Ahead of the locomotive
We deliberately leave the Hamletian question of domestic fleet: do we need aircraft carriers in general? Its statement itself testifies only to one thing - to the weakness, bias of domestic science, in particular naval science. In an era when all continental solutions to the problem have been exhausted due to the shift of the main danger to oceanic directions, it is obvious: a purely continental defense is not well-founded because of its passivity and limitedness. In addition, the likely enemy already has bridgeheads on the continent, which it is preparing to expand just from the sea.
Thus, the question of reanimation of the domestic fleet, and in the format of the ocean and, therefore, balanced, where there is no alternative to its aircraft, should not be made dependent on certain 13 – 17 billions of dollars for the construction of an aircraft carrier. They appear to be no earlier than at the end of 2025. Many people think that only then will the time come for TTZ and other things: who will design, where to build, what to arm ... Obviously, we should work on the above problems.
Carriers have even Italy, Spain, Thailand. Therefore, do we need them? Such a question should not be asked at all, since the answer is clear in advance.
And the last preliminary consideration: aircraft carriers need to be engaged always, constantly also because the task of their development and construction does not have a momentary solution. It is complicated by a significant range of preliminary conditions and preparatory actions.
What to fly
It may be just as good that there is no money for an aircraft carrier. For its construction, we are absolutely not ready. The fact that the Krylov Institute presented at the Sea Show in the past as a model of a promising aircraft carrier is not realistic and quite far from the required presentation.
The industry, of course, is ready to respond with enthusiasm to such an order and accept it even today. First, the astronomical value. Secondly, the project promises to stretch no less than for 10 – 12 years, or even more. As for the deadlines, one can refer to the experience of the advanced states and fleets in these matters, which have both a school for building such ships and comprehensive technological cooperation. Britain, let's say, only designed its last aircraft carriers for nine years. And they must be worked out for certain, at least from the fact that they are to build a series, and not a single ship, as it is now, a ship of little interest in its imperfection.
It is customary to move on to design based on the idea of the main weapons, which will be equipped with a promising ship. For an aircraft carrier, this is primarily the main type of combat aircraft that is part of the wing. According to modern operational-tactical concepts - universal (fighter attack aircraft). In addition, it is now inconceivable to imagine such a wing and the actions of the fleet’s grouping off-shore even in the most general sense - without carrier-based AWACS, PLO at least from the standpoint of ensuring the aircraft carrier’s own combat stability, as well as the fleet entrusted to it.
Therefore, first of all, the main universal deck-based aircraft of the 5 generation with the functions of a fighter and attack aircraft and a bomb load of at least seven tons, with a combat radius of 1200 kilometers, should be immediately ordered. Those who report to the government that we already have it, it is time to correctly put in place, explaining to them and to those who are listening to them that the fighter attack aircraft sought must be the best in the world and remain so at least until 2030 – 2035 . Note: to the deck aircraft, to its, in particular, strength, special requirements are imposed that are not put forward to ground-based vehicles. At the same time, the TTZ should be issued for the development of an early warning aircraft with a super-modern radar, the most economical and powerful power plant. In the same glider - antisubmarine and transport modifications. I do not think that the implementation of these tasks with the delivery of the ordered machines will be able to meet the deadlines of less than five to six years, even if you mobilize the best forces of the aviation industry under the special control of the top leadership of the country and the Navy. It is advisable not to attribute these costs directly to the subject of aircraft carrier development, then funds for financing the development can be carved out now.
Also, an aircraft carrier, like UDC, requires a heavy helicopter in various modifications - transport and unloading, for conducting special operations to a greater depth, anti-submarine. The "Kamov" is not and probably will not. In addition, Kamov machines are extremely overestimated in size, which is hardly acceptable in the ship's conditions, and not enough aerodynamic. On this with helicopters, perhaps, we will stop, because the continuation of the topic begins to go beyond the limits of aircraft carrier need. How long will it take to develop the specified DRLO, PLO and helicopter airplanes? Obviously at least five years, and then if the TTZ falls into the right hands.
Run and take
In the design of the aircraft carrier there are unique functional mechanisms that are not repeated anywhere else, besides technologically so complex that today their creation is available to a very limited number of manufacturers. First of all, it concerns steam or electromagnetic catapults for lifting 30 – 50-ton aircraft into the air. Attempts to circumvent this method of launch are bought by a significant reduction in combat capabilities. First of all, this restriction on the types of aircraft used (for example, early warning systems), reduced combat radius and bomb load.
Secondly, we need powerful mobile airborne aircraft lifts that do not occupy the space of the flight deck. Plus, a reliable landing and braking system for boating machines: a double and even triple aviofinishers system.
And, finally, however strange it may seem, - ship power engineering. The problems caused by boiler installations on domestic aircraft carriers, including those set for export, are still at the hearing. But these are types of steam turbine power plants that have been developed for many decades. Meanwhile, there were no steam catapults as the main consumer of steam on our aircraft carriers.
The whole world is now more and more confidently moving towards integrated ship power plants. But then it is appropriate to raise the question of choosing an option for an electromagnetic electromagnetic catapult, a sample of which is not without problems being run-in on the last American aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford.
If we assume that the braking system of aircraft landing on the Admiral Kuznetsov is in principle implemented, and our industry can cope with the ship power industry, then the catapults and the wing will remain an open and fundamental issue. As far as it is complicated, it can be seen at least by the example of technologically advanced France, borrowing a catapult and deck airplanes of the ARLO for its atomic Charles de Gaulle from abroad, and at the cost of appreciable damage to national sovereignty.
Our military-industrial complex did not master the catapult even in golden Soviet times, being practically omnipotent - just as the other, and traditionally aircraft-carrying, countries could not. The Americans, the monopolists in this matter, work in deep cooperation with the world's best manufacturers of mechanical systems. How much time may it take to develop, build, test and debug a domestic device? Not less than six - eight years, and then subject to the utmost attention to him at the top. But after all, the main power plant of the aircraft carrier is chosen for the type of catapult: for steam - steam power, for electromagnetic - most likely a powerful integrated ship power plant. And we still do not know how to build.
Airplanes and aviofinisery for a promising aircraft carrier does not seem to be considered such a very heavy topic in comparison with previous positions. They are and operate on an existing aircraft carrier. But bringing mechanisms to a constructively modern and absolutely reliable state still remains relevant.
Floating polygon
Thus, the problems raised above, associated with the creation of a modern and combat-ready aircraft carrier, objectively need an 7 – 10-year-old “abandonment” in relation to the deadlines for ordering such a ship as a hull. However, the project of the latter must be selected and approved as a result of the competition also in advance. It would be nice to invite foreign companies to participate in it - this will greatly enliven the process with unexpected original ideas and approaches that will inevitably be brought to such a forum. It is useful to recall that in this section, shipbuilding in the leading maritime powers adhere to the deepest universalization in the construction of aircraft carriers and the UDC, right down to the uniform hull sections and the general nomenclature of the ship equipment, such as, say, on-board aircraft and helicopter lifters.
It turns out that if the Ministry of Defense is really going to build an aircraft carrier from 2025, weapons for it, catapults, aircraft lifters, landing systems should be created now, and a competition of projects should be held no later than 2020 – 2021. The country does not have easy money to make essentially an experienced ship co from the leading aircraft carrier with all the ensuing consequences, as it happened before more than once, when it improvised with a ready-made hull to the fullest: they sculpted everything that sometimes did not highly contradictory wishes of all branches of the leadership, when the lead ship was brought to its pre-infarction state. For running all the necessary equipment, weapons and equipment, it is desirable to have a floating stand or an experienced vessel. This minimizes the natural risks in such cases and speeds up the delivery of such a complex ship. An experienced ship is also required in advance. Apparently, it should be built on the basis of a large transport with a displacement of at least 65 tons or, in the absence of such, in the form of a catamaran or trimaran based on finished hulls of vessels along 15 – 24 tons with a continuous flight deck-transformer and an island bridge, as is customary on aircraft carriers. Here, all functional interior and communications of the future aircraft carrier are actually modeled, run in and optimized: hangars for airplanes and helicopters, repair boxes, aircraft refueling complexes and ammunition supply, cellars themselves, irrigation and fire fighting systems, supply lines for spare large-sized units to be replaced by airplanes and helicopters ... By readiness, a catapult should appear on the ship, and even earlier, flights of vehicles assigned to a promising aircraft carrier should be practiced Incoming them from the industry, with the rise using nasal ramp. The design of such an experimental vessel ensures its continuous operation, as well as the simplicity and manufacturability of any reorganization: the convenience and speed of installation of the newly emerging equipment, the continuity of the marine testing process of the consistently incoming equipment - so that the debugging periods of even the most fundamental mechanisms do not go beyond two or three months .
Re-equipment and operation of the vessel also should not be associated with the financing of a promising aircraft carrier. There is no need to specify how much this particular program will save money by leaving to go through the inevitable trial and error of a non-aircraft carrier, which will then have to be in battle formation for many years. The vessel should be ready no later than mid 2018 of the year.
Who is in the cabin, who is on the bridge?
We have come to that aspect of any problem that we usually take into account in the last turn or ignore. These are human and structural factors. Perhaps, it is worth starting with the fact that deck pilots in all fleets of the world are a super elite among pilots, which is not inferior in any respect to flight test pilots and aces from flight teams. And the point here is not that they with enviable regularity have to board the deck of an aircraft carrier in a vast ocean. They fly at different altitudes and conduct a maneuvering battle above the surface of the sea, near a water edge, over mountainous terrain and unfamiliar water areas, with a superior enemy, which is incomparably more difficult than fighting over a flat earth’s firmament, having behind it a familiar airfield, all types of support and support. And one can imagine how the commanders of groups, squadrons, and squads should be trained, called upon to lead, motivate, and direct their heroic subordinates. There is nowhere without personal authority. And the level of these specialists should be the best not only within the national framework, where we never miss the opportunity to brag, but firmly convertible. No worse than American or French deck pilots aviation, with an objective comparison in close contact with colleagues from the best fleets of the world.
The second consideration: traditionally all over the world, the best aircraft carrier commanders are from deck pilots. So it was with the Americans who have the most experience with the British. It is logical, because who better understands the peculiarities of combat operations at sea under conditions of massive use by the parties of carrier-based aviation? It would seem that we should adopt this practice, but this is impossible for us for structural reasons. Pilots of deck aviation remain in the Navy outside the crew with all the ensuing consequences.
If we go even further, is it possible to be completely confident in the sufficient depth of the study and planning of military operations using the main weapon in this case, if the headquarters of the ship’s formation, interacting with the aircraft carrier, does not have a competent officer from carrier-based pilots? Recall how very difficult even the high flagships that emerged from the surface, in the management of submarines. By the way, in the 50 years, fleet commanders did not control aviation and submarines, but set general tasks. Accordingly, the commanders of the submarine forces and aviation worked directly and competently with subordinate forces - the recent experience of the past war affected.
Management will become truly effective and modern when pilots of deck aviation, submariners, past the bridge of a frigate or patrol will no longer be a rarity among the officers of the naval compound: then all nuances of naval combat will be comprehensively, correctly, soberly and effectively taken into account. Of course, this should be based on a renewed naval science, without a hitch, interpreting the actions of a modern balanced fleet with a full-fledged aircraft carrier in the core. Then the requirements for it will be defined and clear.
Thus, the question of reanimation of the domestic fleet, and in the format of the ocean and, therefore, balanced, where there is no alternative to its aircraft, should not be made dependent on certain 13 – 17 billions of dollars for the construction of an aircraft carrier. They appear to be no earlier than at the end of 2025. Many people think that only then will the time come for TTZ and other things: who will design, where to build, what to arm ... Obviously, we should work on the above problems.
Carriers have even Italy, Spain, Thailand. Therefore, do we need them? Such a question should not be asked at all, since the answer is clear in advance.
And the last preliminary consideration: aircraft carriers need to be engaged always, constantly also because the task of their development and construction does not have a momentary solution. It is complicated by a significant range of preliminary conditions and preparatory actions.
What to fly
It may be just as good that there is no money for an aircraft carrier. For its construction, we are absolutely not ready. The fact that the Krylov Institute presented at the Sea Show in the past as a model of a promising aircraft carrier is not realistic and quite far from the required presentation.
The industry, of course, is ready to respond with enthusiasm to such an order and accept it even today. First, the astronomical value. Secondly, the project promises to stretch no less than for 10 – 12 years, or even more. As for the deadlines, one can refer to the experience of the advanced states and fleets in these matters, which have both a school for building such ships and comprehensive technological cooperation. Britain, let's say, only designed its last aircraft carriers for nine years. And they must be worked out for certain, at least from the fact that they are to build a series, and not a single ship, as it is now, a ship of little interest in its imperfection.
It is customary to move on to design based on the idea of the main weapons, which will be equipped with a promising ship. For an aircraft carrier, this is primarily the main type of combat aircraft that is part of the wing. According to modern operational-tactical concepts - universal (fighter attack aircraft). In addition, it is now inconceivable to imagine such a wing and the actions of the fleet’s grouping off-shore even in the most general sense - without carrier-based AWACS, PLO at least from the standpoint of ensuring the aircraft carrier’s own combat stability, as well as the fleet entrusted to it.Therefore, first of all, the main universal deck-based aircraft of the 5 generation with the functions of a fighter and attack aircraft and a bomb load of at least seven tons, with a combat radius of 1200 kilometers, should be immediately ordered. Those who report to the government that we already have it, it is time to correctly put in place, explaining to them and to those who are listening to them that the fighter attack aircraft sought must be the best in the world and remain so at least until 2030 – 2035 . Note: to the deck aircraft, to its, in particular, strength, special requirements are imposed that are not put forward to ground-based vehicles. At the same time, the TTZ should be issued for the development of an early warning aircraft with a super-modern radar, the most economical and powerful power plant. In the same glider - antisubmarine and transport modifications. I do not think that the implementation of these tasks with the delivery of the ordered machines will be able to meet the deadlines of less than five to six years, even if you mobilize the best forces of the aviation industry under the special control of the top leadership of the country and the Navy. It is advisable not to attribute these costs directly to the subject of aircraft carrier development, then funds for financing the development can be carved out now.
Also, an aircraft carrier, like UDC, requires a heavy helicopter in various modifications - transport and unloading, for conducting special operations to a greater depth, anti-submarine. The "Kamov" is not and probably will not. In addition, Kamov machines are extremely overestimated in size, which is hardly acceptable in the ship's conditions, and not enough aerodynamic. On this with helicopters, perhaps, we will stop, because the continuation of the topic begins to go beyond the limits of aircraft carrier need. How long will it take to develop the specified DRLO, PLO and helicopter airplanes? Obviously at least five years, and then if the TTZ falls into the right hands.
Run and take
In the design of the aircraft carrier there are unique functional mechanisms that are not repeated anywhere else, besides technologically so complex that today their creation is available to a very limited number of manufacturers. First of all, it concerns steam or electromagnetic catapults for lifting 30 – 50-ton aircraft into the air. Attempts to circumvent this method of launch are bought by a significant reduction in combat capabilities. First of all, this restriction on the types of aircraft used (for example, early warning systems), reduced combat radius and bomb load.
Secondly, we need powerful mobile airborne aircraft lifts that do not occupy the space of the flight deck. Plus, a reliable landing and braking system for boating machines: a double and even triple aviofinishers system.And, finally, however strange it may seem, - ship power engineering. The problems caused by boiler installations on domestic aircraft carriers, including those set for export, are still at the hearing. But these are types of steam turbine power plants that have been developed for many decades. Meanwhile, there were no steam catapults as the main consumer of steam on our aircraft carriers.
The whole world is now more and more confidently moving towards integrated ship power plants. But then it is appropriate to raise the question of choosing an option for an electromagnetic electromagnetic catapult, a sample of which is not without problems being run-in on the last American aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford.
If we assume that the braking system of aircraft landing on the Admiral Kuznetsov is in principle implemented, and our industry can cope with the ship power industry, then the catapults and the wing will remain an open and fundamental issue. As far as it is complicated, it can be seen at least by the example of technologically advanced France, borrowing a catapult and deck airplanes of the ARLO for its atomic Charles de Gaulle from abroad, and at the cost of appreciable damage to national sovereignty.
Our military-industrial complex did not master the catapult even in golden Soviet times, being practically omnipotent - just as the other, and traditionally aircraft-carrying, countries could not. The Americans, the monopolists in this matter, work in deep cooperation with the world's best manufacturers of mechanical systems. How much time may it take to develop, build, test and debug a domestic device? Not less than six - eight years, and then subject to the utmost attention to him at the top. But after all, the main power plant of the aircraft carrier is chosen for the type of catapult: for steam - steam power, for electromagnetic - most likely a powerful integrated ship power plant. And we still do not know how to build.
Airplanes and aviofinisery for a promising aircraft carrier does not seem to be considered such a very heavy topic in comparison with previous positions. They are and operate on an existing aircraft carrier. But bringing mechanisms to a constructively modern and absolutely reliable state still remains relevant.
Floating polygon
Thus, the problems raised above, associated with the creation of a modern and combat-ready aircraft carrier, objectively need an 7 – 10-year-old “abandonment” in relation to the deadlines for ordering such a ship as a hull. However, the project of the latter must be selected and approved as a result of the competition also in advance. It would be nice to invite foreign companies to participate in it - this will greatly enliven the process with unexpected original ideas and approaches that will inevitably be brought to such a forum. It is useful to recall that in this section, shipbuilding in the leading maritime powers adhere to the deepest universalization in the construction of aircraft carriers and the UDC, right down to the uniform hull sections and the general nomenclature of the ship equipment, such as, say, on-board aircraft and helicopter lifters.
It turns out that if the Ministry of Defense is really going to build an aircraft carrier from 2025, weapons for it, catapults, aircraft lifters, landing systems should be created now, and a competition of projects should be held no later than 2020 – 2021. The country does not have easy money to make essentially an experienced ship co from the leading aircraft carrier with all the ensuing consequences, as it happened before more than once, when it improvised with a ready-made hull to the fullest: they sculpted everything that sometimes did not highly contradictory wishes of all branches of the leadership, when the lead ship was brought to its pre-infarction state. For running all the necessary equipment, weapons and equipment, it is desirable to have a floating stand or an experienced vessel. This minimizes the natural risks in such cases and speeds up the delivery of such a complex ship. An experienced ship is also required in advance. Apparently, it should be built on the basis of a large transport with a displacement of at least 65 tons or, in the absence of such, in the form of a catamaran or trimaran based on finished hulls of vessels along 15 – 24 tons with a continuous flight deck-transformer and an island bridge, as is customary on aircraft carriers. Here, all functional interior and communications of the future aircraft carrier are actually modeled, run in and optimized: hangars for airplanes and helicopters, repair boxes, aircraft refueling complexes and ammunition supply, cellars themselves, irrigation and fire fighting systems, supply lines for spare large-sized units to be replaced by airplanes and helicopters ... By readiness, a catapult should appear on the ship, and even earlier, flights of vehicles assigned to a promising aircraft carrier should be practiced Incoming them from the industry, with the rise using nasal ramp. The design of such an experimental vessel ensures its continuous operation, as well as the simplicity and manufacturability of any reorganization: the convenience and speed of installation of the newly emerging equipment, the continuity of the marine testing process of the consistently incoming equipment - so that the debugging periods of even the most fundamental mechanisms do not go beyond two or three months .
Re-equipment and operation of the vessel also should not be associated with the financing of a promising aircraft carrier. There is no need to specify how much this particular program will save money by leaving to go through the inevitable trial and error of a non-aircraft carrier, which will then have to be in battle formation for many years. The vessel should be ready no later than mid 2018 of the year.
Who is in the cabin, who is on the bridge?
We have come to that aspect of any problem that we usually take into account in the last turn or ignore. These are human and structural factors. Perhaps, it is worth starting with the fact that deck pilots in all fleets of the world are a super elite among pilots, which is not inferior in any respect to flight test pilots and aces from flight teams. And the point here is not that they with enviable regularity have to board the deck of an aircraft carrier in a vast ocean. They fly at different altitudes and conduct a maneuvering battle above the surface of the sea, near a water edge, over mountainous terrain and unfamiliar water areas, with a superior enemy, which is incomparably more difficult than fighting over a flat earth’s firmament, having behind it a familiar airfield, all types of support and support. And one can imagine how the commanders of groups, squadrons, and squads should be trained, called upon to lead, motivate, and direct their heroic subordinates. There is nowhere without personal authority. And the level of these specialists should be the best not only within the national framework, where we never miss the opportunity to brag, but firmly convertible. No worse than American or French deck pilots aviation, with an objective comparison in close contact with colleagues from the best fleets of the world.
The second consideration: traditionally all over the world, the best aircraft carrier commanders are from deck pilots. So it was with the Americans who have the most experience with the British. It is logical, because who better understands the peculiarities of combat operations at sea under conditions of massive use by the parties of carrier-based aviation? It would seem that we should adopt this practice, but this is impossible for us for structural reasons. Pilots of deck aviation remain in the Navy outside the crew with all the ensuing consequences.
If we go even further, is it possible to be completely confident in the sufficient depth of the study and planning of military operations using the main weapon in this case, if the headquarters of the ship’s formation, interacting with the aircraft carrier, does not have a competent officer from carrier-based pilots? Recall how very difficult even the high flagships that emerged from the surface, in the management of submarines. By the way, in the 50 years, fleet commanders did not control aviation and submarines, but set general tasks. Accordingly, the commanders of the submarine forces and aviation worked directly and competently with subordinate forces - the recent experience of the past war affected.
Management will become truly effective and modern when pilots of deck aviation, submariners, past the bridge of a frigate or patrol will no longer be a rarity among the officers of the naval compound: then all nuances of naval combat will be comprehensively, correctly, soberly and effectively taken into account. Of course, this should be based on a renewed naval science, without a hitch, interpreting the actions of a modern balanced fleet with a full-fledged aircraft carrier in the core. Then the requirements for it will be defined and clear.
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