One of the worst disasters of the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War is the defeat of the Bryansk Front and the formation of the Vyazemsky "boiler" during the German operation "Typhoon".
The tasks of defeating the Soviet armies in the Moscow direction were outlined in directive No. 35 of September 6, 1941, of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command, signed by Adolf Hitler. Soviet forces planned to break before winter. They were going to solve this goal by double encirclement in the general direction of Vyazma - Mozhaisk - Moscow, in the presence of powerful strike forces on the flanks (in the north and south, to cover the capital). On September 16, a directive of the command of the Army Group (GA) “Center” appeared on the preparation of an operation to seize the capital of the USSR, code-named “Typhoon”. The German command planned the strikes of large groups, which were concentrated in the areas of the Spiritual (3rd tank group of Colonel General Herman Goth), Roslavl (4th tank group of Colonel General Erich Göpner) and Shostka (2nd tank group of Colonel General Heinz Guderian), encircle the main forces of the opposing Soviet wax troops and eliminate them in the areas of Bryansk and Vyazma. After this, a swift march to bypass the capital of the Union from the north and south.
September 24 held the last operational meeting of all the commanders of the infantry armies, tank groups, with the participation of Halder and Brauchitsch. September 26 issued an order of attack. The order said that the 4-I field army and the 4-I tank group should strike on both sides of the Rosslavl-Moscow highway, then advancing along the Smolensk-Moscow highway, close the ring around Vyazma. Their actions complemented the offensive units of the 9-th field army and the 3-th tank group. Their mobile units were to go east of the headwaters of the Dnieper and connect with the units of the 4 tank group. The units of the 4 and 9 armies, which were located between the strike forces, were to pin down the Soviet forces in the Yartsevo-Yelnya area.
On the southern wing of the 2-I field army received the task of advancing in the direction of Sukhinichi - Meshchovsk, bypassing Bryansk from the north-west. The 2-I tank group was to attack the Sevsk-Oryol, in cooperation with the forces of the 2 Army, to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops in the Bryansk region.
The “last decisive battle” was set to begin September 28 and complete the operation “Typhoon” and the whole campaign (main fighting) by mid-November 1941. The idea was ambitious - 3 tank groups, 3 armies were concentrated on one operational direction, by the beginning of October the number of GA “Center” was 1,9 million people. It had 78 divisions (including 14 tank and 8 motorized), about 1700-2000 tanks, 14 thousand guns and mortars. Airborne support was provided by General Fleet Marshal Albert Kesselring's 2 air fleet, which had before 1320 aircraft (420 fighters, 720 bombers, 40 attack aircraft, and 120 reconnaissance aircraft).
The Moscow direction was defended by the Western, Bryansk, Reserve Fronts. The Western Front under the command of Colonel-General Ivan Konev occupied a defense zone of approximately 300 km, along the Andreapol-Yartsevo line, west of Yelnya. In the first echelon, the defense was held by: 22-I army of commander V. A. Yushkevich (Oshankovsky direction), 29-I army of general I. I. Maslennikov (direction to Rzhev), 30-I army of commander V. A. Khomenko and part of the units The 19 Army of General MF Lukin (the Sychev direction), the 16 Army of K. K. Rokossovsky and the 20 Army of Commander F. A. Ershakov (Vyazma). In total, the Western Front had 30 rifle divisions, 1 rifle brigade, 3 cavalry division, 28 artillery regiments, 2 motorized rifle divisions, 4 tank brigades. The tanks at the front were 475 (new T-34 - 51, KV - 19 units).
In the rear of the Western Front and partly on its left flank were the orders of the Reserve Front (Commander Marshal S. M. Budyonny). The 6 armies entered the front: the 24-I army of Major General K. I. Rakutin, the 43-I army of commander P. P. Sobennikov in the first echelon covered the Yelnovo and Yukhnovo areas, only about 100 km of the front. Four armies: 31-I Army Major General V.N. Dalmatov, 49-I Army Lieutenant General I. G. Zakharkin, 32 I Army Major-General S.V. Vishnevsky, 33-I Army Kombrig D. N Onuprienko stood in the second echelon at the Rzhev-Vyazma defensive line behind the Western Front. All in all, the Reserve Front had 28 infantry, 2 cavalry divisions, 27 artillery regiments, 5 tank brigades. In the first echelon there were 6 rifle divisions and tank brigades in the 24 Army, 4 rifle divisions, 2 Tank Brigades in the 43 Army.
The forces of the Bryansk Front were headed by Colonel-General Andrei Eremenko. The front closed 330 km on the Bryansk-Kaluga and Orel-Tula directions. The 50-I army of the commander MP Petrov covered the road to Kirov and Bryansk, the 3-I army of Major General Ya. G. Kreiser closed the Trubchevo direction, the 13-I army of Major General AM Gorodnyansky - Sevskoye, and the operative group of Major General A. N. Yermakov - Kursk direction. All in all, the Bryansk Front had 25 rifle divisions, 4 cavalry divisions, 16 artillery regiments, 1 tank division, 4 tank brigades. It should be noted that the divisions were not fully staffed, as in the 50 Army the number of the rifle division was approximately 8,5 thousand, in the 3 and 13 armies in 7,5 thousand, in cavalry divisions in 1,5-2 thousand . person. The situation was similar in parts of the Western and Reserve fronts. The Bryansk front had 245 tanks (including 22 - KV and 83-T-34).
The total strength of all three fronts totaled 1,2 million people, 10,5 thousand guns and mortars, and about 1 thousand tanks. The air forces of three fronts totaled 548 combat aircraft (265 fighters, 210 bombers, 36 attack aircraft, 37 reconnaissance aircraft). After the start of the battle, the Air Force was reinforced by 368 long-range bombers aviation and 432 fighter aircraft in Moscow air defense. Thus, the Soviet Air Force was not inferior in strength to German aviation.
The operational plans of the Soviet troops in the western direction provided for the conduct of defense on almost the entire front. So 10 September The headquarters ordered the Western Front to go on the defensive, “dig in the ground” and allocate 6-7 divisions to the reserve, at the expense of secondary directions, in order to create a powerful maneuvering force. The commander Konev singled out the 4 infantry, motorized rifle 2, cavalry division 1, 4 tank brigades and 5 artillery regiments to the reserve. A lot of work was done in preparing the defense, it was conducted under the supervision of the General Staff. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff, A. M. Vasilevsky, warned 18 of September that the Germans were preparing a strike on the Yartsevo and Yelny directions. The September 27 directive ordered the troops of the Western Front to move in tough defense, only active reconnaissance and private offensive operations were allowed.
It was assumed that the Germans would deliver the main blow along the highway, along the Smolensk-Yartsevo-Vyazma line, in the Rokossovsky 16 Army band. A fairly solid defense was created here, so the 112-I rifle division defended the front in 8 km (10 thousand people, 38 guns and mortars, 226 machine guns), the next 38-I division in the front occupied 4 km (10 thousand people 68 guns and mortars, 202 machine gun). The average staffing of the 16 Army's divisions was the highest on the Western Front - 10,7 thousand people. In addition, Rokossovsky had 266 guns of caliber 76 mm and above, 32 - 85 mm anti-aircraft guns (for fighting tanks), a tank brigade, all other tank units of the front were commanded by front staff. The 16 Army defended the front in 35 km, the neighboring 19 Army I Lukin defended 25 km, having 3 divisions in the first echelon and 2 ve in the second. The 19 Army had 338 guns 76 mm and above, 90 - 45 mm guns, 56 - 85 mm anti-aircraft guns. As a result, not a single tank division of the Wehrmacht advanced through the 19 army. It is necessary to take into account the fact that a reserve line was created behind the defense line of the 16 and 19 armies, it was prepared by the connections of the 32 Army of the Reserve Front (there were even batteries of 130 and 100 mm guns, they covered the highway railway line). It is clear that if the Germans hit along the highway, they would have suffered serious losses.
But other dangerous areas so well cover just was not possible. Khomenko's 30 Army, which was the main attack of the 3 tank group, covered the front in 50 km, 157 shells with 76 caliber - mm and above, only one 45-mm guns, 24 - 85 mm anti-aircraft guns on the entire line of defense . The army did not have tanks.
The General Staff was mistaken not only in the direction of the main attack, but also in the number of shock groups. It was believed that the Germans would strike in one direction, having only one large tank group. Therefore, measures were prepared to repel blows from a number of other directions. On the Western Front, these were the Ostash-Penov, the Nefidovo-Rzhev, Bel, Konyutino-Sychevsk, Yartsev, Dorogobuzh directions.
The Nazis were able to carry out a major regrouping of forces: to transfer the 4 tank group from under Leningrad, and from the southern direction the Guderian 2 tank group. Therefore, although the Soviet command rather accurately determined the time of the strike, they made a mistake in the enemy's strike forces and directions of the main attacks. The German 3 Panzer Goth Group struck the 19 and 30 Armies, north of the Yartsevo-Vyazma Highway. The blow of the Göpner 4 tank group was directed south of the highway, along the 24 and 43 armies. The 2 th Guderian tank group struck the orders of the 13 th army and the Ermakova task force. The Germans were able to create a huge advantage in local areas: for example, against the 4-x divisions of the 30 army, German 12 was set up. 43 Army - 5 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades, which came under attack from the 4 tank group, held the front in 60 km (3 divisions in the first echelon, 2 divisions and tank brigades in the second). The optimal is the density of defense - the maximum 8-12 km per division.
On the Bryansk front, the front command also made a mistake in the direction of the main attack, they were waiting for him in the direction of Bryansk, and the Germans struck 120-150 km to the south.
Heinz Guderian decided to launch an offensive two days ahead of the other strike forces in order to take advantage of the support of aviation, which he had not yet used in other directions and good weather. 30 September 1941, the 2 Panzer Group launched an offensive. The commander of the Bryansk Front, Yeremenko, was going to put an 3 of October with the forces of the 13 Army and the Yermakov group on a flank of a German wedge driven into the defense of the front by the forces of the 1 Army. But the forces of the Nazis underestimated, believed that the group consisting of 1 Panzer and 3 motorized divisions had broken through to Sevsk. And in the breakthrough were 13-and motorized body. Therefore, counterattacks by the forces of the 2 Army (3 rifle divisions), the group of Yermakov (3 rifle divisions), were not successful. Already on October XNUMX, the Germans broke into the Eagle.
In the evening, the command of the Bryansk Front 5 was allowed to withdraw troops to the second line of defense - near the city of Bryansk and the Desna River. Bryansk was attributed to defend. But already October 6 Germans from the rear captured Bryansk. Eremenko gives the order to break through to the east.
To stop the Germans' attack on this sector, they began to transfer reserve units: from the Reserve Front - the 49 Army, from the reserve Headquarters - the 1-th special Guards Rifle Corps of Dmitry Lelyushenko (5-I and 6-I Guards Rifle Divisions, 4-I tank division Brigade of Colonel Mikhail Katukov, 11-I Tank Brigade of Colonel P. M. Arman, 6-I Reserve Aviation Group). In addition, 4 air divisions of long-range aviation divisions and 81 th special divisions division were thrown against Guderian’s tank group. Sent to the Kursk area and 7-th Guards Rifle Division (she gave a tank brigade), which originally wanted to send to the Crimea. The Guard Corps and the 7-I Guard Division, according to the original plan, were to unblock the surrounded troops of the Bryansk Front. At the same time Tula began to prepare for defense.
While the reserves were being transferred by rail, and parts of the Bryansk Front were breaking through from the environment, it was necessary to halt the German offensive in the Tula direction. In the area of Orel and Mtsensk, the 5 th airborne corps was deployed on airplanes (two brigades, 6 in total, thousand soldiers). October 3 Corps received an order to transfer and fought until October 20, when it was replaced. The battles for Mtsensk became the star hour of Katukov’s tank brigade, which was able to defeat the Germans 4 tank division (the command of the division neglected reconnaissance and escort and ran into the brigade’s sudden attack). Aviation operated quite successfully, as 10 of October at the Orel-Zapadny airfield was destroyed before the enemy's 80 aircraft (almost everything on the ground).
In general, the Bryansk front was defeated, the forces of the 3, 13 and 50 of the Soviet armies were surrounded. But they could not be taken into a tight ring and completely destroyed, considerable forces broke through, and the commander of the 50 Army, Major General MP Petrov, was killed during the retreat, Eremenko was seriously wounded.
October 2 The 1941 of the year began the offensive of other German tank strike groups. The 43-I Goepner tank group struck the 50 and 60 armies (4 km front). 6 o'clock in the morning, after the 4-minute artillery preparation, the offensive began. A major role was played by the German Air Force, which prevented the transfer of army reserves to the point of breakthrough. Initially, the Germans were advancing along the Warsaw highway, then turned to Vyazma.
At the same time, units of the 3 Tank Group of the Gotha attacked (since October 5 1941, it was headed by General Georg Reinhardt). The Germans hit the junction of the 30 and 19 armies - 45 km front section. In the first echelon, all 3 tank divisions of the German TG attacked. On the very first day, the Germans broke through the defenses on the Dukhovshchinsk and Roslavl directions, having penetrated the defenses of the Soviet troops on the 15-30 km. On October 3, the advance of the German units in the Western Front was up to 50 kilometers, and the Reserve Front was up to 80 kilometers.
Our troops launched a counterattack, for this they formed the group of I. V. Boldin (1 rifle, 1 motorized rifle division, 2 tank brigades). The Boldin Task Force struck 4-5 in October in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area. Tank battle took place. At the same time, the commander Rokossovsky had to lead the front reserve, for active defense in the Vyazma region, in order to stop the second wing of the Germans. But Boldin’s group failed to complete the task - the forces were unequal. The German 7 Panzer Division broke through the Dnieper positions of the Rzhev-Vyazma defense line, and then to the highway west of Vyazma. October 7 Germans surrounded Vyazma (7-I tank division 3-th TG and 10-I tank division 4-th TG).
It has become one of the darkest days of the terrible 1941 of the year. On October 4, Konev reported to Headquarters "about the threat of a large group of Germans going to the rear of our troops." October 5 reported by the Commander of the Reserve Front Budyonny. The units of the 19, 20, 24, 32 armies and the Boldin group were surrounded. October 8 Konev ordered to break through to the surrounded troops in the area of Gzhatsk. The encircled troops fought until October 13, made repeated breakthrough attempts, but did not succeed. So 10-th went to the breakthrough 20-I army of Lieutenant-General F. A. Ershakova, the battle was fierce and went all day. As a result, 5 divisions of the army were completely defeated (General Ershakov was captured on November 2). On October 11 north of Vyazma, the forces of the 19 and 32 armies and the group of General Boldin, under the command of commander Lukin, tried to break through. Only 12 managed to breach the German defense, but failed to strengthen the flanks, the Germans quickly closed the breakthrough, only part of the connections could leave. Among the fighters left was Boldin.
- The troops encircled near Vyazma pinned down significant enemy forces, intended to pursue the rest of the defeated forces of the Western and Reserve fronts, to develop an offensive. Only on October 14, the German command was able to regroup the main forces and the 15s to launch a new general offensive.
- German troops broke through the defense line of the Western, Reserve fronts to the entire operational depth, and were able to surround and destroy a significant part of the forces of the Western and Reserve fronts. The Germans reached the Mozhaisk line of defense of the capital of the Soviet Union, creating the necessary conditions for the continuation of Operation Typhoon.
- The Red Army suffered huge losses, according to a number of data - only by prisoners of more than 600 thousand people. The commander of the 19 Army, Lieutenant General MF Lukin, and the commander of the 32 Army, Major General S.V. Vishnevsky, was killed in the XUMNUMX Army, Major General K. I. Rakutin .
In his memoirs, the commander of the 2 th Infantry Division, Vashkevich writes: "... 2-sd received an order from the army commander on 7 30 minutes 11 in the morning in October and began to implement it. On the Vyazma River, the 19 th (former 1284 th in the bottom) rifle regiment was left at the disposal of the commander of the 5 army, replacing the units of the 1286 rifle regiment. The main forces of the division included 1282, 1286, rifle regiments, a detachment of Black Sea sailors (about 800 people), 970 th artillery regiment, as well as attached divisions 596 th howitzer artillery regiment and 57 th heavy artillery division, they had a leash starting position to the west, the village of Bogoroditsky, to attack the enemy in 16 hours. Before the start of the attack, 8 hours remained 30 minutes. During this time, the 1286 regiment was to be replaced by subunits of the 1284 regiment on the Vyazma river, all parts of the division passed 15 — 18 kilometers to their original position, artillery to take firing positions and determine the targets for which to fire, supporting infantry, regimental commanders to decide and set tasks for commanders! their units. There was only time left for the company commanders to show the platoon commanders on the ground where to attack. In order to raise artillery, mortars, heavy machine guns, ammunition, engineering and communications equipment, it was necessary to drain all the fuel into combat vehicles from vehicles. This event took two or three hours so tightly limited time. By 10 hours, all orders were given and reports were received that the units had begun their execution. The division commander, part of the division headquarters officers, artillery commander, division engineer and communications commander of communications division, commanders of rifle and artillery regiments in 11 hours 30 minutes arrived at the edge of the forest one and a half kilometers west of Bogoroditsky, where the command post was organized. By one o'clock the commanders of rifle and artillery regiments received combat missions on the ground and immediately began to solve them. By this time the 1282 th regiment arrived, the 970 th artillery regiment, the 3 th division of the 389 th howitzer artillery regiment and part of the 596 th howitzer regiment. The 1286 th regiment, part of the 596 th howitzer regiment and the 57 heavy artillery division were lagging. Not even approached the detachment of sailors. Everything was done in a terrible hurry. From the 16 hours, when the beginning of the attack was established, and before dark it was only about two hours of light time. Around 15 hours battalions of the 1286 regiment appeared. They ran to their departure areas. Around 15 hours, 30 minutes, two late divisions of the 596 th howitzer regiment, as well as the 57 th heavy artillery division, began to unfold. At this time, enemy aircraft stepped up. In groups of four to six aircraft led to our troops, occupying or already occupied the initial position for a breakthrough, an attack from the air. The rear facilities of the divisions and the army, the pontoon reconnaissance units flooded the artillery positions, the second echelons of the regiments and divisions. Communication is broken all the time. All of this, as well as the fact that not all the artillery had prepared for action, and part of the squad of the 1286 regiment had not yet clarified their tasks, I reported to the commander of the 19 army, General Lukin. I insistently asked him to postpone the attack until the morning, in order to take the rears back overnight, tidy up the mixed units and establish a disturbed command and control. On my report and proposal to postpone the offensive on the morning of October 12, I received the answer: “Vashkevich, you cannot imagine the whole situation. Or we will break through today, or we will be crushed by the morning. ” To my remark that at night the enemy would not launch an offensive, General Lukin confirmed: “Go and break through,” and wished him success. At this, shaking hands, we parted. For direct command of the troops, I, with a small group of staff officers and regimental liaison officers, went into battle formations of the first echelons of the 1286 and 1282 rifle regiments. The division artillery chief, Colonel Suvorov, and the senior staff commissar B.Z. Evseev. Division Commissioner V. T. Krylov and the chief of staff of the division, Colonel Sofin, remained at the command post. They had to put in order the second echelons of the regiments, mixed with other parts of the army, and then join us. At about 16, the Katyusha’s clock fired the first and the last volley, all the artillery of the division opened fire. The first echelons of the 1286 and 1282 of the rifle regiments went on the offensive. The enemy met our troops with dense barrage. Around 18 hours, already in the dark, part of the division occupied the village of Pekarevo. Late in the evening they captured the village of Savior, and thus broke through the ring of the enemy’s encirclement. The breakthrough front reached 3 kilometers.
Lukin recalls: "... The commander of the 91 th rifle division, Colonel IA Volkov, is rushing into me swiftly:
- Comrade general! The breakthrough is made, the divisions are leaving, withdraw the headquarters of the armies!
“Immediately report this to the front headquarters.” Artillery is introduced into the breakthrough, other connections are pulled up. I.A. I told Volkov that I would not go out personally until I missed all or at least half of the troops.
- Go, withdraw your division, hold the flanks.
He did not have time to catch up with his connection. The encirclement ring closed again. It was assumed that the enemy was able to bring fresh forces to the place of the breakthrough and close the breakthrough.
He who was surrounded and found himself in the same position as I would understand my state of mind. No, moral forces were not broken, willpower was not shaken, but I understood the whole gravity of the situation and could not do anything. Again gathered commanders and commissioners. They obviously expected a miracle from me. Well, miracles, as we know, do not happen. A lump came to my throat ... What words to find? How to help them? Then, taking himself in hand, he said: Comrades, the situation is not hopeless. The enemy has concentrated all his forces on the eastern direction and sees that we are breaking only in a narrow sector. If we break through south of Vyazma, in the direction of the 20 Army, we will surely break through. I order to leave in separate groups. "
By dawn of October 12, the parts that had broken through were concentrated in 18-kilometer northwest of the breakthrough site. There were units of the 1282 and 1286 rifle regiments, the 970 artillery regiment and part of the sailors' detachment, as well as units from neighboring army divisions. Physical fatigue and great tension of the night battle quickly affected. All fell to sleep.
Vashkevich: “We spent the whole of October 12 day in this area, waiting for the approach of our other units. However, we were joined only by separate small units from different divisions of the 19 Army. The 1284 th infantry regiment, left on the Vyazma river to cover the 19 th army to the east, fulfilled its difficult task. The whole day of October 11, it reflected with fire and counterattacks the attempts of the large forces of the German fascist troops to cross the east bank of the Vyazma river. The fighters fought bravely, showed resilience and heroism. Only a small part of the regiment managed to get out of the encirclement and join its troops. Far to the southwest, where there was a fierce battle at night and in the morning, there was silence. Attempts to get out of the environment, undertaken by the 19 th army of 8, 9 and 10, October, only alerted the enemy, forcing him to further consolidate the military orders of their troops. A break from the environment, scheduled for October 16 11 hours, was supposed to spend the night under cover. But for night operations, especially on such a large scale as the breakthrough by the army of large enemy forces and the subsequent night march on 45 — 55-kilometers, the troops and headquarters were not prepared. ”
The losses were so great that the army ceased to exist. Fallen 19000 warriors. According to eyewitnesses from the surrounding villages, “... in March 1943, the Germans began to drive us around the village of Martyuhi. Here, along the valley of a small river that surrounded the village, lay our soldiers. There were a lot of them. Lay several layers on top of each other. We will remove the top layer, bury it, and leave the next one, still frozen, until the next day to thaw. They worked like this for about a month, they buried about seven layers. The Germans were very afraid of epidemics. ”
This is what the commander of the 45 Cavalry Division, Stuchenko, wrote about the battles in the area of the villages of Stogovo, Pokrov, Selivanovo: “The torn-up land dotted with the corpses of ours and the Germans. Here are warped wagons, guns, cars. Wounded horses, with their heads bowed, roam the dead field. And around the ominous silence ... October 13 army troops began to be divided into separate groups for self-exit. All guns were blown up, cars burned. But no one raised a hand to destroy the horse train. The horses were dismissed through the forest. "The Germans could not hold back the last desperate onslaught of Soviet soldiers from the northern part of the" boiler "in the direction to the south. During the night from October 12 to October 12, a significant part of them was able to break through as a result of heavy and bloody battles However, there they fell into the same surroundings - only now the 13 of the German army. On October 4, the area near the Smolensk-Vyazma motorway was cleared. Soviet troops stopped organized resistance, the picture of the ended battle was truly tragic. Cer from the headquarters of 13, AK, he conveyed his impressions of what he saw at that time in a report prepared for the command of the compound. It reads: "... A frost came and the first snow fell. Infinite flows of Russian prisoners went along the freeway to the west.
Horror fields were full of horror at the sites of the last battles. Everywhere there were masses of saddled horses, property, guns, tanks were lying around. ”
Stuchenko writes about his exit from the “boiler”: “45-th Cavalry Division of 12 in October 23 00 received an order of the army commander: hold the front until 4-o'clock in the morning, then retreat to the south, covering the troops, which will be with dawn break through to the area of Stogovo (south of Vyazma) to join the 20 army of Lieutenant-General Ershakov. However, as it turned out later, the army headquarters, putting together a detachment at 600, took the radio station and left in an unknown direction. It turned out that the division already around 4 hours actually did not cover anyone. At five o'clock in the morning, the regiments on the orders of the division commander took off. Holding horses on the occasion, the horsemen began to move south, as ordered by the commander in the evening. At dawn 13 October, the division approached the village of Gipino. The deported patrols were met with fire: the enemy in the village. To avoid unnecessary losses, the village was bypassed from the northwest, and then the remnants went through the forest to the village of Bukhanovo. But they did not reach it, falling under automatic machine-gun fire. I had to go back to the village of Gipino and make another attack. Soon tankers from the 127 Tank Brigade of Major-General Tank Troops Fyodor Timofeyevich Remizov joined the cavalrymen. In the brigade, however, there remained only the 3 of the KV tank, which soon too were hit. On the way of the division was the river Vyazma, which was decided to cross near the village of Stepankovo. The remnants of the division imperceptibly were supplemented by sided officers and soldiers leaving the encirclement. Soon there were more than 600. But the core still consisted of the 45 fighters of the Cavalry Division, in which at that time 180 horses remained, of which only 22 are healthy. The head of the intelligence division of Gavronsky died from a wound in the stomach. Soon came to the train station Friday. The unit led by the division commander moved forward, entered the woods north of Ugra station and settled down to rest. The remaining part of the detachment, which was already a rather heterogeneous mass, spontaneously, unorganized, was divided into separate groups, which moved in the shortest possible directions to the front line. Some of them broke through in the area of Naro-Fominsk, and some did not reach theirs at all. The group with the division commander Stuchenko at noon on October 17 approached the village of Koptevo, Znamensky district, Smolensk region. The Germans were not here. Here managed to get the boat to cross the river. In the subsequent 8 days, nothing significant happened, except for individual clashes with the enemy, mainly on the roads that had to be crossed. October 26 still lit up the group approached the village of Klina (50 kilometers west of Serpukhovo). In the last days of October, the southwest of Serpukhov managed to capture the “tongue”, which turned out to be the corporal of the 13 Army Corps. According to his testimony, the further route was determined: Troyanovo - Burinovo - Stayki. Here the forests and swamps, and the enemy troops less. The most dangerous section was the road between Burinovo and Voronino, which had to be crossed.