Shipbuilding Program of the Russian Navy, or a Very Bad Premonition (part of 2)
Frigate "Admiral Gorshkov"
What is still wrong with the domestic surface shipbuilding program adopted in the GPV 2011-2020? Immediately, we note that its developers faced a very non-trivial task. The resumption of mass construction of surface ships after a twenty-year hiatus demanded that extremely contradictory requirements be brought together. On the one hand, the newly created ships had to become reliable as a Kalashnikov assault rifle, because in the conditions of a landslide reduction in the ship’s composition, the country simply could not afford to build squadrons to stand at the berths. At fleet and so there were almost no BODs, destroyers, cruisers and TFRs of the 1st and 2nd ranks, and by 2030 - 2035 the vast majority would have to leave the ranks. Therefore, the creation of unreliable ships in the period 2011-2020 will leave the country without a surface fleet.
But how can you ensure the reliability of new projects? Usually, in such cases, the designers try to adhere to the time-tested, well-proven in daily operation solutions. Here are all the time-tested solutions we have twenty years ago and more, so putting them at the forefront means creating deliberately outdated ships. Such a fleet of the Russian Federation is not needed - in the conditions of the numerical superiority of “probable allies” and “sworn friends” our projects should, at a minimum, not give in, but it would be better to surpass similar foreign ones. To do this, new ships should be massively equipped with the latest systems, weapons and equipment, which, due to a pause in construction, are not “run in” by the fleet, but in this case, problems with reliability are almost inevitable.
Add to this the well-known antagonism between shipbuilders and naval sailors - it’s often more convenient and / or more profitable for shipbuilders to build something completely different from what the fleet needs and vice versa - sailors often want to get something that design bureaus and industry are not able to give them.
In order to draw up a competent shipbuilding program, taking into account the above, a systematic approach is needed, the highest competence and professionalism, as well as sufficient authority to coordinate the activities of developers, manufacturers and “end users” seafarers. Probable opponents should be identified, the prospects for the development of their naval forces and the role of their fleets in the war against us should be examined. Assessing the goals and objectives, tactics, composition and quality of the potential adversary's sea forces and determining their own financial and industrial capabilities, set realistic tasks for their fleet, both during war and peace, because the fleet is still the most powerful political tool. And not at the current moment, but at least for a period of 35-40 years, because during this time strengthening of our own fleet and changes in the composition of the Navy of potential opponents, as well as the political situation in the world, can greatly change the tasks facing the Russian Navy.
BOD "Admiral Chabanenko"
And then, using the cost / efficiency scale with might and main, determine by what means we will solve the assigned tasks: to deal with the possible performance characteristics of promising armory (and all other) complexes, to determine the best carriers, to understand the role of submarines, aviation, surface ships, ground and space components of our naval defense (and attack) as part of the “big picture” of the goals and objectives of the Russian Navy. And, having understood, therefore, why we need surface ships in general, to determine their required classes, performance characteristics and quantity. So, for example, a submarine of Project 949A Antei was created - from the task (destruction of the AUG) to the method of solving it (strike of cruise missiles), and through understanding the technical characteristics of a specific missile ("Granite") to the required alongside forces (24 missiles in a salvo) on an operational-tactical mission for a submarine. But the solution methods could be different (coastal naval carrier-based aviation, carrier-based aviation, etc.) - here we need impartial calculations, analysis, professionalism and once again professionalism in order to achieve the maximum result without spending too much.
Was all this done during the formation of the HPV 2011-2020 in terms of the surface fleet? Is this being done today?
Consider the largest surface ships GPV 2011-2020. We are talking about universal landing ships (UDC) Mistral and large landing ships (BDK) Ivan Gren. As you know, the first were planned for construction in the number of 4 units, and the second - 6 units.
UDC "Mistral" in the past few years was perhaps the most talked about in print and the "Internet" ship. He had his supporters and opponents, but, in the opinion of the author of this article, the main reason for such a high interest in the French UDC was due to the fact that neither of them nor the others fully understood why these ships are needed by the domestic fleet.
UDC "Diximyud" type "Mistral"
And really. If we go to the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in the section “Main Command of the Navy” and ask what tasks the fleet should solve in wartime, then we will read:
1. The defeat of enemy ground targets in remote areas;
2. Ensuring the combat stability of strategic missile submarines;
3. Destruction of shock anti-submarine and other enemy groups, as well as coastal facilities;
4. Maintaining a favorable operational regime;
5. Support from the sea for the troops of the front during their defense or offensive in coastal areas;
6. Defense of the sea coast.
As you can see, the only task that the Mistrals somehow suit is the No.5 Support for Troops from the Sea, which can (and should) be understood as landing troops in the interests of the ground forces. At the same time, many Mistral supporters just rested on the fact that this type of ships, capable of disembarking troops from helicopters (and heavy equipment from landing craft), is capable of providing a qualitative leap in our operations of this type. Figures were cited - if tank landing ships of the USSR could have landed on 4-5% of the world coast (simply because far from any place TDK could be brought to shore), for amphibious boats accessibility is much higher (for displacement boats 15-17%, for hovercraft - up to 70%) well, and no coastline is an obstacle for helicopters at all.
Well, perhaps the Navy Main Board really decided to take a step into the future in terms of organizing landing operations? But the question is: if it really turned out that the Soviet ideas about the landing of the Marines and their equipment were outdated and we needed the UDC - why then at the same time with the “Mistrals” were going to build as many as six “Ivanov Grenov”, which are, in essence, the development of the famous BDK "Tapir" project 1171, i.e. the quintessence of the Soviet approach to amphibious ships? After all, these ships are an expression of completely different concepts of landing operations. Why should we follow both at once?
And what did the sailors themselves say about this? Perhaps only the statement of the commander-in-chief of the Navy, VS, is personified. Vysotsky:
The Mistral is designed and built as a ship for power projection and control ... ... it cannot be viewed separately as a helicopter carrier or a landing ship, a command ship or a floating hospital. The presence of an equipped command center on board of this class allows you to control forces of various scales at any distance from the fleet bases in the sea and ocean zones ”
Of course, there is a rational grain in such a statement. “Mistral” is really as comfortable as it is, it has good opportunities for medical care, it allows you to take a lot of supplies and people on board and has a lot of space to stuff it with management equipment. It would be useful, for example, in missions of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. But as a control ship for several frigates trying to destroy the US 6 fleet, it looks somewhat strange. Of course, we are not only the enemy states, for example, the Syrian barmalei. But how would the Mistral help there? The organization of a ground base for aviation of the Russian Aerospace Force of the Russian Federation cannot be managed there in no way (the author does not specifically remember a large aircraft carrier, so as not to provoke an unrelated “holivar” article). And where is the ground base - it is possible to place combat helicopters there, and control can be carried out directly from there, why should a garden be planted with a helicopter carrier?
And what else? Deliver goods to Syria? This is a serious task, but is it a bit expensive? It may still be easier to buy Ukrainian transports on the cheap? If it is a little more serious, then the Russian Navy, unfortunately, not burdened with numerous overseas bases, simply must have a powerful fleet of auxiliary supply ships capable of serving the grouping of ships, where they will be ordered - and in the Mediterranean, for example. And unlike the “Mistral” - this is really one of the most urgent needs. Such ships could be involved in the supply base Chemeim.
What is interesting - let's say we deliberately put everything upside down. Instead of first defining the tasks, and then figuring out the classes and the performance characteristics of the ships to solve them, we take it for granted that we ALWAYS need a helicopter carrier. That is needed, and all. And if necessary, then let's think about how to adapt the helicopter carrier to the tasks of our fleet. So even in this case, the “Mistral” does not look a good option - funny, but the ideal candidate for the position of the helicopter carrier of the Russian Federation would not be the UDC, but the modernized TAVKR of the 1143 project, i.e. a mixture of missile cruisers with an anti-submarine helicopter carrier. Such a ship, being crammed with anti-submarine helicopters, cruise missiles and powerful anti-aircraft weapons, but also having powerful means of communication and control, could well not only ensure the actions of the SSBNs and take part in defeating enemy enemy ship groupings, but also perform many other tasks assigned to according to the website of the Ministry of Defense) to our fleet, including:
1. Search for nuclear missile and multi-purpose submarines of a potential enemy and tracking them on routes and in mission areas in readiness for destruction with the outbreak of hostilities;
2. Observation of aircraft carrier and other naval strike groups of a potential enemy, tracking them in their combat maneuvering areas in readiness to strike at them with the outbreak of hostilities
TAVKR "Baku"
And, of course, to carry out the same control "by forces of various scales at any distance from the bases of the fleet in the sea and oceanic zones," about which Vysotsky spoke. Interestingly, according to some, alas, anonymous sources, some people on the high command of the Navy thought about the same thing:
“We do not need the unarmed DVKDs that the French Navy has. Such “mistrals”, in fact, are giant floating transports with modern combat control, navigation, reconnaissance and communications systems, a kind of defenseless floating command posts that need to be covered both from the sea and from the air by other warships and aircraft, General Staff. - Our Navy DVKD should not only control the actions of various types of forces of naval groups (surface ships, submarines, naval aviation), or even actions of interspecific groups on the maritime and oceanic theaters of war, not only delivering and landing ashore marines on armored vehicles with the help of helicopters and airborne assault vehicles, but they themselves must possess sufficient fire and strike power to be full-fledged self-protected multifunctional warships within these groups. Therefore, the Russian DVKD will be equipped with cruise missiles with an increased range of fire, the latest means of air defense, missile defense and anti-missile defense "
The author of this article would not like the resumption of the “holy war” on whether our fleet needs Mistrals or not. In the personal opinion of the author, which he does not impose on anyone, some work for them in the Russian Navy would probably have been found (especially during non-military times). But the UDC "Mistral" was in no way "a matter of prime necessity", and they were not optimal for carrying out the tasks facing the Navy. This, in turn, suggests sad thoughts: either the fleet’s tasks are set “for show”, or the commander-in-chief of the Navy is not the decisive figure when choosing classes and types of promising ships.
But back to UDC. As another reason for the acquisition in France "Mistral" was the acquisition of modern technologies that are absent in the domestic fleet, and this was understood as a purely shipbuilding technology, and information, such as the French CBS (supposedly the French were going to sell it to us, yeah). Buying technology is definitely a good thing. But in what technologies to the beginning of the GPN 2011-2020, the domestic navy most urgently needed?
During Soviet times, the country had a powerful industry capable of producing the most diverse types of ship power plants. Nuclear, boiler turbines (KTU), gas turbines (GTU), diesel ... well, whatever. But the problem was that not all of them were equally successful. It just so happened that we had excellent gas turbine and nuclear power plants, but somehow we didn’t develop with the boiler-turbine ones - it was KTU that became the Achilles heel of 956 destroyers, and only about the torment with the power plant of our only heavy aircraft carrier cruiser were heard by everyone, who is at least interested in the domestic navy. The same, alas, applies to diesel installations of surface ships - we did not get along with them. And now let's see what power plants the ships of the HPV-2011-2020 program are equipped with.
In other words, someone decided that the Russian navy would henceforth be a diesel one. And this is despite the fact that in Russia the technologies for creating powerful marine diesel engines have not been completely worked out!
In terms of power plants for surface ships, the RF had a choice. We could use gas turbines, but in their pure form they are not ideal. The fact is that, possessing acceptable mass-dimensional characteristics and having a sufficiently low fuel consumption at a power close to the limit, GTU were very “voracious” in the mode of economic progress. But we could use the COGOG scheme adopted on the cruisers of the 1164 Atlant project, where two gas turbines operated for each shaft, one relatively thin for the economic course, the other for the full, though it had a drawback: both turbines could not work on one shaft at a time. We could use the COGAG scheme, which duplicated COGOG in everything, with one exception - in it both gas turbines can work on one shaft at the same time, and from this power plant provides greater speed than COGOG. The EC of such a scheme is more complicated, but we were quite capable of mastering their production - our reliable ones like the TCR of the 1135 project, as well as their descendants of the 11356 project (including those that were supplied to India) are equipped with just such installations.
But instead, for the frigates of the 22350 project, we developed a power plant according to the CODAG scheme - when an economic stroke diesel engine and a gas turbine are working on one shaft, while they can both work on one shaft simultaneously. Such installations are even slightly heavier than COGAG, but it pays off with better fuel efficiency, both economically and at full speed. Of course, you have to pay for everything - of the above, CODAG is the most complex. Well, for the rest of the ships, we decided to use powerful marine diesel engines without GTU.
However, problems could still have been avoided: the fact that the Country of Soviets had good GTUs and it doesn’t matter that diesels are not a sentence at all. And there is no reason for all the millennia remaining in our country to have a long and happy life to use exclusively GTU. If our professional specialists and fathers-commanders, after weighing all the pros and cons, came to the conclusion that the future is in the diesel engine - it means, then so be it. But since we are not strong in this matter, who prevented the acquisition of relevant technologies abroad?
The pre-war USSR soberly assessed its capabilities in terms of creating modern and powerful turbines - there was some experience, but it was clear that independent creation of relatively light, powerful and reliable turbines could take much longer than we had. Therefore, a very successful Italian model was purchased for the Kirov cruiser and Italian help in training the necessary specialists was purchased. As a result, having spent the currency once, we gained many years of Italian experience in turbine and boiler construction, and later, using the knowledge we obtained, we developed improved designs for the 68 and 68-bis cruisers and other ships that were well-known in service.
And since we decided that “diesel engines are our everything”, then we should remember the Stalinist experience - to acquire production lines, diesel projects or help in their development, to buy the necessary technologies ... Yes, it is expensive, but just so we could get reliable the product will continue to design high-quality powerful ship diesel engines independently. And if the navy of the Russian Federation would be diesel, then all these costs would have paid off handsomely, as the purchase of the power plant of the Italian cruiser in the 30 of the last century paid off. Diesels have become for us a key element of the surface shipbuilding of HPV 2011-2020, the success or failure of the program depended on them in the literal sense of the word, because the power plant is the heart of the ship, without which everything else has no special meaning. That's what you had to spend money on the purchase of "Mistral". But it was in this key area that we ignored the foreign experience, which we both needed and decided to put on domestic developments - they say, and it will do.
Corvette "Stereguschy"
The result was not slow to wait. In 2006, the full success of the interdepartmental tests of the units DDA12000, and then a series of publications about the “motor” problems of the 20380 project corvettes on which they were installed. Further, it was decided that the new, improved 20385 series will receive the German diesel engines of the company MTU - it can be seen that the “good” turned out to be passed all the required tests DDA12000. And the proverb that the miser pays twice, was confirmed: without buying “fishing rods” in a timely manner, i.e. projects, technologies and equipment for the production of ship diesel engines, we were forced to spend money on "fish", i.e. diesels themselves. And then the sanctions struck, and we were left without a German product. As a result, as of 2016 g, we have only projects of diesel corvettes, but we do not have reliable diesel engines for them. And how do you order to perform HPN 2011-2020 in its "corvette" part? At the first serial corvette of the 20385 project, they put the same DDA12000 ... and what is our choice?
A similar picture is observed with small ships - if the Buyan ICC allegedly received domestic diesels, then its “elder brother” - the Buyan-M missile - was supposed to go on the diesel circuits of the same German MTU. Of course, the program of import substitution has started, some diesel engines "Buyan-M" will be received, but ... the main thing is that the word "some" should not be the key in this phrase.
We are talking about diesel engines. But after all, it is not only diesel engines that live to our fleet - gas turbines (diesel-gas turbine power plants of Admiral Gorshkov frigates) should also be installed on the latest frigates of the Russian fleet. What is interesting is that by the time HPO 2011-2012 began, we could not do gas turbines for them either. In fact, it was like this: we either bought gas turbines from the Ukrainian company Zorya-Mashproekt, or made them the domestic NPO Saturn, but in the closest cooperation with Zorey, the most complex parts of turbines, their assembly and bench testing in Ukraine. Thus, no matter how terrible it sounds, but we got into a large-scale program of surface shipbuilding, in general, having no gas turbine production for them. We were completely dependent on foreign suppliers!
Could this situation have been remedied? As it turned out - no problem. When economic ties with Ukraine were severed, the same NPO Saturn was able to launch the production of power plants for the 20350 frigates Admiral Gorshkov in Russia. And in fact, which is characteristic, it didn’t require any super efforts - neither the World Cup was canceled, nor the financing of Rosnano was cut. Simply, the leadership of "Saturn" made the next labor feat, that's all. In conditions of high interest rates on loans, the ever-racing dollar, the WTO and the regular global economic crises, daily exploits are, in general, the standard requirement of a job description for the head of any industrial enterprise in the Russian Federation. There is nothing even to talk about.
But only because of the lost time, we obviously break the construction of ships of this type - instead of 8 units to 2020 g, we get 6 units to 2025 g.
To plan the creation of the fleet, without having adequate ship engine building, and almost nothing to do to remedy this situation ... The epithets that come to mind are flowery and juicy, but, alas, are completely irreproducible in print. Then how? The fact that the country needs to get off the oil needle is not even described for 10 years. And what is needed for this? Of course, strengthen non-primary areas of the economy. And so, the Russian Federation is going to build a large surface fleet, whose ships should receive diesel engines and gas turbines. What is the main problem of industrial enterprises in a market economy? Demand instability. Today it is like this, tomorrow it is different, the day after tomorrow a competitor with a new development emerged and the demand for our products fell below the low, tomorrow this competitor went bankrupt and the demand rose again ... But the construction of the fleet provides guaranteed demand for the production of ship engines, their repair and maintenance. Here all the laws of economics just scream: “Urgently build your production!” What diesel engines, gas turbines, it's not just like that, it is a high-tech production, an entire industry, such enterprises around the world, two and two, these are engineering jobs and highly skilled workers, these are taxes to the state treasury, these are possible future deliveries!
Here you can argue, remembering the global division of labor and other things, that almost no state can fully provide themselves with high-tech products alone, that we need to concentrate on what we do well and buy the rest abroad. Something in this approach is correct. But not in key areas on which the state’s defense depends!
Against this background, all sorts of arguments about how useful the Mistral is to us as a storehouse of shipbuilding technologies look, at least ... strange, shall we say.
Frigates and corvettes. Before proceeding to the analysis of the success or failure of the 11356, 20350, 20380 and 20385 projects ships (which is not enough space in this article, so we will do this in the next), we need to answer the following questions: how reasonable was it to assign problem solutions surface forces of the Russian Navy to the ships of the class "frigate" and "corvette"? How did it happen that we abandoned the destroyers we were used to, the large and small anti-submarine ships and other TFRs in favor of frigates and corvettes?
The frigate as a class of warships has undergone an interesting evolution - being a sailing prototype of cruisers, it was transformed into them, and its very name was forgotten for a long time. During the time of the second world frigate returned, but in a completely different rank: now relatively small escort destroyers were called that, intended for the defense of transport convoys, primarily ocean ones. But after the Second World War, he quietly and unnoticed walked the road from a purely auxiliary unit to the main universal rocket and artillery ship of many fleets. Small escort ships at the end of the 20 of the 20th century grew stronger, and ... drove cruisers and destroyers out of the lists of most of the world's Navy.
The USSR also had the idea of creating some kind of foreign frigates capable of solving the same tasks as they are, only better. We collected information on the most advanced ships of this type: Oliver H. Perry, Bremen, Cornwall, Maestrle, Kortenaer, MEKO 200 Yavuz, etc. The German “Bremen” was recognized as the best, and it was decided to surpass it, with which, I must say, Zelenodolsk PKB coped perfectly well, creating an excellent 80 “Hawk” project in the early 11540-s of the last century.
project 11540 "Yaroslav the Wise"
Thus, the path “into the frigates” was trampled back in the USSR. By the way, the 1 institute of the Navy proposed to call the project 11540 a frigate, but Gorshkov did not approve, preferring to call the “Hawk” the patrol ship (TFR). It is no less interesting that the same institute offered to equip the “Hawk” with a diesel-gas turbine installation according to the CODAG scheme (which was later received by the 22350 frigates), but sensibly assessing the capabilities of our industry, they preferred the gas-gas turbine version of COGAG.
Well, then came a period of stagnation and lack of money. The fleet did not want to leave the oceans, but the construction of cruisers and large destroyers was impossible for economic reasons. In many respects because of this, the economical concept of “frigate / corvette” was adopted, in which the frigate was assigned the role of an ocean-based universal rocket-artillery surface ship, while the corvette was to become an equally universal ship of the near-sea zone.
On the one hand, it seemed that such an approach was well founded and had the right to life. First, by doing so, the fleet had to avoid the amazing diversity of ships of various types of the USSR Navy, and unification was far from the last thing, even regardless of the size of the military budget. The benefits from the convenience of basing, supplying and repairing ships of the same type are difficult to overestimate. For the fleet who wants to foam the ocean, such a solution also seemed the most economical, because the frigates were the smallest surface ships of all who could boast of "oceanic" status. The ships of this class are very seaworthy and distinguished by decent autonomy, which to a certain extent was confirmed by the Falkland conflict of 1982, when the British Broadlands and Alakriti operated quite successfully on the other side of the Atlantic. Frigates turned into universal ships, but retained a moderate size and cost. So why shouldn't we “appoint” the frigate as the main rocket-artillery oceanic ship? Moreover, the same TFR of the 11540 project, being twice as small as the BNC of the 1155 project, carried almost the same nomenclature of armaments - already at the stage of its creation some experts noted that their mass construction could make large anti-submarine ships unnecessary, because cheap TFR is quite able to take their place in the ocean.
In general, on the one hand, the frigate seemed like a panacea, but on the other ... You should never get involved in external analogies - they are often false. Yes, foreign frigates, having reached 3,5 - 4 thousand tons of standard displacement, really became generalists able to fight against an air, surface and underwater enemy. Only trouble is that they did it all equally bad. Anti-submarine defense? Some ships of this class were equipped with decent GAS or GAK, but the typical anti-submarine armament of frigates of Western countries with the rarest exception were only 324-mm torpedo tubes. Which neither in range nor in power could not compete with the 533-mm torpedoes of modern submarines. And therefore, when the British ships at the Falklands found the San Luis diesel submarine attacking them, they pursued her ... not approaching her. The task of fire destruction of the enemy was entrusted to the helicopters, and they, despite all the efforts, could not do anything. Whether the British had at least the same ASROC or long-range 533-mm torpedoes, the result could be different, but from the 324-mm torpedo unit the British could only shoot themselves.
Anti-aircraft weapons? Only self-defense complexes like Sea Wolf, RAM or Krotal gave more or less adequate protection, but attempts to put something more serious gave psychological protection more - Sea Sparrow was mainly used, which was very highly estimated in the USSR as an air defense system low (including due to the lack of multi-channel). Only Oliver H. Perry had a truly powerful SAM with Standard missiles, but again - at the cost of completely abandoning missile defense for missile defense, which is why our analysts considered his air defense to be the weakest of all frigates. Impact capabilities? As a rule, 4-8 of small subsonic anti-ship missiles “Harpoon”, “Exoset” or something similar — this should have been enough to destroy a missile boat, or even two, or “disassembling” with a fellow in class, but not to attack serious ship group.
The problem was that, despite its versatility, in the western fleets the frigate was still a secondary ship, called upon to operate in the operational "shadow" of the Big Brothers in the person of the US AUG. Yes, some NATO fleets were built around frigates, but these fleets themselves were initially focused on solving secondary tasks. Still frigates were quite suitable for enlightening any African or Asian natives having the same frigates, only smaller, worse and with less trained crews. And our “Hawk”, surpassing foreign frigates, nevertheless, was not spared from their shortcomings - its URAN anti-ship missiles were designed to combat relatively small (up to 5 thousand tons) targets, the air defense missile system - short-range, here in the anti-submarine parts, of course, he was good: the combination of a decent SAC and rocket-torpedoes was far more dangerous than the capabilities of almost every other 80's frigate. In principle, the 11540 project with certain reservations could indeed replace the BNC 1155, but the problem is that the BODA “Deloi”, acting without the support of ships of other classes, was not able to successfully solve the tasks of fighting the enemy fleet in the ocean.
As a result, as if being in the same class with the western “counterparts”, the Russian frigate had to perform completely different tasks and under completely different conditions. Western frigates are primarily ships of escort and anti-submarine defense, capable of finishing off what, by some miracle, survived after the Nimitsev carrier-based aircraft and Tikonderog cruise missiles. Well, protect yourself from a single plane or anti-ship missiles. No one ever demanded that Western frigates fight a numerically superior enemy in the face of enemy aircraft. But for Russian ships in the ocean, this became almost the only form of combat use.
In view of the foregoing, the Russian Navy does not need frigate-class ships to solve its tasks in the world ocean. They simply do not need him because of the inherent lack of firepower. The domestic fleet needs ships that have the power of a full-fledged destroyer, and as a result ... As a result, the project of the promising domestic frigate 20350 is an attempt to shove the destroyer force into the frigate displacement.
And the same thing we can say about the idea of the Russian corvette. Having set a goal to create a light (standard displacement less than 2 000 t), but at the same time a universal rocket-artillery ship, we tried to shove the power of the frigate into the displacement of the corvette.
But what came out of it was already in the next article.
To be continued!
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