The war is not over until the last soldier who fell on the battlefield is buried and intelligible answers have been received to many questions, including the reasons for the failure of the Red Army to join the war. It’s too easy to blame everything on the “tyrant of Stalin,” who, apparently, was so not interested in remaining in power that he did not listen to those who called for bringing the troops into combat readiness, wanted to deliver a preemptive strike, etc.
Today there is an opportunity to rely on documents and historical sources that were not customary to mention during the years of perestroika and subsequent decades. In addition, liberal "researchers" ruled the ball - as a rule, without a special historical, and even less so military education.
What should the country's leader do to prepare for war? What is the role of the people's commissar of defense K. Timoshenko and the chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov? What is the content of the documents - from the “fundamentals of the strategic deployment of the armed forces” to specific directives to the commanders of the border units to cover sections of the state border? Has the country's military-political leadership been warned of a possible enemy attack? We will try to understand without emotion, relying only on documents.
"The enemy has our people here"
Any military man knows that the Commissar of Defense and the General Staff, and specifically his boss, are responsible for preparing the Armed Forces for war, and therefore the statements that Stalin is to blame for everything, or, for example, intelligence, do not correspond to reality. “Our agent intelligence service, which was led by Golikov before the war, did not work well, and she failed to reveal the true intentions of the Hitler high command with regard to the troops stationed in Poland. Our agent intelligence failed to disprove Hitler’s false version of not intending to fight the Soviet Union, ”Zhukov said at the XIX plenum of the party.
“Why did the commanders of the units that did not fall under the enemy strike, opening the“ red packets ”, were given the task of crossing the border and attacking the enemy on Polish territory? Was it a variant of the “border battles plan” of the executed conspirator Tukhachevsky? ”
When the Marshal was presented with numerous reports on the preparation of Germany for an attack on the USSR, four times the Hero of the Soviet Union was not only amazed, but shocked. After all, he was presented exactly the messages on which he is listed as the addressee and put a signature. By the way, it was precisely because of this that he was already forced to recognize in the first edition of Memoirs and Reflections, 1969, that “On March 20, 1941, Lieutenant-General F. Golikov, Head of the Intelligence Directorate, presented a report containing information of exceptional importance. This document outlined options for the possible directions of strikes by German fascist troops in the attack on the Soviet Union. As it turned out, they consistently reflected the development of the Barbarossa plan by Hitler’s command ...
Nevertheless, Zhukov stated in his memoirs that the conclusions from the information given in the report essentially removed all their significance. What he meant by this is not clear, because, based on the first conclusion, it was clear that Germany would not attack the USSR if Hess, who was in England at that time, did not achieve a favorable result in the negotiations (as history has shown, the Anglo-Saxons, judging by everything, they kept their word - did not open a second front until the 1944 year). And the second conclusion is obvious: the war began on June 22, and not in the spring of 1941.
The list of information submitted to Stalin included 57 reports of Soviet intelligence officers on the preparation of Germany for an attack on the Soviet Union. Overall, from January 1 to June 21, the Center received 1941 reports in which the preparation of Germany for the attack on the USSR was described in detail. At the direction of the head of the GRU, 267 of them were brought to the attention of the political and military leadership of the USSR. Military intelligence almost daily reported to Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko, Beria, Zhukova on the growing threat from Germany. The alleged dates of aggression against the USSR were also called.
However, the time passed, and there was no attack. Along with the “correct date” (in our case, 22 June 1941), a lot of things were reported that did not correspond to reality. In any state preparing for war, the time of the hour to avoid information leakage is called even by its command within a few days. The final decision is made only by the head of state. The date of the attack on France was postponed by Hitler 37 times.
In recent years, it has become a common opinion in historical literature that, less than a day before the invasion of Beria, the NKGB left a resolution on one of the foreign intelligence reports: “Recently, many workers have been arrogant for provocations and panic. Secret staff for systematic misinformation wipe in the camp dust as wanting to embroil us with Germany. The rest are strictly warn. However, authors referring to such documents cannot confirm their presence.
It should be recognized that a certain circle of persons through whom information reached Stalin on the table existed. However, the system excluded the creation of any information filter.
As the analysis of the situation shows, the highly valued intelligence leader of the state did not have confidence in intelligence. There was a desire to recheck the information received, which is simply necessary when making management decisions. No intelligence of the world has complete information about the enemy, and mistakes are expensive.
We must not forget about betrayal. Before the war a lot of intelligence officers went over to the enemies. These are resident illegal immigrants Ignacy Reisse (Nathan Poretsky), Walter Krivitsky (Samuil Ginsburg), Alexander Orlov (Leiba Feldbin). Among the defectors was the head of the UNKVD of the Far Eastern region, Heinrich Lyushkov.
Krivitsky handed over to the British over 100 employees, agents, trust and contacts throughout the world, primarily in England. Meanwhile, the entire intelligence network of the USSR (that is, the NKVD-NKGB) to the beginning of the war numbered just over 600 people. When the report of the British counterintelligence according to the Krivitsky poll came to Moscow, they were shocked at Lubyanka.
In such cases, a double and triple check is introduced for both the employees who remain working abroad and the information coming from them. Special care was required. Indeed, in accordance with the provisions of international law of that time, general mobilization was tantamount to a declaration of war.
For some reason, it is believed that German intelligence did not operate on the territory of the USSR and that it was possible, without fear of publicity, to move troops to the likely theater of operations. Trying to strengthen the border districts, Stalin in the middle of May 1941, authorized the nomination of some armies. But barely began the transfer of troops, occurring with maximum secrecy, the Foreign Ministry of Nazi Germany immediately told the Soviet leadership a protest note demanding to explain why the 16-I army from the Trans-Baikal district was redeployed by rail to the west. The nature of information leaks before the war and at the beginning of it was such that Zhukov also mentions this. In the midst of a tragic summer, 19 August 1941, for a month as the former head of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army Zhukov presented a very interesting report to Stalin: “I think the enemy knows the whole system of our defense, the entire operational-strategic grouping of our forces and our next opportunity. Apparently, among the very large workers who are in close contact with the general situation, the enemy has his people. ”
It should be recognized that the Soviet leadership did everything to save the country and its peoples from a terrible blow. But it was impossible to prevent Germany from attacking the USSR, and determining the date of the attack would not play a significant role - it would have been all the same.
What was done by the top military-political leadership to directly prepare the country to repel the German invasion? It is necessary to distinguish the political and military component of preparing the country for war.
From the point of view of the first action, Stalin and Molotov raise no questions. After the failure of negotiations with the countries of the Western democracies to create a union against Hitler, Stalin managed to gain time to prepare the country for war. The conclusion of the famous non-aggression pact with Germany, so cursed today by liberals and democrats, allowed Germany to expand its aggressive aspirations to 180 degrees, and the USSR received a much-needed more than one-year respite.
As a result of the annexation of Western Ukraine and Belarus, the restoration of hegemony in the Baltic States and the transfer of the state border with Finland, the country's military-strategic position has significantly improved. The resources of the state multiplied, the line of contact with the probable enemy was shifted hundreds of kilometers. The Nazis were deprived of the opportunity to include in their advanced groups three hundred thousand well-armed soldiers of the armies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, to create from the Ukrainian nationalists and the Baltic Nazis a good dozen SS divisions and apply them in the first strike.
Aware of the inevitability of a military clash with Germany, the USSR, in the period from 1935 to 1941, held the following major measures to increase the combat readiness of the Armed Forces:
- transfer of the Red Army (1935 – 1939) to the personnel base;
- the introduction of universal conscription (1939);
-creation and deployment of mass production of a new generation of weapons and military equipment (1939 – 1941);
-strategic mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces in 1939 – 1941 from 98 divisions to 324;
-preparation of the Western theater of war for air (airfields, fortified areas, roads).
In April – June, with the increasing threat of war 1941, additional urgent measures were taken to increase combat readiness, including calling in April and May hundreds of thousands of reservists to replenish the troops of the western military districts, directives: a) to urgently bring all long-term fire installations reinforced areas with installation in them weapons field forces in the absence of a service unit, b) the creation of command posts, c) the hidden transfer of troops from May 13 to the western districts, d) the bringing into combat readiness and covert advancement from the 12 of June towards the border of the second operational echelon divisions districts, e) on bringing the troops of the western districts into combat readiness from 18 June 1941 of the year, f) on the occupation of command posts by the front-line directorates.
Immediately after the appearance of the Soviet-German border in 1939, fortification works were sharply intensified. First of all, in Kiev and Western, and then the Baltic districts. The construction of the second, most western line of fortifications, commonly referred to in the historical literature as the Molotov line, began. There should have been 5807 facilities. By the beginning of the war, 880 had entered the ranks, and 4927 were under construction. On the line of Stalin, there were 3279 structures built in the period from 1928 to 1939 year, still 538 remained unfinished. Subsequently, Khrushchev invented a version that, on Stalin’s orders, the fortified areas on the old border were blown up (option - the weapons were completely removed from them). Unfortunately, for short-term reasons of this stupidity, some marshals, especially Zhukov, played up to explain why the Nazis, having so easily crossed the Molotov line, simply jumped over the Stalin line, including in the most powerful of the districts - Kiev. After all, until the middle of January, 1941 was commanded by Zhukov himself, and then by his promoted Kirponos.
As for the Soviet plans for entry into the war, they remain the subject of fierce controversy. But it is impossible to argue with the fact that there is not a single Soviet official document, in contrast to the famous Barbarossa Plan, which would testify to the preparation of the USSR for offensive actions.
Based on the intelligence received, Marshal Shaposhnikov developed and submitted to the political leadership of the country “Considerations on the basics of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and the East on 1940 and 1941” from September 18.
Today it is the only known official document of a similar nature, it is signed and approved by Stalin. The plan was purely defensive. The focus was on the task of repelling and deterring the enemy, especially his first strike, and in the case of wedging into our defenses - knocking him out with joint counterattacks by mechanized corps and rifle troops. As the main principle at this stage, active defense was envisaged in conjunction with the actions of holding down the enemy. And only then, when the conditions conducive to this will be created, and under them it was unambiguously meant the concentration of the main forces of the western grouping of the Red Army troops, the transition of our troops to a decisive counteroffensive. The sound logic of the General Staff, given the geographical feature of the main theater of operations: after all, it was about the defense of Russia from the invasion from the West, and in the conditions of the Russian plain dominating in this direction, it is simply impossible to do otherwise.
All other proposals for the deployment of troops drawn up by Vasilevsky, Baghramyan and others, to which the Rezuny-Suvorovs and their Russian liberal colleagues like to refer so much, are not legally from the military administration, since they have never been reported to the political leadership and, accordingly, were approved in the prescribed manner. Without going into the analysis of "Considerations ...", we note that the main idea of the document, from which all lower directives were to be imposed, is to concentrate the main efforts on covering the main direction of the enemy's likely strike - Minsk - Moscow (ZapVO lanes in full accordance with the obtained intelligence) . The key difference of the only official state document from the papers developed by Vasilevsky, Baghramyan and others is that according to the vision of the General Staff (Zhukov and Tymoshenko), the Germans should have delivered the main blow in the south (Kiev district) and in the north (Baltic region), To counter these actions, it was envisaged to launch a counter-strike (which led to the disaster of the summer of 1941).
How could it happen that the official plan for entering the war envisaged steps that completely coincided with intelligence data, while the actual preparation was carried out for other reasons? Why did the General Staff of the Red Army, without informing the political leadership of the country, carry out military planning on another document? On what basis did Timoshenko and Zhukov choose the option of an immediate counter-frontal strike or, strictly speaking in military language, to repel aggression with strategic (front-line) offensive operations as the main defense method of the country? After all, this was not provided for by the official defense plan. Why did the commanders of units who did not fall under the enemy strike, opening the "red packets", were given the task of crossing the border and attacking the enemy on Polish territory? Was it a variant of the “border battles plan” shot by conspirator Tukhachevsky and his entourage back in 1937?
The concept of border battles is a variant of combat operations in which the main priority was given to immediate counter-frontal counterattack, that is, supposedly repelling aggression by strategic (front-line) offensive operations, including in a preventive version. Then it was called invasion operations. The concept provided for the priority of the strike by the flanking groups with the transfer of the center of gravity to Aviation и tank (mechanized) parts. In this case, the main ground forces grouping is set up by a static front with a "narrow ribbon" with a minimum linear density, and also with large gaps between operational and strategic echelons. And their defenses, first of all, their stability during a sudden strike, are minimal. Some Soviet generals spoke of the inferiority of such a “strategy” of repelling aggression as early as the 30s and argued for their position. The maneuvers and teachings of that period proved the same. First of all, the use of such a concept in the debut of the war is fraught with catastrophic defeat. Why did this “strategy" work in 1941?
The political leadership of the country has done a huge amount of work to prepare the country for war. However, if liberal “historians” are trying to reduce everything to a miscalculation when determining the date of an attack on the USSR, thereby diverting attention from who brought Hitler to power and why, armed, organized Munich and pushed Germany to the borders of the Soviet Union. the situation in which the border districts were at the time of the attack of the enemy, then we will touch on this topic, based on historical facts.
The NKVD of the Border Guards of the USSR NKVD, which had already played the strategic role of 15 on June 1941, received irrefutable documentary evidence that the process of advancing Wehrmacht troops to the initial positions for the attack resumed from 4.00 on June 18. On the same day, Stalin last checked the accuracy of his understanding of the situation and the reliability of the information received.
“The Odessa OBO met Germans and Romanians in the fortifications that their attack was already stopped on the first day”
Stalin called the commander of the Red Army Air Force, Zhigarev, and Beria, to whom the border troops were subordinate, and ordered the Western Special Military District aviation forces to organize thorough aerial reconnaissance for final establishment and documentary evidence of Wehrmacht’s aggressive preparations for the attack, and the border guards were to assist the aviators. All this is clearly confirmed by the entries in the journal of visits of Stalin. On the night of 17 on 18 June, Zhigarev and Beria were in his office. During daylight 18 June, the U-2 aircraft, piloted by the most experienced pilot and navigator, flew from south to north during daylight along the entire line of the border. After every 30 – 50 kilometers they planted a car and wrote another report right on the wing, which was immediately taken by the silent border guards. This fact is confirmed by the memoirs of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General George Zakharov (before the war, he was a colonel in command of the 43 th Fighter Air Division of the Western Special Military District). Along with him in that flight was the navigator of the 43 Air Division, Major Rumyantsev. From the bird's eye view, they saw everything, mapped it, and reported in writing. They clearly stated that the avalanche movement of the Wehrmacht armada began to the border line.
Not lead, but to be
At the same time, Stalin was reported on the testimony of defectors who had begun to cross the border. Their flow increased. Since the publication of “Memories and Reflections” in the national historical literature, there is an incomprehensible “tradition” to assert that only one ran onto our side the night before the attack, and that they allegedly did not believe and shot. However, even according to the data, which are cited in open sources, there is every reason to speak of at least 24 defectors. They, by the way, nobody shot. And the decision was made.
18 June 1941, Stalin ordered the troops of the first strategic echelon on full alert. The General Staff handed the directive to the troops, but it was not actually implemented in those border districts where the enemy’s main attack fell.
The text of directive number 1, which entered the military districts on the night of June 22, read: “Be on full alert”. Let's pay attention: not to “bring”, but “to be”. So, the order to bring the troops on alert was given in advance.
Until now, the fact of bringing into combat readiness of other districts, for example, Odessa, which so met Germans and Romanians in fortified areas, is being hushed up, that their attack was already stopped on the first day.
Subsequently, in court, the former commander of the Western Front, General Pavlov, and his chief of staff confirmed that the 18 of June was a directive of the General Staff, but they did not do anything to carry it out. This was confirmed by the head of communications of the district through which she walked. But the directive itself could not be found. It was probably destroyed in preparation for the 20th Congress. However, recent pre-war orders, such as the Baltic District, clearly indicate that his command carried out a special instruction of Moscow. And in the Kiev district the same. The fleets reported on combat readiness already 19 June. According to the directive of the General Staff.
In fact, Stalin correctly determined not only the date, but also the direction of the main attack: he would be struck in the KOVO zone with the aim of occupying Ukraine. The fact that Stalin believed that way is evidence of Zhukov. Is it because there the General Staff has concentrated the most powerful grouping of troops, including tank corps? Convinced that the war was about to begin, Stalin ordered that the commanders of the Western military districts be notified of the impending surprise attack by Germany and the need to bring the forces under their control to alert.
Commanders of military districts and fleets were warned about this by telegram of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army Zhukov on June 18 and reported on the measures taken. The headquarters of the Baltic PSB took the following measures to implement the directive from Moscow:
“Directive of the headquarters of a special military district
18th of June 1941
In order to quickly bring the theater of military operations of the district to combat readiness, I ORDER:
... 4. The commander of the 8 and 11 armies:
a) determine on the site of each army the points of organization of field depots, PT mines, explosives and anti-personnel barriers for the design of certain barriers. The specified property is concentrated in organized warehouses for 21.6.41 g .;
b) for setting minefields, determine the composition of the teams, where they should be allocated from and their plan of work. All this through the fillings of the border divisions;
c) proceed to the procurement of scrap materials (rafts, barges, etc.) for arranging ferries across the Vilia, Nevyazh and Dubiss rivers. Crossing points set in conjunction with the operational department of the district headquarters.
The 30 and 4 pontoon regiments are to be subordinated to the military council of the 11 army. The shelves should be in full readiness for laying bridges across the r. Neman. Next to the exercises, check the conditions of bridge laying by these regiments, achieving the minimum deadlines;
d) to the commander of the 8 and 11 armies to destroy the most important bridges in the area: the state border and the rear line Šiauliai, Kaunas, r. Neman reconnoiter these bridges, determine for each of them the number of explosives, teams of demolition men and in the nearest points from them to concentrate all means to undermine. The plan for the destruction of bridges to approve the military council of the army.
Deadline - 21.6.41 g.
... 7. To the army commander and chief of the ABTA district:
To create, at the expense of each vehicle, separate platoons of tanks, using for this purpose the installation of containers on trucks, the number of individual platoons created - 4.
Deadline - 23.6.41 g. These individual platoons in the number of rolling reserves to keep: Telšai, Šiauliai, Kaidana, Ionova at the disposal of army commanders ...
e) select benzocarbons from among parts of the district (except for mechanized and aviation ones) and transfer them by 50 percent. in 3 and 12 microns. Deadline - 21.6.41 g .;
e) take all measures to ensure each machine and tractor with spare parts, and, through the head of the EAST, accessories for refueling machines (funnels, buckets).
The commander of the troops PribOVO Colonel-General Kuznetsov
Member of the Military Council Corps Commissar Dibrov
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Maples.
"Extract from the order of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District
19th of June 1941
1. To control the equipment of the defense line. Emphasis on the preparation of positions on the main page of the UR, the work on which to strengthen.
2. In the assumption to finish the work. But to occupy the positions of the assumption only in case of violation by the enemy of the state border.
In order to ensure the rapid occupation of positions in both the predpole and (c) the main defensive zone, the corresponding units must be completely alert.
In the area behind their positions, check the reliability and speed of communication with border units.
3. Particular attention should be paid so that there is no provocation and panic in our units, to strengthen the control of combat readiness. Everything to do without noise, firmly, calmly. Each commander and political worker soberly understand the situation.
4. Minefields should be installed according to the plan of the army commander where they should stand according to the defensive construction plan. Pay attention to complete secrecy for the enemy and security for their parts. Debris and other anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles to create according to the plan of the army commander - also according to the plan of defensive construction.
5. Headquarters, corps and divisions - in their command posts, which provide VET by the decision of the appropriate commander.
6. Our retractable units must go to their shelter areas. Take into account the increasing incidence of flights of the state border by German aircraft.
7. Continue to aggressively replenish parts with fire supplies and other types of supplies.
Persistently put together units on the march and on the spot.
The commander of the troops PribOVO Colonel-General Kuznetsov
Head of the political propaganda department Ryabchiy
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Maples.
Measures taken by the headquarters of the 8 Army PribOVO in pursuance of the directive of the district headquarters, from June 18:
"Order of the Chief of Staff of the 8 Army of the Baltic Special Military District
18th of June 1941
Operative group of the army headquarters redeploy to the CP Bubiay by the morning of June 19.
Immediately prepare the place of the new KP Departure to make covertly, separate machines.
With the new KP to organize communication with the enclosures during the first half of the day 19 June.
Chief of Staff of the 8 Army, Major General Larionov. "
As for the Navy, the legend is circulated that the Navy Commissar Admiral Kuznetsov, on his own initiative, brought the fleets to combat readiness on the eve of the war. Everything is much more prosaic. The fleets were subordinated to the operational control of the commands of military districts and carried out their directive on combat readiness, and not Kuznetsov's order. The commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Tributs, reported to the leadership this way:
"The report of the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to the commander of the Leningrad and Baltic special military districts, the head of the Border Troops:
20th of June 1941
Parts of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet with 19.6.41 were brought to combat readiness according to plan No. 2, KP deployed, patrol service at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and the Irben Strait was strengthened.
Commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Vice Admiral Tributs.
Also reported the rest of the fleet commanders. However, despite this, the readiness of the fleets was not in Mode No. 1, as Kuznetsov later claimed. For example, from 1943, the “Notes of a Sevastopol Defense Participant” captain 1-rank A. K. Yevseyev are classified, from which it follows that the full alert of 1 on the Black Sea Fleet was announced after the first German bombs exploded on Primorsky Boulevard of Sevastopol .
All reports on the execution of the directive should have been received before 22 June. What was in fact?
For some reason, the troops were preparing not for the implementation of an active defense plan in accordance with the only document approved at the government level, but for a counter-offensive, fulfilling the corresponding tasks. By the way, at the beginning of September 1940-th in KOVO, and Zhukov was the commander at that time, the 6-th army of the district passed the exercises according to the scenario of an immediate (including preventive) counter-frontal attack in the South-West direction from the bridgehead of the Lvov ledge, which in essence was an army prototype of the future scenario of entry into the war, that is, a plan from May 15 of the year 1941, made by Vasilevsky. Having received a directive from 18.06.41 (four days before the war) on bringing the troops into combat readiness and deploying front-line command gears to 0 22 June clocks, the commanders of the three districts on which the main attack of the enemy fell (Army Group South, Center and North "), It is not fulfilled. The main groups of troops were concentrated in the Belostok and Lviv ledges, which, according to the General Staff's plan, were to hit the flank of the attacking German armies and, developing a counter attack, knock out on the territory of Poland, but as a result turned out to be defeated.
One of the most powerful border districts in all, renamed the Western Front, collapsed in virtually four days. And the front commander, General Pavlov, went under fire with the wording for "creating the enemy an opportunity to break through the front of the Red Army." Massacre in the first place demanded the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense in the person of Tymoshenko, and not Beria, who is credited with this. The prosecution of Pavlov and others was first based on the famous art. 58 of the USSR Criminal Code (which was also available in the Criminal Code of the BSSR). However, during the trial, the prosecution was reclassified to Art. 193 UK RSFSR, that is, military crimes. And the harsh sentence imposed on this article. Stalin did not want to repeat the 1937 of the year, because it was necessary to fight, not shoot at his own. But he clearly demonstrated that he can safely do without the notorious 58 article. It was more than clear to him that anything could happen in a war. And so everyone was given the chance to selflessly fight against the hated enemy to correct past mistakes. Many have proven that they can.
After 22 June 1941, to find out who was guilty of the fact that, despite direct instructions to bring the districts to combat readiness four days before the war, this was not done, it was far from the most important. Stalin was more concerned with the problem of loss of command and control by the General Staff and the inability of the command of military districts (especially the Western Special), who were armed with the latest weapons of the time weapons, to organize resistance to the enemy. It was necessary to change the system of leadership of the country, to organize the front and rear (that is the main reason for the creation of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Command, which allowed the state and military administration to be closed to themselves).
After the war, Stalin returned to investigating the tragic circumstances of the summer of 1941, and created a commission that found out who, apart from Pavlov and his staff, was guilty of the tragedy. Apparently, there were good reasons to assume that the tragedy of the summer of 1941 was not just an unfortunate set of circumstances. If you call a spade a spade, then Stalin suspected adultery and had reason to do so.
Then “nobody wrote about the failures of the highest military-political leadership” because everyone remembered how it was and waited for the results of the investigation, and the death of the leader turned out to be salutary for many. Therefore, the topic was developed after the XX Party Congress, when Khrushchev, accusing his predecessor of all possible mistakes, mentioned, among other things, the criminal arrogance of the head of state and lack of attention to intelligence reports. This line was continued by Zhukov, who by his position was responsible for the combat readiness of the troops entrusted to him at the border and was forced to explain the fact of the rapid defeat of the border groups of the Red Army.
History should be written by those who are not afraid to call things by their proper names and are accordingly able to learn lessons from the past. With a sharp deterioration in the international situation, when a hybrid war strategy is being actively developed (in which the fifth column and the use of miscalculations of top military and political leadership play a huge role), it is necessary to take a closer look at the actions of the Soviet government in preparing the country in a special period (including repression). You need to have the courage to call a spade a spade.