Military Review

The cruisers of the project 26 and 26-bis. Part of 1. Genesis

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Ships of projects 26 and 26 bis. The first Soviet cruisers fleetlaid in the USSR. Graceful handsome men in whose silhouettes the sweeping outlines of the Italian school are easily discerned ... It seemed that almost all of these ships should be known to us: they were built in our country, all archival documents should be at hand. Nevertheless, among all the cruisers of the Russian imperial and Soviet fleet, there are probably no ships that would receive such conflicting ratings as cruisers of the Kirov and Maxim Gorky type. Only Soviet nuclear-powered cruisers, by a strange coincidence, are also Kirov-class cruisers, who can compete with them on this issue. Surprisingly, it is a fact: even the classification of ships of the project 26 and 26 bis is still the subject of discussion.

In the USSR Navy, these cruisers were considered light, and Soviet historiography, like most modern publications, also refers these ships to a subclass of light cruisers. Indeed, “if something floats like a duck, quacks like a duck and looks like a duck, then it is a duck”: the 26 and 26-bis projects were not only called light cruisers, they were created on the basis of a light Italian cruiser project, and the sizes and other basic characteristics, with the exception of the main caliber, fully corresponded to this class of ships. There were light cruisers in world practice and bigger ones, better protected or faster ones, but there were quite a few that were inferior to Soviet cruisers in these characteristics. The only difference between the "Kirov" and the "Maxim Gorky" from foreign ships of this class is that the caliber of their guns is an inch larger than was accepted.

This is the difference that proponents of a different point of view point out: despite all the above, the firstborn shipbuilding of the Soviet shipbuilding should be considered not heavy, but heavy cruisers, because according to the international classification, any cruisers with guns above 155-mm are considered heavy. And this is one of the reasons for the polar assessments of our ships. After all, if we compare Maxim Gorky with Fiji, Montekukkoli or Leipzig, our cruiser (at least on paper) is very good, but, of course, against the background of Hipper, Zary or Takao type 26-bis looks pale.

In the series of articles presented to your attention, the author will try to understand stories creating cruisers project 26 and 26-bis. Understand what tasks they were designed for and how their tactical and technical characteristics were determined, were these ships clones of Italian cruisers or should they be considered the brainchild of Soviet shipbuilders, what was the quality of their construction, what were their strengths and what were weak. And, of course, compare Soviet cruisers with their foreign counterparts.

The history of the cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis project began on 15 on April 1932 of the year, when V.M. Orlov approved signed by the head of the USU (the command and command building, in fact - the fleet headquarters) E.S. Pantserzhansky tactical task to develop a light cruiser. According to the document, the cruiser was required to:

1. Providing submarine warfare at their bases and at sea.
2. Intelligence, support for intelligence and destroyer attacks.
3. Reflection of enemy landings and the provision of their tactical assault forces.
4. Participation in the combined strike of fleet forces against the enemy at sea and at the position.
5. Fight with enemy cruisers.

These tasks should be a little more detailed. Where, for example, has the task of ensuring the combat operations of submarines ever come from? Cruisers had to withdraw submarines from the base, act in conjunction with them, direct them at the enemy, and manage ... But these are ships of completely different qualities and purposes! How did the Soviet soldiers manage to tie in one harness “a horse and a quivering doe”?

Let's try to figure out how this happened. To do this, recall that less than two years before the events described, in 1930, engineer A.N. Asafov proposed the idea of ​​a squadron submarine. In his opinion, it was possible to build an underwater ship with a surface speed of up to 23-24 units, capable of supporting its surface squadron, attacking enemy warships. At a time when the leadership of the USSR naval forces was fascinated by the development of the "mosquito fleet", such ideas were simply doomed to the understanding and support of the "commanding fathers". Thus began the history of the submarines of the type "Pravda", the first three (and last) ships of this series were laid in May-December 1931.



By the way, the expensive experiment to create a squadron boat ended in a deafening failure, since attempts to combine the obviously incompatible elements of a high-speed ship and submarine could not be successful. Destroyer lines, required to achieve high speed, are absolutely not suitable for scuba diving, and the need to ensure good seaworthiness required a large reserve of buoyancy, because of which the submarine became extremely difficult to dive.

However, our sailors should not be blamed for excessive adventurism: the idea looked extremely attractive, and it was probably worth a try, especially since similar attempts were made by other maritime powers, including such as Britain and France. Although, of course, at that time in no country in the world did attempts to create a squadron submarine succeed (something like this was approached only with the advent of nuclear power plants, and even with certain reservations). But as long as the creation of an effective squadron submarine seemed possible, the task of interacting with them for the light cruiser seemed quite rational.

Participation in the combined strike. Everything is quite simple here: in the early 30s, the theory of the “small sea war” still retained its position. The main assumption of this theory was that in coastal areas such weapons as aviation, submarines, torpedo boats, coupled with modern land artillery and mines capable of defeating the obviously superior naval forces of the enemy.

Without going into details of the discussions between the supporters of the “small war” and the traditional fleet, I would note that in the specific economic conditions in which the USSR was at the turn of the 30, one could only dream of a powerful ocean fleet. At the same time, the task of defending one’s own coast was extremely acute, so reliance on the “mosquito fleet” as a temporary measure was justifiably up to a known measure. And if the supporters of the “small sea war” were engaged in the thoughtful development of naval aviation, submarines, communications equipment, paying special attention to the development of effective tactics of their use and the practice of crews (not by number, but by skill!), Then all this would not be easy undoubted, but colossal. Unfortunately, the development of domestic light forces went a completely different way, the consideration of which would lead us away from the topic of the article too far.

Combined strike was, in fact, the highest form of battle in the theory of "small war". Its meaning was to quickly and imperceptibly for the enemy to concentrate maximum forces in one place and deliver an unexpected and powerful blow with diverse forces - aviation, destroyers, torpedo boats, submarines, and, if possible, coastal artillery and so on. A small nuance: sometimes a combined strike is called concentrated, which is not entirely true. The difference between them lies in the fact that the combined strike assumed a simultaneous attack by all forces, while a concentrated strike is carried out by successively entering into combat units of different types. In any case, the greatest chances of success were achieved in coastal areas, since it was there that it was possible to concentrate the maximum of light forces and provide the best conditions for coastal aviation attacks. One of the main options for combat was a battle in a mine position, when the enemy was weakened by submarine operations while advancing to it, and the combined strike was delivered during attempts to force it.

At that stage of its development, the Soviet fleet did not intend to go to the world ocean or even to remote sea areas - it simply had nothing to do with it. The main task of the Red Army Navy in the Baltic was to cover Leningrad from the sea, on the Black Sea - to protect Sevastopol and to defend the Crimea and Odessa from the sea, and in the Far East, due to the almost complete absence of naval forces, no tasks were set before them.

Under these conditions, the clause on the participation of Soviet light cruisers in the combined strike became no alternative. Of course, the Soviet admirals wanted in every way to strengthen the light forces that were to perform the main task of the fleet, but even if it were not so, no one would understand the leadership of the Red Army Command, wish it to assign other tasks to cruisers. Create the most modern light cruisers without the ability to use them to perform the most important task of the fleet? “This is worse than a crime. This is mistake".

True, the question may arise here: how exactly should light cruisers be used in a combined strike? After all, it is obvious that any attempt to send them into an artillery battle against battleships, battlecruisers or even heavy cruisers is doomed to failure. The author was unable to find a direct answer to this question, but, apparently, it is contained in the second paragraph of the HTA: "Intelligence, maintaining intelligence and destroyer attacks".

In those years, reconnaissance functions in squadrons of surface ships were everywhere assigned to light cruisers. Aviation provided only preliminary data, but when the distance between fleets preparing for a confrontation was reduced to several tens of miles, it was the light cruisers sent forward who were supposed to detect an approaching enemy, maintain visual contact with it and notify the commander about the structure, course, speed of the main enemy forces . Therefore, light cruisers were very fast to prevent heavy enemy ships from moving closer to dangerous distances, strong enough to fight on an equal footing with ships of their class, and the presence of numerous medium-caliber artillery (130-155 mm) allowed them to effectively deal with enemy destroyers . It was to be expected that the enemy light cruisers would be the first to discover and try to intercept the Soviet destroyers in order to prevent them from reaching the main forces. Accordingly, the task of the domestic cruisers was to defeat or drive away the light forces of the enemy and bring the leading destroyers to the line of attack of heavy ships. Hence, in fact, the point of HTA "Fight with enemy cruisers".

Unfortunately, the leaders of the naval forces of the Red Army did not strive for apothecary accuracy in the formulations, because otherwise this point would surely have sounded like “Fight with enemy light cruisers”. Such a battle could occur in two situations: during a combined strike on heavy ships, as described above, or during an attack by enemy transport or amphibious convoys. Soviet naval thought suggested that such convoys would have “two-level” protection — destroyers and (maximum) light cruisers in the direct guard of transports and larger ships, such as heavy, or even battle cruisers, as long-range cover. In this case, it was assumed that the Soviet cruiser should quickly get close to the convoy, destroying its direct artillery guard, attacking transports with torpedoes and quickly retreat in order not to get hit by heavy ships.

Paragraph: "Reflection of enemy landings and the provision of their tactical landings" does not add anything new to the above functionality of the Soviet cruisers. It is obvious that the enemy’s heavy ships will go into the Soviet coastal waters only for carrying out some important and large-scale operations, most likely landing operations, as was the case with the memorable Operation Albion. Then the task of the Soviet naval forces in general, and cruisers in particular, will be counteraction to such landings, by delivering a combined strike against the main forces of the enemy or by an escort of amphibious transports.

What qualities should a Soviet cruiser have to have in order to meet the requirements of a tactical task?

First, the ship had to have a high speed comparable to the speeds of destroyers. Only in this way could the cruiser, not looking up from the destroyers, advance to the area of ​​the "combined strike" and that was the only way he could lead torpedo-powered flotilla in battle. At the same time, Soviet cruisers had to act in the conditions of the overwhelming superiority of the enemy naval forces, and only speed gave chances for survival both in battles near their own coast and in raids on enemy communications.

Secondly, a long range for Soviet light cruisers was not required, and could be sacrificed for other characteristics. All tasks of this class of ships, with reference to the Soviet fleet, were solved in coastal areas, or during short raider attacks on the Black and Baltic Seas.

Thirdly, the main-caliber artillery must be more powerful than the ships of this class and powerful enough to quickly disable enemy light cruisers.

Fourthly, the reservation should be sufficiently developed (extended along the waterline). The need for maximum armor space was due to the requirement to maintain high speed, even when subjected to intense shelling of enemy light cruisers and destroyers, because the shells of the latter had already reached the caliber 120-130 mm and, if they hit the waterline, they could do a lot of work. On the other hand, increasing the thickness of the vertical armor to counter more powerful than 152-mm shells did not make much sense. Of course, protection is not superfluous, but the cruiser was not designed to fight with heavy enemy ships, and increasing the vertical armor increased displacement, required a more powerful power plant to ensure the required speed and led to an increase in the cost of the ship. But horizontal booking should have been made as powerful as possible, which could only be placed on a cruiser, without prejudice to its speed and artillery power, because acting in coastal areas, and even on the flanks of the warring armies, the danger of enemy air raids could not be ignored.

Fifth, all of the above was required to fit into the minimum displacement and cost. We must not forget that in the early to mid-thirties the possibilities of the military budget and industry of the USSR were still frankly small.

It was assumed that in order to meet all the above tasks, the cruiser should be armed with 4 * 180-mm (in two towers) 4 * 100-mm, 4 * 45-mm, 4 * 12,7-mm machine gun and two three-tube torpedo tubes, the ship also had be able to take up to 100 min in overload. Aviation armament was to consist of four "torpedo bomber" unknown hitherto design. Reservation of the side was supposed to protect from 152-mm high-explosive projectile at a distance of 85-90 KBT, decks - from 115 KBT and closer. The speed should have been 37-38 nodes, while the range was set very small - only 600 miles at full speed, which corresponded to 3 000 - 3 600 miles economic course. It was assumed that such performance characteristics can be obtained with a cruiser displacement in 6 000 t.

The rather strange requirements for the protection of a cruiser attract attention: if the armored deck was supposed to provide almost absolute protection against 6 caliber artillery, then the board should protect only against the high-explosive 152-mm projectile and, practically at the limit for such guns 85-90 KB It is difficult to understand what this is connected with: after all, the lead destroyers for a concentrated strike, and the attack of enemy transport convoys were a type of oncoming and fleeting naval combat, and therefore it was necessary to expect a rapprochement with enemy light cruisers to much closer distances than 8- Xnumx miles It is possible that the sailors were impressed by the high performance of 9-mm guns and hoped to quickly crush the enemy over a long distance. But most likely, the answer should be sought precisely in the counter character of the battles: if the ship goes to the enemy, then the course angle is relatively small and the enemy shells will hit the board at a very large angle, at which even the 180-mm armor-piercing can not even do relatively thin armor.

Thus, having studied the HTA and the supposed technical characteristics of the Soviet cruiser, we can make an absolutely unambiguous conclusion: no one set our ship to achieve success in artillery fighting with heavy enemy cruisers. Of course, a cruiser in 6 000 tons with 4 * 180-mm guns could not withstand the modern at that time "Washington" heavy cruiser with its eight 203-mm guns and a displacement of 10 000 and at least it would be strange to assume our sailors did not understand this. In addition, we see that for the armor protection of the Soviet cruiser, the tasks of confronting 203-mm projectiles were not set at any distances (at least long-range). Heavy cruisers could become an object of attack for the "combined strike" of the naval forces of the Red Army, but in this case the task of the Soviet cruisers was to pave the way for them to their destroyers and torpedo boats, which were to deliver a mortal blow.

In other words, in the light of the then views, the fleet needed an ordinary light cruiser, with one exception: the requirements for the main caliber of our ships exceeded the standard tasks for light cruisers. While the classic light cruiser was enough not to yield in artillery to ships of the same class in other countries, our ships needed a large firepower sufficient to quickly disable or even destroy light cruisers. This is understandable: to break through the barriers of enemy light forces required quickly, for any lengthy firing duel time could not be.

Other requirements: high speed with moderate displacement, booking and range, in many respects coincided with the Italian concept of ships of this class. Small, very high-speed, decently armed, though not very well-armored, Mare Nostrum fenders corresponded to the tasks of the Red Army naval forces to a much greater degree than light cruisers of other powers.

England, France, Germany - all of them for the most part built poorly protected ships almost equally armed (8-9 six-inch guns) and had a very moderate speed (32-33 node). Moreover, the most high-speed ones (French “Duge Truen”, 33 bonds) did not have deck and side armor at all: 25-30 mm only towers, cellars and cabin were protected by armor plates. The situation was even worse with the Emil Berten that was laid out in 1931 - although this ship had already received an 20-mm armored deck, but its artillery was not protected at all - neither the tower nor the barbette. The British Linders had a good vertical citadel protection, consisting of 76 mm armor plates that supported the 25,4 mm lining of medium carbon steel. But this bronepoyas covered only the boiler rooms and engine rooms, and the armor-decks, barbety and towers had only an inch (25,4 mm) armor protection, which, of course, was absolutely not enough. Although in fairness we should mention a fairly strong "boxed" protection of artillery cellars, but in general, "Linder" looked clearly undefended. The German “Cologne” had a longer stronghold than their British counterparts, the thickness of the armor was 50 mm (and 10-mm slant behind it), but otherwise - only 20 mm armored decks and 20-30 mm armor towers. At the same time the standard displacement of these ships was 6700-7300 tons.

Only the French La Galissoniere cruisers stand apart.



With standard light cruiser armament (9 * 152-mm guns in the three towers), the ships had extremely powerful reservations: covering the vehicles and cellars of an armored ammunition unit 105 mm thick (thinned to the bottom edge to 60 mm). There was also an 20-mm bulkhead right up to the armored belt to the very bottom of the ship, which played the role of not only splinter but also anti-torpedo protection. The thickness of the deck armor was 38 mm, the forehead of the towers was 100 mm, the barbats were 70-95 mm.



At the time of the laying of the "La Galissonier" was the most protected light cruiser, so that there - many heavy cruisers could envy his armor! However, the price of such a powerful defense turned out to be considerable - the French cruiser had a standard 7600 tonnage, and its maximum speed should have been just an 31 knot, which is why ships of this type did not fit into the concept of the Red Army Naval Forces.

Italians are another matter. In 1931, the fleet of the Duce was replenished with the four “Kondotieri” series “A”: light cruisers “Alberico da Barbiano”. Ships of this type were designed as Italy's ultimate answer to the extremely powerful (perhaps the most powerful in the world) leaders of the destroyers built in France. Interestingly, initially these offspring of the Italian shipyards were not even considered cruisers. According to the design assignment, these ships were called “37 nodal scouts,” a bit later they were referred to as “esploratori”, i.e. scouts - peculiar only to the Italians class, in which were also large squadron destroyers. And only later the Condotieri were reclassified into light cruisers.

Their defense was extremely weak, designed to counter the French high-explosive 138-mm projectiles. The main belt 24 mm thick was thinned to the extremities up to 20 mm (in some sources 18mm). It should be noted that the Italians used the spaced vertical booking system, which was innovative for the light cruiser, since the main armor had 20 mm armored partitioning, which gave the 38-44 mm cruiser the total thickness of the vertical armor. But in the battle with the cruiser there was no sense in this, because with such “thicknesses” both “armor belts” penetrated 152-mm projectiles at any reasonable distance of the battle. The armor and traverses also had 20 mm, the towers defended with either 22-mm or 23-mm armor plates. In general, the views of those Italian historians who consider ships of the type “Alberico da Barbiano” to be cruiserless ships are not far from the truth.

However, surprisingly, from the point of view of protection among their foreign peers, Italian cruisers do not look like “white crows” - simply because these peers were also armored very badly (not counting the “La Galissoniers” who were only laid back then when the first "Condotieri" were already part of the Italian fleet). And the rest (it would seem!) "Kondottieri" series "A" consisted of the merits alone. Not inferior in armament (8-152-mm cannons), they were almost one and a half thousand tons lighter than the smallest foreign cruisers - the German Cologne (5280 tons versus 6650-6730 tons) and at the same time almost at 10 nodes are high-speed. The ancestor of the series, "Alberico da Barbiano", was able to develop on the tests enchanting 42,05 node!

So is it any wonder that in 1932 v. M. Orlov wrote to Voroshilov: “A Kondotieri type cruiser should be considered a very suitable type of light cruisers for the USSR Naval Forces,” and shortly before that (and even before issuing the HTA to Soviet cruisers), the USSR tried to acquire one ready-made cruiser of this type so that in the future to build similar ships in their shipyards? True, Soviet experts noted the weakness of booking Italian cruisers, which is why “Kondotieri” did not fully meet the expectations of the Red Army MS leadership, but it seems that the desire to get a new cruiser outweighed the rest of the considerations as soon as possible. it would be to finalize ... Fortunately for the Soviet fleet, the deal did not take place - the Italians refused to sell one of their newest and just entered ships.

The “Italian miracle” did not happen: it is impossible to build equally powerful and protected, but much lighter and faster than the competitors, ships on an equal level of technology. Moreover, the technological base of Italy can hardly be considered equal to the French or British. The Italians' attempt to forge ahead led to a natural finale: the Alberico da Barbiano-type cruisers turned out to be extremely unsuccessful ships, over-light and low-passage, while in daily operation they could not develop more 30-31 nodes. Many of their shortcomings were obvious to designers even before they were commissioned, so the next series of Kondotieri, Luigi Cadorna-type cruisers, laid out in 1930, began to work on errors — an attempt to correct the most glaring flaws without a global reworking of the project.



However, here the result was very far from what was expected, which again became clear at the design stage - therefore, only a year later, work on two light cruisers of a completely new type began to boil on Italian stocks.

This time the Italian fleet approached the matter extremely reasonably: by setting high, but not excessive demands on the speed of the new light cruisers (37 units) and leaving unchanged the main caliber (four two-gun 152-mm towers), the sailors demanded protection from 152-mm projectiles, agreeing to the associated increase in displacement. So the cruisers “Raimondo Montecuccoli” and “Muzio Attendolo” were designed, in which the speed, power of artillery and defense were combined very harmoniously.



With a standard displacement in 7 431 t (in some sources - 7 540 t), the thickness of the booking of the board of the new Italian cruisers was 60 mm (and also 25 - 30 mm longitudinal bulkhead behind the main armor belt), towers - 70 mm, barbat towers - 50 mm . Only the traverses (20-40 mm) and the deck (20-30 mm) looked unimportant, but in general such a reservation was a huge step forward compared to the previous Condottieri. The next pair ordered for construction (“Duca d'Aosta” and “Eugenio di Savoia”) was distinguished by further improvement of protection, for which they had to pay an increase in displacement of almost a thousand tons and a drop in speed by half a node. All four ships of these subtypes were laid in 1931-1933. and became part of the Italian fleet in 1935-1936. and precisely these ships were destined to become the “Italian roots” of the Soviet cruiser project 26.

However, it is worth noting that the development of Italian cruisers (in iron) and the Soviet ship (for the time being only on paper) in the period of 1932-33. went completely different ways. While the Italians, satisfied with the firepower that 8 * 152-mm guns gave, concentrated on improving protection, doing so to the detriment of such a traditionally important parameter for their shipbuilding school as speed, the Soviet ship further evolved side gain weapons.

Planning to use the Italian power plant, 19 in March 1933. Namorsi Orlov affirms the “Tactical mission for a light cruiser with the mechanisms (turbines) of the Italian cruiser“ Montekukkoli ”. The side and deck bookings should have been 50 mm, traverse barbets and barrels of main-caliber guns - 35-50 mm, turrets - 100-50 mm, speed - 37 nodes, economic range - 3500 miles. All these data are within the limits of the initial HTA of 15 on April 1932 of the year, unless the armor thickness is specified to ensure the level of protection specified in the HTA. But the composition of weapons began to significantly increase. So, it was decided to add a third two-gun 180-mm turret, bringing the number of trunks of the main caliber to six, and even this namorsi seemed not enough: having approved the new TK for a three-turbo cruiser with six guns of the main caliber, Orlov immediately orders to calculate the possibility of installing the fourth such a tower. Anti-aircraft artillery is also increasing: the number of 45-mm anti-aircraft guns and 100-mm guns increased from four to six, but the latter (if it was impossible to keep within a given displacement) were allowed to leave four. The four unintelligible “torpedo bombers” from the project disappeared, only two KOR-2 scouts remained with one catapult and after all the listed innovations the standard displacement should have increased to 6 500 t.

The conservatism shown in determining the speed of a future cruiser is interesting. As already mentioned, the Soviet ship was to receive the turbines and boilers of "Raimondo Montecuccoli", which, having a 7 431 t standard displacement, in a normal cargo had to develop 37 nodes. Accordingly, from the Soviet cruiser, whose displacement at that time was estimated at almost a thousand tons less and with the same power of machines, one would expect greater speed, but it was installed at the level of the Italian "relative" - ​​all the same 37 nodes. What this is connected with is unclear, but we note that the Soviet designers in this case did not at all strive to achieve some record characteristics.

Interestingly, this "modesty" was practiced in the future. Namorsi Orlov approved the draft design of a cruiser with a displacement of 6 500 tons of April 20 1933, and it is clear that the turbines and the theoretical drawing "Raimondo Montecuccoli" would be quite suitable for such a ship. Nevertheless, the USSR acquired turbines in Italy and a theoretical drawing of a much larger Eugenio di Savoia, whose standard displacement reached 8 750 t.

Perhaps the sailors feared that the displacement of the Soviet cruiser, as the project improved, would continue to climb up? It would be quite reasonable: first, the ship was still “breathing” in the sketches and there were no guarantees that its performance characteristics were close to the final one — quite serious changes in the composition of weapons and so on could occur. And secondly, one of the problems in determining the ship’s displacement was that for him there were not yet many mechanisms that had yet to be developed, so there was simply no precise information about their mass and they could be much harder than now supposed.

Thus, it can be stated that the Soviet cruiser was designed for the specific tasks of the naval forces of the Red Army without copying the views of the Italian fleet. However, in terms of tactical and technical characteristics, it was Italian cruisers of the types “Raimondo Montecuccoli” and “Eugenio di Savoia” that turned out to be the best prototype for the 26 cruiser. How much did the cruisers like Kirov copy their Italian prototype?

To be continued ...
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  1. demiurg
    demiurg 27 July 2016 06: 56
    10
    Straight intrigue. Thanks for the interesting article. Honestly, Kirov has always considered a non-Washington DC cruiser. But it turns out that this is a cruiser built for specific tasks.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 08: 37
      +5
      Quote: demiurg
      Thank you for becoming an interesting

      You are welcome!
      Quote: demiurg
      But it turns out that this is a cruiser built for specific tasks.

      Yes, that's how it is
    2. goose
      goose 27 July 2016 10: 41
      +2
      It was necessary to mention that in parallel negotiations with the Americans on the design of power plants based on EM power failed.
      Of those with whom it was possible to trade, only the Italians had such technologies.
      The British, French, Dutch, Japanese did not trade. The Germans had new EU secret and risky.
      Everyone else was overboard with technological progress.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 27 July 2016 15: 11
        +1
        Quote: goose
        The British, French, Dutch, Japanese did not trade.

        The British traded. But only ready-made products - for example, ours bought 12 sets of GTZA for EM pr. 7 from "Vickers" and "Parsons" (received as a result of 7U).
        ... at the end of 1936, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade ordered 12 sets of GTZA and auxiliary mechanisms for the Sevens from the British firms Metro-Vickers and Parsons. They should have a slightly lower power (24 hp), but they could be launched in a cold state, without preheating, which theoretically reduced the preparation time for the ship to go to sea.

        In March 1938, the turbines received from England were distributed among the plants. Of the eight sets of Metro-Vickers state power plants, 7 went to Leningrad No. 189 and No. 190, and one more was sent to the KBF base as a reserve. Four sets of the Parsons company went to the Black Sea: 3 - to the Nikolaev factory No. 200 and one - to the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol.
  2. Bormanxnumx
    Bormanxnumx 27 July 2016 07: 09
    +7
    In the Anglo-Soviet naval agreement of 1937. had to move away from the then classification and project 26 was classified as: "Cruisers of the non-contractual type with artillery 7,1" of the standard displacement of 7-8 thousand tons of the "Kirov" type ".
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 08: 39
      +5
      Quote: BORMAN82
      In the Anglo-Soviet Maritime Agreement 1937. had to move away from the then classification

      We will definitely get to the international classification. I had a desire to paint everything from the beginnings there, so that there were no innuendo left.
      1. Mister X
        Mister X 27 July 2016 12: 28
        +2
        hi
        Very good and interesting article. Waiting for the continuation.

        Regarding the classification.
        These ships were called “37-nodal scouts”, a bit later they were referred to as “esploratori”, i.e. scouts - peculiar only to the Italians class ...
        Author Andrey from Chelyabinsk

        Last spring I published materials about the Aquila class scout cruiser.
        For this topic, I studied literature in Russian, English, Italian, Spanish and Romanian languages ​​and came to the conclusion
        that esploratore, scout cruiser and cruiser scout are synonymous.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          27 July 2016 18: 07
          +2
          Quote: Mister X
          Very good and interesting article. Waiting for the continuation.

          Thanks! And the continuation will not rust :)
          Quote: Mister X
          Last spring I published materials about the Aquila class cruiser scouts

          "Marasti"? Great cycle, I read it with pleasure.
          Quote: Mister X
          For this topic, I studied literature in Russian, English, Italian, Spanish and Romanian

          I envy :) Such kind, black envy laughing I myself, alas, are not savvy in languages
          Quote: Mister X
          and concluded
          that esploratore, scout cruiser and cruiser scout are synonymous.

          With all due respect - I cannot agree with you. The objection is the following - in the post-war fleets (meaning after WWI), all countries had a clear definition of a destroyer / leader / light cruiser. Cruiser Scout is, one might say, a subtype of light cruiser. But only Italians used the term-class of ships, which united the leaders and, let's say, "small light cruisers" or cruiser-scouts, if you like. Despite the fact that the cruiser scout and the leader are still different things
          1. Mister X
            Mister X 27 July 2016 18: 53
            +3
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            "Marasti"? Great cycle, I read it with pleasure.

            Yes, Marasti.
            Thank you, I worked with the materials for more than one month.
            As I already wrote - before this cycle I could not answer how the ship differs from the vessel.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            I envy :) Good such black envy laughing I myself, alas, are not savvy of languages

            Google Translator to help!
            The meaning can be understood, and the rest - to think out.
            I forgot to write: I have translated the slogans of the Italian ships from Latin.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            With all due respect, I cannot agree with you. Objection following

            I do not insist on being right, I just want to quote from Wiki in Italian:
            Esploratore (nave)
            Per la loro modalità operativa avevano bisogno di una elevata autonomia, comparabile a quella di un incrociatore, ma senza bisogno di un equivalente armamento o protezione,
            tanto che la marina britannica li denominò scout cruiser, cioè incrociatore esploratore.

            Free translation:
            Esploratore (L'esploratore) had a high range, comparable to the autonomy of a cruiser, but with weaker armament and armor protection.
            In the British Navy they were called the scout cruiser (i.e., cruiser scout).

            Curious to know your opinion after reading.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              27 July 2016 21: 31
              +4
              Quote: Mister X
              Curious to know your opinion after reading.

              I am pleased to explain my position in more detail.
              What is a cruiser scout? This is a small cruiser, the main tasks of which are reduced to leading destroyer flotillas and reconnaissance at line squadrons. An example of a scout cruiser is, perhaps, the Russian cruiser Novik. Being weaker than a conventional armored cruiser, it had significantly more powerful weapons than a destroyer and a speed higher than armored cruisers but lower than destroyers, but also, unlike the latter, it had armor. Thus, the cruiser-scout differs from an ordinary light cruiser in higher speed but also in weaker armament, and from a destroyer in more powerful armament, lower speed and armor (which destroyers do not have).
              Well, it was these cruisers-scouts that England built on the eve of WWI - all sorts of "Forwards" and "Actives". But then one continuous frustration turned out - ships of this type were still too slow-moving for joint actions with destroyers (because they were inferior in speed) and too expensive to be consumable (like destroyers), but they could not fight with an ordinary light cruiser. And so the same Englishmen had another idea - to create a new class of ships called "leader".
              The leaders were slightly enlarged destroyers. At the same time, they differed from the destroyers in somewhat larger sizes, more powerful artillery weapons, but the speed of the leaders was usually comparable to the destroyers - a little less (but this is rare), usually the same or even more.
              But the leader was not a scout cruiser. Unlike the latter, the leader was much smaller, faster, and did not carry armor.
              Those. leader and cruiser-scout are ships of different classes. For example, according to the British classification, ships of the Aquila type (1820 tons of full displacement, 3 * 1-152 mm and 4 * 1-76 mm and 34 knots) would be considered leaders. But ships of the "Quarto" type (3388 tons of full displacement, 6 * 1-120-mm and 6 * 1-76-mm, the deck is armored with 38 mm wheelhouse - 100 mm and 28,6 knots of speed) would be considered cruisers-scouts. But the Italians both considered esploratori. Of course, leaders and scouts had a similar purpose, but in other fleets they were still divided, because leaders and scouts still have too different performance characteristics to shove them into the same class
              1. Mister X
                Mister X 27 July 2016 22: 04
                +2
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                What is a cruiser scout? This is a small cruiser.

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                The leaders were a few enlarged destroyers.

                It is quite intelligible and convincing.

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                But the Italians and others considered esploratori.

                Since I am familiar only with Italian esploratories such as L'Aquila, I was of the opinion of the Italians smile
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  30 July 2016 01: 34
                  0
                  Not a question at all. I explain my point of view in as much detail as possible so that there are no shortcomings. And to take my explanations into account or not - this is exclusively your right.
                  I am sincerely glad that you, having familiarized yourself with my reasons, consider them "intelligible and convincing". But, of course, you yourself will determine your point of view on the question - I will be glad if my reasoning turned out to be useful to you
        2. Alf
          Alf 27 July 2016 22: 32
          -1
          Quote: Mister X
          about the cruiser scouts of the Aquila class.

          Not CLASS Aquila, but TYPE Aquila. How much can sheer obvious stupidity be repeated? Cruiser is the class, and Aquila is the type.
          1. Mister X
            Mister X 28 July 2016 00: 03
            0
            Quote: Alf
            Not the CLASS of Aquila, but the TYPE of Aquila. How much can you repeat the obvious nonsense?

            Very grateful for the hint.
            I have already corrected myself and wrote this way half an hour before your comment.
            Quote: Mister X
            Since I am familiar only with Italian esploratories such as L'Aquila, I was of the opinion of the Italians
            1. Alf
              Alf 28 July 2016 20: 15
              0
              Quote: Mister X
              Quote: Mister X
              Since I am familiar only with Italian esploratories such as L'Aquila, I was of the opinion of the Italians

              This is not the opinion of Italians, but the illiteracy of translators.
  3. Papandopulo
    Papandopulo 27 July 2016 07: 23
    0
    With the submarine, there was an ambush for a completely different reason.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 08: 39
      +1
      Quote: Papandopulo
      With the submarine, there was an ambush for a completely different reason.

      For what?
      1. avt
        avt 27 July 2016 09: 14
        +4
        Quote: Papandopulo
        With the submarine, there was an ambush for a completely different reason.

        wassatAnd really
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        For what?

        Enlighten, not you, well, the bearers of secret knowledge who add to you. What else did Asafov do? wassat There is no need for current, well, if you really know the details, spread out like a missile in reserve of 92% buoyancy, high board and shallow draft. This is all just described briefly by the choice of "destroyer" contours of the hull, for the sake of improving the surface course. Since one of the requirements was a joint action in the squadron of surface ships. under water it was controlled badly. Well, if briefly so.
  4. qwert
    qwert 27 July 2016 07: 51
    +2
    Andrei, where are the captions for the pictures ???
    And where are the sources and list of references ???
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 08: 41
      +1
      Quote: qwert
      Andrei, where are the captions for the pictures ???

      I didn’t understand a bit which signatures do you want to see?
      Quote: qwert
      And where are the sources and list of references ???

      As always, I publish them in the last article in the series.
      1. Alex_59
        Alex_59 27 July 2016 08: 49
        +2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I didn’t understand a bit which signatures do you want to see?

        Below the photos of the cruisers - what kind of ship is depicted, when and where. And it is not entirely clear what kind of CD in the photo. There is a signature only for photo P-3: "P-3. Parade on the Neva".
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          27 July 2016 09: 00
          +5
          It’s difficult - I’m looking for photos on the internet and don’t always know what when and where (well, except for the type of ship, of course). But the criticism is constructive - starting from the next article I will sign it.
          And here...
          Screensaver - Cruiser Kaganovich on artillery shooting January 1956
          Submarine type True (well, there it is understandable)
          The La Gallisonniere-class cruiser and its booking scheme, of course
          Next - Italian cruiser Armando Diaz (condottieri, second series)
          And the last photo - Montecuccoli
  5. 27091965
    27091965 27 July 2016 07: 57
    +5
    The cruisers had to take the submarines out of the base, act together with them, direct them at the enemy, and exercise control ... But these are ships of completely different qualities and purposes! How did the Soviet military commanders manage to tie “horse and trembling doe” into one team?


    This tactic was developed in Germany during the 1st World War. Cruisers were supposed to appear in certain areas, with a certain frequency. When the enemy set about patrolling the area, submarines advanced there. The cruisers came into contact with the enemy forces and retreated to the submarine operating area, for this they needed good speed. The second option provided for an independent attack of the submarines on the enemy patrol ships, in the area where high-speed cruisers were supposed to appear.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 08: 44
      +2
      Quote: 27091965i
      This tactic was developed in Germany in the 1 World War

      I have heard about this tactic, but never about the fact that the Red Army was going to use something like that. However, about Pravda is just a hypothesis.
      1. 27091965
        27091965 27 July 2016 12: 13
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I have heard about this tactic, but never about the fact that the Red Army was going to use something like that. However, about Pravda is just a hypothesis.


        “Judging by the official views of the English, Japanese, Italian and some other fleets, they did not forget the Germans' attempt to use submarines in order to weaken the enemy fleet in anticipation of a battle at sea. Such a preliminary effect of submarines on the enemy discovered by reconnaissance was possible only with the advance deployment of submarines at the enemy naval heading courses. In this case, it might be necessary to move the boats to a new area. In a battle at sea, submarines could interact with surface ships subject to the organization of effective aerial reconnaissance, reliable communication with submarines, and most importantly, their sufficiently high speed.
        The views on the possibility of the combat use of submarines in battle at sea in tactical interaction with surface ships were realized in the English Thames type, which entered the sling in 1935 and had a surface speed of 22,5 knots and were at that time the fastest.
        In 1931-1937 two series of submarines were built in Japan: “1-68” - “1-73” and “1-74” - “1-75”, speed —21/8 knots.
        In the same years, the French built several series of submarines of the Rocker type, having a speed of 30/10 knots. Their armament consisted of eleven torpedo tubes. A feature of these and other French interwar-built boats was that part of the torpedo tubes on them was located in rotary installations in the underdeck superstructure.
        ”In the Soviet Union, high-speed submarines of type“ P ”(“ Pravda ”) came into operation.”


        These were the views of those years, we were not the only ones trying to implement this idea. But, in our country it was preparation for the construction of a “big fleet” in the future, preliminary testing of new tactics. Therefore, this requirement of interaction with submarines appeared.
        Your articles are very interesting, thanks.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          27 July 2016 13: 52
          +2
          Quote: 27091965i
          These were the views of those years, we were not the only ones trying to implement this idea.

          I completely agree, I wrote about this in the article.
          Quote: 27091965i
          Your articles are very interesting, thanks.

          And thank you for your kind words!
        2. The comment was deleted.
        3. Bormanxnumx
          Bormanxnumx 27 July 2016 15: 25
          0
          Quote: 27091965i
          The views on the possibility of the combat use of submarines in battle at sea in tactical interaction with surface ships were realized in the English Thames type, which entered the sling in 1935 and had a surface speed of 22,5 knots and were at that time the fastest.
          In 1931 — 1937

          The British were the first to realize this utopian idea back in 1916 - type K submarines, a steam turbine and 24 knots surface speed. At the same time, during this period they launched the first specialized Sudmarina-hunter for submarines of type J.
          1. 27091965
            27091965 27 July 2016 16: 12
            0
            Quote: BORMAN82
            The British were the first to realize this utopian idea back in 1916


            They discussed not when a submarine of this type appeared, but why a clause on interaction with submarines appeared during the design of the Kirov cruiser. Submarines of the "K" type did not last long.
            1. Bormanxnumx
              Bormanxnumx 27 July 2016 18: 14
              +1
              I just clarified that this concept was realized in hardware long before the Thames. As for type K, they were in operation for 9 years (1916-1925) - a long period.
  6. Alex_59
    Alex_59 27 July 2016 08: 22
    +5
    Article plus. We look forward to continuing.

    By the way, a lot of useful things can be learned from history for our present. For example:
    in the specific economic conditions in which the USSR was at the turn of the 30's, one could only dream of a mighty ocean fleet.
    Almost like in our time! Think about it. Is it worth squeezing out aircraft carriers with cruisers, is there any practical sense in this work? All the same, we will not surpass the NATO fleets. Isn't it better to concentrate on this:
    And if the supporters of the “small sea war” took up the thoughtful development of naval aviation, submarines, communications, paying particular attention to the development of effective tactics of their application and the practice of crews (not by numbers, but by skill!), Then the benefits of all this would be not just doubtless, but colossal.
    Guided minefields covered by aircraft and dozens of inconspicuous corvettes like the Swedish Visby, plus our traditionally very secretive diesel submarines. Try to break through to the coast! Cheap and cheerful. We won’t conquer the Atlantic (and do we need it at all?), But we won’t let anyone into the Baltic, Barents and Black Sea. But this is off topic, so, thoughts are rumored.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 08: 48
      +3
      Quote: Alex_59
      By the way, a lot of useful things can be learned from history for our present

      Can:)
      Quote: Alex_59
      Almost like in our time!

      Not at all. The events described in the article take place in 1932-33, then the 1932-33 famine raged in the USSR, which was later called the famine by the "non-brothers" How does this compare with our time?
      Quote: Alex_59
      Is it worth squeezing out aircraft carriers with cruisers, is there any practical sense in this work?

      Yes there is. Because we need them now. The fleet is largely a policy tool
      Quote: Alex_59
      Guided minefields covered by aircraft and dozens of inconspicuous corvettes such as the Swedish Visby,

      What of this we will send to the Mediterranean Sea to the coast of Syria? :)))
      hi
      1. Alex_59
        Alex_59 27 July 2016 09: 08
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        How does this compare with our time?

        I'm not talking about hunger. I'm talking about the fact that there is not enough money for kindergartens, what kind of aircraft carriers are there.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Yes there is. Because we need them now. The fleet is largely a policy tool

        The comment format is too short to give a detailed answer. The ocean fleet is needed, but without fanaticism. Stretch your legs on clothes. And the basis of our vital interests is still concentrated in the marginal seas. For the coming years 10-15. There are many examples - Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia ... But Syria is more likely an exception. We will live without Syria, but not very without Sevastopol.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          27 July 2016 09: 31
          +7
          Quote: Alex_59
          I'm talking about the fact that there is not enough money for kindergartens, what kind of aircraft carriers are there.

          Dear Alex_59, we have more than enough money for kindergartens. Who is to blame that instead of kindergartens, mass sports, etc. we prefer to hold Olympics in Sochi, throw money at the World Cup, pay crazy and absolutely undeserved "salaries" for the Russian national team fubolists, who can not beat every yard team, finance Chubais (he has a lot of money!) and the construction of all kinds of skolkovoye there?
          There is enough money, but the distribution of this money is lame for all four.
          Quote: Alex_59
          The ocean fleet is needed, but without fanaticism. Stretch your legs on clothes. And the basis of our vital interests is still concentrated in the marginal seas.

          Not certainly in that way. Who is threatening us in the same World Cup? Yes, no one, in fact, and even with the forces we have there. Turks have more ships, but they don’t climb to us, and they won’t. The same is in the Baltic. And here and there, the issue of shore cover can be solved with a minimum of effort - aviation + coastal missile systems + relatively small corvette level forces. In the North - yes there, it is necessary to ensure the deployment zones of the SSBN, this is a task. But our presence in Syria is very important.
          Quote: Alex_59
          And Syria is more likely an exception. We will live without Syria, but not very without Sevastopol.

          Maybe, but no one is particularly trying to attack Sevastopol.
          1. Alex_59
            Alex_59 27 July 2016 09: 53
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            There is enough money, but the distribution of this money is lame for all four.
            No, you are wrong. No money. I say exactly. Medvedev said so: "there is no money, you keep there, good luck to you." Medvedev will not lie. smile
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            And here and there, the issue of shore cover can be solved with a minimum of effort - aviation + coastal missile systems + relatively small corvette level forces.

            So I'm talking about the same thing.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Maybe, but no one is particularly trying to attack Sevastopol.

            As a person closely associated with Sevastopol, it seems to me differently. It's just that so far no one has attempted to use force of arms. And so - those who wish are in line. A couple of years ago, a NATO ship at the Grafskaya pier was the norm. As if "visiting" ...
          2. avt
            avt 27 July 2016 11: 11
            -1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Who is to blame that instead of kindergartens, mass sports, etc. we prefer to hold Olympiads in Sochi, throw money at the World Cup on football, pay crazy and absolutely undeserved "salaries" for the Russian national team fubolists, who can not beat any yard team,

            Uh-uh-uh! Listen! "Zenith arena" what? Zabil? bully
        2. Serg65
          Serg65 27 July 2016 10: 33
          +2
          Hello Alexey hi somehow you are not certain ..
          Quote: Alex_59
          Is it worth squeezing out aircraft carriers with cruisers, is there any practical sense in this work? All the same, we will not surpass the NATO fleets.

          Quote: Alex_59
          The ocean fleet is needed, but without fanaticism. Stretch your legs on clothes. And the basis of our vital interests is still concentrated in the marginal seas. For the coming years 10-15.

          At least cruisers and destroyers are very necessary for such fleets as the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet, at least because the expanses of operational activity are very great. Yes, and cover deployment of the SSBN is necessary.
          1. Alex_59
            Alex_59 27 July 2016 10: 57
            +2
            Quote: Serg65
            somehow you are not certain ..

            In short, in vain I raised this topic here, in a nutshell the whole point can not be conveyed. It is necessary to separate the article separately - there is a conversation. drinks
            1. Serg65
              Serg65 27 July 2016 12: 12
              +1
              Quote: Alex_59
              In short, in vain I raised this topic here, in a nutshell the whole point can not be conveyed. It is necessary to separate the article separately - there is a conversation.

              fellow oh and let's play drinks
  7. Maegrom
    Maegrom 27 July 2016 09: 01
    0
    Thank you for a great start to a new interesting cycle.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 09: 33
      0
      You're welcome! I will try to make it really interesting :) hi
  8. VohaAhov
    VohaAhov 27 July 2016 09: 39
    +4
    Here he is - handsome "Kirov", and we are waiting for the continuation ...
    1. goose
      goose 27 July 2016 10: 45
      0
      I wonder why he needed a plane with a catapult if the cruiser was designed for enclosed seas? All this weighed much more than 100 tons. Maybe it was better to remove all this, put another 2 100 mm guns and add armor?
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        27 July 2016 14: 40
        +2
        Quote: goose
        I wonder why he needed a plane with a catapult if the cruiser was designed for enclosed seas?

        So after all, the radius of action of aviation in the middle of the 30's was still not at all amazing. So the placement of the aircraft was quite justified.
        Quote: goose
        All this weighed much more than 100 tons

        Not more. The aircraft itself weighed less than 3 tons (and there were two), gasoline reserves did not exceed 5 tons, and the catapult weighed several tens of tons. So about a hundred tons, perhaps.
        Quote: goose
        Maybe it was better to remove all this, put another 2 100-mm gun and armor to add?

        You can add a couple of hundred, yes. And the armor ... 26 bis has 1536 tons of armor. Of course, protection is never superfluous, but you yourself understand, on 100 you can’t add a lot of tons
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 27 July 2016 15: 21
        +2
        Quote: goose
        I wonder why he needed a plane with a catapult if the cruiser was designed for enclosed seas?

        EMNIP, KOR-1, a multipurpose reconnaissance spotter, was based on the Kirov.
        Given the firing range of 180 mm guns, the spotter on Project 26 is theoretically not out of place.
        Quote: goose
        Maybe it was better to remove all this, put another 2 100-mm gun and armor to add?

        In 1942, the catapult was exchanged for three 70-K.
  9. Kudrevkn
    Kudrevkn 27 July 2016 09: 50
    0
    In our school (VVMIOLU) there was a model of the "Kirov" made by the cadets back in 1939 (immediately after the order of Lenin was awarded to the school), on which two catapults were installed to launch seaplanes. How did Soviet shipbuilders resolve this issue?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 17: 42
      +2
      Generally speaking, very strange. The catapult was alone on the ship. The only thing - in the very first versions (6 000 t and 4 * 180-mm guns in 2 towers) it was planned to place 4-x aircraft and allowed the use of two catapults.
      1. Kudrevkn
        Kudrevkn 29 July 2016 22: 24
        0
        Thank you, fellow countryman, for your comprehensive answer!
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          30 July 2016 01: 22
          0
          Yes, it would be for what ... Ask, and I will try to give an answer - well, if I don’t know (or doubt), I’ll tell you so honestly.
  10. Serg65
    Serg65 27 July 2016 10: 17
    +4
    Welcome Andrew hi . I admit, at first such a big prelude to describing the history of the first Soviet cruisers was strained, but then I realized that 26 was already so gnawed in various opuses that you simply could not do without a history of deciding on their construction. With your permission, I’ll add my conclusions a little ..
    here the question may arise: in what way should the light cruisers be used in a combined strike? After all, it is obvious that any attempt to send them into an artillery battle against battleships, battleships or even heavy cruisers is obviously doomed to failure. The author could not find a direct answer to this question

    You yourself practically answered this question
    One of the main options for military operations was a battle in a mine position, when the enemy was weakened by the actions of submarines while advancing towards it, and a combined strike was inflicted during attempts to force it.

    Even during the WWII, a sharp question arose about long-range naval guns representing the possibility of fighting in mine-artillery positions with large enemy ships without entering their defeat zone. In the 1920's, the leaders of the Red Army Headquarters, including M.N. Tukhachevsky and V.K. Triandafillov, believed that the development of the Red Army naval forces should be limited to light forces operating in mine-artillery positions under the cover of long-range guns of not too large calibers . The peculiarity of the construction of Soviet ships was that they were all built under weapons, i.e. this gun will stand on the cruiser, which you must build under this gun! By the way, the cannon (B-1-P) essentially did not work out. Therefore, or not, but the 26 series was limited to 2 cruisers, the 26 ave bis-4, and already in the 1938 the development of the 68 ave started.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 14: 25
      +3
      Quote: Serg65
      I admit, at first such a big prelude to describing the history of the first Soviet cruisers was strained, but then I realized that PR. 26 is already so gnawed in various opuses that you just can’t do without the history of deciding on their construction

      Definitely. And alas, one cannot do without a rather dreary explanation of the participation of Italians in the development of the project.
      Quote: Serg65
      You yourself practically answered this question

      No, I didn’t answer :))) Dear Serg65, the fight on the MAP is still a separate issue that is not directly related to the combi strike
      Quote: Serg65
      Even during the WWII, a sharp question arose about long-range naval guns representing the possibility of fighting in mine-artillery positions with large enemy ships without entering their defeat zone. In the 1920's, the leaders of the Red Army Headquarters, including M.N. Tukhachevsky and V.K. Triandafillov, believed that the development of the Red Army naval forces should be limited to light forces operating in mine-artillery positions under the cover of long-range guns of not too large calibers .

      In WWI, it was hardly possible not to enter the affected area. But the ideas of Tukhachevsky and Triandafillov still did not have such a significant impact on the fleet - Tukhachevsky flew high and not all of his ideas were accepted by the fleet. Those. it might turn out that the gun is one, but Tukhachevsky has his own view on its use, and the fleet has his own :)
      Quote: Serg65
      By the way, the cannon (B-1-P) essentially did not work out

      We’ll wait and see :)) I’ll disassemble the B-1-P gun in the most detailed way :))) There are a lot of interesting things in this gun :)
      Quote: Serg65
      Therefore, or not, but the 26 series was limited to 2 cruisers, the 26 ais bis-4, and already in 1938 the development of the 68 ave started.

      I can say right away - no, that's not why. hi
  11. Taoist
    Taoist 27 July 2016 11: 05
    +3
    Well, I don’t know why we regularly run into kg / am (i.e., calibres and millimeters of body armor) - although any warship is always a set of compromises based on the theoretically expected range of tasks ... And then clashes with reality and the circle begin tasks for some reason does not coincide with the theoretically derived ...
    In this regard (IMHO of course) cruisers like Kirov are de facto ships built around cannons ... The fathers of the fleet were very impressed with the ballistic characteristics. Theoretically, having superiority in speed, a ship armed with such weapons could fight without entering the firing zone of enemy guns (of any caliber) at all - hence the economy on all characteristics except speed ... True, they could not cope with the fire control system at such distances ... i.e. fire at a distance of over 100 cables was "to whom God would send" although theoretically they could throw shells at twice the distance.
    1. Serg65
      Serg65 27 July 2016 12: 25
      +1
      Quote: Taoist
      In this regard (IMHO of course) cruisers such as Kirov de facto ships built around cannons

      Which is absolutely true!
      Quote: Taoist
      The fleet fathers were very impressed with the ballistic characteristics.

      Galler and Isakov walked in the fathers-commanders, and they knew perfectly well what it was like to stand in a mine position under Linkor shells.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 14: 27
      +1
      Quote: Taoist
      True, they did not manage to cope with the fire control system at such distances ... i.e. fire at a distance of over 100 cables was "to whom God would send" although theoretically they could throw shells at twice the distance.

      Why? Suo Kirov - one of the best cruising.
      1. Taoist
        Taoist 27 July 2016 16: 37
        +2
        Yes, but it still could not conduct normal aimed fire at distances over 100 Kb. + the problem of the most similar "ultra-long-range artillery" when they stupidly do not have time to introduce corrections for the "height of the barrel" dispersion grows exponentially and the farther and more intensively we shoot, the faster we lose accuracy. Those. the system could fire at the range (from a fixed point at a fixed target), but the system could solve the problem of sustainably hitting a maneuvering target at long ranges ... this is no longer a task for mechanical computers ... (not to mention errors in determining ranges and heading angles at such distances)
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          27 July 2016 17: 39
          +2
          Quote: Taoist
          Yes, but she still couldn’t conduct normal aimed fire at distances over 100 Kb

          Honestly, I don’t see any problems
          Quote: Taoist
          the problem of the most similar "ultra-long-range artillery" when they stupidly do not have time to introduce corrections for the "height of the barrel"

          Nuuu, the amendment for shooting the barrel was given by the "Geisler and K" model of 1910
          Quote: Taoist
          Those. to fire at the firing range (from a fixed point on a fixed target), the system could solve the problem of sustainable destruction of a maneuvering target at long ranges ... this is no longer a task for mechanical computers ...

          Why? Mathematically, nothing fundamentally different from shooting at 70 KBT shooting at 100 or more does not contain KBT.
          Quote: Taoist
          not to mention the errors in determining ranges and heading angles at such distances)

          This is decided by shooting. In WWII, battles sometimes went to 100 + kbt and there were hits. But in general - long-range combat is not too serious, so the same British spoke about the distance of the so-called decisive battle - the order of 70 KBt. Those. You can shoot at long distances, but to provide a sufficient number of hits to destroy the enemy is doubtful.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 27 July 2016 19: 21
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            But in general - long-range combat is not too serious, so the same British spoke about the distance of the so-called decisive battle - about 70 kbt.

            Giggle ... I immediately remembered an epic quote from Sir Andrew Brown Cunningham's response to the Mediterranean Fleet's failure to send the annual Maritime Artillery Progress Technical Report:
            In the period 1940 - 41 years of progress in naval artillery in the Mediterranean fleet was not. However, at the cost of great losses and troubles, I had to re-learn the old lessons of the time of the Armada. The most significant lesson was that the correct combat distance for any ship in the Mediterranean fleet, from battleship to submarine, is the distance of a pistol shot (today it is 2000 yards or less). Because at such a distance, even an artillery officer cannot miss.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              27 July 2016 20: 12
              +1
              Quote: Alexey RA
              I immediately remembered an epic quote from Sir Andrew Brown Cunningham's response to the Mediterranean Fleet's failure to send the annual Progress of Naval Artillery technical report:

              Yes :)))) And as a result: "Worspight" gets into the enemy battleship with almost 130 kbt :)))
  12. VohaAhov
    VohaAhov 27 July 2016 11: 35
    +1
    Quote: goose
    I wonder why he needed a plane with a catapult if the cruiser was designed for enclosed seas? All this weighed much more than 100 tons. Maybe it was better to remove all this, put another 2 100 mm guns and add armor?

    The aircraft were needed for reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment. Later, both the plane and the catapult from the Kirov were removed and 2x1-100 mm guns were added, bringing the number of the latter to 8 units.
  13. VohaAhov
    VohaAhov 27 July 2016 11: 37
    +2
    That's what he became after modernization. Hopefully we will see this in future articles.
  14. Verdun
    Verdun 27 July 2016 12: 21
    +3
    Nevertheless, the USSR acquires in Italy turbines and a theoretical drawing of the much larger Eugenio di Savoia, whose standard displacement reached 8 tons.
    Developing a theoretical drawing and turbines from scratch is a complex and time-consuming process that would take at least two years. But still it was necessary to produce all this. Meanwhile, the USSR needed the fleet yesterday. Therefore, such a purchase is justified. It is clear and why they bought from Italians. In the field of body forms, the best at that time were the French, who hardly sold anything to the Soviets. Italians breathed into the back of the head. And the redundancy of the displacement ... At that moment, as it often happened in the history of shipbuilding, there were no unified views on what types of ships should be. Moreover, the Washington Treaty was the reason for the construction of cruisers of such sizes, which most shipbuilders thought about at that time. Many of the limitations of this treaty imposed the unnatural development of various classes of ships. In this sense, the USSR, which did not sign the Washington Agreement, was in a more favorable situation. However, as often happens, many decisions were imposed from above by politicians who believed that in each separate class our ships should be larger, faster, better armored and armed. Designers were not always able to defend their point of view.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 14: 29
      +3
      Quote: Verdun
      Therefore, such a purchase is justified.

      Who argues :))
      Quote: Verdun
      In the field of body forms, the best at that time were the French, who hardly sold anything to the Soviets.

      Could. But the French, for their drawings, have broken down absolutely unreasonable prices and refused to work with them.
  15. uskrabut
    uskrabut 27 July 2016 14: 38
    +1
    Fascinating reading. I noticed a characteristic feature in the design and construction of warships, there are always various kinds of throwing, search for compromises, borrowing technical solutions, etc. As a kid, I read the book "Cruiser" Varyag "- that's where the thriller is!
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 14: 43
      +1
      Quote: uskrabut
      As a kid I read the book "Cruiser" Varyag "- that's where the thriller is!

      Nuuu, strictly speaking, the most thriller was in the design of the battle cruisers "Izmail". We started with eight 305-mm guns, and got down to twelve 356-mm guns :)
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 27 July 2016 15: 31
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Nuuu, strictly speaking, the most thriller was in the design of the battle cruisers "Izmail". We started with eight 305-mm guns, and got down to twelve 356-mm guns :)

        Yeah ... moreover, 12 guns appeared "not because of, but in spite of" - just someone submitted to the competition for a cruiser for the Baltic Sea projects not with 9 (as it was in the approved specification), but with 12 356-mm guns. And then the sailors became thoughtful ... smile

        EMNIP, Tsvetkov wrote that the fourth tower of the Izmailov buried all the projects of the tower Svetlans and cut modernization - because no one would have given the fleet budget to increase.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          27 July 2016 21: 36
          0
          Quote: Alexey RA
          EMNIP, Tsvetkov wrote that the fourth Izmailov tower buried all the projects of the Svetlana tower

          The fact that funds for the fourth tower were sought at the expense of light cruisers is an absolutely reliable fact. As for the towers, Svetlan ... honestly, I do not remember :)
    2. Verdun
      Verdun 27 July 2016 15: 33
      +1
      Quote: uskrabut
      As a kid I read the book "Cruiser" Varyag "- that's where the thriller is!

      To appreciate such a "thriller" you need to have a certain mindset and knowledge. I think that many "representatives of the modern intelligentsia" will fall asleep without having read even ten pages. In general, I have always been critical of the fact that lately the words "creative intelligentsia" mean representatives of show business, singers, artists, writers and completely forget about scientists and engineers.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        27 July 2016 17: 31
        +3
        Quote: Verdun
        In general, I was always critical of the fact that lately the words "creative intelligentsia" mean representatives of show business, singers, artists, writers and completely forget about scientists and engineers.

        Scientists and engineers are not intellectuals; they have a profession! laughing
  16. magician
    magician 27 July 2016 21: 10
    0
    The article is interesting. Mosquito fleet? On this historical development, many things can be done. not 40-50gg all. fellow
  17. Taoist
    Taoist 27 July 2016 21: 11
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    therefore, the same British spoke about the distance of the so-called decisive battle - the order of 70 kbt. Those. You can shoot at long distances, but to provide a sufficient number of hits to destroy the enemy is doubtful.


    So I was talking about the same ... But then we talked about the "super idea" to conduct a battle without entering the enemy's firing range at all (which theoretically just our cannon provided a miracle) - and here the question arises - what to shoot at this range we can ... we can't hit.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2016 21: 34
      +1
      Quote: Taoist
      But then we talked about the "super idea" to conduct a battle without entering the enemy's firing range at all (which theoretically our cannon provided just a miracle) - and this is where the question arises - that we can shoot at such a range ... turns out.

      The whole question is that I have huge and reasonable doubts that our sailors were going to fight at extreme distances. Please note - about
      Tukhachevsky and Triandafillov (not sailors even once) and ... fleet historians say this :) But who of the sailors put forward such ideas?
      1. Taoist
        Taoist 27 July 2016 22: 18
        0
        I read about this in the memoirs of one of the admirals ... I don't remember exactly who they were ... I'll rummage in the library ... no matter how Haller himself came up with such a concept ... again from the point of view of the battle on the "mine and artillery position "in order not to allow trawling, but at the same time not to enter the zone of destruction of heavy weapons of enemy ships ...
        1. Serg65
          Serg65 28 July 2016 05: 32
          +1
          Quote: Taoist
          I read about this in the memoirs of one of the admirals ... I don't remember exactly who they were ... I'll rummage in the library ... no matter how Haller himself came up with such a concept ... again from the point of view of the battle on the "mine and artillery position "in order not to allow trawling, but at the same time not to enter the zone of destruction of heavy weapons of enemy ships ...

          Aleksey, the authorship of the movement "Struggle for the first salvo" is attributed to Admiral Kuznetsov when he was the commander of the "Chervona Ukrainy", he was then a cavalier. As far as I remember, "Chervona Ukraine" fired the first salvo when a "potential enemy" appeared from beyond the horizon
  18. Borus017
    Borus017 27 July 2016 21: 23
    +1
    Great article! There would be more of these on VO! On the topic of the article - in the background of the project, the "Red Caucasus" is not mentioned - an attempt to build a light cruiser with heavy weapons - the same 180-mm. Its completion began in 1929, in the 32nd raised the flag. Just in support of the opinion about the "ship for the guns." With the "rapid-fire" 180, obviously it did not work - which led to an increase in the projected number of barrels.
    1. Taoist
      Taoist 27 July 2016 22: 20
      +1
      The Caucasus was just an "experimental site" ... it was decided to see, in principle, the possibility of installing such barrels ... and then they began to design a special ship for these guns. With the rate of fire, everything was fine there. "The technical rate of fire of the new guns, thanks to the mechanized loading, was almost as good as the initial ones - 5-6 rounds per minute per barrel versus 6-8 for 130 mm." (from)
      1. Bormanxnumx
        Bormanxnumx 28 July 2016 11: 36
        0
        Quote: Taoist
        With the rate of fire, everything was fine there. "The technical rate of fire of the new guns, thanks to the mechanized loading, was almost as good as the initial ones - 5-6 rounds per minute per barrel versus 6-8 for 130-mm." (from)

        On paper, the rate of fire was normal :), but the real combat 2-3 rounds / min was not very impressive.
        1. Taoist
          Taoist 28 July 2016 15: 08
          0
          This gun had a barrel resource of 50-60 rounds with a full charge - what kind of combat rate of fire is it worth talking about? The Caucasus is a pure "experimental ship" - an attempt to test the possibilities of modernization ...
          1. Bormanxnumx
            Bormanxnumx 28 July 2016 18: 06
            0
            I replied to your statement:
            Quote: Taoist
            With the rate of fire, everything was fine there. "The technical rate of fire of the new guns, thanks to the mechanized loading, was almost as good as the initial ones - 5-6 rounds per minute per barrel versus 6-8 for 130-mm." (from)

            The mechanization of the MK-1-180 tower installation consisted in feeding shells with a rod elevator equipped with an electric drive. Then followed a rather complicated reloading of the projectile onto the rammer tray manually. The fact is that thanks to the cramped tower, manual operations were very laborious.
            Regarding the resource of the barrel, it was pulled up by the use of a reduced combat charge, which reported the projectile speed of 920m / s. "Krasny Kavkaz" in WWII, ammunition floor
            GK managed to shoot-about 460pcs. 180 mm shells.
            Quote: Taoist
            The Caucasus is a pure "experimental ship" - an attempt to test the possibilities of modernization ...

            And what were they going to modernize in a new ship and freshly designed guns?
            1. Taoist
              Taoist 28 July 2016 20: 41
              +1
              Is the new ship Svetlana? It was here that the conversation was going on as if from an old cruiser outdated even before the bookmark was made to do something more or less ... in particular, whether it would be possible to fit a super gun into the old body ...
              1. Bormanxnumx
                Bormanxnumx 29 July 2016 09: 16
                0
                In particular, no one there really bothered with shoving superguns, because initially, according to the updated project, they thought about installing eight 8 "caliber shit artillery mounts.
                1. Taoist
                  Taoist 29 July 2016 11: 03
                  0
                  Well, that is, you don’t see the difference between the tower and the panel installation in terms of changing the design of the case? ...
                  1. Bormanxnumx
                    Bormanxnumx 29 July 2016 12: 11
                    0
                    I see the difference, but you also pay attention to the estimated number of 8 "guns, plus the placement and supply of ammunition to them, is clearly more difficult than with the 130s. To call the QC a purely experimental ship, in my opinion, is purely wrong - this is the "product" that could have been produced by the Soviet shipbuilding industry based on the real situation of the production and material base.
                    1. Taoist
                      Taoist 29 July 2016 15: 53
                      0
                      And what can it be attributed to? Serial? - well, even the most optimistic comrade understood that 4 main guns were just "about nothing", not a single ship was even built close to the Caucasus according to the armament scheme ... A training vehicle for testing technology and training crews. And from the point of view of the "ship industry" it was much easier to get the Profintern and Chervona Ukraine ...
  19. Victor Wolz
    Victor Wolz 27 July 2016 22: 26
    0
    I read somewhere that the French refusal to cooperate was more ideological than economic. Until 1941, the USSR was perceived as the country of victorious Satanism, however the fact that communism was modestly silent was a gift from the West.
  20. Victor Wolz
    Victor Wolz 27 July 2016 22: 33
    0
    Thanks for the article, I look forward to continuing.
  21. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 29 July 2016 12: 15
    +1
    The idea of ​​this ship is obvious. Thanks to the transcendence in speed, he is outside the range of enemy weapons, and he himself can hit them.
    It has a speed of 36 knots and a range of 36 km.
    Finnish armadillos have a range of 254 mm guns less than 30 km
    Swedish armadillos have Sverige type of 280 mm and range of 24 km
    Turkish Goeben (Sultan Yavuz) 280 mm, range 21,7 km
    The English battleships Queen Elizabeth 380 mm, range 30 km
    and even the new King George has 5 mm and a range of 356 km.
    Another thing is how much is achievable in practice.
  22. Bormanxnumx
    Bormanxnumx 29 July 2016 14: 34
    0
    Let's compare it not with battleships and BBO, but with classmates:
    "Zara", Italy 8 "125kg 950m / s 34200m
    "Prince Eugene" Germany 8 "122kg 925m / s 33500m
    Difference in max. shooting distances are not so big.
    In practice, more or less predictable results of an artillery duel were achieved at distances of 18-22 km. Hits at distances of 22-24 km can be counted on the fingers of one hand - “Worspight” in “Cesar” closed up, according to various estimates, the distance was from 121 to 140 cables. Note that all these hits were achieved by shells of 12 "and above. The entire huge reserve of the 180mm range of guns is suitable only for firing at areas on land. This is what they actually did in WWII.
  23. kuz363
    kuz363 31 July 2016 11: 34
    -1
    In short, the military industry of the USSR could not develop on its own without the help of foreigners. Apparently now, just out of politeness they are silent.
  24. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 1 August 2016 16: 10
    0
    Soviet cruisers have a horizontal reservation invulnerability zone from 280 mm guns of German pockets of battleships and Yavuz to 22 km and from 203 mm guns of Eugen to 24 km.
    180 mm guns with low-combat charges hit the horizontal armoring of the German heavy cruisers, pocket battleships and Yavuz (Geben) for 18-20 km.
    Having an excellence in speed, Project 26 in a state will maintain the desired distance and course angle.