Military Review

Once again about Khalkhin Gol

128



77 years have passed since the Japanese forces were defeated in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River. However, interest in this armed conflict among historians, exploring a complex set of problems related to the causes of the Second World War, continues. The search continues for more accurate and reasonable answers to the questions: the conflict arose randomly or deliberately organized, what were its causes, which side initiated and what goals did it pursue?

The point of view of Japanese military historians was set forth in the “Official stories War in the Great East Asia. It is based on the assertion that it was a border conflict that the Soviet leadership used "to attack the Japanese army, wanting to deprive it of hopes of victory in China and then focus all its attention on Europe." The authors say that in the USSR they knew very well that the Japanese government, immersed in military operations in China, did everything possible to prevent new border conflicts. However, some Japanese researchers still consider this an armed clash, deliberately organized by the anti-Soviet-minded military, especially the command of the ground forces and the Kwantung Army. To determine the causes of this conflict, it is necessary to briefly consider the events preceding it.

In the early autumn of 1931, Japanese troops occupied part of Manchuria and approached the Soviet state border. At this time, the General Staff of the Japanese Army was adopting the “Basic Provisions of the Plan of War against the USSR”, providing for the advancement of troops of the Rising Sun east of Greater Khingan and the early defeat of the main forces of the Red Army. At the end of 1932, a plan of war against our country was prepared for 1933, which envisaged the consistent defeat of the Red Army units, the liquidation of the Soviet Far Eastern air bases and the occupation of the Far Eastern main line to the borders of Manchuria.

The Japanese military-political leadership took into account that by the mid-thirties, the USSR was able to significantly increase its defense capability in the Far East, and therefore decided to make an alliance with Germany. In a secret decision of the Japanese government from 7 August 1936, it was noted that with respect to Soviet Russia, the interests of Berlin and Tokyo generally coincide. German-Japanese cooperation should be aimed at ensuring the defense of Japan and the "implementation of the fight against the Reds". 25 November 1936, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Arita, at a meeting of the Privy Council that ratified the prisoner of the Anti-Comintern Pact, announced that from now on the Russians must realize that they have to be face to face with Germany and Japan. The presence of allies in the West (Italy joined the pact in 1937) inspired the Japanese ruling circles to unwind the flywheel of military expansion in Asia, aimed primarily against China and the USSR.



7 July 1937 was triggered by an incident at the Lugouqiao Bridge near Beijing, which became a pretext for the start of large-scale military operations against China. The Western powers pursued a policy of de facto connivance of the aggressor, hoping for a Soviet-Japanese clash. 26 August 1937 said quite frankly about this in an interview with the American ambassador in Paris by Bullitt, French head of the French Foreign Ministry Delbos: “The Japanese offensive was primarily directed not against China, but against the USSR. The Japanese want to seize the railway from Tianjin to Beipin and Kalgan, in order to prepare an attack on the Trans-Siberian railway in the Baikal area and against Inner and Outer Mongolia. ” Such a vision of the French minister was hardly an accident. In the West, they knew about the anti-Russian orientation of the Japanese foreign policy in its strategic plans. However, in 1938, Japan, which carried out the offensive in the northern and central parts of China, was not yet ready to launch a large-scale attack on the Trans-Siberian highway in the Baikal region through Mongolia. It took time to prepare such an operation, and therefore, in the same year, she provoked a military conflict near Lake Hassan, which ended its defeat. However, the Japanese leadership was able to show the Western powers the seriousness of their intentions to send a blow to the north. And in the autumn of 1938, the Japanese General Staff began the development of a plan for war against the USSR, codenamed “Plan of Operation No. 8”. The plan was developed in two versions: "A" ("Ko") - the main blow was delivered against the Soviet troops in Primorye; “B” (“Otsu”) - the attack was carried out in the direction that was least expected by the Soviet Union - to the west through Mongolia.

Eastern direction has long attracted the attention of Japanese strategists. War Minister Itagaki indicated in 1936 that it is enough to look at the map to see how important the position is, in terms of the influence of Japan and Manchuria, Outer Mongolia (MNR), which is an extremely important area, as it covers the Siberian Railway. the main highway connecting the Soviet Far East with the rest of the USSR. Therefore, if Outer Mongolia is annexed to Japan and Manchuria, then the security of the Russian Far East will be greatly shaken. If necessary, it will be possible to eliminate the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East without a fight.

In order to prepare for the invasion of our country through Mongolia, on the territory of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, the Japanese began to build railways and highways, as well as airfields, in particular, the railroad to Gunchur was quickly built through Greater Khingan, after which the paths were parallel Mongolian-Manchurian border.

In April, 1939 was assessed in the Japanese General Staff of the European military-political situation and noted that events are rapidly emerging there. Therefore, 1 April, it was decided to accelerate preparations for war. The command of the Kwantung Army intensified the preparation of variant “B” of the “Plan of operation No. 8” with the aim of implementing it in the coming summer. It believed that in the event of hostilities at a distance of 800 km from the nearest railway junction, the Red Army would not be able to organize the supply of the necessary reinforcements, armaments, and other material support of the troops. At the same time, units of the Kwantung Army, located no further than 200 km from the iron route, will be able to create supply bases in advance. The command of the Kwantung Army reported to the General Staff that the USSR would have to spend ten times more effort to ensure military operations in the Khalkhin Gol area than the Japanese.

Once again about Khalkhin Gol


9 May 1939, the head of the Japanese Army’s General Staff, Prince Kanin, presented a report to the emperor, confirming the desire of the ground forces to give the Tripartite Alliance an anti-Soviet focus. The armed conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol river was to check the degree of combat readiness and combat capability of the Soviet troops and test the strength of the Kwantung Army, which received a corresponding reinforcement after the defeat at Lake Hassan. The Japanese command knew that in Germany, Britain and France there was an opinion about the reduction of the Red Army’s combat readiness after the purging of its higher command personnel. In the area of ​​the planned operation, the Japanese concentrated the 23 Infantry Division, whose command cadres were considered experts in the Soviet Union and the Red Army, and its commander, Lieutenant General Komatsubara, was at one time a military attache in the USSR.

In April, an instruction was sent out from the headquarters of the Kwantung Army on the actions of the Japanese units in the border area, where it was prescribed that in cases of border crossing, violators should be immediately destroyed. To implement these goals, even temporary penetration into the territory of the Soviet Union is allowed. In addition, it was pointed out that the commanders of the defense should determine the place of border crossing in those areas where it is not clearly defined and indicate it to the troops of the first line.

The Mongolian-Manchurian state border in this region passed about 20 km east of the river. Khalkhin-Gol, but the commander of the Kwantung Army determined it strictly along the river bank. On May 12, the commander of the 23rd Infantry Division carried out a reconnaissance, after which he ordered the Japanese units to discard the crossed Mongol cavalry detachment for Khalkhin Gol, and on May 13 brought in an infantry regiment with support aviation. On May 28, the 23rd Infantry Division, after a preliminary bombardment, went on the offensive. On May 30, the General Staff of the Army gave the Kwantung Army the first air connection of 1 aircraft, and, in addition, requested the army's needs for people and military materials. The troops of the Kwantung Army began direct preparations for a military conflict.

Aggression against our country and the MPR, thus, was prepared ahead of time. The Japanese side violated the USSR state border more than 1936 times from 1938 to 230, 35 of which were major military clashes. Since January 1939, the state border of the MPR became the object of constant attacks, but military operations with the participation of regular troops of the imperial army began here in mid-May. The balance of power by this time was in favor of the enemy: against 12500 soldiers, 186 tanks, 265 armored vehicles and 82 combat aircraft of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, Japan concentrated 33000 soldiers, 135 tanks, 226 aircraft. However, she did not achieve the planned success: stubborn battles continued until the end of May, and Japanese troops were withdrawn from the state border line.



The beginning of hostilities was not very successful for the defenders. The Japanese attack on the eastern part of the state border was unexpected for our command, since it was believed that Japanese troops would begin active operations in the western part of the border, where the Soviet command concentrated our troops.

The negative impact, along with poor knowledge of local conditions, was exerted by the lack of combat experience, especially in the management of units. Extremely unsuccessful were the actions of Soviet aviation. First, due to the fact that the aircraft were obsolete types. Secondly, the airfields were not fully equipped. In addition, there was no communication between aircraft units. And finally, the staff had no experience. This all led to significant losses: the 15 fighters and 11 pilots, while the Japanese had only one car shot down.

Urgent measures were taken to increase the combat capability of the Air Force units. Groups of aces under the command of the comcor Y.V. Smushkevich, they increased the fleet of combat vehicles, radically improved the planning of military operations and their provision. Vigorous measures were also taken to increase the combat capability of parts of the 57-th special rifle corps. At the end of May 1939, a group of commanders headed by comic corps G.K. arrived in Khalkhin Gol. Zhukov, who took command of Soviet troops in Mongolia on June 12.

The first half of June was relatively calm. Taking into account the experience of the May battles, both sides were pulling fresh forces to the area of ​​operations. In particular, the Soviet grouping strengthened, besides other compounds, with two motorized armored brigades (7 and 8). By the end of June, the Japanese concentrated in the Khalkhin Gol area a fully 23 Infantry Division, 2 Infantry Regiment of the 7 Division, 2 Armored Regiment, 3 Cavalry Regiment of the Khingan Division, 200 order of aircraft, artillery and other units.

In early July, the Japanese began the offensive again, wanting to surround and destroy our troops, who were on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol river. The main battles took place near the Bain-Tsagan mountain and continued for three days. In this sector, on both sides, almost 400 tanks and armored vehicles were involved in battles, more than 300 artillery guns and hundreds of combat aircraft. Initially, success accompanied the Japanese troops. Having forced the river, they pressed the Soviet formations, and reached the northern slopes of Bain-Tsagan, and continued to develop success along the western bank of the river, trying to get our troops to the rear. However, the Soviet command, having thrown the 11 tank tank brigade and the 24 motorized rifle regiment into battle, managed to reverse the course of hostilities, forcing the Japanese to begin the retreat in the morning of July 5. The enemy lost up to 10 thousand soldiers and officers, almost all tanks, most of the artillery and 46 aircraft.



On July 7, the Japanese attempted to take revenge, but they did not succeed, moreover, even more 5 people were lost during the 5000 days of fighting. Japanese troops were forced to continue the withdrawal.

In historical literature, these battles are called Bzin-Tsagansky massacre. But for us, these battles were not easy. Only the losses of the 11 Tank Brigade amounted to about a hundred combat vehicles and more than 200 people. Soon the battles resumed and continued throughout July, but they did not lead to any serious changes in the situation. On July 25, the command of the Kwantung Army issued an order to stop the offensive, bring troops and materiel in order and consolidate at the line where the units are currently located. The fighting, which went from June to July, became crucial in the struggle of Soviet aviation for air supremacy. By the end of June, she destroyed about 60 enemy aircraft. If in May the entire 32 combat sorties were made, in which the 491 aircraft participated in total, then from 1 June to 1 July the 74 of the departure (1219 aircraft) took place. And in early July, the number of downed aircraft increased by another 40. Having thus lost around 100 combat vehicles, the Japanese command had to temporarily abandon airborne operations from mid-July.

Having failed to achieve the goals set during the fighting from May to July, the Japanese command intended to solve them by the “general offensive” planned for the end of summer, for which it was carefully and comprehensively prepared. From the new units, which were urgently transferred to the combat area, by August 10 formed the 6 army, numbering 55000 people, more 500 guns, 182 tank, at least 1300 machine guns and more 300 aircraft.

The Soviet command, in turn, also prepared a response. From the Soviet internal military districts, two rifle divisions, a tank brigade, artillery, and support units were transferred to the place of hostilities. By mid-August, the 1 Army Group consisted (including three cavalry divisions of the MPR) to 57 thousand people, 2255 machine guns, 498 tanks and 385 armored vehicles, 542 guns and mortars, more than 500 aircraft. The Soviet-Mongolian troops were given the task of encircling and then destroying the troops of the aggressor that invaded the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic, and restore the Mongolian state border.



The operation was being prepared in extremely difficult conditions. In view of the considerable remoteness of the combat zone from the railway, it was necessary to transport personnel, military equipment, ammunition, and foodstuffs by car. For a month, about a distance of about 750 km, in off-road conditions, by the heroic efforts of the Soviet people, about 50000 tons of various cargoes and about 18000 people were transferred. Summing up the operation at one of the debriefings, the brigade commander Bogdanov said: "... I must stress here that ... our rear units, our fighters are chauffeurs, our fighters of landmark companies ... all these people showed no less heroism than we all on this front. Not less. Imagine the situation: throughout the 4 months, drivers of cars for 6 days make flights from the front to Solovyovsk and from Solovyovsk to the front. 740 kilometers, and so continuously every day without sleep ... This is the greatest heroism in the rear ... "

Such intense work on the transportation of material resources over a long distance and in difficult climatic conditions made it difficult to carry out regular maintenance and lead to frequent vehicle failures. By September 1939, for example, a quarter of the fleet turned out to be faulty. Before the repair and restoration service was the task in the shortest possible time to put into operation the damaged equipment, to carry out the required repair in the field conditions. And MTO workers successfully coped with this task.

Preparations for the offensive took place under conditions of heightened secrecy, and active and effective measures were taken to disinfect the enemy. For example, the troops were sent a “Memo to the fighter in defense,” written personally by GK Zhukov, false reports on the construction of fortifications were transmitted, all regrouping was carried out only at night and in parts. The noise of relocated tanks, drowned out by the roar of night bombers and the shooting of small weapons. In order to create an impression on the enemy about the strengthening of the Soviet-Mongolian troops in the central sector of the front, the radio stations worked only in the center. The army sound order made imitation of stakes and tank noise, etc.



The Japanese command launched a “general offensive” on August 24. But at dawn 20 August, Soviet-Mongolian troops suddenly launched a powerful offensive for the enemy. It began with a powerful bomb strike, which involved more than 300 aircraft. Following him, an artillery preparation was conducted and tank, and then infantry and cavalry units were brought into battle. It is worth noting that the Japanese quickly recovered from the surprise and began stubborn resistance, sometimes even turning into counterattacks. The fights were fierce and bloody. From 20 to 23, August, our troops broke through the Japanese defenses and surrounded the enemy. Attempts by the Japanese to break through the encirclement ring with outside blows were not successful. Having suffered significant losses, deblocking compounds were forced to retreat. On August 27, the encircled troops were dismembered and partially destroyed, and on August 31 the enemy on the territory of Mongolia was completely destroyed.

Despite this, the Japanese continued to fight, and only 16 September, their government admitted defeat. During the fighting, the enemy lost the order of 61000 people killed, wounded and captured, almost 660 aircraft, a large number of various military equipment and equipment. The total losses of the Soviet-Mongolian troops amounted to over 18000 people.

The victory won by 77 years ago in the area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol river was made possible not only thanks to the competent command of the troops from the command of the modern military equipment of that time, but also to massive heroism. In violent air battles over Khalkhin-Gol Soviet pilots V.F. Skobarihin, A.F. Moshin, V.P. Bushes, having spent ammunition, made air rams and destroyed the enemy. The commander of the 1 Army of the Air Force, Colonel Kutsevalov, noted: “We didn’t have a single incident in the period of hostilities where anyone in a battle would chicken out and leave the battlefield ... We have a whole series of heroic feats that were done before your eyes, when the pilots did not have enough bombs, cartridges, they simply rammed the enemy’s planes, and if they themselves were dying, then the enemy fell ... ”

The exploits of the Soviet soldiers in Mongolian land are calculated not by the dozens or even hundreds. The total number awarded with military orders and medals exceeds 17000 people. Three of them: S.I. Gritsevets, G.P. Kravchenko and Ya.V. Smushkevich - for the second time were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 70 soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union, Knights of the Order of Lenin - 536, Red Banner Stars - 3224, medals "For Courage" and "For Military Merit" were awarded almost 1102 thousand people. All this served as a sobering lesson for the Japanese leadership, who did not dare to attack the Mongolia or the USSR throughout World War II.



Sources:
Gorbunov, E. A. 20 August 1939. M .: Young Guard, 1986. C. 32-87.
Novikov M. Victory on Khalkhin-Gol. M .: Politizdat, 1971. C. 3-92.
Panasovsky V. Lessons of Hassan and Khalkhin-Gol. M .: Knowledge, 1989. C. 48-56
Vartanov V. There far away from the river. // visage 1988. No.8. C.32-37.
Koshkin A. A. The collapse of the strategy of "ripe persimmon". Japan’s military policy towards the USSR 1931 — 1945 M .: Thought. 1989. C. 24-42.
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  1. Aleksander
    Aleksander 13 July 2016 06: 53
    +5
    Serious fights. And they are another good reason to sign the Nonaggression Pact with Germany in order to avoid a war on two fronts.
  2. Uncle Murzik
    Uncle Murzik 13 July 2016 07: 14
    +2
    Thick dew lay on the grass, Fogs fell, wide. That night the samurai decided to cross the border by the river! soldier
  3. Cartalon
    Cartalon 13 July 2016 07: 19
    +2
    Good, but the ending is crumpled.
  4. inkass_98
    inkass_98 13 July 2016 07: 31
    +10
    Well, our tankers in the view of our own Far Eastern "friends" laughing :
    1. Beefeater
      Beefeater 13 July 2016 08: 50
      -6
      Interesting movie. Wow.
  5. parusnik
    parusnik 13 July 2016 07: 47
    +3
    77 years old ... not a round, but significant date ... In essence, the beginning of the Second World War on July 7, 1937 ... and not on September 1, 1939 ..
  6. moskowit
    moskowit 13 July 2016 08: 13
    +4
    In the second photo, the light tank "2595" ("Ha-Go") is in the foreground, and the medium tank "2597" ("Chi-Ha") is in the rear.
    1. Mikado
      Mikado 13 July 2016 13: 08
      0
      Quote: moskowit
      In the second photo, the light tank "2595" ("Ha-Go") is in the foreground, and the medium tank "2597" ("Chi-Ha") is in the rear.

      in the foreground tank Type 89, "2589" "Yi-Go."
      "Ha-Go" - through one photo, where ours are examining the captured equipment.
      1. moskowit
        moskowit 13 July 2016 16: 53
        +1
        Thanks for clarifying ... I'll check ... Maybe you're right ...
        1. Mikado
          Mikado 13 July 2016 18: 09
          +1
          here it is, darling. Photos from Wikipedia, if you google it, you can find many pictures. There were not many of them released, they were used mainly in China and the Philippines. Yours faithfully, hi
  7. V.ic
    V.ic 13 July 2016 08: 58
    +4
    If there was a "border conflict" on Khasan, the fighting on Khalkhin Gol can be viewed as the second Russo-Japanese war. Somewhere on the Internet there was a figure of 600 thousand (the total number of troops of both sides participating in the "conflict"), and the time of the "conflict" from May to November 1939, the loss of both sides during the "armed conflict", and also the geopolitical results thereof, allow us to draw such a conclusion.
    1. Verdun
      Verdun 13 July 2016 10: 35
      +4
      Quote: V.ic
      If there was a "border conflict" on Khasan, the fighting on Khalkhin Gol can be viewed as the second Russo-Japanese war.

      That's it. And today's Japanese politicians strive to present this as an annoying and insignificant incident. If this goes on, then after some time the German invasion of the USSR will be considered as battles of local significance.
      1. V.ic
        V.ic 13 July 2016 12: 26
        +3
        Quote: Verdun
        If this goes on, then after some time the German invasion of the USSR will be considered as battles of local significance.

        This already has a designated place in the minds of "common people". In the Russian Federation, the process is constrained by the presence, alas, of a few, living veterans and their children, like me. Ch / z 30-40 years, through "Eg-shny", education, the level of perception of the population of the Russian Federation Zapadlovsky values ​​will do its vile deed.
  8. Velizariy
    Velizariy 13 July 2016 09: 11
    +6
    ... The balance of power by this time has developed in favor of the adversary: against 125000 soldiers, 186 tanks, 265 armored vehicles and 82 combat aircraft of the Soviet-Mongolian forces, Japan concentrated 33000 soldiers, 135 tanks, 226 aircraft ...
    Something I did not understand, who was called our opponent here? Or did the Japanese have some sort of over 33 capability against 125 for them even superiority?
    1. Beefeater
      Beefeater 13 July 2016 09: 35
      -9
      Quote: Velizariy
      ... The balance of power by this time has developed in favor of the adversary: against 125000 soldiers, 186 tanks, 265 armored vehicles and 82 combat aircraft of the Soviet-Mongolian forces, Japan concentrated 33000 soldiers, 135 tanks, 226 aircraft ...
      Something I did not understand, who was called our opponent here? Or did the Japanese have some sort of over 33 capability against 125 for them even superiority?

      This is so customary to write in every possible way to inflate your achievements and cover up mistakes ...
      You can often find "heroically fought, defeated everyone, but retreated ..." always thought, Well, how is that?
      1. V.ic
        V.ic 13 July 2016 10: 13
        +4
        Quote: Beefeater
        You can often find "heroically fought, defeated everyone, but retreated ..." always thought, Well, how is that?

        well it in the recollections of fascist defectors primarily. General motive: we would give them if they caught us!
        Yes, and in the cries of Banderlog from "country 404" about the tenfold destroyed mechanized divisions of the Buryats of some horse divers, your comment has something similar. By the way, you, quite by accident, do not know - how many special forces divisions of the GRU of the Russian Federation have been destroyed at the moment? Share information!
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 13 July 2016 10: 27
        +6
        Quote: Beefeater
        You can often find "heroically fought, defeated everyone, but retreated ..." always thought, Well, how is that?

        And this is traditional for hudlite and memoirs of all countries. The invariably victorious German army ended the war by surrender. The invariably victorious American army was forced to withdraw from Vietnam. smile
        1. Mikhail Matyugin
          Mikhail Matyugin 13 July 2016 18: 22
          0
          Quote: Alexey RA
          The invariably victorious American army was forced to withdraw from Vietnam.

          Well, here is the question of winning the war and winning the battles.
          For example, oddly enough, but Napoleon (the troops he himself commanded) in 1812 did not lose a single battle. But the "Great Army" became humus.

          And the same, for example, about our units in Afghanistan - I do not know of a single defeat in the field battles of a more or less large Soviet group. But we left there.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 13 July 2016 19: 07
            +1
            Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
            For example, oddly enough, but Napoleon (the troops he himself commanded) in 1812 did not lose a single battle. But the "Great Army" became humus.

            Well, even after leaving Russia and the formation of a new army, Napoleon successfully fought against the Coalition. That's just a series of victories brought him into exile. smile
            Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
            And the same, for example, about our units in Afghanistan - I do not know of a single defeat in the field battles of a more or less large Soviet group. But we left there.

            Well yes. Political defeat after a series of successful operations. sad
    2. Uncle Murzik
      Uncle Murzik 13 July 2016 13: 02
      +3
      As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict at the beginning of the Soviet counterattack, the 1st Army Zhukov’s group consisted of about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft [16], the Japanese group opposing it was specially formed by imperial decree, the Japanese 6th separate army under the command of General Ogisu Rippo, consisted of the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments, the Manchu brigade, three regiments of the Bargut cavalry, engineer regiment and other parts, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 500 aircraft [17]. It should also be noted that as part of the Japanese group there were many soldiers who gained combat experience during the war in China
  9. tiaman.76
    tiaman.76 13 July 2016 10: 42
    +1
    funny movie-movie .. rich imagination among the Japanese yes
    1. Mikado
      Mikado 13 July 2016 11: 35
      +1
      Quote: tiaman.76
      funny movie-movie .. rich imagination among the Japanese yes

      what a rare nonsense .. however, it is enough to educate one or two generations of stoned Japanese jingoistic patriots who have a too distorted view of history. Igor Mozheiko (aka Kir Bulychev) wrote: "Japanese historians characterize the battle at Khalkhin Gol briefly and falsely."
      The battle at Khalkhin Gol was the finest hour of Soviet armored cars. They were actively used in a counterattack on Bain-Tsagan, and in the operation on the environment. Immediately revealed the lack of BA-6 and Ba-10 - the main gas tank was located above the driver's head. When it gets into the forehead and breaks through the armor, gas spilled onto people’s heads and ignited. Therefore, on the BA-10M, gas tanks were placed on the wings of the rear wheels.
      1. Mother CheeseEarth
        Mother CheeseEarth 13 July 2016 15: 08
        -3
        Quote: Mikado
        Immediately revealed the lack of BA-6 and Ba-10 - the main gas tank was located above the driver's head. When it gets into the forehead and breaks through the armor, gas spilled onto people’s heads and ignited.

        That is, in order to understand this, it was necessary to burn hundreds of our tankers?
        I wonder if the pests that developed and adopted the BA-6 and BA-10 were shot?
        1. Simpsonian
          Simpsonian 13 July 2016 23: 34
          0
          Are all "conspiracy theories" haunted? bully

          Awarded and promoted ...
    2. Kim Tsaplin
      Kim Tsaplin 8 January 2018 22: 45
      0
      This is a Korean movie. Look at him as their "sworn friends" of the Japanese hitch. "My path is called." About how the Japanese were taken prisoner by the Japanese, recorded in the "penal battalion", drove to fight with the USSR, the Russians were captured there, recorded in the "penal battalion", drove to fight with the Germans, the Germans captured there, recorded in their own "penal battalion" drove to the western front, there the Americans took him prisoner, recorded in the "penal battalion", drove to fight ...
  10. iouris
    iouris 13 July 2016 11: 20
    -2
    The Second World War began and ended in the Far East; it was economically and financially prepared by the US administration.
    1. cth; fyn
      cth; fyn 13 July 2016 17: 46
      0
      An interesting point of view, especially considering that after the war the dollar became a world currency.
    2. Turkir
      Turkir 13 July 2016 22: 32
      -1
      The Second World War began and ended in the Far East; it was economically and financially prepared by the US administration.

      There is probably something to it ...
  11. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 13 July 2016 11: 21
    +2
    From August 20 to August 23, our troops broke through the Japanese defenses and surrounded the enemy. Attempts by the Japanese to break the encirclement with outside blows were unsuccessful. After suffering significant losses, the release connections were forced to retreat. On August 27, the surrounded troops were dismembered and partially destroyed, and on August 31, the enemy on the territory of Mongolia was completely destroyed.

    Heh heh heh ...
    Comrade Stalin ... As expected, there were no divisions in the encirclement, the enemy either managed to withdraw the main forces, or rather, there were no large forces in this area for a long time, and a specially trained garrison was sitting, which is now completely destroyed. ..
    © NPO comrade Voroshilov.
    But the reason is simple - for too long, ours closed the ring, carried away by the storming of the Japanese OP and battles with the rearguards.
    In the August offensive, the 6th, 11th tank, 7th, 8th, 9th motorized armored brigades were involved. A total of 8 tank battalions of two tank brigades plus one single tank battalion for three motorized armored brigades. So, the 11th tank brigade at the beginning of the offensive was torn in half - two battalions support the advance of the troops of the northern group, two battalions - the southern group. The 6th tank brigade, firstly, was torn apart - one of its tank battalions leaves the command of the army group as a reserve - the other three battalions are delayed at the crossing and have no time to start the offensive. In total, five tank battalions may be involved at the beginning of the offensive - two in the northern and three in the southern group.
    Further, the course of the operation: with a depth of operation of 20-25 km in the first day, the southern group advanced about 8-10 km, the northern group - 4 km, found the Japanese stronghold on the way (the very same height of Fuy - “Finger”, Remizov’s height is a different height) and instead of flinging it around with mobile troops, blocking with infantry and moving on, he began fiercely, furiously, frantically banging his head on his strong point. The second day: reserves were introduced at the front of the northern group (the same battalion of the 6th tank brigade and 9th motorized armored brigade), the furious penetration of the wall with the forehead continues with unrelenting power. The southern group goes to the "meeting point" and takes a seat to smoke and recover. Accordingly, at night, the Japanese begin to withdraw troops and roll out equipment from the semicircle with battalions - with success. Finally, only on August 23 — on the fourth day of the encirclement operation with an operation depth of 25 km — did the Japanese stronghold at the Finger height be finished, and the Japanese troops in the central sector of the front fell into a more or less complete encirclement.
    © D. Shein AKA litl_bro
    1. Mikado
      Mikado 13 July 2016 11: 49
      +2
      Further - a quote from the forum of alternative history (the first one that I found): "But in the same way, which year I have a certain dissonance and misunderstanding inside me. I am very interested in what LitlBro's comrade would do if I happened to be in 1940 it was he. Judging by the posts, it seems he would not do anything ... "
      Aleksey, Shein's level of thinking is expressed in his way of presentation: "fiercely, madly pounding." Is this an Internet scientist from Lurka?
      Maybe he writes correctly (after 70 years, from the height of the sofa). But the sediment remains, as if you yourself know what they smeared with. Yours faithfully,hi
      1. Stas57
        Stas57 13 July 2016 13: 35
        +2
        Quote: Mikado
        Next - a quote from the alternative history forum

        this is a label, if they curse, then it’s definitely a worthy author.))
        1. Mikado
          Mikado 13 July 2016 13: 58
          +2
          Quote: Stas57
          this is a label, if they curse, then it’s definitely a worthy author.))

          It's just that over the past twenty years they have tried so hard to distort our history, starting with Rezun, on the one hand; and so many so-called. sofa "historians" who write nonsense for the sake of PR, on the other hand, that you start to treat each new author with caution. About 15 years ago I bought a book by a certain Beshanov - I spat. Rezun's laurels are clearly not letting him sleep. And everything is so good, it is exactly written that "it was necessary to do this and that in 41, but our fools did it differently, that's why they let the German go to Moscow." Well, from the sofa, you know better, seventy years later, in hindsight! They also pay the Captain Obviously for it! fellow Probably, in a real combat situation decisions are made a little differently ..
          If Shein has good books and articles - give a link. Respectfully, hi
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 13 July 2016 14: 12
            +1
            Quote: Mikado
            If Shein has good books and articles - give a link.

            Shein D.V. Tanks are fishing. The combat path of the 3rd Guards Tank Army.
            Shein D.V. Tank Guard in battle.
            A. Ulanov, D. Shein. Order in the tank troops? Where did the tanks of Stalin.
            A. Ulanov, D. Shein. The first T-34. Combat use.

            At one time I managed to get acquainted with part of the documents used in the preparation of "Order in the tank forces?" More precisely - with docks on mechanized corps of border districts, including reports on the state of the MK for March-April 1941. You know, after that the question "why we fought so much in 1941"I changed to"how we were able to fight against the Germans with all this"?
            Quote: Mikado
            About 15 years ago I bought a book by a certain Beshanov - I spat. Rezun's laurels are clearly not letting him sleep. And everything is so good, it is exactly written that "it was necessary to do this and that in 41, but our fools did it differently, that's why they let the German go to Moscow."

            Hehehehe ... just with such know-it-alls and teachers of the ancestors who do not know the real state of affairs of that time, Shein fights. And fans of Beshanov, Rezun and Solonin, he generally dearly and reverently loves ... to smear on the forum and LJ. smile
            1. Mikado
              Mikado 13 July 2016 14: 14
              0
              A. Ulanov, D. Shein. Order in the tank troops? Where did the tanks of Stalin.
              A. Ulanov, D. Shein. The first T-34. Combat use.
              I will try to find and re-read! yes Thanks again!
            2. Mikado
              Mikado 13 July 2016 14: 32
              0
              Quote: Alexey RA
              And fans of Beshanov, Rezun and Solonin, he generally dearly and reverently loves ... to smear on the forum and LJ. smile

              It is useless to love them. Brain resonism is not cured. It’s not worthwhile to engage in polemics with them, they, as stubborn ones, repeat the dogmas of the Great Rezun.
          2. Stas57
            Stas57 13 July 2016 14: 37
            +1
            Quote: Mikado
            If Shein has good books and articles - give a link. Respectfully,

            I had the first handbook
            1-I Guards Tank Brigade in the battles for Moscow.
            for 2007, this is more than cool.
            she is now one of two books on the brigade.
            "Order in the tank forces?" I liked it, despite the journalism.

            Quote: Mikado
            Just for

            it’s just still simpler, there is such crap, mosh, he is obliged
            turn on.
            we open the book, we see documents showing that, by the poor mind of T34, was without gas or went into battle without shells and died, we open another book, and still, in principle, the same thing, the same losses. Compare, analyze.
            without "nra" or "nra". Pure fact. Especially the fact of grief 41.
            or that we didn’t know how to use MK, or that 45 was weak, or that T34 was raw was no secret, Svirin was the first to speak about this.


            It’s not clear that Shein is to blame for this.
            Although Shein, I argued with him and with Ulanov on issues, remained unconvinced, this is normal.
            1. Mikado
              Mikado 13 July 2016 15: 01
              0
              Quote: Stas57
              It’s not clear that Shein is to blame for this.
              Although Shein, I argued with him and with Ulanov on issues, remained unconvinced, this is normal.

              I’ll get it - I’ll re-read it, be sure! yes Already apologized for the incredulity!
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 13 July 2016 16: 51
              0
              Quote: Stas57
              we open the book, we see documents there that, according to the poor folly, the T34 was without gasoline

              And thank god that the T-34 was without gas. And then the drag officer told Shein had a document about the misadventures of five T-34s with gasoline. laughing
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 13 July 2016 14: 02
          +2
          Quote: Stas57
          this is a label, if they curse, then it’s definitely a worthy author.))

          I remember the first responses to "Order in the tank forces?" ... blazing tent clublaughing

          SW E Belash still joked: The incredibly scandalous work of the desecutor defilers Andreas and Dimitros “Is faith strong?” Where did the children of God the Emperor go? ”
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 13 July 2016 13: 52
        +2
        Quote: Mikado
        Aleksey, Shein's level of thinking is expressed in his way of presentation: "fiercely, madly pounding." Is this an Internet scientist from Lurka?

        This is a quote from the forum. Moreover, torn from a rather long discussion in which opponents gradually switched to a simple language.
        And so - you know Shein’s books on pre-war MK, the first TA, the history of 3 Guards. TA and combat use of the T-34.
        Quote: Mikado
        Maybe he writes correctly (after 70 years, from the height of the sofa). But the sediment remains, as if you yourself know what they smeared with.

        The problem is that Shein relies on documents of that time. And they, unlike the varnished memoirs and official history, are extremely impartial and heavy. And, often, they are very different from the generally accepted and well-known simple explanations of historical events. So there is an extremely unpleasant gap pattern.
        Quote: Mikado
        But in the same way, which year inside I have some kind of dissonance and misunderstanding. I’m very interested in what LitlBro comrade would do if he was the one who was a traitor in some 1940s. Judging by the posts, it seems that he would not do anything ...

        Duc ... Alternativeists traditionally do not like those who break their castles in the air against the all-devastating Red Army harsh prose of documents.
        In which, for example, the tank division considered by them in fact since the moment of formation did not carry out firing from guns for the lack of firing ranges (for the land for them there is a lawsuit with civilians).
        And the cumulative shells that were so easily introduced into the alternatives in real life since 1939 have been engaged in the Leningrad Chemical-Technological Institute, the Artillery Academy of the KA, the Research Institute No. 6 and the Ostekhbyuro of the NKVD - and for 1942 work did not lead to positive results. Approximately the same amount of work is done by sub-calibers - with a zero result until the end of 1941 due to the lack of suitable materials for cores in the USSR (until that time reports were being made in the style of we made the core of the hardest steel that we had - but it still doesn’t break through the armor).
        1. Mikado
          Mikado 13 July 2016 14: 10
          0
          Alex, thank you so much for such a detailed answer! Unfortunately, Sheina did not read. I read Svirin (the kingdom to him be heaven). Especially thanks for the explanation of the syllable. Now everything is clear. I am simply wary of new historians whom I discover for myself, especially if they have a caustic language. Take Shirokorad, for example (with all due respect to him). As for artillery - everything is accurate, beautiful. He begins to retire to politics - he does not spare epithets for historical characters, emotions beat over the edge.
          Thank you!
        2. Stas57
          Stas57 13 July 2016 15: 07
          +1
          Quote: Alexey RA
          The Leningrad Chemical-Technological Institute, the Art Academy of the Spacecraft, the Research Institute No.6 and the Ostekhbyuro NKVD - and for the 1942 year of work did not lead to positive results. Approximately the same amount of work is done by sub-calibers - with a zero result until the end of 1941 due to the lack of suitable materials for the cores in the USSR (until this time there are reports in the style we made the core from the hardest steel that we had - but it still doesn’t break through the armor )

          I brought the 42 year just the day before yesterday
        3. Mikhail Matyugin
          Mikhail Matyugin 13 July 2016 16: 05
          0
          Quote: Alexey RA
          And the cumulative shells that were so easily introduced into the alternatives in real life already from 1939 were occupied by the Leningrad Chemical-Technological Institute, the Artillery Academy of the Spacecraft, the Research Institute No.6 and the Ostekhbyuro NKVD - and for the year 1942 they did not lead to positive results. Approximately the same amount of work is done by sub-calibers - with a zero result until the end of 1941 due to the lack of suitable materials for the cores in the USSR (until this time there are reports in the style we made the core from the hardest steel that we had - but it still doesn’t break through the armor )

          It seems like tungsten was imported from the USA?

          And exactly by the 43 year - when the Germans had heavy tanks - did they solve the problem with cumulative ones?
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 13 July 2016 18: 15
            +1
            Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
            It seems like tungsten was imported from the USA?

            We had tungsten too. Tyrnauz was lost only in the second half of 1942 - and then they managed to endure all the production.
            But tungsten was not enough. And they constantly tried to replace him with something cheaper and more common - with a predictable result.
            Plus, at first there was a problem with the production. After we got into our hands a working sample of a projectile, it suddenly became clear that only the Moscow carbide plant could make the same material for the core in the USSR. And I had to spend time organizing production.
            Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
            And exactly by the 43 year - when the Germans had heavy tanks - did they solve the problem with cumulative ones?

            As Ulanov wrote:
            In reality, the godfather in the USSR was "all very bad" until 43 and just "bad" afterwards.

            In the fall of 1942, the "godfather" pierced a smaller caliber.
            In 1943, the penetration problem was solved. And the godfather appeared, but only for regimental guns and 122-mm howitzers. The reason is known - an overly sensitive fuse could only be used on guns with low muzzle velocities (in a battalion, it often triggered a primo in the barrel). As a result, unconventional Iptap on "regiments" appeared in the Red Army.
            The problem was that the low muzzle velocity of the projectile limited the range of a direct shot. The same 122-mm howitzer managed not to hit the "tiger" by the "godfather" from half a kilometer. And 15 times in a row.
            They brought the fuse only to 1944.
            1. Mikhail Matyugin
              Mikhail Matyugin 13 July 2016 18: 30
              0
              Quote: Alexey RA
              The same 122-mm howitzer managed not to hit the "tiger" by the "godfather" from half a kilometer. And 15 times in a row. The fuse was brought only by 1944.

              Quietly stunned. And this despite the fact that it was the 122mm howitzers in the Red Army that was one of the few effective means of fighting heavy tanks in the spring of 43.
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 13 July 2016 19: 21
                0
                Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
                Quietly stunned. And this despite the fact that it was the 122mm howitzers in the Red Army that was one of the few effective means of fighting heavy tanks in the spring of 43.

                Howitzer in the PTO? Is that for the setting of NZO and PZO. She also has an aiming range of fire at a moving tank - 400 m. Together with the dimensions and separate loading - "goodbye, Motherland."

                Even the "barn" PTP-41 on direct fire is even better.
              2. Stas57
                Stas57 13 July 2016 20: 10
                0
                Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
                Quietly stunned. And this despite the fact that it was the 122mm howitzers in the Red Army that was one of the few effective means of fighting heavy tanks in the spring of 43.

                yawning, I just posted 10 here
            2. Stas57
              Stas57 13 July 2016 20: 14
              0
              Quote: Alexey RA
              The same 122-mm howitzer managed not to hit the "tiger" by the "godfather" from half a kilometer. And 15 times in a row.
              They brought the fuse only to 1944.
            3. Igor V
              Igor V 13 July 2016 21: 25
              0
              Tungsten was purchased in China. Since the USSR seriously helped China militarily, tungsten was also obtained at a low price.
  12. Mother CheeseEarth
    Mother CheeseEarth 13 July 2016 14: 40
    -2
    Horror, but in the article almost everything is not true!
    Suffice it to say that no command of the Soviet troops on June 12, division commander Zhukov Did not accept!
    He took command of the rifle corps, and the commander of the 1st separate Red Banner Army commander (1938) 2nd rank G.M.Stern commanded the troops.
    To be more precise, on June 5, the Red Army command created the Front-line Group of Forces under the command of the 2nd rank commander, G. M. Stern. The group included the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner Armies, the troops of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 57th Special Corps.
    And by August 57th special corps was deployed to the 1st army (front) group under the command (again!) Of the commander G. M. Stern.
    Farther. TSB provides the following data on the number of troops at the beginning of the offensive on August 20.
    USSR - 35 infantry battalions, 20 cavalry squadrons, 216 field and 286 anti-tank guns, 40 mortars, 2255 easel and light machine guns, 498 tanks, 346 armored vehicles, 581 aircraft.
    Japan - 25 infantry battalions, 17 cavalry squadrons, 135 field and 142 anti-tank guns, 60 mortars and bomb guns, 1238 easel and light machine guns, 120 tanks and armored vehicles, 450 aircraft.
    And this, mind you, is the official, positive, Soviet statistics! What does it take into account the previously laid stacks of Soviet soldiers!
    In reality, there were probably much more Soviet soldiers there, because there was a whole front of three armies that were manned from at least three military districts, the Trans-Baikal, Ural and Moscow!
    And Zhukov's military role in that conflict is clearly exaggerated, and his main role was "KNOCK“Voroshilov, because at the beginning of the war he had practically no idea of ​​what was really going on there.
    And the result of all this battle against the inferior Japanese "army" (and several times in terms of technology!) Was a tactical draw and a strategic defeat for the USSR. The USSR later recognized the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia on the terms of the Japanese side !!!!!
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 13 July 2016 19: 34
      +2
      Quote: Mother CheeseEarth
      Suffice it to say that the commander Zhukov did not accept any command of Soviet troops on June 12!
      He took command of the rifle corps, and the commander of the 1st separate Red Banner Army commander (1938) 2nd rank G.M.Stern commanded the troops.
      To be more precise, on June 5, the Red Army command created the Front-line Group of Forces under the command of the 2nd rank commander, G. M. Stern. The group included the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner Armies, the troops of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 57th Special Corps.

      Of all the forces listed above, the 57th Special Corps stationed in Mongolia fought directly with the Japanese. Which was commanded by Zhukov.
      All other troops were on Soviet territory and did not participate in battles.
      Quote: Mother CheeseEarth
      And by August 57th special corps was deployed to the 1st army (front) group under the command (again!) Of the commander G. M. Stern.

      This is not the case has been deployed. It is over Zhukov’s corps, Smushkevich’s aviators, and Mongolian troops that their superstructure 1 A (F) G. appeared.
      Quote: Mother CheeseEarth
      In reality, there were probably much more Soviet soldiers there, because there was a whole front of three armies that were manned from at least three military districts, the Trans-Baikal, Ural and Moscow!

      Can you tell me the numbers of these armies?
      1 and 2 OKA you can not mention - they stood the whole conflict on the Soviet-Japanese border.
      In general, the situation was extremely amusing: extremely limited forces fought on both sides, and the bulk of the troops stood opposite each other, observing the conflict out of the corner of their eyes.

      It is noteworthy that, as reinforcements, Zhukov received not the Far Eastern personnel, but the former territorial division of the inner district, which was distinguished by an extremely low level of training of personnel and a low political mars. And behind it - the rifle division, begun by the formation of the regiment on April 15, 1939.
      1. Mother CheeseEarth
        Mother CheeseEarth 13 July 2016 23: 07
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Of all the forces listed above, the 57th Special Corps stationed in Mongolia fought directly with the Japanese. Which was commanded by Zhukov.
        All other troops were on Soviet territory and did not participate in battles.

        Oh, well, okay, didn't you participate? And "about 50000 thousand cargo and about 1800 soldiers" where did they come from? And this is without considering the fact that Zhukov CAM wrote that it took about 5000 cars, taking into account that at the "disposal army group there were only 2636 cars. "
        About hundreds of tanks and planes (and almost all the pilot heroes available in the USSR), I generally will not say anything.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        This is not the case has been deployed. It is over Zhukov’s corps, Smushkevich’s aviators, and Mongolian troops that their superstructure 1 A (F) G. appeared.

        This is called, I twist the faith, I want to confuse! Because it doesn't matter whether they deployed or built on top, the main thing is that this was not a corps operation, and it was not Zhukov, but Stern, who commanded it (and the troops). It was just that Stern was then shot, and Zhukov then took his place as "leader."
        Well, not about a dead "traitor" was it written in Bolshevik books when there was a living "hero" ?! Think for yourself. request
        Quote: Alexey RA
        1 and 2 OKA you can not mention - they stood the whole conflict on the Soviet-Japanese border.

        So, hundreds of tanks and planes, thousands of tons of cargo and tens of thousands of people, then where then? From Mars ?!
        Quote: Alexey RA
        extremely limited forces fought on both sides, and the bulk of the troops stood opposite each other, watching the conflict out of the corner of their eyes.

        Was it necessary to throw all the available armies on the "patch"? Do you know its size? Or was it necessary to violate the Soviet-Japanese border? Well, nobody wanted that, neither we nor the Japanese.
        We then did not go to Manchukuo "for some reason".
        Quote: Alexey RA
        that as reinforcements Zhukov received not the Far Eastern personnel, but the former territorial division

        Yes, there the devil’s leg will break to figure out who got what. The mess in the sources is the same as in the troops you describe at that time.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 14 July 2016 15: 17
          +1
          Quote: Mother CheeseEarth
          Oh, well, okay, didn't you participate? And "about 50000 thousand cargo and about 1800 soldiers" where did they come from?

          From the Urals, of course - notorious 82 sd.
          Here is the layout of the divisions:
          ... in addition to the 57th artillery division originally located in Mongolia, 57d PRVO and 82d UralVO (ex-territorial) and 212ddbr (Far Eastern) arrived there. In addition, the 109 and 114 rifle divisions from the ZabVO ("six-thousand") were hastily deployed for mobilization, preparing for the transfer.

          Moreover, 109 and 114 sd did not manage to turn around normally.
          Quote: Mother CheeseEarth
          About hundreds of tanks and planes (and almost all the pilot heroes available in the USSR), I generally will not say anything.

          From the ZabVO in 57 USC, one TBR was allocated.
          And the pilots were generally transferred from the European part.
          Quote: Mother CheeseEarth
          So, hundreds of tanks and planes, thousands of tons of cargo and tens of thousands of people, then where then? From Mars ?!

          Mostly from the rear districts. Zabvo gave quite a bit. And FEF - in general, one WBD.
          They did not touch our forces at the border, but arranged a "standing on the Ugra River". And this is correct - because Khalkhin Gol could well have been a Japanese provocation aimed at pulling the Soviet group to the Far East and diverting it to an area poor in communications, from which it would be very difficult for it to get out in the event of a possible strike from the entire KVA.
          Quote: Mother CheeseEarth
          Was it necessary to throw all the available armies on the "patch"? Do you know its size?

          This is not what I mean. All I had in mind was that despite all the loud names like "front-line group of forces" or "army (front-line) group", in fact only 57 USC fought under the command of Zhukov. And the rest of the units in the Far East stood still and prepared to meet the main forces of KvA.
          Even reinforcements for the 57th USC had to be transferred from the inner districts - and not personnel units were transferred, but freshly mobilized ex-territories. And this in the presence of many "old" personnel divisions in the Far East (half of the "personnel" of the Red Army until the mid-20s was located in the Far East).
  13. Mikhail Matyugin
    Mikhail Matyugin 13 July 2016 16: 10
    -3
    Quote: Mother CheeseEarth
    And Zhukov's military role in that conflict is clearly exaggerated, and his main role was to "KNOCK" Voroshilov, because at the beginning of the war he had practically no idea of ​​what was actually happening there.

    Yes, the role of Zhukov in organizing mass executions was not completely disclosed. They do not like to write about this as usual with us, but this was exactly what was almost nonexistent in the troops in Mongolia before Zhukov’s arrival.
    1. Mikado
      Mikado 13 July 2016 16: 40
      +1
      Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
      Yes, the role of Zhukov in organizing mass executions was not completely disclosed. They do not like to write about this as usual with us, but this was exactly what was almost nonexistent in the troops in Mongolia before Zhukov’s arrival.

      Do you have a link to Zhukov’s participation in the organization of executions? Documents, acts, signatures, how many were shot?
      1. Mikhail Matyugin
        Mikhail Matyugin 13 July 2016 18: 19
        -1
        Quote: Mikado
        Do you have a link to Zhukov’s participation in the organization of executions? Documents, acts, signatures, how many were shot?

        Actually, that’s exactly what I’m saying - the topic of mass executions, which Zhukov used for the first time precisely at Khalkhin-Gol, has not yet been disclosed. So your claim to the author.
        1. Mikado
          Mikado 13 July 2016 18: 28
          0
          Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
          Actually, that’s exactly what I’m saying - the topic of mass executions, which Zhukov used for the first time precisely at Khalkhin-Gol, has not yet been disclosed. So your claim to the author.

          Where did you get information about the mass shootings? I ask for a link.
    2. Mother CheeseEarth
      Mother CheeseEarth 13 July 2016 16: 42
      0
      Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
      Zhukov’s role in the organization of mass executions was not completely disclosed.

      In this case, we can say that the topic of the Soviet-Japanese war is practically undisclosed.
      1. Having superiority in the number of drugs and especially in technology, the Soviet leadership managed to achieve only a tactical draw, having suffered a strategic defeat.
      As a result, the true results of the war were initially preferred "not to advertise"
      2. A couple of years later, almost all prominent participants in the Mongol events were arrested and shot as "enemies of the people."
      3. As a result, all the official Soviet "science" wrote about those events from the words of Zhukov, who, being just a "mega modest" man, put on himself (as much as a whole divisional commander) the role of a modest front commander.
  14. Mikhail Matyugin
    Mikhail Matyugin 13 July 2016 18: 27
    +1
    Quote: Mother CheeseEarth
    A couple of years later, almost all prominent participants in the Mongol events were arrested and shot as "enemies of the people."
    Yes, it’s terrible to see how, for example, many pilots - the heroes of Spain and Halhingol became pests, spies of foreign intelligence, etc.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 13 July 2016 19: 44
      +1
      Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
      Yes, it’s terrible to see how, for example, many pilots - the heroes of Spain and Halhingol became pests, spies of foreign intelligence, etc.

      Well, and who else to consider the commanders who completely thwarted the 1940 plan for the reconstruction of the airfield network (the transfer of work to the NKVD in 1941 was, as it now turns out, a necessary measure), hiding the facts of the accident in the Air Force from the top leadership and missed Yu-52 to Moscow ?
      1. Mother CheeseEarth
        Mother CheeseEarth 13 July 2016 22: 17
        +1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Well, and who else to consider the commanders who completely foiled the 1940 plan

        Understand one thing, Dear.
        Before accusing someone of "frustrating plans" you need to make sure that these plans are actually fulfilled in the first place.
        In the meantime, we have what we have, almost all the official figures of Bolshevik statistics are not the real state of affairs, but the numbers released from above, and in reality, there were often only subscriptions, unsubscribes and kickbacks, and so almost everywhere, and in the army too.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 14 July 2016 10: 39
          0
          Quote: Mother CheeseEarth
          Before accusing someone of "frustrating plans" you need to make sure that these plans are actually fulfilled in the first place.
          In the meantime, we have what we have, almost all the official figures of Bolshevik statistics are not the real state of affairs, but the numbers released from above, and in reality, there were often only subscriptions, unsubscribes and kickbacks, and so almost everywhere, and in the army too.

          What does the reality of fulfilling plans have to do with it? 5 GU Air Force SC managed to arrange a shortage of materials, even with their actual availability. Yes, and the mess started already at the stage of design work.
          The construction of facilities in such districts as Odessa and Baltic was carried out without projects and estimates. The search for sites was carried out hastily by external signs without sufficient study. As a result, the selected sites in many cases turned out to be unsuitable for use at operational airfields and landing sites, and the district command was subsequently forced to abandon them, which led to the useless spending of state funds and the failure to fulfill the plan for the construction of facilities.

          The construction of operational airfields in the Moscow Military District was unsatisfactory. By the choice of sites for the construction of operational aerodromes, the airfield department of the MVO Air Force approached irresponsibly.
          During the construction of the Pavlovskoye airfield, when leveling the relief, it was necessary to remove the soil up to 2 meters thick, while nearby was an area with a smaller amount of earthwork.
          Chertanovo airdrome is limited in size to 900x900 and it is not possible to expand [it], since there is a collective farm on one side and a swamp on the other. By the decision of the commission, the construction of the Chertanovo airfield was canceled, but the former. Major General Eremenko, commander of the Air Force Air Defense Ministry, decided to build.
          The Vatulinsky airdrome, measuring 900x900 meters, is 5-6 km from the railway. There are no access roads to the airfield.
          The airfield of the village of Inyukno, 800x800 in size, cannot be expanded further.

          5 management of accurate data for planning building materials in the districts did not have, as a result of which their distribution was carried out by eye. So, for the month of October 1940 for the Air Force PribOVO at st. Riga had planned 40 wagons of cement, while according to the application only 12 wagons were required. With the urgent need for oil bitumen for the Odessa Military District 5, the department planned for October only 90 tons, while for the ZAPOVO, which did not require at all, it planned 95 tons.
          5, the department did not control the shipment of gas tanks in districts and irresponsibly distributed the shipment of gas tanks from plants in the districts, which in some cases led to unnecessary costs and delayed construction. So, it was planned to ship 14 tanks to the Svessky plant in OdVO, while the Tsnitmash plant directly in Odessa, according to the layout, shipped 89 tanks in ZakVO. In turn, Georgia has a factory for the production of gas tanks.

          Land plots for the construction of operational aerodromes are alienated according to the old standards - 144 hectares, i.e. 1200x1200, while the commissioning of new high-speed aviation requires an increase in the airfield to 1500x1500 plus an approach strip of 150 meters.
          1. Mother CheeseEarth
            Mother CheeseEarth 14 July 2016 10: 58
            +1
            Quote: Alexey RA
            The construction of facilities in such districts as Odessa and Baltic was carried out without projects and estimates.

            And for all this, we need professional civil engineers! And they were originally in your 5th GU Air Force SC ?!
            Here is the composition of the Main Directorate of the Air Force KA, approved by the "higher authorities", find there those who were supposed to be professionally engaged in construction!
            http://www.rkka.ru/handbook/high/guvvs.htm
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 14 July 2016 17: 05
              +1
              And for the normal organization of the delivery of building materials and tanks in accordance with the applications of the districts, without initiative, who is needed?
              And what level of commander’s education is needed to understand that 800x800 m and 900x900 m are less than 1200x1200 m (I take exactly the old, approved norm)?

              And what does it take to assemble hangars for airplanes?
              It should also be noted that the construction of collapsible hangars at stationary airfields due to the fault of the Aerodrome Directorate of the Main Air Force of the KA and KEU of the Red Army is unsatisfactory. In 1939, two hangars were brought to the Chernyshevsky Far East Fields and have not yet been assembled. In 1939, designs were brought to the Moninsky airfield, but so far the hangar has not been assembled. A similar situation in ORVO and Zapovo. Thus, dozens of constructions are made and are in a state of mismanagement, while planes due to the lack of hangars in ZakVO and ArkhVO rot.

              However, the responsible employees of the 5th Directorate of the Main Air Force Spacecraft had other important tasks:
              It should be noted that during the busy period of aerodrome construction in 1940, a number of senior officials of the 5th Directorate of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the spacecraft, headed by the head. management Filatov and ex. Commissioner, now deputy. Andreyenko’s offices were engaged in the construction of their own summer cottages, using their official position to obtain building materials and spending official time on this.
  15. Igor V
    Igor V 13 July 2016 21: 31
    +2
    I read the comments, it turned out that we lost at Khalkhin Goal. But the Mongols don’t know!
  16. bubalik
    bubalik 13 July 2016 23: 19
    +1
    ,,,, look not at the penultimate photo. color of the helmet ,,, and you say 43 just started, Andrei Yurievich told a beautiful legend ,,
  17. Talgat
    Talgat 15 July 2016 18: 39
    0
    Of course, we all probably stick to the official point - that if we didn’t give the Japanese aggressors a lesson - they would attack us in 1941

    But my friend read an interesting legend in some book

    Genghis Khan’s grave is located on the banks of Halhingol and he bequeathed that until the leg of the foreign invader sets foot on it, Genghis Khan’s empire will continue

    Mysterious monks were later noticed in the headquarters of nomadic khans, in Kazan and later in Moscow - as soon as she became the main heiress of the empire
    After the revolution, they say and they were received in the Kremlin

    And as if this is the reason why Stalin threw such forces to defend some kind of rivulet in distant Mongolia