Military Review

Was the “failure” of the Naroch operation of 16 of the year?

42
It was believed that the Naroch operation was an extremely unfortunate episode of the First World War - both useless and bloody. But is this really the case?


By the beginning of the 1916 campaign of the year, the strategic planning of the Russian High Command was largely determined by the general coalition plan defined at the November conference of the Entente 1915 in Chantilly.

11 February 1916 at the meeting of the senior commanders of the Army in the Supreme Command Headquarters identified the contours of the main attack during the summer campaign of the year. It was assumed that this strike was to be inflicted by the efforts of two fronts - the left flank of the North and the right flank of the West.

Active actions in the French and Russian fronts had to be coordinated in time. They were planned for early summer, but the large-scale offensive of the Kaiser divisions near Verdun confused the Allies with strategic maps.

It was the catastrophic situation of the French troops on the Verdun front that forced the Russians to launch an offensive ahead of schedule, which led to the Naroch offensive operation 5 - March 17. Thus, the implementation of the basic principles of the coalition war led to the premature offensive of the Russian troops in the northern sector of the Austro-German front.

By the beginning of the campaign, the largest on the Eastern Front grouping of German troops was concentrated on the Baltic-Belarusian theater of military operations - up to 180, thousands of bayonets and sabers opposed the forces of the Northern Front and, up to 358, thousands of bayonets and sabers were concentrated against the Western front.

The plan of the operation of the two fronts assumed a strike in the area of ​​Dvinsk - Lake Naroch - Vishnevskoe. It was planned, having made a strategic breakthrough, to cut off the Vilna group of German troops from Kovno (taking possession of the city) and crossing the Neman River and, bypassing the German grouping concentrated at Dvinsk and Riga, reach the borders of East Prussia. The northern front was supposed to advance from Jacobstadt to Ponevezh, and the Western to attack in the direction from Smorgon to Vilna.

But the implementation of this large-scale planning rested on the currently insurmountable difficulties - the deeply defensive enemy and the excellent communications of the German troops. Having mastered a network of strategic railways in the summer campaign of the 1915 year in the Baltic States, the German command could transfer operational reserves in virtually any quantity.


Il 1. Plan of the Naroch operation. Podorozhny N. E. Naroch operation in March 1916, M., 1938.

The strike force of the Russian troops during the Naroch offensive operation included troops of the 2 and 5 armies (with reserves, these are 12 army corps). The general leadership of the operation was carried out by the commander of the 2 Army (inflicting the main attack), General of Infantry V.V. Smirnov, but after he fell ill, his army was transferred to the command of General of Infantry A.F. Ragoza. In fact, the latter carried out the general management of the Naroch operation.

The size of the shock group of the 2 Army is up to 375 thousands of bayonets and sabers (in total, up to 460 thousands of people were involved in the operation). The grouping is strong enough, but not sufficiently provided with artillery - only about one thousand light and a hundred and fifty heavy guns were involved. The artillery densities at the main strike site averaged 12 - 18 (in some areas up to 35) guns per kilometer of the front. The rate is high for the Russian front, but significantly lower than the standards that existed at that time on the French front (where they were up to 100 guns per kilometer).

The opponents of the Russian troops of the 2 and 5 armies were units of the German 10 armies, as well as part of the forces and equipment of the 8 armies and the F. von Scholz army group (up to 120 thousands of people, including 82 thousands of fighters in 10-th Army). German troops have long occupied deeply echeloned positions and constantly improved them. The offensive area was a wooded, swampy and lake-like terrain and was tactically very difficult, especially in conditions of spring thaw. The commander of the East German Front, P. Hindenburg, noted in his memoirs that as a result of the melting of snow, the thaw had turned the battlefields on this sector of the front into "bottomless swamps."

On the edge of the main attack were three groups of Russian corps of generals M. M. Pleshkov (1, 27, 1, Siberian Army, 7, equestrian corps), L. O. Sirelius (34, 4) Siberian Army Corps); P. S. Balueva (5, 25, 36 and 3 Siberian Army Corps).

Artillery zeroing, carried out for three days, allowed the Germans to see the area of ​​the main attack. As a result, the offensive turned into heavy positional battles, the pace of advancement was low, and noticeable but local success was achieved only by a left-flank shock group (P.S. Balueva).

And yet, despite the fact that the positional war established on the Russian front a full year later than in French, and, accordingly, the Russian army only studied the art of positional warfare, the tactical results of the offensive were no worse than in similar operations with the British and the French.

For example, the troops of P. S. Baluev, advancing on the inter-grain area (Naroch-Vishnevskoye), during the battles of 5 - 8 of March, captured the fortified positions of the enemy, captured the town of Postavy, capturing more than a thousand people (including 17 officers). German units were destroyed in clashes over their lines of defense or captured.


Il 2. General of infantry P. S. Baluev, commander of the group of corps that achieved the greatest tactical success. Chronicles of the War 1914-15-16 No. 107.

But the tactical breakthrough of the enemy’s defense on March 8 was not developed operational. The main obstacles were the difficulties of pulling up reserves (this was prevented by the barrage of unsuppressed German artillery) and tactically difficult terrain. At the same time, German troops were morally shocked by the loss of two lines of defense and made every effort to return them.

E. von Ludendorff noted in his memoirs the Russian success in the lake gorge, which was very painful for the German command, and the situation on the front of the 8 army and the army group of von Scholz was no less difficult for him.

During the Naroch operation, the losses of the attacking Russian troops amounted to over 78 thousand people, and the defending Germans lost up to 40 thousand people (including up to 1,5 thousand prisoners - 20 officers and 1435 noncommissioned officers and privates). Russian trophies were 18 machine guns, a howitzer and 36 enemy mortars. Moreover, the German units suffered particularly serious losses when they tried using counterattacks to recover their lost positions.


Il 3. Captured Germans. Baltic-Belarusian theater. 1916 Winter

So, operatively, the Naroch operation was unsuccessful, but strategically it was not unhelpful.

During the whole week, when the Russian units achieved the greatest tactical success during the martial offensive, the German attacks near Verdun ceased. And it happened in the most difficult period for the allies of Russia "meat grinder". About the transfer to France of the German troops from the Russian front during this period there was nothing to think about. Moreover, the activity was shown by the Russian troops in the period of the traditional at this time of year at the calm front.

For the Russian front, the important consequences of the Naroch operation were revealed in the presence of the fact that the main strategic and operational reserves of the East German Front were in June 1916, concentrated north of the Pripyat swamps. And such a grouping of German reserves contributed to the future success of the offensive of the South-Western Front.

In the course of the operation, the German forces fighting near Naroch grew by 30 thousands of bayonets and 230 guns. And at the end of March, the grouping of German troops, opposing the Northern Front, increased to 200 thousand, and the Western Front to 420 thousand bayonets and sabers — that is, thousands of fighters increased by 82.

We see that the troops of the Western and Northern fronts held down the main part of the German group on the Eastern front (over 600 thousand people), forcing the German command, albeit temporarily, to go on the Verdun front to the defense. In addition, without the Naroch operation, the Offensive of the Southwestern Front would not have been so vivid a result — that which would later be called the Brusilov breakthrough.

In the domestic military stories there is an opinion that the tsarist cannibal generals considered the soldiers to be "gray cattle" and consciously drove them to slaughter for the sake of imperialistic interests. But what is interesting. The Russian army in the First World War basically avoided the "meat grinders" on the French model, when the command of the allies and Germans on the French front deliberately doomed their own troops to huge losses. In particular, E. von Falkengine organized the "Verdun Mill", deciding to grind the French army, at the same time ruining half a million of its own soldiers. The Allies of Russia on the Entente, conscious of their superiority over the Germans in manpower and resources, resorted to the so-called strategy of “exchange” - they sought to cause major losses to the enemy, in turn bearing huge losses. The “Nivelle Massacre” of 1917 of the Year is a great illustration of this. Conversely, the Russian generals (in particular, in 1916, the commanders of the Western and Northern fronts, the generals from the infantry A.E. Evert and A.N. Kuropatkin), protested against the offensive of their fronts, motivating this circumstance by the enemy’s deep-echeloned defense technical resources - and, as a result, the prospect of spilling soldier's blood with insignificant operational and tactical results.

The practice of applying double standards that has existed in relation to the history of the First World War for a hundred years has led to the fact that the operations of the Anglo-French troops, advancing several hundred meters during the offensive and occupying several craters, are characterized as combat success, while (rather infrequent) Russian offensive (for example, the Naroch offensive considered here), moving forward several kilometers and with lower losses than the allies, are considered a heavy defeat.

Thus, we see that strategically, the Naroch operation was far from useless, and tactically no more bloody than many actually useless operations on the French front of world war.
Author:
42 comments
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  1. fenist82
    fenist82 5 December 2016 08: 36
    +17
    Great article! The role of the Russian army in the First World War is traditionally underestimated, as is Russia's contribution to the victory of the Entente countries over the Central Bloc. It is customary to talk about the battles on the eastern front of the WWII as a continuous series of defeats of the Russian army. This series was sometimes interrupted by rare “Pyrrhic” victories (especially with the “Germans”, the “Austrians” sometimes still beat)))). However, as can be seen, including thanks to this article devoted to such a little studied topic as the Naroch operation, this was not at all the case.
    1. Uncle Murzik
      Uncle Murzik 15 December 2016 06: 05
      +1
      a good victory, the endurance of this become "During the Naroch operation, the losses of the advancing Russian troops amounted to more than 78 thousand people, and the defending Germans lost up to 40 thousand people (including up to 1,5 thousand prisoners - 20 officers and 1435 non-commissioned officers and privates) The Russian trophies were 18 machine guns, a howitzer and 36 mortars of the enemy. Moreover, the German units suffered especially serious losses when they tried to return their lost positions with the help of counterattacks. " belay
    2. murriou
      murriou 20 December 2016 15: 49
      0
      OU! Did you manage to conclude from this article that the Naroch operation was the VICTORY of the Russian army ?! fellow
      Congratulations on your rare * intellectual achievement *! good love laughing
  2. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 5 December 2016 08: 57
    +11
    Article plus, and the author my sincere thanks! Finally, an objective article was devoted to the analysis of the actions of the imperial army during the WWII.
  3. Uncle Murzik
    Uncle Murzik 5 December 2016 09: 18
    +4
    if there is no victory, it needs to be invented! [So, quickly the Naroch operation was unsuccessful, but strategically it was not useless.] belaythe conclusion of the author speaks for itself! lol
    1. baudolino
      baudolino 5 December 2016 10: 15
      +10
      In fact, the author quite logically substantiated this conclusion.
    2. Lieutenant Teterin
      Lieutenant Teterin 5 December 2016 10: 47
      +12
      But the author does not talk about victory. He argues that the operation was not a meaningless logging, but played a significant role in the course of the WWII. After all, Somme and Verdun were also not victorious.
    3. Dart2027
      Dart2027 5 December 2016 19: 40
      +1
      Have you read the article at all?
      1. Uncle Murzik
        Uncle Murzik 15 December 2016 06: 06
        +1
        Dart2027 read the results are impressive "During the Naroch operation, the losses of the advancing Russian troops amounted to over 78 thousand people, and the defending Germans lost up to 40 thousand people (including up to 1,5 thousand prisoners - 20 officers and 1435 non-commissioned officers and privates). the trophies were 18 machine guns, a howitzer and 36 mortars of the enemy. Moreover, the German units suffered especially serious losses when they tried to recover their lost positions with the help of counterattacks. " lol
        1. Dart2027
          Dart2027 15 December 2016 19: 20
          +1
          Quote: Uncle Murzik
          read the results are impressive

          Losses, yes, but did the declared goals achieve as a result of the operation?
          So, operatively, the Naroch operation was unsuccessful, but strategically it was not unhelpful.

          One can argue about whether, in principle, it was necessary to save the allies, but the military achieved their goals, so here it is rather a political issue.
  4. The comment was deleted.
  5. RPG_
    RPG_ 5 December 2016 13: 33
    +2
    At VO there was a more competent cycle of articles on 1 MV. And that Evert and Kuropatkin were mediocre generals have long been known and most of all they were afraid to lose because they opposed any active actions. And for example, Brusilov showed how to break through the layered defense, but at the same time, Evert and Kuropatkin stomped on the spot and only when they put pressure on them did they depict the offensive by organizing a useless massacre.
    It was a failure, because with the available forces in this situation could be done better.
    1. Cartalon
      Cartalon 5 December 2016 14: 16
      +2
      It was hardly possible to make better Belarus is not the place to attack in the spring
    2. Roman 11
      Roman 11 7 December 2016 00: 00
      +1
      Quote: RPG_
      at the same time, Evert and Kuropatkin stomped on the spot and only when the headquarters pressed on them did they depict the offensive by organizing a useless massacre.

      It is not clear how, after the Russian-Japanese Kuropatkin, they could appoint a confrontation? Is this not the level of generality? Well, at least one victory in the Japanese! Come and hang a cross ....
  6. Cartalon
    Cartalon 5 December 2016 14: 15
    +2
    Wow, we hit our head against the wall like the French, and with the same result, and this success, the operation was unsuccessful and, what is important, undermined Evert’s faith in the possibility of an offensive and it cost the whole company of 1916, which could otherwise be won with decisive consequences for the move war.
    1. fenist82
      fenist82 5 December 2016 18: 36
      +14
      A victory does not need to be invented! The Entente won the First World War, and without Russia could not have won - this is a fact. Therefore, the efforts of each of the participants are important. As for the Naroch operation, it was no worse than the Western ones, and in terms of strategic consequences it was better. This is exactly what the author showed.
      Held to help the French near Verdun. Ruhni The French front - and we would not be too good.
      And down with double standards!
      1. Cartalon
        Cartalon 5 December 2016 20: 43
        +2
        The Entente then won, but Russia lost, in 15, how long did it take Geoffrey to organize his head bang on the wall in Artois? So why did Russians rush to save Verdun with a bang?
  7. fenist82
    fenist82 5 December 2016 21: 37
    +14
    Over the decades, a negative attitude to many events, stamps and dogmas, has taken root.
    Yes, there were mistakes and miscalculations. But one cannot be taken away - without a Russian contribution, there would have been no victory over the Germans, Austrians and Turks. They were silent about it, our "allies" were silent and distorted - and we helped them in this.
    It's time to stop!
    1. Cartalon
      Cartalon 6 December 2016 05: 58
      +2
      Ie shouting cheers for any reason? Only mountains are higher than us, only eggs are steeper than us.
    2. murriou
      murriou 20 December 2016 15: 52
      0
      I envy your optimism. Maybe you manage to record the Russian-Japanese war in Russian victories? Well, from the highest strategic considerations, the Japanese killed in the REV did not appear on the battlefield against the United States in WWII, and only due to this, the ungrateful Americans were able to defeat Japan ... lol laughing
  8. BRONEVIK
    BRONEVIK 6 December 2016 09: 06
    +17
    Thanks to the author for the article! Various works have been written about the Naroch operation. But the purpose of the author of this article is not a detailed description of the course of hostilities, but a look at the operation from a strategic point of view, the placement of accents, in my opinion, are quite reasonable. And for those who doubt the quality of the article, I would like to remind you of an old army joke: "If you are so smart, then why don't you go in formation?" ))) I also know that every operation has a tactical, operational, strategic result. The strategic course is the most important. That is, the Naroch operation was not carried out in vain! And Russia lost because its army was disintegrated in 1917, and new politicians for the sake of power put the country on a par with the vanquished. Russia may have lost, but not the army! Thanks. More such articles!
    1. Cartalon
      Cartalon 6 December 2016 12: 27
      +2
      And the army has decomposed due to such operations
  9. fenist82
    fenist82 6 December 2016 12: 46
    +15
    The army did not decompose because of operations, but because of the revolutionary bacchanalia during the 1917 policy of the Provisional Government and the subversive ideology of some political parties.
    Have you heard about the number one order, but about the election of commanders, but about the soldiers' committees?
    Read the materials, see the documents.
    Will be useful
    1. Uncle Murzik
      Uncle Murzik 15 December 2016 06: 11
      +1
      fenist82 Well, yes, and until 1917 there were only victories! The army decomposed because of the mediocrity generals, who the soldiers had to follow after General Kuropatkin belay
      1. Dart2027
        Dart2027 15 December 2016 19: 22
        +5
        Quote: Uncle Murzik
        until 1917 there were only victories

        No, not alone. But if Order No. 1 had been issued in 1945, the result would be the same for the USSR.
    2. murriou
      murriou 20 December 2016 15: 39
      0
      Quote: fenist82
      The army did not decompose because of operations, but because of a revolutionary bacchanalia

      Aga-aga, and the East Prussian operation of 1914 failed miserably, having an overwhelming numerical advantage over the enemy, solely through the fault of the Bolsheviks? laughing
  10. murriou
    murriou 20 December 2016 15: 38
    0
    Everything is as always: an owl squeaks, the globe is cracking, but a fermented patriotism uber alles laughing

    It was believed that the Naroch operation was an extremely unfortunate episode of the First World War - both useless and bloody. But is this really the case?

    Having set as his goal to refute the generally accepted (and not without reason) opinion, the author kind of repeated the failure of the Naroch operation, just as he did not achieve his goals with all the costs of pathos and rhetoric laughing
    the largest group of German troops on the Eastern Front - up to 180 thousand bayonets and sabers opposed the troops of the Northern Front and up to 358 thousand bayonets and sabers were concentrated against the Western Front.

    Total, more than 2 times LESS than the Germans on the Western (for them) front.

    the losses of the advancing Russian troops amounted to over 78 thousand people, and the defending Germans lost up to 40 thousand people (including up to 1,5 thousand prisoners - 20 officers and 1435 non-commissioned officers and privates).

    This is according to the most strained and optimistic data for the Russian side, and without a breakdown of losses by category, which gives extensive scope for speculation.

    So, operatively, the Naroch operation was unsuccessful, but strategically it was not unhelpful.

    In this kind of "research", the talk about "strategic gain", translated into Russian, means: since it is not possible at all to hide a failed defeat, let's find an excuse for it in higher strategic considerations laughing
    Even the Battle of Mukden, such "experts" write down a strategic win. wassat

    There was nothing to think about the transfer of German troops from the Russian front to France during this period.

    Just look at the state of the forces on the fronts.
    In the west, the Germans in 1916: January-February - 105 divisions, March - 108, April - 110, May - 111, i.e. the buildup of German forces in the West goes despite Russian movements.

    In the East they have the same: January-February 51 divisions, March - 48, April-May 47 divisions.
    The Austro-Hungarian divisions in the East all this time were 36, in total the number of enemy troops PADALA from 87 to 83 divisions against 128 (!) Russian much larger numbers.
    That is, and here the author with objective reality is at odds.

    The concentration of German forces in the area of ​​the database is quite possible, the Germans very skillfully concentrated their forces, achieving a local advantage even with a significant (!) Numerical superiority of the Russians over the whole front.
    However, there is a flow of German forces from East to West just at the time under discussion. Uncomfortable-sj. repeat

    The practice of applying double standards that has existed in relation to the history of the First World War for one hundred years

    ... based on a comparison of the scale of hostilities and the number of opposing forces.

    I wish the author would take the trouble to analyze the fighting of the Serbs, who in the WWI for a long time heroically fought against the enemy forces, many times superior, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

    Or discovered the victorious military operations in 1912 of the Balkan Slavs and Greeks against the Turks, many times superior in number and weapons.

    Against this background, the Russian army in the WWI looks completely pale, and speculations like the ones written above are completely ridiculous and wretched.
  11. Rotmistr
    Rotmistr 20 December 2016 17: 25
    +16
    Once again, bow to the author for a great article! And please do not pay attention to such owls (Murzikov and Murok) who (not without reason) spit on the military history of our Fatherland, using verbosity as a weapon and it is not clear from what sources the figures are taken.
    Thank you!
    1. soldier
      soldier 20 December 2016 22: 34
      +16
      Yes, it all depends on the outlook on things. Sometimes success seems to be outside - but in the end, failure, and vice versa. What in life, what in war. Everything is reasonably argued - I liked the article. It is possible to cry anything - it is more difficult to write. And there’s a bunch of numbers of all kinds, that of losses, that of divisions. It is unclear what someone murriou used at all
      1. murriou
        murriou 21 December 2016 08: 23
        0
        Quote: soldier
        It is unclear what someone murriou used at all

        I used my brains, which I advise you. laughing

        I traditionally sympathize with you. As usual, you have a lot of show-offs when you are not familiar with the topic and literature on the topic. And instead of discussing the essence, you are trying to fend off attacks on the personality of an opponent who dares to challenge your favorite mythology. repeat

        A significant part of the numbers with which I operate here is taken from the article itself. Did you even read it that you didn’t recognize quotes from it? lol

        The number of divisions by fronts and months is taken from A.M. Zayonchkovsky, a researcher of undoubtedly competent and authoritative, but what the current "researchers" are guided by (except for their own fantasies and wishes), they usually do not report.
  12. Rotmistr
    Rotmistr 21 December 2016 07: 00
    +16
    A slight increase in German divisions on the French front was due to the transfer from the Balkans (3 divisions in February and 1 in March 1916) and formations within Germany - but not due to the Russian front.
    1. murriou
      murriou 21 December 2016 08: 31
      0
      Quote: Rotmistr
      but not at the expense of the Russian front.

      That's funny, but why then the number of German divisions in the West just during the Naroch operation increases by 3 simultaneously with a decrease (!) Of exactly the same number of their divisions in the East? lol

      For data, see A.M. Zayonchkovsky, World War I. Do you have anything against him and his data?

      Although, "The darkness of low truths is dearer to us than we are elevating deception" (C). Bakeries are much nicer than the sad truth for them, the mythology about the immensely beautiful (but for some reason always ending up in a puddle of their own making) Russia, which they have lost.
      1. soldier
        soldier 21 December 2016 10: 13
        +16
        And I agree with Rotmistr. In February-March, divisions were not transferred from the Russian Front to France, despite serious battles near Verdun. German data by the way looked - General Buis. German army. Essay on the development, maneuvers on the internal operational lines, 1922. They are somehow nicer data of the enemy, aren't they?))
        1. murriou
          murriou 21 December 2016 10: 47
          0
          Quote: soldier
          The enemy’s data is somehow nicer, isn't it?

          The enemy’s data on the movements and losses of the enemy’s troops, for a start, are much fuller and more accurate laughing
          I prefer to take similar data on the Russian army from Russian sources. For the same reasons.

          And best of all, when it is possible to compare them.

          Note that the Japanese assumptions during the battle and their reports of hits on the Varyag turned out to be very accurate, as shown by the examination after the cruiser was raised, and Rudnev even exaggerated them. As for his assessment of Japanese losses, it is a classic of the epic genre. lol
          I did not see the overstatement of Russian losses on the Japanese side, but the overstatement of the alleged enemy forces is their usual business.

          There were, of course, inflated losses of Russians according to German reports: for example, during the "Sevastopol wake-up", the Germans counted for themselves the sinking of two gunboats in Odessa instead of the real one; in the battle on the Kassar reach, the Germans counted for themselves the sinking of the gunboat "Brave" - ​​presumably, mistaking the setting of the smoke screen for a fire , and disappearance under the cover of this veil is for drowning.

          But if you believe the Russian reports about this battle, then the German destroyers were sunk almost one and a half times more than their original numbers, and then the remaining (!) Overwhelming numerical superiority (!) Forced the Russians to retreat.

          The fact is that, according to Russian reports, "Thunder" was destroyed in many different ways, including the sinking of the Kingstones who were already stranded, and the detonation of ammunition, also in different ways - after which the Germans, however, removed the ship's documentation from the "Thunder" and a fresh map of minefields.

          In addition, the fate of all allegedly destroyed and sunk in this battle German destroyers Conway's guide traces to the end of the WWII or beyond.

          Here you have confidence in Russian reports. laughing

          Quote: soldier
          In February-March, divisions from the Russian Front were not transferred to France

          And how then do you explain the synchronous decrease in the number of German divisions in the East and their increase in the West? Coincidence? lol
          1. soldier
            soldier 21 December 2016 12: 24
            +16
            I'm not going to guess. I’m talking about the fact - a German source indicates that in February and March there was no transfer from the Russian front to the west
          2. soldier
            soldier 21 December 2016 12: 37
            +16
            Three divisions from the Balkans were transferred to France. I will write you numbers later, if interested
        2. murriou
          murriou 21 December 2016 13: 00
          0
          Quote: soldier
          German data by the way looked - General Buis. German army. Essay on the development, maneuvers along internal operating lines, 1922.

          I've looked too lol but is it so that the author of the book is not German, but French? laughing
          1. soldier
            soldier 21 December 2016 16: 14
            +16
            Of course, I already reported it. You can not immediately think about work and military history)) I apologize. Brains for short.
            In this case, the German-Frenchman is not particularly important - the 2nd Bureau of the French General Staff was a pedantic institution.
            It follows from this work that in February the 43rd reserve, 44th infantry and 11th Bavarian divisions migrated from Bakan to France. In March - the Alpine Corps.
            1. murriou
              murriou 22 December 2016 07: 26
              0
              Thanks for the information.
              But what about the decrease in the number of German divisions on their Eastern Front just during the Naroch operation?
              1. soldier
                soldier 22 December 2016 09: 26
                +16
                First, we found that there was no transfer of German divisions from the Russian front to the French. This is the most important and is directly related to this article.
                Secondly, the nature of the decrease in the total number of divisions (if it happened) can have a variety of reasons: reorganization (as at the end of 14 years it took place with the so-called "serf" corps) or, for example, withdrawal to the reserve.
                1. murriou
                  murriou 22 December 2016 17: 12
                  +1
                  There wasn’t even a transfer from the western front to the eastern one, on the contrary, there was a weakening of German forces in the East and their strengthening in the West just during the operation under discussion.

                  The nature of the weakening of German troops in the East is really insignificant: the main thing is that it took place during the period under discussion.

                  Those. The main premise of the author - allegedly saving an immeasurable number of Frenchmen due to the death of an even greater number of Russian soldiers in a deliberate operation - turns out to be absolutely inflated.
                  My next sympathy for the owl laughing
                  1. soldier
                    soldier 22 December 2016 20: 13
                    +16
                    No, dear cat. We just established the main thing - from the front of the Russian Western and Northern fronts, the transfer to France in February and March (the hardest time for the Allies was not). The German group grew due to the transfer from other fronts. Q.E.D.
  13. soldier
    soldier 21 December 2016 12: 31
    +16
    And they could have been if we had a lull. Ludendorff on the pages of his memoirs in the days of Naroch was pretty worried about the integrity of the front. And our Strategic Essay writes about the growth of the group in the Baltic States and Belarus these days. And Operation Researcher Podorozhny points to a division moved to the area of ​​the Russian offensive