A very important air component of the Unified Regional Air Defense System of Russia and Kazakhstan, and in the future the Unified Pro Air Defense System at the Central Asian Highway, will be the MiG-31B / BM Air Defense Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Now heavy long-range interceptors are being upgraded to a modified BM, thanks to which one air fleet from 32 Foxhound can simultaneously destroy enemy cruise missiles from 120 to 180
Like the European Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a very complex, dynamic and controversial organization in many political and economic issues. Its structure is based both on close foreign policy, economic and military-strategic cooperation between the Shanghai Five countries, most of which, besides China, are part of the CSTO, as well as on the presence of “problematic” participants who “with open arms” adopt NATO strategies and concepts of confrontation with other disagreeable US and alliance states. Such a difficult situation is observed today in the intra-organizational relations of India with Pakistan and China, where the first one even manages to conduct with the American fleet naval exercises "Malabar", directed against the theoretical partner China. The same picture is observed in the EU / NATO on the example of relations between Greece and Turkey, strained due to the Aegean dispute, as well as on the converging positions of Greece and Russia on many important geopolitical issues. But if the CSTO, the EU and NATO are more or less well-established and “mature” organizations, then the SCO, in view of the poorly predicted Pakistan and India, has a rather “raw” background that should be taken into account in any prognostic work regarding the development prospects of this organization.
Considering all the above, today we will try to analyze the statements of Russian experts regarding the formation by the main participants of the SCO (Russia and China) of a single missile defense system of the organization’s member states. The discussion on this difficult issue was held on July 18 at the international media center MIA "Russia Today", where the main topic of discussion was the US-South Korean agreement on the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system in the Republic of Korea. For several years, the American side tried to convince the Russian Federation and the PRC that the complex was designed to protect Seoul from the missile threat from North Korea. But the emergence of the largest in the Far East American base in Pyeongtaek, as well as the increased presence of unmanned strategic reconnaissance Global Hawk at Japanese airbases indicates that the version with the DPRK alone is excluded. In fact, along the entire eastern maritime borders of China and Russia, in the Pacific air route from Japan to the Philippines, a powerful anti-missile barrier is being erected in the form of several THAAD complexes, several dozens of more long-range and high-altitude Ajis systems. Burke "," Congo "and" Atago ", as well as the air defense system of the territorial missile defense system" Patriot PAC-3 ", which will provide cover for US naval and military air assets in Kazakhstan, Japan, the Philippines and Guam.
These destroyers equipped with the Mk41 UVPU carry hundreds of Tomahawk and SM-6 ERAM TFRs with the possibility of hitting surface targets along a ballistic trajectory, which creates great risks for the Russian Pacific Fleet and the Chinese Navy in the event of an aggravation of the situation in the Asia-Pacific Region. This prompted reflections on endowing the SCO with the features of a military-political alliance aimed at deterring the US Armed Forces in key strategic areas. But a full-fledged missile defense system within the framework of the SCO is very dependent on the differing foreign policy preferences of the organization’s members. In the Pacific direction, the formation of an “umbrella” of missile defense will be carried out by the Russian space forces fleet, and the Chinese Navy and Air Force, which possess the best missile defense systems in the SCO, the situation will be different in other directions.
INDIA AND PAKISTAN OUTSIDE THE "GAME"
The promising projects of the FGFA 5 generation fighter (Project 79L), the BrahMos multipurpose supersonic missile, as well as the Su-30MKI retrofit program before the Super Sukhoi modification (which equips the AFAR radar) are not an indication that India’s Defense Ministry was once or will use the air defense of his army to deter American air attack weapons in favor of the SCO. The contract for the supply of the Triumph to the C-400 Indians will not help, because who, if not the Americans, is helping Delhi to maintain military parity with China in the Indian Ocean. For this reason, there is no question of including this strengthening superpower into a single SCO PRO. India will remain for us an excellent strategic partner exclusively in terms of the purchase of new technologies for the military-technical and aerospace areas.
With Pakistan, things are similar, but also with complications. The territory and airspace of Pakistan for several decades used by the American intelligence and fighter aviation: first to conduct high-altitude reconnaissance flights over strategic military facilities of the USSR, now to fight the Taliban and other terrorist organizations. Similarly, Pakistani airspace can be used to conduct radio intelligence of Russian military installations in the southern states of the CSTO (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). Also, due to the impossibility of forming the SCO missile defense position area in Pakistan, the number of launch points for US strategic AGM-86B ALCM cruise missiles in the CSTO countries, including the Russian Federation, will increase. And this is despite the fact that Islamabad has close and stable military-technical cooperation with China, based on similar anti-Indian sentiments. Pakistan and India are a clear example of Asian states, economically and even politically oriented to the West, but not fenced off from the desire to master as many modern Russian military technologies as possible.
“OBSERVER”, WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT MEMBER
As mentioned above, India and Pakistan, as members of the unified missile defense system of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, are absolutely pointless to rely on, which cannot be said of an observer state such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is the only regional superpower in Front Asia, which is the main geostrategic counterweight to the "Arab coalition", the United States and Israel, and can without long reflection be included in the category of allied countries of Russia in deterring the likely Western aggression towards our state. Despite the fact that Iran is not part of the CSTO or the SCO, the condemning anti-American rhetoric of the leaders of this country and the real military-tactical actions of its armed forces show further steps in setting priorities for interaction.
Now the supply of 48H6Х2 missiles to 5 divisions of the C-300PMU-2 air forces of the Iranian Air Force is being made. Deploying these complexes around strategic facilities of the nuclear power industry and the military industry of the IRI will not only protect the developing country’s defenses, but also form an additional EKO boundary with a length of about 1200 - 1500 km, covering a large part of Russia's southern air route, which previously represented a huge uncontrolled gap with a difficult Aircraft A-50U mountainous terrain. In addition, thanks to Chinese and Russian specialists, Iran is perhaps the only country in the region (except for Israel and Saudi Arabia) that has a modern, highly computerized air defense headquarters of the network-centric model, where information about all airborne objects that have been surveyed are collected, analyzed and systematized and multifunctional radar ZRK, radar complexes of the RTR and radar warning systems for missile attack type "Gadir", the first sample of which took to combat duty in the province of Khuzestan, near the Iran-Iraq border.
Almost from the 100% probability, we can say that if the US Navy ever orders the “breakthrough” of our airspace from the southern air route, the first line of information alert and confrontation with their air force will be precisely the well-prepared air defense -PRO Iran.
In the F-14A “Tomcat” photo, the Iranian air force is escorting a Russian strategic bomber-bomber in its own and Syrian airspace at the time of the MRAU ISIS military infrastructure. Despite the 40-year-old service in the Islamic Republic of Iran, "Tomkaty" are updated, getting into service "air" version of the MIM-23B SAM. The AN / AWG-9 radar offers good early warning capabilities, but no more than 200 -300 km. For effective action of the C-300PMU-2 divisions in mountainous terrain, Iran requires at least 3 boards A-50U
In the Central Asian part of the southern air route, the air defense systems of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which are part of the CSTO, should be responsible for a single SCO defense system. But at the moment only Kazakhstan has a decent air defense system in the region: around 20 of the operational C-300PS air defense missile systems and several early C-300Ps are in service with the Air Defense Forces of Kazakhstan. These complexes are quite enough to protect the entire length of the southern borders of the state from various means of air attack approaching from the southern direction. But here, not everything is as smooth as we would like. Now, in the 21st century, C-300PS no longer fully correspond to the level of modern threats from aerospace: the maximum speed of the targets hit is only 4700 km / h, and the cruising speeds of prospective staff hypersonic aircraft are already crossing for 5 — 7 thousand km / h And the minimum EPR of the intercepted target of the C-300PS is 0,05 m2, which is more than that of the modern stealth combat equipment. All the Kazakh "PSy" urgently need to be brought to the level of "PM1", and no one even talked about such plans. RK has long needed such systems as C-300BM “Antey-2500” and C-400, otherwise we will observe a “weakened place” of the southern BH for several more years.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are even more acutely in need of modern means of air defense. These states are the advanced lines of defense of the CSTO. Tajikistan borders with Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan has a border close to Afghanistan and Pakistan, near which the US Air Force has long been a hostage, like at home. The air defenses of these republics are replete with outdated and ineffective anti-aircraft missile systems such as Pechora, Volga and Kub, which can simply be “crushed” by a full-fledged squadron of multi-role fighters F-16C with 48 HARM missiles on board and consolidating the result with a couple dozen JASSM- ER, and we are still talking about a single missile defense system. And what can you say when the strategically important Nurek optoelectronic node and the 201-I Russian military base are located in Tajikistan, which need at least two C-300PM2 and C-300B4 brigades with С1. Our overseas “colleagues” each defend their military object in Europe and Asia with the help of “Patriot PAC-2 / 3” or SLAMRAAM, and in our country the inter-bloc countries are armed with air defense systems that met the requirements in 70 and 80. . On the other hand, Azerbaijan, which looks at Soviet Union at hell, gets new C-300PMU-2 - somehow it doesn’t work out well. All the “south” of the CSTO should urgently receive modern missile defense facilities, and then we can reflect on missile defense within the SCO.
But it is necessary to pay tribute, the first advances in this direction are already observed. According to the statements of the deputy chief of the General Staff of Kyrgyzstan, Marat Kenjisariev, made back in March 2015, the republic’s air defense system will be gradually updated under the guidance of specialists from Concern VKO Almaz-Antey. True work these move very slowly. So, even questions about the creation of a full-fledged air defense system within the CSTO have not yet been resolved, not to mention the multifaceted work on missile defense of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
An even more unpleasant situation is observed around the former CSTO member state of Uzbekistan, as well as ever-neutral Turkmenistan. Over the past 7 years, in addition to the signing of an intergovernmental agreement on strategic cooperation in the fields of energy and engineering in 2009, Ashgabat has not concluded any agreements in the military-strategic area with the Russian Federation and the CSTO. Turkmenistan absolutely didn’t respond to the appeals of the CSTO Secretariat and the organization’s organization. Even a sore point for Central Asia was ignored, concerning the need for all countries in the region to interact with the CSTO in the face of the threat of their statehood being undermined by the terrorist organization ISIL, the Taliban and other extremist forces operating throughout the south-west of the Eurasian continent, as reported by the organization’s general secretary Nikolay Bordyuzha 17 March 2015 of the year. All indicates only that such a model of cooperation is beneficial for Turkmenistan, which provides only for the transfer of military and industrial technologies aimed solely at observing their own economic and defense interests.
Already a no-brainer, the IG has long had its information and training structures in Turkmenistan, which has fenced off from the CSTO and the SCO, and, as it often seems, Ashgabat carries certain financial benefits. The complication in the Central Asian multi-billion dollar drug traffic does not even allow the highest state cell to admit the idea of joining the regional military-political bloc, as it will immediately require coordination with other members of the organization, including the Russian Federation, and all profitable activities will have to be immediately phased out. One should not expect any enlightenment in cooperation with Turkmenistan: Ashgabat will continue to quietly abstract, limiting itself to very profitable, non-binding, contracts with the Russian Federation, periodically glancing at the external vector of Azerbaijan, Turkey and other US regional servants. The Air Defense Forces of Turkmenistan, in the technological plan, are one level lower than the Libyan Air Defense before the Odyssey.Rassvet air operation. There are several C-75 “Dvina”, C-125 “Neva” armies and one of the modifications to the C-200 air defense system. That is, even if it is theoretically estimated that various TFRs and hypersonic WTOs of the US Navy / Air Force launched from the Persian Gulf will fly to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, even with all their desire, they could not weaken this blow .
Uzbekistan has even more "mysterious" history relations with the CSTO and Russia. Unlike Ashgabat, which does not rely on military-technical cooperation, Tashkent also wants to fully maintain the entire level of military-technical cooperation with Russia, while at the same time not participating in the antiterrorist activities of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. For more than a year, Uzbekistan has demonstrated a complete unwillingness to interact with the organization’s countries in the area of creating a Central Asian unified air defense system, in which Tashkent would be assigned the role of a command center based on the Soviet 12-th air defense system. For several years Uzbekistan has led by the governing bodies of the CSTO, now retiring from the organization, now re-entering its structure.
The so-called “special” position of Tashkent was constantly changing, which was affected by any even minor features in the Central Asian air defense model being developed. For example, in the 2007 year, the Uzbek leadership was not satisfied with the creation of a common Central Asian air defense system, jointly with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The Uzbeks wanted to get only a single air defense system with the Russian Federation, which is even theoretically impossible, since it is even geographically clear that without the participation of the Republic of Kazakhstan there can be no common air defense network. But Uzbekistan abstracts from the formation of a single Central Asian air defense system, which forced Russia to focus on the 3-s of the remaining Central Asian states, which is happening today.
Uzbekistan has repeatedly criticized and bewildered the CSTO Secretariat, from 1999 to 2006, interrupting membership in the organization, and then again sharply integrating into it after crushing the Akramite insurgency in Andijan in 2005, when the West suddenly scared the ranks of the Uzbek leadership with typical accusations of "violating human rights and neglecting democratic standards." Again hiding under the umbrella of the CSTO 16 August 2006, Uzbekistan almost 6 years (until 28 June 2012) was in the organization on a very tricky "light" basis, not integrating into the legal provisions of the agreement. This did not require Ashkhabad to participate in intra-bloc operations to resolve possible local conflicts in the organization’s countries (riots, color revolutions, seizure of power by illegal military forces, etc.), but it opened the way for closer bilateral military cooperation with the Russian Federation and joint military exercises. But this did not suit Uzbekistan.
Focusing the attention of Russia and other member states of the organization on dissatisfaction with the structure and concept of the actions of the CSTO, Uzbekistan, leaving the bloc, did not officially declare the problems of sharing water resources of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tashkent was not satisfied with the water monopoly of these states, while Uzbekistan had an underdeveloped system for the distribution of water resources, which were not enough. Tashkent’s construction plans for Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s powerful hydropower plants, which would ultimately leave Uzbekistan with its unwillingness to develop its own water supply systems, were even more out of touch with Tashkent. Moscow, on quite adequate grounds, never supported Uzbekistan in putting pressure on the development programs of its neighboring states, which also became one of the reasons for leaving the organization.
But there were also such statements which testify to the complete change of the foreign policy vector of the Uzbek leadership to the USA, EU and NATO. This was stated by the Tajik deputy Sh. Shabdolov. In Tajikistan, they note that Tashkent is already counting on Western states in terms of supporting the initiative to put pressure on Dushanbe and Bishkek to stop programs for the construction of hydropower plants. It certainly looks ridiculous, but the States may well be in vain to promise such support in exchange for locating their own radio intelligence units and other equipment for the opening of the CSTO operations in the southern country on the territory of Uzbekistan. Today, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan really need an eye and an eye, and it’s good that to the south this area is very tightly covered by the air force and air defense of a more friendly for the CSTO Iran.
PRO SCO IN THE FAR EASTERN AIR DIRECTION: FROM RUSSIAN-CHINESE COMPUTER KSHU TO THIS REALIZATION. Is this a simple way?
From 26 to 28 in May 2016, Moscow hosted the first in the history of the Russian-Chinese military-strategic interaction computer command-staff exercises "Air and Space Security-2016", which worked on the tactics of missile defense simultaneously from enemy cruise and ballistic missiles. The main goal was to determine the methods of systemic linkage between the quickly deployed divisions of the Russian and Chinese air defense missile systems. But the simulation of a missile defense system on a modern virtual theater, although it has similarities with real combat interceptions, imitating the integration of Russian and Chinese air defense systems into a single missile defense system, with all the features of data exchange and general targeting in it, requires only field tests that require a long preparation integration of electronic equipment (a single data bus) in PBU ZRK on both sides, and then further installation and refinement of new software. In this, we have with the Chinese both a ready base and a “raw” one, over which serious events are required.
Anti-aircraft missile systems of the C-300PMU family, delivered by Celestial Empire from 1993 to 2010 year, serve as the ready base. If you believe the resource cinodefence.com, the Chinese air defense received: 8 divisions C-300PMU, 16 srdn C-300PMU-1 and as many batteries of the last modification C-300PMU-2. The total value of the contract was about 1,6 billion. As part of the divisional sets: 160 PU 5P85T / CE / DE with the total number of secured intellectuals 5XXUMXP / 55H48Е / E6 - more than 2 units, RPN 1000Н30 / Е / Е6 and items of combat management, Ipc systems “Almazovskaya” element base of PBU purchased by the Chinese, as well as common with our equipment, RPN and PU communication equipment make it very easy and quick to create full-fledged 2 air defense systems regardless of the presence of our systems in the system, or vice versa. In other words, at the level of the elemental component, both our and the Chinese “Three Hundreds” are practically interchangeable to the smallest details. A similar similarity will be with the C-5 “Triumph” complexes acquired under the 63 billion contract.
The X-NUMX of the C-2 battalion deployed on combat duty near Nakhodka (Primorye Territory) can be integrated into the unified SCO anti-missile defense system at the far East with the Chinese C-400 division, in a quotation account. "Will be able to withstand faster and with less risk with the Japanese or American EAS approaching from the Sea of Japan. The first line of defense will be formed by the Russian C-400, covering the objects of the Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok, they, theoretically, will weaken the first MRAU both for the Pacific Fleet and for the strategically important provinces of China.
Heilongjiang is the most important energy "forge" of the People's Republic of China with more than 200 power plants of various types with a total power of more than 12 - 15 mln. KW. Without these facilities, a huge number of heavy industry enterprises, electronics and shipbuilding yards would not be able to fully function. An equally important economic object is the Industrial Corridor of Harbin-Dacin-Qiqihar, connecting 3 to the main industrial cities of the province, producing petrochemical, pharmaceutical and high-tech products. Joint confrontation with the American threat in the Pacific direction determines the importance of the defense of this strategically important Chinese region.
Integration into a common system can be performed due to the ability of the 55K6 PBU to support the exchange of tactical data with other PBUs at a distance of 100 km, using repeaters. In addition, the unification of automated control systems such as Polyana-D4М1 and 73Н6МЭ Baikal-1МЭ implements connection to the general missile defense structure of all C-300P modifications and even highly specialized C-300В / ВМ / В4 versions. All these complexes already tomorrow can work in a single air defense system with the Chinese “Favorites” and “Triumphs”.
The automated control system of the automated control system 73H6МЭ “Baikal-1МЭ” is a key network-centric link for integration into a single missile defense system of mixed anti-aircraft missile battalions, brigades and regiments. It is this system that can become the basis for building the future SCO PRO. On 2-x images presents all the principles of "Baikal". The high missile defense potential is indicated by the instrumental range in 1200 km and the ceiling in 102 km.
China can temporarily render our Pacific Fleet strengthening the missile defense of a naval strike force in the near and far sea zones until the time when frigates of the air defense system Adn. Gorshkov 22350 and other NK with powerful ABM systems appear in service. The naval forces of China may employ several destroyers of the Lanzhou and Kunming classes (Type 052C and Type 052D), equipped with combat information and control systems and HQ-9 air defense missile systems with a range of up to 200 km. The truth here is not to evade the issue related to the complex modernization of hardware and software of the PBU and MSA of the C-300F Fort-M complex, which is now completely unsuitable for joint operations with the Chinese shipboard CUI of the ZJK-5 type. The first thing that is required is the complete digitization of all subsystems of the Fort, and then the installation of a tactical information exchange bus with Chinese destroyers. This will require additional time, which is why the program to speed up the renewal of the Pacific Fleet with new corvettes of the 20380 pr. With Redoubts on board looks in a more rosy light. In addition to the excellent anti-missile qualities of this KZRK, the ships of the project also have a complete digitization of the operator points of the attack and defensive complexes, built around the Sigma control system with open software architecture.
“Sigma” has several data transmission buses (MIL STD-1553B, Ethernet and RS-232 / 422 / 485), which allow synchronizing with other submarines, surface and air combat units, including airplanes and airborne combat helicopters, anti-aircraft patrol aircraft and helicopters, and ships with similar interfaces on board. High-speed tactical communication (950 kbit / s) in the centimeter X-band allows you to organize noise-proof network-centric interface between the ships of the KUG.
Another “raw” part of the Russian-Chinese cooperation in the field of SCO missile defense should be attributed to the lack of multidimensional work in the field of creating a single EKO center, whose sources of information would not only be the Don-2HP Russian missile attack warning system ”, As well as Voronezh-M / DM, but also Chinese radar missiles, which can alert the organization’s single command of the missile defense system to launch ICBMs from the NATO SSBNs operating in the southern parts of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
With regards to the airborne systems of the Russian Air Force and the PRC Air Force in service, it is possible to note the acute shortage of A-50 machines (15 machines), A-50 (3 units), KJ-2000 (4 units), KJ-500 (2 units) and KJ-200 (4 units). On the total area of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (26 722 151 km 2), the official number of XRUMN XRUMN aircraft in 26 is negligible, given that massive rocket-air strikes by low-altitude TFRs can follow immediately from several HH. Such machines should be more 100 - 150. And we also neglected the squares of other allied states of the CSTO and the SCO, the picture would have looked even dimmer.
The unified system of missile defense of the SCO should be so flexible, multifaceted and aggregated so that the failure of one or even several network-centric elements does not lead to the collapse of a whole operational air route. We have already described the good prerequisites for this in our review, but a whole range of issues and tasks postpones the realization of an ambitious plan for a period that depends solely on the willingness of the parties to coordinate their efforts to curb global Western expansion as soon as possible.