The program of shipbuilding of the Navy of the Russian Federation or a Very Bad Premonition
A few years ago, the shipbuilding program included in the GPV 2011-2020 was discussed with great interest, and especially its adjusted version (2012), according to which until 2020 the composition fleet should enter:
1) 10 Project 955 strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs);
2) 10 Project 885 multipurpose nuclear submarines with cruise missiles (SSGN);
3) 20 non-nuclear submarines, including six diesel-electric submarines of the 636.3 Varshavyanka type (fairly improved) and the remaining 14 - the revised project 677 Lada;
4) 14 frigates, including 6 ships of project 11356 ("admiral's" series for the Black Sea Fleet) and 8 frigates of the latest project 22350;
5) 35 corvettes, including 18 projects 20380 and 20385, and the rest - a completely new project;
6) 4
7) 6 large landing ships (BDK) type 11711 "Ivan Gren";
8) 6 small artillery ships of the project 21630 "Buyan";
9) a number of small missile ships (MRK) of the project 21631 "Buyan-M".
The program looked very serious. Of course, there was no question of any revival of the nuclear-missile oceanic fleet created in the USSR and destroyed with its disintegration — the emphasis was on ships of the near-sea zone, which were non-nuclear submarines, corvettes, and in fact, frigates. Of course, it was funny to hear how the frigate of the 22350 project with its cruising range in 4 000 nautical miles on 14 nodes was universally called the ocean ship. Here are the Soviet 26-bis cruisers capable of going 4 880 miles on 18 nodes (and Pacific even 5 590 miles at the same speed) - this, as is widely recognized, is a ship with a very limited range for the Black and Baltic Seas but unsuitable for the Northern and Pacific theaters. A frigate 22350 - Ocean.
In essence, the shipbuilding program of the HPV 2011-2020 g is a program of building a coastal fleet focused on the protection of the sea borders of the Motherland. Admittedly, this is the only reasonable option for the development of the Navy at that time. Since the collapse of the Union, the Russian shipbuilding industry has hardly had any new orders, completing the construction of the 80-x and 1990-91 at the end. ships and forced to be content with a beggarly stream of government money, irregularly entering the factories. The industry was greatly helped by export contracts, which made it possible to retain at least some production and personnel, but this was negligible for the development of military shipbuilding. And because in the period 1990-2010. the industry did not live, but survived, receiving a blow, perhaps, even more powerful than during the 1917 - 1927 period, when the revolution and civil war almost put an end to domestic shipbuilding. At this time, the period of stagnation was even longer, which almost destroyed the most important thing - cadres. The old men went into retirement, men “in the prime of life” threw a choking industry in search of opportunities to feed their families, while young people simply did not want to go to work for beggarly wages. But the processes of creating warships, compared with the first third of the last century, became even more complicated, and even by orders of magnitude, and therefore the “point of no return” to 2010 g, after which the Russian Federation would finally lose the ability to create modern maritime weaponturned out to be as close as ever.
Fortunately, the Russian Federation did not reach the last point. Funds for rebuilding the fleet were found, but now the leadership of the navy, as well as the RF Ministry of Defense, had another task - to properly dispose of the opportunities provided to them. In fact, as far as it was possible, we will try to figure it out.
A well-known fact - the 2010 of the Russian Navy was an extremely sad spectacle. No, if you count ships formally listed as part of all four fleets, while not forgetting the Caspian flotilla, you get a pretty powerful force, second only to the US Navy, but (albeit with a large margin from the hegemon) firmly holding the honorable second place in the world. But if we take into account the actual condition of the ships, who are in repair, who are in waiting for him, and who are simply on conservation, it turns out that all four Russian Navy fleets had only 23-me active 1 and 2 surface ships th rank:
1) 1 heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" (project 1143.5);
2) 1 nuclear missile cruiser "Peter the Great" (project 1144);
3) 3 missile cruisers of project 1164 "Atlant";
4) 3 destroyers (EM) of project 956 "Sarych";
5) 10 large anti-submarine ships (7 - project 1155, 1 - project 1155.1, 1 - project 1134-B and 1 - project 61);
6) 5 patrol ships (2 - project 11540 "Hawk" and 3 project 1135).
Note: the author does not vouch for the absolute accuracy of the presented figures and will be glad to any clarifications.
It was even more difficult to recover the number of submarines. Presumably, the Navy of the Russian Federation had in service (not counting those in repair, reserve / conservation):
1) 8 SSBNs (5 projects 667BDRM: Tula, Yekaterinburg, Bryansk, Karelia and Verkhoturye, the latter being repaired in August 2010, 3 projects 667BDR: St. George the Victorious, " Podolsk" and "Ryazan"). (There was 1 more Project 941 Akula submarine, but there were no regular ballistic missiles for it);
2) 5 SSGNs of project 949A "Antey" ("Smolensk", "Chelyabinsk", "Tver", "Eagle" and "Omsk");
3) 16 multipurpose nuclear submarines (more precisely, MPLATRK, which stands for Multipurpose Nuclear Torpedo Submarine with Cruise Missiles, differs from SSGNs in that it does not have special missile silos, but from PLATS (nuclear torpedo submarine) by the ability to launch missiles through torpedo devices), including: 9 project 971 "Pike-B": "Kashalot", "Magadan", "Samara", "Panther", "Wolf", "Leopard", "Tiger", "Vepr", "Cheetah ”, 2 projects 945A: “Pskov”, “Nizhny Novgorod”, 1 project 945 (“Kostroma”) 4 projects 671RTM (K) “Pike”;
4) 13 diesel-electric submarines of type 887, including one type 887B "Alrosa".
But even these figures (even if they are real, and not overstated) do not fully reflect the picture of the plight of the fleet, because even those ships that were formally considered “ready for the march and battle,” not all were such. Due to the poor condition of the power plant, none of the destroyers of the 956 project could go on a long voyage, and the only aircraft carrier cruiser, apart from problems with EI, was not equipped with an air group, which made it possible for the latter to perform representative and training functions.
No less sad sight was a sea aviation, which by 2011 turned out to be reduced to almost the nominal value.
In addition, it should be borne in mind is not the best situation with combat training. Despite the fact that in general the situation improved significantly compared with the “wild nineties” and the beginning of the two thousandth, the number of hikes and the complexity of the exercises of the Russian Navy did not closely correspond to the standards of the USSR.
In general, it can be stated that a catastrophic collapse in the number of warships and airplanes / helicopters, combined with insufficient combat training, led to a drop in the combat qualities of the Russian fleet to a completely unacceptable state. Despite the presence of a certain number of large and powerful ships of the 1 rank, the Russian Navy obviously lost its ocean status, but even at its own coast one could hardly expect much from it. Even the fulfillment of the first task of the fleet: ensuring the actions of the naval strategic forces with the aim of launching the latest nuclear missile strike in a full-scale nuclear conflict - was under threat.
What has changed since the adoption of the HPN program 2011-2020?
Intensified training of personnel. The ships "stick off" from the wall and begin to spend a lot of time at sea. It is impossible for an author, as a person who did not serve in the navy, to determine how far the level of today's fleet training corresponds to the requirements of modern naval combat. Presumably, we have not yet reached the best Soviet practices (when our fleet was on the shoulder of Aport, Atrina, etc.), but in any case, crew training is now conducted in the most intensive way over the entire period of the latest stories RF.
A program of military shipbuilding has been adopted, which can be characterized in the most positive way:
Firstly, she is extremely ambitious. Not in the sense that after its execution, the Russian Federation will become a universally recognized ocean storm — this is still very far away. In essence, the fulfillment of the HPN 2011-2020 in its “marine” part will even partially solve the task of protecting the near-sea zone. The ambitiousness of the military shipbuilding program is different - at the time of its adoption, it significantly exceeded the capabilities of the domestic industry and it could only be done by strengthening our shipbuilding enterprises with all their associates in the most significant way. Accordingly, the adoption of this program should have ensured significant industrial growth, but even with this in mind, such a massive supply of ships to the fleet in the period up to just 2020 of the year looked doubtful. Nevertheless, there is no smell of “Manilovism” here, this is the right approach, which should be welcomed in every possible way. How can you not remember a certain character of the national cinema, who, on the remark addressed to him “You want a lot, you will get a little!” Quite rightly remarked: “But this is not a reason to want a little and not get anything.”
Secondly, the program is based on the real possibilities of domestic shipbuilding: the main focus is on submarines and relatively small ships — corvettes and frigates. Thus, the Russian shipbuilding has the opportunity to develop "from simple to complex."
Thirdly, the classes and the number of ships identified for the construction of the HPN 2011-2020, to a large extent, solved the priority tasks of the national fleet: the resumption of the naval component of the Strategic Nuclear Forces was provided and ship groups were created, if not completely eliminating, then at least least, significantly complicating the detection and destruction of our strategic missile submarines before they launch intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Fourthly, the necessary conditions were provided for the training of qualified fleet management, and I would like to dwell on this.
In tsarist Russia, the sea qualification was practiced for a long time. What it is? In essence, this is a set of requirements, without which the officer could not be presented for production at the next rank. The main condition was the time spent by the officer on the ship in months, days or maritime companies.
In the Soviet (and not only) literature, the sea qualification was scolded many times. Indeed, the requirements were often such that high posts could be reached only towards old age, and the career growth was in no way dependent on the skills and talents of the officer. In addition, the big difference is where and how a person served his qualifications, because in other cases a year can safely be considered as three. But many authors overlook another thing: of course, on the one hand, the sea qualification was an evil that impeded the professional growth of worthy officers. But on the other hand, he to some extent defended against the rapid advancement of "favorites" and people who were random in the fleet. After all, how does the qualification work? Someone had a desire to put the head of the Ministry of Defense in no way related to military man, before (not otherwise than by the permission of the Lord) who was in charge of the Federal Tax Service. But no, it is not possible at all - first graduate from the General Staff Academy, then if you please command a company for a year, then ... then ... then ... then ... ... and then - you are welcome to the ministerial chair!
The problem is that if suddenly, by a miracle and completely free of charge, our moorings will have five fully equipped Storm-type aircraft carriers and twenty destroyers of the Leader type, and their decks will be filled up with tons of gold bars (to pay for their operation) then we still (and very long) will not be able to use them (ships, of course, but not ingots). Even if the money will be enough, and the bases are equipped, but we do not have competent commanders of all levels capable of directing the crews of these ships.
What is the lack of command personnel, very well recognized the Navy of the young USSR. In 30, the industry brought a steel tsunami of new ships to the military — several cruisers, dozens of patrol and destroyers, hundreds of submarines ... But where could they get people who could organize a service and command them skillfully in battle? So I had to drive "gallop across Europe" - if the young officer gives at least some hope, he was immediately dragged up. We are largely obliged by the inexperience of commanders to far from always the success of our fleets in the Great Patriotic War.
And it is from this point of view that the post-war shipbuilding programs of the Soviet Navy should be evaluated when morale ships were put on stream. Yes, they could hardly protect the USSR sea borders in 1950-60, such a need arose, but they became a real “forge of personnel”, and without them, the powerful ocean fleet of the USSR 1970-80 would be simply impossible.
So, the saturation of the Navy of the Russian Federation with a large number, even if they are not the largest, but modern ships equipped with the latest technologies, BIUS and armament, just allows you to prevent such a deficit. And will give the country a sufficient number of experienced personnel for the ocean fleet of the Russian Federation, the construction of which was supposed to begin after 2020.
Thus, it can be said that the military shipbuilding program incorporated in the HPN 2011-2020, even in the case of incomplete implementation, had a real chance to become one of the most necessary and useful shipbuilding programs in the entire history of the Russian State. For this, there remained only “nothing at all” - to correctly determine the classes and performance characteristics of the ships included in the program, linking them with the capabilities of domestic design bureaus of naval weapons and other instruments and equipment. Well, the industry, of course.
Alas - the closer we are to the cherished 2020-th year, the stronger the feeling that in this matter we managed to "slip" so that we squandered most of the potential of HPV 2011-2020 to nowhere.
However, in terms of the design and construction of submarines, we made the minimum number of errors, and those that are made long before the formation of the shipbuilding program for the 2011-2020. Although, in fairness, it should be recognized that the merits of our program also flow from decisions made long before 2010.
Strategic nuclear forces
By the end of the existence of the Soviet Union, the situation with our SSBNs (which the author would call all nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles) was somewhat anecdotal. The attempt to switch to solid-propellant ballistic missiles as a whole should be considered correct, since solid fuel provides the missile with a number of significant advantages. Lower flight path, several times smaller active path segment (i.e., the site where the rocket flies with the engines on), short preparation for the launch, less noise (before the start it is not necessary to fill the mines with seawater), etc. In addition, liquid fuel is dangerous when stored, although, strictly speaking, solid is also not a gift - the accident at the Votkinsk plant 2004 is an example. Therefore, the work on solid propellant "ballista" was more than justified. But nothing can justify the launch of a series of P-39 - a monstrous rocket in 90 tons in weight and length in 16 meters. Of course, she needed at least a cyclopean carrier, and it was created - the 941 “Shark” project with a surface displacement of 23 200 tons. It is practically a dreadnought "Sevastopol", hidden under water!
Creating this "victory of technology over common sense", the USSR military still insured against the fiasco of solid-fuel missiles, and in parallel with the construction of "Shark" laid a series of SSBNs of the 667BDRM project "Dolphin", armed with liquid-propellant missiles P-29РМ. Seven of these ships replenished the fleet of the USSR in 1984-90, however, one of them was later converted into a carrier of deep-sea underwater vehicles. But the P-39 turned out to be quite combat-ready weapons, so the work on this topic was continued under the theme of the P-XNUMHUTTH Bark. These missiles were going to re-equip the "Sharks" after the P-39 had run out of expiration dates, and, in addition, they designed new XPSNS for the 39 "Borey" project. It must be said that the missiles for all types of SSBNs (and P-955PM and P-29 and P-39UTTH) created the design bureau for them. Makeeva is an experimental design bureau that has created three generations of ballistic missiles for submarines.
But with the “Bark” makeyevtsy suffered a failure, probably the collapse of the USSR played an important role in this, because of which it was necessary to change the type of rocket fuel (the manufacturer was in the near abroad). Probably, the rocket would still be able to bring to mind, but now it took a lot of money and time. Russia still had time, but now the money ... Further well-known: a very controversial decision was made to create a single center for the development of sea and land-based ballistic missiles based on the Moscow Thermal Engineering Institute (MIT).
The first Borey was laid in the distant 1996 year under the Bark missiles, but in 1998 the project was completely redrawn under the brainchild of MIT - the Bulava, the only (but undeniable) advantage of which was relatively small size and weight (36,8 t).
In general, the Borey proved to be an extremely successful boat, combining moderate displacement, fairly powerful weapons (16 SLBMs) and excellent low noise levels. The Russian Federation put into operation three such SSBNs, and the next seven are being built according to the improved 955A project, and the modernization directions were chosen flawlessly - the number of missiles was increased from 16 to 20, while noisy indicators and other submarines would be reduced. What, in fact, is the key parameters for SSBN.
The submarines of the Borey type are very good ships and their lack, by and large, is one (but which one!) Is their main weapon, the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile. Which, for unclear reasons, still does not want to operate stably. At one time it even seemed that the Bulava would turn out to be a completely failed project and would not fly at all, some suggested redoing the Borea for shooting cruise missiles ... Yet the Bulava somehow flew, but how? That, like, normal launches succeed, then for some reason failures occur, and the rocket does not reach the target. Of course, the work on the improvement of the Bulava is in full swing, but will they lead to success? By the way, if they don’t, then there’s not a word about it in the open press.
There is only one consolation in all this. Neither now nor in the foreseeable future is there a political force that is crazy enough to check on its own skin how many Bulava submarines launched from Russian submarines successfully hit their designated targets. Persons prone to suicide, as a rule, avoid politics, and those who reach the political empyreans, madly in love with life and completely unwilling to part with it. It was necessary to persuade one such “life lover” to all the USSR 4, from the summer of forty-first through 1945, inclusive.
But there are other considerations - the old, but reliable "Dolphins" of the 667BDRM project with the Sinev missiles (and now the Liner) will be able to provide our security until the 2025-2030. And if suddenly with “Bulava” everything will be very bad, then we still have time to somehow react. According to some open press, GRKTs them. Makeeva has already begun to develop a new ballistic missile to replace the Bulava, and there is every reason to hope for the success of this project. And although it is now said that these are missiles for future Husky submarines, it is most likely that Borei can be adapted for them.
Atomic multipurpose submarines.
Project 885 "Ash". Everything is short and clear with him, this is the crown of USSR submarine shipbuilding ... but not only. Ships of this type began to design almost 40 years ago when it was decided to try to escape from the diversity of the submarine fleet (anti-missile missile Antei, torpedo Pike, multipurpose Schuki-B) and create a single type of universal submarine for non-strategic purposes. The idea looked very attractive, but, nevertheless, the work was dramatically delayed: the head "Ash" was laid in the distant 1993 year, and in 1996 g the construction was stopped.
Works on the SSGNs were resumed only in 2004 g under the improved project. Probably, the first pancake to some extent turned out to be a lump - nevertheless, “Severodvinsk” was built in the wildest conditions of underfinancing, using backlog on unfinished submarines, and its creation was “slightly” dragged out. Laid in 1993, the SSGNK was handed over to the fleet only in 2014, after three years of testing and refinement. However, from subsequent ships of this type one should expect very high combat effectiveness, quite comparable with the best multipurpose submarines of the Western world - the Sivulfs of the US Navy.
Unfortunately, high combat capabilities entail immodest cost of the product. Until now, according to the open press, the price is the main claim to the ships of the project 885 and 885М. The Ash series has been reduced to 7 units, and even then - the introduction of the last planned PLARK is scheduled for the 2023 year. And if the cost of the 885M project remains an unsolvable problem, then it is impossible to count on any large series of “Ash”. But once plans were announced transfer of the Navy 30 such ships! At the same time, the commencement of serial construction of submarines of a new type, the Husky, should be expected no earlier than 2030. Accordingly, it can be stated that in the next decade and a half the Russian Navy will have extremely powerful atomic multipurpose submarines, but can we build enough of them to at least keep the total number of our non-strategic atarins at the current level? Hardly.
To some extent, the situation could correct the massive construction of non-nuclear submarines, but ...
Diesel-electric submarines and submarines with VNEU.
The basis of today's non-nuclear submarine forces are the boats of the 877 “Halibus” project, which (in repair and on the move), according to open sources, there are 16 pieces, including those built under the modernized projects “Alrosa” and “Kaluga”. An impressive amount is supported by the high quality of our submarines, which were among the best non-nuclear submarines in the world in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, these boats were created according to the 70 design of the last century and were put into operation during the 1980-1995 period. They are still combat-ready and dangerous, but, of course, they are no longer at the forefront of military progress.
To replace the "Halibut" submarines "Lada", whose development began in the late 80-s of the last century, were to come. The new submarines were supposed to become significantly smaller and cheaper than the 877 project and, moreover, much less noticeable (for example, the noise level should be only 50% of the “Halibus” level). A high level of automation, modern BIUS, a new hydroacoustic complex and other equipment, and in terms of armaments, in addition to torpedo tubes, the boat received 10 mines for modern cruise missiles Onyx or Caliber. In essence, the submarines of this type (according to the project) had only one serious drawback - the diesel-electric power plant. The latter, due to the low speed and range of the underwater course provided by it, limited the tactical capabilities of our ships, in comparison with the boats of the VNEU that appeared at the end of the last century. But by 2012 g work on the domestic air-independent engine seemed to have advanced far enough, which allowed the fleet commanders to count on completing the 677 project in the very near future. Therefore, our shipbuilding program provided for the construction of 6 submarines - modernized Varshavyanka under the 636.3 project and 14 submarines of the 677 project under the improved project with the VNEU. Lada promised to be optimal for closed sea theaters and the near sea zone of the North and the Far East of the Russian Federation. They were thinking of a kind of underwater “Kalashnikov assault rifle”: small, easy to operate, cheap and not demanding large deployment costs, very “quiet”, but possessing great autonomy, high underwater speed and modern armament. Boats of this type could be a terrible headache for any ship group that risked poking to our shores.
But - did not. According to the open press, it is difficult to understand whose fault it is - the lead developer of the Rubin Central Design Bureau or one of its contractors. There are many complaints against Lada submarines, the most well-known is the chronic shortage of power of the power plant, which usually failed, developing 60-70% of the total power. There were also serious shortcomings in the work of a number of basic systems, such as the SJC Lira and the CIU Li, and it is not clear whether it was possible to eliminate them. And although 28 in July, 2016 Mr. Vice-President for Military Shipbuilding of the United Shipbuilding Corporation Igor Ponomarev announced that there was no final decision to stop or resume construction of the submarine of the 677 project, but too many signs that the submarine failed.
The head submarine "St. Petersburg" is in trial operation with 2010 g, and still not completely accepted by the fleet. And for good reason, in 2013, the Rubin Central Design Bureau received an order to develop the appearance of a non-nuclear submarine of the 5 generation Kalina: there is an opinionthat this submarine can go to the series already in 2018, instead of the boats of the project 677.
But there are a lot of questions about Kalina. Despite a number of triumphant reports, the development of a domestic VNEU has been delayed, and today we have no air-independent engine for submarines. Now several teams, including the Rubin Central Design Bureau, are engaged in the development of the VNEU, and the VNEU of the latter should undergo sea tests in the 2016 year. But it should be understood that between such tests and mass production may take more than one year.
This option is also possible - some time ago there were ARTICLES about making lithium-ion batteries. On the one hand, this is not a promising technology like the VNEU, but their use can, at times, increase the range (including the full) of a diesel-electric submarine. There are also some hopes that the development of lithium-ion batteries was a success for domestic developers better than VNEU. And therefore it cannot be ruled out that in case of a complete failure of the VNEU development in the Russian Federation, Kalina will receive conventional diesel-electric power engineering, but with lithium-ion batteries, which nevertheless significantly increase their capabilities in comparison with the power plants of the 877 or 636.3 submarines.
All this, of course, is fine, but: non-nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy are needed right now, and the first Kalina can be laid no earlier than 2018. And it’s more than likely that the specified period will “move” to the right more than once ... Besides just as the famous captain Vrungel said: “As you call a yacht, so it will sail”. Well, who came up with giving the newest submarine naming from the domestic auto industry?
The Russian Federation has production facilities and money, but now and in the next few years we will be able to build only the updated, still formidable, but obsolete "Varshavyanka" 636.3 project, representing a deep modernization of the same 877 project (more precisely, its export 636 modifications. This is not encouraging, but today such construction is the only way to ensure at least some acceptable number of our non-nuclear submarine forces.
In general, the Russian submarine fleet was on the verge of unstable equilibrium. Apart from the submarines commissioned under the HPV program 2011-2020. The Russian Navy as of 2016 g has (in service, in repair, awaiting repair):
1) 6 SSBNs of project 667BDRM;
2) 25 non-strategic nuclear submarines (8 SSGNs of project 949A "Antey", and 17 MPLATRKs: 10 of project 971 "Pike-B", 3 - of project 671RTM (K) "Pike", 2 of project 945 "Barracuda", 2 of project 945A "Condor");
3) 16 diesel-electric submarines of project 887.
In essence, this is a completely scanty value, moreover, it is also spread over all four fleets of the Russian Federation, and if we consider that a significant part of these ships is not in the line, the picture is completely unattractive. Even worse, almost all of the above ships were put into operation in the 80-x and early 90-s, and almost all of them will have to leave the composition of the Russian Navy to 2030. And what can we put in place instead of them? While unconditional progress (8-10 “Boreev” and “Boreev-A”) should be expected in the SSBN, the picture is far from optimistic regarding the multi-purpose submarines. According to current plans, before 2023 g we must receive the entire 7 SSGN of the 885 and 885M “Ash” project. It is possible that during the 2020-2030 period some more of these ships will be ordered. But now one such boat is being built up to 6 years (laid out in 2016 g "Perm" in the fleet is expected only in 2022 g) and if even in the near future the time to build them can be knocked down to 4 years, can we count on the 18 tab of the SSGN " Ash "in the period 2021-2026? Obviously not, which means that the worst times for Russian non-strategic atarinas are still ahead.
The situation could somehow be corrected by non-nuclear ships, now it is entirely possible to expect that according to the LG-2011-2020, the Russian Navy will include 12 diesel-electric submarines of the 636.3 project (six each for the Black Sea and Pacific fleets) and three diesel-electric submarines of the 667 "Lada" project. And the latter, perhaps, will not become full-fledged warships, and the 636.3 project is no longer the best of what plow the depths of the ocean. But still, these are entire 15 ships, and if during the 2020-2030 period, the construction of the newest Kalina submarines of the project develops, then by the 2030 g we will be able to seriously increase the number of groups of non-nuclear submarines compared to what we have today. And at least so rectify the truly deplorable situation with atomic multi-purpose submarines. But in general, neither to 2020 g, nor to 2030 g a serious breakthrough in the number of submarine forces of the Russian Navy is expected.
But it was precisely in the submarines part of the HPN program 2011-2020 that the least amount of errors was made. The types of nuclear and non-nuclear submarines are correctly identified, the work on their missile armament is relatively successful: Onyx and Caliber clearly succeeded, but Bulava is, of course, in question. It is quite possible (here open sources do not indulge in data) that the newest torpedoes “Physicist” and “Case” will at least reduce our lag in torpedoes, and perhaps even completely level them. But even in spite of all this, the failure to develop small non-nuclear submarines and to reduce the cost of the latest SSGNs has meant that we will at best stabilize the current situation over the next 15 years.
What then to say about the surface fleet, in the construction of which the Russian Navy, seems to have decided to make every conceivable mistake, not missing a single one ...
To be continued.
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