Faces of war. Marshal Budyonny
In our age of universal awareness, it is very difficult to find something new about a famous person. Especially if someone has made efforts to ensure that a person is properly immersed in the dirt. Or, on the contrary, a frank scoundrel and a traitor to endow with a crown of martyrdom and glorify. And therefore, to give a certain number of portraits, undeservedly overlooked, is not a bad idea.
On the one hand, a lot was written about Semen Mikhailovich Budyonny, on the other hand, only the lazy one did not throw dirt at him, sculpturing the image of a sort of dashing cavalryman, except for checkers and a horse, he didn’t think anything else, and he couldn’t think.
Yes, the fact that Budyonny was a dashing cavalry, fortunately, does not dare to challenge any writing organism. Five crosses of St. George and four St. George's medals are an indicator. Yes, one cross was taken away by a scuffle superior in rank, but ... A full St. George's bow had the place to be. Zhukov was also a very dashing and fearless cavalryman. But Georgiev he had only two.
And Budyonny did not just love horses. He adored them. And this is also not a minus, but a plus. Because thanks to this love, which was also shifted to work in the field of horse breeding, we have two beautiful breeds of horses, Budennovsk and Terek, as well as a sufficient number of horses in the Red Army in 1941-1945. For this alone it would be possible to assign a Hero of Socialist Labor.
Horse Terek breed
Horse Budennovskaya breed
Many borzopisty accuse Budyonny that he very willingly accepted gifts by horses. This is true. With special joy I took horses of foreign blood. But, since he lived in Moscow, on Granovsky Street, if not in a very simple, but apartment building, it is clear that he did not have any stables. And all the horses donated to him were sent to the stud farms. See the result above.
A biography in general is such a thing ... Dry facts, and the whole question is how to interpret them. But everyone can get acquainted with the biography, much more interesting is what is left behind the frame or between the lines.
The way Budyonny fought in the First World War, we will omit. He fought well, and that says it all. But it is worth noting that half of his awards were awarded for actions in the enemy’s rear areas. This speaks not only of courage, but also of a certain understanding of the tactics of such actions.
SM Budyonny in 1916 year.
During the Civil War, Budyonny acted no less successfully by creating an equestrian detachment operating against the White Guards on the Don, who joined the 1 Cavalry Peasant Socialist Regiment under the command of B. M. Dumenko, in which Budyonny was appointed deputy regiment commander. The regiment subsequently grew into a brigade, and then a cavalry division. And the result was the First Cavalry Army.
Here Budyonny proved himself as a commander. There were beats, and repeatedly, Mammoths, Skins, Denikin, Wrangell. There were also defeats, in 1920, near Rostov, from General Toporkov and in 10 days from General Pavlov. But with Pavlov, restoring the losses incurred, Budyonny got even.
I must say about what ensured the success of the cavalry of Budyonny. For some reason, all the “historians” in unison prefer to keep silent about this. And it is worth saying. I'm talking about cart.
Tachanka invented, that is, Nestor Ivanovich Makhno adapted for military needs. The genius of the partisan war and the author of tactical frauds of the time. Budyonny, having seen this technical novelty, grasped it and used it for its intended purpose. Moreover, he “pushed through” as a special type of weapon in the Red Army.
What is the secret of the cart, why the cart, not the cart, the wagon or something else? What would seem to be the difference?
And the difference in the machine gun. In "Maxim". If someone does not know, the wheels of the machine gun served the same purpose: roll it to the next position on the battlefield. A machine gun was transported exclusively disassembled. Machine separately, trunk separately, shield separately. The essence is not in mass, the essence in the axes of the machine gun, which were loosened by prolonged shaking, and the machine gun lost both accuracy and accuracy. Therefore, "Maxim" transported disassembled. Or tolerated.
The cart is an invention of German colonists, of whom there were many in the south of Russia at that time. Makhno, who was thoroughly a dragon of the Germans, with his light-headed peasant realized that the crew on springs (the Germans loved comfort) with a very soft stroke — that was necessary. But Makhno didn’t just put the machine gun on the cart. Tachanka - a fairly large crew, designed for long journeys through the vast expanses of Russia. So Nestor Ivanovich harness two more pristazhny horses to a pair of existing ones and put another 2-4 infantrymen on the carriage to the machine-gunners.
On the way out what? Highly mobile combat group, with pretty good firepower. Horse rifle squad, the forerunner, if you will, of modern motorized rifle. Machine gun plus manual weapon plus the ability to quickly move a considerable distance.
What they did to Denikin's cavalry under the Gulyai-Pole 100 Makhno machine-gun carts, I think, is not worth telling. And Nestor Ivanovich did not stop there. He also had artillery cart, with light field three-inches. Quartet horses quite a pulling a cannon, the calculation and three dozen shells. For one fight is enough.
In the equestrian regiment of the Red Army of that time (by analogy with the cavalry regiment during the First World War), the sabers were equipped with 1 (two) machine guns on the 000 2. Budyonny increased the number of machine guns to 20-ti, following the example of Makhno, putting them on the cart. Plus artbatareya.
Thus, the First Cavalry struck its opponents not only due to dashing saber attacks, but also with quite normal fire of guns and machine guns. This is what the soldiers of Piłsudski have quite realistically verified in 1920.
By the way, about the Soviet-Polish war.
Many "historians" met such an interesting interpretation of events. Say, poor Tukhachevsky precisely because of losing the whole war with a bang, because he did not wait for help from Budyonny. Here, too, need to say a few words.
In the northern sector (Western Front), Tukhachevsky had at his disposal "only" two armies: the 15-I Cork and the 16-I Sollogub. 66,4 thousands of infantry and 4.4 thousands of cavalry. Plus artillery, armored trains and other pleasures. 60,1 thousands of infantry and 7 thousands of Polish cavalry fought against them.
For comparison: the southern sector (South-Western Front) was occupied by Egorov, with the 12-th army of Mezheninov and the 14-th army of Uborevich. 13,4 thousands of infantrymen and 2,3 thousands of cavalry against 30,4 thousands of Polish infantry and 5 thousands of cavalry. And about 15 thousand soldiers of Petlyura. Plus, Makhno had finally moved out of the coils.
While Tukhachevsky was engaged in his dubious experiments from Minsk, carrying out "ram attacks by infantry masses," the Poles defeated the 8 Army in June to 15. Losses amounted to more than 12 thousand people.
What at the time did Budyonny, who was so blamed for defeat? And here is what.
The First Cavalry Army (16,7 thousand sabers, 48 guns) left Maykop on April 3, defeated the troops of Nestor Makhno in Gulyaypole and on May 6 crossed the Dnieper north of Yekaterinoslav.
On May 26, after the concentration of all units in Uman, the First Cavalry attacked Kazatin, and on June 5 Budyonny, feeling for a weak spot in the Polish defense, broke through the front under Samogorodkom and went to the rear of the Polish units, advancing on Berdichev and Zhytomyr.
10 June 3-I Polish Army Rydz-Smigly, fearing the environment, left Kiev and moved to the region of Mazovia. 12 June First Cavalry Army entered Kiev. The Polish troops, having regrouped, tried to launch a counterattack. On July 1, General Berbetsky’s troops attacked the front of the 1 Cavalry Army near Rivne. Berbetsky was broken. Polish troops made several more attempts to seize the city, but on July 10 it finally came under the control of the Red Army.
Meanwhile, Tukhachevsky, adding to the existing troops more 3-th cavalcarpus of Guy, 3-th army of Lazarevich, 4-th army of Shuvaev and Mozyr group of Tikhvin, launched an offensive on Warsaw.
The number of groups of Tukhachevsky can not be accurately determined, as well as the number of Polish troops. Historians differ greatly in numbers, but it can be said that the forces were approximately equal and did not exceed 200 thousands on each side.
The genius of Tukhachevsky's crawling bore fruit: he gathered against himself a huge grouping, which he actually pushed back to Warsaw, instead of beating it piece by piece, as Budyonny did with his bypass maneuvers and surroundings.
16 August Tukhachevsky began to beat. And eventually broke. That, in general, was not difficult for Pilsudski (with the help of French specialists).
For the sake of saving the situation, the commander in chief Kamenev ordered the advance of the First Cavalry and the 12 Army from Lvov to help the troops of Tukhachevsky.
20 August 1-I Cavalry Army began to move north. March at a distance of about 450 kilometers. By the time the troops began to speak, the troops of the Western Front had already begun an unorganized retreat to the east. 19 August Poles occupied Brest, 23 August - Bialystok. Between 22 and 26 August, the 4 Army, the 3 Cavalry Corps Guy, and two divisions from the 15 Army (about 40 thousand people in total) crossed the German border and were interned.
At the end of August, through Sokal, the army of Budyonny struck in the direction of Zamoć and Hrubieszów, in order to go through the Lüblin to the rear of the Polish attack force advancing to the north. However, the Poles advanced towards the First Mounted Reserve of the General Staff.
Budyonny's army, and behind it the troops of the South-Western Front, were forced to retreat from Lvov and go on the defensive.
It is possible to criticize Budyonny much and persistently, but here only figures and facts.
Firstly, the number of the Cavalry Army in 16, thousands of bayonets and sabers, is its strength by the beginning of the campaign, but after the Ukrainian march and heavy Lviv battles, its strength has more than halved.
Secondly, when the First Cavalry was thrown into a raid on Zamost in order to alleviate the position of the armies of the Western Front, there she was confronted by more than one Polish division. In the Zamoостьi area, the Poles had time to regroup, and in addition to units of the 3 of the Polish Army, 10 and 13 infantry, 1 Cavalry, 2 I Ukrainian, 2 Cossack Division and Rummel Division were found there.
What and how 6-7 of thousands of Budennovsk residents could have alleviated the fate of a broken front is not clear to me personally. By Budyonny, at least on the part of the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army Kamenev, there were no complaints.
Moreover, in September the genius of Tukhachevsky in the battles for Grodno finally brought the Western Front to its knees. The Poles entered Minsk, and in March 1921 of the year a humiliating Riga Treaty was signed, according to which the RSFSR lost not only Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, but also part of the original Russian territories.
Here are just Budyonny do with it?
The mediocre command of Tukhachevsky cost the Red Army in terrible numbers: about 90 thousands of dead and 157 thousands of prisoners, of whom about 60 thousands died in captivity. Are you surprised by Budenny’s resolution on Tukhachevsky’s verdict to "shoot the bastard"? I am personally not surprised.
"The horse will still show itself." Another myth from the pre-war time from lovers to lick at strangers and spit in their own. Say, Budyonny and Voroshilov were categorical opponents of the Tukhachevsky doctrine on the mechanization of the Red Army and in every way harmed and hampered this process.
Here are just numbers about thousands "in spite of" issued tanks say the opposite. As well as the figures on the reduction of the cavalry so beloved by Budyonny. Of the 1938 cavalry divisions and 32 corps departments available in the USSR by 7, 13 cavalry divisions and 4 corps remained by the beginning of the war. And in 1941, the urgent formation of new cavalry corps began.
I managed to find the right quote from Budyonny about his vision of cavalry. It does not sound like it is mainly offered to us:
"What is meant by strategic cavalry? Large cavalry connections reinforced by mechanical and aviationoperating in operational cooperation with the front armies, independent aviation, airborne assault forces. Such connections are operational means of front-line value. "
The prototype of the modern motorized infantry, if you want. Well, then there was still no armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. But the idea is not from the "fool with his sword bald."
[center] Checker, yes, but behind the back something Tokarevskaya self-charging ...
In the first period of the Great Patriotic War, Budyonny did not command the fronts on the point of impact, this is a fact. Although his short command of the South-West direction could be called successful, if not for the events near Kiev.
Budennyi knowingly Stalin put in this direction. Semyon Mikhailovich was well aware of these places, he fought there. And he foresaw the catastrophe near Kiev, and insisted on withdrawing the troops. If the Bid directive had been implemented, there would have been no such defeat. But the traitor Kirponos assured Stalin that "everything is in order, we will not surrender Kiev." As a result, Budyonny was removed from his post, Tymoshenko was appointed in his place, Kirponos abandoned the troops, committing a betrayal, which we will discuss later, Kiev surrendered, and the South-Western Front rolled far to the south.
Opinion of Colonel-General A. P. Pokrovsky, who was then Chief of Staff of the South-West Direction:
“Budyonny is a very peculiar person. This is a real nugget, a person with a people's mind, with common sense. He had the ability to quickly grasp the situation. He did not propose solutions, he did not understand the situation in such a way as to propose a solution, but when he was told He offered various solutions, a program, one or another action, first, he quickly grasped the situation and, second, he usually supported the most rational decisions, and he did it with sufficient determination.
In particular, we must pay tribute to him that when the situation prevailing in the Kiev bag was reported to him, and when he understood it, he appreciated it, the proposal that was made to him by the headquarters in order to put the question before the Bid on withdrawal from the Kiev bag he received immediately and wrote the appropriate telegram to Stalin. He did it decisively, although the consequences of such an act could be dangerous and terrible for him.
So it happened! It was for this telegram that he was withdrawn from the commander of the South-Western direction, and Tymoshenko was appointed instead of him. "
Where is the "fool with a sword"? If Pokrovsky were a close man, it would be clear. But from 1943 to Victory below the post of chief of staff of the front did not fall. And from 1953 to 1961, the year was head of the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff.
In 1943, Budyonny was appointed head of the Red Army cavalry. What is behind this? Many say that an "honorary position" is a type for a retiree. And behind this are the 80 formed cavalry mechanized divisions. These divisions saw both Budapest, and Prague, and Berlin.
In 1943, at the initiative of Budyonny, the Moscow Zoo-Technical Institute of Horse Breeding was recreated from the ashes, which continued to train specialists in this field. Surprisingly, the institution exists today. This is Izhevsk Agricultural University.
In the fact that Budyonny did not occupy significant positions, many “historians” see just the proof of his nearness and other unflattering things. “Budyonny was a good tactician, but a worthless strategist! He did not understand that the essence of the war had changed!” and stuff like that.
Excuse me, did not Budyonny solve strategic problems in 1920, driving two Polish fronts across Ukraine and Belarus at once? The winner of Pilsudski did not write about Budyonny, "If it were not for the First Equestrian Budyonny in our rear, success would have been more significant"?
Budyonny could easily solve strategic problems. And solved them successfully. And the vision of the new war he had exactly the way it actually came out. And the warhorse said his word, oddly enough. But not as a member of a cavalry attack, but as a means of delivering a fighter to the line of attack.
Generals Belov, Dovator, Pliev, Kryukov, Baranov, Kirichenko, Kamkov, Golovskaya and their comrades forged the Victory on a par with the infantry and tank crews. And successfully forged.
On the example of the composition of 4 Guards Kuban Order of Lenin of the Red Banner Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov of the Cossack Cavalry Corps under the command of Issa Alexandrovich Pliev. On October 1 1943, the body looked like this:
9-I Guards Kuban Cossack Cavalry Division
10-I Guards Kuban Cossack Cavalry Division
30 Cavalry Division
1815 th self-propelled artillery regiment
152 Guards anti-tank artillery regiment
12 Guards mortar regiment of jet mortars
255 zenith artillery regiment
4 Guards anti-tank division
68 Guards Mortar Division
27 Guards separate communications division.
And as necessary, the corps was attached to both tanks and aircraft. And the corps passed from Maykop to Prague. Participated in the Battle of the Caucasus, Armaviro-Maikop defensive, North-Caucasian, Rostov, Donbass, Melitopol, Bereznegovato-Snigiryovskoy, Odessa, Belarus, Bobruisk, Minsk, Lublin-Brest, Debrecen, Budapest, Bratislava-Brnov, and the costumes of mash
That's the "little fool with a sword" ...
With all this, Semyon Mikhailovich was neither a careerist nor an amateur of awards. Of all the marshals who took part in the Great Patriotic War, only Voroshilov, Budyonny and Tolbukhin did not become Heroes of the Soviet Union. Why is another question, but a fact. Stalin knew better who and what to do with the Heroes.
And in the 1943 year, when Budyonny was appointed head of the Red Army cavalry, he turned 60 years ... It is logical that the younger ones were commanding the fronts and armies. Many will say that the same Zhukov and Rokossovsky were not much younger. But Budyonny, not occupying high positions, did not get up across the road to anyone and did not walk down anyone. And the same Zhukov and Rokossovsky something each Semyon Mikhailovich obliged.
For the St. George awards Budenny had a separate jacket
Actually, everything. Someone, if he wants, can see in Budyonny the closest shy-harmonica. Yes, he knew how to play accordion, and yes, Stalin loved to listen. Budyonny even recorded a record in the 50's record, “The Duet of the Bayanists,” where Semen Mikhailovich himself played the harmonica part of the German system, and the bayan player, the famous Rostov accordionist Grigory Zaitsev. He knew four languages quite well: German, French, Turkish and English.
And who does not want, he can see a slightly different image. Brave soldier, intelligent commander, a man who did everything that was in his power for the country in those difficult years. To each his own.
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