached the Japanese catching up with him for a pistol shot, and perhaps arrange a dump with their 1st combat detachment.
In addition, in this article we will try to determine the best way to use the 1 Pacific squadron in its condition, in which it was 28 July 1904 g.
It is well known that the squadron speed of the Russian battleships was inferior to that of the Japanese. The main reason for this was two "slow moving" - "Sevastopol" and "Poltava", barely capable of giving 12-13 nodes all the time, while the other four battleships V.K. In this parameter, Witgefta approximately corresponded to the Japanese ships of the 1 combat detachment. And therefore, it is not surprising that a number of officers of the 1 Pacific squadron and many analysts of later times considered it necessary to divide the squadron into “fast” and “slow” squads, which should have increased the chances of a breakthrough of the “high-speed” wing to Vladivostok. But is it really?
Consider the first option. The Russian squadron in full force goes to sea, but then it is divided. Only high-speed ships go for a breakthrough, and Sevastopol and Poltava, along with gunboats and the part of the destroyers of the 2 squad that was able to go into battle, are sent to the “assault” of the Japanese landing site in Bitszyo. Bitszyvo’s defense is a priority for the Japanese, but if the main forces of Heyhatiro Togo first attack the “slow-moving” Russian detachment and smash it, they will not have time to catch up with the main Russian forces.
This option is certainly interesting, but alas, it hardly had any hope of success. The Russians completely lost control of the sea and did not even control the external raid, so that the Japanese learned about the squadron leaving before the battleships of Port Arthur set in motion - from the thick smoke from the pipes that arose during the preparation of the boilers “for the campaign and battle”, which was done when the ship was anchored. In addition, Heihatiro Togo had many cruisers, destroyers and other ships capable of reconnaissance, and there is no doubt that by the time the Russian squadron entered the external raid, it was observed from many ships and from all sides. This is exactly what happened during the Russian exit to the breakthrough on July 28, 1904. Given the fact that the ships of the United fleet they had very reliable radio stations about any actions of Russians Heihatiro Togo knew almost at the very moment when these actions were taken.
Interestingly, when sending a "low-speed" detachment to Bitszyvo V.K. In no way should Witgeft impede Japanese intelligence — on the contrary! X. Togo must have received information that the Russian squadron was divided, otherwise the whole idea would lose its meaning - in order for the Japanese to “peck” on the bait, they had to know about it. In case H. Togo for some reason, instead of “catching” Sevastopol with Poltava, went to intercept a high-speed wing, he would have excellent chances to crush Tsesarevich, Retvizan, ” Victory and Peresvet. In this case, no breakthrough to Vladivostok would have taken place, and the attack of Bitszyvo (even if successful) became an extremely weak consolation for the Russians.
Thus, it was impossible and impossible to prevent Japanese intelligence, but ... we put ourselves in the place of H. Togo. Here is a radiogram in front of him on the table that the Russians divided their squadron into the 2 squadron, indicating the composition of these squads and their courses. What prevented the Japanese commander from separating his own forces now so as to leave a detachment of sufficient numbers to defend Bitszyo, and rush after the “high-speed wing” of the Russian squadron with the rest of the ships?
On the route of Sevastopol and Poltava to Bitszyvo, on the morning of July 28 there were ships of the 5 military detachment, but not only they, the Matsushima and Hasidat were stationed not far from Arthur, a little further (at the Far) Chiyoda and Chin-Yen, while Bitszyvo's direct cover was carried out by Asama, Itsukushima and Izumi. This, of course, would not be enough to stop the two old, but strong Russian battleships, but who would have prevented Heyhatiro Togo from strengthening these ships with one of their battleships - Fuji? In this case, to counteract the Russian detachment, the Japanese would have 1 relatively modern and one old battleships (Fuji and Chin-Yen) modern armored cruiser (Asama) and 5 of old armored cruisers (although strictly speaking, Chiyoda "Formally could be considered armored, as it had an armor belt), not counting other ships. In addition, Heyhatiro Togo could also send Yakumo to Bitszyvo - although he was at Port Arthur, he could well catch up with Sevastopol and Poltava and join the battle when the latter began the battle with Fuji. These forces would be quite enough to prevent the Russian detachment from approaching Bitszyvo.
At the same time, in order to catch up with the main Russian forces, the Japanese commander still had three battleships and two armored cruisers ("Kasuga" and "Nissin"). Given the actual results of the 28 battle of July, 1904 of these ships would have been more than enough for the Tsarevich, Retvizan, Victory, and Peresvet.
In no case should we forget that with the departure of "Sevastopol" and "Poltava" the Russian squadron significantly lost in its combat power, since it was on these ships that the best artillery of the squadron served. It was these ships that showed the best results in 1903 g shooting, and they surpassed the Retvizan following X-NUMX-1,65 by the sum of points scored, while Peresvet and Victory turned out to be even worse than Retvizan. As for the "Cesarevich", this battleship came to Port Arthur at the very last moment before the war, when the other squadron ships got into reserve, so that before the start of the war he could not have any serious training. Even after its start, the torpedo hit and long-term repairs did not allow the commanders to receive full training, why many in the squadron considered his crew to be the worst in training compared to other battleships.
It may not be entirely correct to say that without the “Sevastopol” and “Poltava” armored squadrons of the 1-nd Pacific Squadron lost half of its combat power, but such an assessment is very close to the truth. At the same time, the 1 combat detachment of the Japanese without Fuji and on the condition of non-alignment Yakumo in the second phase lost a quarter of the artillery that participated in the battle, which X. Togo actually had in 28 in July 1904. Thus, the consequences the divisions of the 1 Pacific squadron into the 2 squadron, one of which would attack Bitszyvo, could lead to more heavy casualties than the 1 Pacific squadron incurred with an actual breakthrough attempt.
According to the second variant, the Russian ships go for a joint breakthrough, as it happened in the 28 battle of July, but at the moment when, as a result of X. Togo’s maneuvers, the Japanese 1 combat unit ended up as the stern of the Pacific Squadron and the distance between the opponents reached 1 miles, V.K. Vitgeft gives the order to “Sevastopol” and “Poltava” to return to Port Arthur, and he, with the rest of the ships, increases the speed to 10 bonds and goes for a breakthrough.
It would be a very realistic option, but he promised success only if the battleships V.K. Witgefta was able to maintain at least a fifteen-node speed for a long time (in days), and the Japanese could not go faster. Usually, the squadron speed of the 1 combat detachment X. Togo did not exceed the 14-15 nodes, and although there are references to 16 bonds, they are quite controversial (it is difficult to estimate the speed from the Russian ships to the node). if such a speed has developed, then only for a short time. Accordingly, even if the Japanese, waving a hand at Sevastopol and Poltava, would rush behind the main forces of V.K. Witgefta, they could only catch up to them in the late evening, and X. Togo simply wouldn’t have time to inflict decisive damage on Russian ships. After that, the 1 th Japanese combat detachment could only go to the Korean Strait, but if the Russians had really demonstrated the ability to support 15 nodes around the clock, it’s not a fact that the Japanese would have managed to intercept them even there.
But could the four most modern Russian battleships have been able to support 15 nodes for a long time? To answer this question is very difficult. According to passport data, such an opportunity, of course, was. In addition, it is known that Peresvet in 1903 r, not too troubling machine commands and not forcing machines, kept 36 node speed for 15,7 hours (battleship races on the route Nagasaki-Port Arthur). There could be enough coal to Vladivostok for the battleships: in the 1 phase of the battle, the battleship tubes did not have too serious damage that could cause excessive consumption of coal. It is also not known what happened to the “Retvizan”, which received an underwater hole shortly before the breakthrough, it was impossible to patch a similar hole, and the ship went into battle with water inside the hull - only reinforced bulkheads held it, but with increasing reinforcement speed they could pass, causing extensive shipwrecks. On the other hand, on the fact of the 28 battle of July, 1904 G didn’t do anything of the kind, but the XTNUMX didn’t develop the nodes during the breakout either. Nevertheless, knowing the entire history of the battle, in retrospect it can be assumed that the bulkheads of the battleship would have sustained such speed.
With some probability this option could really lead to the breakthrough of a part of the squadron in Vladivostok. But neither V.K. Witgeft and no one else at that particular moment in the July 28 battle could not have known about it.
From the very exit of the squadron, when trying to develop more than 13 nodes on the battleships, something broke, which made it necessary to slow down and wait until Victory (once) and Tsarevich (twice) would fix the damage and enter service. In order to maintain such a high speed constantly, well-trained firemen are required, and they were once such, but long “holidays”, when the squadron practically did not go to sea since November 1903, (except for the period of command of S.O. Makarov ), did not contribute to the maintenance of appropriate qualification of machine commands. It should also be taken into account that the coal in Port Arthur was not good and clearly worse than the Japanese could have (and actually had). No one knew what would happen to the Retvizan if it went on for a long time on 15 nodes. But most importantly, none of the Russian officers had any idea what the maximum speed of the squadron could be developed by the Japanese fleet.
Knowing the history of the Russian-Japanese war at sea, we can assume (although we don’t know for sure) that the Japanese hardly walked faster than the 15 nodes. But the sailors of the 1 Pacific Pacific Squadron understood only that their coal was worse in quality, the firemen were less well trained, and the Japanese ships appeared to be in better technical condition. From this it was irrefutable that the Japanese, in any case, would be able to go faster than the Russians, and throwing two battleships (especially the best squadron shooters) almost to certain death in order to delay the resumption of the battle could not be considered good. an idea. Thus, it can be argued that this option, if it was realistic, could not be recognized as such on the basis of the data that Russian officers had during the battle.
In discussions on the topic of the July 28 battle, such a plan sometimes came up - in the interval between the 1 and 2 phases, send Poltava and Sevastopol not to Port Arthur, but to attack Bitszyo, and here- then the Japanese would have to fall behind the Russian squadron and rush to defend the landing site! Alas, as we have already seen, no one prevented the Japanese from allocating a detachment sufficient to fend off this threat — and to continue the pursuit of the Russian squadron by superior forces. Moreover, it was enough for the Japanese 1 combat detachment, continuing the pursuit of the main forces of the Russian squadron, to disperse from two old Russian battleships at a short distance on countercourses, and the latter would receive very strong damage, after which the attack Bitszyo would be extremely doubtful. And then to say - such an attack would have some chances if it were supported by light ships, such as gunboats and destroyers, but what would two damaged Russian battleships do at night (before they could not reach Bitsvoe) in waters where there were a lot of mines fields and destroyers of the enemy?
And finally, the third option. When the Japanese caught up with the Russian squadron (tentatively at 16.30) and the battle resumed, the 1 th combat squadron of Kheykhatiro Togo was in a very disadvantageous tactical position - he was forced to catch up with Russian ships, passing along the column of battleships VK. Witgefta and gradually reducing the distance, thereby allowing the Russians to concentrate the fire on their heads. What would happen if at that moment the Russian admiral would turn “all at once” or did another maneuver and rush at the Japanese at full speed?
In order to try to imagine what the attempt to get close to the Japanese at the distance of the pistol shot would lead to, you should try to deal with the effectiveness of the Russian and Japanese fire at different stages of the battle. In total, the 28 phases in the 2 battle of July are approximately equal in time (generally speaking, the 1 phase lasted longer, but there was a break when the parties did not engage in artillery fighting - given the interruption, the fire exposure time in 1 and 2 phase is comparable). But the battle in the 2 phase proceeded at a much smaller distance, because H. Togo "went into the clinch" to beat the Russians before dark. Therefore, all other things being equal, it was to be expected that during the 2 phase, both the Japanese and Russian battleships would receive far more hits than the first.
We have already written about the effectiveness of the fire of the parties in the first part of the battle: for example, the Japanese achieved 19 hits with large-caliber shells, including 18 305-mm caliber and one 254-mm. In addition, the Russian ships received approximately 16 shells of other, smaller calibers. In the second phase, the number of hits to the Russian battleships has increased as expected - they received 46 large-caliber hits (10-12 dm) and 68 hits with other calibers. Thus, as a result of reducing the combat distance from 50-70 kb in the first phase to 20-40 kb in the second phase, the effectiveness of firing Japanese commander large-caliber guns increased almost two and a half times, and other calibers - more than four times!
Alas, the Russian battleships do not demonstrate a similar increase in efficiency. If in the 1 phase of the 8 heavy (6 - 305-mm and 2 - 254-mm) and 2 smaller caliber shells hit the Japanese ships, in the second phase the Japanese ships also hit 7 heavy and 15-16 shells of a smaller caliber considering 2 hits from the cruiser “Askold” made by him during the breakthrough, that is, at the end of the battle of the armored units).
Interestingly, the loss of the system shortly after the death of V.K. Witgefta almost did not affect the accuracy of Russian fire - from 7 heavy shells that hit the Japanese ships in the 2-nd phase of the battle, three found their goal after these unfortunate events.
And yet, if during the first phase of the battle on 1 hit Russian heavy projectile (254-305-mm) accounted for 2,37 Japanese, then in the second phase on the 1 the same hit the Japanese answered already 6,57 projectiles! Two, in general, the random hits of Russian six-inch shells in the 1 phase are not sufficient for statistics, but in the 2 phase, Japanese commandants of medium and small-caliber artillery provided 4,25-4,5 times more hits than their Russian counterparts.
Despite the numerous testimonies of Russian officers, that while reducing the distance, the Japanese began to get nervous and shoot worse, the analysis of the hits of the parties does not confirm this. With the fall of the distance, the quality of the Japanese shooting increased significantly, but the heavy guns of the Russian battleships could not boast of such and even reduced their effectiveness (7 hits against 8 in the 1 phase). In any case, at relatively short distances of the 2 phase of the battle, the Japanese achieved a 4,5-5 multiple superiority over the Russian ships. And this is taking into account the tactically losing position in which the Japanese have been for a long time! In addition, one should never forget that the most severe damage to the battleships could have been caused only by 254-305-mm caliber shells, and here the Japanese achieved absolute superiority in the 2 phase - 46 hits against 7.
Hole under the right 152-mm gun of the squadron battleship Peresvet, obtained during the battle in the Yellow Sea
Thus, it can be stated that a close distance over short distances could hardly bring Russians luck - with the reduction of the distance, the superiority of the Japanese in firepower only grew. And this meant that an attempt to get close to the Japanese could not have contributed to the breakthrough of the squadron in Vladivostok - one would have expected much more damage than the battleships of V.K. Witgefta got in reality.
And yet ... The Russian squadron in the 2 phase of the battle had one advantage. It could not help break through to Vladivostok or win the battle, but at least it gave some chances to inflict sensitive losses on the Japanese.
The fact is that Kheihatiro Togo chose to “encircle” the Russian squadron with its cruisers and destroyers - the detachments of these ships really tried to stay in the distance around the ships of V.K. Witgefta, and this was his reason - no Russian’s most abrupt and unexpected maneuver would have allowed them to go beyond the visibility of Japanese high-speed reconnaissance. But such a tactic had its drawbacks, which consisted in the fact that the main forces of the Japanese did not accompany either the cruiser or the destroyers. But the Russian commander, leading the ships to break, and the cruisers and destroyers were available, and in close proximity.
An attempt to bring the 1 Pacific squadron battleships closer to the main forces of X. Togo for the artillery duel did not promise anything good for the Russians, but if the armored squadrons converged on 7-10 cables or even closer, the Russian cruisers and destroyers attempted to fight for fighting forces at that moment. torpedoes - this was probably the only chance. And besides ...
Partly so low accuracy of the shooting of Russian ships in the 2 phase of the battle can be explained by the instruction of V.К. It was extremely difficult for Vitgefta to shoot at Mikas, which made the latter hide in the midst of water pillars from falling projectiles. Therefore, we can assume that if the Russian battleships would rush against the Japanese and, in this case, everyone would choose the best goal for themselves, then our gunners would be able to achieve a slightly higher number of hits than happened in reality. It also cannot be ruled out that for some time it would have been difficult for the Japanese to direct guns at Russian ships moving in counter-moves, as happened with Retvisan when it rushed into the attack on the Japanese system. The Japanese were indeed worse shot at countercourses, and this gave additional chances for the battleships (not to get excessive damage when approaching), and for cruisers and destroyers going into a torpedo attack ...
Here are just go to such actions VK. Witgeft could not - he was tasked with breaking into a squadron in Vladivostok, and he was obliged to carry it out, and trying to arrange a dump with a dashing mine attack didn’t help in accomplishing the task - it was clear that when a squadron was closer to the Japanese very heavy and disruptive damage.
All of the above allows us to determine the optimal strategy for the 1 Pacific Pacific Squadron. She was inferior to the enemy literally in everything, and even the advantage in heavy weapons was leveled by poor training of the gunners. Still, she had one single advantage — Port Arthur’s ship repair facilities were significantly superior to what the Japanese had at their flying base near Eliot Islands, and the Russians could well try to “play” at this advantage.
Suppose that the order for a breakthrough to Vladivostok, which was received by V.K. Witgeft would have been put together like this:
1) The 1st Pacific Squadron must go to sea, and the purpose of its exit will be determined by the actions of the enemy.
2) If for some reason the squadron is not intercepted by the main forces of the Japanese fleet, it should go to Vladivostok.
3) If the main forces of the Japanese nevertheless impose a battle, the squadron must, without regret, abandon the breakthrough to Vladivostok and engage in a decisive battle with the Japanese fleet. In battle, the task of the armadillos is to, after waiting for the right moment, to get close to the enemy, or even completely mix the formation, trying to use not only artillery, but also torpedoes and rams. The task of the cruisers and destroyers, hiding behind the armadillos ahead of time, at the right time to decisively attack enemy armored ships with torpedoes.
4) After the battle, the squadron should retreat to Port Arthur and repair the damage that prevents the breakthrough to Vladivostok as soon as possible, after which, without delaying a single day, make a second attempt to break through. In the event that a ship receives such damage to the underwater part that cannot be repaired without a long repair, then it should be left in Port Arthur.
5) In an open battle against the entire strength of the Japanese fleet, the 1st Pacific Squadron is unlikely to find enough strength to push the enemy back and pave the way to Vladivostok. But if you manage to destroy or at least damage several enemy ships with torpedoes, then they will no longer be able to participate in the battle when they exit again.
6) If, even upon re-exit, the enemy can block the squadron’s road with equal or superior forces, then it should again, without trying to go to Vladivostok, give it a decisive battle, then retreat to Port Arthur, and having repaired, make a new attempt to break through.
7) In such battles, we will have an advantage due to the ship repair capabilities of Port Arthur, which are far superior to those of the Japanese at their flying base. And even if our damage will be stronger, we will be able to return the ships to service faster than the Japanese can, so that, if not the first time, then the second time, the advantage in large ships may be ours. Even if this does not happen, then, fighting desperately, we, perhaps, will sink several enemy battleships or cruisers, and thus, even at the cost of our own death, we will facilitate the work of the 2nd Pacific squadron, coming to our rescue.
8) During the exit, take with you all the destroyers capable of going to sea, even those that cannot go to Vladivostok. Such destroyers must fight, supporting the squadron, attack Japanese ships at night, and then return to Port Arthur (V.K. Vitgeft took with him only those destroyers that could pass to Vladivostok).
The above plan has a huge number of “bottlenecks” and it’s far from the fact that all of the above would lead the 1 Pacific Squadron to some kind of success. But if Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft received such an order, he simply would have no choice. In the 28 battle of July 1904, he found himself in a very difficult situation precisely because he was charged with the unconditional duty to break through to Vladivostok, and by no means engage in a desperate battle (which he did not want to join in any way). And therefore it is completely understandable why, before the start of the 2 phase, he rejected the proposals of his staff to engage in a decisive battle: the chances of success in such a battle were scanty, but there was no hope of a subsequent breakthrough at all. And from the point of view of accomplishing the task (breakthrough), the tactics of V.K. Vitgefta looked optimal: taking advantage of her tactical advantage, try to knock out her head Mikas and hold out until dark.
But if the Russian Rear Admiral had the order: if it was impossible to evade the battle with the main forces of the enemy, abandon the breakthrough and give a decisive battle with the subsequent departure to Arthur, then he could hardly reject the proposals of his staff. And what could have happened then?
Most likely, the 1 phase of the battle would have proceeded unchanged - while the Japanese were рез frolicking ’at 50-70 kb, it was not possible to get close to them, so VK It only remained for Witgeft to go forward with the expectation of some Japanese mistake. But then, if after the resumption of the battle
Witgeft would give full speed and, slightly speeding away, ordered “all of a sudden”, attacking the enemy in front-line formation,
then X. Togo would have very little time to make a decision, and it’s far from the fact that he would choose the only right thing - the turn "all suddenly" from the Russian squadron. And all the more not the fact that even if Heyhatiro Togo made such a decision, the 1-nd combat squad would manage to carry it out.
To calculate the consequences of this maneuver is very difficult, and we will not describe it in detail, but simply make a number of assumptions. Suppose the Russians acted as described above, and the cruisers with the destroyers, seizing the moment, were able to attack the Japanese with torpedoes. Suppose the Russians were lucky, and the oldest Japanese battleship of the 1 squad "Fuji" received one or two torpedo hits, but did not die and was able to drag it to the parking lot of Elliot. Suppose also that due to the fire impact of the Japanese (and the number of hits to the Russian battleships would obviously have increased), the Russians lost the Peresvet (the battleship most affected in that battle), the cruiser Askold and part of the destroyers sunk. What's next?
The Russian squadron is returning to Port Arthur, but now all ships are going there - the order “THE STATE IMPERATOR has commanded to follow to Vladivostok” no longer dominates the commanders, and therefore the “Tsarevich”, “Diana”, and “Novik” and other ships return with the squadron. As you know, already 20 August Russian ships were repaired and technically ready for a new attempt to breakthrough. Of course, it must be assumed that 1 Pacific due to descent from the Japanese fleet would suffer more damage, but if the squadron intended to urgently go to sea again, there would be no sending of many sailors to land and they could have significantly speed up repairs. The Japanese artillery could not prevent the Russians from being repaired - the problems of the Russian ships began only in November, when the Japanese managed to use the 280-mm siege artillery, but this was still far away. Thus, roughly on August 20, the Russian squadron could take a chance and go for a second breakthrough.
In this case, Fuji could no longer block its way - it would either have stood in the caissons of Elliot, or would have been somewhere in the Kure shipyards, but clearly not in service. And the rest of the 3 Japanese battleships in the 28 battle of July from the regular 12 305-mm guns failed five (most likely from ruptures of their own projectiles inside the barrel). So they would have to stop 5 Russian battleships (minus the Peresvet), having only 7 guns of such caliber. With all due respect to the mastery of the Japanese artillerymen, it is extremely doubtful that with such forces they could inflict decisive damage to the Russian ships and stop their breakthrough to Vladivostok.
In addition to all of the above, something else suggests itself, namely, understanding that part of the Russian ships (such as Sevastopol and Poltava), most likely, will not be able to reach Vladivostok due to lack of coal, it would be possible to try in advance to bring several coal miners under neutral flags to the neutral port (yes, the same Qingdao) so that after the battle they would be able to replenish coal reserves.
Of course, all of the above doesn’t look like a panacea for all ills at all - the same Japanese destroyers and the numerous minefields on Arthur’s outer raid could at any time “correct” the composition of the Russian squadron. And yet ... perhaps, only a decisive battle with the Japanese fleet, the quick repair of ships in Arthur and the exit to a repeated breakthrough gave the 1 Pacific Fleet the greatest chance of breaking through at least part of the forces in Vladivostok, causing the maximum trouble for the United Fleet.
Thank you for attention!
END
List of used literature:
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5. V. Polomoshnov “Fight 28 July 1904 (the battle in the Yellow Sea (the battle at Cape Shantung))”
6. V.B. Mujenikov "Battleships type" Kaiser ""
7. V. Maltsev, “On the Question of Accuracy of Shooting in the Russian-Japanese War” Part I-IV
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11 V.Y. Gribovsky. Russian Pacific Fleet. 1898-1905. History of creation and death.
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16. R.M. Melnyk "Tsarevich" Part of 1. 1899-1906 squadron battleship
17. PM Melnikov The Bayan armored cruiser (1897-1904)
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25. Surgical and medical description of the sea war between Japan and Russia. - Medical Bureau of Maritime department in Tokyo.
As well as many documents published on the website http://tsushima.su in the sections:
- Fleet actions. The period of command of Vice-Admiral Stark
- Fleet actions. The period of command of Vice-Admiral Makarov
- Fleet actions. The period of direct command of the Vicar E.I.V. 2-22 April 1904
- Fleet actions. The period of command of Rear Admiral Witgeft (June 11 - July 28 1904)
- Fleet actions. Fight in the Yellow Sea 28.07.1904. Damage to the Russian ships
Information