Wehrmacht paralysis
In early September, 1941, Hitler signed directive No. 35 on the transition of Army Group "Center" to the general offensive against Moscow (operation "Typhoon").
On September 29, Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Fedor von Bock held a meeting with army commanders and tank in groups. The troops were tasked with capturing Moscow by November 7, before the onset of winter. Von Bock promised Hitler that the Russian capital would fall by this date. The Battle of Moscow began on September 30 - the 2nd German Panzer Group attacked the troops of the Bryansk Front. On October 2, three German field armies (2nd, 4th and 9th), as well as two tank groups (3rd and 4th) launched an offensive on the positions of the Western and Reserve Fronts.
"The enemy is broken and will never rise again!"
These words, transmitted to German radio throughout the world, Hitler uttered 3 on October 1941 of the year in the Reichstag, announcing the first results of Typhoon. Indeed, the German attack on Moscow initially developed successfully: the Wehrmacht outnumbered the defending Soviet troops both in numbers (1 800 000 people against 1 250 000) and in military skill.
In the first days of the formation of the Army Group Center, they broke through the defenses of the three Soviet fronts and surrounded October 7 near Vyazma — connections and units of 16, 19, 20, 24 and 32 of the Western and Reserve Fronts, October 9 near Bryansk - 3, 13 and 50 th armies of the Bryansk Front.
On October 8, the head of the Hitler government’s press service, Otopgruppenhührer SS Otto Dietrich, announced to foreign journalists that, in a military sense, Soviet Russia had been destroyed, the German newspaper Volkischer Beobachter wrote in October on the 10 in October: the enemy was defeated. Stalin’s armies are wiped out. ”
Wehrmacht generals who participated in the battle of Moscow, and German historians evaluate the results of the October victories much more restrained. The commander of the 2 Tank Group, Colonel-General Heinz Guderian, in Memories of a Soldier, wrote about the battles near Bryansk in the first week of October 1941: “The severity of the fighting gradually exerted its influence on our officers and soldiers ... On the battlefield, the division commander (4- th tank. - V.L.) showed me the results of the battles of 6 and 7 of October, in which his fighting group performed responsible tasks. The tanks hit on both sides were still in place. The losses of the Russians were much less than ours ... Returning to Orel, I met Colonel Eberbach there, who also reported to me on the course of the last battles ... For the first time since the beginning of this intense campaign, Eberbach had a tired look, and it was felt that it was not physical fatigue, but emotional shock. I was embarrassed by the fact that the last battles had an effect on our best officers. But on the other hand, in the main command of the ground forces and in the headquarters of the army group, a high mood reigned. It was precisely in this that the gap between the views of the high command and ours was revealed, although at that time the 2 tank army knew nothing that the high command was so drunk with our victories. ”
Historian Klaus Reinhardt in his book “Turning near Moscow” reports: “On October 12, northeast of Bryansk, the encirclement around the northern part of the enemy grouping was finally closed. However, significant forces of the Soviet troops managed to break through on October 8 and, despite great losses (the commander of the front Yeremenko was injured), 12, 13 and October 14 left the encirclement ”.
The restraint of the Germans in the evaluation of the “boilers” near Bryansk and Vyazma is explained by the discrepancy between the results achieved in the battles of early October 1941 and the goals outlined by the command of the Wehrmacht and Army Group Center. Only the 11 divisions could continue the attack on Moscow, and the 48 fought hard with the surrounded Soviet forces (the rest covered the flanks of the advancing group). The fights in the “cauldrons” were stubborn and long. A week after the encirclement of the Soviet troops - October 14, the 1941 of the year was reported in the summary of the Wehrmacht Army High Command (OKH): "The enemy, surrounded ... west of Vyazma, was completely destroyed." But on the daily report cards of the OKH Lage Ost for more than two weeks, it was shown that from nine to five German divisions continued to fight with the "destroyed" enemy.
The Bryansk Cauldron, according to Reinhardt, “pulled off until the end of October the main forces of the 2-th combined-arms and 2-th tank armies ... The Soviet troops ... with their resistance decisively paralyzed the offensive of the southern wing of the Army Group Center and did not allow to organize quick pursuit. The fighting in the “Bryansk Cauldron” did not bring the desired success to the Germans. ” The fighting went on until October 23, when the formations and units of the 3, 13 and 50 armies managed to break out of the encirclement with great losses. The stubborn resistance of the surrounded troops allowed the Soviet command to restore the defensive lines in the Moscow direction. Therefore, when the advanced parts of the Germans reached the Mozhaisk line of defense, they were met, as Reingardt noted, a dense barrier, about which German intelligence knew nothing.
The actions of the Soviet troops in the Vyazma and Bryansk directions disrupted the operation "Typhoon". The strategy of the blitzkrieg assumed that the surrounded and deprived of control and supply of enemy troops would break the will to resist, and they quickly capitulate. So it was in Poland and in France. But in Russia, as rightly noted by the English historian Robert Kershaw in the book “1941 Year by the Eyes of the Germans. Birch crosses instead of iron crosses, the truism of blitzkrieg "turned out to be turned upside down by desperate, sometimes reaching fanaticism, the resistance of the Russians in seemingly hopeless situations." It was precisely this that led to the fact that “half of the offensive potential of the Germans was gone, not to advance towards the goal set, but to consolidate the already existing successes.
In the second half of October, compared with the first decade of the month, the average daily rate of the German offensive fell by a factor of 8 – 10 (from 30 – 40 to 3 – 5 kilometers per day). Along with the growing resistance of the Soviet troops, the Germans were constrained by the problems of supply and mudslides.
In the fierce battles of October, the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses. According to Martin Garais, in the 1 battalion of the 282 Infantry Regiment, only 148 remained, but “the bloody tribute was paid by the 290 th regiment. In the rota, the numerical strength fell to a 20 man. ”
Paul Carell (pseudonym Obersturmbanführer SS Paul Schmidt - Executive Director of the service News Third Reich and the head of the press department of the German Foreign Ministry) in the book “The Eastern Front. Hitler goes east ”also discusses the large losses of German troops in the October battles. He tells about the state of the German 46th motorized corps: “The losses turned out to be huge until the 3rd infantry regiment of the SS Reich motorized infantry division had to be disbanded, and the surviving personnel transferred to the Deutschlands and der Führer regiments, in the 2nd company of the Great Germany infantry regiment, 60 people remained. Sixty out of a hundred and fifty. ”
Not the best was the position of the 2 troops of the German tank army, advancing on Tula. Its commander, Colonel-General Heinz Guderian, wrote in his memoirs: “On October 29, our head tank units reached a point four kilometers from Tula. An attempt to seize the city from the course came across a strong anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense and ended in failure, and we suffered significant losses in tanks and officers. ” The situation in the 2 units of the German Tank Army is clarified by Paul Carell: “As of October 31, the 3 Tank Division on the outskirts of Tula had only 40 tanks from 150 that were available from the beginning.”
The command of Army Group "Center" considered the combat capability of the Red Army low. However, the large losses of troops, the low level of organization of material and technical supply, including ammunition and fuel, forced von Boc at the end of October 1941 to stop the offensive.
Typhoon blown away
October 30 1941 of the year von Bock signed an order for a second offensive against Moscow, but could only begin on November 15. Prior to that, the German units cleaned up themselves, replenished with ammunition, fuel and other material means. According to the plan of the offensive, the Wehrmacht should have surrounded the Soviet capital with a double ring. Storm was not planned: even 8 October 1941, Hitler ordered after the completion of the encirclement of Moscow to wipe out and flood.
The November offensive of the Wehrmacht was no longer so successful. The euphoria of command in connection with the October encirclement of the Soviet troops has affected. Hitler and the Wehrmacht strategists generally overestimated their combat capabilities. Focusing on the ten-day reports of troops on casualties, the command believed that the loss of the advancing troops was insignificant and the combat capability was high. Therefore, von Bock did not allocate additional forces and funds for replenishment and reinforcement: in November 1941, the group’s reserve consisted only of a guard division and several police battalions. The real combat capability of an army group has significantly decreased - the casualties were much more than indicated in the troop reports.
But the main miscalculation was the underestimation of the enemy. "Mainly in terms of human resources, the fighting qualities of the Red Army and their morale," says Paul Carell. The leadership of the Wehrmacht mistakenly believed that the Soviet troops were practically destroyed near Vyazma and Bryansk and the Red Army was not able to seriously resist. In fact, the resistance of the Soviet troops continuously increased.
The casualties of the attackers grew rapidly: the 137 Infantry Division, according to the former Chief of Operations, Wilhelm Meyer-Detring, in just four days, from 13 to 16, lost to dead and wounded (not counting losses due to frostbite) 1060 fighters these are 34 officer, including five battalion commanders.
Former German 4 Chief of Staff, General Gunter Blumentrit, in an article about the Moscow Battle, said: "In most infantry companies, the number of personnel reached just 60 – 70 people (with the regular number of 150 people. - V.L.)”. In the 2 tank army, according to Guderian, at the same time, the combat strength of the infantry was reduced on average to 50 people in each company.
21 November von Boc wrote in his diary: “According to the number of divisions, judging this at the green table, the balance of power is no worse than usual. But a decrease in combat capability — in individual companies, there remained from 20 to 30 people, large losses in command personnel and over-exertion of people in combination with cold weather give a completely different picture. ”
The combat readiness of the German troops sharply decreased, including due to the death of a large number of experienced soldiers. On November 23, Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, noted in his diary: “We will never again have such ground troops as we had in June 1941.”
But the command of the Wehrmacht continued to live with illusions and had a completely wrong idea about the real state of the Soviet troops. On November 30, ground forces commander Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch reprimanded von Bock: “The Führer is confident that the Russians are on the verge of complete collapse. He wants to hear specific words from you, Field Marshal von Bock, when this collapse becomes a reality. ”
2 December 1941, Halder made a diary entry: “The enemy has reached the peak of his ability to hold defenses. He no longer has reinforcements. ” On the same day, when the Red Army had only three days left before the start of the counter-offensive, it was stated in the intelligence section of the foreign armies study department in the east: “The Russian command currently does not have reserves and therefore makes attempts, putting into battle all the available forces, suspend the German offensive. " 4 December, the same department came to the conclusion: "The enemy’s combat capability is not so great that a major attack could be launched without significant reinforcement."
The “decisive” attack of the fascists on Moscow was completely exhausted by the beginning of December - the Army Group “Center” had exhausted its capabilities. General Kurt Tippelskirkh infantry in the book "History World War II "writes:" December 4 was made a desperate attempt to once again throw the army on the offensive. After capturing small sections of the 4 army, the next day they retreated to their original positions, the 2 tank army also stopped the offensive after it failed to capture Tula, which was like a eyesore. None of the orders could move these troops forward ... December 6 was ordered to stop the offensive. The troops were supposed to hold their positions. ”
Paul Carell summed up the operation "Typhoon": if in October the Army Group "Center" consisted of 78 divisions, their number decreased to 35 by December. That is, its combat effectiveness has fallen by more than half: the troops did not have the strength not only to attack, but already to defend themselves.
By this time, the Supreme Command Headquarters of the Red Army was able to concentrate a large number of troops near Moscow, unexpectedly for the Germans to launch an offensive and achieve victory. The American historian David Glanz remarked on this point: “The offensive organized by the headquarters near Moscow at the very time when, according to German intelligence, the Red Army was reduced to“ the last few battalions ”, took the Wehrmacht by surprise with its suddenness and made it almost in panic".
On September 29, Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Fedor von Bock held a meeting with army commanders and tank in groups. The troops were tasked with capturing Moscow by November 7, before the onset of winter. Von Bock promised Hitler that the Russian capital would fall by this date. The Battle of Moscow began on September 30 - the 2nd German Panzer Group attacked the troops of the Bryansk Front. On October 2, three German field armies (2nd, 4th and 9th), as well as two tank groups (3rd and 4th) launched an offensive on the positions of the Western and Reserve Fronts.
"The enemy is broken and will never rise again!"
These words, transmitted to German radio throughout the world, Hitler uttered 3 on October 1941 of the year in the Reichstag, announcing the first results of Typhoon. Indeed, the German attack on Moscow initially developed successfully: the Wehrmacht outnumbered the defending Soviet troops both in numbers (1 800 000 people against 1 250 000) and in military skill.
In the first days of the formation of the Army Group Center, they broke through the defenses of the three Soviet fronts and surrounded October 7 near Vyazma — connections and units of 16, 19, 20, 24 and 32 of the Western and Reserve Fronts, October 9 near Bryansk - 3, 13 and 50 th armies of the Bryansk Front.
On October 8, the head of the Hitler government’s press service, Otopgruppenhührer SS Otto Dietrich, announced to foreign journalists that, in a military sense, Soviet Russia had been destroyed, the German newspaper Volkischer Beobachter wrote in October on the 10 in October: the enemy was defeated. Stalin’s armies are wiped out. ”
Wehrmacht generals who participated in the battle of Moscow, and German historians evaluate the results of the October victories much more restrained. The commander of the 2 Tank Group, Colonel-General Heinz Guderian, in Memories of a Soldier, wrote about the battles near Bryansk in the first week of October 1941: “The severity of the fighting gradually exerted its influence on our officers and soldiers ... On the battlefield, the division commander (4- th tank. - V.L.) showed me the results of the battles of 6 and 7 of October, in which his fighting group performed responsible tasks. The tanks hit on both sides were still in place. The losses of the Russians were much less than ours ... Returning to Orel, I met Colonel Eberbach there, who also reported to me on the course of the last battles ... For the first time since the beginning of this intense campaign, Eberbach had a tired look, and it was felt that it was not physical fatigue, but emotional shock. I was embarrassed by the fact that the last battles had an effect on our best officers. But on the other hand, in the main command of the ground forces and in the headquarters of the army group, a high mood reigned. It was precisely in this that the gap between the views of the high command and ours was revealed, although at that time the 2 tank army knew nothing that the high command was so drunk with our victories. ”
Historian Klaus Reinhardt in his book “Turning near Moscow” reports: “On October 12, northeast of Bryansk, the encirclement around the northern part of the enemy grouping was finally closed. However, significant forces of the Soviet troops managed to break through on October 8 and, despite great losses (the commander of the front Yeremenko was injured), 12, 13 and October 14 left the encirclement ”.The restraint of the Germans in the evaluation of the “boilers” near Bryansk and Vyazma is explained by the discrepancy between the results achieved in the battles of early October 1941 and the goals outlined by the command of the Wehrmacht and Army Group Center. Only the 11 divisions could continue the attack on Moscow, and the 48 fought hard with the surrounded Soviet forces (the rest covered the flanks of the advancing group). The fights in the “cauldrons” were stubborn and long. A week after the encirclement of the Soviet troops - October 14, the 1941 of the year was reported in the summary of the Wehrmacht Army High Command (OKH): "The enemy, surrounded ... west of Vyazma, was completely destroyed." But on the daily report cards of the OKH Lage Ost for more than two weeks, it was shown that from nine to five German divisions continued to fight with the "destroyed" enemy.
The Bryansk Cauldron, according to Reinhardt, “pulled off until the end of October the main forces of the 2-th combined-arms and 2-th tank armies ... The Soviet troops ... with their resistance decisively paralyzed the offensive of the southern wing of the Army Group Center and did not allow to organize quick pursuit. The fighting in the “Bryansk Cauldron” did not bring the desired success to the Germans. ” The fighting went on until October 23, when the formations and units of the 3, 13 and 50 armies managed to break out of the encirclement with great losses. The stubborn resistance of the surrounded troops allowed the Soviet command to restore the defensive lines in the Moscow direction. Therefore, when the advanced parts of the Germans reached the Mozhaisk line of defense, they were met, as Reingardt noted, a dense barrier, about which German intelligence knew nothing.
The actions of the Soviet troops in the Vyazma and Bryansk directions disrupted the operation "Typhoon". The strategy of the blitzkrieg assumed that the surrounded and deprived of control and supply of enemy troops would break the will to resist, and they quickly capitulate. So it was in Poland and in France. But in Russia, as rightly noted by the English historian Robert Kershaw in the book “1941 Year by the Eyes of the Germans. Birch crosses instead of iron crosses, the truism of blitzkrieg "turned out to be turned upside down by desperate, sometimes reaching fanaticism, the resistance of the Russians in seemingly hopeless situations." It was precisely this that led to the fact that “half of the offensive potential of the Germans was gone, not to advance towards the goal set, but to consolidate the already existing successes.
In the second half of October, compared with the first decade of the month, the average daily rate of the German offensive fell by a factor of 8 – 10 (from 30 – 40 to 3 – 5 kilometers per day). Along with the growing resistance of the Soviet troops, the Germans were constrained by the problems of supply and mudslides.
In the fierce battles of October, the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses. According to Martin Garais, in the 1 battalion of the 282 Infantry Regiment, only 148 remained, but “the bloody tribute was paid by the 290 th regiment. In the rota, the numerical strength fell to a 20 man. ”
Paul Carell (pseudonym Obersturmbanführer SS Paul Schmidt - Executive Director of the service News Third Reich and the head of the press department of the German Foreign Ministry) in the book “The Eastern Front. Hitler goes east ”also discusses the large losses of German troops in the October battles. He tells about the state of the German 46th motorized corps: “The losses turned out to be huge until the 3rd infantry regiment of the SS Reich motorized infantry division had to be disbanded, and the surviving personnel transferred to the Deutschlands and der Führer regiments, in the 2nd company of the Great Germany infantry regiment, 60 people remained. Sixty out of a hundred and fifty. ”
Not the best was the position of the 2 troops of the German tank army, advancing on Tula. Its commander, Colonel-General Heinz Guderian, wrote in his memoirs: “On October 29, our head tank units reached a point four kilometers from Tula. An attempt to seize the city from the course came across a strong anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense and ended in failure, and we suffered significant losses in tanks and officers. ” The situation in the 2 units of the German Tank Army is clarified by Paul Carell: “As of October 31, the 3 Tank Division on the outskirts of Tula had only 40 tanks from 150 that were available from the beginning.”
The command of Army Group "Center" considered the combat capability of the Red Army low. However, the large losses of troops, the low level of organization of material and technical supply, including ammunition and fuel, forced von Boc at the end of October 1941 to stop the offensive.
Typhoon blown away
October 30 1941 of the year von Bock signed an order for a second offensive against Moscow, but could only begin on November 15. Prior to that, the German units cleaned up themselves, replenished with ammunition, fuel and other material means. According to the plan of the offensive, the Wehrmacht should have surrounded the Soviet capital with a double ring. Storm was not planned: even 8 October 1941, Hitler ordered after the completion of the encirclement of Moscow to wipe out and flood.
The November offensive of the Wehrmacht was no longer so successful. The euphoria of command in connection with the October encirclement of the Soviet troops has affected. Hitler and the Wehrmacht strategists generally overestimated their combat capabilities. Focusing on the ten-day reports of troops on casualties, the command believed that the loss of the advancing troops was insignificant and the combat capability was high. Therefore, von Bock did not allocate additional forces and funds for replenishment and reinforcement: in November 1941, the group’s reserve consisted only of a guard division and several police battalions. The real combat capability of an army group has significantly decreased - the casualties were much more than indicated in the troop reports.
But the main miscalculation was the underestimation of the enemy. "Mainly in terms of human resources, the fighting qualities of the Red Army and their morale," says Paul Carell. The leadership of the Wehrmacht mistakenly believed that the Soviet troops were practically destroyed near Vyazma and Bryansk and the Red Army was not able to seriously resist. In fact, the resistance of the Soviet troops continuously increased.
The casualties of the attackers grew rapidly: the 137 Infantry Division, according to the former Chief of Operations, Wilhelm Meyer-Detring, in just four days, from 13 to 16, lost to dead and wounded (not counting losses due to frostbite) 1060 fighters these are 34 officer, including five battalion commanders.
Former German 4 Chief of Staff, General Gunter Blumentrit, in an article about the Moscow Battle, said: "In most infantry companies, the number of personnel reached just 60 – 70 people (with the regular number of 150 people. - V.L.)”. In the 2 tank army, according to Guderian, at the same time, the combat strength of the infantry was reduced on average to 50 people in each company.
21 November von Boc wrote in his diary: “According to the number of divisions, judging this at the green table, the balance of power is no worse than usual. But a decrease in combat capability — in individual companies, there remained from 20 to 30 people, large losses in command personnel and over-exertion of people in combination with cold weather give a completely different picture. ”
The combat readiness of the German troops sharply decreased, including due to the death of a large number of experienced soldiers. On November 23, Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, noted in his diary: “We will never again have such ground troops as we had in June 1941.”
But the command of the Wehrmacht continued to live with illusions and had a completely wrong idea about the real state of the Soviet troops. On November 30, ground forces commander Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch reprimanded von Bock: “The Führer is confident that the Russians are on the verge of complete collapse. He wants to hear specific words from you, Field Marshal von Bock, when this collapse becomes a reality. ”
2 December 1941, Halder made a diary entry: “The enemy has reached the peak of his ability to hold defenses. He no longer has reinforcements. ” On the same day, when the Red Army had only three days left before the start of the counter-offensive, it was stated in the intelligence section of the foreign armies study department in the east: “The Russian command currently does not have reserves and therefore makes attempts, putting into battle all the available forces, suspend the German offensive. " 4 December, the same department came to the conclusion: "The enemy’s combat capability is not so great that a major attack could be launched without significant reinforcement."
The “decisive” attack of the fascists on Moscow was completely exhausted by the beginning of December - the Army Group “Center” had exhausted its capabilities. General Kurt Tippelskirkh infantry in the book "History World War II "writes:" December 4 was made a desperate attempt to once again throw the army on the offensive. After capturing small sections of the 4 army, the next day they retreated to their original positions, the 2 tank army also stopped the offensive after it failed to capture Tula, which was like a eyesore. None of the orders could move these troops forward ... December 6 was ordered to stop the offensive. The troops were supposed to hold their positions. ”
Paul Carell summed up the operation "Typhoon": if in October the Army Group "Center" consisted of 78 divisions, their number decreased to 35 by December. That is, its combat effectiveness has fallen by more than half: the troops did not have the strength not only to attack, but already to defend themselves.
By this time, the Supreme Command Headquarters of the Red Army was able to concentrate a large number of troops near Moscow, unexpectedly for the Germans to launch an offensive and achieve victory. The American historian David Glanz remarked on this point: “The offensive organized by the headquarters near Moscow at the very time when, according to German intelligence, the Red Army was reduced to“ the last few battalions ”, took the Wehrmacht by surprise with its suddenness and made it almost in panic".
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