Shipbuilding Program of the Russian Navy, or a Very Bad Premonition (part of 4)

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Corvette "Savvy", 27 July 2014 g.

This article is devoted to the frigates of the “admiral” series of the 11356 project, as well as to domestic corvettes.

Frigates project 11356

Regarding these ships, only one thing can be said: despite the relatively “middling” performance characteristics in comparison with the latest foreign frigates, they became the most successful surface ships of the GPV 2011-2020. Reliable gas turbine power plant familiar to our the fleet, 24 SAM "Shtil-1", of course, are not the peak of technological progress, but they are very reliable and effective weapon. According to some (unconfirmed) data, it was “Calm” that showed the best results when firing at targets that simulate cruise missiles compared to “Fort” and “Dagger”. The ammunition in the 8 Caliber missiles is small, but is supplemented by four 533-mm torpedo tubes, i.e. the ship can take on the 8 PKR, without remaining defenseless against submarines. The standard displacement in 3620 t provides good (for the frigate) seaworthiness.

As a result, the ship combines acceptable firepower, reliability and moderate cost, and all its weapons systems work as expected. This is a consequence of the fact that when creating the frigate 11356 for the domestic fleet, for the most part reliable and tested technical solutions were used, but this also became its disadvantage. Such frigates look good in today's “table of ranks,” but what will they look like in 15-20 years? On the other hand, it should be understood that we had no alternative to the construction of the “admiral” series.

The 11356 project ships are an upgrade of Talvar frigates built for the Indian Navy, mastered by domestic industry (with the exception of the power plant) and put on stream. The Yantar GCC, where new ships of the 11356 project for the Russian Navy were laid, could hardly quickly organize the construction of frigates of the 22350 project or something similar in terms similar to the admirals. Of course, it’s not encouraging to lay ships of the same class for two different projects, but this is largely stopped by the fact that frigates of the “admiral” series were created for a single theater (the Black Sea), on which the presence of other types of frigates was not planned.


Frigate "Admiral Grigorovich"

In a previous article in this series, the author stated that instead of building frigates of the Russian Federation, destroyers of the 21956 project or something similar should have been created. But in this case too, the construction of 11356 frigates should be considered justified, at least for the same Black Sea. Under the conditions of a severe shortage of surface ships, the construction of these frigates guaranteedly provided the fleet with a series of not enough “most powerful in the world” but powerful enough modern ships that did not threaten to spend many years at the completion wall waiting for weapons and other systems to be completed. The decision to include them in the HPV 2011-2020. The author of this article considers one of the few correct decisions regarding surface shipbuilding.

Unfortunately, of the six ships planned for the construction of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, apparently, only three will be added: "Admiral Grigorovich", "Admiral Essen" and "Admiral Makarov". The reason is well known: the power plant for these frigates was created by the Ukrainian Zorya-Mashproekt, and after the well-known events, the supplies were frozen. But this can hardly be blamed on our leadership: the situation with the coup d'état in Ukraine at the time of the adoption of the GPN 2011-2020. it was hardly possible to predict, and it would be totally inefficient to organize the production of turbines for a limited series of ships in Russia, while domestic industry and for the newest frigates could not create turbines on their own.

Corvettes

I must say that story creating a small ship near the sea zone is very confused. As usual, everything started well: after the TFR of the 11540 project (in our fleet today there are two such ships: Fearless and Yaroslav the Wise) were identified in the ships of the far sea zone, where they had to replace the famous Stormy (1135 ), there was a need to come up with something to replace the small anti-submarine ship of the 1124 project. For its time, it was an excellent PLO-ship - being just 900 tons of standard displacement, he was armed with a fairly powerful towed GUS, two 533-mm torpedo tubes and two RBU-6000 bombers. To protect against airborne targets, the Osa-M SAM, 1124-mm artillery gun and AK-57 "metal cutter" were installed on the 630 project's IPC. The first ship was laid in 1966 year, and the project was so successful that the IPC of this type continued to lay even in the 80-ies.



Nevertheless, the IPC of the 1124 project, of course, became obsolete, and the small displacement did not leave hopes for significant upgrades, so that in the 80-ies the domestic fleet needed a new ship. Its design was entrusted to Zelenodolsk PKB, and this is not surprising: it was his designers who at one time created the IPC of the 1124 project, which now had to be replaced, and besides, quite a good watchdog of the 1159 project. The latter had a standard displacement 1670 and at the same time carried the 4 CRP P-20 Termite, one OSR Osa, two quadruple missile launchers for the Strela MANPADS, two 76-mm AK-30, two 230-mm AK-630 assault rifles (the utility of which, in contrast to their six-barrel "brothers" AK-6000, is somewhat doubtful) and the omnipresent RBU-11660. Ships of this type were intended for export: they became part of the fleets of the GDR, Yugoslavia, Libya, Cuba, Algeria and Bulgaria. Having such a significant experience in designing small ships, the Zelenodolsk PKB seemed to be doomed to success, and so it was, in general, what happened: the XNUMX project created by its designers turned out to be dangerously close to the ideal.

The standard displacement of the new patrol significantly exceeded that of the 1124 IPC and reached 1 500 T. But it was not the developers who were to blame for this, but the customers of the fleet: they wanted the new ship to be GAS, and this, of course , affected the size and weight of the ship. The composition of the armament turned out to be extremely qualitatively balanced: the Medvedka anti-submarine missile system was used for anti-missile defense, the Kortik anti-submarine missile defense system was provided, the Uranium anti-ship complex was used against ships, and the 2-mm gun mount was installed for the unfinished ones. Only RBU looked superfluous, although it is possible that as an anti-torpedo weapon (and MLRS for firing at the shore) it also had some meaning. Perhaps the only drawback of the ship was the inability to base the helicopter.


Coastal Watchtower Project 11660

Why is such an armament composition optimal for a ship in the near sea zone? Imagine a military conflict ... but with Turkey, for example. What will they send to our shores? Submarines? Of course. Frigates and corvettes? But this is already extremely doubtful. The problem is that a ship with even an object, at least with a zonal air defense in itself is very vulnerable to a well-organized marine attack (land based, or deck) aviation. This, of course, does not mean that the air defense of ships is useless, but there is no point without the extreme need to send a surface fleet to the enemy aviation domination zone, without being able to cover it from the air. Of the strike weapons, Turkish frigates carry Harpoon anti-ship missiles and 127 mm artillery systems, but what should they do with such a set off our coasts? Unless you try to stop coastal shipping, but such a goal is clearly not worth the highest risk of losing your own surface ships, because Turkish frigates will be an easy target on our shores, even for aviation, even for ground-based missile systems. Rather, Turkish frigates will cover their own shipping from the attacks of our submarines.

Interestingly, in the case of a global non-nuclear war with the participation of the United States, little does change for our guards: the same AUGs will not reach either the Baltic, or the Black, or the Barents Sea - what should they do there? In the same Black Sea basin, an American aircraft carrier, maneuvering in the Sea of ​​Marmara, will be less than 600 km from Sevastopol. This will be quite enough in order to do all sorts of nasty things to us, while at the same time powerful tools for monitoring the air situation, located in the Istanbul area, will be added to the AUG air defense system and air surveillance. And, of course, the local Turkish air defense, so that it will be extremely difficult to “take” the AUG there. But still for the deck aircraft 600 km - a significant enough distance, it is possible to carry out any air operations from there, but to establish the constant presence of air patrols on our shores - no.

These considerations are largely true for our TFR. Throwing them to the Turkish coast is meaningless, but their “unsinkable aircraft carrier Crimea” provides good cover in the air, the chances of encountering enemy surface ships and airplanes are not too great, although, of course, there is. For example, when supplying or assisting the units operating in the coastal zone (they would say “on the coastal flank of the army”), either in the course of countering the landing of the airborne troops, or landing their own ... The same applies to enemy aircraft. Watchdogs are unlikely to be hit by a full-scale air strike, when everything is according to the rules: enemy scouts detect the location of the TFR, the DRLO exercises control, distraction groups cause fire on themselves, anti-aircraft suppression planes interfere with and crush anti-aircraft missiles, and at this time assault groups from under the radio-horizon, cruise missiles strike ... Such a strike does not reflect either the patrol ship or the missile cruiser, but the fact of the matter is that in the near sea zone the enemy does not have much of his capabilities Anesties: our ground-based means of lighting the air situation and air defense should prevent this, fighting primarily with the "eyes" of the enemy air forces, i.e. reconnaissance aircraft and AWACS. And operations to support the ground forces or counter enemy / disembarking of our own assault forces should be closely guarded by our fighter aircraft by definition. All this does not guarantee the absolute protection of the guards from enemy aircraft, you can always "run into", being under the blow of one or two aircraft or even helicopters of the enemy Air Force that jumped out of nowhere, but this is a completely different and much lower level of threat.

The peculiarity of combat operations in the near-sea zone is that the destruction of enemy surface ships and airplanes are most effectively solved by using land-based naval aviation together with aircraft of the VKS, but for ships of the watchdog / corvette, they are secondary. In essence, the TFR / corvette should be able to “finish” what has managed to break through the air barriers. Therefore, as an anti-ship weapon, it is quite enough for the sentry to have light anti-ship missiles like the same “Uranus”, which is more than enough to instruct frigates, corvettes and other missile boats of a potential enemy. And in terms of air defense, the emphasis should be placed not so much even on the aircraft, as on the destruction of the enemy’s controlled ammunition.

The patrol ship of the 11660 project was supposed to carry the Uran missile and two well-positioned (in the bow and in the stern) the Dirk KORIK. It must be said that at that time ZRAK were represented as a powerful weapon, capable of getting rockets all flying at a distance of up to 8 km and an altitude of up to 3,5 km, and autoguns - respectively 4 km and 3 km. The composition of the weapons seems to be optimal, especially since the “Dirks”, optimized for intercepting cruise missiles, differed in their minimal response time. And that the firing range of Zour is not dozens of kilometers away - so do not forget that the most effective British air defense system in the Falkland conflict was the “Sea Wolfe”, which then had a range 5 km and height - 3 km.

Of course, someone can say that such a minimalistic approach does not paint a warship, and that it is much better to have more powerful anti-ship missiles and air defense missiles. Perhaps it is so, but the fact is that the ship of the coastal zone is simply obliged to be massive. Domestic fleets require dozens of TFR / corvettes and each ruble spent unnecessarily on a “more powerful air defense system” will result in very large costs, as a result of which the fleet will not receive other means of fighting at sea — nuclear or diesel submarines, naval aircraft, etc., which really needed, and not just "that it was just in case."

So, the anti-ship and air defense functions for the coastal marine zone are secondary, but to combat submarines, the ship must be equipped according to the highest standards. Submarines are his main adversary, and they will definitely “work” off our shores, despite the domination of our aviation. But a significant number of small ships, coupled with ground-based anti-submarine aviation and other technical means, are fully capable of repulsing them, inflicting heavy losses, or even squeezing them out of the near-sea zone. In addition, in the Northern and Pacific theaters, such ships become part of the system for ensuring the deployment of domestic SSBNs.

And what is needed for this? First, sufficiently powerful means of controlling the underwater situation is a rather effective HOOK. Secondly, anti-submarine weapons that can "get" the enemy boat immediately after its detection. Modern torpedoes have a range of tens of kilometers, and the anti-ship missiles with which almost all submarines are now equipped - and further, therefore our ship may not have time to prepare the helicopter for departure. Zelenodolsk PKB chose Medvedka complex for the TFR of the 11660 project, and it was probably the best choice of all. "Medvedka" is small enough to be placed on a small ship, but its maximum range (20,5 km), perhaps, corresponds to the real capabilities of the SAC of detecting modern submarines at that time. At the same time (according to the author's assumptions) Medvedki has a significant advantage over such complexes as Waterfall or Caliber-PLE. The latter use a rocket-torpedo, which, when launched from a torpedo tube, departs a short distance from the ship, after which the rocket starts - and is landed at the point where the submarine stays. According to some (unverified) data, the underwater launch of such a rocket will be very well heard by the acoustics of the submarine, which is why they will be able to take immediate measures: an evasive maneuver, preparation for launching traps, etc. But the Medvedki missiles immediately fly to the submarine maneuvering area, so that the enemy learns that it was struck only by the sound of propellers attacking his torpedo.

According to the author of this article, a promising corvette of the Russian Navy could well have happened if the 11660 project were taken as the basis for its design. There was, in general, a little bit: add stealth elements, increase the caliber of the gun from 76 to 100 mm (much more solid for both the enemy ship and the support of landing operations), build a helicopter hangar and a launch pad. The result would be a corvette of the most moderate displacement (in dimensions of the “Watchman” or even less) with relatively inexpensive, but effective weapon systems, quite suitable for mass construction.

Alas, but everything went wrong, and this time the PKB Almaz, which proposed a completely different ship of the near-sea zone, the 12441 Thunder project, was the initiator of the “warp”.



In size, this ship was a cross between the Fearless project 11540 and 11660. While the former had the 3 590 and the standard displacement, while the latter had only the 1 500, then the Thunder from PKB Almaz was 2 560. But the armament, perhaps, was left behind by the 11540 and 11660 projects taken together: 18 (in words - EIGHTEEN) Onyx anti-ship missiles, Redut (32 mines), 2 * 4, Medvedka PU-command radar, 100-mm AU and 30-mm ZAC Duet and one helicopter. On paper, the 12441 project looked insanely menacing, but in fact it was an attempt to push the destroyer not even into the dimensions of the frigate, but into the displacement of the corvette. Who and why needed such a ship? It did not have the dimensions sufficient for effective operation in the far sea zone, and its armament was obviously redundant for the “coastal” ship - accordingly, the ship was prohibitively expensive for a large series. And yet, he seemed to our leadership much more preferable than the modest patron of the 11660 project.

However, the late USSR and its successor RF managed to start building ships of all three projects: in 1987-93. three Baltic ships of the 11540 project (one of them, “Fog”, will not be completed) were laid on the Baltic GCC “Yantar”, but the other two were still part of the national fleet. In 1990, one ship of the 11660 project was laid; however, it was dismantled on the slipway after 5 years after laying, and the 12441 project came out in the same way: having laid head Novik in 1997, its construction was soon suspended. For some time it was planned to finish it as a training ship, but in 2016, the final decision was made to dispose of it. Strictly speaking, none of these ships could claim the role of a promising corvette of the XXI century, and therefore it was decided to create a new project, which later became the 20380 corvette. It was the right decision, but using the 12441 as the basis for the project was a mistake, because instead of giving the 20380 the proper corvette, it was decided to provide him with Redut air defense system and heavy anti-ship missiles with universal installations capable of launching Onyxes "And" Caliber ". If the corvette of the 20380 project received something useful "inherited" from the "Thunder", it is a deck helicopter, and even with a hangar for its permanent base.

It is interesting to compare the very first Corvette "Steregushchy" with the TFR of the 11660 project. Both are equipped with Uranas, but instead of the 4 RCC on the TFR, the Steregushchy carries the 8. A helicopter hangar and a landing site were placed in the Stern Steward, so there was not enough room for the Kortik-M Stern. There was a couple AK-630 to do. But with the nose "Dirk" is not all clear: the author could not find the photos where the rocket armament was mounted on the installation. Has the anti-aircraft missile and artillery complex turned into a purely artillery complex? If so, why?


"Dirk-M" corvette "Stereguschy"

But the "main caliber" increased from 76 to 100 mm.


100-mm artillery mount Corvette "Stereguschy"

But as for the fight against an underwater enemy ... no, they have not forgotten about it. If the old 1124 project had a towed GUS, and for the TFR of the 11660 project, instead of it, the underwater GUS was envisaged, then the Steregushchy was piled up with 3 (!) GAS "Anapa-M" is also being dropped! Why such abundance on a small ship, the designers themselves hardly know. But instead of the same “Medvedki”, the “Steregushchy” was installed ... no, not “Waterfall” and not 2-mm torpedo tubes, from which the ship could use long-range torpedoes of the “Caliber” family. The only anti-submarine weapon of the ship was the 533-mm torpedo unit "Package-NK". Theoretically, the range of its 324-mm torpedoes when attacking a submarine is 324 km, i.e. almost as much as the Medvedka missile system. But the torpedo has practically such a range only at the speed of 20 nodes (there are two speed modes on it, 30 and 30 knots) and on 50 knots. to overcome 30 km torpedo will need almost 20 minutes! In the modern sea battle - the whole eternity. The Package-NK complex is well suited for the ship’s self-defense against enemy torpedoes, in some cases it can also be used on an enemy submarine, but it is completely inappropriate as the main anti-submarine weapon. A helicopter can not always be used simply due to weather conditions (especially from the deck of a small ship), and the reaction time, taking into account the preparation of the helicopter for departure, can also exceed all reasonable limits.

The result is an oxymoron:

1. The main opponent of our corvettes in the near sea zone is the submarine.

2. The 11660 project received adequate anti-submarine weapons.
3. The rival project 12441 also had adequate anti-submarine weapons, but moreover also powerful attack / anti-aircraft weapons.

4. The 12441 project is considered too large and expensive, but nevertheless it was he who was taken as the basis for the “future corvette” (with the conscious need to “cut down the sturgeon”).

5. The results of the savings "under the knife" pleased anti-submarine weapons.

6. As a result, nn. The 1-5 Corvette has stopped responding to its main task. A curtain.

After “The Watchman”, the corvettes went to the series, on which the nasal “Dirk” CRAFT changed the 12 PU for the Redut missile. More than a controversial decision: the corvette formally acquired a perfect air defense system, which was in no way inferior to the same “Calm”, but it is completely unclear how the developers in general were going to solve the problem of target designation to Redut missiles. The problem was that the 9M96E rocket carried an active homing head, which, on the one hand, didn’t require a specialized target illumination radar (as for a missile with a semi-active seeker), but on the other hand the rocket still needed someone summed it up to a distance from which AGSN Zur could capture an aerial target. This is usually implemented as follows: a powerful radar of the general review, once every few seconds fixing the position of the rocket and the target in space, transmits this data to the control system of the air defense missile system, it calculates them and produces the necessary correction, which is transmitted to the rocket. The layout is excellent, only on corvettes of the 20380 project there is no powerful surveillance radar. As a result, the choice of the developers is quite poor: either try to teach a full-time radar "Furke-2" to somehow control the flight of missiles, or use for this purpose a full-time OMS of Puma artillery systems. Neither is an acceptable option. “Furke-2” is a survey radar of the Pantsir-С1 complex adapted for a ship, but the fact is that within the framework of the mentioned complex its task is only primary target detection, and the tracking and guidance radar is taken further. “Furca” works in the decimeter range, which is more or less acceptable on land, but at sea such a radar does not matter what is happening against the background of the underlying surface, i.e. low flying targets. Americans, in their time, were tormented by training the AN / SPY-1 radar, also operating in the decimeter range, to recognize what is flying at a low altitude, and it is not a fact that they were trained properly. But this radar is the basis of the entire Aegis of Ticonderoga type cruisers and destroyers of the Arly Burk type, and it is much more powerful than the Furke 2.

That is why in the ground “Pantsira” the prototype of “Furke” should only detect “something”, and further - the case of tracking and guidance radar operating in the centimeter (and millimeter) ranges, which perfectly see everything against the background of sea waves. That’s the way, by the way, is the excellent SAMPSON radar, on the newest British destroyers of the Daring type, which many analysts consider to be the best air defense ships in the world today. The “Dearing” missiles are also equipped with an active GOS, and SAMPSON carries out their “output” to the target, but does it in the following way: SAMPSON is a “two in one” being a kind of symbiosis of decimeter and centimeter radars. The decimeter has an advantage in range, and it is the main one, but if it suddenly "seemed" to him that something was flying against the background of the ocean, immediately this section is checked by a centimeter radar - and then there is nothing to hide. The USSR Navy solved this question differently - in those years we relied on missiles from a semi-active GOS, and general overview radars were decimeter. But if suddenly the surveillance radar saw some kind of interference, then “Tackle” could be immediately turned on - also a general overview radar, but optimized for identifying low-flying targets, and besides tracking and guidance radars operating in the same centimeter range could not just highlight the goal, but also to carry out its search, albeit in a narrow sector. Those. as soon as even the slightest suspicion arose that something low-flying and bad was approaching, Tackle and the radar of the SLA were able to very quickly explain the situation and give exhaustive recommendations to the means of fire destruction. For the ships of the Russian Federation, it was supposed to use a powerful Polimer radar, specially created for both general overview and missile guidance from the AHP, i.e. some kind of domestic analogue of the same SAMPSON (not on architecture, but on the tasks performed), and it was reasonable. But such a radar is too expensive to use on ships of the Corvette class.

As a result, the corvettes of the 20380 project in terms of air defense had a completely sad picture: there were no “Polyments”, “Tackles” and LMS for tracking and pointing at them, and “Puma” was focused on using artillery and equipped with not the best (and only two-coordinate ) Radar. Therefore, there are not too many hopes that the Reduta missiles will be able to shoot down low-flying targets, and if the enemy is not shy about using EW means, then the chances for defeat are low, although the high-flying targets will not be as high as we would like. According to the author of this article, the only DARK “Dirk-M” (which has its own guidance radar), the Corvette “Watching” in a real battle, can be more effective than the Redut under the control of “Furca-2” (if on “Dirk”) nevertheless there are rockets). And this is on condition that the missiles of the Redut complex themselves will work properly. And according to the latest data published in the open press, they are not going to do this at all, and moreover, it is not known when they will gather.


Corvette "Stereguschy"

Thus, the corvettes of the 20380 project today represent a rather strange sight: ships with reduced anti-submarine defense capabilities, incompetent air defense systems and a problematic power plant. This was not what the navy of the Russian Federation was waiting for.

Of course, the 20380 project has undergone a modernization, as a result of which the final digit “0” of its number has been changed to “5”. Two such corvettes, the “Thunderer” and the “Agile”, were laid on the “Northern Shipyard” in the 2012-2013. respectively. How do they differ from the basic project? This was not known as much as we would like. From the obvious - an increase in the number of cells of the Reduta air defense system from 12 to 16, the installation of UKKS on the 8 mines, and the replacement of the domestic unit DDA12000 with German diesel engines from MTU. Less clear is some kind of "opto-mast", which

“Includes radar systems and systems for various purposes, significantly increasing the capabilities of the corvette to detect and accompany enemy’s sea and air targets, and to defeat them. In particular, the mast allowed to abandon the separate antenna post of the Puma radar control of artillery fire ".


Apparently, the 20385 series corvettes became the “work on the bugs” of the 20380 project: the problem of targeting the Redut complex was supposedly solved; The UBCS, which was introduced into the armament, was valuable not because of the possibility of deploying Onyx or Caliber anti-ship missiles, but with the ability to use torpedoes of the Caliber family. Thus, the “long arm” was returned to the corvette to fight the enemy’s submarines. But here the overlap went the other way - the 91РЭ1 and 91РТЭ2 rocket-torpedoes have a range of 50 and 40 km, respectively, and it is somewhat doubtful that at least one of the three SAS of the domestic corvette (or all of them together) could detect the enemy submarine at such a distance . But the author of this article does not have accurate TTX GAS modern corvettes, so - what if? In addition, it is also possible that the helicopter of the corvette in the search mode found kilometers so in 50 from the native ship something underwater unfriendly ...

In general, the ships of the 20385 project could probably become the first fully combat-ready ships of this type (when and if the Redut air defense system is brought to mind, of course), but the excessiveness of weapons unnecessary on ships of the corvette class played the same joke that with the "ancestor" of modern Russian corvettes - TFR project 12441 "Thunder". As already mentioned in the previous article, the cost of the 20385 corvettes came very close to the frigates of the “admiral” series, while the combat capabilities of the frigates are still higher - at least due to twice the displacement, and a corresponding increase in autonomy and seaworthiness. Accordingly, the number of corvettes project 20385 limited to two units.

But what next? There is talk of creating new 20386 corvettes, and there are various rumors: who say that this modification will be the minimum “restyling” of the 20380 project, and who uploads a photo of the amazing nightmare of the seas and oceans, which the hangar has moved to the hull, t . under the deck, where the helicopter, sitting on the platform, falls with a special lift. But there is a place nearby for a pair of containers in which you can cram even the “Caliber” missile complex, at least something else - according to the modular principle ...

Shipbuilding Program of the Russian Navy, or a Very Bad Premonition (part of 4)


Something

To be honest, the author of this article had to see even more terrible ship projects, but not often. The modularity of weapons is a highly dubious innovation. Well, how to prepare the crew to fight weapons, which is currently not installed on the ship? And the design ... for only one deck being laid out and a helicopter lift can be safely presented with the Darwin Award (unreasonable complexity, and even on a ship with a small displacement, where every ton is in the account). However, the English text, perhaps, hints that it is a question of some kind of export. Then there are no questions - any whim for the customer's money!
But there are reasonable options: a gas turbine installation, one or two Pantsir-M or Palash (the last in a rocket-gun version), a sub-hook or towed GAS, an anti-submarine complex Medvedka or torpedoes with the ability to use rocket-torpedoes " Caliber-PLE ”, and a pair of quad launchers for Uranov. And it will turn out a relatively inexpensive corvette suitable for the mass series, a “workhorse” for any of our fleets.

But not in this state program. Having set a goal to build 2020 corvettes of various types before 35, by August 2016 we have 4 corvettes in service (including the “Watchman”, which went into service before the HPN 2011-2020, but oh well), one (“Perfect”) on the tests, seven - in various stages of construction (two of them of the 20385 project) and that's it. A total of twelve units, and they all have good chances to enter service until the 2020 year, but new bookmarks have been postponed indefinitely. This, in general, is understandable: not having the ability to make normal diesel power plants, but having great doubts about the capability of the Redoubt system, we need not build new corvettes like 20380 / 20385, and we have no other projects. And not only in the project case: you can design a new ship, but where do you get engines for it? All facilities today are devoted to the production of turbines for frigates, but even there we have a huge lag.

To be continued ...
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132 comments
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  1. +5
    26 August 2016 07: 00
    Great start to Friday. Andrey, thank you for the article.
    1. +4
      26 August 2016 09: 41
      You're welcome!
      1. +1
        26 August 2016 10: 27
        Oh, I feel, not just "Andreyiz Chelyabinsk". A very informed comrade.
        1. +10
          26 August 2016 12: 48
          The temporary workers will not have a systematic approach and strategy. Just no reason. Hence all the problems with weapons. The rest is lyrics. Since 1991, Russia has lost many important enterprises, some of which moved away with their neighbors, some of which were destroyed. But when adopting the rearmament program, no one bothered to restore and create their own industry. The West also fed their loved ones, now it’s too late to lament, we need to act. And journalist Rogozin or furniture maker Serdyukov will not help in this matter, no matter who says it. And I do not believe that out of 140 ml of people, a couple of dozens of competent and worthy will not be typed.
          1. +4
            26 August 2016 16: 08
            And I do not believe that out of 140 ml of people, a couple of dozens of competent and worthy will not be typed.

            But who will give them a fodder place? not for that it was mined with such difficulty.
      2. +1
        26 August 2016 18: 20
        My opinion: our defense against foreign fleets in a hypothetical war will continue to be taken out by aviation and submarines. There are no questions to aviation and in terms of submarines, GOZ 2020, is carried out without disruption.

        If anyone was interested in the opinion of an amateur like me, in an age when there are airplanes like the Tu-160, supersonic with an intercontinental flight range, especially when hypersonic is approaching, the surface fleet is generally of very dubious value. Huge constructions, with prohibitive cost, which can be destroyed by the "strategists" of the enemy long before they reach its shores. Suppose an AUG, even if it is a part of 2 aircraft carriers, with its own, not too numerous air group, is attacked by a dozen Tu-160s, with an ammunition capacity of 120 anti-ship missiles? And also the Su-30 (probably all the other T-10s?), Capable of carrying Moskit anti-ship missiles. Not to mention the Tu-22, which is almost the main purpose of fighting a surface enemy. Here at the PL, there are still prospects, due to secrecy. It seems to me a smart idea to re-equip the 949s of Antei, instead of 24 Granites, to 72 Zircons. True, I haven't heard anything about this project for a long time. Well, okay ...

        And the opinion, directly about corvettes: is it possible that the modularity of the structure should work just here? Perhaps the above ships of the series will take into account the above, will be more balanced?

        Sincerely, Ilya from Chelyabinsk.
        1. +3
          26 August 2016 19: 49
          Hello fellow countryman, Ilya! drinks
          Quote: Sevastiec
          My opinion: our defense against foreign fleets in a hypothetical war will continue to be taken out by aviation and submarines

          Unlikely
          Quote: Sevastiec
          There are no questions to aviation

          No. Because aviation, one might say, is not there either.
          Quote: Sevastiec
          and for submarines, GOZ 2020, is carried out without disruption.

          With some breakdowns. Instead of 10 Ash trees - 7, and until 2023, and not until 2020. Instead of 20 non-nuclear submarines incl. 6 Varshavyankas and 14 Ladas there will be 12 Varshavyankas (good if) and 3 Ladas, which have not been brought to mind and have limited combat effectiveness.
          Quote: Sevastiec
          And the opinion, directly about corvettes: is it possible that the modularity of the structure should work just here?

          It will not work - all this is good only in theory
          1. 0
            11 November 2016 00: 06
            And where did you get the number 35 to 2020, there were a total of 20 planned, I'm talking about pr.20380-85!
      3. 0
        11 November 2016 00: 02
        So sit in Chelyabinsk, because it is practically a "mecca" of karable building, from there you can see all the problems of our Navy!
    2. +4
      26 August 2016 11: 15
      I join, a great continuation of my favorite series of articles.
      True, I have a few questions for the author, but rather of a conceptual nature.
      Personally, I got the impression that the result of all these body movements (I would even say suffering and torment. And what is born differently?), Even though such experiments cost us a pretty penny, will be that gradually we will come to the configuration of the fleet (let's hope and believe, because what else remains) where the existing now and in Soviet times (though not so obvious) disproportion regarding the presence of coastal and oceanic ships in the fleet will gradually decrease, finding the optimal point balance to perform the tasks of conducting successful combat operations both in open waters and in closed waters. Of course, there is no confirmation of this: RTOs continue to build at an unprecedented pace, while frigates and destroyers are still there. Andrei clearly shows us what to do. For this, they create articles. I just want to emphasize a couple of points that seemed to take place, and if not, then correct me
      First of all, I would like to emphasize that the thesis about the advisability of creating destroyers of project 21956 instead of frigates 22350 is understandable and admissible. But personally, I got the impression that all of Andrey's argumentation, which is undoubtedly reinforced concrete and objective, was directed not so much against frigates, which the author himself calls one of the masterpieces of design thought, as against the still design destroyer Leader with its nuclear power plant. It seems to me that Andrey is sending us a message that all the necessary projects have already been created on paper and are only awaiting their material embodiment. It is against this atomic monster that the author complains, and not so much because of the unavailability of pr. 22350. Why such thoughts? First of all, it is quite clear that the choice of a nuclear installation, even for a ship with a displacement of 9 to 12 thousand tons, is unnecessary and expensive, even though our industry has mastered the production of such a power plant. The design sketch of the weapons of the "promising destroyer" (at least the one that flashes on the net and was on the VO), except for the S-400, hypersonic anti-ship missiles and grotesque mast, is not particularly striking. It is clear that this is only a layout and will still change more than once, but how long it will take from paper to launch is unknown, but ships are needed now. At the same time, similar weapons can be installed on 21956, which the author showed us. It is clear that it would be as cheap and cheerful as possible to produce ships of projects 21956 and 11356, but if the first ship of today (especially if they finally do not accept a full-fledged missile for the S-400, and then I think that the "chilling" of this complex will not take long we will get not just sea-based air defense, but also sea missile defense), then the second - 11356, the project of yesterday and realize itself outside closed reservoirs, it will hardly be able to. And it is perfectly clear that a replacement must be created now. Yes, of course, 22350 is not yet a candy, although in theory nothing is needed: to give up the diesel engine, go to the COGAG scheme and bring the missile defense to mind. All! Of course, the volumes will grow slightly (due to the sustainer economical turbines), even if the ship becomes 500-1000 tons heavier, it is not critical for an ocean-going ship. Moreover, there will be additional volumes for fuel, for torpedo tubes of large caliber. It is the combination of 22350 (whatever digital index is after zero) and 21956 that would turn our fleet into a thunderstorm of the seas, creating a deeply echeloned missile defense / air defense system in the best traditions of our "probable Western partners." And that is why all the argumentation against frigates 22350 (if work is done on the errors) by the author ultimately boiled down to the fact that this class has a place for its existence, and moreover, there will be both a place and tasks for it in the fleet. In addition, I am sure that such a 22350 could also take on some of the functions of protecting the coastline by sharing this burden with the 11660 corvettes (I fully agree with the author that this particular project would be more appropriate as a corvette or TFR).
      Well, I just want to thank the author for not forgetting our beauty and pride and our sorrow 1143, which I’m sure would find a place in the structure of the updated fleet with exactly those functions that Andrey indicated, even if in the current conditions they are just blind dreams .
      1. +2
        26 August 2016 20: 04
        Quote: Dante
        I join, a great continuation of my favorite series of articles.

        Thank you!
        Quote: Dante
        But personally, I had the impression that the whole argument of Andrei, which is undeniably reinforced concrete and objective, was directed not so much against the frigates, which the author calls one of the masterpieces of design thought, but against the still designed destroyer Leader with its nuclear power plant.

        Not certainly in that way. I am not happy about this "destroyer", but everything is very complicated here - so much so that it is time to write another article dedicated specifically to the "Leader" :)
        Quote: Dante
        Yes, of course, 22350 is not a sweetie yet, although in theory you just need to do nothing: abandon the diesel engine by going to the COGAG scheme and bring the SAM to mind. All!

        And then it will be a sweetheart in technical terms, but it will not be so in terms of cost / efficiency - we will get an excellent frigate for the price of a destroyer. Nearly.
        Quote: Dante
        In addition, I am sure that such a 22350 could also take on part of the functions of protecting the coastline by sharing this burden with 11660 corvettes

        Yes, he could, but there he is redundant. That’s the problem - for the ocean tasks it’s not badly armed, but it’s small, and for coastal tasks it is too strong.
        Quote: Dante
        Well, I just want to thank the author for not forgetting our beauty and pride and our sorrow 1143

        And thank you. And ... I’ll put it to myself as an avatar - the last black silhouette was quite fine with me, but now this pale circle is somehow not pretty
        hi
        1. +1
          27 August 2016 21: 03
          I'm reading your articles with interest Andrei!
          In short:
          Corvettes 20380 - the unfortunate victims of the incompetence of individual large leaders and lobbyists attached to them. They are easier to forget than to modify.
          I fully share the point of view that our new ships are nonsense (projects from the 90s):
          - 11356 - IMHO is a normal corvette, with the ability (if really needed) to go far sometimes. Everything for the PLO corvette is on it (2x2x533mm TA, RBU, helicopter, place for helicopter fuel, UKKS). And it was not very expensive. On 20380, if I am not mistaken, fuel for 2 helicopter departures.
          - 22350 is an armament and into a hull of 6000-7000 tons (everyone has been doing this for a long time). Well, of course, gas turbines instead of diesel engines. And the placement of the crew will improve, and the range, and the conditions for the use of weapons will expand. You can add a means of landing marines. Reef-M yes 2 Shell MSM (I hope this will be) - good air defense. And if they add the third UKKS, then the holiday will come. There will be a universal ship of the ocean zone. Then you can go to the Leader.
  2. +4
    26 August 2016 07: 13
    Thank!!! I look forward to continuing !!! The fact that the program has been disrupted is already clear and unfortunately. Judging by the publications and loud statements, this is all a farce. The fleet in the near future does not expect anything good, if for limited water areas such as the Baltic and the Black Sea, something bad is bad for us, that is, for the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet there is nothing or what is not expected in the near future unfortunately (
    1. +2
      26 August 2016 08: 40
      That is, you have already elevated to the absolute the opinion of a person who is simply building a pessimistic forecast, extrapolating on the basis of sometimes biased or outdated data and even a dubious smell, because in some places it looks like disinformation or falsification (especially if it is taken from open sources). Interesting .... although your right to believe in something, and to look for the guilty, yes "useful" occupation, very "useful"
      1. +3
        26 August 2016 09: 24
        Dear, I do not know very well the situation in our Armed Forces, for this situation is before our eyes, and our fleet has always been financed by the residual principle !!! If in our army not everything is glorious to God, despite the statements of high ranks in uniform, which, beyond the cabinets, stick their nose only at the victory parade, then it will not be difficult to imagine what is going on in the fleet all the more urgent I myself pulled to KTOF
    2. +7
      26 August 2016 09: 43
      Quote: Nehist
      Judging by the publications and loud statements, this is all a farce. The fleet in the near future does not expect anything good

      Nuuu, there is a big plus - we still started :))) And yes, despite the GPV 2011-2020, we have not reached the bottom yet. By and large, everything will be determined by the construction of ships until 2030 - for us this is the stage at which we lose the remnants of the USSR fleet by 90-95 percent
      1. 0
        9 November 2016 13: 30
        The only thing that pleases me in the fleet building program is that admirals still draw conclusions from attempts to create an Über ship, and cut the sturgeon on the fly. In particular, the transition to 20386, despite the dubious solutions with "modularity", speaks of the awareness of all the problems of 20380 and attempts to fix them in a new reincarnation. We will see what attempts will be made, but we are glad that we do not rest our horns on the overweight ship BMZ in the face of 20380, but are looking for ways of development. Of course, these paths are not straight and can be scolded for a long time, but at least we are not standing still.
        Personally, analyzing the situation in the Navy, I understand that before the 2030 of the year we do not close the BMZ, and exits to the far ocean are laid off over the horizon. Unless, of course, we do not rely on patrolmen with one 76 mm fluff as representatives of the ocean squadron.
    3. 0
      26 August 2016 10: 38
      Yes, the saddest thing is that "Polyment-Redut" can not bring to mind, and of course the engines ...
    4. 0
      26 August 2016 18: 41
      The fleet needs just billions of dollars of infusion, and in the evergreens. In the meantime, we have a budget of the entire army less than what would be nice to allocate to the fleet. The Northern Fleet can still pull - strong, but it’s sad with the Pacific Fleet - a Japanese destroyer will sail and will be able to drown everything and everything there.
      1. +1
        27 August 2016 21: 09
        Quote: Forest
        The fleet needs just billions of dollars of infusion, and in the evergreens. In the meantime, we have a budget of the entire army less than what would be nice to allocate to the fleet. The Northern Fleet can still pull - strong, but it’s sad with the Pacific Fleet - a Japanese destroyer will sail and will be able to drown everything and everything there.


        Not everything is so bad, the Japanese will not swim yet! :)
        But there’s nothing special to visit him.
  3. 0
    26 August 2016 07: 19
    Yes, it remains only to hang
    1. +1
      26 August 2016 15: 23
      4-5 years ago - Yes! Now at the end of the pipe they lit a candle.
  4. +16
    26 August 2016 07: 24
    Although this is the author’s personal opinion, it is detailed and as objective as the necessary data are available to the author.
    Personally, I believe that analytics at the level and the article on the topic to the author were a success. A plus. smile
    Problems always exist, they just need to be noticed and corrected on time. Of course, on the wave of patriotism for a simple layman, the flip side of the coin is not visible and he may not be aware of the shortcomings of both individual ships and the system as a whole. Therefore, the author in a series of his articles tries to show all aspects of the construction of the fleet. And such an opinion has the right to life. The question is, do such top-level comrades take into account such materials from lower classes?
    Andrew offset good drinks hi
    1. +3
      26 August 2016 09: 44
      Thanks, namesake! hi drinks
  5. 0
    26 August 2016 08: 12
    Hmm, it is interesting and detailed, thanks, I read all 4 articles, although in some places and fluently .... Questions will be out of place, for example, it is not clear why you consider corvettes or frigates a full-fledged ocean class of ships, given their limited role in protecting the coast or there economic interests along the shelf and in inland seas, limited travel radius, limited resistance to resisting waves, etc. and so on, is it, even in places, sometimes perceived as the "Chinese classification of animals" by Borges? Also, unless the performance characteristics of even these as YOU think (and your opinion is not the ultimate truth, although I think pessimism is justified in places) unbalanced corvettes and frigates are quite sufficient in the Baltic or Black Sea in defense against surface ships of fleets of such countries as Denmark (Frigates of the type "Yver Huitfeld"), and Spain (Frigates of the "Alvaro de Bazan" type), Germany (Frigates of the "Saxony" type), and from the "neutrals", let's say Norway (Frigates of the "Iver Hueitfeld" type), which have about same level + \ -.?
    1. +2
      26 August 2016 09: 47
      Quote: Saireg
      it’s a little unclear why you consider corvettes or frigates to be a full-fledged ocean-class ship

      On the contrary - I do not consider them as such. But in our country, frigates 22350 were presented to the general public precisely as ocean-going ships, which is incorrect.
      Quote: Saireg
      Unless even the performance characteristics of even these as YOU think (and your opinion is not the ultimate truth, although I think pessimism is justified in places) unbalanced corvettes and frigates are quite sufficient in the Baltic or Black Sea in defense against surface ships of fleets of countries such as Denmark

      The only problem is that our surface ships for the most part have completely different tasks
    2. +3
      26 August 2016 10: 00
      for example, it’s a little unclear why you consider corvettes or frigates to be a full-fledged ocean-class ship

      And you do not read fluently, then maybe you will see that Andrei does not even consider the frigate pr 22350 a full-fledged ocean warship!
      quite sufficient in the waters of the Baltic or Black Sea in defense against surface ships

      About the war in inland seas - at the beginning of the article!
      and from "neutrals" let's say Norway

      Since when did a NATO member state become neutral ?!
      That is, you propose to make a kind of superMRK?

      Do you imagine MRKs? Read at your leisure the composition of armaments of 21631 Ave. and compare it with 20380 / 20385 - you will not find any matches! Yes, they can not be, because the ships were created for completely different tasks!
      PS
      And Andrei many thanks for the work done! Great publishing cycle! drinks
      PPS Will coastal infrastructure be addressed in future articles?
      1. +2
        26 August 2016 10: 08
        Quote: Rokossovsky
        And Andrei many thanks for the work done!

        And thank you, with a kind word! drinks
        Quote: Rokossovsky
        PPS Will coastal infrastructure be addressed in future articles?

        I would love to, but there is practically no data, alas request
  6. +1
    26 August 2016 08: 32
    I have no doubt that there are serious problems. However, unlike the author, I am sure that specialists are no less interested in overcoming emerging problems. And the fact that the article is quite full of all sorts of data indicates the author's meticulousness. One thing is embarrassing - do such analytical articles facilitate the work of the special services of our "partners"? They also read and carefully study everything that is of the slightest interest to them. Is it necessary to make their work so easy. Holy simplicity is worse than stealing.
    1. +3
      26 August 2016 08: 55
      Let's "classify" Andrey? bully
      1. +4
        26 August 2016 10: 05
        Quote: alexej123
        Let's "classify" Andrey?

        I propose to limit ourselves to the epigraph to each article: "Before reading - print and burn!"
        1. +1
          26 August 2016 21: 50
          Well, if it's no joke, Andrey, then the "oracle" is right in some way, special structures, the bulk of information, after analysis, is obtained from open sources. But, the oracle's comment says that you are still "in the body". I have always respected professionals. hi
    2. +3
      26 August 2016 09: 32
      That's right, it’s necessary to ban all such articles, and leave only cheers-patriotic materials. It’s like we crushed everyone there in Syria, or like today, about how the Americans are afraid of our old BOD. Reading your post, I immediately remember the second lieutenant Oak from the immortal Schweik hi
    3. +3
      26 August 2016 09: 54
      Quote: oracul
      One thing is embarrassing - do such analytical articles facilitate the work of the special services of our "partners"?

      Do not worry. In the Russian-speaking Internet there are so many analytic articles (in 90% of which there is no smell of analytics) that no special service will deal with them. They do not track analytics, but the official data of manufacturers and MO
  7. 0
    26 August 2016 08: 52
    "a gas turbine installation, one or two" Pantsir-M "or" Broadsword "(the latter in the missile-cannon version), under-keel or towed GAS, anti-submarine complex" Medvedka "or torpedo tubes with the possibility of using missile-torpedoes" Caliber-PLE ", yes, a couple of quad launchers for the Uranus. And it will turn out to be a relatively inexpensive corvette, suitable for mass production, a "workhorse" for any of our fleet. " That is, you propose to make a kind of super MRC?
    1. 0
      26 August 2016 09: 24
      Quote: Saireg
      "a gas turbine installation, one or two" Pantsir-M "or" Broadsword "(the latter in the missile-cannon version), under-keel or towed GAS, anti-submarine complex" Medvedka "or torpedo tubes with the possibility of using missile-torpedoes" Caliber-PLE ", yes, a couple of quad launchers for the Uranus. And it will turn out to be a relatively inexpensive corvette, suitable for mass production, a "workhorse" for any of our fleet. " That is, you propose to make a kind of super MRC?


      You have now described the weapons of the Frigate 22350.

      But in general, I did not understand the author’s thoughts on the account of corvettes. What don't you like?
      The air defense of 20385 corvettes is enough for the near zone. These are two AK-630 one AK-190 and 12 Redut rockets.
      FFP is also there. These are 8 calibers, onyxes or uranium.
      PLO is similar. One PLO helicopter and 8 calibers (if you put rocket and torpedoes into them, they have been trying for a long time by the way, and it seems like it turned out). There is a towed GAS station, there is a GAS on the ship itself. To protect against torpedoes are 2 package-NK with 8y anti-torpedoes.

      In my opinion, it can very well perform the function of a MULTIPURPOSE patrol ship with such weapons.
      1. +2
        26 August 2016 09: 51
        You see, the whole point is that Redoubt still doesn’t even shoot normally with the Polymer complex, which is not just a surveillance radar and even a decimeter range (as installed on the corvettes of this Furke-2 series), but a complex of radar and an active phased antenna array. She will not work with the shell on the radar from the complex - this is a completely different weight category, if you want. As for the PLO, it is in general, and it is well demonstrated in the article - it is insufficient. If you proceed as you propose and place in the ZS-14 cells an anti-submarine version of the Caliber caliber missile torpedoes, then in that case the possibilities for fighting enemy submarines will really increase many times, while the possibility of fighting ships of the same probable will drop by a similar indicator foe, because for these purposes only 100 mm guns will remain. All of the above, coupled with problem engines, turns this project into a very dubious acquisition for our fleet. Although visually the project is beautiful, but unfortunately no more.
      2. +3
        26 August 2016 09: 52
        Quote: Nikita Dmitriev
        You have now described the weapons of the Frigate 22350.

        Where from? Nothing like
        Quote: Nikita Dmitriev
        But in general, I did not understand the author’s thoughts on the account of corvettes. What don't you like?

        It seems that I described this in sufficient detail in the article
        Quote: Nikita Dmitriev
        The air defense of 20385 corvettes is enough for the near zone. These are two AK-630 one AK-190 and 12 Redut rockets.

        Not even 12, but 16 Reduta rockets
        Quote: Nikita Dmitriev
        In my opinion, it can very well perform the function of a MULTIPURPOSE patrol ship with such weapons.

        Able, of course. Only due to the fact that the cost of such a corvette came close to the cost of the frigate of project 11356, 20385 will not be built. The ship turned out to be quite multi-purpose, yes. But unsuitable for mass construction due to high cost
      3. PPD
        0
        26 August 2016 09: 58
        Air defense is not only SAM, it is still a lot of anything. About what they usually read reluctantly.
        But in vain. Air defense on these ships from the series, so it was. Look at the probability of hitting a target on these complexes -0,7. Further, you can no longer continue, alas.
        1. +1
          26 August 2016 10: 11
          Quote: PPD
          Look at the probability of hitting a target on these complexes -0,7.

          This is about nothing. Western guys do not set a probability of defeat of less than 0,85 for their missiles in principle. And in battle - well, if 40%
          1. PPD
            +2
            26 August 2016 10: 39
            Voooooooot! A guaranteed defeat from 0, 9 begins.
            The West has no such concept, it seems .. We have it. Oops i.e. It looks like the fleet was ...
            Redoubt generally knows how to shoot "burst" ie multiple missiles at minimal intervals? It looks like no. Only "with missile consumption control".
            Moral, with such performance characteristics it is better to build RTOs cheaper and more will work out.
    2. +3
      26 August 2016 09: 54
      Quote: Saireg
      Oh, are you proposing to do some kind of superMRK?

      Generally speaking, the corvette - this is superMRK :))))
      And so - yes, these are exactly the ships I offer.
  8. 0
    26 August 2016 09: 07
    The Redut air defense system was planned to be installed on the 20380 project corvettes, but due to the rocket’s unpreparedness, the lead ship went into operation with the Kortik, and the Redut air defense system was installed on subsequent 20385 ships.
  9. +1
    26 August 2016 09: 12
    Quote: oracul
    I have no doubt that there are serious problems. However, unlike the author, I am sure that specialists are no less interested in overcoming emerging problems. And the fact that the article is quite full of all sorts of data indicates the author's meticulousness. One thing is embarrassing - do such analytical articles facilitate the work of the special services of our "partners"? They also read and carefully study everything that is of the slightest interest to them. Is it necessary to make their work so easy. Holy simplicity is worse than stealing.

    This is vryatli, the author clearly works with open sources: advertising brochures of Russian military-industrial complex companies, data from Wikipedia and other similar online directories, conjectures of various journalists of the level of Rain or Ren-TV, and maybe reviews of some "military experts" from the "Alternative History" resource , or from the journal of the level "Foreign Military Review", although meticulousness pleases, encourages to read and verify and look for where the author gets the data, for which thanks to him) Although the value will only be for science fiction futurists ...
    1. +3
      26 August 2016 12: 16
      Dear, maybe you specify your thoughts? What specific information, from the one that the author cites in his article, do you disagree with? What specific erroneous information did the author cite? The author naturally works with open sources, do you have others? Then please enlighten us using your classified information, what is the author wrong about? And then I read your comments, except for arrogance and neglect I don’t see anything ... but on what this arrogance is based, there is no rational grain in your comments at all ...
  10. +4
    26 August 2016 09: 18
    The article, of course, is curious and relevant, although I do not agree with the author in everything! Especially with respect to the modular construction, the FUTURE is behind it. Only such a system will allow you to quickly turn the ship exactly into what you most need HERE and NOW! Agree very urgently, especially in conditions of limited funding.

    There are several inaccuracies:
    Corvettes 20380 PLUR 91RE1 cannot be used in principle, since it does not have a 533-mm TA! The "Caliber-NK" uses ONLY modification 91RE2.
    And further. Dear Andrey! Finally, stop calling the civilian BIUS "Aegis"! Pronounce this word (Aegis - aegis) as IJIS!
    Well, respect to the author (Big, human "+")!
    The discussion will unfold - it will be interesting!
    1. +1
      26 August 2016 10: 02
      Quote: venik
      Only such a system will allow you to quickly turn the ship exactly into what you most need HERE and NOW! Agree very urgently, especially in conditions of limited funding.

      Generally irrelevant :))) This is not a "Lego" constructor :))) Ie. in order to replace something with something, factory conditions are required.
      Suppose, at some stage, they learned to do it in 5 minutes. What about people? What about combat training? How long does it take to drive a ship with modular weapons in order for the crew to work out its application?
      Quote: venik
      Corvettes 20380 PLUR 91RE1 cannot be used in principle, since it does not have a 533-mm TA! The "Caliber-NK" uses ONLY modification 91RE2.

      Thank you, I didn’t know! drinks
      Quote: venik
      And further. Dear Andrey! Finally, stop calling the civilian BIUS "Aegis"! Pronounce this word (Aegis - aegis) as IJIS!

      Good :))) It's just that in publications it is called this way and that, but as it is - not with my English
      "I studied the English-Russian dictionary - I learned the English-Russian language" feel
      1. 0
        27 August 2016 21: 24
        Regarding the block-modular construction of ships of the future, practice has spoken. Almost all blockiness was canceled on American littoral ships, although for the sake of it this program was conceived. As a result, money was spent - the sea, slightly armed ships with under-displacement quickly run around. They are also hard to see on radars when they have been waiting for months for repairs at foreign ports. bully
        It’s good that we haven’t gotten into this topic yet. hi
  11. +1
    26 August 2016 09: 46
    Another question is why do you use corvettes against submarines?) If the same role is played all over the world by either frigates, or coastal aviation (helicopters) in guiding the same frigates and above, or there coastal radars, or domestic submarines? Maybe then you consider it a mistake, for example, Sweden’s Visby type corvettes, or Germany’s Braunschweig K130 type corvettes, which are against the mosquito fleet of NATO, you propose to exhibit large-tonnage vessels of the destroyer level and above, which may not keep up with them, and which are most needed are not needed in sea puddles (well, except perhaps as a flagship for frigates to make the squadron more stable), but in the ocean ??
    1. +3
      26 August 2016 10: 24
      Quote: Saireg
      Another question is why do you use corvettes against submarines?)

      I do not use them, but the Navy of the Russian Federation :)
      Quote: Saireg
      if the same role is played all over the world by either frigates, or coastal aviation (helicopters) in guiding the same frigates and higher, or there coastal radars, or domestic submarines?

      The tasks "all over the world" are completely different. For example, the countries of the same Europe are interested in protecting their ocean communications, along which, in the event of a major war, reinforcements from the United States would go. And we have an ASW in the coastal seas. Why is there a frigate if you can get by with a corvette?
      Quote: Saireg
      Maybe then you think it’s a mistake, for example, Sweden’s visby corvettes

      Visby corvettes were created as shock ships. What are the mistakes?
      Quote: Saireg
      against the mosquito of the NATO fleet, you propose to exhibit large-tonnage vessels of the destroyer level and above, which may not keep up with them, and which are needed most are not needed in sea puddles

      Once again, please read the article about frigates :))) We have an ocean presence in the tasks of the fleet. What kind of mosquito fleet is there? Or are the US AUG a "mosquito fleet" for you?
      And in closed waters - at the World Cup, I offered the 11356 series, but in the Baltic I don’t see any utility for frigates either, there you can get by with corvettes
      In general, I understand that you don’t like my conclusions, but let's still criticize somehow constructively
  12. The comment was deleted.
  13. +4
    26 August 2016 10: 15
    Only RBU looked superfluous, although it is possible that it made some sense as an anti-torpedo weapon (and MLRS for coastal shooting).

    RBU on ships operating in coastal areas is just not superfluous. EMNIP, at shallow depths and the range of detection of submarines is less, and torpedoes have problems with homing.
    The same Swedes even put RBU on the super-sophisticated visby.
    1. +1
      26 August 2016 10: 25
      Quote: Alexey RA
      RBU on ships operating in coastal areas is just not superfluous.

      It is quite difficult to say - as I understand it, it is almost impossible to cover submarines with them.
      1. 0
        27 August 2016 21: 30
        With RBU, the topic is ambiguous - new intelligent "shells" are being actively developed. Well, a colleague above rightly spoke about the depths of the use of missile-torpedoes.
  14. 0
    26 August 2016 10: 24
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: venik
    Only such a system will allow you to quickly turn the ship exactly into what you most need HERE and NOW! Agree very urgently, especially in conditions of limited funding.

    Generally irrelevant :))) This is not a "Lego" constructor :))) Ie. in order to replace something with something, factory conditions are required.
    Suppose, at some stage, they learned to do it in 5 minutes. What about people? What about combat training? How long does it take to drive a ship with modular weapons in order for the crew to work out its application?
    And if they use crew rotation? After all, it is planned to use two or three configurations in a specific direction, say, "patrol" or "shock escort" or "submarine hunter", say for up to six months or a year, then on the basis of planned change the configuration and take the crew for training for another specialty ? Maybe this will just help to train a crew in different specializations for the destroyers you want, because you still need to serve, you need to train on ships of a lower rank? Oh yes, when changing the configuration, you can still update the data for recognition, so that the enemy never really knows how many ships of a specific class there are that will knock tactical planning
    1. +2
      26 August 2016 20: 10
      Quote: Saireg
      And if they will use the rotation of the crew?

      Then, I'm afraid nothing good will come of this venture. Well, it is impossible to train three crews on one ship :))) Well, count it yourself - it turns out that in comparison with the "Burk" whose crew is on the ship all the time, each of our crews will have 1/3 of their stay on the ship. What kind of preparation is there? And who will win the naval battle?
      1. 0
        27 August 2016 21: 48
        The only ships where replacement crews are planned are the new German F-125 frigates. The reason is that they do not want to drive ships from patrol places (Somalia, the Persian Gulf, etc.) home, for the crew to rest. Resource ships are going to protect.
        Let's see how it goes. hi
  15. +2
    26 August 2016 10: 48
    Good day, Andrey. Article and to you plus! And not only the content, but also the style and writing, I read it with great pleasure and for the first time I have absolutely nothing to object to, on the topic of the article I completely agree with everything.)) A very good article. We look forward to continuing.
    1. +1
      26 August 2016 20: 13
      And good day to you! Glad I liked everything. However, I’m also glad when you didn’t like something, because It’s always a pleasure to talk with relevant people! hi
  16. 0
    26 August 2016 10: 51
    Project 22350 frigates are multipurpose frigates of the far sea zone, not the ocean. You obviously have something wrong with geography, you forgot to say that a huge part of the seas is located in the western part of the Pacific Ocean along Eurasia, including: Bering, Okhotsk, Japanese, Inland Japanese, Yellow, East China , Philippine; as well as the seas between the islands of Southeast Asia: South China, Yavan, Sulu, Sulawesi, Bali, Flores, Sava, Banda, Seram, Halmahera, Moluccas ... You are clearly replacing concepts in order to bring the idea of ​​mythical oceanic truths to the truth for likelihood frigates, where did you get this?
    1. +1
      26 August 2016 12: 33
      Well, let’s say so, the destroyers are not being built at the moment, and until they are built, the frigates of Project 22350 will at least have to close the functionality of the ships of the ocean zone, as far as possible. Sorry, but the BOD and the Missile cruisers left from the Soviet Navy to plug all the holes will obviously not be enough. In many ways, this (IMHO) explains some redundancy of weapons of these frigates.
    2. 0
      26 August 2016 18: 18
      Project 22350 frigates are multipurpose frigates of the far sea zone, not the ocean.
      \
      Sorry Saireg! Well, why, in fact, not OCEAN ??? My favorites - destroyers of the 56th project (together with cruisers) climbed all the seas and oceans! Sclerosis has not yet completely overcome - I remember how in the 70s a group of Pacific Fleet ships (including Project 56) came to India on a visit (for reference - Project 56 has a displacement of 2.8 thousand tons, full - 3.2 thousand tons) !!!
      \ And what prevents Pr.22350 from doing the same? So there max. displacement of 4.5 thousand tons !!! And the range (in fuel) is not much less, and autonomy (in food supplies) - even more!
    3. +2
      26 August 2016 20: 23
      Quote: Saireg
      You are clearly substituting concepts in order to bring into truth the idea of ​​mythical oceanic frigates for credibility

      Honestly, I don’t even want to explain.
      When Gorshkov was laying down, only the iron was silent, and the washing machine, the rest of the electrical appliances broadcast on all channels about the revival of the OCEAN fleet. While 22350 - well, that's never an ocean ship. This time. Second-sea you have listed, five points. Can you list the tasks that will need to be solved in these seas by frigates? Or for you a ship of the far sea zone is a ship that goes on distant seas? laughing
      We have tasks in the coastal seas, and to solve them, frigate 22350 is not needed, smaller and cheaper ships will also cope. We have tasks in the ocean, in the far sea zone, call it what you want - the fact is that for operations in the same Philippine Sea frigate 22305 is not optimal due to its small size, and I explained in the articles why. I took the TASKS that confront our fleet and showed the non-optimality of a frigate class ship to solve them. And you to me - a list of seas
  17. +1
    26 August 2016 11: 04
    Yes, a competent analysis. The "Sea Collection" of the year was like 1988-1989. I remember reading them out to the holes. :)
  18. +3
    26 August 2016 11: 34
    Welcome Andrew hi ! Eco flooded you with articles !!!! You don’t have time to read and comprehend crying . Oh well, now about the article ...
    Alas, but everything went wrong, and this time the PKB Almaz, which proposed a completely different ship of the near-sea zone, the 12441 Thunder project, was the initiator of the “warp”.

    The fate of pr. 11660 is as tragic as the fate of many projects born at the turn of the 90s. And as far as I remember, pr. 11660 was originally created as an export ship for the Indians. An analysis of the development of the projects showed that if the delivery of the export version of the TFR can be planned for 1990, then the readiness for the delivery of the version for the Soviet Navy in terms of weapons systems cannot be earlier than 1992! The trouble with "Cheetah" was that he was the brainchild of the Zelenodolsk PKB and not the idea of ​​the Krylovtsy transferred to "Almaz"! It is also interesting that the Krylov Central Research Institute, together with Almaz, gave birth to Thunder Ave. for 11 years. The future president of the commercial firm Vtormetinvest had to prove that he was not only a thief, but also a creator. And in order to prove it on the fast "Novik" was very convenient. Here Gromov strenuously lobbied for the construction of Project 12441, calling it a ship of the XXI century! Gromov was replaced by the rogue Kuraedov and now the ship of the XXI century has become pr. 20380. Everything, Andrey, is simple to the point of banality! And the fact that "Redoubt" flies or does not fly, can "Puma" control fire ... but who cares ?????
    The good news is that you, Andrei, when writing your articles, besides your TTX enthusiasm, began to put yourself in the place of a shooting performer or corvette commander. In the fact that the fleet needs small anti-submariners you are absolutely right
    But there are reasonable options: a gas turbine installation, one or two Pantsir-M or Palash (the last in a rocket-gun version), a sub-hook or towed GAS, an anti-submarine complex Medvedka or torpedoes with the ability to use rocket-torpedoes " Caliber-PLE ”, and a pair of quad launchers for Uranov. And it will turn out a relatively inexpensive corvette suitable for the mass series, a “workhorse” for any of our fleets.

    Take for example such a situation .... The Sea of ​​Okhotsk is a place of combat duty of the Pacific Fleet's SSBN, along the ocean perimeter there are the Dniester State Aviation Complex. "Dniester" spotted the passage of the nuclear submarine of the ver. enemy. An outfit of PLO ships is allocated to destroy or expel the "partner", and here it seems to me that some kind of leader is needed, for the IPC, who has an PLO helicopter. Indeed, the same Ka-27 has a search area radius of 200 km. This leader (again, this is purely my opinion) may well be a pair of frigates.
    This part of the article is the most successful for my taste! good drinks
    1. +2
      26 August 2016 13: 11
      Quote: Serg65
      Take for example such a situation .... The Sea of ​​Okhotsk is a place of combat duty of the Pacific Fleet's SSBN, along the ocean perimeter there are the Dniester State Aviation Complex. "Dniester" spotted the passage of the nuclear submarine of the ver. enemy. An outfit of PLO ships is allocated to destroy or expel the "partner", and here it seems to me that some kind of leader is needed, for the IPC, who has an PLO helicopter. Indeed, the same Ka-27 has a search area radius of 200 km.

      Or maybe it is better to send a PLO plane in parallel with the allocation of the PLOW? He will quickly come to the area where the system is triggered (before the area of ​​probable location of the submarine expands to indecent dimensions), expose the RSL barriers, pinpoint the submarine and, when approaching the PLUG, pass the submarine for later taming and releasing. Then the helicopter PLO is not required.
      1. +3
        26 August 2016 13: 31
        Or maybe it is better to send a PLO plane in parallel with the allocation of the PLOW?

        I agree, the option with an airplane is much better! But again, it all depends on the location. Although the MO has now taken up the Kuril Islands, for sure, the airfields will be restored.
        1. 0
          27 August 2016 21: 54
          An airplane is, of course, a good thing, but in many areas of the vast Motherland, non-flying weather reaches 60% a year. So that the aircraft can never replace the ship - it will only complement it.
          1. 0
            29 August 2016 09: 55
            So if the weather for the base aircraft is not flying, then the deck helicopter, most likely, will not help. smile
    2. +2
      26 August 2016 20: 33
      Greetings, Sergey! And thanks for your feedback! drinks
      Quote: Serg65
      Eco flooded you with articles !!!!

      Yes, rushing like a beaver on rails laughing But this is not from a good life - at the moment I am unemployed, so there is time.
      Quote: Serg65
      Everything, Andrey, is simple to the point of banality! And the fact that "Redoubt" flies or does not fly, can "Puma" control fire ... but who cares ?????

      I perfectly understand that this is a matter of undercover games, but I do not know the material so well as to express it in persons.
      Quote: Serg65
      The good news is that you, Andrei, when writing your articles, besides the TTX enthusiasm, began to put yourself in the place of the shooting artist or corvette commander

      I tried before, but apparently did not work :)
      Quote: Serg65
      and here it seems to me that I need some kind of leader for the IPC, which has a PLO helicopter.

      I haven’t come to a consensus for myself - do I need a helicopter on a corvette or not? On the one hand, it is clear that with a helicopter it is MUCH better than without a helicopter. But can you do without a platform for a coastal ship? Or will it be more correct with the hangar? A helicopter is great, but try to board a small boat with excitement .. How is it? In general, I am not at all against a helicopter. And not against the frigates at all. I just don’t have enough knowledge to at least come to a final decision for myself
      And what do you think?
      1. +3
        27 August 2016 09: 40
        do you need a helicopter on a corvette or not?

        The question, Andrey, is of course debatable! On the one hand, the PLO helicopter expands the search area and increases the possibility of hitting submarines, and also makes it possible to dispense with the omitted GAS. On the other hand, as Alexey RA correctly noted, a PLO aircraft will perform this task better than a helicopter. But in my opinion, our patrol planes are in the same condition as our fleet. As far as I remember, IL-38 to IL-38Н has been upgraded to date (although in my opinion IL-38SD for Indians will be better than IL-38Н for us) there are only 5 airplanes, although there is a desire of the MO to upgrade all 2020 aircraft before 28. At the same time, General Kozhin announced a new patrol aircraft platform, which will also be ready for the 2020 year. Tu-142 in various modifications of all 27 pieces for two fleets. So, wherever you throw a wedge everywhere!
        What about a corvette with a helicopter? And let's compare pr. 11661K "Dagestan" with "Gepard-3.9" in the 2nd version (platform for a helicopter and GAK)? It seems to me that if you put the Caliber-NK on the Gepard and stick the RPK-9 Medvedka-2 in front of the helipad, then you can't imagine a better corvette.
        but try to board a small boat with excitement.

        When testing the Ka-27, the helicopter landed on deck with on-board rolling at 10 degrees.
        Something like that ..
        1. +1
          27 August 2016 21: 57
          A helicopter is good where there is fuel for it for more than 2 flights. hi
  19. 0
    26 August 2016 11: 39
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: Nehist
    Judging by the publications and loud statements, this is all a farce. The fleet in the near future does not expect anything good

    Nuuu, there is a big plus - we still started :))) And yes, despite the GPV 2011-2020, we have not reached the bottom yet. By and large, everything will be determined by the construction of ships until 2030 - for us this is the stage at which we lose the remnants of the USSR fleet by 90-95 percent

    Well, Russia has no other fleet, unfortunately! We accept programs quickly and, in some places, are sensible, but with the implementation we have a complete failure ... Again, long-term construction, an eternal problem, that is, ships on slipways are morally obsolete (
  20. +1
    26 August 2016 11: 44
    Receive only formal criticism from me. The article is useful for general development, and will generate both laudatory odes and angry cries. I see the disadvantages, the presence of dubious author's conjectures and substitution of categories and concepts (for example, the author uses "ocean" instead of "distant sea") as well as the theory that it is impossible to master the production of gas turbine engines on his own within a reasonable time, apparently because the author ignores the existence of reverse engineering (China, for example, does something like this) when developing a gas turbine engine (in the presence of ready-made samples from other manufacturers) which significantly reduces the development cycle. Therefore, I recommend taking it with a grain of salt ... since there is a possibility of using irrelevant and unverified information, because the author did not bother to draw up a list of primary sources, which also makes him doubt his arguments ...
  21. +1
    26 August 2016 11: 54
    Quote: Saireg
    Another question is why do you use corvettes against submarines?) If the same role is played all over the world by either frigates, or coastal aviation (helicopters) in guiding the same frigates and above, or there coastal radars, or domestic submarines?

    good !!!!!! "The whole world", Sergey, is using the SOSUS system to detect Soviet and Russian nuclear submarines! I understand that you want to use corvettes against corvettes in squadron combat?
    Maybe then you think it’s a mistake, for example, Sweden’s Visby type corvettes, or say K130 Braunschweig type corvettes,

    Sergey, why compare the tasks facing the corvettes of the Russian Federation and the tasks for the corvettes of Germany and Sweden ??
  22. exo
    +3
    26 August 2016 12: 10
    The fact that relations with Ukraine, unstable, and sometimes unfriendly, was known even during the reign of Yushchenko. And to establish the release of their turbines and gearboxes, it was necessary since then. There is no excuse for our leadership in this.
    The article is about to be called "The Shipbuilding Program We Failed". And for the article, Thank you!
  23. +1
    26 August 2016 12: 18
    Quote: Serg65
    Quote: Saireg
    Another question is why do you use corvettes against submarines?) If the same role is played all over the world by either frigates, or coastal aviation (helicopters) in guiding the same frigates and above, or there coastal radars, or domestic submarines?

    good !!!!!! "The whole world", Sergey, is using the SOSUS system to detect Soviet and Russian nuclear submarines! I understand that you want to use corvettes against corvettes in squadron combat?
    Maybe then you think it’s a mistake, for example, Sweden’s Visby type corvettes, or say K130 Braunschweig type corvettes,

    Sergey, why compare the tasks facing the corvettes of the Russian Federation and the tasks for the corvettes of Germany and Sweden ??

    But what are they not suitable for disrupting the logistics of a likely adversary? or to protect the sea lanes,? or zonal cover for the same corvettes, frigates in the flotilla? I compare them with them because it is likely that the enemy primarily uses them for, say, stealth attacks on sea transport routes and other troubles, especially if he does not have the submarine at hand in that part of the sea ... or do you think that for the submarine opponents of the priorities of the corvettes, are superior to frigates, destroyers, to spray them like that ?? SOSUS against Russian submarines of the third and higher generation does not have sufficient effectiveness.
    1. +1
      26 August 2016 12: 55
      I compare them with them because there is a chance that it is them that the enemy primarily uses for, say, stealth attacks on sea transport routes and other troubles,

      In my opinion have you read some fantastic books? What does stealth attack mean? Which sea transport routes will the German and Swedish corvettes attack? Really on the Northern Sea Route? If you think that the Kaliningrad region during the 3 World War will be supplied by sea, then I dare to assure you the valiant ground troops of the Russian Federation in a couple of days with stops for a smoke break will build an excellent transport corridor!
      SOSUS against Russian submarines of the third and higher generation does not have sufficient effectiveness.

      Do not underestimate the enemy!
      . or do you think that for submarines of opponents the priorities of the corvettes are higher than frigates, destroyers, in order to spray them like that ??

      I think that our SSBNs and the NK that detects this submarine will be a priority for enemy submarines.
    2. +1
      26 August 2016 12: 58
      The fact that SOSUS does not have sufficient efficiency in the current mode is a fact, but it is worth considering that the system is partially mothballed. With full re-preservation and ghosting it in proper condition, the factor of large numbers will work, so what else will be effective
    3. 0
      26 August 2016 15: 20
      Do not swim to a given area. Autonomy in most like a rubber boat.
  24. +1
    26 August 2016 12: 59
    All these problems, which are adequately covered by the author, have their roots. In the Serdyukov period, almost all the specific research institutes of the Ministry of Defense were destroyed, it is their task to look at the development of the enemy and develop requirements for weapons, now industry does it, we see the result not only in the navy, he in all forms, industry does what it can or is profitable to do it. Here is the result of the reforms.
    1. +5
      26 August 2016 13: 20
      That's right - bring everything to Serdyukov.
      It is especially successful to blame him for the corvettes laid down in 2001 20380 and the incorporated in 2006 FR 22350. smile

      Only FR 11356 can be called "Serdyukovs". But their order while was absolutely justified, because the fleet demanded new ships just yesterday (the ship's composition of the same Black Sea Fleet was a "museum afloat"), and fine-tuning 22350 was dragged on and on. So we decided to order a "tit in hand" on the basis of the project worked out in the construction.
  25. The comment was deleted.
    1. +3
      26 August 2016 13: 36
      Welcome old man hi !
      Thought out loud. Unscientific and subjective. Purely from my own observations.

      One thing is frustrating, my thoughts are similar to yours, and so I want a holiday!
      1. The comment was deleted.
        1. +3
          27 August 2016 10: 44
          It’s not that everything new takes time, it seems that in many ways we have lost our competence.

          Sometimes it seems to me that it is necessary to enter the 37th year in the military-industrial complex, because it probably won't work otherwise! And to bring state property to at least 80%. Look, everyone is lobbying for something. Take the same "Pantspr" - this is how much and to whom "KAMAZ" poured money. what would "Pantsyr" be put on its platform? !!! So it is with ships. Let's take a topic that is close to you, how long has the fleet been suffering with the Bulava? And that there is no alternative? Why is R-29RMU2 bad? If they have already begun to build ave. 955 for "Bark", why did they have to cut a 70% finished project? And now the question arises .... who lobbied for the Bulava? Who lobbied for the unification of sea and land missiles? Why were the research institutes of Roscosmos removed from design: TsNIIMash, Research Institute of Thermal Processes, Research Institute of Mechanical Engineering Technology, Central Research Institute of Materials Science? Why was the development entrusted to MIT, which had no practice in sea-based missiles before? And interesting names come up ... Chernomyrdin, Urinson, Sergeev and the best naval commander of Russia Kuroedov !!! The curtain is closing belay
          It seems that we have lost a lot of competence.

          Well, something you really went down! Look what we export for DOLARS!
          Those. not everything is so bad if you put the manufacturer in a tight framework!
          1. The comment was deleted.
            1. 0
              29 August 2016 11: 27
              The shell on the Kamaz chassis is absurd and asks for it on MKZT or BAZ.


              There was such an option. Why did not go into the series, of course.
  26. +2
    26 August 2016 15: 19
    The only thing that calms you down is that any ships other than submarine strategic missile carriers for Russia are secondary buns. There is good - no - and not really like that. But enough will be to butt with Iran and Turkmenistan in the Caspian, the Georgian fleet drowned paratroopers with grenades altogether, Ukrainians themselves will not sail, and NATO, in principle, an adversary that is beloved in principle.
  27. +1
    26 August 2016 16: 53
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Generally irrelevant :))) This is not a "Lego" constructor :))) Ie. in order to replace something with something, factory conditions are required


    Quite right !!! Precisely "factory conditions", and precisely "constructor" LEGO "!!! When at the base / factory something" that is not needed "is removed and EXACTLY what is here and now is NECESSARY !!! And at the same time, specialists from the naval crew come who EXACTLY are trained to service this technique, replacing those who served another !!!


    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Thank you, I didn’t know!


    Yes, you all know very well, but why write like that !!!

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Good :))) It's just that in publications it is called this way and that, but as it is - not with my English


    Andrew! Do not be offended! This is a "professional deformation", I just have a 2nd VUS - a military translator (with basic English). From preschool age he spoke 3 languages ​​(not because he was so smart - it just happened ... (children generally absorb foreign languages ​​like a sponge).
    \
    PS I had a classmate at the faculty who studied German at school, and decided to master English at the university. As a result, at one of the first classes I thanked the teacher (a young girl, 5 years older than us), instead of "Senk yu veri match" with the phrase "Senk yu veri flies". There was laughter ... And I was "blown up": If we are all so "smart" here, then let someone say the same thing in German! Further - silence ...
    PPS And the guy then graduated from the university, defended himself and wrote articles including in foreign magazines in excellent English!
    1. 0
      26 August 2016 20: 50
      Quote: venik
      Yes, you all know very well

      Thank you for such faith in my strength, but not all laughing In general, with age, you better understand how much you still don't know. laughing
      Quote: venik
      Andrew! Do not be offended!

      And there was no thought. But I really have everything very bad with languages, although I tried to learn the same English several times. Well, a stone flower doesn’t come out ... And it’s very sad - English-speaking sources are closed for me, but using an auto-translator and relying on my own modest powers ... you can, of course, but somehow I managed to refer to an English quote in a dispute, and then it turned out that she means exactly the opposite of what I thought laughing
      So thanks for the tip, now I will know exactly what Aegis is called. drinks
    2. +2
      27 August 2016 11: 16
      at the base / plant what is not needed is removed and EXACTLY what is here and now is NECESSARY !!!

      what Vladimir, can you imagine the size of this base? And the outfit of the security forces?
      specialists come from the naval crew who are EXACTLY trained to serve this technique, replacing those that served another !!!

      Is this what should be in the barracks 5-10 of interchangeable crews for 120-150 mantle specialists? During the war it will begin to smell like revolutionary Kronstadt wassat
      It seems to me that it’s cheaper to build a couple of three heterogeneous ships than to bother like that.
  28. 0
    26 August 2016 17: 18
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: Alexey RA
    RBU on ships operating in coastal areas is just not superfluous.

    It is quite difficult to say - as I understand it, it is almost impossible to cover submarines with them.


    And here you, Andrey, are just wrong! As the "classic" used to say, "not pgava" !!! In shallow (relatively) areas of the Barents, Baltic and Mediterranean seas - VERY EFFECTIVE! One problem - the range is SMALL! And in this way - the anti-submarine ship must have a GREAT (compared to submarine) speed!
    1. 0
      29 August 2016 11: 33
      One trouble - the range is SMALL! And therefore - the anti-submarine ship must have a LARGE (compared to the submarine) speed!


      For this, there were IPCs with dynamic principles of support, which worked "on a jump."
  29. +3
    26 August 2016 17: 29
    Quote: venik
    The article, of course, is curious and relevant, although I do not agree with the author in everything! Especially with respect to the modular construction, the FUTURE is behind it. Only such a system will allow you to quickly turn the ship exactly into what you most need HERE and NOW! Agree very urgently, especially in conditions of limited funding.

    There are several inaccuracies:
    Corvettes 20380 PLUR 91RE1 cannot be used in principle, since it does not have a 533-mm TA! The "Caliber-NK" uses ONLY modification 91RE2.
    And further. Dear Andrey! Finally, stop calling the civilian BIUS "Aegis"! Pronounce this word (Aegis - aegis) as IJIS!
    Well, respect to the author (Big, human "+")!
    The discussion will unfold - it will be interesting!

    About the modularity! Unfortunately, the coastal infrastructure of the fleet is in an even more deplorable state than the fleet itself (And yet, on small boxes, modularity is rather a minus than a plus
  30. 0
    26 August 2016 17: 44
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    On the contrary - I do not consider them as such. But in our country, frigates 22350 were presented to the general public precisely as ocean-going ships, which is incorrect.

    \
    Sorry, Andrey! But in the 60s - 70s of the last century, the Sverdlov-class cruisers (which climbed ALL seas and oceans) were ALWAYS accompanied by the destroyers of the 56th project! But their standard displacement was only 2.6 thousand tons !!!!! That is, they with such a displacement were OCEAN, and project 22350 with a displacement of 4.5 thousand tons - this is no longer OCEAN ????
    1. 0
      26 August 2016 21: 09
      Quote: venik
      in the 60s - 70s of the last century, cruisers of the "Sverdlov" type (which climbed over ALL seas and oceans) were ALWAYS accompanied by destroyers of the 56th project! But their standard displacement was only 2.6 thousand tons !!!!! That is, they with such a displacement were OCEAN, and the project 22350 with a displacement of 4.5 thousand tons - this is no longer OCEAN ????

      Dear venik, what’s the matter here - we have passed the 2nd Pacific half of the world, and its 350-ton destroyers escorted, but still this does not make them ocean ships. 56th went across the oceans, honor and praise to their crews! At a rate of 1,3 sq.m. living quarters for one person ... Yet an ocean ship is certain requirements for the use of weapons on a wave (and for this you need to have the appropriate dimensions in order to minimize pitching and all this requires about 6 tons), etc. Of course, at 500 you can wrap three round-the-world rounds on a screw, but that’s why it won’t become an ocean ship
      1. +3
        27 August 2016 11: 25
        With a norm of 1,3 sq.m. living quarters per person.

        bully It’s you, Andrei, you haven’t seen the warheads of the warhead-30 yet at the stern cockpit 70-encore on 5!
        But you are right, from the hopelessness of the sea-ocean, you can send anything you want. And how they will survive there, uncles with spiders on their shoulders are somehow not interested ...die but do the duty!
    2. The comment was deleted.
  31. +4
    26 August 2016 18: 15
    As always - very detailed.
    For some points:
    1. On pr. 11356 of the "admiral's" series - I plan to sell unfinished ships to the Indians (http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2053500.html).
    2. regarding:
    The standard displacement of the new watchdog significantly exceeded that of the IPC of Project 1124 and reached 1 tons. But the developers were not “to blame” for this, but customers from the fleet: they wanted the new ship to carry not a towed, but a fusky GAS, and this, of course , affected the size and mass of the ship.

    the "albatrosses" did have a sickly GUS "Bronze". Speaking of the IPC, they write that Almaz has developed a project 23420 to replace it (http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1744165.html).
    3. Regarding the submarine capabilities of corvettes, I would like to note that it is planned to use a helicopter as the "long arm" of the ship itself, plus work with the base submarine aviation. And yet, I note that taking into account the reduction in noise of modern submarines (for the Baltic - German and Swedish submarines with VNEU, first of all), the ship's capabilities to detect these very enemy submarines, I think, are sufficient.
    4. Regarding the air defense of corvettes - I agree, "Polyment-Redut" for corvettes, I think, is somewhat redundant. Why the same "Calm-1" in the "vertical" version was not cut down - x / s. As a radar "Fregat-MAE-4K" it would be quite normal to use it, there is practically no difference in mass and dimensions (antenna post + equipment for "frigate" is about 3 tons, for "Furke-2" is about 3,3 tons .; However, in relation to the "Calm" it is necessary to add the weight of the "radar searchlights" OP-3, the weight of which, unfortunately, could not be found, however, I believe there will be no fatal advantage).
    5. Well, and a bit of a patchwork - work on "Polyment-Redut" is still going on, they write that it is quite successful (http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2085440.html); with GTU, too, little by little, things are going on. Although, as a safety net, nuclear power plants are also planned.
    1. +1
      26 August 2016 20: 31
      Damn, a mistake crept in. At the IPC pr. 1124, the keen GAS is not "Bronze", but "Argun", sorry.
      1. 0
        26 August 2016 21: 12
        Greetings, dear colleague!
        Thanks for the comments, very interesting. I’ll rummage around a bit about what - I haven’t heard anything about 23420 - and I will unsubscribe tomorrow drinks
  32. 0
    26 August 2016 19: 50
    Good day, Countryman! Yes, the "disease" is indicated, should you appoint a "treating doctor" and "treat"? However, a few months ago, in his interview, the director of Zelenodoltsev mentioned long-term plans and, in particular, how about "dynamic" options ("on wings" or skegs) and about SMPV (small area of ​​the waterline). For the Black Sea (Caspian) theater of operations this is probably good, for example "Samum". For the rest of the theaters, the operation of even 20380-20385 as OVR ships (especially in winter) is a big problem both in evolution and in the use of weapons? Of course, we are all for "more different and different ships", but .... Finding the "golden ratio" is extremely difficult - our country is too big and Russia is a large sea power, from Ocean to Ocean across the Ocean! Thanks for the article, I liked it !!!
  33. 0
    26 August 2016 23: 15
    Although the article is gloomy but very wonderful, I thank you for the article and indeed for the whole series of articles! It is not paradoxical, but the author is largely right, and it is precisely for the opportunity to read such publications that I love VO! Andrei wants to hope that you will continue to present objective views on things in your articles, and if you criticize something, then relying on real facts, and not as Kaptsov does! I look forward to continuing, the article is a big plus!
  34. +2
    27 August 2016 09: 10
    Raise your hands, who does not understand that the war is already underway, and not only in sports! Who will develop projects of the ocean wunderwaffe during the war for which there is simply no money? Let's leave the global scale and look around the Black Sea. In the Second World War, on the Black Sea Fleet since 43, Stalin banned the use of all large surface ships because of their vulnerability to aviation. The increment of Russia by Crimea by the same amount reduced the NATO field (whoever has the battlefield left behind will get all the trophies). While the Luftwaffe dominated the air, Soviet battleships and cruisers were like Tirpitz in Norway. And now, if we do not screw up, from the air bases of the Crimea, Syria and Iran, you can try to compete for influence in the Black, Mediterranean Seas and in the Indian Ocean. It seems to me that we will build squadrons of serial aircraft faster than squadrons of sketch designs for ocean-going ships.
  35. 0
    27 August 2016 11: 16
    I read the first three parts, flipped through the fourth. One question for the author - what is his VUS (military specialty) and experience in service / work on it?
    1. +2
      27 August 2016 12: 15
      One question for the author - what is his VUS (military specialty) and experience in service / work on it?

      And this, my dear Sergey, has something to do with the above problem? Here for example Sivkov K.V. finished Popovka, rose to the rank of caperang, and expounds his thoughts as an amateur! Or let’s say, for example, I have a VUS 653001 (just kidding, actually 901566 bully ) So what? Should Navy Problems Be Indifferent to Me? If you have something to say, tell me .... so they say so, the author is lying! In fact, comrades, everything is fine, by the 2020 year we will catch up and overtake! By the way. the author in all his articles and comments indicates that he did not serve in the navy. And you, I apologize, what do you have to do with the fleet?
  36. 0
    27 August 2016 16: 42
    In many ways, the problem of re-equipping the fleet lies in the ambitiousness of the project polymer redoubt.
    It was not clear why it was necessary to depart from the traditional unification with the NE. It is unclear why the unfinished systems began to be used in serial ships.
    For example, in corvettes, instead of redoubts, a hot torus would look great. Moreover, the "dagger" that is on many ships of the Russian Navy is just that. The biggest disadvantage of this is the drum. Which is the easiest to solve. But someone came up with the idea to make a frigate out of a corvette, or even a destroyer.
    The same problem with 22350. What prevents building it with calm laying the possibility of replacing it with a polymer redoubt?
    The polymer itself redoubt in its ambitions pulls on the destroyer air defense. And it could have been run around on some kind of 1155. Stamping at the same time efficient frigates with a calm.
    Such systems as s-400/500/100500 are good for theoretical battles against drills aug. In practice, this will increase the cost of the same destroyer to the level of a cruiser.
    Development paths, in principle, can be seen 2.
    Corvette, Frigate, Destroyer - all with redoubt. Interestingly, the price indicated will differ at the price of the metal body and engines. Provided that they’ll guess in the destroyer to sculpt the same engines as the frigate (just 4, not 2).
    Or the traditional unification for the USSR Navy:
    - Corvette (aka MPK) - TOR-M (in the USSR wasp-m on MPK 1124), he is also a "dagger" in the Navy for 1155. You could put on the same 20380 with a caliber. And do not invent.
    - The frigate (aka skr) - calm (it was a "hurricane", aka beech in the NE) by the way, they were on the destroyers of the 956s. On the basis of the same 22350 for it and the turbines, there are other new bells and whistles.
    - Destroyer - to be honest, at least the above 2 were serial. While the fleet and with the polymer redoubt can get enough of them, they can even be born with s-100500 (if you really want to).

    As you can see, the Navy and the military-industrial complex have chosen a more ambitious program. Both in terms of price and in terms of technical specifications.
    Well, everyone can draw conclusions on their "results" for himself.
    1. 0
      29 August 2016 12: 27
      For example, in corvettes, instead of redoubts, a hot torus would look great. Moreover, the "dagger" that is on many ships of the Russian Navy is just that. The biggest disadvantage of this is the drum. Which is the easiest to solve. But someone came up with the idea to make a frigate out of a corvette, or even a destroyer.


      Yes, there is such a "Thor". And oddly enough, it is offered for export. Why don't we put it at ourselves - "this is a great mystery"
  37. +2
    27 August 2016 20: 13
    Quote: Serg65
    And this, my dear Sergey, has something to do with the above problem? Here for example Sivkov K.V. finished Popovka, rose to the rank of caperang, and expounds his thoughts as an amateur! Or let's say for example I have VUS 653001 (just kidding, actually 901566) and what? Should Navy Problems Be Indifferent to Me? If you have something to say, tell me .... so they say so, the author is lying! In fact, comrades, everything is fine, by 2020 we will catch up and overtake! By the way. the author in all his articles and comments indicates that he did not serve in the navy. And you, I apologize, what do you have to do with the fleet?


    To begin with, the education and professional experience of a person are directly related to his competence to evaluate certain scientific or technical phenomena. For the audience, an indication of these circumstances, as well as academic degrees, is a marker of whether one should not only trust such articles, but generally take them seriously.
    In professional journals, in addition to indicating degrees or positions, there is even an institute for scientific review,
    Peer review is a procedure for reviewing scientific articles and monographs by specialist scientists in the same field (hence the name in some languages ​​is “peer review”, “peers”: English peer review, Spanish revisión por pares). The purpose of reviewing before publication is to verify the accuracy and reliability of the presentation and, if necessary, to ensure that the author follows the standards adopted in a particular field or science as a whole. Publications of works that have not passed peer review are often perceived with disbelief by professionals in many fields.
    As you can see, this has a direct bearing on the above problem. Although this forum does not have such strict approaches. Such approaches are, in principle, rather absent.
    Now to the point. It seems to me that you are confusing two things: love for the fleet of the author and indifference to his problems and the degree of competence of the author, which is reflected in his publications.
    About love :
    - As well as many who came to the fleet, I was brought up on Sobolev's “Overhaul”, Lebedev’s lyrics and Pikul’s works. And at a very young age he went through all the stages of comprehensive naval training - from a six-piece yal in the Neva channels and a marquise puddle, to the basics of navigational and mine-torpedo work, special courses in naval history and naval forces and assets. And of course, I’m not pleased with the general weakness of the fleet today, especially in comparison with the times of my service
    About competencies:
    - already as an officer of warhead 5, he was well aware that I could not give an integrated description of the combat effectiveness and combat stability of not only other warheads, but even sometimes other divisions of warhead 5. Not to mention the ship as a whole. And this does not mean my cool attitude to the matter, but only about the division of competencies. I was well aware of the complexity and number of systems in my institution, how many years I spent learning and mastering this knowledge, and quite obviously I realized the same complexity of systems in other warheads, of which I simply did not have detailed knowledge, although the general information was of course known .
    The real integral and complex competencies on the combat effectiveness and combat stability of the ship as a whole are owned from the position by no means less than the start-up, but access to such information is probably three zeros.
    If we talk about the connections of ships or fleets, as well as about the fleet as a whole, then I think very few possess such integral competencies, and the experts who broadcast in the media probably do not belong to them. The same applies to knowledge about the combat effectiveness and combat stability of individual systems and institutions. This knowledge costs billions in peacetime, and tens of thousands of lives in war.
    For each institution, these are calculated values ​​that are derived from the practice of combat use and daily service, and are information, at least, of chipboard, so the evaluation of such characteristics by outsiders, even if well-read by people, must be taken with great restraint.
    I imagine what would have happened on the forum, for example, trauma surgeons or maybe microbiologists, if I (a mechanical engineer), having read the specialized literature and medical periodicals, started giving advice on the details of surgical intervention on the hip joint or concepts and directions microbiology development.
    Reading how the author gives peremptory assessments in the field of missile weapons, radio electronics, artillery, ship propulsion systems and the concept of fleet development, I wanted to learn about his education and experience that would help me shape my attitude to his work.
    So far, I am defining my attitude to publications such as “militant amateurism.” It is very suitable for many articles on naval topics on this site. Moreover, "amateurism" is even unconscious.
    1. +2
      27 August 2016 20: 43
      YOU on what and where you served, my dear friend (
    2. +3
      27 August 2016 23: 42
      Quote: theone
      Reading how the author gives peremptory assessments in the field of missile weapons, radio electronics, artillery, ship propulsion systems and the concept of fleet development, I wanted to learn about his education and experience that would help me shape my attitude to his work.
      So far, I am defining my attitude to publications such as “militant amateurism.”

      laughing This is please. Your attitude is your right to decide. I will even completely kill my reputation in your eyes - I am a typical "jacket", I did not serve in the army, I saw ships only from the shore.
      But here's the thing ... You see, since you have considered it possible to express your attitude to me, then you will not consider it a job to hear mine about you. You have written a lot of words, but you have not written ANYTHING on the merits of the problems I have raised. All that was enough for you was a question in the style of piquant vests: "Who are you ?!"
      It means that my level is not so bad if the naval officer has not found other objections for me. This is the first. Second - you make one but fatal logical mistake - you postulate that only professionals can judge professional matters
      Quote: theone
      I imagine what would have happened on the forum, for example, trauma surgeons or maybe microbiologists, if I (a mechanical engineer), having read the specialized literature and medical periodicals, started giving advice

      I already wrote about this, but it is not difficult for me to repeat it. I do not understand dentistry, but I can understand that my tooth was badly cured (because it hurts). I don’t understand anything in tailoring, but I can appreciate a suit made for me if I have to wear trousers over my head. And I don’t understand anything in the automotive industry, but if the car just bought breaks down behind the gates of the store, something goes wrong. Here we take domestic diesel engineering. I'm not a pro in it. I don’t understand engines at all. And I do not climb with my advice on what exactly needs to be fixed in a diesel engine in order for it to work. But in order to state the fact - in the USSR they did not make good marine diesels for surface ships - there is no need to be a specialist in diesel engineering. One does not have to be a great rocket launcher in order to understand that Polement-Redoubt is in a very poor state. You don’t need to be a great physician to understand that if you are brought to pneumonia for the third time in the same hospital, then local doctors are unprofessional.
      And please! - Be consistent in your beliefs. How can you express an opinion about an article without being a professional in journalism and / or writing? hi
    3. 0
      14 February 2017 21: 59
      Thanks for the detailed explanation. I agree with many. But! But what about the phrase "that soldier who does not dream of becoming a marshal" is bad?
  38. +1
    27 August 2016 20: 33
    Andrey directly stuck a stick into the naval anthill with his publications am And rightly so, you look squeezes of opinions will reach people in black uniforms with epaulets at least two-enlightened! Regarding 11356 corvettes. I also visited the 1135 project (TFR) on ships and shipyards (Yantar) in the 80s. "Petrel" - the boat turned out to be very successful, akin to the "singing frigates" of 61 projects. It is a pity that the "sho lads" screwed up and the ALREADY PAID turbines for them are not shipped to 11356. They simply trusted such partners even before the Maidan turmoil. Is that the Indians have 3 of them. completed with uk. to exchange turbines on barter for nuclear submarines? request
    1. 0
      29 August 2016 12: 48
      The fact that gas turbine engines were not involved is a crime, moreover, with a long history. GTU was not enough in Soviet times, it was not in vain that the 956th project appeared with its vocational school. Trite lacked GTU. Even then, the question was raised about increasing production capacities.
  39. 0
    28 August 2016 10: 54
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk


    For some reason, I immediately thought about your belonging to the second oldest. I see that I was not mistaken. These guys always know everything about nothing. They know that the tooth was cured badly, but they did not know and will not know how to treat it, but doctors torture them with the advice.

    First, you do not have any level to rate it. In essence, you can answer someone who has at least approximately the same knowledge and experience as you. And you do not even own the corresponding vocabulary. You still essentially demand an answer from the Commander-in-Chief.

    The second - yes, I postulate that only professionals can judge professional issues, if you have a different opinion, then you either do not understand such issues, or you are a journalist). Therefore, I do not judge EW, SAM, etc., etc., because I am not an expert in these matters.
    By training and experience as a mechanical engineer, I have no right to criticize signalmen or rocket men and give them advice because of the lack of special knowledge, because professionals should be responsible for their words.

    Non-professionals do not owe anything to anyone, because no one will listen to them, except for the same non-professionals, therefore they can write anything. And the trouble is small, fortunately nothing terrible will happen.

    And the third - even talking about the knowledge available to you as a specialist in a certain field is not recommended at all, because many years ago the form was signed the number of times (saw such a modest form?), Because “two zeros”, and simply because it will be "Do not feed the horse." Journalists are not able to listen, just talk.
    Maybe that's why prominent TV experts sometimes have such obvious crap - or they can’t say or there is no clearance, or vice versa - they MUST say this crap.

    He received an answer to his first question about your background, everything fell into place, miracles do not happen. The rest is not interesting.

    You have a syllable, there is no special knowledge, to dive and defend your opinion NOT a specialist on a wide range of issues are ready with foam at the mouth with anyone until the "victorious" end.
    I think my definition is correct - "militant amateurism."

    By the way, I’ve never been an expert in aviation, but I would advise you to take a closer look at the degree of elaboration and the form of presentation of the material in the article comparing 4-5 generation aircraft (close air combat) at this forum.
    It can be seen that the writer has special knowledge (hydrodynamics, which I studied in depth and aerodynamics in many respects have a common mathematical apparatus and terminology) and he correctly applies this knowledge (both mathematical apparatus and graphic data) in the proof process. This is probably the best material on very narrow special technical issues that I met on the forum.
    Although it is unlikely that you will succeed because you did not have two courses in higher mathematics, but I am sure that you will give advice in this area right away).
    1. +1
      28 August 2016 13: 17
      Sergey, once again I ask you to convincingly answer ..... where and what did you serve or serve and what did you end up with?
    2. +1
      28 August 2016 18: 32
      Quote: theone
      For some reason, I immediately thought about your belonging to the second oldest. I see that I was not mistaken.

      And again they were mistaken :))) I wrote
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      How can you express an opinion about an article without being a professional in journalism and / or writing?

      But my affiliation with journalism in no way follows from this. In general, in order not to play the secret of the boarded up attic: I am the financial director.
      Quote: theone
      He received an answer to his first question about your background, everything fell into place, miracles do not happen. The rest is not interesting.

      Yes, and I also do not really. Conversations from the standpoint "From the height of my origin, the difference between you and the Queen of England is completely invisible" I somehow do not offend. Is there anything to object to the merits of the issues raised? Please take a look at it with interest. Do you want to discuss the author instead of discussing the article? Fire :)
      Quote: theone
      By the way, I’ve never been an expert in aviation, but I would advise you to take a closer look at the degree of elaboration and the form of presentation of the material in the article comparing 4-5 generation aircraft (close air combat) at this forum.
      It can be seen that the writer has special knowledge

      Of course have. But incomplete, because he still does not quite understand what he is writing about
      A simple example - a person considers the load on the wing of the Su-27 as the ratio of the normal take-off mass to the wing area. He also considers the wing load of the F-15C and concludes
      but the wing load of the F-15 is still decently ahead

      But such a calculation is fundamentally wrong - the fact is that, unlike the F-15, in the design of the Su-27 the fuselage itself is also used to create lift, so "shifting" the entire load onto its wings is a mistake, and a gross mistake.
      This is so, just a small demonstration of what immediately caught my eye at a cursory reading right away - there is still much to talk about (the topic of OBT in the article SIMPLY is not disclosed), but I don’t have time for this.
      Well, and you, from the height of your mathematical education - how are you, don’t you see such mistakes at all? Or are you so highly specialized that you don’t even know about the integral layout of the Su-27?
      Then yes, I understand perfectly why you do not dare to judge other areas of human activity.
      Quote: theone
      Although it is unlikely that you will succeed because you did not have two courses in higher mathematics, but I am sure that you will give advice in this area right away).

      Nuuu, I still graduated from one of the best physical and mathematical lyceums in the Russian Federation, whose students win gold and silver annually in world olympiads in physics and mathematics, so I studied the integral differential calculus and the theory of limits even before uni. And at the university, then considered (according to certification) in the top ten in Russia, I went to the budget without blat (that of the 15 gold medalists only three could do) and atm also taught something, although of course I did not study in depth the tower (only until the third year). Therefore, yes, I will give it right away. And I will not even offer you to refute my words about the Su-27 - you are not an expert in this field laughing
      1. 0
        28 August 2016 20: 25
        Why mention the integral layout of the Su-27 in conjunction with the specific wing load?

        The hull and even the F-15 air intakes are optimized (as they could) to create lift - naturally, to a lesser extent than the Su-27 airframe, but this already comes from the curvature of American aerodynamics compared to the Sukhoi Design Bureau and TsAGI.
        Moreover, the F-15 kit includes conformal fuel tanks that make the airframe integrated, but it doesn’t help much, since the over-maneuverability chip is buried deeper.

        The integrated layout is primarily used for the rational use of the internal volume of the airframe for the placement of fuel, engines and avionics.

        The Su-27 glider, like its development of the Su-35С, outperforms the F-15 in the final effect - maintaining lift at large angles of attack and preventing surging of the external engine with a smaller turning radius in the horizontal plane.

        The first is achieved by vortex aerodynamics of the airframe, the second - by a partial rejection of the integral layout by moving the engine nacelles to the lower surface of the airframe. Americans with their simple F-15 in these matters look like kindergarteners.

        PS The F-22 glider, being fully integrated (for the purpose of matching stele technology), also loses to the partially integrated Su-35С glider in terms of super-maneuverability, despite the lower wing load (since the Su-35С eliminates this from all-perspective UVT).

        You just don’t have to make a cult / idol out of anything - stealth, integral layout, etc. laughing
        1. 0
          28 August 2016 21: 20
          Quote: Operator
          Why mention the integral layout of the Su-27 in conjunction with the specific wing load?

          The hull and even the F-15 air intakes are optimized (as they could) to create lift

          Because if a person undertook to analyze the issues of super-maneuverability and obviously read something about it, it would be nice for him to familiarize himself with the basics - the main indicators of aircraft construction. And do not try to draw conclusions about the maneuverability of the aircraft on the basis of one's own and incorrectly calculated indicators of the specific wing load. Even Wikipedia knows that the specific load is the ratio of the weight of the aircraft to the AREA OF THE CARRYING SURFACE, and this is not only the wing. You do not know the area of ​​the bearing surface - focus on the area of ​​all horizontal surfaces of the aircraft, you cannot calculate them - just do not use this indicator, describe the situation "as is" and find other comparison criteria that you know about.
          And here comes one theone, in all the brilliance of his mathematical knowledge, puts in place the presumptuous shtafirka (that is, me) who decided to judge not by the rank that his (that is, mine) reason is inaccessible, and pokes as an example a model for writing articles my nose into the material, where the author discusses over-maneuverability, not understanding what the unit load on the wing is. wassat
          What does not happen on the internet ...
          1. 0
            28 August 2016 22: 16
            You are too strict on your opponent.

            The aerodynamics of the Su-27 (the generation of vortices, the operation of the air intakes) are very cunning and are not captured by the formal set of LTX in digital terms, even if an aerodynamic quality indicator is available.

            Its advantages are visible only in the form of a graph of the dependence of the angular velocity of a steady turn on the flight speed under conditions of limitation on the angle of attack and glider strength (given in Falcon's article).

            Plus the additional effect of the all-perspective UVT Su-35С (compared with the simple UV-F-22), which is also determined on the graph.

            1. 0
              28 August 2016 22: 54
              Russia is still losing in the information war on the issue of the technological level of fighter aircraft - most of those interested have developed an absolutely wrong understanding of super-maneuverability as a means of conducting close air combat, while it also directly affects the result of long-range combat using air-to-air missiles ...

              The reason is elementary - the characteristics of the missiles do not disclose how much they fly in the active area during the operation of the mid-flight engine, how much by inertia after the fuel is exhausted, and how much they are at the end when the speed drops below the evolutionary one.

              A missile is able to get on an airplane only if its available overload will be a multiple greater than the available overload of the aircraft. For a highly maneuverable aircraft, 10 is overloaded, so a missile can enter it only in its active section, which is about a quarter of the maximum range. For a simply maneuverable aircraft - including in the flight section of a rocket by inertia at a speed higher than the evolving one, which is about half of the maximum range.

              When using missiles with equal maximum range in long-range aerial combat, a super-maneuverable aircraft at a distance of 0,5 max. range it will be safe for yourself to intercept simply maneuverable aircraft whose missiles are effective only at a distance of 0,25 max. range.

              This is the double effect of super-maneuverability - in close and long-range combat.

              PS I’m silent about the fact that the United States drove itself into a corner with stealth and placing missiles in the internal compartments of the F-22 and F-35, thereby imposing a limit on the overall weight and characteristics of the missiles and, therefore, on their maximum range. The maximum that they were able to squeeze in this situation from AIM-120D is 180 km.
              Whether the case is placed on the external suspension of the Su-35С with more overall and heavy P-37 and RVV-DB with 300 km.
              Those. for the F-22 and F-35 with a range of AIM-120D on the super-maneuverable Su-35S of 45 km, alles kaput is guaranteed at a distance of 75 and 150 km, respectively (provided that the Belka radar is installed on the Su-35S, but for this, I hope it won't rust).
          2. +2
            29 August 2016 09: 48
            And here comes one theone, in all the brilliance of his mathematical knowledge, puts in place the presumptuous

            smile Calm down Andrey. In my opinion, this one theone is either an upstart book that has been read upstart having a dubious relationship with the Navy, or Troll! Why did I decide so?
            theone
            being an officer of warhead 5

            As a rule, in this case, the officers introduce themselves ... as the commander of the JJ BCH-5, or the commander of the TrG of the JJ BCH-5. Sailor usually says ... I served as the hold of the warhead 5. These representations of the post over the years have been worked out to be automatic.
            Further...
            I can’t give an integral characteristic of combat effectiveness and combat stability not only of other warheads, but and even sometimes other divisions of the warhead 5

            what interesting, but how did this comrade pass the admission to the management of the unit, the shift, the compartment?
            More ..
            theone
            The same applies to knowledge about the combat effectiveness and combat stability of individual systems and institutions. This knowledge costs billions in peacetime, and tens of thousands of lives in war.

            Officer warhead-5 decided to play special?
            Methodology for assessing the effectiveness of naval strategic nuclear forces
            http://flot.com/publications/books/shelf/vedernikov/ussr-usa/6.htm
            Campaign this site missed billions !!!!!!
            Andrew, it’s not for nothing that I insistently asked theone about duty stations and an educational institution!
            1. 0
              29 August 2016 12: 00
              Quote: Serg65
              Calm down Andrey. In my opinion, this one theone is either an upstart book that has been read upstart having a dubious relationship with the Navy, or Troll!

              Thanks for the clarification, dear Sergey! I understood earlier that you didn’t just ask him, and waited with interest for his answer :))
  40. 0
    29 August 2016 14: 59
    Andrey from Chelyabinsk,

    I am glad for you that everything is fine with higher mathematics. But where did you see that I gave a personal assessment of the material about the BVB? I noted only the form and presentation of the material, as well as the use of mat. apparatus in the evidence process. What you absolutely do not have.
    Once again about your level, which you are so proud of.
    The most basic level in the fleet is the sailor. He must finish training in some specialty, for example, special. hold, undergo testing to fight for the survivability of the ship - flooding the compartment, fire in the compartment, diving training, leaving the ZPL, pass the test for knowledge of regulatory documents, for example KU, RBZH PL 82, and much more, and on the ship pass the test for admission to independent management of their institution. Now this is the naval entry level.
    It seems to me that you are not pulling at this level either - you do not have special skills and knowledge.
    You can go on the other hand, measuring your so-called level - in what capacity or in what position as a military serviceman or civilian expert as an expert in any field could you be hired / could you be useful to the fleet?
    Again, I think in no way. I wonder what you think about this so-called level.
    It is interesting because I used to think that everyone understands and understands football (I'm probably the only non-specialist), now I am surprised to learn that the Navy is not without numerous experts.
    Again, I want to note that the use of the words "upstart", "troll", "read books" do not bring constructiveness to the discussion. I also know such words, and even more - they don't swear at the navy - they speak it.
    And then, about the "books" - you yourself know about the fleet only from them?) (Sorry - and also from the Internet)
    Yes, and yet - why is there someone thinking. that I should introduce myself to someone here - have you confused the place and yourself in it?
    1. +1
      29 August 2016 15: 52
      Quote: theone
      But where did you see that I gave a personal assessment of the material about the BVB?

      Have you forgotten? I’ll give you a little fat one.
      Quote: theone
      It can be seen that the writer has special knowledge (hydrodynamics, which I studied in depth and aerodynamics in many respects have a common mathematical apparatus and terminology) and he correctly applies this knowledge (as a mat. apparatus, and graphic data) in the evidence process.

      Is it really so bad with memory? Or all the same with a device that you are so proud of?
      Quote: theone
      I wonder what you think about this so-called level.

      My person is too insignificant to waste time discussing it. laughing Try to say something better on the topic of the article - it will suddenly work out. Just - advice before you decide, read something about the fleet, so as not to look as funny as in the case of over-maneuverability.
      Quote: theone
      Again, I want to note that the use of the words "upstart", "troll", "read a lot of books" do not bring constructiveness into the discussion

      It is very sad that your mother did not teach you in childhood that discussing the interlocutor (not his actions, namely the interlocutor) is a priori unconstructive, because your regrets will not affect anyone here.
      Quote: theone
      Yes, and yet - why is there someone thinking. that I should introduce myself to someone here - have you confused the place and yourself in it?

      Me not. And here you are - for sure
      1. 0
        30 August 2016 21: 43
        I think that it only remains for you what to read about the fleet, there is no other way to find out about it, and then retell your inventions to the same readers. Under their brisk sofa cushioning.
        I played these boats, starting from the age of 14 from the Nakhimov School and my last name there is engraved on the railing in the issue of 83, therefore your opuses of the naval strategist from the port of all the seas of Chelyabinsk are really fun.
        Write more! such an office plankton like you very much!
        By the way, are you a financier as fake as a pilot and a seaman? Or is there any kind of specialized education this time around?
        Maybe some programs, such as SRC?
        You still will not believe it again and again, but I, for example, have not such steep institutions as you, for example, but the MBA of the Academy of National Economy under the Government of the Russian Federation and the Moscow State Law Academy, as well as studies and work in the United Kingdom and the USA on the profile, are available. And as on purpose, the last place of work is the financial director, though for a long time and with a completely different goal setting. But it is not important.
        So - is there education or, as always?) The final touch to your portrait, so to speak. )
        1. 0
          30 August 2016 22: 15
          Quote: theone
          I think that it only remains for you to read about the fleet, there is no other way to find out about it, and then retell your fiction to the same reader

          Well, in essence of the questions raised, you couldn’t write anything. Although they amused me with the super-maneuverability device, thanks for that :)))
          Therefore, I answer you for the last time - yes, I have a specialized education, higher economic :)) Then I see no reason to maintain a "conversation" with you - except for the frankly stupid "Who are you?" I haven't heard anything constructive from you. I don’t put you on the black list, because I don’t use it in principle, but I will not answer any more (unless you suddenly risk writing something on the merits of the questions raised), and so, write whatever you want. I hope you have heard the old proverb about the caravan and the dog
          All the best!
          1. 0
            2 September 2016 09: 58
            Yes, in fact, you do not get sick. The problem is that essentially you have nothing to answer. You play with ships, like with lego blocks, trying to configure the perfect ship. But in reality, the fleet and the court. industry is much more complicated. Therefore, their result is mixed.
            So, the formula about the caravan is really very true, only I have the opportunity to look at the caravan from the inside, and you will continue to run around, not understanding how it works.
            Or do you take yourself for a caravan with this forum of couch analysts?) And with your higher economic?
            I advise the author to ride a river bus and go to the local KYUM, which would be imbued with naval life)
            Well, and add me to the black list - this is a forum only for naval sailors! )
  41. +1
    30 August 2016 00: 25
    Many thanks to the author for the article. It is written competently, reasonably. I read all 4 parts with great interest.
  42. 0
    1 September 2016 16: 28
    Regarding the redoubt: the main problems are with the new 9M96D and 9M100 Fakel missiles ...
    It is they who sometimes show off.
    Given that the air defense system is very promising, the deadlines are quite met. do not forget that the same SM-3 is still being sawn.
    With 9M96 which have long been worked out on ground air defense, there are no problems. That suggests that they test the entire range of missiles and, moreover, on just one corvette. By the way, from him there were both a series of successful launches, and not successful ones.
    I think that everything will end with the fact that in the next GPV we will finally solve the problems with the gas turbine engine, Redut, AFAR Polyment, as I understand it, it’s in order and you can already start cutting 22350M for example. In general, you can follow the example of amers and saw the destroyer. Given the manners of our admirals (cram poplar m onto MRK wassat ), with the planned weapons, you can settled down the destroyer under 10 tons. Although ours are always cooler than the whole planet: 000-15 16 tons of destroyer with nuclear power. Easy damn .....
    Andrew, in general, exciting reading!
  43. kig
    0
    19 October 2016 02: 22
    This series of articles has already been here, why repeat it?
  44. 0
    14 February 2017 21: 44
    Strange reasoning touches that 4 different fleets should have identical corvettes. Each fleet receives ships from its supplier and repairs at its (local) repair plant. Yes, in the Pacific Ocean it is its own type of corvette, and in the North its own type of frigate. Within the fleet and service, unification.
    It will be much worse if there is no competition and competition between developers and manufacturers. Ships will become expensive and substandard, and projects new only in the name! We already went through all this in 1937-39.
    As for the size of the ships, small ships are an advantage to protect the coast! They can support coastal troops with artillery, air defense, protect against attack of ANY enemy ships from the sea.
    There are almost no such ships in the USA. They are effective at protecting ocean trade routes and are completely defenseless against coastal shallow landing. Read the history of the Battle of Gangut, and the entire Northern War of 1700-1721. Using galleys and other small ships along the coast, Russia conquered all of today's Finland from the Swedes. Coastal aviation is always more powerful than aircraft carrier. And without carrier aircraft, the modern US fleet is powerless against 30 missile boats and corvettes in the coastal waters of Alaska or California. As the classics say, “And the king is naked!”
  45. 0
    4 October 2019 01: 49
    Taking into account the fact that people who are not related to the indigenous population of the Russian Federation, some of whom have already been arrested by the FSB of the Russian Federation for espionage against the Russian Federation, have to think not only about stupidity and corruption, but also about deliberate sabotage. How Chernomyrdin, to the detriment of the Russian Federation, lobbied for orders for Ukrainian enterprises, instead of developing domestic industry, as a result of which the Russian Federation remained without turbines for frigates for a long time, it is still very fresh in memory ... It is time to cancel all these dual citizenships in the Russian Federation, and patriots of foreign states, lost in the Russian Federation, to be taken out of it with the deprivation of citizenship of the Russian Federation ... Anyone who obtains US citizenship takes the United States the oath and swears to protect the United States and their interests in arms ... Those who do not need Russia ready to defend foreign states, not the Russian Federation ...

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