Project 26 and 26 bis cruisers. Part of 5: Armor and Machines

41

The cruiser "Voroshilov"


Before proceeding to the description of the reservation, the power plant and some of the structural features of the Soviet cruisers, let us give a few words to the torpedo, aircraft and radar armament of the 26 and 26-bis ships.

All cruisers (with the exception of the Molotov) were equipped with two three-tube 533-mm torpedo tubes 39-Yu, but the Molotov received more advanced 1-H developed in 1938-1939. The 1-H was distinguished by a slightly higher weight (12 tons against 11,2 and 39-Yu) and one and a half times as fast as the torpedo exit from the vehicle. All torpedo tubes had individual sighting devices (placed on the middle tube), but could be induced by devices of the central semi-automatic aiming. Unfortunately, the author of this article did not find a detailed description of the scheme of their work.

In general, it is possible to characterize the torpedo armament of Soviet cruisers as fully appropriate for their tasks. Unlike, say, the Japanese heavy cruisers, the Soviet ships were not obliged to attack enemy cruisers and battleships with torpedoes. The ships of the 26 and 26-bis projects were to torpedo enemy transports after destroying the convoy’s close guard during short attacks on the enemy’s communications, and for this six 533-mm torpedoes, “strong middling”, in the world torpedo hierarchy with sufficient quality control devices shooting was enough. Initially, it was supposed to put torpedoes spare for 6 on Soviet cruisers, but then they refused, and this was the right decision: the concept of using domestic cruisers did not imply long pauses between attacks, and reloading torpedoes into the sea was a very trivial task. In general, the theoretical benefits of increasing the ammunition did not compensate for the danger of storing additional torpedoes and the additional weight of both the ammunition and its means of transportation.

The cruisers also had anti-submarine armament as part of the 20 large depth bomb BB-1 (containing 135 kg of explosives) and 30 small (25 kg), and shortly before the outbreak of war (in 1940 g), both of them received very reliable fuses K- 3, providing bomb explosions at depths from 10 to 210 m. But then we have another riddle, which is filled with story first domestic cruisers.

It is absolutely certain that the ships of the 26 and 26-bis project did not have noise-finding or hydroacoustic stations, but they were equipped with the Arktur (Underwater Communication) stations (apparently - the Arctur-MU-II). At the same time, in some sources (for example, “Soviet cruisers of the Great Patriotic War,” A. Chernyshev and K. Kulagin ”) it is indicated that this station:

"Did not allow to determine the distance to submarines and had a short range"


On the other hand, other sources (A.A. Chernyshev, “Maxim Gorky-type cruiser”) assert that this ZPS could not perform the sound-and-direction finding function. Who is right? Unfortunately, the author did not find the answer to this question.

Of course, it’s not a matter of a light cruiser to chase a submarine, for it it is not a hunter, but a prey. Nevertheless, given the short range of torpedo firing, the equipment of a cruiser with depth charges is quite reasonable - in some cases, after seeing a periscope near it, the ship, using its rather big draft, could try to ram the boat (this is how the famous Otto Weddigen died, crushed the battleship of the battleship “Dreadnought”), and then throw it at depth charges. Therefore, the presence of depth charges on the cruiser is fully justified, even if there is no noise-finding / hydroacoustic station on it.

But on the other hand, even the inferior submarine detection equipment can tell the cruiser that he is about to attack, and thereby allow him to avoid death. No words, of course, it is better to have a powerful HAS, first-class noise-finders, but all this is an additional weight that a light cruiser has and is (I apologize for the tautology) its weight in gold. But for the Soviet light cruisers, as is known, the task of interacting with submarines was posed, therefore the presence of the Arctur RPT on it was more than justified.

At the same time, the underwater communication is built precisely on sound vibrations, thus, the receiver of the PPS, in any case, must catch some underwater noise. In view of the above, it is difficult to imagine that the ZPS is not able to fulfill the role of a simple noise finder. However, this cannot be ruled out.

The anti-mine armament of the 26 and 26-bis cruisers was represented by the K-1 paravan. Some authors have noted the lack of effectiveness of their actions, but this is not so easy to judge. For example, on November 29, the cruiser Voroshilov exploded two mines, but this happened at a speed of 1942 knots (the first blasting) and lower (the second blasting), while the paravans were calculated to work efficiently at the ship’s speed - 12-14 node. And, despite the “abnormal” working conditions, the paravanes prevented the sides of the cruiser from being hit by mines - both exploded, although not far, but still not at the side, which caused damage, although serious, did not create the threat of the death of the cruiser. Another undermining occurred in the cruiser Maxim Gorky, and its bow was torn off, but not everything is clear here. 22 June 23 G cruiser entered the minefield, accompanied by three destroyers, moving at a speed of 1941 nodes, and soon went to 22 KBT ahead of the cruiser destroyer "Wrathful" exploded a mine, losing the bow. After that, "Maxim Gorky" turned around and lay down on the opposite course, but after a short time an explosion thundered. At what speed the cruiser ran into a mine - not reported.


Cruiser "Maxim Gorky" with a severed nasal extremity


In addition to para-vans, all cruisers were equipped with degaussing devices installed after the start of the war, and, judging by the available data, their effectiveness is beyond question - the same Kirov repeatedly found itself in areas where other ships that had no demagnetization system were undermined land mines. Kirov, however, was blown up only when its degaussing device was turned off.

Aviation armament on the project was represented by a catapult and two spotting aircraft, which were also supposed to carry out reconnaissance functions. Project 26 ships received two KOR-1 aircraft, despite the fact that these aircraft, in general, failed the test. Despite the more or less decent flight characteristics, the seaplanes showed extremely low seaworthiness, but no other was available, therefore ... But the project 26 bis cruisers received the latest KOR-2, though already during the war. The catapults turned out to be a continuous streak - domestic ZK-1 could not be completed on time, which is why Project 26 cruisers received K-12 catapults purchased in Germany. In terms of their performance characteristics, they fully corresponded to the domestic ones, but had a lower mass (21 tons versus 27). The first pair of Project 26 bis cruisers - Maxim Gorky and Molotov installed domestic ZK-1s, but during the war years they replaced it with Molotov with the more modern ZK-1a, but the Baltic cruisers (Maxim Gorky and "Kirov") catapults were dismantled to strengthen anti-aircraft weapons. The Pacific cruisers “Kaganovich” and “Kalinin” did not receive catapults when putting into operation, after the war ZK-2b were installed on them.


Performance characteristics of the Soviet aircraft KOR-1 and KOR-2 according to A. Chernyshev and K. Kulagin "Soviet cruisers of the Great Patriotic War"


Repeatedly encountered in a number of sources, and in the "Internet" opinion, that the aircraft armament cruisers like "Kirov" and "Maxim Gorky" was not needed, with all the logic, the author still does not consider true. For example, competent aerial reconnaissance and adjustment of the fire of the Kirov cruiser during the shelling of the Finnish battery on the island of Russara, which took place on December 1 1939, could well provide suppression of this battery of 254-mm guns, moreover, from distances inaccessible to its fire. There was no other way for its destruction in the cruiser "Kirov". You can also recall the shooting of the Black Sea cruiser "Voroshilov" 19 September 1941 g on the clusters of German fascist troops in the villages of Alekseyevka, Khorly and Skadovsk, located on the outskirts of Perekop. Then for firing from a distance of 200 KBT (Alekseyevka), 148 KBT (Khorly) and 101 KBT (Skadovsk) an MBR-2 aircraft was used, which served as a spotter.

On the contrary, it can be argued that professional crews of spotters, who perfectly know the peculiarities of naval artillery firing and who are able to correct the fire, could play a huge role in the shelling of enemy troops out of direct line of sight. With regard to purely marine operations, the air correction of fire on a moving target is extremely difficult (although there were such cases during the Second World War), but the usefulness of reconnaissance aircraft is unconditional. The disappearance of ejection aircraft from the post-war cruisers of Western countries is associated with a large number of aircraft carriers that were able to provide aerial reconnaissance better than the seaplane cruisers.

Radar weapons - when designing the first domestic cruisers, its installation was not planned for the reason that in those years, the USSR had not yet engaged in radar. The first ship station "Redut-K" was created only in 1940 year, and was tested on the cruiser "Molotov", which is why the latter became the only Soviet cruiser that received radar before the war. But in the war years, the cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis projects received radars of various purposes.

Reservation


The armor protection of the Soviet cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis projects was structurally very simple, especially compared to the Italian cruisers. However, in this case “simply” is not at all synonymous with “bad.”

The basis of the armor was an extended citadel, which had a 121 meter in length (64,5% of the hull length) and covered the boiler rooms and machine rooms, as well as the ammunition cellar. Very impressive (for a cruiser) was the height of the armor belt - 3,4 meters. At Kirov and Voroshilov, the citadel was a kind of box in which the walls (armor belts and traverses) were covered with deck armor, and in all places the thickness of the armor plates was the same - 50-mm. And the same, 50-mm, protection received the main caliber towers and their barbety. In addition, the conning tower (150-mm), steering and steering compartment (20 mm), torpedo guide posts (14 mm), KDP (8 mm), stabilized pick-up posts and 100-mm B-34 shield were also booked 7 mm).

The 26-bis cruisers had absolutely the same booking scheme, but in some places the armor became thicker — armor, traverse, front plates, roofs and 180-mm barbets of the towers received not 50-mm, but 70-mm armor, steering and the tiller compartments - 30 mm instead of 20 mm, otherwise the thickness of the armor corresponded to the Kirov-type cruisers.



It is interesting to compare the booking systems of domestic cruisers with their Italian "ancestor"



The first thing that catches your eye - the protection of the "Italian" is much more difficult. But has it made it more efficient? Let's look at possible trajectories of defeat.



The trajectories of 1 and 2 are falling bombs. Here, in the Soviet cruiser, the ammunition will meet 50-mm armored deck, while in Italian cruisers - only 35-m and 30 mm, respectively. At the same time, the Italians have so important compartments as boiler rooms and engine rooms and ammunition cellars, only 35 mm are covered with armor (1 trajectory), and the 26-bis cruiser has 50 mm. Closer to the sides, the situation is slightly better - although the Italians' deck armor is reduced to 30 mm (2 trajectory), but if a bomb breaks through thin armor and explodes in the hull of an Italian ship, there will be an 35 mm armored partition and fragments, going down, will meet horizontally laid 20 mm armor plates. Here, the cruiser project 26-bis and Eugenio di Savoia get an approximate parity — the domestic armored form is harder to penetrate, but if the bomb still breaks it, the consequences of the explosion inside the hull will be more dangerous than the Italian, because "Maxim Gorky" is not. A shell that hit the Italian cruiser along the 3 trajectory will first meet the 20 mm onboard armor and then the 35 mm deck, and here the Eugenio di Savoie again loses to the Soviet cruiser — the Maxim Gorky is protected here by 18 mm board steel (though not armored ) and 50 mm armored. The situation is again leveled out if the projectile enters the Eugenio di Savoia in the 30 mm deck between the main armor belt and the armored partition - in this case, after the 20 mm board and 30 mm breakdown of the deck, the projectile will still have to overcome 35 mm vertical protection, which together equivalent to 18 mm board and 50 mm armored "Maxim Gorky". But below, the Italian is better protected - the projectile caught in his 70 mm armored belt, even if broken through, will have to break the 35 mm armored rearrangement behind him, while the Soviet cruiser has nothing for the same 70 mm armor belt (the 5 trajectory for the Italian and for Soviet cruisers). On the other hand, the Eugenio di Savoie barbets are worse protected - having where 70 is mm of barbett armor (6 trajectory), where 60 is mm (7 trajectory), where is 20 mm onboard + 50 mm barbet (8 trajectory), “Italian” is slightly weaker than Council xNUMX mm barbet (70 trajectory), “Italian” is a bit weaker than Council (6 mm of barbet (7 trajectory), “Italian” is a bit weaker than Council (18 mm) barbet (70 trajectory), “Italian” is a bit weaker than Council (8) mm barbet (XNUMX trajectory), “Italian” is a bit weaker where enemy projectiles encounter XNUMX mm (XNUMX and XNUMX trajectories) and XNUMX mm plating + XNUMX mm barbet (XNUMX trajectory). The towers themselves ... it's hard to say. On the one hand, the Italians had a thicker frontal plate (90 mm versus 70 mm), but the walls and roof had only 30 mm versus Soviet 50 mm. It is equally difficult to say how right the Italians were, "smearing" the armor throughout their tower-like superstructure - yes, they defended it with anti-splinter armor, but the conning tower had only 100 mm against 150 mm of the Soviet cruiser. It is completely unclear why, having spent so much effort on booking the sides, the Italians did not likewise defend the traverse, where they limited themselves to only 50 mm armor (in Soviet cruisers - 70 mm). For a light cruiser to lead a battle on a retreat or catching up with the enemy is as natural as for a battleship to stand in line. Another drawback of the Italian cruiser was the absence of any protection of the steering and tiller compartments, but I must say that with Maxim Gorky, this was not all in order - just 30 mm armor.

In general, it can be stated that in the part of the vertical armor of the corps "Eugenio di Savoia" was somewhat superior to the 26-bis project, but in terms of booking artillery and horizontal defense - it is inferior. In this case, because of the weak traverse, the Italian cruiser is protected worse than the Soviet one for combat on sharp bow and stern corners. The overall level of protection of ships can be considered comparable.

A little remark. Reading domestic sources, you come to the conclusion that the protection of Soviet cruisers was completely inadequate, "cardboard." A classic example is the statement of A.A. Chernyshev, made in the monograph "Cruiser type" Maxim Gorky ":

“Compared with most foreign light cruisers, the booking was not sufficient, although on the ships of the 26-bis project it was somewhat strengthened - according to calculations, it provided protection against 152-mm artillery in the 97-122 kmb range (17,7-22,4 km), but the fire The enemy's 203 mm guns were dangerous for our cruisers at all distances. ”


It would seem that there can be objected? Formula armor penetration known for a long time and everywhere, you can not argue with them. But ... that should be borne in mind.

The fact is that any armor penetration formula, in addition to caliber, also operates with the weight of the projectile and its speed “on the armor”, i.e. at the time of contact of the projectile with armor. And this speed depends on the initial velocity of the projectile. Accordingly, the results of the calculation of "invulnerability zones" or "free maneuvering zones" for any ship will directly depend on what kind of gun they took in the calculation. Because it is quite obvious that the armor penetration capability of the German SK C / 34, firing a 122 kg projectile with an initial speed of 925 m / s, will differ significantly from the American Mark 9, sending a projectile at a speed of 118 m / s.

Of course, it would be most reasonable when focusing on armor penetration to focus on the guns of their likely opponents, but here a number of problems arise. Firstly, there are always several potential enemies, and they have different guns. Secondly, countries usually do not spread about the performance characteristics of their guns. For example, comparing the capabilities of artillery dreadnought type "Empress Maria" and dreadnoughts, which were built for the Turks in England, domestic developers are pretty wrong in the qualities of the British 343-mm guns. They believed that an armor-piercing projectile of such a gun would weigh 567 kg, while in fact the English projectile weighed 635 kg.

Therefore, very often, in calculating the armor penetration of the country, they used either the data of their own guns of the right caliber, or some idea of ​​what guns will be in service with other countries. Therefore, calculations of invulnerability zones without specifying the performance characteristics of the weapon for which they were designed will not help the reader who wants to understand the durability of the protection of a ship.

And here is a simple example. Domestic developers have adopted such a powerful 152-mm gun for their calculations that it could penetrate the 70 mm armor of the Soviet cruiser at all distances, up to 97 kb or almost 18 km (it is not clear why A. Chernyshev writes about 17,7 km. 97 kb * 185,2 m = 17 964,4 m). But the Italians, counting the invulnerability zones for their cruisers, came to the conclusion that the external 70 mm armor belt "Eugenio di Savoia" protects, starting from 75,6 KBT (14 km). Moreover, according to the Italians, at a distance in 14 km 70 mm the armor belt could only be broken if the projectile hit at an angle of 0, i.e. completely perpendicular to the slab, which is almost impossible (at such a distance the projectile falls at a certain angle, so there must be a very strong pitching capable of “unfolding” the armor perpendicular to its trajectory). More or less reliably, the “Eugenio di Savoia” armor belt began to penetrate only (approximately) at 65 kbt (12 km), where an 152-mm projectile could pierce such armor at an angle of 28 hail to normal. But this, again, in a certain dueling situation, when the ships are fighting as battleships, turning them to each other, but if, for example, a fight takes place on the course angle 45 degrees, then to defeat 70 mm armor plate, according to Italian calculations , should have come closer to less than 48 KB (less than 9 km).

Where does this difference in calculations come from? It can be assumed that the Soviet developers, considering heavy duty weapons, believed that guns in the West were just as good, and they calculated armor penetration based on completely monstrous masses of projectiles and their initial speeds for 152-mm guns. At the same time, the Italians, most likely, were guided by the actual data of their own six-inch units.

It is also interesting that, according to Italian calculations, the 203-mm projectile punched 70 mm armor and the 35 mm bulkhead “Eugenio di Savoia” behind it when the projectile deviated from the normal in 26 hail already from a distance of almost 107 kbt (20 000 m). Of course, the Soviet 180-mm gun B-1-P had a slightly lower armor penetration, but it can be argued that during the 14-15 km distance, the vertical protection of the Italian cruiser will be completely permeable to Russian 97,5 kg shells. And here we come to an understanding of the value of 180-mm artillery for a light cruiser - while the “Maxim Gorky” at a distance of 75-80 KB (i.e. the distance of a decisive battle, which should expect a high enough percentage of hits) Feel practically invulnerable, because neither its board, nor deck, nor barbety can be pierced with 152-mm Italian shells, the larger Eugenio di Savoy (standard displacement 8 750 t against 8 177 t “Maxim Gorky”) does not have no protection against Soviet 180-mm projectiles racer.

Project 26 and 26 bis cruisers. Part of 5: Armor and Machines

Bow towers MK-3-180. The cruiser, alas, is not identified


If we recall that cruisers' speeds are generally comparable, then the Italian cruiser will not be able to impose combat distances advantageous for him, and attempts to escape, or conversely converge with the Soviet cruiser, will only result in the “Italian” setting up Fire their completely "cardboard" for 180-mm traverse guns.

How accurate are Italian calculations of armor penetration? It is rather difficult to say, but indirect confirmation of the fact that it was Italian, rather than Soviet, that were true, was the battle of the German pocket battleship Admiral Count Spee at La Plata. In it, the British six-inch semi-armored SRVS projectiles (Common Pointed, Ballistic Cap - semi-armored with a light tip to improve ballistics) hit the 75-80 mm plates of the German caliber main towers three times (and two hits were achieved from a distance of about the order of 54 kbt of German towers of the main caliber (with two hits achieved from a distance of the order of 203 kbt) of German towers of the main caliber (with two hits reached from a distance of about 100 kbt of the German caliber main turrets (distance from 40 kbt), and the heading of the towers, zoomers of the main caliber towers (distance from Xnumx kBT, hit the target,), the target, the gauge, the target, the target, the main towers of the main caliber (two hits achieved from a distance of about 80 kbt of German caliber towers of the main caliber) was not. But the Exeter XNUMX-mm cannon showed very high armor penetration - a similarly designed semi-armored British shell pierced XNUMX mm German raider armor plate and steel XNUMX mm bulkhead behind it from a distance of about XNUMX kbt. And this speaks of the high quality of British shells and their ability to pierce armor.

As for the reliability of horizontal protection, we can safely say that the 30 mm reservation was not enough. It is known that 250 kg bombs punched 30 mm deck armor of Admiral Hipper-type cruisers with a break under the armor deck, and the fall of such a bomb from a height of 800 m on the 20 mm bevel of the Voroshilov cruiser (and the explosion on the armor) resulted in a hole in armor area 2,5 sq.m. At the same time, 50 mm deck armor of the cruiser "Kirov" defended the ship from direct hit 5 bombs. One of them, landing a forecastle deck, exploded in the cabin of the commanders, the second, also burst into a forecastle, hit the armored deck, but did not explode - this happened during the 23 September 1941 air raid. Three more bombs hit the ship in the 24 April superstructure 1942. r during the operation “Goetz von Berlichingen”, the cruiser was very hard to hurt - the ammunition fed to the guns caught fire, they were thrown overboard, but the 100-mm and 37-mm shells exploded, and sometimes in the hands of sailors. However, the deck was not pierced. Unfortunately, now it is impossible to reliably establish the caliber of aerial bombs caught in a cruiser. About those that got into the forecastle, there is generally no information, but on the fact that caused severe damage in the feed, in various sources indicate the mass and 50 kg, and 100 kg and 250 kg. It is hardly possible to establish the truth here, but it should be remembered that for the Germans, bombs weighing 50 kg and 250 kg were typical. At the same time, the same three hits in the stern of the Kirov cruiser were not achieved as a result of an accidental raid, but during the purposeful operation to destroy large Baltic Fleet ships — it is extremely doubtful that aircraft for attacking such targets were equipped with only 50 kg of ammunition. On the other hand, this cannot be completely ruled out - it is possible that some of the aircraft were equipped with 50 kg bombs to suppress ground-based anti-aircraft artillery positions.

Power plant.


All cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis project had twin-shaft boiler-turbine installations consisting of two main turbo-tooth units (GTZA) and six powerful boilers located in the middle part of the hull according to the same scheme (from bow to stern):
1) Three boiler compartments (one boiler each)
2) Engine room (GTZA on the starboard propeller shaft)
3) Three more boiler compartments
4) Engine room (GTZA on the left side propeller shaft)

An Italian-made power plant was installed on the head cruiser Kirov, and on all subsequent cruisers they were domestic-made under the name TV-7, representing Italian installations with some modernization. The rated power of one GTZA should have been 55 000 HP, at the oversage - 63 250 HP. - i.e. a cruiser with two gtsa had 110 000 hp rated power of machines and 126 500 hp when forcing boilers. Attention is drawn to the fact that the Italian chassis "Kirov" was able to develop only 113 500 hp, while domestic TV-7 showed 126 900 hp ("Kalinin"), and 129 750 HP ("Maxim Gorky") despite the fact that domestic boilers were even more economical than the Italian.

Interestingly, the Italian cruisers, being larger, showed nevertheless greater speed on the acceptance tests than the Soviet ones. But it is rather a reproach to the Italian shipbuilders, rather than their merit. The same cruiser "Kirov", having developed on tests with power in 113 500 hp the speed in the 35,94 node reached the measured line in the “fair” displacement of 8 742 t, while its normal displacement (even taking into account the construction overload) should have been 8590 tons. And the Italians took their ships to the measuring line simply enchantingly over-lightened, not just with almost no fuel, but with many other mechanisms not yet installed. For example, the same “Raimondo Montecuccoli” with a normal displacement of 8 875 tons came to the test, having only 7 020 tons, i.e. on 1855 is easier than it was supposed to be! And, of course, developed 38,72 ties on 126 099 hp, why not develop something here.

I must say that in both Italian and Soviet fleets this power plant has proven itself from the best side. As a rule, and with the rarest exceptions, in day-to-day operation, ships cannot show the speed shown by them on a measured mile, usually it is a knot or two lower. For example, the same American “Iowas”, having 33 knots according to the reference book, usually went no more than 30-31 knots. This is understandable and understandable - the speed of full speed according to the book is usually calculated for the design normal displacement, and they try to carry out the tests by unloading the ships to the design weight. But in everyday life, ships "live" overloaded (here both the construction overload and the weight of the equipment obtained during the modernization), moreover, they try to carry with them not 50% of the maximum fuel (as it should be with a normal displacement), but more ...

Unlike previous "Kondotieri", on tests, which gave 40 and 40 nodes, but in daily operation barely able to develop 30-32 nodes, the ships of the types "Raimondo Montecuccoli" and "Duca d'Aosta" during the war could keep The 33-34 hub, thus becoming one of the fastest Italian light cruisers - not in word, but in deed. And the same can be said about the Soviet cruisers.

Despite the fact that in some sources for some reason it is argued that "Molotov" in a combat situation could not develop over 28 nodes, the same AA. Chernyshev reports that in December 1941 g for the delivery of 386 th rifle division to Sevastopol on a cruiser were loaded 15 ammunition wagons (this is already about 900 t "extra" weight), guns and mortars (in an unspecified number), and also 1200 personal the composition of the division. The cruiser was removed from the anchor and went to Sevastopol, with:
"At the transition speed reached 32 nodes"


And despite the fact that during this transition the ship obviously did not force the mechanisms - why would he do that? In addition, there are many other cases - for example, after the shelling of the German troops at Perekop in September of the 1941 g, the Voroshilov cruiser returned to the base at a speed in the 32 node. So where did the 28 nodes for Molotov come from? The only thing that comes to mind: on the night of 21 on 22 in January of 1942, the strongest Nord-Ost (the so-called boron) crashed at the Molotov pier, as a result of which the cruiser hit the pier hard, causing significant damage to its hull damage. Almost all of them were corrected by the repair plant in Tuapse, but due to the lack of capacity, the bent stem could not be fixed, which caused a loss of speed on the 2-3 node. True, subsequently the stem was repaired, but for some time the cruiser received speed limits. In addition, another “nuisance” happened to the “Molotov” - its stern was torn off by a torpedo, there was no time to build, therefore the ship was “assigned” to the stern from the unfinished cruiser “Frunze”. But, of course, the contours of the new stern differed from the theoretical drawing of the cruisers of the 26-bis project, which could affect the full speed of the Molotov. Again, A.A. Chernyshev points out that, according to the test results, the “newly fed” cruiser did not have a loss of travel speed (but, alas, does not indicate what kind of speed the ship demonstrated during the tests).

Subsequently, the GTZ TV-7 (at least with some modifications and upgrades) were installed on the 68 “Chapaev” cruiser and 68-bis “Sverdlov”, where they also demonstrated outstanding power and reliability in operation.

But it was at the Italian-Soviet power plants and another extremely important advantage ...

To be continued..
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  1. +5
    August 17 2016
    Andrey, thanks. Again I read it with pleasure. A comprehensive and reasonable approach gag assumptions with a lack of facts.
    I think, with such a wealth of knowledge and a thorough approach, you should try yourself in the role of the historical consultant of the World of Warships project (the current Kirov, by the way, does not satisfy me there for a number of aspects). Although modeled the little devil beautifully.
    Also, all the more pleasant that countryman. I myself from cities of falling meteorites Chelyabinsk.
    1. 0
      August 17 2016
      Quote: Fei_Wong
      Andrey, thanks

      And thank you for your kind words!
      Quote: Fei_Wong
      I think, with a similar baggage of knowledge and a thorough approach, you should try yourself as a historical consultant of the World of Warships project

      This, frankly, is unlikely :)) There is one important point here - a computer game is still primarily entertainment, not a simulation of real combat situations, so there will always be certain simplifications.
      Quote: Fei_Wong
      I myself am from the city of falling meteorites of Chelyabinsk.

      Glad to see a fellow countryman! drinks
      1. +1
        August 17 2016
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        There is one important point here - a computer game is still primarily entertainment, and not a simulation of real combat situations, so there will always be certain simplifications.

        In short, in mass games, historicity is at the expense of playability.
        What, incidentally, was directly and unequivocally discussed in one of the first promotional videos bloody potatoes according to World of Tanks - the very one that began with a view of the battlefield from a moving T-34 from the place of the mechanical drive.

        As an answer to historicity, WoT is very fond of offering, as an answer, to attach a 32-kg weight to the mouse, which imitates historical efforts on the control levers and the handwheel of the tower's manual (precise) drive. smile
        1. +1
          August 17 2016
          Quote: Alexey RA
          In short, in mass games, historicity is at the expense of playability.

          Of course! And so, in any game. Take the tactics of XCOM - much cooler ... the soldiers we are given at the base (special forces elite!) Cannot get into the figure at a human height of 25 meters.
          Quote: Alexey RA
          As an answer to historicity, WoT is very fond of offering, as an answer, to attach a 32-kg weight to a mouse that imitates historical efforts on the control levers and the handwheel of a manual (precise) tower drive

          good laughing I didn’t know, but it’s not in the eyebrow but in the eye :))
  2. 0
    August 17 2016
    At "Kirov" and "Voroshilov" the citadel was a kind of box in which the walls (armored belts and traverses) were covered with deck armor, and in all places the thickness of the armor plates was the same - 50 mm.


    Well, of course, he developed 38,72 knots per 126 hp, which is why there is nothing to develop.


    An attempt to translate the idea of ​​battlecruisers of the First World War into a light cruiser.
    1. 0
      August 17 2016
      Not at all, a light cruiser with a reinforced main caliber, for the possibility of confronting heavier ships (see ships of a probable adversary), as well as protecting the mine position and working along the coast. All this was superimposed on the restriction in displacement and finances. There was money and experience began to build other ships
      1. +1
        August 17 2016
        Quote: Fotoceva62
        Not at all, a light cruiser with a reinforced main caliber, for the possibility of confronting heavier ships (see ships of a probable adversary), as well as protecting the mine position and working along the coast.


        They did not mean the tasks to be performed, but the ideas laid down in the construction of the first battlecruisers. Strong artillery, high speed (for that time) and moderate booking. Meeting in battle with heavier brethren would be reminiscent of the Falkland battle, of course, in relation to light cruisers. Holding at a certain battle distance, to obtain minimal damage, due to greater speed and causing more severe damage to the enemy due to a larger caliber. Well, a quick departure when meeting with a stronger opponent. They tried to implement these ideas even before the Russo-Japanese War. Just an example of the Falkland battle, I repeat for light cruisers of this type, more indicative.
        1. 0
          August 17 2016
          Quote: 27091965i
          Holding at a certain battle distance, to obtain minimal damage, due to greater speed and causing more severe damage to the enemy due to a larger caliber. Well, a quick departure when meeting a stronger opponent

          I believe that you are absolutely right.
        2. 0
          August 17 2016
          Quote: 27091965i
          Holding at a certain battle distance, to obtain minimal damage, due to greater speed and causing more severe damage to the enemy due to a larger caliber. Just an example of the Falkland battle, I repeat for light cruisers of this type, more indicative.

          In the Falkland battle, the British, having an overwhelming advantage in tonnage and in artillery (305mm shell -385 kg firepower 16 guns 6000kg / min, German 210mm-108kg and 3000kg / min for 12 guns) - transported for almost two hours, released more than 80% of the main ammunition caliber, we achieved about 33-34 hits and got a 25 response. If we consider a hypothetical battle pr.26, for example, with the German Nurnberg, then most likely it will not be possible to defeat with little blood.
          1. 0
            August 17 2016
            Quote: BORMAN82
            In the Falkland battle, the British, having an overwhelming advantage in tonnage and in artillery (305mm projectile -385 kg, fire performance of 16 guns 6000kg / min, German 210mm-108kg and 3000kg / min for 12 guns)


            It is clear that the British had an advantage. The question was in choosing the tactics of warfare, they (the British) kept at that distance at which they could receive the least damage from German shells. Project 26 is an attempt to improve the project of the Argentinean cruiser Almirante Brown. Although different ships were taken as the basis, the main tasks were long-range combat and speed, with armor protection capable of keeping the main caliber of light cruisers from that time, at a distance from which 180 mm and 190 mm main guns would penetrate the enemy cruisers' defense.
            1. +1
              August 18 2016
              Dear 27091965i and Andrey from Chelyabinsk, I perfectly understand the concept of "battle cruisers" - I am trying to convey the fact that not everything is so unconditionally smooth in this concept and a relatively weak opponent will be easily torn apart "like Tuzik a rag". Remember the example of the battle at La Plata, when the Admiral Scheer kicked Exeter for an hour and a half, which was also actively attacking the offender. It is clear that Scheer is not a battle cruiser and it did not have the speed to break fire contact, but often the combat situation forces fight all the way despite the possibility of a retreat, as was the case with Exeter.
            2. 0
              August 18 2016
              Quote: 27091965i
              Although different ships were taken as the basis, the main tasks were long-range combat and speed, with armor protection capable of keeping the main caliber of light cruisers from that time, at a distance from which 180 mm and 190 mm main guns would penetrate the enemy cruisers' defense.

              The whole question is in the possibility of pr.26 to conduct an effective battle at such a distance that will completely exclude the possibility of receiving serious damage from a 6 "opponent. 10-14 km you can grab yourself in response, and from 15-17 km and more it takes a long time and tedious to land ammunition.
          2. +2
            August 17 2016
            Quote: BORMAN82
            In the Falkland battle, the British, having an overwhelming advantage in tonnage and in artillery (305mm shell -385 kg firepower 16 guns 6000kg / min, German 210mm-108kg and 3000kg / min for 12 guns) - transported for almost two hours, released more than 80% of the main ammunition caliber, achieved about 33-34 hits, receiving in response 25.

            Sorry, but this is some kind of fantasy. According to various estimates, Scharnhorst received from 30 to 40 shells, and Gneisenau (and this is reliable) - 29. In total, the British fired 513 shells (Invincible) and 661 shells (Inflexible), which amounted to 58 and 75% of the ammunition load, respectively, and no more than 80. Moreover, the percentage of hits from the English is about 5,45%, which is generally excellent.
            Quote: BORMAN82
            If we consider the hypothetical battle of Project 26, for example, with the German Nurnberg, then most likely it will not be possible to defeat with little blood.

            You need to understand that the Falklands' FCS ships are not like WWII cruisers. For Sturdy, the distance of a decisive battle, from which he could quickly "throw" a lot of hits, is 45 cables, but he did not climb there, realizing that at 45 kbt Spee hesitated very well, and from these 45 kbt his battle cruisers are not too well protected from 210 German guns. Therefore, Sturdy was forced to fight at 60 kbt, from where he came, but not as often as we would like, but his cruisers were safe
            And for Nuremberg with “Maxim Gorky” it turned out like this - the distance of a decisive battle is 70 kb, but at this distance our 180 mm fought the German's defense, but his 152 mm could hardly have done serious damage to Maxim.
            Ie there is a fundamental difference - Sterdy could not climb the distance of effective shooting - booking did not allow. And the 26th project completely allows :)
            1. 0
              August 18 2016
              I read Y. Corbett's "Admiral Spee's squadron in battle", there are detailed hit patterns. It was obtained from "Sharik :)" 29 pcs, "Gnezya" 13 pcs. Regarding 80% of ammunition, I got a little excited :)
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              And for Nuremberg with "Maxim Gorky" it turned out like this - the distance of a decisive battle is 70 kbt, but at this distance our 180 mm fought the protection of a German, but his 152 mm could hardly have caused serious damage Maxim

              At the distance indicated by you - 70kbt, 6 "German projectile, taking into account the angle of incidence of about 60mm, therefore, it will hardly be possible to exclude serious damage. Well, one more important point is the training of the crews, which can also significantly affect the results of the battle.
              1. 0
                August 18 2016
                Quote: BORMAN82
                I read Y. Corbett's "Admiral Spee's squadron in battle", there are detailed hit patterns. I got it from "Sharik :)" 29pcs, "Gnezya" 13pcs

                A detailed scheme of getting into Scharnhorst (from which not a single person was escaped) is strong :))) As for Gneisenau, there is only one source - records of art. the artilleryman Werner (from Inflexible) who he checked with the testimony of captured German officers and on the basis of which a report was compiled to the Admiralty. And there are 29 hits.
                Quote: BORMAN82
                At the distance indicated by you, 70kbt, for a 6 "German shell, taking into account the angle of incidence, penetration is about 60mm

                Huh. At zero deviation from the normal, corrected only for the angle of incidence. And there are practically no zero deviations in battle.
                Quote: BORMAN82
                Well and one more important moment - training by crews

                When ships are evaluated, a priori they come from equal crew training. The second - in terms of artillery, we do not have data to compare the quality of Soviet and German crews.
                1. 0
                  August 18 2016
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

                  A detailed scheme of getting into Scharnhorst (from which not a single person was escaped) is strong :))) As for Gneisenau, there is only one source - records of art. the artilleryman Werner (from Inflexible) who he checked with the testimony of captured German officers and on the basis of which a report was compiled to the Admiralty. And there are 29 hits.

                  I do not undertake the obligations of the "last resort" but Corbett has a pattern of hits and their timing.
  3. avt
    +4
    August 17 2016
    Everything would be fine, well, at a very decent level, but the statement clung
    Radar weapons - when designing the first domestic cruisers, their installation was not planned for the reason that in those years the USSR was not yet engaged in radar.
    wassat How we did it! Another gave that the real founder of the theme, and for the fleet in particular, Axel Berg, on a denunciation, was taken in 1937 and rehabilitated in 1940. Yes, so Stalin, apparently understanding and considering that you need to apologize like something like at a meeting, suddenly "asked," Are you not offending? " And maybe knowing someone of the envious tried to make a second run, he showed concretely - once again you will stick your head to Berg ... well, further it is clear ... Another thing - purely production opportunities were during the war ... to put it mildly, limited. However, Axel Ivanovich managed Stalin personally to push through the need to create an interdepartmental structure and subscribe to the funds of several people's commissariats already in 1943! And having received posts in 1943-1944 - deputy. People's Commissar of Electrical Industry of the USSR, in 1943-1947 - Deputy. prev. Council for Radar under the State. Committee of Defense, was practically the main character of this structure and it was to him, his activities that we owe everything that we received in the USSR in terms of radar, especially in the navy. More tog! In 1959, he also tried to create an interdepartmental structure for communications and ... cybernetics! BUT ... request Persons in the leadership of the scale of Stalin, who managed to realize in 1943 the urgent need to divert significant material and human forces, and there were no funds for that period ... Alas! And Berg's initiative was drowned in a bureaucratic swamp.
    1. +1
      August 17 2016
      Quote: avt
      How to do it!

      Really? Did not know. And who and how did we do this in 1934-35? You write about Berg, but at that time he was only involved in radio stations in NIIMIST?
      In general, if, so to speak, remove the veil from my eyes, I will be very grateful! drinks
      1. avt
        +1
        August 17 2016
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        . And who and how did we do this in 1934-35?

        I heard that something was working in Kharkov, and the result of the work was at least a friend of Vasya Stalin, pilot Nikichikhin, tested in 1938, a friend of Vasya Stalin's pilot Nikichikhin. In fact, what was being done in Kharkov laboratories before the war is covered with darkness to this day, especially in the part of the atomic project.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        You write about Berg, but at that time he was only involved in radio stations in NIIMIST?
        I generally suspect that he was repressed for giving a negative expert assessment to the “rays of death.” Well, the congenial marshal Misha, with the advice of the Deputy People's Commissar for Armaments, was running around with such an idea of ​​incinerating weapons.
      2. +2
        August 17 2016
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Really? Did not know. And who and how did we do this in 1934-35? You write about Berg, but at that time he was only involved in radio stations in NIIMIST?

        And if you look into Lobanov - "Development of Soviet radar technology"? wink
        He in the first two chapters describes, among other things, the initial period of development of radar in the USSR - from 1933 to 1939.
        In October 1933, an agreement was concluded between GAU and TsRL, which was the first legal document in the Soviet Union that laid the foundation for systematic scientific research and development work on radio detection, and the first document for the systematic financing of such work.

        The TsRL experiments in January 1934 were the actual beginning of Soviet radar technology, its birth and the initial milestone of subsequent brilliant development.

        After the experiment of the TsRL, the task of the first contract was completed, on February 14, 1934, GAU concluded a second contract with the TsRL, which provided for the complex of studies, calculations and experiments necessary to create a prototype of the aircraft radio-detection system and verify it in the field.

        After the TsRL experiments were conducted on radio detection of the aircraft, GAU engineers, realizing the complexity of solving this problem, suggested that the command simultaneously deploy similar work in LEFI.

        On February 19, 1934, the Air Defense Administration of the Red Army concluded an agreement with LEFI, the task of which provided for: 1) the creation of experimental aircraft detection equipment by July 1, 1934, 2) the study of electromagnetic wave reflections from various surfaces by October 1, 1934, 3) development by December 1, 1934 on the basis of accumulated materials of the design of the air reconnaissance station.

        In the fall of 1935, the LEFI was merged with the Radio Experimental Institute (REI - Dir. A. M. Kugushev) and transformed into the Scientific Research Institute No. 9 (NII-9) NKTP.
        1. +1
          August 17 2016
          Quote: Alexey RA
          And if you look into Lobanov - "Development of Soviet radar technology"?

          Yeah I admit - I was wrong. Thank! drinks
          1. +1
            August 18 2016
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Yeah I admit - I was wrong. Thank!

            At the same Lobanov, the first work on heat direction finders is described, which SI Kabanov recalled in his book "Battlefield-Coast". And what they have become now. And the test of the first heat direction finders was carried out on the ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the forts of Krondshtat.
  4. 0
    August 17 2016
    (it is not clear why A.A. Chernyshev writes about 17,7 km.)
    Chernyshev uses artillery cables equal to 183 meters. The ships turned out to be very successful, especially considering the conditions under which they were built. Damn of course the first, but by no means lumpy. Protection at the level, especially against high-explosive shells of caliber 120_155 mm, and even against semi-armor-piercing shells at major combat distances is even nothing. Compare with the reservation "Hipper", only the displacement do not forget to consider.
    1. 0
      August 17 2016
      Quote: Fotoceva62
      Chernyshev uses artillery cables equal to 183 meters.

      Ah, here it is ... yes, I didn’t think about it, thanks!
      Quote: Fotoceva62
      Compare with Hipper booking

      Compare, be sure to compare :))
  5. +2
    August 17 2016
    Colleague, several remarks:
    Well, at least when assessing horizontal armor (more precisely, its protective properties), it should be borne in mind that bombs have an even wider range than artillery shells - and, accordingly, even something that has the same marking (for example, FAB-250) can be completely different structurally and, accordingly, in terms of armor penetration capabilities. .. (hence such a discrepancy in the real defeat of ships), in particular, in the Soviet aviation there were bombs converted from artillery shells, there were bombs with a welded and solid-forged hull, in addition, the fuses (and their installation) were very different. Thus, for example, a 250 kg bomb with a welded body and a head fuse is likely to "splash" against the armored deck, while the same bomb with a solid-forged body and a bottom fuse is likely to pierce it and do something ... and a bomb from an artillery shell with a fuse on a large deceleration is likely to go right through ...

    we must pay tribute, in fact, if we compare our cruisers with foreigners close (if not by class, then by displacement), then it turns out that the booking of our ships was quite "at the level" and in some cases it was even more rational ... In principle, it should be taken into account that for such ships as light cruisers, in general, the armor protection was not expected to be "frontal confrontation" but rather to "minimize damage" - Reflect the fragments of heavy shells when covered, prevent the destroyers from "spitting" ... etc. And in this regard, the armor protection of the Kirovs is very, very good ... In fact, with their speed, ballistics and range of guns, they were a very difficult nut to crack for any enemy and it was not their fault that they never had to face one ... In principle, the only complaint against their developers is a strong underestimation of the "air threat" and, as a consequence, practically helpless anti-aircraft weapons.
    1. 0
      August 17 2016
      Quote: Taoist
      Well, at least when evaluating horizontal reservations (more precisely, its protective properties), it should be borne in mind that air bombs have an even wider nomenclature than artillery shells

      Yes you are right. The only pity is not to get such data. Ours in general, as I understand it, wrote down as "hit by an aerial bomb 100-250 kg."
      Quote: Taoist
      In fact, with their speed, ballistics and range of guns, they were a very difficult nut for any enemy, and it was not their fault that they did not have to face one ...

      I absolutely agree.
      Quote: Taoist
      In principle, the only complaint against their developers is a strong underestimation of the "air threat" and, as a consequence, the almost helpless anti-aircraft weapons.

      Yes, but again, very many cruisers at birth had insufficient air defense, but received one afterwards. Those. this is definitely a flaw, but not incorrigible
      1. 0
        August 17 2016
        Unfortunately, to a certain extent, only light weapons that did not require power drives and ammunition supply systems were easily strengthened. To strengthen the ZKDB (according to the Soviet classification), a major overhaul was required ... as a result, our cruisers did not receive normal anti-aircraft weapons of the corresponding time. As a result, they severely limited their operations even to support ground forces ... In general, such an underestimation on our part is strange, designing ships for closed naval theaters where they are constantly in the zone of action of coastal aviation? The only intelligible explanation for this is that they hoped that our coastal aviation could also provide an "umbrella" ... alas, they miscalculated.
        1. 0
          August 17 2016
          Quote: Taoist
          To strengthen the ZKDB (according to the Soviet classification), a major modernization was required ...

          How can I say? Look, they were going to install six "hundred parts" with the MSSP according to the project, which was not bad for its time. By sequestering the catopult on Kirov, 2 more were stuck during the war. Of course, in comparison with cruisers, the United States somehow does not dance, but in relation to everyone else, it is not so bad.
      2. 0
        August 17 2016
        With all the shortcomings of air defense, the sailors adequately repelled the raids. I read that Voroshilov shot down the torpedo bomber with the main caliber
    2. 0
      August 17 2016
      Quote: Taoist
      Well, at least when evaluating horizontal reservations (more precisely, its protective properties), it should be borne in mind that air bombs have an even wider nomenclature than artillery shells

      Heh heh heh ... actually, artillery shells also have an extremely wide range. Moreover, even within the framework of one type there can be several shells that seem to be of the same purpose, but which sharply differ in characteristics.

      I remember one discussion on tanks, where one opponent argued that a three-inch OFS penetrates the side armor of a "four", and the other does not. Moreover, both referred to the same documents. laughing It all ended with the spirit of the comrade Litl_bro being summoned, who explained in detail to those who debated that the OFS that penetrates the armor was issued before the war and there were trace quantities of it in the troops. And the basis of the BC in the war was just the non-penetrating OFS.
      The fact is that among the OFS of 76,2 mm caliber, there were a steel long-range grenade and steel cast iron fragmentation long-range grenade:
      High-explosive fragmentation steel grenade. It can be used when firing at light (in some cases medium) tanks during their oblique movement on the sides, or in the turret ring, which leads to the destruction of side sheets, or to their detachment from the mounts, as well as jamming of the tower and damage to the tower mechanisms
      (...)
      Fragmented grenade of steel cast iron can be used only when firing at the tank’s tower “to blinding”.
      1. 0
        August 17 2016
        Well, large-caliber shells all the same no matter how they had such a variation in production - at least due to the much smaller output ...
  6. +2
    August 17 2016
    1. On cruisers drunk full fighter kotorie then landed on land.
    2. "The fire of the enemy's 203-mm guns was dangerous for our cruisers at all distances": if they have in view of the towers, the barbet and traverse are so. But at the sharp heading corners there was a large area in which the deck and side of the Soviet cruisers were not affected by the 203 mm armor-piercing shells of the German cruisers.
    180 mm (with lower charges) could hit the deck of the German heavy cruisers from this zonya.
    An additional horizontal reservation of 35 mm hit the Baltic cruisers.
    1. 0
      August 17 2016
      Quote: Kostadinov
      On cruisers drunk full fighter kotorie then landed on land.

      It was like this, it was launched from the Molotov with the 3K-1a.
      Quote: Kostadinov
      But at the sharp-pointed course angles, a large zone hit in which the deck and board of the Soviet cruisers were not affected by 203 mm armor-piercing shells of German cruisers.

      It’s quite difficult to say - the deck is for sure, but the board ... The Italians believed that 70 mm armor penetrates 203 mm at an angle of 44 degrees from a distance of 14 m. The German gun was more powerful.
      Quote: Kostadinov
      180 mm (with lower charges) could hit the deck of the German heavy cruisers from this zonya.

      Yes.
      Quote: Kostadinov
      An additional horizontal reservation of 35 mm hit the Baltic cruisers.

      Not certainly in that way. Armor plates of such thickness were laid on the ships, on the upper deck, but it was not supposed that they would go with them - it was just additional defense against enemy raids, while the ships were forced to stand in the base.
      1. 0
        August 18 2016
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        It’s quite difficult to say - the deck is for sure, but the board ... The Italians believed that 70 mm armor penetrates 203 mm at an angle of 44 degrees from a distance of 14 m. The German gun was more powerful.

        There is always an angle at which the side cannot be pierced.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Armor plates of such thickness were laid on the ships, on the upper deck, but it was not supposed that they would go with them - it was just additional defense against enemy raids, while the ships were forced to stand in the base.

        Of course against raids, but if necessary, enters the sea? Somewhere I saw that the weight of these plates is 270 tons? This is not so much that you can’t walk with this weight.
        1. 0
          August 18 2016
          Quote: Kostadinov
          There is always an angle at which the side cannot be pierced.

          Of course! But from this angle traverse will break through crying
          Quote: Kostadinov
          Of course against raids, but if necessary, enters the sea? Somewhere I saw that the weight of these plates is 270 tons? This is not so much that you can’t walk with this weight.

          Yes. Our cruisers on the Black went, loading over 1000 tons, and nothing. But the problem is that 250-270 tons is only a partial reservation (a full reservation of a deck of 35 mm will weigh twice as much)
          1. 0
            August 19 2016
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            But from this angle traverse will break through

            This is so, but still the traverse as the target will be smaller than the deck (at these distances). What am I doing? It cannot be said that against the German cruisers with 203 mm artillery, Project 26 did not beat any chances in an artillery battle. On the contrary, the chances beat more than 50% if only artillery, armor and ship speed were considered
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            But the problem is that 250-270 tons is only a partial reservation (a full reservation of a deck of 35 mm will weigh twice as much)

            Yes it is. If I’m not mistaken, 270 tons and 0,035 meters are somewhere around 1000 square meters (about 20 to 50 meters).
  7. exo
    0
    August 17 2016
    I hope to 68 bis, we get;)
    1. +1
      August 17 2016
      Quote: exo
      I hope to 68 bis, we get;)

      If yes, then it won't be soon :) Given that the cruiser is very interesting, but there are probably no special "white spots" in its history, but to retell what I was reluctant to write 100 times before me :)
  8. 0
    August 19 2016
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    a computer game is still primarily entertainment, not a simulation of real combat situations, so there will always be certain simplifications.


    In the overwhelming majority of cases, it is so. However, the next reincarnation of "Harpoon", namely "Command Modern Air / Naval Operations", personally made a favorable impression on me.
  9. 0
    August 19 2016
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: Fei_Wong
    I think, with a similar baggage of knowledge and a thorough approach, you should try yourself as a historical consultant of the World of Warships project

    This, frankly, is unlikely :)) There is one important point here - a computer game is still primarily entertainment, not a simulation of real combat situations, so there will always be certain simplifications.

    This is true, but it does not negate the importance of having a good history consultant on the development team. WG projects, as a rule, adhere to the rule of "realism where it does not interfere with gameplay" (and where it does, sometimes you can still leave the historical characteristics, tweaking other purely game characteristics for balance). At least, the booking plus the arrangement of systems and modules of both tanks and ships is realized "no fools": the way it was in real life. If I were you, I would still send an application. And worthy use of talents, and the project itself would only benefit from this.
  10. 0
    February 20 2018
    "Despite the fact that some sources for some reason claim that the Molotov could not develop more than 28 knots in a combat situation, the same AA Chernyshev reports that in December 1941, the 386th Rifle Division was delivered to Sevastopol 15 wagons of ammunition were loaded onto the cruiser (this is already about 900 tons of “overweight”), guns and mortars (in undetermined quantities), as well as 1200 personnel of the division. The cruiser dropped anchor and went to Sevastopol, while: “ at the transition speed reached 32 knots. ""
    Most likely there was much less ammunition by weight. If the cars were biaxial, then just a little more than 200 tons. If four-axle, then about 750 tons. Besides shells went in boxes, but not in bulk. I’m afraid that even 750 tons cannot be “shoved” into such a cruiser (taking into account 1200 fighters).

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