Igor Shishkin: The concept of "occupation" of the Baltic states, Bessarabia and the "fourth section" of Poland is a challenge to Russia's security
The goal of the "occupation" concept is not money and the territory of Russia, but its sovereignty and civilizational identity. Although the money and the territory in the case of surrender on the "historical" field, of course, will be taken away.In a large-scale campaign to introduce into the public consciousness a new concept of the Second World War based on the identity of Nazism and "Stalinism", a special place is given to joining the Soviet Union in 1939-1940. Western Belarus, Western Ukraine, Bessarabia and the Baltic States. (For the reasons and objectives of the campaign, see “The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: Return to Big Politics”). Along with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and in conjunction with it, these actions of the USSR are presented as "material evidence" of equal responsibility of Germany and Soviet Russia for unleashing a world war.
Accordingly, territorial acquisitions of the USSR are interpreted exclusively as grossly violating the norms of international law, criminal in relation to the entire world community, and, first of all, to the Baltic republics, Poland and Romania. The direct linkage of the territorial expansion of the Soviet Union with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact plays a significant role in substantiating such an assessment of the actions of the USSR. According to the new concept of war, the Pact is a “criminal conspiracy” of Stalin and Hitler; and the "fourth section" of Poland, the "occupation" of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bessarabia - its implementation.
All these events are now proposed to be regarded as the initial stage of the Second World War, at which the two totalitarian empires jointly solved their aggressive tasks. If the consequences of the German aggression for its victims were eliminated as a result of the Victory in 1945, then the status quo of August 1939 in Eastern Europe has not yet been fully restored. Therefore, it is quite natural that the revision of the meaning of the Second World War is inextricably linked with the theme of "overcoming the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" or otherwise - "the consequences of occupation."
At first glance, “overcoming the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,” the qualification of territorial acquisitions of the USSR, as an illegal occupation violating the norms of international law, do not pose any danger to modern Russia. The Russian Federation has long overcome these consequences for itself, returning to the borders not even of the USSR August August 1939, but to the bizarre combination of the borders of the Russian empire of the early 18th century with the borders of the Moscow kingdom of the early 17th century.
Having lost a hand, it is strange to be afraid of someone's intentions to chop off fingers from it. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are now no longer parts of Russia, but of the European Union. Poland must now resolve all claims regarding Vilnius, Western Belarus and Western Ukraine with Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, and not with Russia. Restoring the status quo in Bessarabia applies exclusively to Romania and Moldova. Therefore, it would seem that the problem of assessing the legality of the territorial acquisitions of the USSR, the problem of overcoming the consequences of the Covenant - this is another's problem and another's headache. For the Russian Federation she wears exclusively historical or historical and legal nature. As the saying goes, "there is no silver lining."
However, such an “optimistic” approach has no basis. This is a Russian problem, and not a historical one, but a political one. The problem on which the security of the country, its role and place in the world directly depends.
Baltic
The concept of "occupation" is the cornerstone of the statehood of the Baltic republics; without it, their modern political system is unthinkable. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania position themselves as a direct continuation (the doctrine of continuity) of pre-war states. According to the official version, in 1940 they were "occupied" by the USSR, but de jure retained their statehood and restored it in 1991. As the President of Estonia (1992-2001) Lennart Meri stated: "State power in Estonia or the Estonian concept of statehood - or, if you like, the philosophy of the state - is based on the continuity of the Estonian state "(1). He is also echoed by the current Estonian president Hendrik Ilves in an ETV New Year’s interview on the eve of 2012: “The Estonian state was created in 1918 and restored on the basis of legal continuity, and the president’s role is to protect the fundamental principles. The fact that Estonia was occupied is one of the biggest tragedies in the history of the Estonian people, and this was an injustice, this injustice will not give rise to any new law "(2). The position formulated by Estonian presidents can be fully attributed to both Latvia and Lithuania.
Such an understanding by the Baltic republics of their statehood is directly related to the problem of Russia's security.
Latvia and Estonia, from which in the RSFSR, while clarifying the administrative borders during the "occupation" period, some territories, mostly populated by Russians, were transferred, immediately after independence, began to make territorial claims to Russia on the Pytalovsky district (Latvia) and the city of Pechora , Izborsk, Ivangorod (Estonia).
Lithuania, unlike Latvia and Estonia, increased its territory by almost a third during its stay in the USSR, and even thanks to Moscow, Vilnius, previously occupied by Poland, returned its capital. Deprived of the opportunity to claim the territory, she decided to expose Russia (as the Soviet Union’s successor) a financial account: 13 July 2000 The Lithuanian Seim passed the “Law on Compensation for Damage Caused by the Occupation of the USSR”.
The law is based on the continuity (identical legal personality) of Russia, according to which "under international law, the Russian Federation is the legal successor of the rights and obligations of the USSR". On this basis, the Lithuanian government is ordered to calculate the damage and “start negotiations and constantly make efforts so that the Russian Federation will indemnify the people of Lithuania and the Lithuanian state for the damage caused by the USSR occupation” (3). There is even provision for the creation of a special account on which funds from Russia will be accumulated, transferred for the crimes of the “occupation regime.” Determined and the order of their use. The Lithuanian example has awakened financial appetites in Latvia and Estonia. In 2004, when presenting the results of calculating damages from the Soviet "occupation" to the Estonian president, the chairman of the special state commission for investigating repressive policies, Professor of the University of Toronto, Vello Salo (volunteered to fight on the side of the Third Reich) offered to demand from Russia for compensation oblast: "Let, for example, the Novosibirsk Oblast be given to our use, on the territory of which for a certain number of years we could make a forest blank "(4).
Such a requirement can in no way be considered as nonsense. The professor proceeded from historical precedent. Under the Yuryev Peace Treaty of 1920, the Bolsheviks not only recognized the secession of Estonia from Russia, ceded the Russian lands of Pechora, Izborsk and Ivangorod to her, but also transferred the 15 million rubles in gold to the Estonian side and provided one million dessiatine forests for the concession ( prompted the Soviet government to make such an agreement, see: Igor Pavlovsky, “Yurievsky Offshore: the Price of Yurievsky Peace” (5)).
The membership of Estonia in the European Union gives confidence to the professor: “There is a big difference - whether Estonia, which is 150 times smaller than Russia or the European Union, is three times larger than Russia, speaks to the Kremlin” (6).
In 2005 and in Latvia, the Commission began to operate on the calculation of damage from the "occupation". In 2009, due to the global financial crisis, its activities were temporarily suspended, but even the purely preliminary Latvian experts managed to count almost 200 billions of dollars that Russia must pay to Latvia affected by its "occupation".
There are no grounds for considering territorial and financial claims to Russia to be deeds of bygone days or regrettable but explainable costs of the formation of new democratic states (they will mature and everything will resolve itself).
The Lithuanian Seimas 9 June already 2011 adopted amendments to the law "On responsibility for the genocide of Lithuanian residents", aimed, according to the Lithuanian Ministry of Justice, to "people who suffered damage during the Nazi and Soviet occupation from 1940 to 1991 year , had the right to demand compensation, regardless of the statute of limitations "(7).
Undoubtedly, if the Baltic version of overcoming the consequences of the "occupation" was limited solely to issuing Russia multibillion-dollar bills and territorial claims, then there would be no reason to take it as a real and not a potential threat to Russian security. As V.Putin said: “They will receive not the Pytalovsky district, but their ears from a dead donkey” (8).
However, the main manifestation of the policy of overcoming the consequences of the "occupation" in the Baltic States is not the virtual demands of money and territories, calculated on the prospect of changing the internal political situation in Russia, but the very real, carried out for two decades now, discrimination of the Russian population.
President Ilves, answering a question from a Swiss journalist about the reasons for turning the Russian minority of Estonia into a "lower economic class", said: "They (Russians) were Herrenvolk (the people of the gentlemen - the journalist notes that Ilves spoke this word in German, although the interview was conducted in English) for 50 years, and were privileged in various historical contexts. Now that they no longer have privileges, some people consider it a defeat "(9).
Based on the concept of "occupation", the ethnocratic regimes of the Baltic states legally put the Russian population in their countries in an initially unequal position compared to the titular nations, in the position of second-class people. The direct connection of the concept of "occupation" with the legal status of Russians was quite frankly pointed out by the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Latvian Sejm Vaira Paegle: "If we abandon the concept of occupation, we jeopardize our policy regarding citizenship, with respect to non-citizens and their rights, and other key issues. It is clear that we cannot take such a step "(10) (emphasized by me - I.Sh).
Only in Estonia, when it was separated from the USSR, about a third of the population was at the legislative level limited in civil rights, obtaining the unique status of "persons with undetermined citizenship" (most of them were born in the Estonian SSR). As a result, in a democratic country, a member of the European Union, a significant part of the population, paying taxes regularly, was deprived of democratic representation, faced with the practice of "prohibitions on the profession," restrictions in economic activity.
Restrictions on the rights of any groups of the population and even their complete deprivation have been encountered several times in history, but in democratic states this was observed only in the United States of America before the cancellation of racial discrimination as a result of the mass public movement for the rights of black citizens by a special law in 1964 ).
In Europe, until the Baltic republics gained independence, there was no precedent for such a policy. As you know, the Third Reich did not declare itself a democratic state.
The restrictions imposed by the Baltic regimes concern not only fundamental political, but also fundamental human rights. In the past two decades, in the Baltics, the policy of restricting the rights of the Russian minority to receive education in their native language and its use in public and political life has been purposefully and methodically pursued.
Such language discrimination is justified, again by “occupation”. President Ilves clearly stated in the above-mentioned interview: “We are occupying your country and after 50 years we say that you have to make Estonian an official language. The occupation authorities seize land, deport hundreds of thousands of people to Siberia and send their people to these lands. And now when we are independent again, should the language of the occupation authorities become the second state language? Don't ask me any funny questions! " (11). It should be borne in mind that the policy of ethnic discrimination of the Russian population in the Baltic States was carried out and is being carried out with the full support of the European Union and the West as a whole. No international human rights structures considered it their duty to defend the rights of Russians. All of them show maximum understanding and sympathy for the authorities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, who are forced to overcome the legacy of the Soviet "occupation".
According to Lauri Mälksoo, an Estonian lawyer, a specialist in the history of international law, and above all in the concept of "occupation", such an approach cannot cause much surprise in light of the fact that most members of the international community recognized the restoration of the Baltic States in 1991 The fact that Soviet immigrants in Estonia and Latvia in 1992-93 became stateless persons was not considered as “discrimination” ipso facto ”(12).
Indeed, there is no such “big surprise” about Russian rights. Only a century and a half ago, N.Ya. Danilevsky noted this peculiarity of Europe: “Hangers, daggers and arsonists become heroes, since their vile actions are turned against Russia. Defenders of nationalities are silent, since it’s about protecting the Russian people” (13). Time beyond recognition changes political forms, but the civilizational essence remains unchanged.
The almost unconditional support of the anti-democratic policies by Western democracies does not prevent the Baltic ethnocracies from complaining about the restriction of the sovereignty of their countries by the European Union because of the Russian minority. According to Lauri Mälksoo, the Estonian and Latvian states "were denied full freedom in the implementation of the citizenship policy. Thus, these states do not have the full" freedom "to decide when and on the basis of which criteria they grant citizenship rights to Russian immigrants" (14 ).
Such complaints are especially interesting due to the fact that the current situation of the Russians, in the absence of "full freedom of the hands", is usually characterized as a European kind of apartheid.
Of course, in Russia there are quite influential forces for which the infringement of the rights of Russians in the Baltic States is not a Russian problem. As Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made clear at a joint press conference with his Latvian counterpart on the basis of Russian-Latvian negotiations: the position of the Russians in Latvia is an internal affair of the Latvian state. Answering the journalist's question about the situation of compatriots in Latvia, the President of Russia said: "I think that these questions, in fact, need to be asked to our colleagues, because we are talking about a situation that is in Latvia, not in Russia" (15) .
There is nothing surprising about this approach. In the liberal system of coordinates, the population of Russia constitutes a civic nation of "Russians", the ethnic identity of which does not matter for the state and is an intimate affair (and even the choice) of every citizen. As Professor VDKuznechevsky writes, the Russian liberals "attempted to revive the Suslov-Brezhnev chimera and in another form return to the concept of" Soviet man ", removing all generic national characteristics from this international homunculus. The" Russian nation "was invented (16), or the nation of "Russians".
Accordingly, the Russian state should be protected abroad not by Russians, but by “Russians”, i.e. Russian citizens. The need for protection and support of the Russian language abroad is determined by the fact that, due to the historically established practice of the "Russians" to use it, it is recognized as the official language of Russia.
According to this logic, the position of the Russians in the Baltic states concerns the Russian Federation more than the position of the Ethiopians in Zimbabwe, only because of the Russian language of the former. Talk Ethiopians in Russian, for the Russian government would have disappeared any difference.
However, in addition to the liberal community in Russia, there is also a state-forming Russian nation, the number of which exceeds 80% of the population. How this “intimate” property or choice (by liberal notions) of the overwhelming majority of “Russians” turns the problem of discrimination of Russians in the Baltic states into a problem of the Russian state, is shown by the example of Israel. In Israel, a little over 70% of "Israelis" intimately chose their Jewish ethnicity. Israel, a state with an established democratic system of government, considers it its duty and sacred duty to defend the rights of Jews throughout the world, regardless of their Israeli citizenship. This is done not because of philanthropy or the neglect of the liberal principles of a civil nation, but in view of the clear understanding of the obvious truth: the interests of the state and the state-forming nation (real, not virtual - "civil") are inseparable.
A nation indifferent to the oppression of fellow tribesmen is not viable, the state of the nation that is not viable makes the state created by it unviable. In turn, an unviable state is not able to effectively defend the interests of the nation that created it, which already adversely affects its life forces. Vicious circle.
This fully applies not only to Israel and the Jews, but also to all other nations and states, including the Russian people and Russia. Therefore, the infringement of the rights of Russians in the Baltic States under the slogan of overcoming the consequences of the "occupation" is a direct and unconditional challenge to Russia's security.
Poland
In contrast to the Baltic republics, the Polish state did not formally declare the need to overcome the consequences of the fourth division of Poland "conditioned by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" and, accordingly, it has not made any territorial or financial claims. But this is only one side of the coin.
Poland is a recognized generator of the Eastern policy of the European Union, the main instigator and engine of the EU Eastern Partnership program. At the same time, as the REGNUM Editor-in-Chief Modest Kolerov notes: “There is no evidence that Poland is ready to recognize its traditional bicentennial imperialist goals in the East and turn this tradition into a basis for partnership. Warsaw conducts a dialogue so that Russia repent for the USSR, and does not give up its traditional goals in the East "(17).
In 2009, the Polish Sejm qualified the liberation of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine from the Polish yoke as Soviet aggression, and their reunification with the USSR as the “fourth section” of the Commonwealth. “On September 17, 1939 of the year,” says the Resolution, “Soviet troops, without declaring war, committed aggression against Rzecz Pospolita, violating its sovereignty and violating international law. between the USSR and Hitler's Germany. Thus the fourth partition of Poland was made "(23).
This Resolution can in no way be considered as a document that refers exclusively to the past and expresses only the opinion of the highest legislative body of the Polish state on the events of seventy years ago. The goal of the Resolution is not the past, but the future. In the Resolution for the first time officially, at the level of the highest legislative body of a European country, the Soviet Union is declared the aggressor, on a par with Germany, responsible for the start of the Second World War.
It provides a legal basis for the possible (under favorable conditions), and quite logical with such an assessment of the events of September 1939 of the year, the requirement to overcome the consequences of the "aggression" and the "fourth section" of Poland. Moreover, at the information and propaganda level, such training has been going on for many years.
The trend has already become so obvious that after the 2011 autumn summit of the Eastern Partnership, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko could not stand it and undocumentedly called things by their names, accusing Poland of trying to “take away” Western Belarus by hook or by crook. “At the last event there was a thousand diplomatic quirks from their side. This is Poland! Well, they are great figures! They sleep and see that the border of Poland passes near Minsk, they can’t agree with the fact that the border is beyond Grodno. Buy in Poland geographical maps, you will see there: the border near Minsk. This is Stalin’s bad - he took and took the lands of Western Belorussia from the Poles "(19), - said A.G. Lukashenko.
Of course, frank and consistent preparation of the ground for claims on Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine, first of all, concerns the present-day Belarus and Ukraine. But we must not forget that Belarus and the Russian Federation form the Union State (albeit largely formally), belong to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and jointly build the Eurasian Union. Therefore, the potential (for the time being, potential) threat to the territorial integrity of Belarus, emanating from the “historical policy” of Poland, is in full measure a potential threat to the security of Russia as well.
If we “overcome” the Austro-Polish-Bolshevik-liberal myth that only Great Russians are considered Russian, and Belarusians and Ukrainians are deprived of this right, and return to their traditional understanding of the three branches of a single Russian nation, then the direct connection of the official Polish concept The "fourth section" of Poland on security issues of the Russian Federation will become even more obvious.
Bessarabia
The situation with overcoming the consequences of the "occupation" of Bessarabia has its pronounced specificity.
In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the policy of overcoming the consequences of the "occupation" is already really being implemented at the state level since their separation from the USSR.
In Poland, consistently and purposefully, the legal and political ground is still being prepared for possible future consequences of the "fourth section" of the Commonwealth.
In Romania and Moldova, the legal foundations for overcoming the consequences of the "occupation" of the Soviet Union by Bessarabia were laid two decades ago. Accordingly, in the "Declaration on the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and its consequences for our country" dated 24 June 1991, and in the "Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova" dated 27 in August 1991. In the Declarations Bessarabia (Moldova) was proclaimed "occupied" by the Soviet The Union of the Territory of Romania set the task of "liquidating the political and legal consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact" (20).
In the following years, the Romanian authorities and the pro-Romanian forces in Moldova have been persistently trying to translate this legal framework into a real policy to overcome the consequences of the "occupation". So far unsuccessfully. Independent Transnistria and the reluctance of the majority of the population of Moldova to become Romanians, do not allow them to expand the borders of Romania.
Despite this, they do not lose hope. It is significant that Romania, the first to recognize the separatist regime of Moldova, still refuses to sign the border treaty with the sovereign Moldova. As the President of Romania told Basescu, “Who can imagine that the head of the Romanian state will sign an agreement that would legitimize the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact? Only he who doesn’t reach what the responsibility of the head of the Romanian state means (21) .
If the “historical policy” of the Baltic republics is a real challenge to Russia, and Poland is a potential challenge, then the desire to overcome the consequences of the “occupation” of Bessarabia may seem to be not affecting the interests of the Russian Federation and not threatening its security.
Indeed, what difference does it make to Russia, whether or not the Dniester and Prut interfluve will be part of Romania or not? It is no longer Russian. Moreover, this development may even be beneficial for the Russian Federation.
Overcoming the consequences of the "occupation" opens in legal terms before friendly Russia Transnistria the prospect of international recognition of independence, and the subsequent legitimate entry into Russia. In the 2006 referendum, 97% of Transnistrians voted for "independence and subsequent free accession to the Russian Federation." The grounds for this view are provided by the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova. It contains an extremely important statement that the Law on the formation of the allied Moldavian SSR of 2.8.1940 and subsequent legislative acts were adopted "in the absence of any real legal justification" (22). This is a unique feature of the Declaration. As Professor N.V. Babilung points out, “the declaration of one’s own statehood as a result of a foreign occupation regime is not so often met in world practice” (23). In accordance with the Declaration of Independence, on which modern Moldova is founded, Transnistria de jure does not belong to this state. The left bank of the Dniester, formerly part of the Ukrainian SSR, was combined with Bessarabia just by the invalid Law of 2 of August 1940 of the year.
Therefore, overcoming the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for Bessarabia should include not only the accession of Moldova to Romania, but also recognition of the independence of the Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublika. Transdniestria, in turn, is free to decide for itself how to live further and with whom to unite.
Complete idyll for Moscow. We are changing Moldova to Transnistria. As a result, Romania gets what Russia no longer belongs. Russia, without undertaking any efforts and not entering into conflict with the West, ensures the protection of the interests of its citizens (more than a third of Transdniestrian residents are citizens of the Russian Federation), and their geopolitical interests on the Dniester.
However, all this has nothing to do with reality. Here there is a direct analogy with the "historical policy" of Lithuania. On the one hand, overcoming the consequences of the "occupation" in Lithuania has been elevated to the rank of state policy. On the other hand, it does not even occur to anyone to expect that Lithuania within the framework of this policy will hand over Vilnius to Poland. The condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact gets along very well there with the celebration of the day of the return of Vilnius.
Similarly, the pro-Romanian politicians of Moldova, who proclaim Moldovan statehood as a product of Stalin’s policies and who seek to eliminate the consequences of the “occupation” of Bessarabia, are not going to give up a centimeter from the borders drawn by Stalin and insist on their sovereignty over Transdniestria. Moreover, under the anti-Stalinist slogans and with Romanian support, they organized aggression against Transdniestria that declared independence. The purpose of the aggression was obvious - to return the territories annexed by Stalin, and go with them to Romania.
The need to restore the territorial integrity of Moldova (synonymous with the accession of the Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic of Moldova) is constantly stated by Romania with the European Union and the USA.
There is nothing surprising in this, and the notorious “double standards” have nothing to do with it. The standard is always the same - interests. The goal of overcoming the "occupation" policy is not the restoration of the norms of international law allegedly violated by Stalin once, but the realization of the interests of the elites of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Moldova and Romania. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the "occupation", as well as international law in general, for them are just tools, means of ensuring their interests.
Therefore, to rely on, Romania and the pro-Romanian forces of Moldova will put the slogans and tools (norms of law) above their interests, go against them, and agree to the independence of Transnistria, there is no reason. With the full support of the West and the liberal community of Russia, they fought for, and will continue to fight, for Transnistria.
It is not by chance that, using the announced “reset” of relations, the West immediately tried to get Russia to surrender Transnistria. We are changing Transnistria to abolish visas. Russia was actually offered for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Transnistria sometime in the future to cancel the visa regime with the European Union.
Moreover, all specialists, both in Russia and in the West, are well aware that only the presence of Russian peacekeepers is holding back a new aggression against the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and its annexation. As the director of the Center for Political Technologies, Sergey Mikheyev, notes, if Russian troops leave Transnistria, a new war will begin there, “and if Romania appears there, then there will be just a massacre” (24). In Washington, Brussels, Berlin and Paris, they understand this no worse.
It is particularly noteworthy that in a new attempt with the help of Russian liberals to oust Russia from Transnistria, Germany plays the first violin, and not Romania.
The thesis that overcoming the consequences of the "occupation" of Bessarabia, which presumes Moldova’s accession to Romania, does not affect the security of Russia, is also not true. Consideration of the geopolitical significance of the Prut-Dniester interfluve is not the purpose of this work, reference to the opinion of the “experts” competent in these issues would be quite enough.
The border of the Russian Empire exactly two hundred years ago was transferred from the Dniester to the Danube and Prut thanks to the leadership and diplomatic talents of Kutuzov. At least, it is strange to consider the results of the exploits of Suvorov's miraculous heroes (the border on the Dniester is approximately modern Transnistria) and do not recognize the significance of the victory of Kutuzov (the border on Danube and Prut is approximately modern Moldova). In the twentieth century, Bessarabia, lost during the Civil War, found it necessary to return Stalin to the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that competence in matters of strategy of Kutuzov and Stalin is in no way less than the competence of modern Russian politicians.
The argument about changing the geopolitical interests of states in time is refuted by the policies of the EU and NATO (and not only Romania), which is definitely aimed at ousting Russia from both Transdniestria and Moldova. It is difficult to assume that they are doing this, taking care of the interests of Russia, or that they are not competent in strategic matters.
The obvious fact of the almost complete loss by Russia of its positions in Moldova does not cancel the objective need for their restoration. To do this after the inclusion of Moldova in the EU and NATO will be many times more difficult. Which is also obvious.
With all geopolitical significance for Russia between the Dniester and Prut rivers, no less, if not more important, is the centuries-old spiritual and civilizational unity of the Moldavian and Russian peoples, their affiliation, by definition, of His Holiness Patriarch Cyril, to the Russian world.
From the geopolitical point of view, as already mentioned, overcoming the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the form of joining Bessarabia to Romania is a deferred challenge and now for Russia almost nothing will change - moving NATO's borders from the Danube to the Dniester will not fundamentally affect the security of Russia.
Already in the present, this will have completely different consequences for Russia from a civilizational, spiritual point of view. Moldova's accession to Romania will inevitably entail its separation from the Russian world. For the Moldovan people, such a development is fraught with the loss of their “I”, their identity. But no less serious consequences will be for the whole Russian world, as a civilizational integrity. Including the Russian Federation. The Russian nation is the root of the Russian world. Therefore, the weakening of the Russian world means its spiritual weakening. The spiritual weakening of the state-forming nation is a direct and immediate threat to the security of the state created by it.
During the pastoral visit to Chisinau, His Holiness Patriarch Kirill revealed this interconnection and interdependence figuratively: “The Lord will give me strength and strength in carrying out my Patriarchal service, Moldova and the Moldovan people will always be in my heart. Not at the periphery - in the center, therefore that the heart has no periphery. If the heart is afflicting the disease, then it doesn’t matter where the heart muscle is infarcted - the whole heart is shaken by pain. And if the pain continues, then the heart stops "(25).
***
Consideration of the manifestations of the policy of overcoming the consequences of the "occupation" in the Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Moldova suggests that the concept of "occupation" and the "historical policy" based on it are either a direct or potential challenge to Russia's security all the way from Baltic to Black Sea.
At the same time, this challenge cannot be reduced only to regional security issues.
The policy of overcoming the consequences of "occupation" has a very specific global dimension. If the territorial expansion of the Soviet Union in 1939-1940. recognized by the "occupation" of the Baltic states, Bessarabia and the "fourth section" of Poland, then it becomes possible to put the USSR on a par with the Third Reich. It is possible to “prove” that at the first stage of the Second World War, two aggressive empires jointly divided the world, until the imperialistic instincts pushed them into a deadly confrontation. That is why the concept of "occupation" is given one of the key places in the large-scale campaign of the West to substitute the meanings of the Second World War. Along with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the concept of "occupation" is designed to facilitate the transfer of the Russian Federation from the winners and founders of the modern world order, to the position of the successor to the defeated aggressor.
So, it would seem, the purely regional and even parochial historical claims of limiting countries become elements of the collapse of the USSR and the bipolar system of the world order of the struggle for the geopolitical redivision of the world. The struggle, the rate in which for Russia is not money and pieces of territory, but its future, sovereignty and civilizational identity. Although the money and the territory in case of defeat on the "historical" field, of course, will be selected.
In this regard, the question of the legality of the accession to the USSR of the Baltic States, Western Belarus, Western Ukraine and Bessarabia for the Russian Federation is not a historical or historical-legal issue, but a political one, on which the security of the Russian state directly depends. It will not be possible to leave him, despite all the desire of the Russian authorities to avoid confrontation with the West and to leave history to historians. * * *
(1) Cit. by: Myalksoo L. Soviet annexation and state continuity: The international legal status of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940-1991. and after 1991. Study of the conflict between standardization and power in international law. Tartu. Publishing house of Tartu University. 2005. C.73.
(2) http://www.dzd.ee/684266/ilves-okkupacija-jestonii-byla-nespravedlivostju/
(3) Cit. by: Myalksoo L. Soviet annexation and state continuity. C.372-373.
(4) http://lenta.ru/world/2004/05/12/estonia/
(5) http://www.regnum.ru/news/948103.html
(6) http://www.gorod.lv/novosti/354-vello_salo_vopros_vostrebovaniya_rossiyskih_kompensatsiy_dlya_estonii_stanet_delom_vsey_evropyi
(7) http://www.regnum.ru/news/1370061.html
(8) http://www.newsru.ru/russia/23may2005/otmertvogoslaushi.html
(9) http://www.ves.lv/article/197306
(10) http://www.regnum.ru/news/1485565.html
(11) http://www.ves.lv/article/197306
(12) Myalksoo L. Soviet annexation and state continuity. C.259
(13) N.Y. Danilevsky Russia and Europe. M., Book, 1991. C.49
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(24) http://www.regnum.ru/news/1348327.html
(25) http://ava.md/news/012995-patriarh-kirill-moldova-i-moldavskii-narod-vsegda-budut-v-moem-serdce.html
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