Military Review

Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 14. Little alternative

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The long 13 articles of this series, we understood the descriptions of the battle of July 28 and the events preceding it, which are historical part of this work. We studied the facts and looked for explanations for them, identified causal relationships in an attempt to understand - why did this happen, and nothing else? And now the thirteenth, final article of the series, which is brought to your attention, is devoted not to facts, but to unrealized opportunities that can be described by the question: “What would happen if ...?”

Of course, this is already an alternative story, and everyone who is jarred by this phrase, I ask you to refrain from further reading. Because below we will try to find answers to questions about what could happen if:
1) V.K. Vitgeft accepted the offer of Matusevich and sent the low-speed Poltava and Sevastopol to Bitszyo as the squadron sailed to the sea, while he himself would have gone on a breakthrough with only four of the fastest armadillos.
2) After the 1-o phase, when VK Witgeft separated Poltava and Sevastopol from the squadron and sent them to Port Arthur or neutral ports, and he would develop full speed and go for a breakthrough with the rest of the squadron.
3) V.K. In the 2 phase of the battle, Vitgeft made an energetic maneuver close to the Japanese who were catching up on a pistol shot, and perhaps arrange a landfill with their 1 battle squad.
In addition, in this article we will try to determine the best way to use the 1 Pacific squadron in its condition, in which it was 28 July 1904 g.

It is well known that the squadron speed of the Russian battleships was inferior to that of the Japanese. The main reason for this was two "slow moving" - "Sevastopol" and "Poltava", barely capable of giving 12-13 nodes all the time, while the other four battleships V.K. In this parameter, Witgefta approximately corresponded to the Japanese ships of the 1 combat detachment. And therefore, it is not surprising that a number of officers of the 1 Pacific squadron and many analysts of later times considered it necessary to divide the squadron into “fast” and “slow” squads, which should have increased the chances of a breakthrough of the “high-speed” wing to Vladivostok. But is it really?

Consider the first option. The Russian squadron in full force goes to sea, but then it is divided. Only high-speed ships go for a breakthrough, and Sevastopol and Poltava, along with gunboats and the part of the destroyers of the 2 squad that was able to go into battle, are sent to the “assault” of the Japanese landing site in Bitszyo. Bitszyvo’s defense is a priority for the Japanese, but if the main forces of Heyhatiro Togo first attack the “slow-moving” Russian detachment and smash it, they will not have time to catch up with the main Russian forces.

This option is certainly interesting, but alas, it hardly had any hope of success. The Russians completely lost control of the sea and did not even control the external raid, so that the Japanese learned about the squadron leaving before the battleships of Port Arthur set in motion - from the thick smoke from the pipes that arose during the preparation of the boilers “for the campaign and battle”, which was done when the ship was anchored. In addition, Heihatiro Togo had many cruisers, destroyers and other ships capable of reconnaissance, and there is no doubt that by the time the Russian squadron entered the external raid, it was observed from many ships and from all sides. This is exactly what happened during the Russian exit to the breakthrough on July 28, 1904. Given the fact that the ships of the United fleet they had very reliable radio stations about any actions of Russians Heihatiro Togo knew almost at the very moment when these actions were taken.

Interestingly, when sending a "low-speed" detachment to Bitszyvo V.K. In no way should Witgeft impede Japanese intelligence — on the contrary! X. Togo must have received information that the Russian squadron was divided, otherwise the whole idea would lose its meaning - in order for the Japanese to “peck” on the bait, they had to know about it. In case H. Togo for some reason, instead of “catching” Sevastopol with Poltava, went to intercept a high-speed wing, he would have excellent chances to crush Tsesarevich, Retvizan, ” Victory and Peresvet. In this case, no breakthrough to Vladivostok would have taken place, and the attack of Bitszyvo (even if successful) became an extremely weak consolation for the Russians.

Thus, it was impossible and impossible to prevent Japanese intelligence, but ... we put ourselves in the place of H. Togo. Here is a radiogram in front of him on the table that the Russians divided their squadron into the 2 squadron, indicating the composition of these squads and their courses. What prevented the Japanese commander from separating his own forces now so as to leave a detachment of sufficient numbers to defend Bitszyo, and rush after the “high-speed wing” of the Russian squadron with the rest of the ships?

On the route of Sevastopol and Poltava to Bitszyvo, on the morning of July 28 there were ships of the 5 military detachment, but not only they, the Matsushima and Hasidat were stationed not far from Arthur, a little further (at the Far) Chiyoda and Chin-Yen, while Bitszyvo's direct cover was carried out by Asama, Itsukushima and Izumi. This, of course, would not be enough to stop the two old, but strong Russian battleships, but who would have prevented Heyhatiro Togo from strengthening these ships with one of their battleships - Fuji? In this case, to counteract the Russian detachment, the Japanese would have 1 relatively modern and one old battleships (Fuji and Chin-Yen) modern armored cruiser (Asama) and 5 of old armored cruisers (although strictly speaking, Chiyoda "Formally could be considered armored, as it had an armor belt), not counting other ships. In addition, Heyhatiro Togo could also send Yakumo to Bitszyvo - although he was at Port Arthur, he could well catch up with Sevastopol and Poltava and join the battle when the latter began the battle with Fuji. These forces would be quite enough to prevent the Russian detachment from approaching Bitszyvo.

At the same time, in order to catch up with the main Russian forces, the Japanese commander still had three battleships and two armored cruisers ("Kasuga" and "Nissin"). Given the actual results of the 28 battle of July, 1904 of these ships would have been more than enough for the Tsarevich, Retvizan, Victory, and Peresvet.



In no case should we forget that with the departure of "Sevastopol" and "Poltava" the Russian squadron significantly lost in its combat power, since it was on these ships that the best artillery of the squadron served. It was these ships that showed the best results in 1903 g shooting, and they surpassed the Retvizan following X-NUMX-1,65 by the sum of points scored, while Peresvet and Victory turned out to be even worse than Retvizan. As for the "Cesarevich", this battleship came to Port Arthur at the very last moment before the war, when the other squadron ships got into reserve, so that before the start of the war he could not have any serious training. Even after its start, the torpedo hit and long-term repairs did not allow the commanders to receive full training, why many in the squadron considered his crew to be the worst in training compared to other battleships.

It may not be entirely correct to say that without the “Sevastopol” and “Poltava” armored squadrons of the 1-nd Pacific Squadron lost half of its combat power, but such an assessment is very close to the truth. At the same time, the 1 combat detachment of the Japanese without Fuji and on the condition of non-alignment Yakumo in the second phase lost a quarter of the artillery that participated in the battle, which X. Togo actually had in 28 in July 1904. Thus, the consequences the divisions of the 1 Pacific squadron into the 2 squadron, one of which would attack Bitszyvo, could lead to more heavy casualties than the 1 Pacific squadron incurred with an actual breakthrough attempt.

According to the second variant, the Russian ships go for a joint breakthrough, as it happened in the 28 battle of July, but at the moment when, as a result of X. Togo’s maneuvers, the Japanese 1 combat unit ended up as the stern of the Pacific Squadron and the distance between the opponents reached 1 miles, V.K. Vitgeft gives the order to “Sevastopol” and “Poltava” to return to Port Arthur, and he, with the rest of the ships, increases the speed to 10 bonds and goes for a breakthrough.

It would be a very realistic option, but he promised success only if the battleships V.K. Witgefta was able to maintain at least a fifteen-node speed for a long time (in days), and the Japanese could not go faster. Usually, the squadron speed of the 1 combat detachment X. Togo did not exceed the 14-15 nodes, and although there are references to 16 bonds, they are quite controversial (it is difficult to estimate the speed from the Russian ships to the node). if such a speed has developed, then only for a short time. Accordingly, even if the Japanese, waving a hand at Sevastopol and Poltava, would rush behind the main forces of V.K. Witgefta, they could only catch up to them in the late evening, and X. Togo simply wouldn’t have time to inflict decisive damage on Russian ships. After that, the 1 th Japanese combat detachment could only go to the Korean Strait, but if the Russians had really demonstrated the ability to support 15 nodes around the clock, it’s not a fact that the Japanese would have managed to intercept them even there.

But could the four most modern Russian battleships have been able to support 15 nodes for a long time? To answer this question is very difficult. According to passport data, such an opportunity, of course, was. In addition, it is known that Peresvet in 1903 r, not too troubling machine commands and not forcing machines, kept 36 node speed for 15,7 hours (battleship races on the route Nagasaki-Port Arthur). There could be enough coal to Vladivostok for the battleships: in the 1 phase of the battle, the battleship tubes did not have too serious damage that could cause excessive consumption of coal. It is also not known what happened to the “Retvizan”, which received an underwater hole shortly before the breakthrough, it was impossible to patch a similar hole, and the ship went into battle with water inside the hull - only reinforced bulkheads held it, but with increasing reinforcement speed they could pass, causing extensive shipwrecks. On the other hand, on the fact of the 28 battle of July, 1904 G didn’t do anything of the kind, but the XTNUMX didn’t develop the nodes during the breakout either. Nevertheless, knowing the entire history of the battle, in retrospect it can be assumed that the bulkheads of the battleship would have sustained such speed.

With some probability this option could really lead to the breakthrough of a part of the squadron in Vladivostok. But neither V.K. Witgeft and no one else at that particular moment in the July 28 battle could not have known about it.

From the very exit of the squadron, when trying to develop more than 13 nodes on the battleships, something broke, which made it necessary to slow down and wait until Victory (once) and Tsarevich (twice) would fix the damage and enter service. In order to maintain such a high speed constantly, well-trained firemen are required, and they were once such, but long “holidays”, when the squadron practically did not go to sea since November 1903, (except for the period of command of S.O. Makarov ), did not contribute to the maintenance of appropriate qualification of machine commands. It should also be taken into account that the coal in Port Arthur was not good and clearly worse than the Japanese could have (and actually had). No one knew what would happen to the Retvizan if it went on for a long time on 15 nodes. But most importantly, none of the Russian officers had any idea what the maximum speed of the squadron could be developed by the Japanese fleet.

Knowing the history of the Russian-Japanese war at sea, we can assume (although we don’t know for sure) that the Japanese hardly walked faster than the 15 nodes. But the sailors of the 1 Pacific Pacific Squadron understood only that their coal was worse in quality, the firemen were less well trained, and the Japanese ships appeared to be in better technical condition. From this it was irrefutable that the Japanese, in any case, would be able to go faster than the Russians, and throwing two battleships (especially the best squadron shooters) almost to certain death in order to delay the resumption of the battle could not be considered good. an idea. Thus, it can be argued that this option, if it was realistic, could not be recognized as such on the basis of the data that Russian officers had during the battle.

In discussions on the topic of the July 28 battle, such a plan sometimes came up - in the interval between the 1 and 2 phases, send Poltava and Sevastopol not to Port Arthur, but to attack Bitszyo, and here- then the Japanese would have to fall behind the Russian squadron and rush to defend the landing site! Alas, as we have already seen, no one prevented the Japanese from allocating a detachment sufficient to fend off this threat — and to continue the pursuit of the Russian squadron by superior forces. Moreover, it was enough for the Japanese 1 combat detachment, continuing the pursuit of the main forces of the Russian squadron, to disperse from two old Russian battleships at a short distance on countercourses, and the latter would receive very strong damage, after which the attack Bitszyo would be extremely doubtful. And then to say - such an attack would have some chances if it were supported by light ships, such as gunboats and destroyers, but what would two damaged Russian battleships do at night (before they could not reach Bitsvoe) in waters where there were a lot of mines fields and destroyers of the enemy?

And finally, the third option. When the Japanese caught up with the Russian squadron (tentatively at 16.30) and the battle resumed, the 1 th combat squadron of Kheykhatiro Togo was in a very disadvantageous tactical position - he was forced to catch up with Russian ships, passing along the column of battleships VK. Witgefta and gradually reducing the distance, thereby allowing the Russians to concentrate the fire on their heads. What would happen if at that moment the Russian admiral would turn “all at once” or did another maneuver and rush at the Japanese at full speed?

In order to try to imagine what the attempt to get close to the Japanese at the distance of the pistol shot would lead to, you should try to deal with the effectiveness of the Russian and Japanese fire at different stages of the battle. In total, the 28 phases in the 2 battle of July are approximately equal in time (generally speaking, the 1 phase lasted longer, but there was a break when the parties did not engage in artillery fighting - given the interruption, the fire exposure time in 1 and 2 phase is comparable). But the battle in the 2 phase proceeded at a much smaller distance, because H. Togo "went into the clinch" to beat the Russians before dark. Therefore, all other things being equal, it was to be expected that during the 2 phase, both the Japanese and Russian battleships would receive far more hits than the first.

We have already written about the effectiveness of the fire of the parties in the first part of the battle: for example, the Japanese achieved 19 hits with large-caliber shells, including 18 305-mm caliber and one 254-mm. In addition, the Russian ships received approximately 16 shells of other, smaller calibers. In the second phase, the number of hits to the Russian battleships has increased as expected - they received 46 large-caliber hits (10-12 dm) and 68 hits with other calibers. Thus, as a result of reducing the combat distance from 50-70 kb in the first phase to 20-40 kb in the second phase, the effectiveness of firing Japanese commander large-caliber guns increased almost two and a half times, and other calibers - more than four times!

Alas, the Russian battleships do not demonstrate a similar increase in efficiency. If in the 1 phase of the 8 heavy (6 - 305-mm and 2 - 254-mm) and 2 smaller caliber shells hit the Japanese ships, in the second phase the Japanese ships also hit 7 heavy and 15-16 shells of a smaller caliber considering 2 hits from the cruiser “Askold” made by him during the breakthrough, that is, at the end of the battle of the armored units).

Interestingly, the loss of the system shortly after the death of V.K. Witgefta almost did not affect the accuracy of Russian fire - from 7 heavy shells that hit the Japanese ships in the 2-nd phase of the battle, three found their goal after these unfortunate events.

And yet, if during the first phase of the battle on 1 hit Russian heavy projectile (254-305-mm) accounted for 2,37 Japanese, then in the second phase on the 1 the same hit the Japanese answered already 6,57 projectiles! Two, in general, the random hits of Russian six-inch shells in the 1 phase are not sufficient for statistics, but in the 2 phase, Japanese commandants of medium and small-caliber artillery provided 4,25-4,5 times more hits than their Russian counterparts.

Despite the numerous testimonies of Russian officers, that while reducing the distance, the Japanese began to get nervous and shoot worse, the analysis of the hits of the parties does not confirm this. With the fall of the distance, the quality of the Japanese shooting increased significantly, but the heavy guns of the Russian battleships could not boast of such and even reduced their effectiveness (7 hits against 8 in the 1 phase). In any case, at relatively short distances of the 2 phase of the battle, the Japanese achieved a 4,5-5 multiple superiority over the Russian ships. And this is taking into account the tactically losing position in which the Japanese have been for a long time! In addition, one should never forget that the most severe damage to the battleships could have been caused only by 254-305-mm caliber shells, and here the Japanese achieved absolute superiority in the 2 phase - 46 hits against 7.


Hole under the right 152-mm gun of the squadron battleship Peresvet, obtained during the battle in the Yellow Sea

Thus, it can be stated that a close distance over short distances could hardly bring Russians luck - with the reduction of the distance, the superiority of the Japanese in firepower only grew. And this meant that an attempt to get close to the Japanese could not have contributed to the breakthrough of the squadron in Vladivostok - one would have expected much more damage than the battleships of V.K. Witgefta got in reality.

And yet ... The Russian squadron in the 2 phase of the battle had one advantage. It could not help break through to Vladivostok or win the battle, but at least it gave some chances to inflict sensitive losses on the Japanese.

The fact is that Kheihatiro Togo chose to “encircle” the Russian squadron with its cruisers and destroyers - the detachments of these ships really tried to stay in the distance around the ships of V.K. Witgefta, and this was his reason - no Russian’s most abrupt and unexpected maneuver would have allowed them to go beyond the visibility of Japanese high-speed reconnaissance. But such a tactic had its drawbacks, which consisted in the fact that the main forces of the Japanese did not accompany either the cruiser or the destroyers. But the Russian commander, leading the ships to break, and the cruisers and destroyers were available, and in close proximity.

An attempt to bring the 1 Pacific squadron battleships closer to the main forces of X. Togo for the artillery duel did not promise anything good for the Russians, but if the armored squadrons converged on 7-10 cables or even closer, the Russian cruisers and destroyers attempted to fight for fighting forces at that moment. torpedoes - this was probably the only chance. And besides ...

Partly so low accuracy of the shooting of Russian ships in the 2 phase of the battle can be explained by the instruction of V.К. It was extremely difficult for Vitgefta to shoot at Mikas, which made the latter hide in the midst of water pillars from falling projectiles. Therefore, we can assume that if the Russian battleships would rush against the Japanese and, in this case, everyone would choose the best goal for themselves, then our gunners would be able to achieve a slightly higher number of hits than happened in reality. It also cannot be ruled out that for some time it would have been difficult for the Japanese to direct guns at Russian ships moving in counter-moves, as happened with Retvisan when it rushed into the attack on the Japanese system. The Japanese were indeed worse shot at countercourses, and this gave additional chances for the battleships (not to get excessive damage when approaching), and for cruisers and destroyers going into a torpedo attack ...

Here are just go to such actions VK. Witgeft could not - he was tasked with breaking into a squadron in Vladivostok, and he was obliged to carry it out, and trying to arrange a dump with a dashing mine attack didn’t help in accomplishing the task - it was clear that when a squadron was closer to the Japanese very heavy and disruptive damage.

All of the above allows us to determine the optimal strategy for the 1 Pacific Pacific Squadron. She was inferior to the enemy literally in everything, and even the advantage in heavy weapons was leveled by poor training of the gunners. Still, she had one single advantage — Port Arthur’s ship repair facilities were significantly superior to what the Japanese had at their flying base near Eliot Islands, and the Russians could well try to “play” at this advantage.

Suppose that the order for a breakthrough to Vladivostok, which was received by V.K. Witgeft would have been put together like this:

1) The 1 Pacific squadron is to go to sea, and the goal of its exit will be determined by the actions of the enemy.

2) In case, for any reason, the squadron is not intercepted by the main forces of the Japanese fleet, it must proceed to Vladivostok.

3) If the main forces of the Japanese nevertheless impose battle, the squadron must without regret abandon the breakthrough to Vladivostok and enter into a decisive battle with the Japanese fleet. In battle, the battleships' task is to, after waiting for a convenient moment, get close to the enemy, or even completely mix up the line, trying to use not only artillery, but also torpedoes and ram. The task of cruisers and destroyers, hiding behind time for the battleships, at the right time to decisively attack enemy armored ships with torpedoes.

4) After the battle, the squadron should retreat to Port Arthur and fix the damage that would prevent a breakthrough to Vladivostok as soon as possible, and then, without delaying a single day, make another attempt at a breakthrough. If a ship receives such damage to the underwater part, which cannot be repaired without long-term repairs, it should be left in Port Arthur.

5) In an open battle against all the strength of the Japanese fleet, the 1 Pacific squadron is unlikely to find enough strength to push back the enemy and pave the road to Vladivostok. But if they succeed in destroying or at least damaging several enemy ships with torpedoes, they will no longer be able to participate in the battle when re-entering.

6) If, even when re-entering, the enemy can block the squadron with equal or superior forces, then again, not striving to go to Vladivostok, give him a decisive battle, and then retreat to Port Arthur, and after repairing, make a new attempt to break through.

7) In such battles, we will have an advantage at the expense of the ship-repair capabilities of Port Arthur, which are far superior to those of the Japanese on their flying base. And even if our damage will be stronger, but we will be able to return ships to the system faster than it is available to the Japanese, so if not from the first, then the second time, the advantage in large ships may be behind us. Even if this does not happen, then, desperately fighting, we may sink several enemy battleships or cruisers and, even at the cost of our own death, facilitate the 2 th Pacific Squadron, which is coming to our rescue.

8) During the exit, take with you all the destroyers capable of going to sea, even those who cannot go to Vladivostok. Such destroyers must fight, supporting the squadron, attack the Japanese ships at night, and then return to Port Arthur (V.K. Vitgeft took only those destroyers that could pass to Vladivostok).

The above plan has a huge number of “bottlenecks” and it’s far from the fact that all of the above would lead the 1 Pacific Squadron to some kind of success. But if Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft received such an order, he simply would have no choice. In the 28 battle of July 1904, he found himself in a very difficult situation precisely because he was charged with the unconditional duty to break through to Vladivostok, and by no means engage in a desperate battle (which he did not want to join in any way). And therefore it is completely understandable why, before the start of the 2 phase, he rejected the proposals of his staff to engage in a decisive battle: the chances of success in such a battle were scanty, but there was no hope of a subsequent breakthrough at all. And from the point of view of accomplishing the task (breakthrough), the tactics of V.K. Vitgefta looked optimal: taking advantage of her tactical advantage, try to knock out her head Mikas and hold out until dark.

But if the Russian Rear Admiral had the order: if it was impossible to evade the battle with the main forces of the enemy, abandon the breakthrough and give a decisive battle with the subsequent departure to Arthur, then he could hardly reject the proposals of his staff. And what could have happened then?

Most likely, the 1 phase of the battle would have proceeded unchanged - while the Japanese were рез frolicking ’at 50-70 kb, it was not possible to get close to them, so VK It only remained for Witgeft to go forward with the expectation of some Japanese mistake. But then, if after the resumption of the battle

Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 14. Little alternative


Witgeft would give full speed and, slightly speeding away, ordered “all of a sudden”, attacking the enemy in front-line formation,



then X. Togo would have very little time to make a decision, and it’s far from the fact that he would choose the only right thing - the turn "all suddenly" from the Russian squadron. And all the more not the fact that even if Heyhatiro Togo made such a decision, the 1-nd combat squad would manage to carry it out.

To calculate the consequences of this maneuver is very difficult, and we will not describe it in detail, but simply make a number of assumptions. Suppose the Russians acted as described above, and the cruisers with the destroyers, seizing the moment, were able to attack the Japanese with torpedoes. Suppose the Russians were lucky, and the oldest Japanese battleship of the 1 squad "Fuji" received one or two torpedo hits, but did not die and was able to drag it to the parking lot of Elliot. Suppose also that due to the fire impact of the Japanese (and the number of hits to the Russian battleships would obviously have increased), the Russians lost the Peresvet (the battleship most affected in that battle), the cruiser Askold and part of the destroyers sunk. What's next?

The Russian squadron is returning to Port Arthur, but now all ships are going there - the order “THE STATE IMPERATOR has commanded to follow to Vladivostok” no longer dominates the commanders, and therefore the “Tsarevich”, “Diana”, and “Novik” and other ships return with the squadron. As you know, already 20 August Russian ships were repaired and technically ready for a new attempt to breakthrough. Of course, it must be assumed that 1 Pacific due to descent from the Japanese fleet would suffer more damage, but if the squadron intended to urgently go to sea again, there would be no sending of many sailors to land and they could have significantly speed up repairs. The Japanese artillery could not prevent the Russians from being repaired - the problems of the Russian ships began only in November, when the Japanese managed to use the 280-mm siege artillery, but this was still far away. Thus, roughly on August 20, the Russian squadron could take a chance and go for a second breakthrough.

In this case, Fuji could no longer block its way - it would either have stood in the caissons of Elliot, or would have been somewhere in the Kure shipyards, but clearly not in service. And the rest of the 3 Japanese battleships in the 28 battle of July from the regular 12 305-mm guns failed five (most likely from ruptures of their own projectiles inside the barrel). So they would have to stop 5 Russian battleships (minus the Peresvet), having only 7 guns of such caliber. With all due respect to the mastery of the Japanese artillerymen, it is extremely doubtful that with such forces they could inflict decisive damage to the Russian ships and stop their breakthrough to Vladivostok.

In addition to all of the above, something else suggests itself, namely, understanding that part of the Russian ships (such as Sevastopol and Poltava), most likely, will not be able to reach Vladivostok due to lack of coal, it would be possible to try in advance to bring several coal miners under neutral flags to the neutral port (yes, the same Qingdao) so that after the battle they would be able to replenish coal reserves.
Of course, all of the above doesn’t look like a panacea for all ills at all - the same Japanese destroyers and the numerous minefields on Arthur’s outer raid could at any time “correct” the composition of the Russian squadron. And yet ... perhaps, only a decisive battle with the Japanese fleet, the quick repair of ships in Arthur and the exit to a repeated breakthrough gave the 1 Pacific Fleet the greatest chance of breaking through at least part of the forces in Vladivostok, causing the maximum trouble for the United Fleet.

Thank you for attention!

END

List of used literature:
1. A.A. Belov. "Armadillos of Japan".
2. A.S. Alexandrov, S.A. Balakin. "Asama" and others. Japanese armored cruisers programs 1895-1896.
3. Artillery and armor in the Russian-Japanese war. Nauticus, 1906.
4. A.Yu.Emelin “Novik cruiser II rank”
5. V. Polomoshnov “Fight 28 July 1904 (the battle in the Yellow Sea (the battle at Cape Shantung))”
6. V.B. Mujenikov "Battleships type" Kaiser ""
7. V. Maltsev, “On the Question of Accuracy of Shooting in the Russian-Japanese War” Part I-IV
8. V.N. Cherkasov “Notes of the artillery officer of the battleship Peresvet”
9. V.Krestyaninov, S.Molodtsov "Armadillos of type" Peresvet ". “Heroic Tragedy” ”
10. V.Yu. Gribovsky "Tsesarevich in battle 28 July 1904 g"
11 V.Y. Gribovsky. Russian Pacific Fleet. 1898-1905. History of creation and death.
12. V.Ya.Krestyaninov, S.V. Molodtsov "Cruiser" Askold "
13. V.Ya. Peasants "Sea Mine War at Port Arthur"
14. V.Maltsev "On the issue of shooting accuracy in the Russian-Japanese" P III-IV.
15. R.M. Melnikov "Squadron battleships like" Peresvet ""
16. R.M. Melnyk "Tsarevich" Part of 1. 1899-1906 squadron battleship
17. PM Melnikov The Bayan armored cruiser (1897-1904)
18. Analysis of the battle 28 July 1904 of the year and the study of the causes of failure of the actions of the 1 th Pacific Squadron / Sea collection, 1917, №3, neof. otd. with. 1 - 44.
19. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 Fleet actions. Documents. Division III 1 Pacific squadron. Book One. Actions on the southern maritime theater of war. Release 6 th. Fight 28 July 1904 g
20. S.A. Balakin. Battleship Retvizan.
21. S.V. Suliga "squadron battleships of the type" Poltava "
22. S.A. Balakin. "Mikasa" and others. Japanese battleships 1897 — 1905's. // Maritime collection. 2004. No.8.
23. Top Secret History of the Russo-Japanese War at Sea in 37-38 Meiji / MGS Japan.
24. Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 Meiji / Maritime General Headquarters in Tokyo.
25. Surgical and medical description of the sea war between Japan and Russia. - Medical Bureau of Maritime department in Tokyo.
As well as many documents published on the website http://tsushima.su in the sections:
- Fleet actions. The period of command of Vice-Admiral Stark
- Fleet actions. The period of command of Vice-Admiral Makarov
- Fleet actions. The period of direct command of the Vicar E.I.V. 2-22 April 1904
- Fleet actions. The period of command of Rear Admiral Witgeft (June 11 - July 28 1904)
- Fleet actions. Fight in the Yellow Sea 28.07.1904. Damage to the Russian ships
Author:
Articles from this series:
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 1: Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft and Kheyhatiro Togo
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 2. Squadron received by V.K. Vitgeft
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 3: V.K. Witgeft takes command
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 4. Armadillos in the ranks, or altercations about the fate of the squadron
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 5. Last preparations
The battle in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part 6: The beginning of the battle The battle in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. The part 6: The beginning of the battle
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 7: The amazing maneuvers of the Japanese admiral
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 8. Finishing the 1 phase
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 9. Respite and resumption of combat
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 10. The death of V.K. Vitgefta
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 11. Was there a panic?
Fight in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part 12: Prince Ukhtomsky's retreat
The battle in the Yellow Sea 28 July 1904 g. Part of 13: The sun was set to sunset
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  1. V.ic
    V.ic 26 January 2017 08: 31
    +5
    The Russian fleet was not ready to defeat Togo! Unfortunately, the history of the subjunctive mood does not have ...
    1. Cat
      Cat 26 January 2017 11: 38
      +2
      Just many thanks to the Author!
    2. co-creator
      co-creator 26 January 2017 13: 31
      0
      There is no win, but he could break through the main forces. If not to Vladivostok, then to the East China Sea for sure.
      1. Diana Ilyina
        Diana Ilyina 26 January 2017 13: 53
        +11
        With all due respect to the skill of the Japanese gunners, it is extremely doubtful that with such forces they would be able to inflict decisive damage to Russian ships and stop their breakthrough to Vladivostok.
        Many thanks to the author for the wonderful cycle. As for the above phrase, a breakthrough would be possible under the condition that the squadron be commanded by Makarov or Essen, but he couldn’t hold out by rank. In general, in my opinion, the Russo-Japanese War was lost for three main reasons.
        1. This is the technical backwardness of the Russian Empire.
        2. This is the regime’s rottenness, theft, bribery and open betrayal.
        3. This is the absolute mediocrity of the entire high command, with the exception of Makarov at sea and Kondratenko on land! Mediocrity is still half the trouble, but here is open betrayal and sabotage, this is really a disaster!
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 26 January 2017 17: 13
          +4
          Quote: Diana Ilyina
          As for the above phrase, a breakthrough would be possible under the condition that the squadron be commanded by Makarov or Essen

          If Makarov commanded the squadron, then, I am afraid, the squadron might not have survived until the breakthrough. Stepan Osipovich had once flown to the aid of Bayan, ending up with two EDBs against six Japanese, after which he barely managed to retreat to the harbor ... to his death.
          Quote: Diana Ilyina
          3. This is the absolute mediocrity of the entire high command, with the exception of Makarov at sea and Kondratenko on land!

          I recommend asking how Admiral Makarov died. Neglect of staff work, inappropriateness at the post of commander of the squadron, arrogance, stereotyped actions - and the flagship EDB, obeying the orders of Makarov, goes straight to where the Japanese were waiting for him. More precisely - Japanese mines.
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          26 January 2017 17: 44
          0
          And thank you for the response! hi
        3. jumbo
          jumbo 26 January 2017 19: 10
          +1
          I would not want to agree with the opinion of Diana, but in short, perhaps the main reasons
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            26 January 2017 19: 18
            0
            Quote: Jumbo
            I would not want to agree with the opinion of Diana

            Well, I have a slightly different opinion, but I expressed it in 14 articles :))))
        4. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 26 January 2017 19: 17
          0
          Quote: Diana Ilyina
          As for the above phrase, a breakthrough would be possible under the condition that the squadron be commanded by Makarov or Essen, but he couldn’t hold out by rank.

          Madame, you are irresistible in the maritime industry love hi
      2. jumbo
        jumbo 26 January 2017 20: 08
        +1
        Diana, Tsesarevich, Novik broke through, Diana reached Saigon, Askold went to Shanghai ...
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 26 January 2017 21: 27
          0
          Fear God, my friend belay And the destroyers "Stormy", "Silent", "Fearless
          "," Merciless "? Well, the" Stormy "de facto did not return to Arthur, because on the stones of Cape Shantung ended his journey (we will write off the navigation error) hi
    3. Silvio
      Silvio 30 January 2017 13: 31
      0
      To be honest, they lacked the ability to defeat the Japanese, even in a power ratio of 1: 1. And our naval commanders were aware of this. The battle in the ZhM is not some non-typical case in the history of the Russian Navy. At naval theaters of 1MB, the same tendency is observed in a collision with large ships of the Germans - the so-called "Tsushima syndrome."
  2. Rotmistr
    Rotmistr 26 January 2017 08: 34
    +20
    Solid competent research
    Thanks to the author
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      26 January 2017 17: 43
      0
      And thank you for your kind words!
      1. Glory1974
        Glory1974 27 January 2017 01: 07
        0
        Thanks for the series of articles. I read it not only with interest, but also with pleasure. In the conclusions, I would like to hear your assessment of how the shooting of our commandors would affect the final result. In your articles, this slipped. But still, the tactical result and strategic.
  3. Schultz
    Schultz 26 January 2017 09: 33
    +7
    Decent analysis with an alternative look. One clarification on the situation at 16.30. (scheme No. 1) the distance between the wake columns of the battleships, cruiser-destroyers of the Russian squadron in KBT.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      26 January 2017 17: 32
      0
      Quote: Schultz
      Decent analysis with an alternative look.

      Thanks very nice to hear! hi
      Quote: Schultz
      One clarification on the situation at 16.30. (scheme No. 1) the distance between the wake columns of the battleships, cruiser-destroyers of the Russian squadron in KBT.

      According to my data, at 16.30 the distance between the battleships and the cruisers of the Russian squadron was 15-20 kbt. After the resumption of the battle (but not immediately, but between 16.35 and 16.50), the cruisers, having landed under the flights, turned 4 rumba to the left “all of a sudden” and increased the distance by another 15 kbt, after which they again went in parallel to the battleships course. As for the destroyers, I only know that before the increase in distance at 16.35-16.50 they went to the left of the cruisers.
  4. Army soldier2
    Army soldier2 26 January 2017 09: 51
    +9
    Thanks to the author for a wonderful series of articles. I read, as they say, "in one breath."
    However, do you overestimate the port repair capabilities of Port Arthur?
    But, all the same, great articles. For the sake of such articles I still go to VO. Thank! Write, do not stop there!
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      26 January 2017 17: 35
      +2
      Quote: Army 2
      Thanks to the author for the wonderful series of articles.

      Thank you for mastering :)))) Honestly, when I started to write, I did not expect such a collection of works by Vladimir Ilyich - I thought I could fit into 3-4 articles.
      Quote: Army 2
      However, do you overestimate the port repair capabilities of Port Arthur?

      Judge for yourself - the battleships of 1 TOE after the battle on July 28 were badly damaged, however, after three weeks they were ready to go on a breakthrough again. In my opinion this is a very good result, which the Japanese could hardly have achieved if they had repaired similar damage to about Elliot - there was practically nothing besides the floating workshops
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 26 January 2017 21: 31
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In my opinion, this is a very good result, which the Japanese could hardly have achieved if they had repaired similar damage to about Elliot - there was practically nothing besides the floating workshops

        Well, if (walk as an alternative, so walk fellow ) the Russians did not fall for the theory of close sea combat and did not lighten their shells in 12 "from 470 kg to 331 kg, as well as the few hits that the commandants of the 1st squadron achieved due to objective reasons (Wittgeft rule), the result would not be so deplorable what
  5. Cartalon
    Cartalon 26 January 2017 10: 01
    +10
    Thank you so much for this cycle, he dispelled many illusions about this battle, from childhood he believed that a couple of shells destroyed the squadron, now I see that only absolutely error-free actions of the Russians could lead to success.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      26 January 2017 17: 39
      0
      Quote: Cartalon
      Thank you so much for this cycle, he dispelled many illusions about this fight.

      Thank you too. I must note that for me personally at the time the dispelling of illusions turned out to be extremely unpleasant - since childhood I was sure that on July 28 we almost won and if not for the death of Vitgeft ... Alas, in fact, everything turned out to be completely wrong.
      1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Glory1974
      Glory1974 27 January 2017 00: 57
      +1
      dispelled many illusions about this battle, from childhood I thought that a couple of shells destroyed the squadron, now I see that only absolutely error-free actions of the Russians could lead to success.


      Once again I’m convinced that “you can’t do what you have done”. Combat training is the basis of success.
  6. avt
    avt 26 January 2017 10: 02
    +5
    Another last tale -
    And my record is over,
    Duty bequeathed to God
    To me, a sinner.
    laughing good I told Rurikovich, “Don’t worry, holidays, Andrei will be found and complete the cycle of his monograph.
    END
    Well, the end is not the end at all. The end is someone else's beginning " bully
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      26 January 2017 17: 39
      +1
      Quote: avt
      Another last tale -
      And my record is over,
      Duty bequeathed to God
      To me, a sinner.

      laughing good Not in the eyebrow but in the eye :))) Thank you!
    2. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 26 January 2017 19: 19
      +2
      Quote: avt
      I told Rurikovich, “Don’t worry, holidays, Andrei will be found and complete the cycle of his monograph.

      After reading in the morning I was incredibly happy !!! fellow Alas, the work is not late, because I could not express my joy to the last stroke ... what request
  7. Mooh
    Mooh 26 January 2017 11: 48
    +1
    Thanks Andrew. I almost despaired of waiting for the end. Please tell me, is this book on your paper or is there an electronic one?
    3. Artillery and armor in the Russian-Japanese war. Nauticus, 1906.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      26 January 2017 17: 41
      +1
      Quote: MooH
      Thanks Andrew

      And thank you!
      Quote: MooH
      Please tell me, is this book on your paper or is there an electronic one?

      I have only a translation (translated by art. Leith. Baron Wrangel) posted on tsushima here
      http://tsushima.su/RU/libru/i/Page_6/page_16/arti
      ll_i_dron_riw /
      scanned copy
  8. jumbo
    jumbo 26 January 2017 14: 22
    +1
    Thanks to the author, very informative. In my opinion, the author should continue this topic of Russian-Japanese ... Without Tsushima, it cannot be complete ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      26 January 2017 17: 43
      0
      Quote: Jumbo
      Thanks to the author, very informative.

      You're welcome!
      Quote: Jumbo
      Without Tsushima, it cannot be complete ...

      I’ve already laid out a small analysis (for several articles), but to make a publication similar to this one ... there’s not 14, here all 42 articles will be :)))
      1. jumbo
        jumbo 26 January 2017 20: 20
        +1
        very interesting ... but for myself I can’t find a definite answer why this happened, and yet, I don’t know why, but I'm interested in this period of history ...
  9. sergei1975
    sergei1975 26 January 2017 17: 03
    +1
    Interesting article.
  10. jumbo
    jumbo 26 January 2017 17: 17
    +1
    Quote: Jumbo
    Thanks to the author, very informative. In my opinion, the author should continue this topic of Russian-Japanese ... Without Tsushima, it cannot be complete ...
  11. jumbo
    jumbo 26 January 2017 17: 22
    +2
    I apologize, my comment was redundant, found the author’s thoughts and the Tsushima topic ...
  12. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 26 January 2017 19: 42
    0
    Greetings, namesake! fellow drinks hi
    For starters - chic good for the whole cycle yes
    With many conclusions, in principle, I agree what
    But I will personally express my opinion, which you probably already heard somewhere in the middle in an article about maneuvering before the second phase of the battle.
    At the moment when Witgeft began to turn a couple of points to the left of Togo, in order to increase the time it takes for the Japanese system to pass over the Russian because of the superior speed of the Japanese and the hope that our fire would harm the enemy, I personally would turn the other way round outgoing courses with the Japanese.
    Advantages:
    1. cross the course - Russian fire becomes impossible for Matelots behind Mikasa, and Russian fire is concentrated on the head of the Japanese.
    2. One must either move towards rapprochement (then the Russians "return") on unfavorable conditions.
    3. Either
    and. stop the move
    b. turn away under the tail of the Russians or even more to the right, which leads to a loss of time, which is what ours needs.
    4. In any case, we do not allow ourselves to be circumvented and reserve the advantage in choosing a position because of the need to catch up with Togo (the slower Russian squadron needs less time to maneuver, staying ahead of the Japanese)
    The problem of a breakthrough is not solved, but the problem of gaining time and position is being solved.
    Minus - under the fire end “Sevastopol" with "Poltava", but plus - achieving the result - stay in the dark request
    Personally, I would have done so. winked
    PS It’s not a dump with a turn “all of a sudden”, but a crossing “T” for the Japanese - time and position allowed yes . Cruisers with destroyers just had to move forward for the freedom of maneuver of the battleships
    With the possible evasion of the Japanese to the right, they simply lose time, while evading to the left and passing under the tail of the Russians, the maneuver is leveled by a lapel to the left with a subsequent “overhang” over the head of the Japanese. In any case, time is won, and already after dark a completely different story arises. yes
    PPS The advantage in speed of the Japanese is not so impressive as to get around the Russians yes
    My personal opinion, Andrei Nikolayevich drinks hi
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 January 2017 18: 48
      0
      Greetings namesake! hi drinks
      Quote: Rurikovich
      But I will personally express my opinion, which you probably already heard somewhere in the middle in an article about maneuvering before the second phase of the battle.

      Let's discuss! drinks Under beer yes on friday laughing
      Quote: Rurikovich
      personally, I would have turned the other way on the outgoing courses with the Japanese.

      Why not? Let's look at the implications of such a decision together. So, you are turning to the right ... and I, with your permission, having seated on Mikasa’s bridge and seeing your maneuver, I also turn right - one less than you.
      Bottom line - you are now moving along a large arc, and I - along a small arc. Mikasa will go on the traverse "Tsesarevich" earlier than in the Republic of Ingushetia. Ships of the Japanese who have not yet passed the turning point come off in Poltava or one of the other Russian terminal ones.
      Quote: Rurikovich
      With the possible evasion of the Japanese to the right, they simply lose time

      The fact of the matter is that in the described case they do not lose it, but win it - Mikasa appears on the Tsesarevich traverse earlier than in the Republic of Ingushetia. Rapprochement occurs at the same speed as in the Republic of Ingushetia, just the course is slightly different, to the right than in the Republic of Ingushetia. And where is the profit?
      Quote: Rurikovich
      My personal opinion, Andrei Nikolayevich

      That's wonderful. But let's see what comes of it! It’s possible, by the way, if you wish, to draw all this out on paper so that it is more visible! drinks
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 27 January 2017 19: 02
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Let's discuss! drinks Under the beer yes on Friday laughing

        No, I had a beer yesterday smile because today is a day off
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Bottom line - you are now moving along a large arc, and I - along a small arc. Mikasa will go on the traverse "Tsesarevich" earlier than in the Republic of Ingushetia. Ships of the Japanese who have not yet passed the turning point come off in Poltava or one of the other Russian terminal ones.

        Terminal end up anyway. request Do we have the task of starting a battle or getting to darkness according to ideas? wink You will not immediately react, but try to understand me and calculate the next steps. And if you turn right, then I will return to the previous course. You will again have to look for a solution on how to get around me, but you will still be behind. For 2-3 knots - this is not the speed that would quickly get around me request Anyway, I will be ahead for a while. Which is what I need.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But let's see what comes of it! It’s possible, by the way, if you wish, to draw all this out on paper so that it is more visible! drinks

        A little later, because now in the shower and put yourself in order smile
        But I hope that you caught my logic. Try to overtake me by car, if I constantly interfere. Minus, loss of terminal, but this was allowed when the task was achieved with the onset of night to hide request Something like this
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 27 January 2017 19: 37
          0
          Yes, and if you also turn when you return to the old course, you will find yourself in the immediate vicinity of the terminal armadillos, only not on the parallel ones, but breathing in the stern. You either have to overtake again at a distance (again, time), or go to the clinch with terminal ones, waiting for a possible destroyer attack in view of the relatively short distance due to these same terminal ships wink
  13. jumbo
    jumbo 26 January 2017 21: 30
    +1
    Quote: Jumbo
    Diana, Tsesarevich, Novik broke through, Diana reached Saigon, Askold went to Shanghai ...

    and what's good, everyone was interned, except for Novik, he accepted the heroic battle, like the Varangian ...
    1. jumbo
      jumbo 26 January 2017 21: 31
      +1
      Something is wrong here...
      1. jumbo
        jumbo 26 January 2017 21: 35
        +1
        some kind of disunity ...
    2. jumbo
      jumbo 26 January 2017 22: 13
      +1
      why didn’t they all go to Vladivostok? Of course, as they say on the spot, it’s more visible what and how, in terms of the situation, and people are literate, studied, and do not take up experience, they do not just become captains, qualifications and everything else ... But still, why did they choose to go to neutral ports ?
  14. marquis
    marquis 15 August 2018 15: 29
    0
    Thanks to the author for a great cycle!
    Also earlier he was of the opinion that the defeat was the result of the injury of the captain of the "Tsarevich". It seems that Stepanov's "Port Arthur" colorfully describes how Togo admitted defeat and was going to withdraw the ships for repairs when he saw the circulation of the Russian flagship.
    I’ll bring my 5 kopecks to an alternative story, how do you like the following scenarios:
    Variant 1. The Russians in the second phase of the battle after Mikasa reached the Tsesarevich's traverse (or even earlier) all of a sudden turn 8 points to the left and begin to move away from the Japanese in front formation. In this case, Togo would have to repeat this turn and pursue the Russians with the formation of the front, which, as indicated, gave the Russian squadron an advantage in the number of guns involved in the exchange of fire, and, in addition, reduced the likelihood of hitting for both sides, which again would be at hand Vitgeft. In the event that the Japanese tried to cross-T, they would have to bend around the Russian system in a wide arc and waste precious time, and, in addition, Vitgeft could in this case gradually continue to turn to the left, all the while keeping stern to the Japanese , or make another turn 8 points to the left and rebuild into a column. In this case, if the Japanese began to catch up with the Russian squadron, the sun and wind would work against them, or they would have to lose to get to the Russians from the right side, and then night would come ... In short, if Witgeft undertook active maneuvers in order to prevent the Japanese at close range, as well as to win a convenient position for shooting. It seems to me that from the point of view of making a decision, this option is quite realistic, since As Togo moved along the Russian system, Vitgeft could see the increased number of hits to the Japanese on the ships of his squadron and estimate that reducing the distance of the battle to the Russians was unprofitable.
    Option 2. Witgeft withdraws the squadron from Arthur in the evening and moves to the South-West, not allowing Togo to overtake him before dark. At night, the squadron heading for ... Bizzyvo and in the morning arranges a pogrom there, while Togo is looking for her on the way to the Strait of Korea. Then the ships return to Arthur and replenish coal reserves. (If Togo arrives in Bizzyvo, the Russians will most likely have time to retreat to Arthur, especially if the slow-moving armadillos are left at night not far from the harbor entrance) After a couple of days, the evening exit also follows, but this time the squadron really goes to the Korean Channel at night. More than likely, Togo would prefer to defend Bizzvo this time, and only the cruiser Kamimura would be in the Korean Channel. In my opinion, the implementation of this option was hindered by an exaggerated fear of night attacks by Japanese destroyers, which, as subsequent events showed, ships without fires, as a rule, lost.
    1. goga13
      goga13 April 6 2019 12: 06
      0
      Witgeft was supposed to go to Vladivostok in early June as planned. And he was not supposed to bring his entire headquarters up to perdition.