A couple of words in defense of the first "Minsk"
“In the XXI century there is a tendency to erase the differences between the state of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared, but when they begin, they do not follow our usual pattern. ”
Valery Gerasimov ("Military Industrial Courier")
Valery Gerasimov ("Military Industrial Courier")
Tank 17th tank brigades in Mariupol. August 2014
The military campaign of 2014 in the Donbas has become one of the bloodiest conflicts in the CIS 21st century. It also served as the greatest informational cause for all sorts of contradictions and disputes, which have not subsided to this day.
The main question remains: was it worth signing the Minsk Protocol of 5 of September (the so-called “Minsk Truce”, or “first Minsk”), supplemented by a memorandum of September of 19? Perhaps it was a mistake, and the militia, irregular formations of Donbass could inflict a greater defeat on the armed forces of Ukraine (APU)? And was it worth stopping there?
A euphoria arose in society, similar to the one that appeared in the Supreme Command Headquarters after a difficult victory near Moscow in the battle of 1941-1942. The consequences of this euphoria were widely known.
The main claim to the "founding fathers" of the "first Minsk" was that Mariupol was not taken by assault. A city with almost half a million people (including the agglomeration), a large industrial center and a port on the Sea of Azov, could become a pearl in the crown of two young Donbas republics. Residents, among whom were many descendants of the Black Sea Greeks, were secretly waiting for their liberators.
However, whether the militia (then just began to appear the term "VSN" - the armed forces of New Russia) could free Mariupol? And could not the further continuation of the campaign have consequences that were somewhat opposite to those expected?
The degradation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine began long before the Donbass conflict. With the official number of thousands of military personnel in 184, in December, 2013 actually turned out to be in combat readiness of the order of 49 thousand people. By April 2014, this number was reduced to 17 thousands of bayonets.
The reasons for this are different. Like the Maidan or the “revolution of dignity” of 2013 of the year (which led to the collapse of the governing structures), so does the sluggish disintegration of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which has continued since the independence of the state was declared in 1991 (quite typical for most post-Soviet countries) and supplemented by the reorganization of the army started in 2013 ( for example, the adoption of new staffing tables, and not received, or received only partially in the troops).
As a result, to the march on the Crimea (which failed) to 12-13 in March 2014, an "army" was assembled, numbering, according to various sources, from 5 to 6 thousands of fighters (including rear units). At the end of April, 2014 of the whole 7 thousand people were ready to launch an operation in the “ATO zone” - an anti-terrorist operation (the territory of Lugansk and Donetsk regions). Of these, only half (about 3500 soldiers and officers) were in combat units (despite the fact that in Kiev they feared only the 10-thousandth group of Russian troops stationed along the border).
All this, together with the complicated political situation, created the basis for the success of performances in the east of Ukraine. The repressive apparatus of the state was damaged (traditionally for a state experiencing decay, as in Russia 1917 of the year), at the initial stage it lacked adequate resources to suppress such uprisings, new power mechanisms were only being formed.
(Armed seizures of power in April 2014 of the year in Donetsk and Lugansk, the seizure of Slavyansk on April 12 was made by small forces with weak opposition. Protests took place in Odessa and Mariupol, earlier (in March) in Kharkov. Many servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine deserted or switched sides insurgents, volunteers from Russia stretched to Donbass.)
Armament, equipment stored in warehouses, was in a state of non-finished. So, from 189 tanks captured in the Crimea, only 15 units were more or less intact. The motivation of the personnel was absent, desertion exceeded all permissible limits.
In such circumstances, Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov announced the creation of an anti-crisis headquarters and the beginning of anti-terrorism measures in the east of Ukraine.
The consequence was the need to create a new army. As in any revolution, it included the restoration of old structures and the formation of a new one - on the basis of a loyal new power element.
First of all, the territorial units of the National Guard of Ukraine (NSU) were created, which received as a result a magnificent name - the territorial defense battalions. Their number at the initial stage was 30 units, 100 bayonets in each (total about 3000 soldiers, in fact there was a shortage and even fewer). By the end of August, 2014 of the year, these were already three, four-rooted monsters, 340-550 fighters in each, with a total number of battalions in 54-60 (according to different sources).
Gaps in military construction were also filled with various nationalistic and departmental formations (the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, Ministry of Internal Affairs). Their personnel, as a rule, did not exceed 90-250 people, although the same “Azov”, declared as a “special unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs”, had at least 2014-600 fighters by the end of August - beginning of September, and soon after the first Minsk "was deployed to the regiment with 700 bayonets in their ranks.
The key issues were the reorganization of the army. And here, at the very beginning, the disease that was struck by the Ukrainian command and organizational structures turned out to be in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and that continued to influence the entire course of military operations up to the armistice and beyond. This is the creation of a certain placer of divisions and consolidated groups, both raid and "heavy".
The early stage of actions in the east of Ukraine showed that, due to the collapse of the armed forces and the disintegration of supplies, the limit of the shock capabilities of troops is the formation of tactical "kulaks" from consolidated groups. The number of such groups, as a rule, did not exceed 500 people from the brigade (in the March “march” to the Crimea), although in the Donbas these figures from the APU were not reached before the summer.
This forced hastily to collect battalion groups, like real small armies - having in their ranks their own rather powerful artillery, and even tank units. In July-August, these formations were both “light” (250-350 soldiers and officers, created on the basis of airborne amphibious, special and other units with light weapons) and “heavy” (from tank and mechanized brigades, with divisions of artillery as a means of strengthening - for 600-700 fighters in their ranks, although in reality there were no more than 500-600 people). There was also the creation of company tactical groups from units of various units.
Other authors in these transformations saw the so-called “modular scheme” used in the US military, but this was not entirely true. Rather, there was the creation of "battalions with reinforcement units" according to Soviet regulations: the incomplete combat "core" of a battalion of a brigade was replenished with parts from other brigades to make it look efficient.
In fact, this emergency measure, caused by the impossibility due to weak logistics and low combat capability to operate immediately with brigades, simply led to disastrous consequences. Lacking proper ACCS (army command and control systems), communication devices, even remotely comparable to American ones, the architects of the new army device in the “ATO zone” provided a situation in which the Ukrainian commanders themselves did not know who they were subordinate to and often had a bad idea of who is their "neighbor". Moreover, the army units had their own leadership, the other formations had their own, which made the subordination in the “ATO zone” reminded of chaos.
The supply turned out to be decentralized to a considerable degree (including entrusted to various volunteer organizations). The consequence was the inability of the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to conduct large-scale offensive operations by large forces (for example, under Ilovaisk from the entire Volnovakha-Amvrosievsky grouping, a scattered set of separate companies and stopped terbats were thrown, the 15-thousandth group of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Debaltsevo by September 2014 did not make a decisive offensive, carrying out only one-time raids by separate parts).
The situation was aggravated by the pre-war desire to focus on Europe and abandon the "obsolete" call. However, the influx of volunteers to the unpopular war (legally, besides, the war was not) was limited, and low funding did not allow to fill the gap at the expense of hired soldiers (contract soldiers). Three waves of mobilization (March-September 2014 of the year) - a necessary measure! - due to high desertion, incomplete, short duration (45-90 days), out of the 105, thousands of guns put under the gun did not produce sufficient draft material.
Similarly with military equipment. The serial production of new weapons was never adjusted, most of the weapons were removed from conservation (and in fact not finished) and, accordingly, the work of the defense industry was primarily assembly (out of two or three samples was made one "on the move"), recovery, and local handicraft industry was reminiscent of “creativity” in various Arab countries, engulfed in interventions and civil wars.
In general, military construction in Ukraine was similar to countries that had survived revolutionary (or counter-revolutionary) upheavals — France at the turn of the 18-19 centuries, Iran during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980-1988 years. Nevertheless, a certain military mechanism - cumbersome, difficult to control, amorphous - was created by July 2014.
2 May occurred notorious events in Odessa. On the same day, about 2, a thousand-strong grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, almost half of which consisted of various nationalist groups, launched an offensive against Slavyansk. The military campaign has begun.
The fighting in May was sluggish in nature. During this period, they concentrated around the Slavic-Kramatorsk agglomeration, the situation with the battle at Donetsk airport, the Bezler raid on the Volovakha 18 number, as well as Lysychansk and Severodonetsk.
Mariupol stood open. With the raids of a group of nationalist groups, the local militia was never formed (a squad of several dozen people with hunting rifles could hardly have been considered as such). Khodakovsky’s “Vostok” campaign to occupy the city launched by 9 in May did not take place for some reason, the Iskra brigade (120 man) also went under Donetsk, where it was defeated in the infamous 26 battle in May at Donetsk airport.
Ukrainian troops "in the ATO zone" in May 2014, there were about 11 thousands of people. To a large extent, these forces constituted various rear and security structures, the number of really combat-ready active bayonets remained small.
In June 2014, the situation worsened even more for the self-proclaimed republics (as they were then called in the media) of the DPR and the LPR. 5 June in an attempt to break through the "corridor" across the border at the checkpoint in Marinovka, a Khodakovsky detachment was defeated. June 13 after the operation, Mariupol fell, June 14 mechanized group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (mainly from the “Aydar” battalion), passing along the highway to Lugansk, after a short battle occupied the city of Happiness and a strategically important bridge across the Seversky Donets.
18 June in the battle of Yampol suffered defeat detachment of the forces that defended Slavyansk (whose environment, after which, according to the head of defense, the well-known I. Strelkov, "became only a matter of time"). True, 14 June was shot down by one of the three IL-76 military transport planes, replacing the paratroopers of the 25 airborne brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which was guarding the Lugansk airport (49 dead), but this did not affect the change in the strategic situation.
But the main (and in many respects determined the course of further campaign) was the famous “throw along the border”. At the beginning of June, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, acting along the Volnovakha-Amvrosiyivka axis, frontier, with a bend along the border to the north, on Izvarino, from the line of the Kalmius river, began a campaign to cut off the DPR and the LPR from communications with Russia, hoping to interrupt the flow of volunteers and various other assistance. The total number of units involved increased from 4-5 thousands of people in early June to 9-10 thousands of fighters in mid-July, of which about half remained in the Amvrosiyivka area (where the D-group headquarters also moved) to the East.
Thus, an “intestine” extended to the east, about 8-10 kilometers wide, stretching along the border, was formed. It is worth noting, however, that the unwinding ram of the invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine here was stopped only at Izvarino, the backbone of whose defenders were fugitives from the left Slavyansk.
Regarding the Border Campaign of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other authors found some similarities with the Western military model. The correspondences, however, are very doubtful, on the basis of a comparative analysis with the actions of the American military machine in Iraq in 2003 on the right bank of the Euphrates:
1. Depth of operation. It reached almost 200 kilometers from the Armed Forces of Ukraine, yielding to similar indicators from the American troops in the first days of the war (up to 350 kilometers). At the same time, the difference in the state of logistics made the offensive by the US troops a one-step process - and was broken into stages by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which literally rolled over “from point to point”.
2. The pace of progress. The average speed of movement of Ukrainian troops averaged 4-5 kilometers per day (which was determined by the terrain, poor logistics, low road network development - the main roads went across, not along, - and the degree of mechanization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine). On average, American troops marched in the first 4 days of the Second Gulf War along 90 kilometers of beautiful Iraqi roads.
3. Relief (terrain specificity). American troops were moving, trying to attach themselves to the excellent Iraqi roads, providing flanks on the right - the water barrier of the Euphrates, on the left - the desert (which ensured the speed and relative safety of the march). Ukrainian troops followed, on the one hand having an open area, on the other hand - the Russian border. Their route was crossed by deep beams, running down from the north to the south from the Donetsk ridge along the steppe, as well as the water barrier of Mius. All these factors ensured the cutting of the “corridor along the border” by strikes and raids from the flanks and hampered communications between the individual elements of the APU border group.
4. The organization of supply. American tactical calculations were based on the creation every 100 kilometers of huge warehouses - supply bases - along the communication line along which the troops were fed. Loads between these points, links in a huge chain, were driven by huge mechanized convoys, without crushing into small groups, with a solid ground and air cover. In the “Sector D” command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, an attempt was made to create something like this, but because of shortcomings in the organization, everything failed (equipment and supplies often fell out with minimal cover and were captured or destroyed by Donbas militiamen, in Zelenopole a similar warehouse of armored vehicles was destroyed by shelling , convoys were carried out by “supply companies” by 45-48 people, accompanied by one or two mechanized infantry platoons — that is, in small groups without air support, vulnerable to shelling and attack ).
During July, the number of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the conflict zone increased steadily and on the last day of the month amounted to 31 a thousand people. However, apparently, it was incomplete data: on the 32 thousands of Ukrainian military, declared by the General Staff of the Supreme Court of Ukraine on the next day of August 1, there were “7-8 thousand” people from various departmental (primarily MIA) units. The total number of persons involved in the battles on 1 of August 2014 of the year was determined in 40 thousands of bayonets (another 10 of thousands of soldiers stood against the Crimea, as part of the Perekop group).
In July, the situation for the militia of New Russia has deteriorated further. The ring of forces abandoned by the new government of Ukraine continued to shrink: in some places the mechanized columns of the Armed Forces of Ukraine moved without meeting the slightest resistance.
The most significant event was the abandonment of the Slavic-Kramatorsk agglomeration. After a series of battles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (up to 10 of thousands of fighters), this urban area was compressed, from which the militia forced 5 on July to break through a narrow sweep corridor (for example, from 1200 people leaving directly from Slavyansk, the casualties of the breakthrough could be up to 10%, According to the head of defense I. Strelkov). In total, around 2000 fighters came out of all the cities and towns of the agglomeration: when they came to Donetsk, along the way they also successfully passed the entourage near Artyomovsk.
The wedges of the Ukrainian troops literally cut the young republic. About a thousand people of the Ukrainian mechanized infantry occupied Artyomovsk without a fight, from where they could go further and capture Debaltseve, a strategically important intersection, threatening the routes that provided Donetsk with Lugansk and Russia (in fact, going to the very heart of Donbass).
In the south, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continued to roll, cutting off the LC and the DPR from the border with Russia. 11 July in Zelenopole on the most important highway from Rostov-on-Don to Kharkov, they tried to make a strong point and a warehouse for storing equipment and fuel, but this attempt was stopped by shelling. Officially killed from 19 to 35 military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the author of this article on various materials at one time counted 41 killed.
On July 13, having made a daring tank breakthrough to the besieged Lugansk airport, the Ukrainian armed forces swept Lugansk from the west and south. Now the capital of the LC was completely surrounded and blockaded, many rebel formations escaped from it.
The broken Slavic-Kramatorsk group cemented resistance in the DPR. In mid-July, part of the forces of this compound (about 680 people) attempted to cut off the southern (border) group of Ukrainian troops at the very base of the “gut”, but achieved only partial success (the villages of Stepanovka and Marinovka were occupied, and the distracting attack on Kozhevnya failed, and the throughput the point on the border with Russia “Marinovka” was never occupied). In the future, these forces were pushed back to Snow (losses since the beginning of the operation amounted to 250 killed and wounded, half - in the first two days of fighting).
On July 17, there was an incident with the shooting down of a Boeing (while the 3-th special-purpose regiment of the APU, which was heading for the crash site, suffered simply catastrophic losses - up to 40% of its combat strength), on July 22 left Lysychansk and Severodonetsk north ledge). Now, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were able to penetrate the newly-minted state entities of Donbass to the full depth (greatly reduced).
The effect of the “Southern boiler” was greatly exaggerated in the Russian media. In fact, the group of Slavs and strongholds was pushed aside from the “marinov's neck”. And although before the 500 Ukrainian troops entered the territory of Russia, before 120 soldiers and officers were killed, 150 people switched to the militia and at least 300 fighters were captured, from 1500 to 2000 bayonets (from the 4-thousandth group) could turn around and hit the front to the north (on communications of the LC and the DPR), and the 200 fighters went out to their troops in the Amvrosiyivka area or were taken out as wounded, plus some of the forces remained in their positions along the border.
From 25 to 31 July, the famous battle for Shakhtersk happened. The Ukrainian troops, occupying the forces of the thousandth group of Debaltseve, threw two battalion groups (near 600 bayonets) into the raid to the south, trying to ride one of the vital roads for Donetsk.
On the part of the militia of Novorossia, at the initial stage, according to various sources, from the 150 to the 180 fighters, who subsequently (due to units from the west) increased to 600-700 people, the Ukrainian forces decreased (without entering the settlement in full including) from 600 to 240-350 bayonets (due to the separation of the raid group) and were defeated due to the correlation of forces thus changed. The raid group, separated from the main forces and departed to the south, on Saur-Grave, was also hit by artillery and was defeated.
The fighting continued. In fact, in the second decade of August, the NPT and the LC were in the full operational environment.
All roads were busy, for the only bare-handed APU route from Donetsk to Torez there were battles, maps of the operational situation of that time from the Russian side, unfortunately, did not really correspond to reality. The number of the Armed Forces of Ukraine steadily grew and by 24 of August it reached 50 thousand people “in the ATO zone” (including 10 thousand in various departmental subdivisions). Quantitatively, the Donbass militia was inferior to them and by mid-August it was (estimated) 10 thousand only Donetsk rebels (half from the overgrown “Slavic brigade”), not counting a certain number of “wild” (unrecorded and unclear to whom they obeyed) and 5-6 thousand Lugansk .
The disadvantage in planning and carrying out operations on the part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was that of the growing fists in the area of Amvrosievka, Volnovakhi and Debaltsevo, only separate units were brought into battle, striking their splayed fingers towards each other. In fact, instead of “near” coverage with massing troops, a concentrated blow to the compression and the environment of Donetsk on the outskirts, by analogy with Lugansk, there was an indistinct dispersion of forces (possibly associated with the mentioned problems in logistics).
Nevertheless, at this moment (the time of the protracted battles for Ilovaysk, Krasny Luch and other points that allowed to control transport routes), quite interesting events began to occur. The events that actually registered a coup in the Donbass war and led to the current state (many disputed). The crown of these events was the question of the identity of Mariupol.
On August 12, 21 General Petrovsky (pseudonyms "Gloomy" and "Bad Soldier") announced the start of a large-scale offensive militia operation in Donbass (already called in other sources "the army of Novorossia", 3 the day before the action itself). A little earlier, the 13 numbers (there is a video with Pavel Gubarev for that day) was busy at the Marinovka border crossing (for its counterpart in the neighboring Uspenka, fighting continued for some time), which played a role in the further campaign.
Further was of considerable interest. The Ukrainian version of events indicated that about 4 thousands of people (four battalion groups) came from all over the territory of Russia. At least one more battalion group (up to a thousand bayonets, judging by the number of armored vehicles) was seen before in Rovenki on July 27 (perhaps it was she who covered the militia positions under the Red Ray) and, besides, considerable forces unlocked Lugansk (that is, It turned out that only 5-6 of thousands of fighters in all directions were involved.
These forces, entering, occupied empty space, a lacuna in the steppes between the border and the rear forces of the armed forces grouping, deployed front to the north, against the Torez-Shakhtersk-Khartsyzk highway, finding themselves in the operational rear of these troops. Simultaneously, a counterstrike was prepared from the north (on the environment) of some reorganization, re-equipment and replenishment of the militia forces and newly formed reserves, and on the ledge of the border (bending deep into the territory of Russia) in the area of Dyakovo a “boiler” was formed with approximately 500 surrounded and stationary Ukrainian soldiers.
21, on August, Petrovsky also announced that “everything is bad” and “we are moving to the sea”. At the same time, separate militia patrols began to occupy villages in the Telmanovsky district of the DPR, on the road leading to Novoazovsk along the corridor between Kalmius and the Russian border (the distance from Amvrosiyivka is less than 100 kilometers). The aggregate number of these forces hardly exceeded one thousand people; they were lightly armed detachments, for which it was not necessary to organize impressive (and extremely visible) supply columns.
23 August began regular mortar shelling of the border guard station of the SPSU in Sedovo (obviously, there was no possibility for an assault on a strategically important object with a guard of several dozen people). On August 24, positions of the 9 of the Armed Forces of the NSU near Novoazovsk also came under fire (no more than a company; most of the battalion of 400 people occupied the positions of 50 kilometers to the north opposite the border village of Berestovoye).
24 in August (on the day of independence or independence of Ukraine - the symbolic date was not chosen by chance), the militia counterattack began, or rather, the BCH (the final stage of the Battle of Ilovaisk). Ukrainian troops were taken under the city "in ticks" by strikes in converging directions (classic Cannes), fighters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, who had been provocatively trying to get out of the battle on the last day of the battle. weapons in violation of the agreements, were shot. The damage of the “ATO forces” was great (at the moment, the Ukrainian side recognizes from 366 to 459 only those who died missing at 158-180), the remaining troops concentrated on the right bank of Kalmius, at the turn of Mariupol-Olenevka-Dokuchaevsk, relying on the transport hub in the area Volnovakhi.
It is this time period (21-24 of August) that is given as a gap of missed opportunities and the optimal time to strike at Mariupol. Since the next day, the remnants of the Vinnitsa 9 Battalion of the territorial defense and the future Azov regiment (and then the battalion), in the amount of up to a thousand people, left their positions and retreated to Novoazovsk, covering Mariupol - the “sea gate” and the main port of Donbass .
(Subsequently, they were also reinforced by the remnants of the Shakhtyorsk battalion. As of 29 in August, there was a video where the fighters of this unit strengthened their positions under Mariupol. In addition, the garrison was replenished with fighters of the NNU 1-1200 units) , in the rush of August 1500 transferred to the city from Kiev with a minimum of heavy weapons.)
Directly on August 21-24, along the coast, there was approximately the following minimum outfit of the forces of the Ukrainian security forces (those parts that were established):
- forces of the Donetsk border guard detachment (military unit 9937, headquarters in Mariupol) - from 500 to 1000 border guards, including the border post in Sedovo;
- a marine guard detachment (military unit 1472, headquarters in Mariupol) - at least 500 military personnel of the border police, 18 boats;
- not less than the company of 9 of the Vinnitsa BTRO of the NSU (stationed in Novoazovsk) - from 120 to 130 of the National Guard;
- reinforced 5-I company of the battalion Dnepr-1 (dislocation from 6 in August Novoazovsk, Sedovo, Obryv) - from 160 to 200 bayonets;
- battalion company Donbass (dislocation Mariupol) - up to 120 people;
- 23 th Zaporozhye BTRO NSU "Khortytsya" (in full composition, dislocation - the region of Mariupol) - around 400 of the National Guard;
- the detachment of the 42 th battalion of the territorial defense “Ruh Support” (after 4 of August was sent to Mariupol) - the exact number is unknown, hardly more than a few dozen people;
- at least half of the platoon (2 tank) 17-th tank brigade;
- sector M headquarters, headquarters security (deployment - Mariupol) - number unknown.
In total, the forces of the Ukrainian side in the Mariupol region in the period under review (24 August 2014 inclusive) were around 2000-2500 bayonets of different subordination and low degree of combat capability, with a minimum of heavy weapons and a high degree of demoralization. They turned out to be no less than doubled in the next day's 3-4.
This was, of course, somewhat more reports in Russian media about allegedly “one company at 6 checkpoints on the outskirts of the city”. Especially since before August 26-27, forward detachments (reconnaissance) of the militia could not occupy either strongholds near Novoazovsk or a border crossing point in Sedovo on the Ukrainian side. They were left alone due to the threat of the approach from Telmanovo to the main army of Novorossia (although the word “army” here would probably be too loud - rather, an analogue of a motorized rifle regiment).
Assessing the prospects and possibilities of assault on Mariupol at the end of August 2014, one should turn to ... foreign experience, namely the experience of the American side in the Second Iraqi War 2003, during the attack of Baghdad. There were a number of similar moments in the attack on the Iraqi capital:
1. The garrison city was also fragmented, disorganized and demoralized. Moreover: from approximately 7 thousands of defenders during the battle to the half - the best security units of the Special Republican Guard - left the Iraqi capital and retreated to the north, to the family nest of Saddam Hussein the city of Tikrit. The US troops - the US Army 3 Infantry Division, the Marine Corps 1 Division, Special Forces - faced only separate detachments that did not have a single subordination: the militias, anti-aircraft gunners, the rear structures of individual Iraqi guard divisions, and special forces.
2. Baghdad was delineated from the east by the “moat” of the Diyala River. Mariupol from the east was also limited to the small river Kalmius, which partially flowed through the territory of the city.
However, there were differences that influenced the prospect of an assault:
1. Baghdad lay on a wide and flat plain - the location of Mariupol was caused by relief differences, including, with the crossing of the city’s territory by the Kalmius river, an abundance of greenery, a large percentage of industrial buildings compared to Baghdad. The central port of Donbass, unlike the Iraqi capital, could not boast a rectangular layout and very wide - tens of meters - straight streets convenient for raids by mechanized groups (called “Sander wounds” - “thunder raids”) by the Americans.
2. The ratio of forces. By attacking Baghdad, which was not occupied by large forces of Iraqi infantry and tank units, the American command could count on fivefold (and after escaping from the capital of the guardsmen - tenfold) superiority. The preponderance or at least parity in the number over the Ukrainian militia of Novorossia, which was defending Mariupol by the Ukrainian troops, as can be seen above (and as will be shown below), was never achieved.
3. The quality of the troops. Still, it was not worth comparing the training of American regular units with dozens of tanks and artillery barrels and the irregular formations of New Russia (even if perhaps supported by the so-called "North Wind"). The entire potential of Donbass heavy equipment - 50-60 tanks, several dozen guns and MLRS - was dispersed over a vast territory, and about the corresponding aviation support, intelligence, communications, command systems and electronic warfare and did not have to say. The possibility of the militia to form an attack fist in the western pattern, a mobile mechanized group that could sweep through the streets of Mariupol, cutting down the battle formations of the enemy and directing artillery at targets, in order to gain a foothold in the central defensive position in the city center, also raised great doubts.
4. Preparing an assault. Planning operations to capture Baghdad took at least 10 years, took pictures, plans, mapped objects, conducted training and reconnaissance activities. The militia of Novorossia could not even count on preparatory actions at the level of Operation Jihad (attack by Chechen militants of Grozny in August 1996 of the year), since they continued for at least three weeks (advancement stage of separate parts to the attack object), and the approach to Mariupol was carried out fast enough.
5. Supply. To attack Baghdad from the east, “feeding” the artillery of the 11 artillery regiment (we are talking only about the actions of the 1 division of the marines), the Americans extended a huge communication line across the Interfluve, which was served by about a thousand trucks and two battalion groups used in as cover and guard. In the event of an attack on Mariupol in the style of Operation Jihad, the militia of Novorossia could have been waiting for the fate of Chechens breaking through into Grozny: a serious shortage of ammunition and other war content, as well as poor artillery support.
However, with such overwhelming superiority, the US troops got bogged down in the battle for Baghdad for 9 days and suffered heavy losses by the standards of the theater of operations - 34 killed. The militia of Novorossia in the battle for Mariupol could not count (by results) even on an analogue of Operation Jihad in the Chechen Republic in August 1996, which, if not interfered by certain Russian political circles, could end in tears for the attackers. Militants got bogged down in a two-week battle for the city, the military pay was coming to an end, while Russian troops were completing a maneuver to encircle an illegal armed group.
In addition, the Donbass militia until the Debaltsev operation (January-February, 2015), when it was already in the role of the BCH, after all the reorganizations carried out, was still unable to perform perfectly, although it won, did not have experience of assault on large settlements. The experience of the seizure of agglomerations of the level of Mariupol (with almost half a million inhabitants), the armed forces of the DPR and LPR do not have to this day.
However, let us return to the chronology (and the build-up of forces by the parties). 23-24 of August, as already noted, there occurred mortar attacks on the position of the Ukrainian security forces near Sedovo and Novoazovsky, but these were actions of only small small militia groups.
August 25 among the highest military and administrative officials of the Ukrainian side in Mariupol began to panic. However, the Vinnytsia National Guardsmen and the Azov (a thousand bayonets) who had broken into the city after a retrade from the north temporarily stabilized the situation. Nevertheless, the tension grew, from Mariupol a part of its defenders deserted.
August 26-27 positions were evacuated in Novoazovsk and Sedovo. Ukrainian troops concentrated in Mariupol, the panic atmosphere continued to build up in the media.
On August 27, the 1 th operational team of the NSU entered the city (1200-1500 people). Despite the forced march (from outside Kiev), the unit that had just been formed and hurriedly thrown into battle could maintain its combat capability, order, and even more, it restored a stable position in Mariupol. Now the garrison of the city has reached 4-5 thousands of people, significantly exceeding the forces of General Petrovsky.
28-30 of August some other units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine also arrived in the city (for example, 28 of the 26 soldiers of the battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Kharkiv-1). And on August 31, after a long transition from under Perekop, Mariupol finally entered the long-awaited (with the command of sector M) heavy-armed army teammen: battalion tactical groups of the 17 tank and 28 and 72 motorized, 79 airborne (BTG based on one of the battalions of the brigades has been on the isthmus since May) and the 55 artillery brigade, a unit of the 15 th reactive artillery regiment, the 703 th engineering regiment, some other units (in total, no less than 3000 officers and soldiers) .
Now the garrison of the “sea gate of Donbass” was in the 7-8 range of thousands of defenders. Militia forces in the corridor to the sea between Kalmius and the Russian border after 5 days, for example, were estimated at 5 thousands of fighters (the figure is probably overestimated). At the same time, not all of them were concentrated opposite Mariupol, part of it covered the flanks of the “extension” stretched to the south.
Already in the period from 2 to 4, September, the tank crews of the 17 brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were marked in action east of the city. And on the night of 1 on September 2, a deep raid of the compound from the 79 battalion groups and the 95 airborne brigade began (two thousand brave Ukrainian paratroopers, from the reserve command of the ATO forces) from Kramatorsk to the south bypassing Donetsk to rescue Mariupol (from 2 on 5 September, these forces marched along the east coast of Kalmius to Novoazovsk, the 5 of the same number, drawing in Starolaspu north of Telmanovo.
In addition, on September 5, the garrison of the city conducted a local reconnaissance of militia positions in the direction of Novoazovsk, using the 8th battery of the 55th artillery brigade. On the night of September 4-5, Russian news resources also announced the arrival in the city of a marine company of Ukraine and a combined detachment of border guards (reinforced company) of about 200 people. But this information required confirmation: one combined battalion (from the 1st and 501st) of the Marine Corps of the Ukrainian Navy of 200 soldiers fought near Amvrosiyivka at least until August 20 and there was no information about its transfer to Mariupol, from Odessa on August 27-28 There were steep messages about the dispatch of the 1st Marine Corps Battalion to the ATO zone (numbering 200 people), but the destination was unknown.
The Sector M command planned a large-scale offensive operation. The 2-5 airmobile raid of September through seemingly controlled by defenders of Donbass territory demonstrated that to oppose the enemy in the “process” - Telmanov (who was threatened by Kalmius) and Novoazovsk - the Donetsk insurgents had nothing to do.
By 5 September, the alignment on the operational map of the Donbass conflict was not easy. As on a huge battlefield, the parties seemed to be preparing for a new battle.
Despite the defeat at Ilovaisk and huge losses - at least 2 thousands killed since the beginning of the conflict (more than half lost in August), many wounded, prisoners missing, several thousand deserters - APU received reinforcements and recovered from their failures, reaching a peak in 55 Thousands of troops. No more than a quarter of all forces in the “ATO zone”, which slowly regained their battered potential, were defeated, the troops retreating beyond the major river obstacles (Kalmius and Seversky Donets), accumulated in Volnovakh, Debaltseve and Mariupol. Defensive lines for Kalmius and Seversky Donets were formed, and piece-of-armor equipment unnecessary there was picked up from the rear roadblocks (taking into account the negative experience of the Syrian civil war), sending it to the first line to compensate for the losses.
The striking fist was going to Debaltseve (15-17 thousand bayonets), where at any moment they could abandon obscure sluggish trampling around Gorlovka’s surroundings and create a defensive perimeter around Debaltseve and from where they could try to deliver a concentrated blow to the south. The second such fist of comparable abundance (anvil for Debaltsev's hammer from the north) was formed in Volnovakha - the second wedge for a counterstrike to the north and a repeated attempt to throw the encirclement around Donetsk.
In the south in Mariupol 7-8 thousands of Ukrainian security forces are concentrated. They were supposed to be opposed by approximately 5 of thousands of fighters of the consolidated militia formations, however, it is possible that this was a suspended number. Only two thousand Ukrainian paratroopers, having passed through the raid on the rear of the Donbass, literally permeated the territory they controlled, showing that the real ground from Amvrosievka to Novoazovsk was occupied by not-so-large forces (except that collected in Novoazovsk itself).
For several reasons, it would be correct to call the troops as the armed forces of Novorossia (VSN), approximately twice as low as the APU quantitatively and also suffered heavy damage. 2-3 thousands were killed since the beginning of the conflict on 19 August (according to the Deputy Prime Minister of the DPR A. Purgin), at the beginning of September the losses were even greater, many left the ranks of those who fought for injuries or were disabled.
The chances of achieving new success in these conditions were slim. Of course, these days in the Russian media (against the background of the euphoria of victories), encouraging information flashed that Mariupol was already surrounded, battles were fought west of the city on the Mariupol-Berdyansk highway, and maps were drawn that were not true, but eyewitnesses did not confirm. The BCH was absent as a class on the west bank of the Kalmius (with the exception of the DRG - small sabotage and reconnaissance groups), and the said road remained free.
In such a situation, diplomacy began to speak. The Ukrainian General Staff loudly announced its intention to attack again, starting on September 6, and the politician who continued the cause of the war entered into his rights by other means.
September 6 truce agreement was signed. After 13 days, 19-th, the parties agreed on the procedure for the divorce of weapons. In fact, the Donbass was saved from the new invasion (the same “corridor to the sea” in the Telmanovskiy and Mariupol districts was occupied only because it turned out to be operational emptiness - starting from 6 September, this segment of land was threatened with a powerful counter-offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine).
Having received a limited opportunity for respite, the process of state-building of the DPR and LPR began, which, however, continued, not without flaws. Centralized power, debugging the work of the state apparatus, and so on.
The main process was the creation of the army, reduced to two corps: 1-th (DNR) and 2-th (LC). Their total number over the past year and a half has changed little, reaching about 32-35 thousands of bayonets. The number of trained reservists in the DPR alone was estimated at 10 in February 2015 of the year in 30 thousands of fighters and in 30-40 of thousands of people as of June 2016 of the year.
(In February, the 2015 of the year following the results of the Debaltsevskaya campaign, the DPR leader A. Zakharchenko declared the possibility of creating an aggregate 100-thousandth army after the announced call-up of volunteers. All this, as well as the creation of centralized structures of management and subdivisions that are in the barracks (that is, all the attributes of the regular army), it was, of course, impossible without the help of Russia.)
After the first “Minsk”, the Ukrainian troops began the process of withdrawing the troops, having reduced to a minimum of 38,5 thousands of bayonets in October of the 2014 year (of which about 10% was in the Debaltsev ledge). The maximum was reached in February 2015 of the year (73 thousands of military personnel only in military units - just up to 85-90 thousands of people in the ATO zone). However, it should be borne in mind that these indicators included only forces in the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions and did not take into account the reserves - units of the second line in the Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Dnieper-pro-Petrovka and Kharkiv regions, as well as independent operational command of the NSU around Kiev from 6 Brigade.
The positional stage has begun - the stage of the war has died out, when everything was decided by mutual exhaustion, and not by deep breakthroughs and reach. The Debaltsev campaign of January-February 2015 of the year (when the so-called Debaltsevskiy protuberance was cut off, with the railway junction in Debaltseve, and the transport connectivity of the DPR and LPR was restored) was the exception rather than the rule.
The loss of Mariupol became a heavy burden for the young republics of Donbass. Not only economic value (port, production facilities), but also strategic determined the damage suffered. A large industrial city today, besides located on vital routes, is a promising fortress in a big war, capable of chaining an essential enemy force.
(The Mariupol garrison from the supporters of Novorossia could also serve as a flank threat to the Armed Forces of Ukraine advancing northward to cut off the border with Russia. The clamp of the encirclement under Ilovaisk, from which a significant part of the Ukrainian forces flowed, could be abandoned to the west with counter blows from the north and south to Volnovakha , by rail from Mariupol to Donetsk: the very geography of these edges indicated a promising place for an attack.)
The practical experience of modern conflicts prompted the need to engage in urban development and urbanized areas with a loyal population. Odessa, Kharkov and the separate state formations that rallied around them could serve as independent strongholds of resistance. Their abandonment, as well as the abandonment of strategically important facilities located around them (industrial enterprises such as the Kharkov Tank Plant, weapons depots, and so on) had serious consequences in the formation of territories occupying a pro-Russian political position.
2003's second Iraqi campaign of the year demonstrated: marching in the open field, the huge mechanized columns of Americans and British did not meet with significant resistance and, sustaining small losses, quickly cut through the territory of Iraqis. In the cities, the irregular formations of the Iraqis received some tactical advantage (minimizing the technical superiority of the enemy, shortening the distances for battle) and often for a long time tied up large enemy formations, causing them substantial damage.
This happened in the summer of 2014 in the Donbas. Parts of the APU quietly rolled into the field, meeting no significant resistance until August (when the BCH reached a certain quality level). However, the cities where large enemy forces could wait for them preferred to bypass — even the same Donetsk in the second half of July, from which, according to the reports of the DPR Defense Minister I. Strelkov, he led a significant part of his troops to protect communications with Russia to the east and south- east of the city.
The alternative to taking Mariupol, and indeed the emergence of the “Great New Russia”, was seen in the spring of 2014 of the year - but not in August-September of the same year. Only in May-June (before 13 of June - the dates of the operation of the nationalist formations to capture Mariupol) there were several forks to hold the “City by the Sea”:
1. May 9 - after the raid of Ukrainian nationalist formations - the Vostok battalion of Khodakovsky was already loading onto KAMAZ trucks in Donetsk, moving south, but for some reason the march turned out to be curtailed. At about the same time, the personnel and property of the military unit based in the city were withdrawn from the city.
2. 25-26 of May - Mariupol occasionally visited with isolated acts of a terrorist nature isolated groups of “Azov” (then the number of units - 115 people) on automotive and lightly armored vehicles. A detachment or “team” of “Iskra” (the size of a company of light infantry in 120 volunteers), not going to Donetsk (where it was defeated during an unsuccessful assault of Donetsk airport), but in Mariupol, could drastically turn the tide.
3. The beginning of June - the Khodakovsky squad instead of going to Marinovka (where he was again defeated, taking the 80 man to Russia), could take Mariupol, again changing the balance of local forces. However, a half-million industrial and port city, its potential was still ignored by the rebel Donbas formations (its garrison was at best 60-80 poorly armed volunteers).
For the occupation of large settlements (spring 2014 year in Ukraine) required teams of determined-minded people. Each such detachment could serve as a foundation for the deployment of larger units capable of holding the building on their base. Slavyansk was occupied by a group in 52 man, Mariupol may have required a slightly larger number of defenders.
The one-time and chaotic occurrence of such units on the territory of Donbass indicated the unwillingness or unwillingness of the state apparatus of the Russian Federation to influence the strategic situation on the post-mayon Ukrainian political chessboard. Kharkiv, Odessa, Donetsk and Lugansk could act as ready-made cornerstones in the construction of the architecture of the project “Greater Novorossia”.
History does not know the subjunctive mood. The political and economic consequences of the implementation of the “Big Option” are difficult to predict today. The APU, despite all the lack of coherence and amorphousness of their mechanism, could act much more elegantly in the summer of 2014 (for example, by attempting to make the “Small Saturn” - the surroundings of Donetsk on the outskirts, with subsequent negative consequences, or abandoning a not too rational hike along the border).
However, the experience gained was undoubtedly valuable. It should always be taken into account in the event of similar conflicts around the perimeter of the Russian border.
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