Shipbuilding Program of the Russian Navy, or a Very Bad Premonition (part of 4)
Corvette "Savvy", 27 July 2014 g.
This article is devoted to the frigates of the “admiral” series of the 11356 project, as well as to domestic corvettes.
Frigates project 11356
Regarding these ships, only one thing can be said: despite the relatively “middling” performance characteristics in comparison with the latest foreign frigates, they became the most successful surface ships of the GPV 2011-2020. Reliable gas turbine power plant familiar to our the fleet, 24 SAM "Shtil-1", of course, are not the peak of technological progress, but they are very reliable and effective weapon. According to some (unconfirmed) data, it was “Calm” that showed the best results when firing at targets that simulate cruise missiles compared to “Fort” and “Dagger”. The ammunition in the 8 Caliber missiles is small, but is supplemented by four 533-mm torpedo tubes, i.e. the ship can take on the 8 PKR, without remaining defenseless against submarines. The standard displacement in 3620 t provides good (for the frigate) seaworthiness.
As a result, the ship combines acceptable firepower, reliability and moderate cost, and all its weapons systems work as expected. This is a consequence of the fact that when creating the frigate 11356 for the domestic fleet, for the most part reliable and tested technical solutions were used, but this also became its disadvantage. Such frigates look good in today's “table of ranks,” but what will they look like in 15-20 years? On the other hand, it should be understood that we had no alternative to the construction of the “admiral” series.
The 11356 project ships are an upgrade of Talvar frigates built for the Indian Navy, mastered by domestic industry (with the exception of the power plant) and put on stream. The Yantar GCC, where new ships of the 11356 project for the Russian Navy were laid, could hardly quickly organize the construction of frigates of the 22350 project or something similar in terms similar to the admirals. Of course, it’s not encouraging to lay ships of the same class for two different projects, but this is largely stopped by the fact that frigates of the “admiral” series were created for a single theater (the Black Sea), on which the presence of other types of frigates was not planned.
Frigate "Admiral Grigorovich"
In a previous article in this series, the author stated that instead of building frigates of the Russian Federation, destroyers of the 21956 project or something similar should have been created. But in this case too, the construction of 11356 frigates should be considered justified, at least for the same Black Sea. Under the conditions of a severe shortage of surface ships, the construction of these frigates guaranteedly provided the fleet with a series of not enough “most powerful in the world” but powerful enough modern ships that did not threaten to spend many years at the completion wall waiting for weapons and other systems to be completed. The decision to include them in the HPV 2011-2020. The author of this article considers one of the few correct decisions regarding surface shipbuilding.
Unfortunately, of the six ships planned for the construction of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, apparently, only three will be added: "Admiral Grigorovich", "Admiral Essen" and "Admiral Makarov". The reason is well known: the power plant for these frigates was created by the Ukrainian Zorya-Mashproekt, and after the well-known events, the supplies were frozen. But this can hardly be blamed on our leadership: the situation with the coup d'état in Ukraine at the time of the adoption of the GPN 2011-2020. it was hardly possible to predict, and it would be totally inefficient to organize the production of turbines for a limited series of ships in Russia, while domestic industry and for the newest frigates could not create turbines on their own.
Corvettes
I must say that story creating a small ship near the sea zone is very confused. As usual, everything started well: after the TFR of the 11540 project (in our fleet today there are two such ships: Fearless and Yaroslav the Wise) were identified in the ships of the far sea zone, where they had to replace the famous Stormy (1135 ), there was a need to come up with something to replace the small anti-submarine ship of the 1124 project. For its time, it was an excellent PLO-ship - being just 900 tons of standard displacement, he was armed with a fairly powerful towed GUS, two 533-mm torpedo tubes and two RBU-6000 bombers. To protect against airborne targets, the Osa-M SAM, 1124-mm artillery gun and AK-57 "metal cutter" were installed on the 630 project's IPC. The first ship was laid in 1966 year, and the project was so successful that the IPC of this type continued to lay even in the 80-ies.
Nevertheless, the IPC of the 1124 project, of course, became obsolete, and the small displacement did not leave hopes for significant upgrades, so that in the 80-ies the domestic fleet needed a new ship. Its design was entrusted to Zelenodolsk PKB, and this is not surprising: it was his designers who at one time created the IPC of the 1124 project, which now had to be replaced, and besides, quite a good watchdog of the 1159 project. The latter had a standard displacement 1670 and at the same time carried the 4 CRP P-20 Termite, one OSR Osa, two quadruple missile launchers for the Strela MANPADS, two 76-mm AK-30, two 230-mm AK-630 assault rifles (the utility of which, in contrast to their six-barrel "brothers" AK-6000, is somewhat doubtful) and the omnipresent RBU-11660. Ships of this type were intended for export: they became part of the fleets of the GDR, Yugoslavia, Libya, Cuba, Algeria and Bulgaria. Having such a significant experience in designing small ships, the Zelenodolsk PKB seemed to be doomed to success, and so it was, in general, what happened: the XNUMX project created by its designers turned out to be dangerously close to the ideal.
The standard displacement of the new patrol significantly exceeded that of the 1124 IPC and reached 1 500 T. But it was not the developers who were to blame for this, but the customers of the fleet: they wanted the new ship to be GAS, and this, of course , affected the size and weight of the ship. The composition of the armament turned out to be extremely qualitatively balanced: the Medvedka anti-submarine missile system was used for anti-missile defense, the Kortik anti-submarine missile defense system was provided, the Uranium anti-ship complex was used against ships, and the 2-mm gun mount was installed for the unfinished ones. Only RBU looked superfluous, although it is possible that as an anti-torpedo weapon (and MLRS for firing at the shore) it also had some meaning. Perhaps the only drawback of the ship was the inability to base the helicopter.
Coastal Watchtower Project 11660
Why is such an armament composition optimal for a ship in the near sea zone? Imagine a military conflict ... but with Turkey, for example. What will they send to our shores? Submarines? Of course. Frigates and corvettes? But this is already extremely doubtful. The problem is that a ship with even an object, at least with a zonal air defense in itself is very vulnerable to a well-organized marine attack (land based, or deck) aviation. This, of course, does not mean that the air defense of ships is useless, but there is no point without the extreme need to send a surface fleet to the enemy aviation domination zone, without being able to cover it from the air. Of the strike weapons, Turkish frigates carry Harpoon anti-ship missiles and 127 mm artillery systems, but what should they do with such a set off our coasts? Unless you try to stop coastal shipping, but such a goal is clearly not worth the highest risk of losing your own surface ships, because Turkish frigates will be an easy target on our shores, even for aviation, even for ground-based missile systems. Rather, Turkish frigates will cover their own shipping from the attacks of our submarines.
Interestingly, in the case of a global non-nuclear war with the participation of the United States, little does change for our guards: the same AUGs will not reach either the Baltic, or the Black, or the Barents Sea - what should they do there? In the same Black Sea basin, an American aircraft carrier, maneuvering in the Sea of Marmara, will be less than 600 km from Sevastopol. This will be quite enough in order to do all sorts of nasty things to us, while at the same time powerful tools for monitoring the air situation, located in the Istanbul area, will be added to the AUG air defense system and air surveillance. And, of course, the local Turkish air defense, so that it will be extremely difficult to “take” the AUG there. But still for the deck aircraft 600 km - a significant enough distance, it is possible to carry out any air operations from there, but to establish the constant presence of air patrols on our shores - no.
These considerations are largely true for our TFR. Throwing them to the Turkish coast is meaningless, but their “unsinkable aircraft carrier Crimea” provides good cover in the air, the chances of encountering enemy surface ships and airplanes are not too great, although, of course, there is. For example, when supplying or assisting the units operating in the coastal zone (they would say “on the coastal flank of the army”), either in the course of countering the landing of the airborne troops, or landing their own ... The same applies to enemy aircraft. Watchdogs are unlikely to be hit by a full-scale air strike, when everything is according to the rules: enemy scouts detect the location of the TFR, the DRLO exercises control, distraction groups cause fire on themselves, anti-aircraft suppression planes interfere with and crush anti-aircraft missiles, and at this time assault groups from under the radio-horizon, cruise missiles strike ... Such a strike does not reflect either the patrol ship or the missile cruiser, but the fact of the matter is that in the near sea zone the enemy does not have much of his capabilities Anesties: our ground-based means of lighting the air situation and air defense should prevent this, fighting primarily with the "eyes" of the enemy air forces, i.e. reconnaissance aircraft and AWACS. And operations to support the ground forces or counter enemy / disembarking of our own assault forces should be closely guarded by our fighter aircraft by definition. All this does not guarantee the absolute protection of the guards from enemy aircraft, you can always "run into", being under the blow of one or two aircraft or even helicopters of the enemy Air Force that jumped out of nowhere, but this is a completely different and much lower level of threat.
The peculiarity of combat operations in the near-sea zone is that the destruction of enemy surface ships and airplanes are most effectively solved by using land-based naval aviation together with aircraft of the VKS, but for ships of the watchdog / corvette, they are secondary. In essence, the TFR / corvette should be able to “finish” what has managed to break through the air barriers. Therefore, as an anti-ship weapon, it is quite enough for the sentry to have light anti-ship missiles like the same “Uranus”, which is more than enough to instruct frigates, corvettes and other missile boats of a potential enemy. And in terms of air defense, the emphasis should be placed not so much even on the aircraft, as on the destruction of the enemy’s controlled ammunition.
The patrol ship of the 11660 project was supposed to carry the Uran missile and two well-positioned (in the bow and in the stern) the Dirk KORIK. It must be said that at that time ZRAK were represented as a powerful weapon, capable of getting rockets all flying at a distance of up to 8 km and an altitude of up to 3,5 km, and autoguns - respectively 4 km and 3 km. The composition of the weapons seems to be optimal, especially since the “Dirks”, optimized for intercepting cruise missiles, differed in their minimal response time. And that the firing range of Zour is not dozens of kilometers away - so do not forget that the most effective British air defense system in the Falkland conflict was the “Sea Wolfe”, which then had a range 5 km and height - 3 km.
Of course, someone can say that such a minimalistic approach does not paint a warship, and that it is much better to have more powerful anti-ship missiles and air defense missiles. Perhaps it is so, but the fact is that the ship of the coastal zone is simply obliged to be massive. Domestic fleets require dozens of TFR / corvettes and each ruble spent unnecessarily on a “more powerful air defense system” will result in very large costs, as a result of which the fleet will not receive other means of fighting at sea — nuclear or diesel submarines, naval aircraft, etc., which really needed, and not just "that it was just in case."
So, the anti-ship and air defense functions for the coastal marine zone are secondary, but to combat submarines, the ship must be equipped according to the highest standards. Submarines are his main adversary, and they will definitely “work” off our shores, despite the domination of our aviation. But a significant number of small ships, coupled with ground-based anti-submarine aviation and other technical means, are fully capable of repulsing them, inflicting heavy losses, or even squeezing them out of the near-sea zone. In addition, in the Northern and Pacific theaters, such ships become part of the system for ensuring the deployment of domestic SSBNs.
And what is needed for this? First, sufficiently powerful means of controlling the underwater situation is a rather effective HOOK. Secondly, anti-submarine weapons that can "get" the enemy boat immediately after its detection. Modern torpedoes have a range of tens of kilometers, and the anti-ship missiles with which almost all submarines are now equipped - and further, therefore our ship may not have time to prepare the helicopter for departure. Zelenodolsk PKB chose Medvedka complex for the TFR of the 11660 project, and it was probably the best choice of all. "Medvedka" is small enough to be placed on a small ship, but its maximum range (20,5 km), perhaps, corresponds to the real capabilities of the SAC of detecting modern submarines at that time. At the same time (according to the author's assumptions) Medvedki has a significant advantage over such complexes as Waterfall or Caliber-PLE. The latter use a rocket-torpedo, which, when launched from a torpedo tube, departs a short distance from the ship, after which the rocket starts - and is landed at the point where the submarine stays. According to some (unverified) data, the underwater launch of such a rocket will be very well heard by the acoustics of the submarine, which is why they will be able to take immediate measures: an evasive maneuver, preparation for launching traps, etc. But the Medvedki missiles immediately fly to the submarine maneuvering area, so that the enemy learns that it was struck only by the sound of propellers attacking his torpedo.
According to the author of this article, a promising corvette of the Russian Navy could well have happened if the 11660 project were taken as the basis for its design. There was, in general, a little bit: add stealth elements, increase the caliber of the gun from 76 to 100 mm (much more solid for both the enemy ship and the support of landing operations), build a helicopter hangar and a launch pad. The result would be a corvette of the most moderate displacement (in dimensions of the “Watchman” or even less) with relatively inexpensive, but effective weapon systems, quite suitable for mass construction.
Alas, but everything went wrong, and this time the PKB Almaz, which proposed a completely different ship of the near-sea zone, the 12441 Thunder project, was the initiator of the “warp”.
In size, this ship was a cross between the Fearless project 11540 and 11660. While the former had the 3 590 and the standard displacement, while the latter had only the 1 500, then the Thunder from PKB Almaz was 2 560. But the armament, perhaps, was left behind by the 11540 and 11660 projects taken together: 18 (in words - EIGHTEEN) Onyx anti-ship missiles, Redut (32 mines), 2 * 4, Medvedka PU-command radar, 100-mm AU and 30-mm ZAC Duet and one helicopter. On paper, the 12441 project looked insanely menacing, but in fact it was an attempt to push the destroyer not even into the dimensions of the frigate, but into the displacement of the corvette. Who and why needed such a ship? It did not have the dimensions sufficient for effective operation in the far sea zone, and its armament was obviously redundant for the “coastal” ship - accordingly, the ship was prohibitively expensive for a large series. And yet, he seemed to our leadership much more preferable than the modest patron of the 11660 project.
However, the late USSR and its successor RF managed to start building ships of all three projects: in 1987-93. three Baltic ships of the 11540 project (one of them, “Fog”, will not be completed) were laid on the Baltic GCC “Yantar”, but the other two were still part of the national fleet. In 1990, one ship of the 11660 project was laid; however, it was dismantled on the slipway after 5 years after laying, and the 12441 project came out in the same way: having laid head Novik in 1997, its construction was soon suspended. For some time it was planned to finish it as a training ship, but in 2016, the final decision was made to dispose of it. Strictly speaking, none of these ships could claim the role of a promising corvette of the XXI century, and therefore it was decided to create a new project, which later became the 20380 corvette. It was the right decision, but using the 12441 as the basis for the project was a mistake, because instead of giving the 20380 the proper corvette, it was decided to provide him with Redut air defense system and heavy anti-ship missiles with universal installations capable of launching Onyxes "And" Caliber ". If the corvette of the 20380 project received something useful "inherited" from the "Thunder", it is a deck helicopter, and even with a hangar for its permanent base.
It is interesting to compare the very first Corvette "Steregushchy" with the TFR of the 11660 project. Both are equipped with Uranas, but instead of the 4 RCC on the TFR, the Steregushchy carries the 8. A helicopter hangar and a landing site were placed in the Stern Steward, so there was not enough room for the Kortik-M Stern. There was a couple AK-630 to do. But with the nose "Dirk" is not all clear: the author could not find the photos where the rocket armament was mounted on the installation. Has the anti-aircraft missile and artillery complex turned into a purely artillery complex? If so, why?
"Dirk-M" corvette "Stereguschy"
But the "main caliber" increased from 76 to 100 mm.
100-mm artillery mount Corvette "Stereguschy"
But as for the fight against an underwater enemy ... no, they have not forgotten about it. If the old 1124 project had a towed GUS, and for the TFR of the 11660 project, instead of it, the underwater GUS was envisaged, then the Steregushchy was piled up with 3 (!) GAS "Anapa-M" is also being dropped! Why such abundance on a small ship, the designers themselves hardly know. But instead of the same “Medvedki”, the “Steregushchy” was installed ... no, not “Waterfall” and not 2-mm torpedo tubes, from which the ship could use long-range torpedoes of the “Caliber” family. The only anti-submarine weapon of the ship was the 533-mm torpedo unit "Package-NK". Theoretically, the range of its 324-mm torpedoes when attacking a submarine is 324 km, i.e. almost as much as the Medvedka missile system. But the torpedo has practically such a range only at the speed of 20 nodes (there are two speed modes on it, 30 and 30 knots) and on 50 knots. to overcome 30 km torpedo will need almost 20 minutes! In the modern sea battle - the whole eternity. The Package-NK complex is well suited for the ship’s self-defense against enemy torpedoes, in some cases it can also be used on an enemy submarine, but it is completely inappropriate as the main anti-submarine weapon. A helicopter can not always be used simply due to weather conditions (especially from the deck of a small ship), and the reaction time, taking into account the preparation of the helicopter for departure, can also exceed all reasonable limits.
The result is an oxymoron:
1. The main opponent of our corvettes in the near sea zone is the submarine.
2. The 11660 project received adequate anti-submarine weapons.
3. The rival project 12441 also had adequate anti-submarine weapons, but moreover also powerful attack / anti-aircraft weapons.
4. The 12441 project is considered too large and expensive, but nevertheless it was he who was taken as the basis for the “future corvette” (with the conscious need to “cut down the sturgeon”).
5. The results of the savings "under the knife" pleased anti-submarine weapons.
6. As a result, nn. The 1-5 Corvette has stopped responding to its main task. A curtain.
After “The Watchman”, the corvettes went to the series, on which the nasal “Dirk” CRAFT changed the 12 PU for the Redut missile. More than a controversial decision: the corvette formally acquired a perfect air defense system, which was in no way inferior to the same “Calm”, but it is completely unclear how the developers in general were going to solve the problem of target designation to Redut missiles. The problem was that the 9M96E rocket carried an active homing head, which, on the one hand, didn’t require a specialized target illumination radar (as for a missile with a semi-active seeker), but on the other hand the rocket still needed someone summed it up to a distance from which AGSN Zur could capture an aerial target. This is usually implemented as follows: a powerful radar of the general review, once every few seconds fixing the position of the rocket and the target in space, transmits this data to the control system of the air defense missile system, it calculates them and produces the necessary correction, which is transmitted to the rocket. The layout is excellent, only on corvettes of the 20380 project there is no powerful surveillance radar. As a result, the choice of the developers is quite poor: either try to teach a full-time radar "Furke-2" to somehow control the flight of missiles, or use for this purpose a full-time OMS of Puma artillery systems. Neither is an acceptable option. “Furke-2” is a survey radar of the Pantsir-С1 complex adapted for a ship, but the fact is that within the framework of the mentioned complex its task is only primary target detection, and the tracking and guidance radar is taken further. “Furca” works in the decimeter range, which is more or less acceptable on land, but at sea such a radar does not matter what is happening against the background of the underlying surface, i.e. low flying targets. Americans, in their time, were tormented by training the AN / SPY-1 radar, also operating in the decimeter range, to recognize what is flying at a low altitude, and it is not a fact that they were trained properly. But this radar is the basis of the entire Aegis of Ticonderoga type cruisers and destroyers of the Arly Burk type, and it is much more powerful than the Furke 2.
That is why in the ground “Pantsira” the prototype of “Furke” should only detect “something”, and further - the case of tracking and guidance radar operating in the centimeter (and millimeter) ranges, which perfectly see everything against the background of sea waves. That’s the way, by the way, is the excellent SAMPSON radar, on the newest British destroyers of the Daring type, which many analysts consider to be the best air defense ships in the world today. The “Dearing” missiles are also equipped with an active GOS, and SAMPSON carries out their “output” to the target, but does it in the following way: SAMPSON is a “two in one” being a kind of symbiosis of decimeter and centimeter radars. The decimeter has an advantage in range, and it is the main one, but if it suddenly "seemed" to him that something was flying against the background of the ocean, immediately this section is checked by a centimeter radar - and then there is nothing to hide. The USSR Navy solved this question differently - in those years we relied on missiles from a semi-active GOS, and general overview radars were decimeter. But if suddenly the surveillance radar saw some kind of interference, then “Tackle” could be immediately turned on - also a general overview radar, but optimized for identifying low-flying targets, and besides tracking and guidance radars operating in the same centimeter range could not just highlight the goal, but also to carry out its search, albeit in a narrow sector. Those. as soon as even the slightest suspicion arose that something low-flying and bad was approaching, Tackle and the radar of the SLA were able to very quickly explain the situation and give exhaustive recommendations to the means of fire destruction. For the ships of the Russian Federation, it was supposed to use a powerful Polimer radar, specially created for both general overview and missile guidance from the AHP, i.e. some kind of domestic analogue of the same SAMPSON (not on architecture, but on the tasks performed), and it was reasonable. But such a radar is too expensive to use on ships of the Corvette class.
As a result, the corvettes of the 20380 project in terms of air defense had a completely sad picture: there were no “Polyments”, “Tackles” and LMS for tracking and pointing at them, and “Puma” was focused on using artillery and equipped with not the best (and only two-coordinate ) Radar. Therefore, there are not too many hopes that the Reduta missiles will be able to shoot down low-flying targets, and if the enemy is not shy about using EW means, then the chances for defeat are low, although the high-flying targets will not be as high as we would like. According to the author of this article, the only DARK “Dirk-M” (which has its own guidance radar), the Corvette “Watching” in a real battle, can be more effective than the Redut under the control of “Furca-2” (if on “Dirk”) nevertheless there are rockets). And this is on condition that the missiles of the Redut complex themselves will work properly. And according to the latest data published in the open press, they are not going to do this at all, and moreover, it is not known when they will gather.
Corvette "Stereguschy"
Thus, the corvettes of the 20380 project today represent a rather strange sight: ships with reduced anti-submarine defense capabilities, incompetent air defense systems and a problematic power plant. This was not what the navy of the Russian Federation was waiting for.
Of course, the 20380 project has undergone a modernization, as a result of which the final digit “0” of its number has been changed to “5”. Two such corvettes, the “Thunderer” and the “Agile”, were laid on the “Northern Shipyard” in the 2012-2013. respectively. How do they differ from the basic project? This was not known as much as we would like. From the obvious - an increase in the number of cells of the Reduta air defense system from 12 to 16, the installation of UKKS on the 8 mines, and the replacement of the domestic unit DDA12000 with German diesel engines from MTU. Less clear is some kind of "opto-mast", which
Apparently, the 20385 series corvettes became the “work on the bugs” of the 20380 project: the problem of targeting the Redut complex was supposedly solved; The UBCS, which was introduced into the armament, was valuable not because of the possibility of deploying Onyx or Caliber anti-ship missiles, but with the ability to use torpedoes of the Caliber family. Thus, the “long arm” was returned to the corvette to fight the enemy’s submarines. But here the overlap went the other way - the 91РЭ1 and 91РТЭ2 rocket-torpedoes have a range of 50 and 40 km, respectively, and it is somewhat doubtful that at least one of the three SAS of the domestic corvette (or all of them together) could detect the enemy submarine at such a distance . But the author of this article does not have accurate TTX GAS modern corvettes, so - what if? In addition, it is also possible that the helicopter of the corvette in the search mode found kilometers so in 50 from the native ship something underwater unfriendly ...
In general, the ships of the 20385 project could probably become the first fully combat-ready ships of this type (when and if the Redut air defense system is brought to mind, of course), but the excessiveness of weapons unnecessary on ships of the corvette class played the same joke that with the "ancestor" of modern Russian corvettes - TFR project 12441 "Thunder". As already mentioned in the previous article, the cost of the 20385 corvettes came very close to the frigates of the “admiral” series, while the combat capabilities of the frigates are still higher - at least due to twice the displacement, and a corresponding increase in autonomy and seaworthiness. Accordingly, the number of corvettes project 20385 limited to two units.
But what next? There is talk of creating new 20386 corvettes, and there are various rumors: who say that this modification will be the minimum “restyling” of the 20380 project, and who uploads a photo of the amazing nightmare of the seas and oceans, which the hangar has moved to the hull, t . under the deck, where the helicopter, sitting on the platform, falls with a special lift. But there is a place nearby for a pair of containers in which you can cram even the “Caliber” missile complex, at least something else - according to the modular principle ...
Something
To be honest, the author of this article had to see even more terrible ship projects, but not often. The modularity of weapons is a highly dubious innovation. Well, how to prepare the crew to fight weapons, which is currently not installed on the ship? And the design ... for only one deck being laid out and a helicopter lift can be safely presented with the Darwin Award (unreasonable complexity, and even on a ship with a small displacement, where every ton is in the account). However, the English text, perhaps, hints that it is a question of some kind of export. Then there are no questions - any whim for the customer's money!
But there are reasonable options: a gas turbine installation, one or two Pantsir-M or Palash (the last in a rocket-gun version), a sub-hook or towed GAS, an anti-submarine complex Medvedka or torpedoes with the ability to use rocket-torpedoes " Caliber-PLE ”, and a pair of quad launchers for Uranov. And it will turn out a relatively inexpensive corvette suitable for the mass series, a “workhorse” for any of our fleets.
But not in this state program. Having set a goal to build 2020 corvettes of various types before 35, by August 2016 we have 4 corvettes in service (including the “Watchman”, which went into service before the HPN 2011-2020, but oh well), one (“Perfect”) on the tests, seven - in various stages of construction (two of them of the 20385 project) and that's it. A total of twelve units, and they all have good chances to enter service until the 2020 year, but new bookmarks have been postponed indefinitely. This, in general, is understandable: not having the ability to make normal diesel power plants, but having great doubts about the capability of the Redoubt system, we need not build new corvettes like 20380 / 20385, and we have no other projects. And not only in the project case: you can design a new ship, but where do you get engines for it? All facilities today are devoted to the production of turbines for frigates, but even there we have a huge lag.
To be continued ...
- Andrei from Chelyabinsk
- Shipbuilding Program of the Russian Navy, or a Very Bad Premonition (part of 3)
Shipbuilding Program of the Russian Navy, or a Very Bad Premonition (part of 2)
The program of shipbuilding of the Navy of the Russian Federation or a Very Bad Premonition
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