Project 26 and 26 bis cruisers. Part of 5: Armor and Machines
Before proceeding to the description of the reservation, the power plant and some of the structural features of the Soviet cruisers, let us give a few words to the torpedo, aircraft and radar armament of the 26 and 26-bis ships.
All cruisers (with the exception of the Molotov) were equipped with two three-tube 533-mm torpedo tubes 39-Yu, but the Molotov received more advanced 1-H developed in 1938-1939. The 1-H was distinguished by a slightly higher weight (12 tons against 11,2 and 39-Yu) and one and a half times as fast as the torpedo exit from the vehicle. All torpedo tubes had individual sighting devices (placed on the middle tube), but could be induced by devices of the central semi-automatic aiming. Unfortunately, the author of this article did not find a detailed description of the scheme of their work.
In general, it is possible to characterize the torpedo armament of Soviet cruisers as fully appropriate for their tasks. Unlike, say, the Japanese heavy cruisers, the Soviet ships were not obliged to attack enemy cruisers and battleships with torpedoes. The ships of the 26 and 26-bis projects were to torpedo enemy transports after destroying the convoy’s close guard during short attacks on the enemy’s communications, and for this six 533-mm torpedoes, “strong middling”, in the world torpedo hierarchy with sufficient quality control devices shooting was enough. Initially, it was supposed to put torpedoes spare for 6 on Soviet cruisers, but then they refused, and this was the right decision: the concept of using domestic cruisers did not imply long pauses between attacks, and reloading torpedoes into the sea was a very trivial task. In general, the theoretical benefits of increasing the ammunition did not compensate for the danger of storing additional torpedoes and the additional weight of both the ammunition and its means of transportation.
The cruisers also had anti-submarine armament as part of the 20 large depth bomb BB-1 (containing 135 kg of explosives) and 30 small (25 kg), and shortly before the outbreak of war (in 1940 g), both of them received very reliable fuses K- 3, providing bomb explosions at depths from 10 to 210 m. But then we have another riddle, which is filled with story first domestic cruisers.
It is absolutely certain that the ships of the 26 and 26-bis project did not have noise-finding or hydroacoustic stations, but they were equipped with the Arktur (Underwater Communication) stations (apparently - the Arctur-MU-II). At the same time, in some sources (for example, “Soviet cruisers of the Great Patriotic War,” A. Chernyshev and K. Kulagin ”) it is indicated that this station:
On the other hand, other sources (A.A. Chernyshev, “Maxim Gorky-type cruiser”) assert that this ZPS could not perform the sound-and-direction finding function. Who is right? Unfortunately, the author did not find the answer to this question.
Of course, it’s not a matter of a light cruiser to chase a submarine, for it it is not a hunter, but a prey. Nevertheless, given the short range of torpedo firing, the equipment of a cruiser with depth charges is quite reasonable - in some cases, after seeing a periscope near it, the ship, using its rather big draft, could try to ram the boat (this is how the famous Otto Weddigen died, crushed the battleship of the battleship “Dreadnought”), and then throw it at depth charges. Therefore, the presence of depth charges on the cruiser is fully justified, even if there is no noise-finding / hydroacoustic station on it.
But on the other hand, even the inferior submarine detection equipment can tell the cruiser that he is about to attack, and thereby allow him to avoid death. No words, of course, it is better to have a powerful HAS, first-class noise-finders, but all this is an additional weight that a light cruiser has and is (I apologize for the tautology) its weight in gold. But for the Soviet light cruisers, as is known, the task of interacting with submarines was posed, therefore the presence of the Arctur RPT on it was more than justified.
At the same time, the underwater communication is built precisely on sound vibrations, thus, the receiver of the PPS, in any case, must catch some underwater noise. In view of the above, it is difficult to imagine that the ZPS is not able to fulfill the role of a simple noise finder. However, this cannot be ruled out.
The anti-mine armament of the 26 and 26-bis cruisers was represented by the K-1 paravan. Some authors have noted the lack of effectiveness of their actions, but this is not so easy to judge. For example, on November 29, the cruiser Voroshilov exploded two mines, but this happened at a speed of 1942 knots (the first blasting) and lower (the second blasting), while the paravans were calculated to work efficiently at the ship’s speed - 12-14 node. And, despite the “abnormal” working conditions, the paravanes prevented the sides of the cruiser from being hit by mines - both exploded, although not far, but still not at the side, which caused damage, although serious, did not create the threat of the death of the cruiser. Another undermining occurred in the cruiser Maxim Gorky, and its bow was torn off, but not everything is clear here. 22 June 23 G cruiser entered the minefield, accompanied by three destroyers, moving at a speed of 1941 nodes, and soon went to 22 KBT ahead of the cruiser destroyer "Wrathful" exploded a mine, losing the bow. After that, "Maxim Gorky" turned around and lay down on the opposite course, but after a short time an explosion thundered. At what speed the cruiser ran into a mine - not reported.
In addition to para-vans, all cruisers were equipped with degaussing devices installed after the start of the war, and, judging by the available data, their effectiveness is beyond question - the same Kirov repeatedly found itself in areas where other ships that had no demagnetization system were undermined land mines. Kirov, however, was blown up only when its degaussing device was turned off.
Aviation armament on the project was represented by a catapult and two spotting aircraft, which were also supposed to carry out reconnaissance functions. Project 26 ships received two KOR-1 aircraft, despite the fact that these aircraft, in general, failed the test. Despite the more or less decent flight characteristics, the seaplanes showed extremely low seaworthiness, but no other was available, therefore ... But the project 26 bis cruisers received the latest KOR-2, though already during the war. The catapults turned out to be a continuous streak - domestic ZK-1 could not be completed on time, which is why Project 26 cruisers received K-12 catapults purchased in Germany. In terms of their performance characteristics, they fully corresponded to the domestic ones, but had a lower mass (21 tons versus 27). The first pair of Project 26 bis cruisers - Maxim Gorky and Molotov installed domestic ZK-1s, but during the war years they replaced it with Molotov with the more modern ZK-1a, but the Baltic cruisers (Maxim Gorky and "Kirov") catapults were dismantled to strengthen anti-aircraft weapons. The Pacific cruisers “Kaganovich” and “Kalinin” did not receive catapults when putting into operation, after the war ZK-2b were installed on them.
Repeatedly encountered in a number of sources, and in the "Internet" opinion, that the aircraft armament cruisers like "Kirov" and "Maxim Gorky" was not needed, with all the logic, the author still does not consider true. For example, competent aerial reconnaissance and adjustment of the fire of the Kirov cruiser during the shelling of the Finnish battery on the island of Russara, which took place on December 1 1939, could well provide suppression of this battery of 254-mm guns, moreover, from distances inaccessible to its fire. There was no other way for its destruction in the cruiser "Kirov". You can also recall the shooting of the Black Sea cruiser "Voroshilov" 19 September 1941 g on the clusters of German fascist troops in the villages of Alekseyevka, Khorly and Skadovsk, located on the outskirts of Perekop. Then for firing from a distance of 200 KBT (Alekseyevka), 148 KBT (Khorly) and 101 KBT (Skadovsk) an MBR-2 aircraft was used, which served as a spotter.
On the contrary, it can be argued that professional crews of spotters, who perfectly know the peculiarities of naval artillery firing and who are able to correct the fire, could play a huge role in the shelling of enemy troops out of direct line of sight. With regard to purely marine operations, the air correction of fire on a moving target is extremely difficult (although there were such cases during the Second World War), but the usefulness of reconnaissance aircraft is unconditional. The disappearance of ejection aircraft from the post-war cruisers of Western countries is associated with a large number of aircraft carriers that were able to provide aerial reconnaissance better than the seaplane cruisers.
Radar weapons - when designing the first domestic cruisers, its installation was not planned for the reason that in those years, the USSR had not yet engaged in radar. The first ship station "Redut-K" was created only in 1940 year, and was tested on the cruiser "Molotov", which is why the latter became the only Soviet cruiser that received radar before the war. But in the war years, the cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis projects received radars of various purposes.
The armor protection of the Soviet cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis projects was structurally very simple, especially compared to the Italian cruisers. However, in this case “simply” is not at all synonymous with “bad.”
The basis of the armor was an extended citadel, which had a 121 meter in length (64,5% of the hull length) and covered the boiler rooms and machine rooms, as well as the ammunition cellar. Very impressive (for a cruiser) was the height of the armor belt - 3,4 meters. At Kirov and Voroshilov, the citadel was a kind of box in which the walls (armor belts and traverses) were covered with deck armor, and in all places the thickness of the armor plates was the same - 50-mm. And the same, 50-mm, protection received the main caliber towers and their barbety. In addition, the conning tower (150-mm), steering and steering compartment (20 mm), torpedo guide posts (14 mm), KDP (8 mm), stabilized pick-up posts and 100-mm B-34 shield were also booked 7 mm).
The 26-bis cruisers had absolutely the same booking scheme, but in some places the armor became thicker — armor, traverse, front plates, roofs and 180-mm barbets of the towers received not 50-mm, but 70-mm armor, steering and the tiller compartments - 30 mm instead of 20 mm, otherwise the thickness of the armor corresponded to the Kirov-type cruisers.
It is interesting to compare the booking systems of domestic cruisers with their Italian "ancestor"
The first thing that catches your eye - the protection of the "Italian" is much more difficult. But has it made it more efficient? Let's look at possible trajectories of defeat.
The trajectories of 1 and 2 are falling bombs. Here, in the Soviet cruiser, the ammunition will meet 50-mm armored deck, while in Italian cruisers - only 35-m and 30 mm, respectively. At the same time, the Italians have so important compartments as boiler rooms and engine rooms and ammunition cellars, only 35 mm are covered with armor (1 trajectory), and the 26-bis cruiser has 50 mm. Closer to the sides, the situation is slightly better - although the Italians' deck armor is reduced to 30 mm (2 trajectory), but if a bomb breaks through thin armor and explodes in the hull of an Italian ship, there will be an 35 mm armored partition and fragments, going down, will meet horizontally laid 20 mm armor plates. Here, the cruiser project 26-bis and Eugenio di Savoia get an approximate parity — the domestic armored form is harder to penetrate, but if the bomb still breaks it, the consequences of the explosion inside the hull will be more dangerous than the Italian, because "Maxim Gorky" is not. A shell that hit the Italian cruiser along the 3 trajectory will first meet the 20 mm onboard armor and then the 35 mm deck, and here the Eugenio di Savoie again loses to the Soviet cruiser — the Maxim Gorky is protected here by 18 mm board steel (though not armored ) and 50 mm armored. The situation is again leveled out if the projectile enters the Eugenio di Savoia in the 30 mm deck between the main armor belt and the armored partition - in this case, after the 20 mm board and 30 mm breakdown of the deck, the projectile will still have to overcome 35 mm vertical protection, which together equivalent to 18 mm board and 50 mm armored "Maxim Gorky". But below, the Italian is better protected - the projectile caught in his 70 mm armored belt, even if broken through, will have to break the 35 mm armored rearrangement behind him, while the Soviet cruiser has nothing for the same 70 mm armor belt (the 5 trajectory for the Italian and for Soviet cruisers). On the other hand, the Eugenio di Savoie barbets are worse protected - having where 70 is mm of barbett armor (6 trajectory), where 60 is mm (7 trajectory), where is 20 mm onboard + 50 mm barbet (8 trajectory), “Italian” is slightly weaker than Council xNUMX mm barbet (70 trajectory), “Italian” is a bit weaker than Council (6 mm of barbet (7 trajectory), “Italian” is a bit weaker than Council (18 mm) barbet (70 trajectory), “Italian” is a bit weaker than Council (8) mm barbet (XNUMX trajectory), “Italian” is a bit weaker where enemy projectiles encounter XNUMX mm (XNUMX and XNUMX trajectories) and XNUMX mm plating + XNUMX mm barbet (XNUMX trajectory). The towers themselves ... it's hard to say. On the one hand, the Italians had a thicker frontal plate (90 mm versus 70 mm), but the walls and roof had only 30 mm versus Soviet 50 mm. It is equally difficult to say how right the Italians were, "smearing" the armor throughout their tower-like superstructure - yes, they defended it with anti-splinter armor, but the conning tower had only 100 mm against 150 mm of the Soviet cruiser. It is completely unclear why, having spent so much effort on booking the sides, the Italians did not likewise defend the traverse, where they limited themselves to only 50 mm armor (in Soviet cruisers - 70 mm). For a light cruiser to lead a battle on a retreat or catching up with the enemy is as natural as for a battleship to stand in line. Another drawback of the Italian cruiser was the absence of any protection of the steering and tiller compartments, but I must say that with Maxim Gorky, this was not all in order - just 30 mm armor.
In general, it can be stated that in the part of the vertical armor of the corps "Eugenio di Savoia" was somewhat superior to the 26-bis project, but in terms of booking artillery and horizontal defense - it is inferior. In this case, because of the weak traverse, the Italian cruiser is protected worse than the Soviet one for combat on sharp bow and stern corners. The overall level of protection of ships can be considered comparable.
A little remark. Reading domestic sources, you come to the conclusion that the protection of Soviet cruisers was completely inadequate, "cardboard." A classic example is the statement of A.A. Chernyshev, made in the monograph "Cruiser type" Maxim Gorky ":
It would seem that there can be objected? Formula armor penetration known for a long time and everywhere, you can not argue with them. But ... that should be borne in mind.
The fact is that any armor penetration formula, in addition to caliber, also operates with the weight of the projectile and its speed “on the armor”, i.e. at the time of contact of the projectile with armor. And this speed depends on the initial velocity of the projectile. Accordingly, the results of the calculation of "invulnerability zones" or "free maneuvering zones" for any ship will directly depend on what kind of gun they took in the calculation. Because it is quite obvious that the armor penetration capability of the German SK C / 34, firing a 122 kg projectile with an initial speed of 925 m / s, will differ significantly from the American Mark 9, sending a projectile at a speed of 118 m / s.
Of course, it would be most reasonable when focusing on armor penetration to focus on the guns of their likely opponents, but here a number of problems arise. Firstly, there are always several potential enemies, and they have different guns. Secondly, countries usually do not spread about the performance characteristics of their guns. For example, comparing the capabilities of artillery dreadnought type "Empress Maria" and dreadnoughts, which were built for the Turks in England, domestic developers are pretty wrong in the qualities of the British 343-mm guns. They believed that an armor-piercing projectile of such a gun would weigh 567 kg, while in fact the English projectile weighed 635 kg.
Therefore, very often, in calculating the armor penetration of the country, they used either the data of their own guns of the right caliber, or some idea of what guns will be in service with other countries. Therefore, calculations of invulnerability zones without specifying the performance characteristics of the weapon for which they were designed will not help the reader who wants to understand the durability of the protection of a ship.
And here is a simple example. Domestic developers have adopted such a powerful 152-mm gun for their calculations that it could penetrate the 70 mm armor of the Soviet cruiser at all distances, up to 97 kb or almost 18 km (it is not clear why A. Chernyshev writes about 17,7 km. 97 kb * 185,2 m = 17 964,4 m). But the Italians, counting the invulnerability zones for their cruisers, came to the conclusion that the external 70 mm armor belt "Eugenio di Savoia" protects, starting from 75,6 KBT (14 km). Moreover, according to the Italians, at a distance in 14 km 70 mm the armor belt could only be broken if the projectile hit at an angle of 0, i.e. completely perpendicular to the slab, which is almost impossible (at such a distance the projectile falls at a certain angle, so there must be a very strong pitching capable of “unfolding” the armor perpendicular to its trajectory). More or less reliably, the “Eugenio di Savoia” armor belt began to penetrate only (approximately) at 65 kbt (12 km), where an 152-mm projectile could pierce such armor at an angle of 28 hail to normal. But this, again, in a certain dueling situation, when the ships are fighting as battleships, turning them to each other, but if, for example, a fight takes place on the course angle 45 degrees, then to defeat 70 mm armor plate, according to Italian calculations , should have come closer to less than 48 KB (less than 9 km).
Where does this difference in calculations come from? It can be assumed that the Soviet developers, considering heavy duty weapons, believed that guns in the West were just as good, and they calculated armor penetration based on completely monstrous masses of projectiles and their initial speeds for 152-mm guns. At the same time, the Italians, most likely, were guided by the actual data of their own six-inch units.
It is also interesting that, according to Italian calculations, the 203-mm projectile punched 70 mm armor and the 35 mm bulkhead “Eugenio di Savoia” behind it when the projectile deviated from the normal in 26 hail already from a distance of almost 107 kbt (20 000 m). Of course, the Soviet 180-mm gun B-1-P had a slightly lower armor penetration, but it can be argued that during the 14-15 km distance, the vertical protection of the Italian cruiser will be completely permeable to Russian 97,5 kg shells. And here we come to an understanding of the value of 180-mm artillery for a light cruiser - while the “Maxim Gorky” at a distance of 75-80 KB (i.e. the distance of a decisive battle, which should expect a high enough percentage of hits) Feel practically invulnerable, because neither its board, nor deck, nor barbety can be pierced with 152-mm Italian shells, the larger Eugenio di Savoy (standard displacement 8 750 t against 8 177 t “Maxim Gorky”) does not have no protection against Soviet 180-mm projectiles racer.
If we recall that cruisers' speeds are generally comparable, then the Italian cruiser will not be able to impose combat distances advantageous for him, and attempts to escape, or conversely converge with the Soviet cruiser, will only result in the “Italian” setting up Fire their completely "cardboard" for 180-mm traverse guns.
How accurate are Italian calculations of armor penetration? It is rather difficult to say, but indirect confirmation of the fact that it was Italian, rather than Soviet, that were true, was the battle of the German pocket battleship Admiral Count Spee at La Plata. In it, the British six-inch semi-armored SRVS projectiles (Common Pointed, Ballistic Cap - semi-armored with a light tip to improve ballistics) hit the 75-80 mm plates of the German caliber main towers three times (and two hits were achieved from a distance of about the order of 54 kbt of German towers of the main caliber (with two hits achieved from a distance of the order of 203 kbt) of German towers of the main caliber (with two hits reached from a distance of about 100 kbt of the German caliber main turrets (distance from 40 kbt), and the heading of the towers, zoomers of the main caliber towers (distance from Xnumx kBT, hit the target,), the target, the gauge, the target, the target, the main towers of the main caliber (two hits achieved from a distance of about 80 kbt of German caliber towers of the main caliber) was not. But the Exeter XNUMX-mm cannon showed very high armor penetration - a similarly designed semi-armored British shell pierced XNUMX mm German raider armor plate and steel XNUMX mm bulkhead behind it from a distance of about XNUMX kbt. And this speaks of the high quality of British shells and their ability to pierce armor.
As for the reliability of horizontal protection, we can safely say that the 30 mm reservation was not enough. It is known that 250 kg bombs punched 30 mm deck armor of Admiral Hipper-type cruisers with a break under the armor deck, and the fall of such a bomb from a height of 800 m on the 20 mm bevel of the Voroshilov cruiser (and the explosion on the armor) resulted in a hole in armor area 2,5 sq.m. At the same time, 50 mm deck armor of the cruiser "Kirov" defended the ship from direct hit 5 bombs. One of them, landing a forecastle deck, exploded in the cabin of the commanders, the second, also burst into a forecastle, hit the armored deck, but did not explode - this happened during the 23 September 1941 air raid. Three more bombs hit the ship in the 24 April superstructure 1942. r during the operation “Goetz von Berlichingen”, the cruiser was very hard to hurt - the ammunition fed to the guns caught fire, they were thrown overboard, but the 100-mm and 37-mm shells exploded, and sometimes in the hands of sailors. However, the deck was not pierced. Unfortunately, now it is impossible to reliably establish the caliber of aerial bombs caught in a cruiser. About those that got into the forecastle, there is generally no information, but on the fact that caused severe damage in the feed, in various sources indicate the mass and 50 kg, and 100 kg and 250 kg. It is hardly possible to establish the truth here, but it should be remembered that for the Germans, bombs weighing 50 kg and 250 kg were typical. At the same time, the same three hits in the stern of the Kirov cruiser were not achieved as a result of an accidental raid, but during the purposeful operation to destroy large Baltic Fleet ships — it is extremely doubtful that aircraft for attacking such targets were equipped with only 50 kg of ammunition. On the other hand, this cannot be completely ruled out - it is possible that some of the aircraft were equipped with 50 kg bombs to suppress ground-based anti-aircraft artillery positions.
All cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis project had twin-shaft boiler-turbine installations consisting of two main turbo-tooth units (GTZA) and six powerful boilers located in the middle part of the hull according to the same scheme (from bow to stern):
1) Three boiler compartments (one boiler each)
2) Engine room (GTZA on the starboard propeller shaft)
3) Three more boiler compartments
4) Engine room (GTZA on the left side propeller shaft)
An Italian-made power plant was installed on the head cruiser Kirov, and on all subsequent cruisers they were domestic-made under the name TV-7, representing Italian installations with some modernization. The rated power of one GTZA should have been 55 000 HP, at the oversage - 63 250 HP. - i.e. a cruiser with two gtsa had 110 000 hp rated power of machines and 126 500 hp when forcing boilers. Attention is drawn to the fact that the Italian chassis "Kirov" was able to develop only 113 500 hp, while domestic TV-7 showed 126 900 hp ("Kalinin"), and 129 750 HP ("Maxim Gorky") despite the fact that domestic boilers were even more economical than the Italian.
Interestingly, the Italian cruisers, being larger, showed nevertheless greater speed on the acceptance tests than the Soviet ones. But it is rather a reproach to the Italian shipbuilders, rather than their merit. The same cruiser "Kirov", having developed on tests with power in 113 500 hp the speed in the 35,94 node reached the measured line in the “fair” displacement of 8 742 t, while its normal displacement (even taking into account the construction overload) should have been 8590 tons. And the Italians took their ships to the measuring line simply enchantingly over-lightened, not just with almost no fuel, but with many other mechanisms not yet installed. For example, the same “Raimondo Montecuccoli” with a normal displacement of 8 875 tons came to the test, having only 7 020 tons, i.e. on 1855 is easier than it was supposed to be! And, of course, developed 38,72 ties on 126 099 hp, why not develop something here.
I must say that in both Italian and Soviet fleets this power plant has proven itself from the best side. As a rule, and with the rarest exceptions, in day-to-day operation, ships cannot show the speed shown by them on a measured mile, usually it is a knot or two lower. For example, the same American “Iowas”, having 33 knots according to the reference book, usually went no more than 30-31 knots. This is understandable and understandable - the speed of full speed according to the book is usually calculated for the design normal displacement, and they try to carry out the tests by unloading the ships to the design weight. But in everyday life, ships "live" overloaded (here both the construction overload and the weight of the equipment obtained during the modernization), moreover, they try to carry with them not 50% of the maximum fuel (as it should be with a normal displacement), but more ...
Unlike previous "Kondotieri", on tests, which gave 40 and 40 nodes, but in daily operation barely able to develop 30-32 nodes, the ships of the types "Raimondo Montecuccoli" and "Duca d'Aosta" during the war could keep The 33-34 hub, thus becoming one of the fastest Italian light cruisers - not in word, but in deed. And the same can be said about the Soviet cruisers.
Despite the fact that in some sources for some reason it is argued that "Molotov" in a combat situation could not develop over 28 nodes, the same AA. Chernyshev reports that in December 1941 g for the delivery of 386 th rifle division to Sevastopol on a cruiser were loaded 15 ammunition wagons (this is already about 900 t "extra" weight), guns and mortars (in an unspecified number), and also 1200 personal the composition of the division. The cruiser was removed from the anchor and went to Sevastopol, with:
And despite the fact that during this transition the ship obviously did not force the mechanisms - why would he do that? In addition, there are many other cases - for example, after the shelling of the German troops at Perekop in September of the 1941 g, the Voroshilov cruiser returned to the base at a speed in the 32 node. So where did the 28 nodes for Molotov come from? The only thing that comes to mind: on the night of 21 on 22 in January of 1942, the strongest Nord-Ost (the so-called boron) crashed at the Molotov pier, as a result of which the cruiser hit the pier hard, causing significant damage to its hull damage. Almost all of them were corrected by the repair plant in Tuapse, but due to the lack of capacity, the bent stem could not be fixed, which caused a loss of speed on the 2-3 node. True, subsequently the stem was repaired, but for some time the cruiser received speed limits. In addition, another “nuisance” happened to the “Molotov” - its stern was torn off by a torpedo, there was no time to build, therefore the ship was “assigned” to the stern from the unfinished cruiser “Frunze”. But, of course, the contours of the new stern differed from the theoretical drawing of the cruisers of the 26-bis project, which could affect the full speed of the Molotov. Again, A.A. Chernyshev points out that, according to the test results, the “newly fed” cruiser did not have a loss of travel speed (but, alas, does not indicate what kind of speed the ship demonstrated during the tests).
Subsequently, the GTZ TV-7 (at least with some modifications and upgrades) were installed on the 68 “Chapaev” cruiser and 68-bis “Sverdlov”, where they also demonstrated outstanding power and reliability in operation.
But it was at the Italian-Soviet power plants and another extremely important advantage ...
To be continued..
- Andrei from Chelyabinsk
- Project 26 and 26 bis cruisers. Part of 4. And a little more about artillery
Project 26 and 26 bis cruisers. Part of 3. Main caliber
Project 26 and 26 bis cruisers. Part of 2. “Italian footprint” and classification features
The cruisers of the project 26 and 26-bis. Part of 1. Genesis
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