Shipbuilding Program of the Russian Navy, or a Very Bad Premonition (part of 5)
In this article we will consider the construction of domestic "mosquito" forces and summarize the cycle.
Despite the fact that in the USSR they paid great attention to the development of small fleet, in the GPV program 2011-2020. included a minimum of strike ships with a displacement of less than a thousand tons. They planned to build 6 small artillery ships (IAC) of project 21630 "Buyan" and several of their "older brothers", small missile ships "Buyan-M" - and that, in fact, was all.
The purpose of these ships is not easy to understand. Take, for example, the Buyan artillery: a small, about 500 ton displacement, the ship had to have good seaworthiness, but a small draft, so as to be able to act at the small depths of the northern Caspian Sea and the Volga River. But what is there to do with an artillery ship? The artillery of the “Buyan” consists of the 100-mm artillery system, two 30-mm “metal-cutters” AK-306, the “Bending” launcher (for using standard Igla MANPADS) and the Grad-MRLS, and the RSZO hints at the possibility of against shore targets. This is fine, but if we create a river ship for action against the enemy’s land forces, then who will be his most dangerous enemy? Ordinary tank - it is perfectly protected and has a powerful gun that can quickly cause critical damage to the ship in a few hundred tons. And in the composition of the weapons "Buyana" is missing weaponcapable of knocking out a tank. Of course, we can assume that the installation tank guns on a ship of such a small displacement would create problems, but placement of a modern ATGM should not cause any difficulties. But even with the ATGM, the river ship can hardly count on survival in modern combat - it is quite large and noticeable (and no Stealth technologies will help here), but it’s practically not even protected from small arms, services will have to be "substituted" under fire from the shore.
MAK project 21630 "Makhachkala"
With the project 21631, or MRK "Buyan-M", is still more difficult. It is larger (949 t), but just like the Buyan, it belongs to the river-sea type of ships. Two AK-306 installations changed the Spark AK-630М-2 Duet, but the main innovation is the abandonment of the MLRS and the installation of the Caliber missiles on the 8. But why the river, in essence, a ship, such fire power? Against who? A few Iranian missile boats? So they PKR "Uranus" will be behind the eyes, and in general such a trifle is much easier to destroy from the air. In general, the composition of the “Buyan-M” weapons looks completely incomprehensible, but exactly until we remember the international treaties limiting armaments, and in particular the INF Treaty on December 8 of 1987.
A detailed description of the reasons why the United States and the USSR signed this agreement is clearly beyond the scope of this article, but it should be noted that the agreement banning the ground deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles of medium (1000-5500 km) and small (500-1000 km ) The range was beneficial to both parties. The Americans were deprived of the opportunity to deliver a disarming attack on the most important targets on the territory of the USSR (only 1613 km in a straight line from Berlin to Moscow), and such a blow threatened to become really “lightning fast” - the flight time of the “Pershing-2” was just 8-10 minutes . The USSR, in turn, was deprived of the opportunity to destroy the main European ports in one short stroke and thereby block the transfer of US ground forces to Europe, which, against the background of the superiority of the ATS countries in conventional armaments, made the NATO position completely hopeless. Interestingly, under the INF Treaty of the USSR, it was forced to abandon the RK-55 "Relief", which is a land variant of the C-10 "Granat" sea missile, which became the forerunner of "Caliber".
Self-propelled launcher 9В2413 complex RK-55 "Relief"
However, it should be remembered that under the INF Treaty, only land-based missiles were destroyed, but air and sea cruise missiles remained permitted. In the era when the USSR was alive, which possessed a powerful fleet and missile-carrying aviation, this did not carry an excessive threat, but now that the Russian Federation, at sea and in the air, has only a shadow of former Soviet power, this restriction has begun to play against us. Yes, the United States of America destroyed its land-based Tomahawks, but they now have 85 surface ships and 57 nuclear-powered submarines capable of carrying sea-based Tomahawks, and any of their destroyers can take dozens of such missiles on board. The capabilities of our fleet are incomparably smaller, and the only serious “counterargument” is strategic aviation, capable of carrying medium-range missiles, but here too our capabilities are far from desired. Under these conditions, the creation of a certain number of cruise missile launch vehicles capable of navigating through a single deep-sea system in the European part of the Russian Federation (of course, provided that it is still maintained in a sufficiently “deep-sea” state) makes some sense. Not a panacea, of course, but ...
In view of the foregoing, it is quite understandable to refuse the further construction of the 21630 “Buyan” ships (three ships of this type that became part of the Caspian Flotilla were incorporated in 2004-2006, that is, long before HPV-2011-2020). and the tab of the nine interregional companies of the 21631 “Buyan-M” project, the last of which is to be commissioned in the 2019 year. Accordingly, we can say that the plans for the SPV 2011-2020. in part of the "mosquito" fleet will be fully implemented. And even exceeded.
The fact is that in addition to “Buyanam” and “Buyanam-M”, which were planning to build according to the HPO 2011-2020, the Russian Federation began the construction of small rocket ships of the 22800 “Karakurt” project. These ships will have a displacement of the order of 800 t, i.e. even less “Buyan-M”, speed up to 30 units, armament - all the same 8 “Calibers”, 100-mm (or 76-mm) gun mounts and anti-aircraft missile and artillery complex. According to some reports, the Pantsir-M or Palash were to be put on ships of this type, and that would be a good choice, but the Mortar Storm’s hired board hints that at least the first ships of the series will have to get by with old AK-630 or even 306. Initially it was assumed that the series will be 18 ships, then there were suggestions that it will be reduced to 10-12 ships.
Where did they come from, because in the original HPV 2011-2020. nothing like that? Perhaps the most resonant statement related to "Karakurts" were the words of the commander-in-chief of the Navy V. Chirkov, told by him on July 1 on 2015:
In what they didn’t blame the commander in chief after these words ... the softest epithet "on the Internet" was "the inconsistency of the position". And really, how can you replace high-grade frigates with eight hundred-ton IRAs?
No, and it is obvious. But V. Chirkov was not going to change frigates to Karakurts, because the commander-in-chief does not have any frigates “for exchange”. Three ships of the project 11356 will come to the Black Sea, and a point. For the other three there are no engines, but there is nothing to say about 22350: all the problems are described in previous articles, and it is clear that even the head Admiral Gorshkov will replenish the fleet very much and not very soon. For frigates, the HPV program 2011-2020 failed miserably, and the only way to at least partially alleviate the situation is to build ships of other classes. The question is not that we build ISCs instead of frigates, but that we either get the frigate 3 to the Black Sea, and that’s all, or we get the same 3 frigate and in addition to them some ships of the 22800 project. About this and said the commander in chief.
Project view "Karakurt"
But here another question arises. If we, being aware of the need to urgently replenish the ship composition, are ready to replace the frigates, which we will not build anyway, in the terms we need with other ships, then why was the 22800 “Karakurt” project chosen? Do we really need small rocket ships?
Surprisingly, but a fact: at the stage of formation of our shipbuilding program, the command of the Russian Navy almost completely abandoned the marine mosquito fleet (represented by small rocket / anti-submarine ships and boats). Scheduled for construction in HPO 2011-2020 The “Buyans-M”, in essence, are mobile river platforms for launching the “Kalibr” KR, belong to the “river-sea” type and do not have sufficient seaworthiness to operate in the open sea. How justified was the abandonment of rocket boats and / or IRAs?
Let's try to guess: it is known that small rocket ships and boats are fully capable of operating in coastal areas and can be effective against surface ships of the enemy, both in their class and larger ones, such as a corvette or a frigate. But they have a number of unrecoverable "vices": narrow specialization, very modest air defense, small size (why the use of weapons is limited by excitement to a greater degree than that of larger ships) and a relatively small range of progress. All this leads to the fact that modern ground-based aviation and long-range mobile coastal missile systems are fully capable of replacing missile boats and IRAs. Moreover, modern IRAs are not a cheap pleasure. According to some data, the price of the IRAs of the 22800 “Karakurt” project amounts to 5-6 billion rubles, i.e. corresponds to the cost of 4-5 type aircraft Su-30 or Su-35. At the same time, the main enemy in our coastal waters will not be enemy rocket boats or frigates, but submarines against which RTOs are useless.
Apparently, such (or similar) considerations played a role in the formation of the LG-2011-2020. In addition, the program involved the massive construction of corvettes, which are capable of performing, inter alia, the functions of RTOs. That's just the construction of corvettes also not wondered. What is left? Lay the new "Buyan-M"? But they, by virtue of their "belonging" "river-sea", are not sufficiently navigable. Another question: why do our RTOs are seaworthy? If we assume that the range of Caliber missiles for ground targets is 2 600 km, then the same Grad Sviyazhsk (the leading ship of the Buyan-M type), anchored in the cozy bay of Sevastopol, is quite capable of striking at Berlin. Well, going to Evpatoria, it will reach London. Thus, from the point of view of a big war with NATO countries, the seaworthiness of our RTOs is not very necessary.
But this is from the position of a big war, and in fact the fleet is not only a military but also a political tool, and it is used regularly in politics. At the same time, the state of our surface forces so ... does not correspond to the tasks facing them, even in peacetime, that in the current, 2016, year we were forced to send to strengthen the Mediterranean squadron "Green Doll" of the "Buyan-M" project. It is clear that the Russian Federation in its military capabilities by orders of magnitude inferior to the USSR, and today no one expects the revival of the Mediterranean 5 OPESK in all the splendor of its former power: 70-80 pennants, including three dozen combat surface ships and a dozen submarines . But sending a river-sea type ship to the Mediterranean service ... even for today's RF, this is an obvious overwhelming. However, let's not forget that in the USSR they could not provide the Mediterranean squadron exclusively with ships of the first rank: starting from 1975 (or still 1974?), Small rocket ships were sent to reinforce the 5 OPESK (this is a project of 1234 “Gadfly "). It is worth paying tribute to their crews:
Service in the "alien sea" on a boat in 700 tons of full displacement ... "Yes, there were people in our time." But, according to eyewitness recollections, our “sworn friends” from the 6 fleet took the “Gadgets” very seriously:
Of course, the author of this article did not participate in the BS as part of the TUG, composed of "Gadfly", but sees no reason to ignore such memories: a group of 3-4 such ships, each armed with 6 missiles "Malachite" and carrying combat duty in relative proximity to the AUG, represented a serious threat to American ships. In view of the foregoing, the construction of the series of MRs of the 22800 project, which differ from “Buyanov-M” in the first place with increased seaworthiness, has a definite meaning. Of course, an attempt to solve the tasks of frigates (and better - destroyers) by small rocket ships, is, of course, a palliative, but in the absence of official paper, you have to write in idle.
Thus, the construction of a series of MRKs for the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy is fully justified by the gloomy realities of today, and would not cause questions if ... if the patrol ships of the project were not laid at the Zelenodolsk CVD in 2014, the 2011-2020 GVVX 22160.
Estimated appearance of the patrol ship project 22160
On the one hand, reading about their purpose on the manufacturer’s official website, you get the impression that this is not so much about a warship, but about something borderline with giving the function of MES:
Accordingly, try to enter them into the existing “table of ranks” of warships according to the LG 2011-2020. there seems to be no point - the problems are completely wrong. Yes, and the performance characteristics, to put it mildly, are not impressive: “around 1 300 tons” the standard displacement for the domestic corvette is somehow not enough (“Guarding” - 1 800 t), but a lot for RTOs. The standard armament - one 57-mm artillery unit A-220M, “Bending” and a pair of 14,5-mm machine guns — are quite sufficient for a border guard or a pirate catcher, when the most dangerous thing that threatens a ship is a speedboat with light rifle weapons. But for a serious fight such a set, of course, is not suitable.
But here are the other characteristics: hydroacoustic complex MGK-335EM-03 and GAS Vignetka-EM. The latter is capable of detecting submarines at a distance of up to 60 km in the sonar or noise-finding mode. What are they on the patrol ship for? Environmental monitoring of the environment? So that no Turkish poachers on their “Atylai” (German diesel-electric submarine type 209) would disturb the eco-balance of the region to us? And if they break, then what? Finger shocked? No anti-submarine armament on the patrol ship 22160 seems to be provided. There is only a helicopter, but it says about it:
Of course, the Ka-27PL from the ant-submarine Ka-27PS is not that fundamentally different, and if the PS can be based, so maybe the PL will be able to accommodate? There is a hangar, there is fuel, there is maintenance too, there remains the question of an ammunition depot for an antisubmarine helicopter and their maintenance / supply, but perhaps this can be solved? But then - the most delicious:
1 LAWS "Calm-1" with two modular PU 3C90E.1.
1 integrated caliber-NKE rocket system.
Of course, either one or the other can be installed on the 22160 project ship, and according to reports made in October 2015, it will be the “Gauges” that will be installed.
From the point of view of percussion functionality, such a ship will not lose anything to the 22800 project's MRC: the same 8 Calibers, the same speed in 30 nodes, but as a “force projection” 22160 is preferable, if only because of a larger displacement ( means, and seaworthiness) and the presence of a helicopter (allowing to monitor the movements of those we are afraid). On the other hand, artillery and other armament is an obvious step back — instead of 76-mm or even 100-mm AU — only a weak 57-mm, instead of ZRAK, it is only “Bending” with its capabilities of a conventional MANPADS. But the presence of sufficiently powerful sonar equipment, which is completely devoid of the 22800 project: in combination with a helicopter and anti-submarine "Caliber" is not so bad.
In fact, in the 22160 project, we see another attempt to create a corvette, and it could even be successful: slightly add displacements, replace “Bending” with the SIGNATURE, put “weave” instead of 57-mm cannons ... But again it did not work out. And most importantly, if we really think that our fleet needs such a “peaceful tractor”, that is, a patrol ship with a powerful gas and eight “Gauges” (absolutely indispensable means of environmental monitoring, yes), then why not just start mass construction 22160, without being distracted by any "Karakurt"?
Okay. The author of these articles is not a professional naval sailor, and, of course, does not understand much in naval art. It can be assumed that with the patrol ships of the 22160 project, something turned out to be wrong, and they are not suitable for our fleet. And therefore the ships will not go into the big series, they laid two such patrol ships in 2014, and that's enough, and instead they will be more suitable for the Russian Navy "Karakurt". After all, the first ships of the project 22800 ("Hurricane" and "Typhoon") laid in December 2015 of the year.
But if so, then why in February and May 2016 of the year was laid the next pair of patrol ships 22160?
If you look closely at what we are doing now in the small military shipbuilding, the hair just stands on end. We began to recreate the Russian Navy after a huge break in military shipbuilding. If there was some kind of plus, it is that we could start everything from scratch and avoid the mistakes of the USSR Navy, the main of which was the creation of many non-unified projects. And how did we take advantage of this opportunity? Here is the corvette 20380, it does not all go well with a diesel power plant. But in the 2014 year, we proceed to the serial construction of patrol ships in much the same functionality, in which the power plant is different, and more powerful, but also diesel. What for? Few attacked the same rake? Or, perhaps, there are some reasonable assumptions that the new power plant will be more reliable than the previous one? But why not unify it with the power plant, which is used on 20380 / 20385 corvettes, in order to continue their construction? Why do we need two types of corvettes at all (and the patrol ship 22160, in essence, is) a similar purpose? And at the same time, small rocket ships, in which, naturally, power plants will be different from both 20380 projects and 22160? Why do we need to use 100-mm, 76-mm and 57-mm artillery units at the same time? Or (if 76-mm is still refused) 100-mm and 57-mm? Why do we need the simultaneous production of Pantsir-M (or Chestnut) and much weaker Bending? Survey radar on the corvette of the 20380 project - “Furke” and “Furke-2”, on the patrol ship of the 22160 project - “Positive-МЭ1”, on the MRK of the 22800 project - “Mineral-M”. Why do we need this zoo? Are we seriously gathered to outdo the USSR in terms of the range of weapons being manufactured ?!
According to the author, the problem is as follows. The corvette of the 20380 project was created by the Almaz PKB, and the patrol ship of the 22160 project was created by the Northern PKB. Collectives are different, and subcontractors are different too. In the end, everyone is concerned with the promotion of their own products, and not at all unification with competitors' ships. On the one hand, this is a natural consequence of market competition, but on the other hand, why does the state need such consequences? Of course, competition is a blessing, it doesn’t “nurture the fat” and “rest on its laurels,” therefore, in shipbuilding, and in any other industry, it is highly undesirable to close everything on one team. But you need to understand that honest, decent competition only happens in economics books for authorship of professors divorced from life, and in our reality, it is not the one who offers the best product that wins the reality, but the one who has the greater “administrative resource” or other similar "benefits". Accordingly, it is up to the state’s business to establish such “rules of the game” in which the benefits of competition would be maximal and the damage minimized. One of these “rules” could be the requirement for all creative teams to unify weapons and units when designing ships of the same (or similar) classes. Of course, this is easy only on paper, but the benefits of such an approach are undoubted.
Conclusion: the construction of the "mosquito" fleet is the only area in the part of the surface shipbuilding where we will seriously overtake the schedule by the year of 2020. However, the only reason we do this is to try to replace larger ships (frigates and corvettes) with something that can sail on the sea. Given the unreasonable heterogeneity of projects, there is little joy in this.
Well, let's summarize the fulfillment of the shipbuilding program for the HPN 2011-2020.
The only position where we failed, not much, is the 955 Borey SSBN. It is quite possible that we still get 8 ships of this type before 2020 (not 10, as planned, but the deviation in 20% is not that bad). Reducing the number of "Ash", obviously, will lead to the fact that at least in the period to 2025 (and with probability to 2030), the number of atomic multi-purpose submarines will decrease even from the current, completely insufficient number of them. The Lada 677 naval project turned out to be a failure: instead of the 2011-2020 expected by LG. 14 units will be commissioned only three ships of this type, and even those, given the rejection of their large-scale construction, are likely to be of limited combat capability. We will have to replenish the fleet of non-nuclear submarines with Varshavyanki, but if the order for 6 of such diesel-electric submarines for the Pacific is placed in a timely manner, then there are good chances to get 6 of the Black Sea and 6 of Pacific-AED diesel-electric submarines in time.
The amphibious ship construction program failed completely: instead of the four Mistrals and the Grenov 6, we might get the Grena 2. An error in assessing the importance of localizing ship power plants in Russia led to the fact that before 2020, instead of the planned 14 frigates, the fleets would receive a little over a third, i.e. only five, and that provided that "Polyment-Redut" by some miracle will bring to mind. The corvette construction program, even if timely supplied, four patrol ships of the 22160 project, which we also write to the corvettes, will be completed with 46%, while the Redut air defense problems will follow 11 ships from 16, and problems with the power plant will all 16. But the construction of 9 "Buyanov" according to the plan and a dozen "Karakurts" above the plan, most likely, will go on schedule, unless the company "Pella", which had not been involved in the construction of warships, and "More" in Feodosia, which (because of being part of a separatist Ukraine) for a long time was not seriously engaged in military construction.
In general, we have to state that the shipbuilding program in the framework of HPV 2011-2020. did not take place, and for some reason not because of a lack of funding, but as a result of systemic errors in the strategy of the development of the Navy, the organization of the work of the military-industrial complex and the control of this work by the state.
And yet this is not the end. Despite the fiasco of the 2011-2020 shipbuilding program, the country still has about 15 years before the ships that replenished the national fleet during the years of the USSR and early Russian Federation and make up the backbone of the Russian Navy today. The future of our fleet depends on whether the leadership of the country, the Defense Ministry, the Navy and the military industrial complex can draw the right conclusions based on the results of the HPN 2011-2020, and whether they have enough energy to reverse the situation.
There is still time. But he has very little left.
Thank you for attention!
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