White spots of the battle at Prokhorovka station
In the Soviet official historiography of this battle, not only is the loud title of the greatest tank battle that took place during World War II, it is also called one of the largest in the entire military stories battles using tank troops. However, the history of this battle is still full of "blank spots". There is still no exact data on the chronological framework, the number of armored vehicles that took part in it. And how the battle itself took place is described by different researchers in very contradictory terms, no one can objectively assess the losses.
For the general reader, information about the “tank duel” appeared only ten years after the battle, in 1953, when the Battle of Kursk became available, a book written by I. Markin. It was the Prokhorov battle that was called one of the most important components of this battle, since after Prokhorovka the Germans were forced to retreat to their original positions. There is a question about why the Soviet command was hiding information about the battle near Prokhorovka? The answer, most likely, lies in the desire to keep secret the huge losses, both human and in armored vehicles, especially since the fatal mistakes of military leadership led to their occurrence.
Until 1943, the German forces were confidently moving forward in almost all directions. The decision to conduct a major strategic operation in the Kursk salient was made by the German command in the summer of 1943. The plans were strikes from Belgorod and Orel, after which the strike groups were to merge near Kursk in order to completely surround the troops that make up the Voronezh and Central Fronts. This military operation was called the "Citadel". Later, an adjustment was made to the plans, which suggested that the SS 2 tank corps would advance in the direction of Prokhorovka, in an area with terrain conditions that were ideal for a global battle with the armored reserve of the Soviet troops.
In the military command of the USSR there was information about the plan "Citadel". To counter the German offensive, a system of deeply echeloned defense was created, the purpose of which was to wear down the Germans and then defeat them with attacking counterattacks.
The official historiography has a clear date for the start of the Battle of Prokhorovka - 12 July 1943 of the year, the day when the Soviet army launched a counter-offensive. However, there are sources that indicate that the battles on the Prokhorovsky direction were fought on the third day after the start of the German advance on the Kursk Bulge, so it would be more correct to consider the date of the start of the battle near Prokhorovka station 10 July, the day when German troops began to break through the rear of the army’s defense line aim to take Prokhorovka.
July 12 can be considered the culmination of a “tank duel,” however, ending with unclear results, it lasted until July July 14. The end of the battle of Prokhorovka is 16 July 1943, even the night 17 July, when the Germans began to retreat.
The beginning of the battle near Prokhorovka was unexpected for our troops. Further developments have several versions. According to one of which it turns out that for the Germans it was an unexpected battle. Two tank armies performed their tasks on the offensive and did not expect to meet serious resistance. The movement of tank groups took place under the "angle", but the Germans were the first to discover Soviet tanks, and because of this they managed to carry out a rebuilding and preparation for battle. They carried out a rapid attack, which violated coordination among the Soviet tank crews.
Other historians put forward the version that the counter attack by Prokhorovka by the Red Army was worked out by the German command. SS divisions specially "set up" under the blow of the Soviet tank army. The result was a head-on collision of Soviet armored vehicles with large German tank formations, which put Soviet soldiers in extremely unfavorable strategic conditions.
The second version seems to be more likely, since after the Soviet armored vehicles entered the direct defeat of their guns, she was met by a dense enemy fire, which was so powerful that it literally stunned the Soviet tank crews. Under this hurricane fire, not only did you have to fight, but psychologically moved from maneuver into the depth of defense in a positional war. Only the high density of the battle further deprived the Germans of this advantage.
The main participants of the “tank duel” that took place on Prokhorovka’s July 12 on July 1943 are called the 5 Panzer Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov, and the SS 2 Panzer Corps commanded by SS Paul Hausser. According to data provided by the German generals, about 700 Soviet vehicles took part in the battle. Other data called the number in Soviet tanks 850. On the German side, historians refer to a figure in 311 tanks, although in official Soviet historiography there is a figure in 350 of only destroyed German armored vehicles. However, now historians provide information about the apparent overestimation of this figure, they believe that only about 300 tanks could participate from the German side. In any case, about a thousand tanks came together in the battle of Prokhorovka. It was here that the Germans first used teletnets.
In Soviet times, the version that our tanks were attacked by the German Panthers was spread. But now it turned out that the “Panther” was not at all in the Prokhorovka battle. Instead, the Germans "incited" on the Soviet soldiers "Tigers" and .... "T-34", captured cars, which in battle was 8 from the German side.
However, the worst was that one third of the Soviet tank army consisted of T-70 tanks, which were intended for reconnaissance and communications. They were much less protected than the T-34, which were clearly inferior in the battles in open areas to German medium tanks, which were equipped with a new long-barreled gun, and there were also more powerful Tigers. In open battle, any projectile of heavy and medium German tanks easily destroyed the Soviet "seventies". This fact our historians preferred not to mention.
Our troops under Prokhorovka suffered awfully huge losses. Now historians sounded the ratio of 5: 1, even 6: 1 in favor of the Germans. For each German soldier killed, there were six killed on the Soviet side. The following figures have been made public by modern historians: from 10 to 16 in July, about 36 thousand people were lost from the Soviet side, 6.5 thousand of whom were killed, 13.5 thousand were on the list of the missing. This figure is 24% of all losses of the Voronezh Front during the Battle of Kursk. The Germans lost about 7 thousands of soldiers during the same period, of whom 2795 was killed, and 2046 - missing. However, it is not yet possible to establish the exact number of casualties among the soldiers. Search groups still find dozens of nameless warriors who fell under Prokhorovka.
Two Soviet fronts lost 143 950 people on the south face of the Kursk bulge. The largest number was missing - about 35 thousand people. Most of them were captured. According to the German side, 13 July captured about 24 thousands of Soviet soldiers and officers.
Large losses were in armored vehicles, 70% of the tanks that were in service with the army of Rotmistrov were destroyed. And that was 53% of all the equipment of the army that participated in the counterstroke. The Germans didn’t count up all 80 machines ... And the German data about the "duel" generally contain data only about 59 lost tanks, 54 of which were evacuated, and they were able to take out a few Soviet machines. After the battle of Prokhorovka in the corps was already 11 "thirty-three".
Such enormous sacrifices were the result of numerous mistakes and miscalculations by the command of the Voronezh Front, which was headed by N. F. Vatutin. The counter-strike planned for July 12, to put it mildly, was unsuccessful. Later, after analyzing all the events, he will be called the “pattern of an unsuccessful operation”: incorrectly chosen time, lack of real data about the enemy, poor knowledge of the situation.
There was also an incorrect assessment of the development of the situation over the next few days. There was such a bad interaction between our units leading the offensive that sometimes there were battles between the Soviet units, even bombing of our positions took place. aviation.
Already after the Battle of Kursk ended Deputy High Commander Georgy Zhukov, attempts were made to initiate the process of analyzing the events of 12 on July 1943 of the year near Prokhorovka, the main purpose of which were the main culprits of huge losses - Vatutin and Rotmistrov. Last was going to give later under the tribunal. They were saved only by the successful completion of battles on this sector of the front, and later they were even awarded orders for the Battle of Kursk. Captain after the war he received the title of Chief Marshal of Armored Forces.
Who won the battle near the station Prokhorovka and the Battle of Kursk in general? For a long time, Soviet historians have put forward an undoubted assertion that, of course, the Red Army won. The German strike group failed to break through the defense and our troops managed to defeat it, the enemy retreated.
However, in our time there are claims that this "victorious" view is nothing more than a myth. The departure of the Germans did not cause the defeat of their strike force, but the inability to hold the area into which their troops had penetrated, with a total length of up to 160 km. Due to the huge losses, our troops could not immediately push through enemy units and launch an offensive in order to complete the defeat of the retreating German units.
Yet the feat accomplished by Soviet soldiers in the most difficult conditions is immense. Ordinary soldiers with their lives paid all the miscalculations of their commanders.
Here is what Gregory Penezhko, Hero of the Soviet Union, who survived in that hellish cauldron recalled:
“... It was such a roar that the membrane pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The solid roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild gnash of ruptured iron ... The turrets collapsed from point-blank fires, armor burst, tanks exploded ... Hatches opened and tank crews tried to get out ... we lost the sense of time They did not feel thirst, or heat, or even strikes in the cramped cabin of the tank. One thought, one striving - while alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, having got out of their wrecked cars, searched for enemy crews on the field, who were also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols, grabbed hand to hand ... "
In the documents there are memories of German soldiers about that “duel”. According to Untershturmführer Gürs, commander of the grenadier motorized rifle regiment, the attack was launched by the Russians in the morning, they were everywhere, and the hand-to-hand combat began. "It was hell."
Only in the 1995 year, during the celebration of the 50 anniversary of the victory, the Church of the Holy Apostles Paul and Peter was opened in Prokhorovka - it is on 12 July that these saints are celebrated - the day of the terrible battle at Prokhorovka station. Thanks to the descendants of the earth waited, stained with blood.
For the general reader, information about the “tank duel” appeared only ten years after the battle, in 1953, when the Battle of Kursk became available, a book written by I. Markin. It was the Prokhorov battle that was called one of the most important components of this battle, since after Prokhorovka the Germans were forced to retreat to their original positions. There is a question about why the Soviet command was hiding information about the battle near Prokhorovka? The answer, most likely, lies in the desire to keep secret the huge losses, both human and in armored vehicles, especially since the fatal mistakes of military leadership led to their occurrence.
Until 1943, the German forces were confidently moving forward in almost all directions. The decision to conduct a major strategic operation in the Kursk salient was made by the German command in the summer of 1943. The plans were strikes from Belgorod and Orel, after which the strike groups were to merge near Kursk in order to completely surround the troops that make up the Voronezh and Central Fronts. This military operation was called the "Citadel". Later, an adjustment was made to the plans, which suggested that the SS 2 tank corps would advance in the direction of Prokhorovka, in an area with terrain conditions that were ideal for a global battle with the armored reserve of the Soviet troops.
In the military command of the USSR there was information about the plan "Citadel". To counter the German offensive, a system of deeply echeloned defense was created, the purpose of which was to wear down the Germans and then defeat them with attacking counterattacks.
The official historiography has a clear date for the start of the Battle of Prokhorovka - 12 July 1943 of the year, the day when the Soviet army launched a counter-offensive. However, there are sources that indicate that the battles on the Prokhorovsky direction were fought on the third day after the start of the German advance on the Kursk Bulge, so it would be more correct to consider the date of the start of the battle near Prokhorovka station 10 July, the day when German troops began to break through the rear of the army’s defense line aim to take Prokhorovka.
July 12 can be considered the culmination of a “tank duel,” however, ending with unclear results, it lasted until July July 14. The end of the battle of Prokhorovka is 16 July 1943, even the night 17 July, when the Germans began to retreat.
The beginning of the battle near Prokhorovka was unexpected for our troops. Further developments have several versions. According to one of which it turns out that for the Germans it was an unexpected battle. Two tank armies performed their tasks on the offensive and did not expect to meet serious resistance. The movement of tank groups took place under the "angle", but the Germans were the first to discover Soviet tanks, and because of this they managed to carry out a rebuilding and preparation for battle. They carried out a rapid attack, which violated coordination among the Soviet tank crews.
Other historians put forward the version that the counter attack by Prokhorovka by the Red Army was worked out by the German command. SS divisions specially "set up" under the blow of the Soviet tank army. The result was a head-on collision of Soviet armored vehicles with large German tank formations, which put Soviet soldiers in extremely unfavorable strategic conditions.
The second version seems to be more likely, since after the Soviet armored vehicles entered the direct defeat of their guns, she was met by a dense enemy fire, which was so powerful that it literally stunned the Soviet tank crews. Under this hurricane fire, not only did you have to fight, but psychologically moved from maneuver into the depth of defense in a positional war. Only the high density of the battle further deprived the Germans of this advantage.
The main participants of the “tank duel” that took place on Prokhorovka’s July 12 on July 1943 are called the 5 Panzer Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov, and the SS 2 Panzer Corps commanded by SS Paul Hausser. According to data provided by the German generals, about 700 Soviet vehicles took part in the battle. Other data called the number in Soviet tanks 850. On the German side, historians refer to a figure in 311 tanks, although in official Soviet historiography there is a figure in 350 of only destroyed German armored vehicles. However, now historians provide information about the apparent overestimation of this figure, they believe that only about 300 tanks could participate from the German side. In any case, about a thousand tanks came together in the battle of Prokhorovka. It was here that the Germans first used teletnets.
In Soviet times, the version that our tanks were attacked by the German Panthers was spread. But now it turned out that the “Panther” was not at all in the Prokhorovka battle. Instead, the Germans "incited" on the Soviet soldiers "Tigers" and .... "T-34", captured cars, which in battle was 8 from the German side.
However, the worst was that one third of the Soviet tank army consisted of T-70 tanks, which were intended for reconnaissance and communications. They were much less protected than the T-34, which were clearly inferior in the battles in open areas to German medium tanks, which were equipped with a new long-barreled gun, and there were also more powerful Tigers. In open battle, any projectile of heavy and medium German tanks easily destroyed the Soviet "seventies". This fact our historians preferred not to mention.
Our troops under Prokhorovka suffered awfully huge losses. Now historians sounded the ratio of 5: 1, even 6: 1 in favor of the Germans. For each German soldier killed, there were six killed on the Soviet side. The following figures have been made public by modern historians: from 10 to 16 in July, about 36 thousand people were lost from the Soviet side, 6.5 thousand of whom were killed, 13.5 thousand were on the list of the missing. This figure is 24% of all losses of the Voronezh Front during the Battle of Kursk. The Germans lost about 7 thousands of soldiers during the same period, of whom 2795 was killed, and 2046 - missing. However, it is not yet possible to establish the exact number of casualties among the soldiers. Search groups still find dozens of nameless warriors who fell under Prokhorovka.
Two Soviet fronts lost 143 950 people on the south face of the Kursk bulge. The largest number was missing - about 35 thousand people. Most of them were captured. According to the German side, 13 July captured about 24 thousands of Soviet soldiers and officers.
Large losses were in armored vehicles, 70% of the tanks that were in service with the army of Rotmistrov were destroyed. And that was 53% of all the equipment of the army that participated in the counterstroke. The Germans didn’t count up all 80 machines ... And the German data about the "duel" generally contain data only about 59 lost tanks, 54 of which were evacuated, and they were able to take out a few Soviet machines. After the battle of Prokhorovka in the corps was already 11 "thirty-three".
Such enormous sacrifices were the result of numerous mistakes and miscalculations by the command of the Voronezh Front, which was headed by N. F. Vatutin. The counter-strike planned for July 12, to put it mildly, was unsuccessful. Later, after analyzing all the events, he will be called the “pattern of an unsuccessful operation”: incorrectly chosen time, lack of real data about the enemy, poor knowledge of the situation.
There was also an incorrect assessment of the development of the situation over the next few days. There was such a bad interaction between our units leading the offensive that sometimes there were battles between the Soviet units, even bombing of our positions took place. aviation.
Already after the Battle of Kursk ended Deputy High Commander Georgy Zhukov, attempts were made to initiate the process of analyzing the events of 12 on July 1943 of the year near Prokhorovka, the main purpose of which were the main culprits of huge losses - Vatutin and Rotmistrov. Last was going to give later under the tribunal. They were saved only by the successful completion of battles on this sector of the front, and later they were even awarded orders for the Battle of Kursk. Captain after the war he received the title of Chief Marshal of Armored Forces.
Who won the battle near the station Prokhorovka and the Battle of Kursk in general? For a long time, Soviet historians have put forward an undoubted assertion that, of course, the Red Army won. The German strike group failed to break through the defense and our troops managed to defeat it, the enemy retreated.
However, in our time there are claims that this "victorious" view is nothing more than a myth. The departure of the Germans did not cause the defeat of their strike force, but the inability to hold the area into which their troops had penetrated, with a total length of up to 160 km. Due to the huge losses, our troops could not immediately push through enemy units and launch an offensive in order to complete the defeat of the retreating German units.
Yet the feat accomplished by Soviet soldiers in the most difficult conditions is immense. Ordinary soldiers with their lives paid all the miscalculations of their commanders.
Here is what Gregory Penezhko, Hero of the Soviet Union, who survived in that hellish cauldron recalled:
“... It was such a roar that the membrane pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The solid roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild gnash of ruptured iron ... The turrets collapsed from point-blank fires, armor burst, tanks exploded ... Hatches opened and tank crews tried to get out ... we lost the sense of time They did not feel thirst, or heat, or even strikes in the cramped cabin of the tank. One thought, one striving - while alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, having got out of their wrecked cars, searched for enemy crews on the field, who were also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols, grabbed hand to hand ... "
In the documents there are memories of German soldiers about that “duel”. According to Untershturmführer Gürs, commander of the grenadier motorized rifle regiment, the attack was launched by the Russians in the morning, they were everywhere, and the hand-to-hand combat began. "It was hell."
Only in the 1995 year, during the celebration of the 50 anniversary of the victory, the Church of the Holy Apostles Paul and Peter was opened in Prokhorovka - it is on 12 July that these saints are celebrated - the day of the terrible battle at Prokhorovka station. Thanks to the descendants of the earth waited, stained with blood.
Information