Immediately make a reservation: TVD, of course, is a combat system, a set of shock, control, support and service subsystems designed for solving combat missions.
In the USSR there was a logically built system of technical support for the naval forces of the state. The Navy's factories were loaded with urgent unscheduled orders to eliminate failures, to carry out navigation, dock, current and medium repairs of Soviet ships and vessels fleet, marine units of the border troops. This circumstance is due to the fact that the plants were deployed in the operational area of the theater of operations at the place of base connections. At any time of the day or night, qualified specialists were ready to depart by accessible transport to the designated base or the ship was moored to the mooring wall of the shipyard. There was no particular need for the creation and development of infrastructure for military repairs.
Today, only the Zvezdochka enterprise in Severodvinsk and, with some restrictions, the 13 SRH in Sevastopol can make a comprehensive average repair.
What do we have? After inconsistent, scattered according to the goals and objectives of the reforms of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the technical support of the country's naval forces as a single subsystem and its command bodies disappeared from the field of the Navy. As a result, it turned out that in the current regulations on the activities of the existing bodies of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for shipbuilding and armament, the head of the Main Technical Directorate of the Navy does not even hint at the performance of maintenance functions.
How can you not remember the phrase cast in granite "They wanted the best, but it turned out, as always."
Note: in ground forces it was possible to save the accumulated one. For example, the Main Automobile-Armored (GABTU) and the Main Rocket-Artillery (GRAU) controls fully and completely fulfill the functions of technical support of a kind of troops and are fully responsible for the current state of VVST according to the prescribed nomenclature. There are fruitful work of the Omsk Military Automobile and Armored Engineering Institute, Penza Artillery Military Engineering Institute, in which specialists of technical support of the Ground Forces are trained.
But in the Navy, this complex is outside the zone of influence of the most important state institution, a separate special type of the Armed Forces - the Navy.
The ship is not a tank, not a plane and not a ballistic missile. A modern cruiser is the most complex anthropotechnical system, created on the basis of conflicting and at the same time compromise technical solutions. Its combat ability is provided both by design solutions and by the extensive sphere of influence of a set of organizational and technical measures, that is, the maintenance of the vessel’s life cycle.
The current state of the ship determines its ability to perform specified functions. It may be in good working order or operational status, in some cases in the limit technical condition.
We will clarify that a ship is considered to be in good condition where the ship meets all the requirements of regulatory technical and (or) design (project) documentation. Consequently, it will be defective in the case when its state does not meet at least one of these requirements.
The transfer of a ship from one technical condition to another usually occurs as a result of a malfunction, damage or failure. Defects lead to them - each individual product inconsistency with the established requirements. Defects are hidden in the most dangerous consequences, when the requirements for their prevention are not established, but the probability of their occurrence during the operation of ships is rather high.
Under the conditions of constant controversial and compromise decision-making in the design and construction of ships, the tolerances of hidden defects are quite possible. This is evidenced by the death of submarines K-8 of the 627 project in 1970 and K-278 Komsomolets of the 685 project in 1989. Or the dubious, controversial requirement of preserving the surface buoyancy of the submarine during the flooding of one of the compartments. In 1981, at the entrance to the Vladivostok Bay of the Golden Horn, aboard Cape Skryplev, a C-178 submarine of the 613 project sank when the ship was in contact with the vessel. Although only the sixth compartment was flooded through the hole of the strong hull.
The conductor of operational defects is unrestrained, tireless physical wear and tear. The limit for the development of such defects are the assigned resources and the service life of both individual elements of functional units and the ship as a whole. It would be highly desirable to use not assigned resource indicators, but technically sound or experimental statistical standards. In the designated indicators laid a fairly decent reserve of numerical values, which causes an overwhelming desire to make volitional decisions to extend the resource.
After the numerical values of the resource indicators expire, the ship is subject to factory repair. With its current repair, the value of all parameters characterizing the ability to perform specified functions that meet the requirements of regulatory and (or) design (design) documentation is restored. With an average ship, it is brought into good technical condition, there is a partial replacement of the product life with the replacement or restoration of the component parts of a limited range, performed in the amount determined by the regulatory and technical documentation.
When overhauling, this is a full or close to it restoration of the product life with the replacement if necessary of any of its parts, including the base ones. Values close to the full resource are also set in the regulatory and technical documentation.
Classical definitions of technical terms should be read out, since lately there have been a lot of careless options. For example: the average repair is made in order to restore the properties of the ship to the specified values with the replacement or restoration weapons, technical means and hull structures. It is made by specialized companies with the involvement of the ship’s personnel to carry out individual work. Maintenance repairs include maintaining the properties of the ship within the prescribed limits, with the replacement or restoration of certain quickly-wearing hardware and hull structures. It is conducted at the enterprises, the ship crew can be involved for separate works.
Blurred interpretations of the types of repair give rise to the complete uncertainty of its goals and objectives.
Unlike other types and genera of the Armed Forces in the Navy, troop repair as a term and type was excluded from the vocabulary and practice.
After the elimination of the industrial branch of the military ship repair, the need for it has not dried up. And the replacement was found. A number of organizationally fragmented, small, narrowly specialized, poorly technologically equipped and at the same time not burdened with fixed assets of limited liability companies have appeared.
By contracting the former industry with ship repair contractors, they are able to promptly eliminate the failure of individual ship elements, but only in the area of their specialization. As a result, ships and ships of the Navy are gradually involved in the endless process of patching holes. Thus, the problems of the resource of the Navy become not only a technical or economic, but also a strategic category.
At the same time, the current state of warships, hydrographic vessels and auxiliary fleet cannot be considered satisfactory.
Freakish distortion of the truism of technical policy inevitably leads to the loss of the naval combat potential.
The cause of accidents, catastrophes and accidents of ships and vessels of the Russian Navy is the same - the defects are manifested. And most importantly - a thin layer of "smeared" responsibility among all participants in the design and construction of ships. There is a "medicine" - a complex of special events. Its development and subsequent implementation will prevent the appearance of design and manufacturing defects. Monitoring the implementation of activities should be both internal and external.
In the Russian Navy at all times constructive, moderate, conservative policies have been professed for all vital functions. It is objective, as the existence of any ship. But nothing will change, the words will remain on paper until the organizational and legal body, the staff structure of the Navy is created, which will work out and implement a set of technical policy measures in the daily activities of the fleet, until a wide field of activity is developed to improve the technical policy of the Navy. Russia.
Market vortices excite turbulent movement of thoughts in the minds of the current generation of sailors. In search of truth, it is time to draw into the experience the experience of all who cherish the memory of service in the Russian Navy, honor and dignity of the naval officer.
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