The program of shipbuilding of the Navy of the Russian Federation or a Very Bad Premonition

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A few years ago, the shipbuilding program included in the GPV 2011-2020 was discussed with great interest, and especially its adjusted version (2012), according to which until 2020 the composition fleet should enter:
1) 10 Project 955 strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs);
2) 10 Project 885 multipurpose nuclear submarines with cruise missiles (SSGN);
3) 20 non-nuclear submarines, including six diesel-electric submarines of the 636.3 Varshavyanka type (fairly improved) and the remaining 14 - the revised project 677 Lada;
4) 14 frigates, including 6 ships of project 11356 ("admiral's" series for the Black Sea Fleet) and 8 frigates of the latest project 22350;
5) 35 corvettes, including 18 projects 20380 and 20385, and the rest - a completely new project;
6) 4 tin cans universal amphibious assault ships (UDC) of the Mistral type, including two built in France, and as many at domestic shipyards;
7) 6 large landing ships (BDK) type 11711 "Ivan Gren";
8) 6 small artillery ships of the project 21630 "Buyan";
9) a number of small missile ships (MRK) of the project 21631 "Buyan-M".

The program looked very serious. Of course, there was no question of any revival of the nuclear-missile oceanic fleet created in the USSR and destroyed with its disintegration — the emphasis was on ships of the near-sea zone, which were non-nuclear submarines, corvettes, and in fact, frigates. Of course, it was funny to hear how the frigate of the 22350 project with its cruising range in 4 000 nautical miles on 14 nodes was universally called the ocean ship. Here are the Soviet 26-bis cruisers capable of going 4 880 miles on 18 nodes (and Pacific even 5 590 miles at the same speed) - this, as is widely recognized, is a ship with a very limited range for the Black and Baltic Seas but unsuitable for the Northern and Pacific theaters. A frigate 22350 - Ocean.

In essence, the shipbuilding program of the HPV 2011-2020 g is a program of building a coastal fleet focused on the protection of the sea borders of the Motherland. Admittedly, this is the only reasonable option for the development of the Navy at that time. Since the collapse of the Union, the Russian shipbuilding industry has hardly had any new orders, completing the construction of the 80-x and 1990-91 at the end. ships and forced to be content with a beggarly stream of government money, irregularly entering the factories. The industry was greatly helped by export contracts, which made it possible to retain at least some production and personnel, but this was negligible for the development of military shipbuilding. And because in the period 1990-2010. the industry did not live, but survived, receiving a blow, perhaps, even more powerful than during the 1917 - 1927 period, when the revolution and civil war almost put an end to domestic shipbuilding. At this time, the period of stagnation was even longer, which almost destroyed the most important thing - cadres. The old men went into retirement, men “in the prime of life” threw a choking industry in search of opportunities to feed their families, while young people simply did not want to go to work for beggarly wages. But the processes of creating warships, compared with the first third of the last century, became even more complicated, and even by orders of magnitude, and therefore the “point of no return” to 2010 g, after which the Russian Federation would finally lose the ability to create modern maritime weaponturned out to be as close as ever.


The destroyer "Fighting" in the sediment in the bay Abrek http://specnazspn.livejournal.com/602068.html


Fortunately, the Russian Federation did not reach the last point. Funds for rebuilding the fleet were found, but now the leadership of the navy, as well as the RF Ministry of Defense, had another task - to properly dispose of the opportunities provided to them. In fact, as far as it was possible, we will try to figure it out.

A well-known fact - the 2010 of the Russian Navy was an extremely sad spectacle. No, if you count ships formally listed as part of all four fleets, while not forgetting the Caspian flotilla, you get a pretty powerful force, second only to the US Navy, but (albeit with a large margin from the hegemon) firmly holding the honorable second place in the world. But if we take into account the actual condition of the ships, who are in repair, who are in waiting for him, and who are simply on conservation, it turns out that all four Russian Navy fleets had only 23-me active 1 and 2 surface ships th rank:
1) 1 heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" (project 1143.5);
2) 1 nuclear missile cruiser "Peter the Great" (project 1144);
3) 3 missile cruisers of project 1164 "Atlant";
4) 3 destroyers (EM) of project 956 "Sarych";
5) 10 large anti-submarine ships (7 - project 1155, 1 - project 1155.1, 1 - project 1134-B and 1 - project 61);
6) 5 patrol ships (2 - project 11540 "Hawk" and 3 project 1135).
Note: the author does not vouch for the absolute accuracy of the presented figures and will be glad to any clarifications.

It was even more difficult to recover the number of submarines. Presumably, the Navy of the Russian Federation had in service (not counting those in repair, reserve / conservation):
1) 8 SSBNs (5 projects 667BDRM: Tula, Yekaterinburg, Bryansk, Karelia and Verkhoturye, the latter being repaired in August 2010, 3 projects 667BDR: St. George the Victorious, " Podolsk" and "Ryazan"). (There was 1 more Project 941 Akula submarine, but there were no regular ballistic missiles for it);
2) 5 SSGNs of project 949A "Antey" ("Smolensk", "Chelyabinsk", "Tver", "Eagle" and "Omsk");
3) 16 multipurpose nuclear submarines (more precisely, MPLATRK, which stands for Multipurpose Nuclear Torpedo Submarine with Cruise Missiles, differs from SSGNs in that it does not have special missile silos, but from PLATS (nuclear torpedo submarine) by the ability to launch missiles through torpedo devices), including: 9 project 971 "Pike-B": "Kashalot", "Magadan", "Samara", "Panther", "Wolf", "Leopard", "Tiger", "Vepr", "Cheetah ”, 2 projects 945A: “Pskov”, “Nizhny Novgorod”, 1 project 945 (“Kostroma”) 4 projects 671RTM (K) “Pike”;
4) 13 diesel-electric submarines of type 887, including one type 887B "Alrosa".

But even these figures (even if they are real, and not overstated) do not fully reflect the picture of the plight of the fleet, because even those ships that were formally considered “ready for the march and battle,” not all were such. Due to the poor condition of the power plant, none of the destroyers of the 956 project could go on a long voyage, and the only aircraft carrier cruiser, apart from problems with EI, was not equipped with an air group, which made it possible for the latter to perform representative and training functions.

No less sad sight was a sea aviation, which by 2011 turned out to be reduced to almost the nominal value.

In addition, it should be borne in mind is not the best situation with combat training. Despite the fact that in general the situation improved significantly compared with the “wild nineties” and the beginning of the two thousandth, the number of hikes and the complexity of the exercises of the Russian Navy did not closely correspond to the standards of the USSR.

In general, it can be stated that a catastrophic collapse in the number of warships and airplanes / helicopters, combined with insufficient combat training, led to a drop in the combat qualities of the Russian fleet to a completely unacceptable state. Despite the presence of a certain number of large and powerful ships of the 1 rank, the Russian Navy obviously lost its ocean status, but even at its own coast one could hardly expect much from it. Even the fulfillment of the first task of the fleet: ensuring the actions of the naval strategic forces with the aim of launching the latest nuclear missile strike in a full-scale nuclear conflict - was under threat.

What has changed since the adoption of the HPN program 2011-2020?

Intensified training of personnel. The ships "stick off" from the wall and begin to spend a lot of time at sea. It is impossible for an author, as a person who did not serve in the navy, to determine how far the level of today's fleet training corresponds to the requirements of modern naval combat. Presumably, we have not yet reached the best Soviet practices (when our fleet was on the shoulder of Aport, Atrina, etc.), but in any case, crew training is now conducted in the most intensive way over the entire period of the latest stories RF.

A program of military shipbuilding has been adopted, which can be characterized in the most positive way:
Firstly, she is extremely ambitious. Not in the sense that after its execution, the Russian Federation will become a universally recognized ocean storm — this is still very far away. In essence, the fulfillment of the HPN 2011-2020 in its “marine” part will even partially solve the task of protecting the near-sea zone. The ambitiousness of the military shipbuilding program is different - at the time of its adoption, it significantly exceeded the capabilities of the domestic industry and it could only be done by strengthening our shipbuilding enterprises with all their associates in the most significant way. Accordingly, the adoption of this program should have ensured significant industrial growth, but even with this in mind, such a massive supply of ships to the fleet in the period up to just 2020 of the year looked doubtful. Nevertheless, there is no smell of “Manilovism” here, this is the right approach, which should be welcomed in every possible way. How can you not remember a certain character of the national cinema, who, on the remark addressed to him “You want a lot, you will get a little!” Quite rightly remarked: “But this is not a reason to want a little and not get anything.”

Secondly, the program is based on the real possibilities of domestic shipbuilding: the main focus is on submarines and relatively small ships — corvettes and frigates. Thus, the Russian shipbuilding has the opportunity to develop "from simple to complex."

Thirdly, the classes and the number of ships identified for the construction of the HPN 2011-2020, to a large extent, solved the priority tasks of the national fleet: the resumption of the naval component of the Strategic Nuclear Forces was provided and ship groups were created, if not completely eliminating, then at least least, significantly complicating the detection and destruction of our strategic missile submarines before they launch intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Fourthly, the necessary conditions were provided for the training of qualified fleet management, and I would like to dwell on this.

In tsarist Russia, the sea qualification was practiced for a long time. What it is? In essence, this is a set of requirements, without which the officer could not be presented for production at the next rank. The main condition was the time spent by the officer on the ship in months, days or maritime companies.

In the Soviet (and not only) literature, the sea qualification was scolded many times. Indeed, the requirements were often such that high posts could be reached only towards old age, and the career growth was in no way dependent on the skills and talents of the officer. In addition, the big difference is where and how a person served his qualifications, because in other cases a year can safely be considered as three. But many authors overlook another thing: of course, on the one hand, the sea qualification was an evil that impeded the professional growth of worthy officers. But on the other hand, he to some extent defended against the rapid advancement of "favorites" and people who were random in the fleet. After all, how does the qualification work? Someone had a desire to put the head of the Ministry of Defense in no way related to military man, before (not otherwise than by the permission of the Lord) who was in charge of the Federal Tax Service. But no, it is not possible at all - first graduate from the General Staff Academy, then if you please command a company for a year, then ... then ... then ... then ... ... and then - you are welcome to the ministerial chair!

The problem is that if suddenly, by a miracle and completely free of charge, our moorings will have five fully equipped Storm-type aircraft carriers and twenty destroyers of the Leader type, and their decks will be filled up with tons of gold bars (to pay for their operation) then we still (and very long) will not be able to use them (ships, of course, but not ingots). Even if the money will be enough, and the bases are equipped, but we do not have competent commanders of all levels capable of directing the crews of these ships.

What is the lack of command personnel, very well recognized the Navy of the young USSR. In 30, the industry brought a steel tsunami of new ships to the military — several cruisers, dozens of patrol and destroyers, hundreds of submarines ... But where could they get people who could organize a service and command them skillfully in battle? So I had to drive "gallop across Europe" - if the young officer gives at least some hope, he was immediately dragged up. We are largely obliged by the inexperience of commanders to far from always the success of our fleets in the Great Patriotic War.


The death of the leader "Moscow"


And it is from this point of view that the post-war shipbuilding programs of the Soviet Navy should be evaluated when morale ships were put on stream. Yes, they could hardly protect the USSR sea borders in 1950-60, such a need arose, but they became a real “forge of personnel”, and without them, the powerful ocean fleet of the USSR 1970-80 would be simply impossible.

So, the saturation of the Navy of the Russian Federation with a large number, even if they are not the largest, but modern ships equipped with the latest technologies, BIUS and armament, just allows you to prevent such a deficit. And will give the country a sufficient number of experienced personnel for the ocean fleet of the Russian Federation, the construction of which was supposed to begin after 2020.

Thus, it can be said that the military shipbuilding program incorporated in the HPN 2011-2020, even in the case of incomplete implementation, had a real chance to become one of the most necessary and useful shipbuilding programs in the entire history of the Russian State. For this, there remained only “nothing at all” - to correctly determine the classes and performance characteristics of the ships included in the program, linking them with the capabilities of domestic design bureaus of naval weapons and other instruments and equipment. Well, the industry, of course.

Alas - the closer we are to the cherished 2020-th year, the stronger the feeling that in this matter we managed to "slip" so that we squandered most of the potential of HPV 2011-2020 to nowhere.

However, in terms of the design and construction of submarines, we made the minimum number of errors, and those that are made long before the formation of the shipbuilding program for the 2011-2020. Although, in fairness, it should be recognized that the merits of our program also flow from decisions made long before 2010.

Strategic nuclear forces

By the end of the existence of the Soviet Union, the situation with our SSBNs (which the author would call all nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles) was somewhat anecdotal. The attempt to switch to solid-propellant ballistic missiles as a whole should be considered correct, since solid fuel provides the missile with a number of significant advantages. Lower flight path, several times smaller active path segment (i.e., the site where the rocket flies with the engines on), short preparation for the launch, less noise (before the start it is not necessary to fill the mines with seawater), etc. In addition, liquid fuel is dangerous when stored, although, strictly speaking, solid is also not a gift - the accident at the Votkinsk plant 2004 is an example. Therefore, the work on solid propellant "ballista" was more than justified. But nothing can justify the launch of a series of P-39 - a monstrous rocket in 90 tons in weight and length in 16 meters. Of course, she needed at least a cyclopean carrier, and it was created - the 941 “Shark” project with a surface displacement of 23 200 tons. It is practically a dreadnought "Sevastopol", hidden under water!


"Severstal" of the 941 project and (a small one, in the corner) - the multipurpose submarine "Cheetah" of the 971 project "Pike-B"


Creating this "victory of technology over common sense", the USSR military still insured against the fiasco of solid-fuel missiles, and in parallel with the construction of "Shark" laid a series of SSBNs of the 667BDRM project "Dolphin", armed with liquid-propellant missiles P-29РМ. Seven of these ships replenished the fleet of the USSR in 1984-90, however, one of them was later converted into a carrier of deep-sea underwater vehicles. But the P-39 turned out to be quite combat-ready weapons, so the work on this topic was continued under the theme of the P-XNUMHUTTH Bark. These missiles were going to re-equip the "Sharks" after the P-39 had run out of expiration dates, and, in addition, they designed new XPSNS for the 39 "Borey" project. It must be said that the missiles for all types of SSBNs (and P-955PM and P-29 and P-39UTTH) created the design bureau for them. Makeeva is an experimental design bureau that has created three generations of ballistic missiles for submarines.

But with the “Bark” makeyevtsy suffered a failure, probably the collapse of the USSR played an important role in this, because of which it was necessary to change the type of rocket fuel (the manufacturer was in the near abroad). Probably, the rocket would still be able to bring to mind, but now it took a lot of money and time. Russia still had time, but now the money ... Further well-known: a very controversial decision was made to create a single center for the development of sea and land-based ballistic missiles based on the Moscow Thermal Engineering Institute (MIT).

The first Borey was laid in the distant 1996 year under the Bark missiles, but in 1998 the project was completely redrawn under the brainchild of MIT - the Bulava, the only (but undeniable) advantage of which was relatively small size and weight (36,8 t).

In general, the Borey proved to be an extremely successful boat, combining moderate displacement, fairly powerful weapons (16 SLBMs) ​​and excellent low noise levels. The Russian Federation put into operation three such SSBNs, and the next seven are being built according to the improved 955A project, and the modernization directions were chosen flawlessly - the number of missiles was increased from 16 to 20, while noisy indicators and other submarines would be reduced. What, in fact, is the key parameters for SSBN.


SSBN project 995 "Borey"


The submarines of the Borey type are very good ships and their lack, by and large, is one (but which one!) Is their main weapon, the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile. Which, for unclear reasons, still does not want to operate stably. At one time it even seemed that the Bulava would turn out to be a completely failed project and would not fly at all, some suggested redoing the Borea for shooting cruise missiles ... Yet the Bulava somehow flew, but how? That, like, normal launches succeed, then for some reason failures occur, and the rocket does not reach the target. Of course, the work on the improvement of the Bulava is in full swing, but will they lead to success? By the way, if they don’t, then there’s not a word about it in the open press.

There is only one consolation in all this. Neither now nor in the foreseeable future is there a political force that is crazy enough to check on its own skin how many Bulava submarines launched from Russian submarines successfully hit their designated targets. Persons prone to suicide, as a rule, avoid politics, and those who reach the political empyreans, madly in love with life and completely unwilling to part with it. It was necessary to persuade one such “life lover” to all the USSR 4, from the summer of forty-first through 1945, inclusive.

But there are other considerations - the old, but reliable "Dolphins" of the 667BDRM project with the Sinev missiles (and now the Liner) will be able to provide our security until the 2025-2030. And if suddenly with “Bulava” everything will be very bad, then we still have time to somehow react. According to some open press, GRKTs them. Makeeva has already begun to develop a new ballistic missile to replace the Bulava, and there is every reason to hope for the success of this project. And although it is now said that these are missiles for future Husky submarines, it is most likely that Borei can be adapted for them.

Atomic multipurpose submarines.

Project 885 "Ash". Everything is short and clear with him, this is the crown of USSR submarine shipbuilding ... but not only. Ships of this type began to design almost 40 years ago when it was decided to try to escape from the diversity of the submarine fleet (anti-missile missile Antei, torpedo Pike, multipurpose Schuki-B) and create a single type of universal submarine for non-strategic purposes. The idea looked very attractive, but, nevertheless, the work was dramatically delayed: the head "Ash" was laid in the distant 1993 year, and in 1996 g the construction was stopped.

Works on the SSGNs were resumed only in 2004 g under the improved project. Probably, the first pancake to some extent turned out to be a lump - nevertheless, “Severodvinsk” was built in the wildest conditions of underfinancing, using backlog on unfinished submarines, and its creation was “slightly” dragged out. Laid in 1993, the SSGNK was handed over to the fleet only in 2014, after three years of testing and refinement. However, from subsequent ships of this type one should expect very high combat effectiveness, quite comparable with the best multipurpose submarines of the Western world - the Sivulfs of the US Navy.



Unfortunately, high combat capabilities entail immodest cost of the product. Until now, according to the open press, the price is the main claim to the ships of the project 885 and 885М. The Ash series has been reduced to 7 units, and even then - the introduction of the last planned PLARK is scheduled for the 2023 year. And if the cost of the 885M project remains an unsolvable problem, then it is impossible to count on any large series of “Ash”. But once plans were announced transfer of the Navy 30 such ships! At the same time, the commencement of serial construction of submarines of a new type, the Husky, should be expected no earlier than 2030. Accordingly, it can be stated that in the next decade and a half the Russian Navy will have extremely powerful atomic multipurpose submarines, but can we build enough of them to at least keep the total number of our non-strategic atarins at the current level? Hardly.

To some extent, the situation could correct the massive construction of non-nuclear submarines, but ...

Diesel-electric submarines and submarines with VNEU.

The basis of today's non-nuclear submarine forces are the boats of the 877 “Halibus” project, which (in repair and on the move), according to open sources, there are 16 pieces, including those built under the modernized projects “Alrosa” and “Kaluga”. An impressive amount is supported by the high quality of our submarines, which were among the best non-nuclear submarines in the world in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, these boats were created according to the 70 design of the last century and were put into operation during the 1980-1995 period. They are still combat-ready and dangerous, but, of course, they are no longer at the forefront of military progress.


"Alrosa" (project 877В) in the harbor of Sevastopol


To replace the "Halibut" submarines "Lada", whose development began in the late 80-s of the last century, were to come. The new submarines were supposed to become significantly smaller and cheaper than the 877 project and, moreover, much less noticeable (for example, the noise level should be only 50% of the “Halibus” level). A high level of automation, modern BIUS, a new hydroacoustic complex and other equipment, and in terms of armaments, in addition to torpedo tubes, the boat received 10 mines for modern cruise missiles Onyx or Caliber. In essence, the submarines of this type (according to the project) had only one serious drawback - the diesel-electric power plant. The latter, due to the low speed and range of the underwater course provided by it, limited the tactical capabilities of our ships, in comparison with the boats of the VNEU that appeared at the end of the last century. But by 2012 g work on the domestic air-independent engine seemed to have advanced far enough, which allowed the fleet commanders to count on completing the 677 project in the very near future. Therefore, our shipbuilding program provided for the construction of 6 submarines - modernized Varshavyanka under the 636.3 project and 14 submarines of the 677 project under the improved project with the VNEU. Lada promised to be optimal for closed sea theaters and the near sea zone of the North and the Far East of the Russian Federation. They were thinking of a kind of underwater “Kalashnikov assault rifle”: small, easy to operate, cheap and not demanding large deployment costs, very “quiet”, but possessing great autonomy, high underwater speed and modern armament. Boats of this type could be a terrible headache for any ship group that risked poking to our shores.


Type "Lada" diesel-electric submarines


But - did not. According to the open press, it is difficult to understand whose fault it is - the lead developer of the Rubin Central Design Bureau or one of its contractors. There are many complaints against Lada submarines, the most well-known is the chronic shortage of power of the power plant, which usually failed, developing 60-70% of the total power. There were also serious shortcomings in the work of a number of basic systems, such as the SJC Lira and the CIU Li, and it is not clear whether it was possible to eliminate them. And although 28 in July, 2016 Mr. Vice-President for Military Shipbuilding of the United Shipbuilding Corporation Igor Ponomarev announced that there was no final decision to stop or resume construction of the submarine of the 677 project, but too many signs that the submarine failed.

The head submarine "St. Petersburg" is in trial operation with 2010 g, and still not completely accepted by the fleet. And for good reason, in 2013, the Rubin Central Design Bureau received an order to develop the appearance of a non-nuclear submarine of the 5 generation Kalina: there is an opinionthat this submarine can go to the series already in 2018, instead of the boats of the project 677.

But there are a lot of questions about Kalina. Despite a number of triumphant reports, the development of a domestic VNEU has been delayed, and today we have no air-independent engine for submarines. Now several teams, including the Rubin Central Design Bureau, are engaged in the development of the VNEU, and the VNEU of the latter should undergo sea tests in the 2016 year. But it should be understood that between such tests and mass production may take more than one year.

This option is also possible - some time ago there were ARTICLES about making lithium-ion batteries. On the one hand, this is not a promising technology like the VNEU, but their use can, at times, increase the range (including the full) of a diesel-electric submarine. There are also some hopes that the development of lithium-ion batteries was a success for domestic developers better than VNEU. And therefore it cannot be ruled out that in case of a complete failure of the VNEU development in the Russian Federation, Kalina will receive conventional diesel-electric power engineering, but with lithium-ion batteries, which nevertheless significantly increase their capabilities in comparison with the power plants of the 877 or 636.3 submarines.

All this, of course, is fine, but: non-nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy are needed right now, and the first Kalina can be laid no earlier than 2018. And it’s more than likely that the specified period will “move” to the right more than once ... Besides just as the famous captain Vrungel said: “As you call a yacht, so it will sail”. Well, who came up with giving the newest submarine naming from the domestic auto industry?

The Russian Federation has production facilities and money, but now and in the next few years we will be able to build only the updated, still formidable, but obsolete "Varshavyanka" 636.3 project, representing a deep modernization of the same 877 project (more precisely, its export 636 modifications. This is not encouraging, but today such construction is the only way to ensure at least some acceptable number of our non-nuclear submarine forces.

In general, the Russian submarine fleet was on the verge of unstable equilibrium. Apart from the submarines commissioned under the HPV program 2011-2020. The Russian Navy as of 2016 g has (in service, in repair, awaiting repair):
1) 6 SSBNs of project 667BDRM;
2) 25 non-strategic nuclear submarines (8 SSGNs of project 949A "Antey", and 17 MPLATRKs: 10 of project 971 "Pike-B", 3 - of project 671RTM (K) "Pike", 2 of project 945 "Barracuda", 2 of project 945A "Condor");
3) 16 diesel-electric submarines of project 887.

In essence, this is a completely scanty value, moreover, it is also spread over all four fleets of the Russian Federation, and if we consider that a significant part of these ships is not in the line, the picture is completely unattractive. Even worse, almost all of the above ships were put into operation in the 80-x and early 90-s, and almost all of them will have to leave the composition of the Russian Navy to 2030. And what can we put in place instead of them? While unconditional progress (8-10 “Boreev” and “Boreev-A”) should be expected in the SSBN, the picture is far from optimistic regarding the multi-purpose submarines. According to current plans, before 2023 g we must receive the entire 7 SSGN of the 885 and 885M “Ash” project. It is possible that during the 2020-2030 period some more of these ships will be ordered. But now one such boat is being built up to 6 years (laid out in 2016 g "Perm" in the fleet is expected only in 2022 g) and if even in the near future the time to build them can be knocked down to 4 years, can we count on the 18 tab of the SSGN " Ash "in the period 2021-2026? Obviously not, which means that the worst times for Russian non-strategic atarinas are still ahead.

The situation could somehow be corrected by non-nuclear ships, now it is entirely possible to expect that according to the LG-2011-2020, the Russian Navy will include 12 diesel-electric submarines of the 636.3 project (six each for the Black Sea and Pacific fleets) and three diesel-electric submarines of the 667 "Lada" project. And the latter, perhaps, will not become full-fledged warships, and the 636.3 project is no longer the best of what plow the depths of the ocean. But still, these are entire 15 ships, and if during the 2020-2030 period, the construction of the newest Kalina submarines of the project develops, then by the 2030 g we will be able to seriously increase the number of groups of non-nuclear submarines compared to what we have today. And at least so rectify the truly deplorable situation with atomic multi-purpose submarines. But in general, neither to 2020 g, nor to 2030 g a serious breakthrough in the number of submarine forces of the Russian Navy is expected.

But it was precisely in the submarines part of the HPN program 2011-2020 that the least amount of errors was made. The types of nuclear and non-nuclear submarines are correctly identified, the work on their missile armament is relatively successful: Onyx and Caliber clearly succeeded, but Bulava is, of course, in question. It is quite possible (here open sources do not indulge in data) that the newest torpedoes “Physicist” and “Case” will at least reduce our lag in torpedoes, and perhaps even completely level them. But even in spite of all this, the failure to develop small non-nuclear submarines and to reduce the cost of the latest SSGNs has meant that we will at best stabilize the current situation over the next 15 years.

What then to say about the surface fleet, in the construction of which the Russian Navy, seems to have decided to make every conceivable mistake, not missing a single one ...

To be continued.
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103 comments
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  1. +21
    10 August 2016 06: 40
    I read it with interest, and sometimes even with pleasure "+". However, there are also controversial points, for example this:
    In general, the Borey turned out to be an extremely successful boat, combining moderate displacement, fairly powerful weapons (16 SLBMs) ​​and excellent low noise levels.
    The service of the SSBN for this project is just beginning and to say how successful it is obviously premature. No. In addition, in my opinion, despite the fact that Andrei raised a very sharp topic and does not hesitate to call a spade a spade, sometimes he is prone to subjectivity and does not always use verified information.
    1. +14
      10 August 2016 08: 34
      Quote: Bongo
      in my opinion, despite the fact that Andrei raised a very sharp topic and does not hesitate to call a spade a spade, sometimes he is prone to subjectivity and uses not always verified information.

      Well, agree Sergey, the articles of the crisis manager Andrei Kolobov are much more informative and truthful than the articles of the captain of the 1 rank Sivakov!
      1. +10
        10 August 2016 11: 11
        Quote: Serg65
        Well, agree Sergey, the articles of the crisis manager Andrei Kolobov are much more informative and truthful than the articles of the captain of the 1 rank Sivakov!

        I absolutely agree with you! Yes I always read Andrey’s publications with great pleasure, although we argued a couple of times, but it’s always nice to argue with a smart person! Andrei, write more, unfortunately there are not many such authors! good
      2. +2
        10 August 2016 14: 41
        I absolutely agree with you and with my fellow countryman The author, but especially "intriguing" CONTINUED ...
    2. 0
      10 August 2016 09: 09
      We can already say with confidence that the fleet rearmament program until the 2020 of the year is partially failed.
      1. +11
        10 August 2016 09: 17
        Quote: Vadim237
        We can already say with confidence that the fleet rearmament program until the 2020 of the year is partially failed.

        I do not recall a single shipbuilding program in the history of the fleet that would not be partially failed. There are always grandiose plans on paper, barely half is obtained in metal. Well, at least they do something, and not like in 90.
        1. +8
          10 August 2016 17: 48
          Quote: Alex_59
          Quote: Vadim237
          We can already say with confidence that the fleet rearmament program until the 2020 of the year is partially failed.

          I do not recall a single shipbuilding program in the history of the fleet that would not be partially failed. There are always grandiose plans on paper, barely half is obtained in metal. Well, at least they do something, and not like in 90.

          "The mountain gave birth to a mouse ..." The fleet is not built for the amusement of the public and not to discuss its problems on the forums. What is happening now cannot be called anything other than "to calm public opinion." The monstrous pace of destruction of the Fleet, as one of the most important, if not the most important, component of military power (mind you, not the nuclear triad, but more broadly), in the 90-00s, does not give the occupation authorities of the Russian Federation a delay in time. Even a non-specialist can see that the Russian Federation is NOT READY today to perform a full-fledged confrontation with a potential enemy at sea. There are no one-time, spectacular words, actions with "calibers" and demonstrations of the flag, far from a WAR AT SEA. We are definitely not ready for it, unlike our "sworn partners" ...
          1. 0
            12 August 2016 14: 47
            "The mountain gave birth to a mouse ..."
            I regret to note YES. But firstly, Russia is a land power. And secondly, there are different mice.
      2. +7
        10 August 2016 11: 07
        the program is not just failed, there is no one to build and repair the fleet! everything, - the last grandfathers leave such corpses, mechanics, electric mechs - and. t d. and what will you do? without specialists? because all the schools killed! teachers, dispersed! Well, how are you going to build a fleet ???
    3. +15
      10 August 2016 09: 20
      Quote: Bongo
      I read it with interest, and sometimes even with pleasure "+"

      Thank you, good to hear!
      Quote: Bongo
      However, there are controversial issues

      Well, where without them :)
      Quote: Bongo
      The service of the SSBN for this project is just beginning and to say how successful it is obviously premature.

      Well, how to say - it starts ... of course, on the one hand you are right. On the other hand, the transfer of 955 to the fleet is proceeding more or less routinely, there were only problems with the Bulava, but no one cursed at the boat itself. Dissatisfaction with "Severodvinskoye" slipped through, but I don't remember about Borey.
      Quote: Bongo
      sometimes he is prone to subjectivity and operates with not always verified information

      That is yes. I’m just a person, nothing subjective is alien to me :))) And there is very little proven information.
      1. +4
        10 August 2016 11: 18
        Minor flaws of the essence of the matter do not change, I liked the article with its balanced approach and analysis of the state of affairs in the Russian Navy, attempts to deal with the essence of the problems that have accumulated in shipbuilding, without emotional overlaps and cliches, which many articles of this plan sin ...
        I will refrain from remarks of a professional nature, since I have encountered few fleets - I served in the NE of the USSR, except at one time with the 5th Operational Squadron in the Mediterranean ...
        I wish you success and look forward to continuing ....
        1. +4
          10 August 2016 11: 42
          Thanks, I will try not to disappoint!
          1. +3
            10 August 2016 13: 41
            Andrei really read with pleasure. good
            We are waiting for the surface fleet.

            And on the article a couple of questions:

            1) The creation of a new naval ICBM was generally surprising. It will not be very soon. Mace: have you already completed all 5 launches planned by Shoigu or has everything stopped?
            2) A series of "ash-trees" the less, the more expensive. And as the world practice shows, MPLARC never comes out cheap. This applies not only to the Navy.
            DO NOT tell me how things are going with the subsequent Ashes? Severodvinsk is generally in fog. Nothing is heard of him. The last time appeared in a funny article on the account of transferring it to leasing to India laughing . Maybe I just missed it.
            All the same, you need to cut them, because there is no other option. Cost, cost, how else?
            3) I do not understand the problems of VNEU: Holland floats on VNEU, Germans too, Australians even. Why is our problem so acute? Perhaps a problem with the developer ?!

            hi
            1. jjj
              +2
              10 August 2016 15: 50
              Quote: silver_roman
              I do not understand the problems of VNEU: the Netherlands floats on the VNEU, the Germans too, the Australians even. Why do we have such an acute problem? Perhaps a problem with the developer ?!

              They walk the same way we do. Everyone is tormented. So far no one has a really working non-volatile installation. Everything else is an advertising booth. Today, from a practical point of view, only diesel-electric submarines with elements of VNZU can be considered.
              And in general, there is a review of the global role of the fleets. Therefore, investing in projects of the past now will not be entirely correct. The paramount task is to keep the existing abilities afloat. The situation now, in fact, as during the era of sailing
              1. The comment was deleted.
            2. +4
              10 August 2016 20: 33
              Quote: silver_roman
              The creation of a new naval ICBM was generally surprising. It will not be very soon.

              Yes, but still it will be. Work on this topic should be carried out in any case - even a flying mace is still not the best weapon, it is necessary to work further unambiguously.
              Quote: silver_roman
              Mace: have you already completed all 5 launches planned by Shoigu or has everything stopped?

              It seems to be scheduled two launches this year?
              Quote: silver_roman
              The smaller the series of ash trees, the more expensive. And as the world practice shows, MPLARC never comes out cheap. This applies not only to the Navy.

              Well, the problem is that the Seawulfs didn't even pull the US with their bottomless barrel of dollars, and switched to cheaper (and much worse) Virginias. At the same time, in the USSR, there was still a division into Antei and more modest Pike-B. What we need now is very difficult to say, it's just that the SSGN is still a shock one, but if you cover your own SSBNs and crush enemy nuclear submarines, then you can do with the PLAT. Maybe we should go back to the division of labor ...
              Quote: silver_roman
              DO NOT tell me how things are going with the subsequent Ashes?

              Yes, it’s as if everything is normal, in the sense that they are building quietly, nm there certainly aren’t any cotostrophs
              Quote: silver_roman
              The last time appeared in a funny article on the account of transferring it to leasing to India

              Well, the Indians' lip is not a fool :))) They will not give it up, of course. "You need such a cow yourself!"
              Quote: silver_roman
              I do not understand the problems of VNEU: the Netherlands floats on the VNEU, the Germans too, the Australians even. Why do we have such an acute problem? Perhaps a problem with the developer ?!

              There are already about six of these developers. Rubin should be in front of everyone, but it is possible that the work is completely deadlocked. They developed the "hydrogen" direction of VNEU, and it is explosive and in general ... there were rumors that the Rubinites, having eaten an incredible amount of budget money for the hydrogen VNEU, are now simply afraid to declare it a dead end, because the design bureau could break like a heating pad for it.
              1. +2
                10 August 2016 21: 27
                About the Indians, information seemed to have slipped that they agreed to the second Pike.

                Here is an ambush with VNEU, of course. It seems that awards have already been handed out for an almost "ready-for-series" reforming block of diesel fuel from Rubin (April publication), but since then silence. Although the idea is very sensible. Or maybe they really got to the point, or to real results and classified the progress of work. Very much, by the way, in our style. @@
              2. 0
                11 August 2016 11: 04
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                even a flying mace is still not the best weapon

                What's the problem with a flying mace? abandoned weight? range? it seems like he is covering all the states, but no more.
                Her weight certainly can not be compared with the P-29 or P-39, but still there the emphasis is on missile defense systems, tricks - false blocks, etc.
                That and 8 blocks of 150 kT are like a lot. And it seems that it is possible and fewer blocks, but 300 each.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                It seems to be scheduled two launches this year?

                that something has quieted down or are doing it inadvertently from everyone.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Well, the problem is that the Seawulfs didn't even pull the US with its bottomless barrel of dollars.

                "dear" for us and for the Yankees is a very different concept. If our head is estimated to be 1.5 lard green, then the seawulfs are sure that they are pulling by 5. In addition, it is not clear how much will be cut there. They have corruption and a military lobby much cooler than our "puppies" in the defense industry. Those. this is not corruption, but a full-fledged side of the deal, in which part of the dough goes into the pocket of bureaucrats, the military, etc.
                At the expense of the PLAT - there are enough non-atomic ones for this, but it is necessary to bring to mind either VNEU, or at least lithium-ion batteries.
                It's too cool to have so many different projects in the navy. Ideally, of course, it would be 955, 885 and "viburnum". I think it would be enough.
                I don’t want to, as in the surface fleet: 100500 projects only RTOs.,

                As for the "ash": as I understand it. What is already the 885M? Therefore, there is probably a delay. This is the problem we have: while we hand over the head one, there are already many improvements and the next serial one becomes the head one with the letter "m". I like the amers' approach: they riveted 200 F-35s. Yes, they are raw, but they are there and fly. Now they will bring to mind, they will assign block II and all the buzz. It would be necessary to rivet the fleet already, tk. soon there will be nothing to sail, and then they will be modernized. Kazan takes a very long time to build.
  2. +2
    10 August 2016 06: 45
    To be continued ... Already encouraging, otherwise I already decided that everything will end with a sub-melting.
    1. +4
      10 August 2016 09: 21
      Quote: Leto
      otherwise I already decided that everything would end with a sub-melting.

      Of course not. Everything with the subfloor is exactly the same for us, but with the submarines ... in general, the song.
      1. 0
        10 August 2016 10: 56
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        but with the surface soldiers ... generally a song.

        ... in different voices, while the performers to varying degrees of intoxication ...
        1. +1
          10 August 2016 11: 33
          Quote: Leto
          . to different voices, while the performers to varying degrees of intoxication ...

          what But you, as a teetotaler, do you think what kind of surface fleet Russia needs?
          1. +2
            10 August 2016 21: 38
            A good phrase above was about the boundary of eras. There are so many weapons developments in the making. And it is not clear what will go and what will break off. And under what gun to build frigates?
            If everything seems to be clear with UKKS, then how to start it with another question. And intelligence systems, target designation? What about ship and group air defense? Sonar, self-defense systems, means of RTR and electronic warfare ...
            And there are many promising projects, but in real readiness there is almost nothing. Well, maybe Caliber and Onyx. Crossroads.
      2. +3
        11 August 2016 16: 31
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Everything with the subfloor is exactly the same for us, but with the submarines ... in general, the song.
        Andrew, hello.
        Remembered Nekrasov? ("... this groan we call SONGS ...") bully
        1. 0
          11 August 2016 17: 00
          Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
          Remembered Nekrasov? ("... this groan we call SONGS ..."

          Greetings categorically! drinks
          Yeah ... Although all this reminds me more of Krylov, with his swan, which pike is cancer ...
  3. +8
    10 August 2016 07: 17
    A great article, I didn’t even expect to see such a thing. The photo of the GOD had an extremely depressing effect (my former order). Hmm ... almost new ships were written off .....
    1. +2
      10 August 2016 09: 22
      Quote: Dimon19661
      Great article, did not even expect to see this is not IN

      Thank you!
      Quote: Dimon19661
      The photo of the GODGEST produced an extremely depressing effect (

      Not that word. Especially considering that a "living" ship of this type is extremely beautiful
  4. +8
    10 August 2016 07: 41
    Well, who invented giving the latest submarines naming from the domestic auto industry?
    Andrey from Chelyabinsk - actually KALINA is a bitter berry! And "Lada" is an ancient Russian goddess.wink
    And By car "Kalina" - the cost per kilometer of "Kalina" is much cheaper than ANY other cars. Therefore, the French leadership of AvtoVAZ is trying to "push" it, putting on the conveyor the unnecessary Datsuns and Almeri. hi
    P, C, A article is cool! good
    1. +1
      10 August 2016 09: 05
      I think that the cost of a kilometer hour on a "penny" is even lower. I think that the only desire of the Avtovaz management is to make money.

      And the name was given by the same people who gave the Russian combat submarine a name in honor of the commercial campaign. )
      1. +5
        10 August 2016 11: 05
        Quote: clidon
        And the name was given by the same people who gave the Russian combat submarine a name in honor of the commercial campaign. )

        Remember the 90s how warships were renamed for the sake of patronage help, at least with money, at least with food, at least with paint ... There was RRC "Slava" (which could sound better?) Became "Moskva" so that Luzhkov would pour money.
        1. +12
          10 August 2016 11: 37
          Quote: Leto
          There was RRC "Slava" (what could sound better?) Became "Moscow" so that Luzhkov would pour money.

          As a witness to this event, I am ready to bow to Yuri Mikhailovich for this! And I don’t think it is shameful, his cruiser saved the money and the Black Sea Fleet turned to sixteen with a combat officer. He, unlike balabolov did the job!
          1. jjj
            +6
            10 August 2016 15: 54
            Quote: Serg65
            As a witness to this event, I am ready to bow to Yuri Mikhailovich for this!

            Yuri Mikhailovich saved the children of Severodvinsk from starvation by arranging free hot meals in the city’s schools at the expense of the capital. This alone he writes off a lot and the Lord will be counted. So he spends time in the apiary, and not in the logging
    2. +6
      10 August 2016 09: 27
      Quote: Ingvar 72
      Andrey from Chelyabinsk - actually KALINA is a bitter berry! And "Lada" is an ancient Russian goddess.

      Alas, our auto industry tried to associate these names only with him am
      Quote: Ingvar 72
      And By car "Kalina" - the cost per kilometer of "Kalina" is much cheaper than ANY other cars

      It's hard to believe it :)))
      1. +3
        10 August 2016 13: 48
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Alas, our auto industry tried to associate these names only with him

        I’ve been driving Kalina for 5 years - it took us several times less money to pay for maintenance than for Opel Astra (I left for 6 years).
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        It's hard to believe it :)))

        Easy to check! wink
        1. +2
          10 August 2016 15: 03
          Quote: Ingvar 72
          I’ve been driving Kalina for 5 years - it took us several times less money to pay for maintenance than for Opel Astra (I left for 6 years).

          I go to the auris-auris (not a subcompact Yaris, but an analogue of the kings). Since 2009, I have been pouring gasoline, changing the oil for maintenance, and sometimes the brake discs have been changed there (grinding off). All. I didn’t spend money on repairs (I knocked a little a couple of times, so the insurance paid for repairs). A relative has viburnum. It will go out, then go out ...
          1. +3
            10 August 2016 17: 57
            Although it’s offtopic, my friend Kalina has repairs, but they’re all cheap or a guarantee at the beginning. And with foreign cars, it’s lucky, someone practically without problems, someone with such jambs that at least the light of a carcass. Like a colleague working with Tiguan, a chain jumped off. Engine overhaul of 40 thousand. The car only turned three years old. But more comfortable and roomy.
  5. +8
    10 August 2016 07: 56
    hi Welcome Andrew! This time you touched on the burning topic of the state and development of the fleet! With interest I read somewhere I agree, but somewhere controversial points.
    In essence, the shipbuilding program GPV 2011-2020 g is a program for the construction of the coastal fleet, focused on the protection of the sea borders of the motherland. Admittedly, this is the only reasonable option for the development of the Navy at that time.

    Here you are absolutely right, it’s not so expensive to build an aircraft carrier, but it needs planes, the planes need a training center, the ship needs basic infrastructure, training squads are needed to form the crew (I remember in 80’s in Kronshtadt there was a special training squad that let out firefighters for TAKR, in my number 999). Now, many are blaming the government and Putin personally for the oil needle, but no one offers a quick and adequate alternative to replacing the raw material component of the Russian economy. And money is needed NOW and it is necessary to build not only ships, planes and tanks. As for the fleet, in order to create the Ocean Fleet, not only warships of the ocean zone are needed, but also the corresponding auxiliary fleet, which is often several times greater than the naval composition of warships. Therefore, you are absolutely right that ..
    the program is made taking into account the real capabilities of domestic shipbuilding: the main emphasis is on submarines and relatively small ships - corvettes and frigates. Thus, Russian shipbuilding has the opportunity to develop “from simple to complex

    I do not agree ..
    4 cans of the universal landing ship (UDC) of the Mistral type

    In light of the return of the RF Ministry of Defense and Pacific Fleet in particular to the Kuril Islands, these cans would be very useful given the lack of berths and places convenient for landing.
    Of course, it was fun to hear how the frigate of the 22350 project with its cruising range of 4 000 nautical miles at 14 nodes was universally called an ocean ship. Here are the Soviet cruisers of the 26 bis project, capable of traveling 4 880 miles at 18 nodes (and Pacific cruisers even up to 5 590 miles at the same speed) - this is universally recognized as ships with a very limited cruising range sufficient for the Black and Baltic Seas but unsuitable for the North and Pacific theaters. And frigate 22350 is oceanic.

    Andrey, given your articles on pr.26-26 bis, should you know what the Slava LKR did in the Mediterranean Sea! The Russian fleet differs from the enemy's fleets in that it is not predictable bully ! Tembolee pr. 22350 is essentially a continuation of the concept of pr. 1135, and the "Petrels" only probably have not been to Australia and Antarctica.
    For this, there was just “nothing” - to correctly determine the classes and performance characteristics of the ships included in the program, linking them with the capabilities of domestic design bureaus of naval armaments and other instruments and equipment. Well, industry, of course.

    That's where the dog is buried!
    A article of course +
    1. +7
      10 August 2016 09: 23
      Quote: Serg65
      Tembolee pr. 22350 is essentially a continuation of the concept of pr. 1135, and the "Petrels" only probably have not been to Australia and Antarctica.

      About 1135 there is an excellent book P. Vasiliev, S. Mashensky "The ship is like a bird. Guard ships of projects 1135, 1135M, 11353, 11352". All combat services are scheduled there. When I first read it, I was very surprised - how long these ships wound in the oceans, beyond all standards of autonomy. In this regard, a very important, but hardly noticeable event is the laying down of supply vessels 23130 and 23131 at the Nevsky and Kerch shipyards. Very necessary vessels - with tankers in general, everything has been very bad so far. Their commissioning will even allow 22350 and 11356 to go to the Indian Ocean without relying on coastal bases (which we almost do not have).
      1. +3
        10 August 2016 10: 12
        Hello Alex hi ... Many stories of the Soviet Navy are connected with the Petrel, here and the "Selfless" ramming "Yorktown", and "Zadorny" in splendid isolation made bold and daring maneuvers against the ships of the AUG led by "J. Washington" while guarding the TAVKR "Kuznetsov" in 1991 .. ..the ships were notable, these Petrels, and the commanders match them.
        Quote: Alex_59
        Very necessary vessels - with tankers, in general we still had everything very bad

        We have bad things not only with tankers, there are no aquarius, supply transports, ACC vessels, floating bases, few killers, SRov and even a small cart and a ship!
        1. 0
          10 August 2016 10: 36
          Quote: Serg65
          We have bad things not only with tankers, there are no aquarius, supply transports, ACC vessels, floating bases, few killers, SRov and even a small cart and a ship!

          There seems to be some progress, though not big.
          SS Ave. 20180 built, Ave. 21300. MB build 22870, boats 23040, 23370.
          BGK pr. 19920, 19910, OIS 22010.
          They started to move.
          1. +1
            10 August 2016 11: 30
            Quote: Alex_59
            SS Ave. 20180

            And here is SS "Elbrus" pr.537 - a city, a factory and a steamer rolled into one.
            Displacement 13400 t., Length 175 m, width 35 m. And draft 9,5 m.
            A true ocean lifeguard!
    2. +2
      10 August 2016 09: 39
      Greetings, dear Sergey!
      Quote: Serg65
      I agree somewhere, but controversial moments

      Where without them :))
      Quote: Serg65
      Now, many are blaming the government and Putin personally for the oil needle, but no one offers a quick and adequate alternative to replacing the raw material component of the Russian economy.

      The problem is not that there is no quick alternative. She really isn’t. The problem is that our leadership DOESN’t understand at all how to get out of there and (apparently - not specifically) does everything to stay on it, although there are opportunities to get off (not quickly).
      Quote: Serg65
      I do not agree ..
      4 cans of the universal landing ship (UDC) of the Mistral type

      :)))
      Quote: Serg65
      In light of the return of the RF Ministry of Defense and Pacific Fleet in particular to the Kuril Islands, these cans would be very useful given the lack of berths and places convenient for landing.

      What for? In the radius of Japanese aviation, we still will not establish supplies, sending UDCs without air cover less than an IA regiment is a little dull, and there is nowhere to get an IA regiment from the Kuril Islands. Well, in peacetime, and without UDC, we will figure it out.
      Quote: Serg65
      Andrey, taking into account your articles on pr.26-26 bis, should you know what the LKR "Slava" was doing in the Mediterranean

      I know, I know :))) But strictly speaking, the range is still not enough. We have people on 350-ton destroyers in Tsushima passed half the world, but you must admit, this is not a reason to call them ocean ships :)
      Quote: Serg65
      and the "Petrels" only probably have not been to Australia and Antarctica

      Wow ... legend ships
      Quote: Serg65
      A article of course +

      Thank you!
      1. +1
        10 August 2016 10: 23
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        What for? In the radius of Japanese aviation, we still will not establish supplies, sending UDCs without air cover less than an IA regiment is a bit scanty, and there is no place to take an IA regiment from the Kuril Islands.

        Burevestnik Airfield (Iturup) - Runway 2400x33, state - active
        Iturup airdrome (Iturup island) - Runway 2300х42, state - active
        Vetrovoy airdrome (Iturup island) - Runway 3000x70, condition - destroyed
        Sokol airfield (Dolinsk, Sakhalin Island) - runway 2500х46, condition - current
        Khomutovo Airfield (Sakhalin Island) - Runway 3500x45, state - current
        Leonidovo airfield (Poranaysk, Sakhalin Island) - runway 2000х57, condition - partially destroyed
        1. +1
          10 August 2016 10: 45
          Quote: Alex_59
          Burevestnik Airfield (Iturup) - Runway 2400x33, state - active
          Iturup airdrome (Iturup island) - Runway 2300х42, state - active

          It is very unlikely, frankly, because right under the nose of the Japanese, it will be quite easy to knock out these airfields, but to protect ...
          Quote: Alex_59
          Sokol airfield (Dolinsk, Sakhalin Island) - runway 2500х46, condition - current
          Khomutovo Airfield (Sakhalin Island) - Runway 3500x45, state - current

          Wow, that could help. But, as far as I heard, the Sakhalin air defense aerodromes are completely ruined and completely unworkable, nothing can be based on them
          1. +4
            10 August 2016 10: 56
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            It is very unlikely, frankly, because right under the nose of the Japanese, it will be quite easy to knock out these airfields, but to protect ...

            Well, duck are not alive with a single aviation ... It is necessary to provide cover accordingly, with the help of air defense systems, radar. In Soviet times, the IAP of the Air Defense Forces was based in Burevestnik - 40 vehicles, no problem. "Iturup" is a civilian airport, but one more regiment can receive, or to disperse aircraft from Petrel. Vetrovoe - as an alternate unpaved airfield + helicopters. Built on rocks, it had no artificial turf even in the best years, although it was planned to plant "strategists" on it.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Wow, that could help. But, as far as I heard, the Sakhalin air defense aerodromes are completely ruined and completely unworkable, nothing can be based on them

            The falcon is active, not destroyed, is used regularly, although it does not have a permanently based unit. Leonidovo - the cover plates were partially removed, but the infrastructure was preserved, after some restoration efforts it is still able to serve. There is also the Smirnykh airfield - here it is completely destroyed. Khomutovo is a civilian airport, and cancellation of civilian flights can accommodate up to 2 regiments.
          2. +1
            10 August 2016 11: 11
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            as far as I heard, the Sakhalin air defense airdromes are completely ruined and completely unworkable, nothing can be based on them

            what and the war with Japan is not tomorrow!
      2. +2
        10 August 2016 11: 09
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The problem is not that there is no quick alternative. She really isn’t. The problem is that our leadership DOESN’t understand at all how to get out of there and (apparently - not specifically) does everything to stay on it, although it’s possible to get off (not fast) is.

        I now desperately need to buy a timing belt, two financing options; take a stash from the nightstand, or wait for the salary bully . In my case, take a stash the belt is already dead wink
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In the radius of Japanese aviation, we still will not establish a supply

        In Soviet times, the 41st IAP was based on Iturup (Burevestnik) and there was also the Vetrovoy airfield, so the "figvam-Eskimo national hut" wink
        1. +1
          10 August 2016 12: 40
          Quote: Serg65
          I now desperately need to buy a timing belt, two financing options; take a stash from the nightstand, or wait for the salary. In my case, take a stash the belt is already dead

          There is also a third option, which many of our politicians love so much. Not buying a belt, but throwing the wheelbarrow as it is, the proceeds are partly offshore, partly into the "stabilization fund". For the rest - stir up a holiday, like the Olympics in Sochi. The headache is zero, otherwise you still need to figure out which belts are, how to change them.
  6. +1
    10 August 2016 08: 53
    How proud I was when I watched a documentary about Shark Square. there just like Severstal showed which was based in Severodvinsk. and what was my disappointment when I found out that almost the entire line of Sharks was sent for conservation. such giants. could still swim remake them and so on. as a result, there was only one left and that as a testing ground. very very sorry
    1. +1
      10 August 2016 14: 10
      From 941 the Yankees simply wandered, and one of the conditions for the collapse was a 941 cut.
  7. -2
    10 August 2016 09: 14
    Article plus. The most yummy is obviously ahead - about the surface component.
    since solid fuel provides the rocket with a number of significant advantages. Lower flight path
    The shape of the BR flight path is determined by the pitch angle and speed at the moment of traction cutoff of the last marching stage. Fuel is secondary here. But this is so, nitpicking. smile
    And therefore, during the period 1990-2010. the industry did not live, but survived, having received a blow, perhaps even more powerful than during the 1917 - 1927 period,
    Now Kaptsov will come and say that it’s even worse now, but under Yeltsin we built the wow. Shipbuilding (and industry in general) is an inert thing - there are no orders today - the collapse will be in ten to twenty years. So the worst is yet to come.
    1. 0
      10 August 2016 09: 41
      Quote: Alex_59
      The shape of the BR flight path is determined by the pitch angle and speed at the moment of traction cutoff of the last marching stage. Fuel is secondary here

      As I understand it, a significantly smaller active area for solid-fuel SLBMs makes this pitch angle sharper than for liquid fuels, but maybe I'm wrong request
      1. +1
        10 August 2016 10: 07
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        As I understand it, a significantly smaller active area for solid-fuel SLBMs makes this pitch angle sharper than for liquid fuels, but maybe I'm wrong

        You can set any angle while the engine is running - the flight is controlled. After turning off the remote control, the angle will change only under the influence of gravity. In the meantime, the remote control works, you can do at least 90 degrees, at least zero. Regardless of the type of fuel.
  8. +2
    10 August 2016 09: 22
    The author uses the term "modern sea battle". But what is this? The last of the "modern naval battles" I remember in the Falklands and our American patrol ram in the 80s. Greenpeace and mine explosions are not counted.
    Nobody knows what a sea battle in the XNUMXst century is until this battle happens. At a time when the Caliber can be launched from an inconspicuous container ship and hit something significant with it, priorities are rapidly changing.
    Who is better prepared for modern warfare, missile crews or crews for their potential goals? Nobody knows that. And just trying to guess. Who guesses correctly, he will win, if that.
    1. -1
      10 August 2016 09: 34
      That's right. Container ship can be easily remade
      under a full warship.
      Mount on it a pair of C-300 installations for protection against aircraft,
      a couple of Thors against low-flying targets, several starting Gauges for attacks.
      And a cannon 150 mm for order. Before this queen of the seas, let the minesweeper from the mines, and let the diesel submarine run from below to protect it from torpedoes.
      And you get a powerful naval ship.
      I also forgot the radar tower.
      1. The comment was deleted.
        1. -2
          10 August 2016 13: 57
          Quote: Cat Man Null
          Quote: voyaka uh
          And a cannon 150 mm for order. Before this queen of the seas, let the minesweeper from the mines, and let the diesel submarine run from below to protect it from torpedoes.
          And you get a powerful naval ship.
          Another tower with zab radars

          - You rely on something to explain to freaks ... udldbdkam, I’ll get drunk words
          - these are not people, this is meat

          I am bored to write on this subject. unstalaaaooa "

          A minusoff should be a hundred ... less uninteresting laughing
      2. 0
        10 August 2016 11: 09
        Quote: voyaka uh
        Container ship can be easily remade
        under a full warship.
        Mount on it a pair of C-300 installations for protection against aircraft,
        a couple of Thors against low-flying targets, several starting Gauges for attacks.
        And a cannon 150 mm for order. Before this queen of the seas, let the minesweeper from the mines, and let the diesel submarine run from below to protect it from torpedoes.
        And you get a powerful naval ship.
        I also forgot the radar tower.

        In the warm tube times of the old VIF uv. FVL suggested doing exactly the same thing on the basis of a supertanker. He argued that the high survivability of TN, shown during the Persian Gulf war.
      3. +2
        10 August 2016 11: 49
        Quote: voyaka uh
        That's right. Container ship can be easily remade
        under a full warship.
        Mount on it a pair of C-300 installations for protection against aircraft,
        a couple of Thors against low-flying targets, several starting Gauges for attacks.
        And a cannon 150 mm for order. Before this queen of the seas, let the minesweeper from the mines, and let the diesel submarine run from below to protect it from torpedoes.
        And you get a powerful naval ship.

        Alexei, would you be careful or something, the Palestinians with Lebanese are probably on the site!
      4. +1
        10 August 2016 13: 49
        On top of a couple more lasers, and a shuttle for reconnaissance ....
        And on the topic of your proposal, a merchant ship NEVER to be converted into a full-fledged warship is simply impossible, even with a lot of money and a huge desire. The maximum that you get is a raider whose combat value in modern conditions tends to zero.
        1. -1
          10 August 2016 23: 25
          Call it that: sea-based mobile missile base.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. +2
      10 August 2016 11: 46
      Quote: baudolino
      The author uses the term "modern sea battle". But what is this?

      pawn on e4!
      Quote: baudolino
      What is a naval battle in the 21st century, no one knows until this battle happens.

      That's right, we are sitting and waiting for the first sea collision in the 21 century, and there where the curve will take!
      Quote: baudolino
      At a time when the Caliber can be launched from an inconspicuous container ship and hit something significant with it, priorities are rapidly changing.

      What can you hit a significant "Caliber" at sea?
      Quote: baudolino
      Who is better prepared for modern warfare, missile crews or crews for their potential goals?

      Builders, after the war there will be many construction sites!
      1. 0
        10 August 2016 13: 37
        Quote: Serg65

        That's right, we are sitting and waiting for the first sea collision in the 21 century, and there where the curve will take!

        You cannot build a curve at one point. smile To understand that there is a modern naval battle, you need statistics of battles of modern ships with trained teams.
        And it will be like at the beginning of the last century:
        - do not care about the Civil Code, medium-speed shooters are more important!
        - down with the medium caliber - give an all-big-gun ship with a three-inch PMK!
        - mmm ... it would be necessary to return to the LK a normal anti-mine caliber.

        And all these throwings were after the results of the next wars.
        1. +1
          10 August 2016 14: 01
          Quote: Alexey RA
          And all these throwings were after the results of the next wars.

          Oh Alex, today without throwing wars! Shipbuilders and naval commanders physically do not keep pace with the manufacturers of weapons. They made a ship, and the weapons are already outdated .... here's a new one, but for a new one you still need to come up with a concept for combat use. In my opinion from here and shy from project to project.
    4. +2
      10 August 2016 13: 41
      But what about the attack of Georgian boats on 08.08.08?
  9. 0
    10 August 2016 09: 23
    The author is right. In our country, it is more important for capitalists to milk the country, and not to strengthen it. To reverse this situation, you need to have the will and courage that the authorities do not have.
    1. -8
      10 August 2016 09: 38
      Quote: Mareman Vasilich
      The author is right. In our country, it is more important for capitalists to milk the country, and not to strengthen it. To reverse this situation, you need to have the will and courage that the authorities do not have.

      Mavreman Vasi (b) q ..... the crown does not press?
      - to Durkee ... there there they are just like that, they’re being accepted ... just like that, come on (damn it) ....
      1. +2
        10 August 2016 12: 30
        Strange You Cat. You often give adequate comments, and sometimes you blurt out something like that ... Here you want to define a chela. That is, you do not agree that the military shipbuilding program has failed almost completely? What is your evidence? Argument. There are plenty of arguments for the failure of the program. Let's face it. Under the communists, there was a systematic approach, good or bad, but it was. Now, in fact, "some in the forest, some for firewood", ie. USC, as a single structure, does not exist and no matter how hard they try to put it together, it crumbles like sand. This is because there is no single owner - the state, which could ensure the development of the entire industry as a whole. It turns out that everyone pulls a piece of the blanket over himself and there is no integrity either in the plans or in the results of the work. Plus, not very high competence of the top leadership of the Navy in planning defense orders. Plus technological and personnel backwardness. I believe that only the complete nationalization of the industry under the most severe state control (well, you can find 2-3 people in the country who do not steal and do not take bribes) can raise this industry on its feet. And we get it, like in the fable about a swan, cancer and pike.
  10. -3
    10 August 2016 09: 37
    To the author, as a person who did not serve in the fleet


    Nuuu ... Marine Response Couch Troops?
    1. +3
      10 August 2016 09: 45
      Quote: hiukoko
      Nuuu ... Marine Response Couch Troops?

      In essence, the issues raised will be claims, about the sea captain? :)))
  11. +1
    10 August 2016 09: 47
    But now one such boat is being built up to 6 years (Perm was expected to be launched in the fleet in 2016 only in 2022) and if even in the near future it will be possible to shorten their construction time to 4 years, can we count on bookmark 18 SSGN " Ash "in the period 2021-2026? Obviously not, which means that the worst times for Russian non-strategic atomarians are still ahead.

    I can agree with the author that the Yasen and Yasen-M projects are successful in terms of functionality, but all these advantages completely cover the cost and construction time.
    And then the question arises of what to do with the multipurpose ...
    I think the most correct way today is the construction of both specialized and universal submarines. And there is no time for fat. "Kazan" has been under construction for 7 years! Plus the terms have been pushed back by another 2 years, that is, not 7, but 9 years at least ! And this MAPL is the head one Ash-M.
    The Lada project failed and this must be honestly recognized and that is why they are now trying to start building the Kalina project submarine as soon as possible. Will it work, time will tell.
    Maybe, as an option, recall the projects of submarines that were undeservedly curtailed and not reinvent the wheel, and having finished them taking into account modern technologies and realities, start building them? Who knows...
  12. 0
    10 August 2016 10: 20
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    The merits of the issues raised will be claims


    Well, there is one: subject information from open sources?

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    oh captain of the sea?


    Accepted. :)
    1. 0
      10 August 2016 10: 35
      Quote: hiukoko
      Well, there is one: subject information from open sources?

      Yes of course. For closed I did not come out with a rank :)
  13. +2
    10 August 2016 10: 37
    Mr. article is evidence.
    Everyone applauds, but I almost didn’t like anything. And most importantly - the person writes (the author) that he not a sailor. This is a keyword.
    Yes, he argues as an analyst. But having touched on a global topic, he is trying to describe all the problems of our fleet in a small article. All this is understandable.
    Messrs. Vilnit and Solomonov, being the general designers of the Design Bureau, about whom the esteemed author writes, they did everything possible to stretch and chat these problems in their units. For the sake of financing, they threatened the security of our country and are now resting on their laurels. This is especially worth mentioning when analyzing the situation in shipbuilding.
    The defeat of military schools in the structure of the Navy under Serdyukov. Is this not an answer to the situation with the command staff.
    Generally speaking, not talking about the reasons, but only hinting at them - all this still smacks of criticism.
    It was unpleasant to read like a former sailor. hi
    1. +5
      10 August 2016 11: 36
      Quote: Archikah
      Mr. article is evidence.

      In general, yes. Especially to you
      Quote: Archikah
      like a former sailor

      But here is the question. Will you show me similar material on VO or somewhere else? one in which (albeit in short form) would the main problems of the Navy be consolidated into one? In publications devoted to particular issues, something is highlighted, but on the whole it seems that in spite of individual shortcomings, everything is fine with us. Although in fact it’s rather the other way around - despite the separate bright places, everything is not at all good.
      Quote: Archikah
      Messrs. Vilnit and Solomonov, being the general designers of the Design Bureau, about whom the esteemed author writes, they did everything possible to stretch and chat these problems in their units. For the sake of financing, they threatened the security of our country and are now resting on their laurels.

      Well, Solomonov was nevertheless moved from the leadership of MIT, now he is only the chief designer, isn’t he? I don’t think that he is resting somewhere there - he’s actually a finished man, and there is only one question for him - to bring a mace, then, I think, they will not trust him and the naval toilet design.
      Quote: Archikah
      The defeat of military schools in the structure of the Navy under Serdyukov.

      As far as I know, what Serdyukov defeated is now being restored - i.e. with all his efforts, he did not do too much harm in this matter
      Maybe I'm wrong, but who prevents you from writing in detail about this in a comment, or even writing your own article? Incidentally, I do not suffer from star disease, and I understand perfectly that I can be mistaken in many matters. For - not a sailor, yes.
      Quote: Archikah
      Generally speaking, not talking about the reasons, but only hinting at them - all this still smacks of criticism.

      I don't understand this reproach. I am writing about the current state of affairs, and according to open sources - that everything is not clear with Bulava, that Lada, most likely, will not go into a large series, etc. The mace will either fly, or not, I do not know this, and I am honestly writing about this, and you suggest that I make the final verdict "will not fly" and explain why. Lack of command personnel - this is not Serdyukov's fault (although he is also to blame, of course, but he is not the root cause), but the fact that by 2010 one and a half ships remained at the wall.
      Quote: Archikah
      It was unpleasant to read like a former sailor.

      I regret that I caused your displeasure. Thank you, plus. Despite the clearly negative attitude to what I wrote, you criticize, remaining within the framework of the cultural discussion.
    2. +3
      10 August 2016 11: 55
      Quote: Archikah
      The defeat of military schools in the structure of the Navy under Serdyukov. Is this not an answer to the situation with the command staff.
      Generally speaking, not talking about the reasons, but only hinting at them - all this still smacks of criticism.
      It was unpleasant to read like a former sailor.

      As a retired sailor to a former sailor .... educational institutions of the Moscow Region, and not just the Navy, issue specialist officers, the officer becomes a commander in units and on ships after some time has passed.
      Show us the reasons for Comrade. former sailor!
  14. +1
    10 August 2016 11: 00
    After all, how does qualification work? There was a desire for someone to put at the head of the Ministry of Defense a person who was in no way related to military affairs, before (by the assumption of the Lord) the head of the Federal Tax Service. But no, it’s impossible in any way - first graduate from the General Staff Academy, then if you please command the company, then ... then ... then ... after this ... ... and then - you are welcome to the ministerial chair!

    In theory, of course, it is so ...
    But in practice I recommend recalling the Minister of the Sea of ​​Voivodship.
    At the end of the marine corps, it was made in 1878 in midshipmen.
    In 1878-1881 he was circumnavigating the clipper "Dzhigit".
    In 1884 he graduated from the course of the Nikolaev Maritime Academy in the shipbuilding department, promoted to the rank of lieutenant;
    since 1886, sailed in the Baltic Sea and abroad.
    In 1895, he was promoted to captain of the 2nd rank and appointed senior officer of the cruiser Svetlana.
    In 1899 he was appointed commander of the Brave boat, which was being built at the St. Petersburg Admiralty Plant.
    Appointed as the commander of the training ship Verny, Voevodsky sailed in 1902-1903 in a detachment of ships of the marine corps.
    In 1904 he was appointed head of the training team quartermaster and commander of the 1st rank cruiser "Duke of Edinburgh" and promoted to captain of the 1st rank.
    In 1906, he commanded a detachment of ships of the marine corps and in August of the same year he was appointed head of the naval academy and director of the marine corps; at this post, the Voivodship was promoted to rear admiral in 1907 and enlisted in His Majesty's retinue.
    In 1908 he was appointed fellow minister of the sea,
    in 1909 - Minister of the Sea and promoted to vice admiral.

    KR, KL, training ship, training cruiser, detachment of ships of the marine corps, director of the marine corps, EIV suite - and here he is, the future naval minister.

    2 years in office - and resignation, when the International Bank needed a new minister who would approve the transfer of the state admiralty to private hands and the order at the private factory of new LCs for the Black Sea Fleet.
    1. +1
      10 August 2016 11: 40
      So I write that qualification is not a panacea :)))
      Quote: Alexey RA
      when the International Bank needed a new minister who would approve the transfer of the state admiralty to private hands and the order at the private factory of new LCs for the Black Sea Fleet.

      But how to build! :))))
  15. +3
    10 August 2016 11: 18
    Quote: voyaka uh
    That's right. Container ship can be easily remade
    under a full warship.
    Mount on it a pair of C-300 installations for protection against aircraft,
    a couple of Thors against low-flying targets, several starting Gauges for attacks.
    And a cannon 150 mm for order. Before this queen of the seas, let the minesweeper from the mines, and let the diesel submarine run from below to protect it from torpedoes.
    And you get a powerful naval ship.
    I also forgot the radar tower.


    To do this, you will have to purchase a container ship abroad. With civilian shipbuilding, the country is generally full of seams. Alas.
  16. exo
    0
    10 August 2016 11: 23
    Good analytics, based on open data. And indeed, the article is more competent than what the expert Sivkov writes. Unfortunately, both there and there, the conclusion is disappointing: the fleet will be in ruin for a long time.
  17. +1
    10 August 2016 11: 39
    The article put a plus, because this is the most objective, in recent years, attempt to assess the situation in the Russian Navy. Without joyful patriotic statements about "Calibers", "Maces" and Small Missile Ships, which so abound in many, frankly, not very competent articles and comments. It would be very useful, if Andrei took up such a topic, to try to assess the state and prospects of the operational base of the fleets. Indeed, without it, even a built fleet will fall into decay in a short time. And the current state of this operational base is very poor.
    1. 0
      10 August 2016 12: 35
      Quote: Verdun
      It would be very useful if Andrei took up such a topic to try to assess the state and prospects of the fleet's operational base.

      I would love to, but for me it's a mystery behind 7 seals. Here I can only express a set of good wishes, but who needs it? :)
      1. 0
        10 August 2016 12: 48
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I would love to, but for me it's a mystery behind 7 seals

        Sorry. It is hoped that in VO there is someone else who has such information. For the fleet without bases and technical support is a piano on two legs.
  18. +1
    10 August 2016 12: 12
    The author presented the material from the perspective of operational tactical art of 60-70s g. The modern level of rocket science has significantly affected the composition and structure of the modern fleet, now small missile ships equipped with PCR ,, caliber ,, can solve strategic tasks, and there are ,, Onyx ,,, X101, X - 555. Some of them practically nullify the actions of the potential enemy’s ACG and hit ships of the 1st and 2nd rank in any zone. There is a separate conversation about the advantages of solid-fuel rockets over liquid rockets. ,, Mace ,, Solomonov will bring to the required characteristics this is not omneny and ,, ,, Sineva is certainly the crown of perfection Makeevtsev.
    1. +3
      10 August 2016 12: 21
      Quote: rica1952
      , now small missile ships equipped with PKR ,, caliber ,, can solve strategic problems

      It is impossible for a ship with a range of 2000 km to solve strategic tasks at a distance of 5000 km.
      there is Onyx, X101, X-555. Some of them practically nullify the actions of the ACG of the potential enemy and hit ships of the 1st and 2nd rank in any zone.
      If in your opinion the author lives in 60-70 years, then you, apparently, are in a parallel universe. Such categorical statements can only be made by "zeroing" the AUG at least once in reality. At the same time, judging by your comment, you did not understand even half of what the author of the article wrote about the problems of the Russian fleet.
    2. +6
      10 August 2016 12: 42
      Quote: rica1952
      The author presented the material from the standpoint of operational tactical art 60-70x

      You can’t imagine how many times throughout the history of the Navy exclamations like yours have been heard.
      - Urra, we came up with a torpedo, the Khan’s battleships, our destroyers are everything!
      “Urra, we came up with a submarine, Khan armadillos, and destroyers too!”
      “Urra, we came up with an airplane, now the whole fleet of the khan!”
      - Urra, we came up with missiles, now not only the Khan’s fleet, but also the Air Force, and maybe also the ground forces too (although Khrushchev didn’t particularly encroach on them :)))
      What is characteristic, the fleet is relevant and lives to this day. But his palliatives (fleet of destroyers, fleet of submarines, fleet of mosquito forces) were repeatedly ordered to live long, not justifying the hopes placed on them.
      1. +2
        10 August 2016 13: 19
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Urra, we came up with missiles, now not only the Khan’s fleet, but also the Air Force, and maybe also the ground forces too (although Khrushchev didn’t particularly encroach on them :)))

        In the final phase of Operation Anadyr, when the Americans blockaded Cuba, Khrushchev angrily asked Gorshkov ... where is your mother admiral vigorous mother ??? To which Gorshkov calmly replied ... so Nikita Sergeevich you yourself ordered to cut them! Khrushchev thought a little and uttered a brilliant phrase ... not true, I did not order this! So Andrew is not yours bully
        1. +1
          10 August 2016 13: 29
          Quote: Serg65
          To which Gorshkov calmly answered ... so Nikita Sergeyevich you yourself ordered them to be cut! Khrushchev thought a little and uttered a brilliant phrase ... not true, I did not order this!

          good laughing drinks Honest noble word, for the first time I hear! Thank you, laughed heartily :)
          1. +2
            10 August 2016 13: 51
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Honest noble word, for the first time I hear! Thank you, laughed heartily :)

            smile Well, if I really amused, then I'll tell you one more story. The cruiser "Kuibyshev" was allocated to Zhukov for a visit to Yugoslavia, the marshal, at the entrance to the ship's superstructure, hit his foot hard on the doorway coaming ... damn, what a muddled thought of such thresholds ... comrade. Marshal, so this is on purpose so that water does not get inside ... all your sailors are not polyuds, I order you to make thresholds humanly! Well, that was one of the last orders of the marshal! wassat
    3. +1
      10 August 2016 13: 25
      "The modern level of rocketry has significantly influenced the composition and structure of the modern fleet, now small missile ships equipped with the Caliber missile defense system can solve strategic tasks, and there is Onyx, X 101, X-555." - Subsonic cruise missiles against an aircraft carrier strike group are useless, and Caliber carriers can be counted on one hand.
      1. +4
        10 August 2016 14: 03
        Missiles by themselves are not aimed, Someone should give them target designation, and only then can they be launched. Here explain to us how the MRC can find the AUG without remaining in the affected area at the same time? And believe me, when conducting a military operation, the AWACS aircraft carrier will hang in the air around the clock, there will always be on-duty links there. Security ships will go in a wide order, creating an extensive air defense and anti-aircraft defense zone. Do not forget about at least 1-2 shock submarines that also protect the AOG. Only an equal defense scheme can be opened in strength the enemy, alas, the US Navy is currently missing. For example, we can only rely on the coastal parts, which can again repulse only in the coastal zone.
    4. +1
      10 August 2016 17: 58
      That is, do you think the world fleet moved to a new level already in the 80s? After all, missiles of the "caliber" type are already 35 years old.
  19. +2
    10 August 2016 13: 55
    Article +! Stop throwing up hats - "the fleet is reborn." So far, everything is in order in the submarine fleet, but we are building the ships of the coastal zone on the surface. There is nothing to send in the ocean, all the large ships-legacy of the USSR. And they do not last forever.
    It is necessary for each fleet to supply several ships of rank 1-2 (modern cruisers and destroyers). With helicopter hangars, numerous UVPs and other modern "stuffing". And there will be our flag in the ocean! Yes hi
  20. +1
    10 August 2016 15: 04
    I remember that about three years ago, I entered into a polemic with the officers of the Naval Academy about the salvation of Project 941 by converting it into a "womb" of a "wolf pack" (a "cash cow" - a tanker, an arsenal, a "battery", TsKP, etc.) and the creation of a "flock" of 636 (6-10 units). In the beginning, I was "treated" that "a boat with soft paws, like a wolf - a loner will stealthily approach and ..." no shit? You could see something like that on Channel One in a film about the Russian submarine fleet and hear it from Rogozin's "first hand"! But in the end my opponents confessed to the main problem - there are NO boats for the "flock" ??? And not much to be expected in the near future! On this site, I am often criticized that, "they say, why seek good from good", that is, why give part of the order (GOZ) to the Far East (from LAO to Komsomolsk) or from "Pella" to the Tatars? Comrades, dear ones, we need a lot of different ships, and it is desirable for ALL of the fleet !!! Therefore, to restore the Khabarovsk Shipyard, "Krasnoe Sormolovo", "More" is required and, preferably, faster, and on the modernization and reconstruction of B. Kamen and the Baltic plant to accelerate ??! Success to the author Andrey from Chelyabinsk! Greetings from Magnitogorsk, Konstantin K.
    1. +2
      10 August 2016 21: 09
      Polemics are polemics, but you always need to have a budget problem in mind. Everyone understands that they want "without bread and more, more", but in reality they are still deciding where to cut costs. And the fleet, as always, is candidate number 1.
  21. 0
    10 August 2016 15: 26
    "What then can we say about the surface fleet, in the construction of which the Russian Navy, it seems, has decided to make every conceivable mistake, without missing a single one ...

    To be continued.
    Author Andrey from Chelyabinsk "

    A review information article ...... about analytics, conclusions and forecasts is controversial (not counting: failed, problems, failed, failed ... etc.
    For me, the topic is so big and deep that it even comes out superficially with one stroke (and paint). It would be interesting to analyze in more detail the history of the project or the plant-people.
    A development strategy analysis, it is better to listen to narrow experts.

    About "Kalina" and "Autoind" - pearl flat. With all due respect to the author, fellow countryman.
  22. +1
    10 August 2016 15: 27
    But you know, Friends. what is the most disgusting thing: while we are here about "high", about "patriotism and love for the Motherland", "the Navy needs to be revived" ... do the guys from the Government at the President Hotel "launder" the state defense fund money in pools with black caviar and champagne? Straight, a sickle to me .... Already from anger and hatred, cheekbones drove - what kind of locusts are so greedy and voracious? Indeed, greed and stupidity are irrepressible, limitless and endless !!!
  23. 0
    10 August 2016 15: 29
    the article did not impress the author is inclined to sarcasm (but what) to level the achievements of shipbuilders and defenders without offering and not recommending a way out of the situation. All of it annoys if the Ash boats are good then the Boreas are impressive but without Mace. The author is more likely from Makeev’s Design Bureau and in his style there is a chagrin for ignoring this design bureau on the topic of the Bulava and the huge financial flows that remained in Moscow and not in the Urals.
    1. +1
      10 August 2016 17: 42
      Quote: 23424636
      .All it annoys if Ash boats are good, then expensive if Boreas are impressive but without a Mace

      And what to do if it's true.
      Project 885 is the legacy of the USSR, a country with a completely different military budget and doctrine. For the Russian Navy, they are now like "seawulfs" for the Yankees after the collapse of the USSR: too expensive and too little.
      With Bulava, everything is still unclear - each launch is like a lottery. One thing is good - the dynamics are positive.
  24. 0
    10 August 2016 16: 12
    The article is very informative, but the consequences are listed, and there is not a word about the causes of the plight in shipbuilding, but they are. The sanction war of the Trap against Russia makes its own adjustments, among other things, its goal is to disrupt the Program for the rearmament of the Army and Navy of the Russian Federation. The fifth column is not a fairy tale, it is active and acts at all levels where it cannot harm, it slows down. The Central Bank with its exorbitant rates keeps everyone and everyone on a starvation diet.
    All of our large business is registered in offshore companies in order to receive cheap loans over our hill. But loans after Crimea were trapped by the Trap, and the Central Bank still holds interest rates at unacceptably high levels, exceeding the profitability of any shipbuilding enterprise. And many more different reasons why and from what ...
    The USSR fleet was oceanic, numerous and well-armed, however, with all its might and personnel training, it could not defend the state. Fact. The enemy demonstrated the possibility of neutralizing the USSR fleet without active databases on the sea and on land. Fact. This unfortunate fact applies to all the Armed Forces of the USSR.
    The enemy, having adjusted the technologies of such without a combat defeat of the USSR, will try to apply them to defeat the RF Armed Forces, including the Russian Navy.
    The possibilities of the defensive doctrine of the Russian Federation now seem much more modest, resources are much more limited, although we do not know everything. There may be some good news. Let's hope for the best, but we need to prepare for the worst.
    Faster to put on alert the systems "Zircon", "Yu-71", with their placement on submarines and surface ships, but the main thing is not to miss the Cosmos!
  25. +2
    10 August 2016 18: 05
    Plus, I agree with the author and the article, and many theses are very controversial from my point of view, I will not criticize, because in my opinion it is always very easy to criticize, and you would try to write it yourself better.) I would not write. The article is the most important thing, it provides the basis for reflection and discussion. Write more, read with interest.
  26. +1
    11 August 2016 00: 04
    It is impossible for a ship with a range of 2000 km to solve strategic tasks at a distance of 5000 km.

    And why and what can be "solved" at such a distance?
    Maybe then it is better from the shore and / or from the mooring wall?
    If our doctrine is defensive.
  27. +4
    16 August 2016 23: 02
    Quote: Serg65
    Now, many are blaming the government and Putin personally for the oil needle, but no one offers a quick and adequate alternative to replacing the raw material component of the Russian economy.

    Apparently, the government and Putin personally do not consult with those people. I will give an example.
    1945 + 16 = 1961
    2000 + 16 = 2016.
    This is to say that in 1945 the War had just ended. Half of the country is in ruins, men are in the army, and many of them are in the land. There is no bomb yet. Not like the ocean, there is practically no fleet. There is no strategic aviation. There is no launch vehicle for the future bomb. And there’s a lot more ...
    1961 - the flight of OUR man into space. And this is an integral indicator characterizing the economic power of a country, including, in addition, education at all levels, science, etc. Strategic aviation - is. Active construction of the fleet is underway. The country has been rebuilt, industry is working, science now recalls that period with nostalgia ... And no oil needle, please note.
    But the difference between the 2000s and 2016s can be seen only with a magnifying glass, although the starting conditions for the country's leadership in 2000 are much more favorable than in 1945.

    It’s me that the claims against the government and Putin are VERY STRONGLY substantiated.
  28. 0
    27 September 2016 07: 52
    Another opus, couch general ...

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