Military Review

Unfulfilled directive

33
The cause of the disaster of the summer of 1941 could be treason


The war is not over until the last soldier who fell on the battlefield is buried and intelligible answers have been received to many questions, including the reasons for the failure of the Red Army to join the war. It’s too easy to blame everything on the “tyrant of Stalin,” who, apparently, was so not interested in remaining in power that he did not listen to those who called for bringing the troops into combat readiness, wanted to deliver a preemptive strike, etc.

Today there is an opportunity to rely on documents and historical sources that were not customary to mention during the years of perestroika and subsequent decades. In addition, liberal "researchers" ruled the ball - as a rule, without a special historical, and even less so military education.

What should the country's leader do to prepare for war? What is the role of the people's commissar of defense K. Timoshenko and the chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov? What is the content of the documents - from the “fundamentals of the strategic deployment of the armed forces” to specific directives to the commanders of the border units to cover sections of the state border? Has the country's military-political leadership been warned of a possible enemy attack? We will try to understand without emotion, relying only on documents.

"The enemy has our people here"

Any military man knows that the Commissar of Defense and the General Staff, and specifically his boss, are responsible for preparing the Armed Forces for war, and therefore the statements that Stalin is to blame for everything, or, for example, intelligence, do not correspond to reality. “Our agent intelligence service, which was led by Golikov before the war, did not work well, and she failed to reveal the true intentions of the Hitler high command with regard to the troops stationed in Poland. Our agent intelligence failed to disprove Hitler’s false version of not intending to fight the Soviet Union, ”Zhukov said at the XIX plenum of the party.

“Why did the commanders of the units that did not fall under the enemy strike, opening the“ red packets ”, were given the task of crossing the border and attacking the enemy on Polish territory? Was it a variant of the “border battles plan” of the executed conspirator Tukhachevsky? ”
When the Marshal was presented with numerous reports on the preparation of Germany for an attack on the USSR, four times the Hero of the Soviet Union was not only amazed, but shocked. After all, he was presented exactly the messages on which he is listed as the addressee and put a signature. By the way, it was precisely because of this that he was already forced to recognize in the first edition of Memoirs and Reflections, 1969, that “On March 20, 1941, Lieutenant-General F. Golikov, Head of the Intelligence Directorate, presented a report containing information of exceptional importance. This document outlined options for the possible directions of strikes by German fascist troops in the attack on the Soviet Union. As it turned out, they consistently reflected the development of the Barbarossa plan by Hitler’s command ...

Nevertheless, Zhukov stated in his memoirs that the conclusions from the information given in the report essentially removed all their significance. What he meant by this is not clear, because, based on the first conclusion, it was clear that Germany would not attack the USSR if Hess, who was in England at that time, did not achieve a favorable result in the negotiations (as history has shown, the Anglo-Saxons, judging by everything, they kept their word - did not open a second front until the 1944 year). And the second conclusion is obvious: the war began on June 22, and not in the spring of 1941.

The list of information submitted to Stalin included 57 reports of Soviet intelligence officers on the preparation of Germany for an attack on the Soviet Union. Overall, from January 1 to June 21, the Center received 1941 reports in which the preparation of Germany for the attack on the USSR was described in detail. At the direction of the head of the GRU, 267 of them were brought to the attention of the political and military leadership of the USSR. Military intelligence almost daily reported to Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko, Beria, Zhukova on the growing threat from Germany. The alleged dates of aggression against the USSR were also called.

However, the time passed, and there was no attack. Along with the “correct date” (in our case, 22 June 1941), a lot of things were reported that did not correspond to reality. In any state preparing for war, the time of the hour to avoid information leakage is called even by its command within a few days. The final decision is made only by the head of state. The date of the attack on France was postponed by Hitler 37 times.

In recent years, it has become a common opinion in historical literature that, less than a day before the invasion of Beria, the NKGB left a resolution on one of the foreign intelligence reports: “Recently, many workers have been arrogant for provocations and panic. Secret staff for systematic misinformation wipe in the camp dust as wanting to embroil us with Germany. The rest are strictly warn. However, authors referring to such documents cannot confirm their presence.

Unfulfilled directiveIt should be recognized that a certain circle of persons through whom information reached Stalin on the table existed. However, the system excluded the creation of any information filter.

As the analysis of the situation shows, the highly valued intelligence leader of the state did not have confidence in intelligence. There was a desire to recheck the information received, which is simply necessary when making management decisions. No intelligence of the world has complete information about the enemy, and mistakes are expensive.

We must not forget about betrayal. Before the war a lot of intelligence officers went over to the enemies. These are resident illegal immigrants Ignacy Reisse (Nathan Poretsky), Walter Krivitsky (Samuil Ginsburg), Alexander Orlov (Leiba Feldbin). Among the defectors was the head of the UNKVD of the Far Eastern region, Heinrich Lyushkov.

Krivitsky handed over to the British over 100 employees, agents, trust and contacts throughout the world, primarily in England. Meanwhile, the entire intelligence network of the USSR (that is, the NKVD-NKGB) to the beginning of the war numbered just over 600 people. When the report of the British counterintelligence according to the Krivitsky poll came to Moscow, they were shocked at Lubyanka.

In such cases, a double and triple check is introduced for both the employees who remain working abroad and the information coming from them. Special care was required. Indeed, in accordance with the provisions of international law of that time, general mobilization was tantamount to a declaration of war.

For some reason, it is believed that German intelligence did not operate on the territory of the USSR and that it was possible, without fear of publicity, to move troops to the likely theater of operations. Trying to strengthen the border districts, Stalin in the middle of May 1941, authorized the nomination of some armies. But barely began the transfer of troops, occurring with maximum secrecy, the Foreign Ministry of Nazi Germany immediately told the Soviet leadership a protest note demanding to explain why the 16-I army from the Trans-Baikal district was redeployed by rail to the west. The nature of information leaks before the war and at the beginning of it was such that Zhukov also mentions this. In the midst of a tragic summer, 19 August 1941, for a month as the former head of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army Zhukov presented a very interesting report to Stalin: “I think the enemy knows the whole system of our defense, the entire operational-strategic grouping of our forces and our next opportunity. Apparently, among the very large workers who are in close contact with the general situation, the enemy has his people. ”

It should be recognized that the Soviet leadership did everything to save the country and its peoples from a terrible blow. But it was impossible to prevent Germany from attacking the USSR, and determining the date of the attack would not play a significant role - it would have been all the same.

Measures taken

What was done by the top military-political leadership to directly prepare the country to repel the German invasion? It is necessary to distinguish the political and military component of preparing the country for war.

From the point of view of the first action, Stalin and Molotov raise no questions. After the failure of negotiations with the countries of the Western democracies to create a union against Hitler, Stalin managed to gain time to prepare the country for war. The conclusion of the famous non-aggression pact with Germany, so cursed today by liberals and democrats, allowed Germany to expand its aggressive aspirations to 180 degrees, and the USSR received a much-needed more than one-year respite.

As a result of the annexation of Western Ukraine and Belarus, the restoration of hegemony in the Baltic States and the transfer of the state border with Finland, the country's military-strategic position has significantly improved. The resources of the state multiplied, the line of contact with the probable enemy was shifted hundreds of kilometers. The Nazis were deprived of the opportunity to include in their advanced groups three hundred thousand well-armed soldiers of the armies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, to create from the Ukrainian nationalists and the Baltic Nazis a good dozen SS divisions and apply them in the first strike.

Aware of the inevitability of a military clash with Germany, the USSR, in the period from 1935 to 1941, held the following major measures to increase the combat readiness of the Armed Forces:

- transfer of the Red Army (1935 – 1939) to the personnel base;
- the introduction of universal conscription (1939);
-creation and deployment of mass production of a new generation of weapons and military equipment (1939 – 1941);
-strategic mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces in 1939 – 1941 from 98 divisions to 324;
-preparation of the Western theater of war for air (airfields, fortified areas, roads).

In April – June, with the increasing threat of war 1941, additional urgent measures were taken to increase combat readiness, including calling in April and May hundreds of thousands of reservists to replenish the troops of the western military districts, directives: a) to urgently bring all long-term fire installations reinforced areas with installation in them weapons field forces in the absence of a service unit, b) the creation of command posts, c) the hidden transfer of troops from May 13 to the western districts, d) the bringing into combat readiness and covert advancement from the 12 of June towards the border of the second operational echelon divisions districts, e) on bringing the troops of the western districts into combat readiness from 18 June 1941 of the year, f) on the occupation of command posts by the front-line directorates.

Immediately after the appearance of the Soviet-German border in 1939, fortification works were sharply intensified. First of all, in Kiev and Western, and then the Baltic districts. The construction of the second, most western line of fortifications, commonly referred to in the historical literature as the Molotov line, began. There should have been 5807 facilities. By the beginning of the war, 880 had entered the ranks, and 4927 were under construction. On the line of Stalin, there were 3279 structures built in the period from 1928 to 1939 year, still 538 remained unfinished. Subsequently, Khrushchev invented a version that, on Stalin’s orders, the fortified areas on the old border were blown up (option - the weapons were completely removed from them). Unfortunately, for short-term reasons of this stupidity, some marshals, especially Zhukov, played up to explain why the Nazis, having so easily crossed the Molotov line, simply jumped over the Stalin line, including in the most powerful of the districts - Kiev. After all, until the middle of January, 1941 was commanded by Zhukov himself, and then by his promoted Kirponos.

As for the Soviet plans for entry into the war, they remain the subject of fierce controversy. But it is impossible to argue with the fact that there is not a single Soviet official document, in contrast to the famous Barbarossa Plan, which would testify to the preparation of the USSR for offensive actions.

Based on the intelligence received, Marshal Shaposhnikov developed and submitted to the political leadership of the country “Considerations on the basics of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and the East on 1940 and 1941” from September 18.

Today it is the only known official document of a similar nature, it is signed and approved by Stalin. The plan was purely defensive. The focus was on the task of repelling and deterring the enemy, especially his first strike, and in the case of wedging into our defenses - knocking him out with joint counterattacks by mechanized corps and rifle troops. As the main principle at this stage, active defense was envisaged in conjunction with the actions of holding down the enemy. And only then, when the conditions conducive to this will be created, and under them it was unambiguously meant the concentration of the main forces of the western grouping of the Red Army troops, the transition of our troops to a decisive counteroffensive. The sound logic of the General Staff, given the geographical feature of the main theater of operations: after all, it was about the defense of Russia from the invasion from the West, and in the conditions of the Russian plain dominating in this direction, it is simply impossible to do otherwise.

All other proposals for the deployment of troops drawn up by Vasilevsky, Baghramyan and others, to which the Rezuny-Suvorovs and their Russian liberal colleagues like to refer so much, are not legally from the military administration, since they have never been reported to the political leadership and, accordingly, were approved in the prescribed manner. Without going into the analysis of "Considerations ...", we note that the main idea of ​​the document, from which all lower directives were to be imposed, is to concentrate the main efforts on covering the main direction of the enemy's likely strike - Minsk - Moscow (ZapVO lanes in full accordance with the obtained intelligence) . The key difference of the only official state document from the papers developed by Vasilevsky, Baghramyan and others is that according to the vision of the General Staff (Zhukov and Tymoshenko), the Germans should have delivered the main blow in the south (Kiev district) and in the north (Baltic region), To counter these actions, it was envisaged to launch a counter-strike (which led to the disaster of the summer of 1941).

How could it happen that the official plan for entering the war envisaged steps that completely coincided with intelligence data, while the actual preparation was carried out for other reasons? Why did the General Staff of the Red Army, without informing the political leadership of the country, carry out military planning on another document? On what basis did Timoshenko and Zhukov choose the option of an immediate counter-frontal strike or, strictly speaking in military language, to repel aggression with strategic (front-line) offensive operations as the main defense method of the country? After all, this was not provided for by the official defense plan. Why did the commanders of units who did not fall under the enemy strike, opening the "red packets", were given the task of crossing the border and attacking the enemy on Polish territory? Was it a variant of the “border battles plan” shot by conspirator Tukhachevsky and his entourage back in 1937?

The concept of border battles is a variant of combat operations in which the main priority was given to immediate counter-frontal counterattack, that is, supposedly repelling aggression by strategic (front-line) offensive operations, including in a preventive version. Then it was called invasion operations. The concept provided for the priority of the strike by the flanking groups with the transfer of the center of gravity to Aviation и tank (mechanized) parts. In this case, the main ground forces grouping is set up by a static front with a "narrow ribbon" with a minimum linear density, and also with large gaps between operational and strategic echelons. And their defenses, first of all, their stability during a sudden strike, are minimal. Some Soviet generals spoke of the inferiority of such a “strategy” of repelling aggression as early as the 30s and argued for their position. The maneuvers and teachings of that period proved the same. First of all, the use of such a concept in the debut of the war is fraught with catastrophic defeat. Why did this “strategy" work in 1941?

The political leadership of the country has done a huge amount of work to prepare the country for war. However, if liberal “historians” are trying to reduce everything to a miscalculation when determining the date of an attack on the USSR, thereby diverting attention from who brought Hitler to power and why, armed, organized Munich and pushed Germany to the borders of the Soviet Union. the situation in which the border districts were at the time of the attack of the enemy, then we will touch on this topic, based on historical facts.

The NKVD of the Border Guards of the USSR NKVD, which had already played the strategic role of 15 on June 1941, received irrefutable documentary evidence that the process of advancing Wehrmacht troops to the initial positions for the attack resumed from 4.00 on June 18. On the same day, Stalin last checked the accuracy of his understanding of the situation and the reliability of the information received.

“The Odessa OBO met Germans and Romanians in the fortifications that their attack was already stopped on the first day”
Stalin called the commander of the Red Army Air Force, Zhigarev, and Beria, to whom the border troops were subordinate, and ordered the Western Special Military District aviation forces to organize thorough aerial reconnaissance for final establishment and documentary evidence of Wehrmacht’s aggressive preparations for the attack, and the border guards were to assist the aviators. All this is clearly confirmed by the entries in the journal of visits of Stalin. On the night of 17 on 18 June, Zhigarev and Beria were in his office. During daylight 18 June, the U-2 aircraft, piloted by the most experienced pilot and navigator, flew from south to north during daylight along the entire line of the border. After every 30 – 50 kilometers they planted a car and wrote another report right on the wing, which was immediately taken by the silent border guards. This fact is confirmed by the memoirs of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General George Zakharov (before the war, he was a colonel in command of the 43 th Fighter Air Division of the Western Special Military District). Along with him in that flight was the navigator of the 43 Air Division, Major Rumyantsev. From the bird's eye view, they saw everything, mapped it, and reported in writing. They clearly stated that the avalanche movement of the Wehrmacht armada began to the border line.

Not lead, but to be

At the same time, Stalin was reported on the testimony of defectors who had begun to cross the border. Their flow increased. Since the publication of “Memories and Reflections” in the national historical literature, there is an incomprehensible “tradition” to assert that only one ran onto our side the night before the attack, and that they allegedly did not believe and shot. However, even according to the data, which are cited in open sources, there is every reason to speak of at least 24 defectors. They, by the way, nobody shot. And the decision was made.

18 June 1941, Stalin ordered the troops of the first strategic echelon on full alert. The General Staff handed the directive to the troops, but it was not actually implemented in those border districts where the enemy’s main attack fell.

The text of directive number 1, which entered the military districts on the night of June 22, read: “Be on full alert”. Let's pay attention: not to “bring”, but “to be”. So, the order to bring the troops on alert was given in advance.

Until now, the fact of bringing into combat readiness of other districts, for example, Odessa, which so met Germans and Romanians in fortified areas, is being hushed up, that their attack was already stopped on the first day.

Subsequently, in court, the former commander of the Western Front, General Pavlov, and his chief of staff confirmed that the 18 of June was a directive of the General Staff, but they did not do anything to carry it out. This was confirmed by the head of communications of the district through which she walked. But the directive itself could not be found. It was probably destroyed in preparation for the 20th Congress. However, recent pre-war orders, such as the Baltic District, clearly indicate that his command carried out a special instruction of Moscow. And in the Kiev district the same. The fleets reported on combat readiness already 19 June. According to the directive of the General Staff.

In fact, Stalin correctly determined not only the date, but also the direction of the main attack: he would be struck in the KOVO zone with the aim of occupying Ukraine. The fact that Stalin believed that way is evidence of Zhukov. Is it because there the General Staff has concentrated the most powerful grouping of troops, including tank corps? Convinced that the war was about to begin, Stalin ordered that the commanders of the Western military districts be notified of the impending surprise attack by Germany and the need to bring the forces under their control to alert.

Commanders of military districts and fleets were warned about this by telegram of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army Zhukov on June 18 and reported on the measures taken. The headquarters of the Baltic PSB took the following measures to implement the directive from Moscow:

“Directive of the headquarters of a special military district

18th of June 1941

In order to quickly bring the theater of military operations of the district to combat readiness, I ORDER:

... 4. The commander of the 8 and 11 armies:

a) determine on the site of each army the points of organization of field depots, PT mines, explosives and anti-personnel barriers for the design of certain barriers. The specified property is concentrated in organized warehouses for 21.6.41 g .;

b) for setting minefields, determine the composition of the teams, where they should be allocated from and their plan of work. All this through the fillings of the border divisions;

c) proceed to the procurement of scrap materials (rafts, barges, etc.) for arranging ferries across the Vilia, Nevyazh and Dubiss rivers. Crossing points set in conjunction with the operational department of the district headquarters.

The 30 and 4 pontoon regiments are to be subordinated to the military council of the 11 army. The shelves should be in full readiness for laying bridges across the r. Neman. Next to the exercises, check the conditions of bridge laying by these regiments, achieving the minimum deadlines;

d) to the commander of the 8 and 11 armies to destroy the most important bridges in the area: the state border and the rear line Šiauliai, Kaunas, r. Neman reconnoiter these bridges, determine for each of them the number of explosives, teams of demolition men and in the nearest points from them to concentrate all means to undermine. The plan for the destruction of bridges to approve the military council of the army.

Deadline - 21.6.41 g.

... 7. To the army commander and chief of the ABTA district:

To create, at the expense of each vehicle, separate platoons of tanks, using for this purpose the installation of containers on trucks, the number of individual platoons created - 4.

Deadline - 23.6.41 g. These individual platoons in the number of rolling reserves to keep: Telšai, Šiauliai, Kaidana, Ionova at the disposal of army commanders ...

e) select benzocarbons from among parts of the district (except for mechanized and aviation ones) and transfer them by 50 percent. in 3 and 12 microns. Deadline - 21.6.41 g .;

e) take all measures to ensure each machine and tractor with spare parts, and, through the head of the EAST, accessories for refueling machines (funnels, buckets).

The commander of the troops PribOVO Colonel-General Kuznetsov

Member of the Military Council Corps Commissar Dibrov

Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Maples.

"Extract from the order of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District

19th of June 1941

1. To control the equipment of the defense line. Emphasis on the preparation of positions on the main page of the UR, the work on which to strengthen.

2. In the assumption to finish the work. But to occupy the positions of the assumption only in case of violation by the enemy of the state border.

In order to ensure the rapid occupation of positions in both the predpole and (c) the main defensive zone, the corresponding units must be completely alert.

In the area behind their positions, check the reliability and speed of communication with border units.

3. Particular attention should be paid so that there is no provocation and panic in our units, to strengthen the control of combat readiness. Everything to do without noise, firmly, calmly. Each commander and political worker soberly understand the situation.

4. Minefields should be installed according to the plan of the army commander where they should stand according to the defensive construction plan. Pay attention to complete secrecy for the enemy and security for their parts. Debris and other anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles to create according to the plan of the army commander - also according to the plan of defensive construction.

5. Headquarters, corps and divisions - in their command posts, which provide VET by the decision of the appropriate commander.

6. Our retractable units must go to their shelter areas. Take into account the increasing incidence of flights of the state border by German aircraft.

7. Continue to aggressively replenish parts with fire supplies and other types of supplies.

Persistently put together units on the march and on the spot.

The commander of the troops PribOVO Colonel-General Kuznetsov

Head of the political propaganda department Ryabchiy

Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Maples.

Measures taken by the headquarters of the 8 Army PribOVO in pursuance of the directive of the district headquarters, from June 18:

"Order of the Chief of Staff of the 8 Army of the Baltic Special Military District

18th of June 1941

Operative group of the army headquarters redeploy to the CP Bubiay by the morning of June 19.

Immediately prepare the place of the new KP Departure to make covertly, separate machines.

With the new KP to organize communication with the enclosures during the first half of the day 19 June.

Chief of Staff of the 8 Army, Major General Larionov. "

As for the Navy, the legend is circulated that the Navy Commissar Admiral Kuznetsov, on his own initiative, brought the fleets to combat readiness on the eve of the war. Everything is much more prosaic. The fleets were subordinated to the operational control of the commands of military districts and carried out their directive on combat readiness, and not Kuznetsov's order. The commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Tributs, reported to the leadership this way:

"The report of the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to the commander of the Leningrad and Baltic special military districts, the head of the Border Troops:

20th of June 1941

Parts of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet with 19.6.41 were brought to combat readiness according to plan No. 2, KP deployed, patrol service at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and the Irben Strait was strengthened.

Commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Vice Admiral Tributs.

Also reported the rest of the fleet commanders. However, despite this, the readiness of the fleets was not in Mode No. 1, as Kuznetsov later claimed. For example, from 1943, the “Notes of a Sevastopol Defense Participant” captain 1-rank A. K. Yevseyev are classified, from which it follows that the full alert of 1 on the Black Sea Fleet was announced after the first German bombs exploded on Primorsky Boulevard of Sevastopol .

Indicative execution

All reports on the execution of the directive should have been received before 22 June. What was in fact?

For some reason, the troops were preparing not for the implementation of an active defense plan in accordance with the only document approved at the government level, but for a counter-offensive, fulfilling the corresponding tasks. By the way, at the beginning of September 1940-th in KOVO, and Zhukov was the commander at that time, the 6-th army of the district passed the exercises according to the scenario of an immediate (including preventive) counter-frontal attack in the South-West direction from the bridgehead of the Lvov ledge, which in essence was an army prototype of the future scenario of entry into the war, that is, a plan from May 15 of the year 1941, made by Vasilevsky. Having received a directive from 18.06.41 (four days before the war) on bringing the troops into combat readiness and deploying front-line command gears to 0 22 June clocks, the commanders of the three districts on which the main attack of the enemy fell (Army Group South, Center and North "), It is not fulfilled. The main groups of troops were concentrated in the Belostok and Lviv ledges, which, according to the General Staff's plan, were to hit the flank of the attacking German armies and, developing a counter attack, knock out on the territory of Poland, but as a result turned out to be defeated.

One of the most powerful border districts in all, renamed the Western Front, collapsed in virtually four days. And the front commander, General Pavlov, went under fire with the wording for "creating the enemy an opportunity to break through the front of the Red Army." Massacre in the first place demanded the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense in the person of Tymoshenko, and not Beria, who is credited with this. The prosecution of Pavlov and others was first based on the famous art. 58 of the USSR Criminal Code (which was also available in the Criminal Code of the BSSR). However, during the trial, the prosecution was reclassified to Art. 193 UK RSFSR, that is, military crimes. And the harsh sentence imposed on this article. Stalin did not want to repeat the 1937 of the year, because it was necessary to fight, not shoot at his own. But he clearly demonstrated that he can safely do without the notorious 58 article. It was more than clear to him that anything could happen in a war. And so everyone was given the chance to selflessly fight against the hated enemy to correct past mistakes. Many have proven that they can.

After 22 June 1941, to find out who was guilty of the fact that, despite direct instructions to bring the districts to combat readiness four days before the war, this was not done, it was far from the most important. Stalin was more concerned with the problem of loss of command and control by the General Staff and the inability of the command of military districts (especially the Western Special), who were armed with the latest weapons of the time weapons, to organize resistance to the enemy. It was necessary to change the system of leadership of the country, to organize the front and rear (that is the main reason for the creation of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Command, which allowed the state and military administration to be closed to themselves).

After the war, Stalin returned to investigating the tragic circumstances of the summer of 1941, and created a commission that found out who, apart from Pavlov and his staff, was guilty of the tragedy. Apparently, there were good reasons to assume that the tragedy of the summer of 1941 was not just an unfortunate set of circumstances. If you call a spade a spade, then Stalin suspected adultery and had reason to do so.

Then “nobody wrote about the failures of the highest military-political leadership” because everyone remembered how it was and waited for the results of the investigation, and the death of the leader turned out to be salutary for many. Therefore, the topic was developed after the XX Party Congress, when Khrushchev, accusing his predecessor of all possible mistakes, mentioned, among other things, the criminal arrogance of the head of state and lack of attention to intelligence reports. This line was continued by Zhukov, who by his position was responsible for the combat readiness of the troops entrusted to him at the border and was forced to explain the fact of the rapid defeat of the border groups of the Red Army.

History should be written by those who are not afraid to call things by their proper names and are accordingly able to learn lessons from the past. With a sharp deterioration in the international situation, when a hybrid war strategy is being actively developed (in which the fifth column and the use of miscalculations of top military and political leadership play a huge role), it is necessary to take a closer look at the actions of the Soviet government in preparing the country in a special period (including repression). You need to have the courage to call a spade a spade.
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  1. parusnik
    parusnik 25 June 2016 07: 58
    +8
    Ignatius Reis (Nathan Poretsky) .. besides making a political statement he had no time to do anything else, he was killed .. Alexander Orlov (Leiba Feldbin) - despite interrogations at the US FBI, managed to keep all known Soviet secret secrets secret and earn official excuse for the former colleagues in the Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, KGB of the USSR. Walter Krivitsky (Samuel Ginzburg) - the fact that he handed over about 100 agents was greatly exaggerated, but the failures were his fault, he committed suicide in 1941. Heinrich Lyushkov, according to the memoirs of the former officer of the fifth division of the Japanese General Staff Koizumi Koichiro, reported information about the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East, their deployment, the construction of defensive structures, about the most important fortresses and fortifications. In addition, Lyushkov gave the Japanese detailed information about the plans for the deployment of Soviet troops not only in the Far East, but also in Siberia, Ukraine, and revealed military radio codes. He handed over to the Japanese the most important agents of the NKVD in the Far East. He proposed to the Japanese a plan for the assassination of Stalin. On August 19, 1945, Lyushkov was shot dead by Takeoka, who suggested that Lyushkov commit suicide ... There is a version that General Vlasov allegedly surrendered to the Germans because of the simplicity of his soul, but he was a zealot from a group of Soviet generals who were plotting against Stalin .. But this is not particularly confirmed ..
    1. Tambov Wolf
      Tambov Wolf 25 June 2016 11: 20
      +6
      Look, all of the "chosen by God" are traitors again. How long will we step on the same rake. How many of them are at the helm now? Then again we will yell, how did it happen. Maybe it's time for us to turn on our brains? Yes, give them all a ride in the elections?
  2. parafoiler
    parafoiler 25 June 2016 08: 02
    +11
    Bring the contents of the article to government leaders of all ranks for signature! To avoid repeating the events described hereinafter!
  3. Strashila
    Strashila 25 June 2016 08: 04
    +6
    Have everyone complied with the bid directives ... many disguise orders. communications, dispersal of equipment were published in the spring of 41 on the basis of the Finnish company.
    All opened and complied with the instructions in alarm packages.
    Blame the tops forgetting the performers at the bottom ... below, millions go and understand who exactly, but at the top there is only one and in front of everyone.
  4. samoletil18
    samoletil18 25 June 2016 09: 03
    +8
    The article prompted memories of Mlechin's reasoning on the "echo of the mask" about the Non-Aggression Pact of 23.08.1939/XNUMX/XNUMX. And now he often pops up on OTP.
    While such "historians" form public perception exclusively through the prism of the guilt of the Soviet leadership and Stalin, unambiguously, in fact, blaming their country, it becomes problematic for the population of not only Russia to learn the truth about that period. I understand that mass media, such as "echo" show our pluralism and freedom of speech. But after two decades of presenting the history of that period, it is enough only to waggle occasionally to maintain an already established opinion, and now it is necessary to beat back the truth with great efforts. Starting a history textbook. And here again, as in 1941, bungling and betrayal, and not to understand which is worse: the first or the second? Although, why understand, you need to end it.
  5. Aleksander
    Aleksander 25 June 2016 09: 09
    +2
    Stalin managed to buy time to prepare the country for war. The conclusion of the famous non-aggression pact with Germany, so cursed today by liberals and democrats, allowed Germany to expand its aggressive aspirations by 180 degrees, and the USSR received a much-needed more than one-year respite
    1. Aleksander
      Aleksander 25 June 2016 10: 02
      +1
      Stalin managed to buy time to prepare the country for war. The conclusion of the famous non-aggression treaty with Germany, so cursed today by liberals and democrats, allowed Germany to expand its aggressive aspirations by 180 degrees, and the USSR received so much more than a year's respite needed

      Comment disappeared ...

      Hitler also got a respite. And if the USSR intensified by interest, then Germany (while the USSR was quite watching the imperialists wet each other in the West) intensified -FACTOR OF, and it was precisely the resources of captured Europe that allowed it to attack the USSR.
      Therefore, the Nonaggression Pact was beneficial until May 1940 before the attack on France. Then it became a disaster for the USSR.

      Germany in the 20 century realized TWO TIMES the same scenario in 1914 and 1940: an attack on France and Russia.
      And if for the first time Russia hit and helped France, as a result of which it received only 9% of the total world losses and Russia was not touched at all.
      For the second time, she did as many suggested for WWI-: she did not intervene and watched from the side how France spread rot and as a result received a terrible blow from Hitler united by Europe and the entire Hitler army, as a result of which she received 52% of global losses (without China) and it’s already ruined Russia ....

      The strategic mistake in the second case is obvious, IMHO ....
      1. andrew42
        andrew42 25 June 2016 12: 11
        +13
        It is fundamentally wrong. It WOULD be so if the Soviet Union (Russia) at least someone asked for mutual assistance. The so-called "Western plutocracies" in every possible way distanced themselves from diplomatic interaction with the Soviet Union and preferred to resolve issues with Hitler "without the Russians, without the Bolsheviks." This applies primarily to Britain, and secondly to the same France. Nobody asked us, offered nothing, and all Soviet initiatives were brushed aside. So what kind of "waiting" on the part of Russia can we talk about? We were ONE. So all the other "players" decided. True, some played it out: France was surprisingly easily surrendered by collaborators, Japan fell off the leash and gnawed off the feeding arm of the Britons and the Americans. But in any case, we had no one to hope for. The worst thing would be if Britain and Germany had joined forces against the USSR in an explicit one! Stalin and the leadership of the Union understood perfectly well that British / American / and even French "horns" were sticking out behind the German National Socialism. And "helping" the same France, Britain, meant helping the true customers of Drang nach Osten.
        1. Aleksander
          Aleksander 25 June 2016 13: 42
          +1
          Quote: andrew42
          False at the root.

          That wrong? I brought only FACTS-Do you dispute them?
          And your "would" and reasoning, excuse me, is a very shaky foundation for conclusions.
      2. Svidetel 45
        Svidetel 45 26 June 2016 00: 31
        +3
        Well, how can you compare 1 MV to 2 MV. In 1 MV, France took the brunt of the war with Germany, it was on the western front that the most bloody and decisive battles took place - Verdun, Marne and others. Three quarters of the German troops were on the western front, and on the eastern front the Russian army opposed mainly the Austrian, not the most combat-ready army, and every time the Germans transferred part of their forces to the eastern front to help the Austrians, the Russian army suffered defeats almost every time.
        And in the 2nd MV of the USSR, he confronted virtually UNITED 44 Europe under Hitler’s rule until the age of XNUMX, because this time France and her ally, England, were defeated by the Wehrmacht and so completely defeated that no one could help them in any way.
        As for the non-aggression pact, it was an exceptionally correct step of the Soviet leadership, otherwise, already in '39 we could really already be alone against Germany, and not only against Germany, or do you really, out of the simplicity of your mind, think that the West was arming Germany in order to defeat it later together with the USSR? No, the West was preparing Germany for the role of an instrument for the destruction of the USSR, followed by the destruction of Germany itself by a bloodless war. And if we imagine that in 39 year we would have faced Germany and the war would have taken a favorable course for the USSR, then there is 100% no doubt, and France and the Anglo-Saxons would have found 1000 and 1 reason to side with Germany and protect against " Asian Bolshevik hordes "European civilization, even though at that time they were at war with Germany, by the way, a war that went down in history as a" strange "war. The readiness to negotiate with Hitler is confirmed by the same Munich.
        1. Aleksander
          Aleksander 26 June 2016 10: 27
          +2
          Quote: Svidetel 45
          Well, how can you compare 1 MV with 2 MV.


          That WWII war was continuation of PMV only you deny (for simplicity of soul).
          Quote: Svidetel 45
          In 1 MB, the main burden of the war with Germany took France

          What do you mean "took"? She was not going to take anything and did not want to and would have quickly surrendered, as in 1941, if not for the exceptionally wise policy of Russia, which struck from the East. By this, Russia actually made France resist and take the brunt of the war, saving millions of lives of its soldiers.
          Quote: Svidetel 45
          for the role of an instrument for the destruction of the USSR with the subsequent destruction of the bloodless war and Germany itself. And if we imagine that in 39 year we would have faced Germany and the war would have taken a favorable course for the USSR, then there is 100% no doubt, and France and the Anglo-Saxons would have found 1000 and 1 reason to side with Germany and protect against " Asian Bolshevik hordes "European civilization, even though at that time they were at war with Germany, by the way, a war that went down in history as a" strange "war. The readiness to negotiate with Hitler is confirmed by the same Munich.

          Again your "WO", "WO" - what are they worth?
          WHY the USSR should have faced Germany in 1939, after all, the USSR had no treaty of assistance with Poland, why should it fight with Germany, with what fright? belay HOW has the Pact prevented this? No way! The pact was needed to liberate the West Russian regions, and in this it was correct.
          But in 1940, after the attack on France, when, ACCORDING TO HIM (read the text), the USSR did not offer help and did not help France, he played an exceptionally detrimental role, leading eventually to the blow of the whole German army against the USSR.
          Quote: Svidetel 45
          In the 39 year we would have faced Germany and the war would have taken a favorable course for the USSR, then there is no doubt about 100%, and France and the Anglo-Saxons would have found 1000 and 1 a reason to side with Germany

          In 1939 BEFORE the attack on Poland, yes, but in 1940 the situation changed radically - the very existence of France and England became at stake, and here they were no longer fat and they immediately went to an alliance with the USSR, but already 22 June 1941, when the USSR wanted it.
          If the USSR wanted to in 1940, it would be the same, to the universal good.
      3. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 26 June 2016 17: 45
        +3
        Stalin was actually a gentle gullible person.
        And the villain Hitler managed to trick him.

        Hitler's letter to Stalin on May 14, 1941, full text

        "I am writing this letter at the moment when I finally came to the conclusion that
        it’s impossible to achieve lasting peace in Europe - not only for us,
        but for future generations without the final collapse of England and
        its destruction as a state. As you well know, I have long been
        decided to implement a number of military measures to achieve this goal.
        The closer the hour of the decisive battle, the greater the number of people facing
        me problems. For the masses of the German people, not a single war is
        popular, and especially the war against England, because the German people
        considers the British a fraternal people, and the war between us is a tragic event.
        I will not hide from you what I thought in the same way and suggested several times
        England peace terms. However abusive responses to my suggestions
        and the expanding expansion of the British in the field of military operations - with a clear
        the desire to draw the whole world into war, convinced me that there is no way out
        from this situation, besides the invasion of the British Isles.

        British intelligence in the most cunning way began to use the concept
        "fratricidal war" for their own purposes, using it in their propaganda -
        and not without success. Opposition to my decision began to grow in many elements.
        German society, including representatives of high-ranking circles.
        You probably know that one of my deputies, Herr Hess, is in a fit
        madness flew to London to arouse a sense of unity among the British.
        According to my information, several generals share such sentiments.
        my army, especially those who have relatives in England

        These circumstances require special measures. To organize troops away from
        English eyes and in connection with recent operations in the Balkans, a significant number of my troops, about 80 divisions, are located near the borders of the Soviet Union.
        Perhaps this gives rise to rumors about the possibility of a military conflict between us.

        I want to assure you - and I give a word of honor that this is not true ...

        In this situation, it is impossible to exclude random episodes of military clashes.
        Due to the significant concentration of troops, these episodes can reach significant
        sizes, making it difficult to determine who started first.

        I want to be absolutely honest with you. I'm afraid some of my generals
        can consciously start a conflict in order to save England from its future fate and
        ruin my plans. It's about time over a month. Starting around
        From June 15-20, I plan to begin a mass transfer of troops from your borders to the West.
        Accordingly, I urge you, as far as possible, not to succumb
        provocations that could be the work of those of my generals who forgot
        about your duty. And, of course, do not attach special importance to them. It has become almost impossible
        avoid the provocation of my generals. I ask for restraint, do not respond to provocations
        and contact me immediately through the channels you know. Only in this way
        we can achieve common goals, which, I believe, are agreed .....

        I look forward to seeing you in July. Yours sincerely,

        Adolf Gitler".

        date
        1. The comment was deleted.
        2. Aleksander
          Aleksander 26 June 2016 23: 23
          +1
          To you, of course, + for an interesting document, but your remark about Stalin that he was a "gentle, trusting person" I consider incorrect.
          He was an extremely suspicious person, who did not believe anyone, who destroyed people not because they were opponents, but because they Can be opponents.
          At the same time, he was sure that it was he who kept the situation under control and that he was the one who dictated the rules of the game (the imperialists "kill" each other, and he looked wisely from the outside and dictated the rules), and he was the smartest. And this letter only assured him of the correctness of his position.
          Reality brutally dispelled his confidence and showed his gross errors in the pre-war period .....
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 27 June 2016 10: 38
            +1
            "He was an extremely suspicious person who did not trust anyone,
            destroying people not because they were opponents, but because
            that they MAY be opponents "////

            Yes, I agree with you, "soft and trusting" - there was sarcasm, it was necessary to put a smiley.

            The letter explains a lot. Dictators usually trust 1) personal connections with other leaders
            and 2) your intuition or "connections with higher powers."
            And NOT intelligence, experts and scientists.
            Both Stalin and Hitler fell into this puddle. Hitler bought Stalin with cheap disinformation ("personal letter").
            But he himself bought into his "intuition", not having checked the actual military potential of the USSR with the help of intelligence
            (and the amount of equipment) on the eve of the attack. What made the blitzkrieg technically impossible.
      4. The comment was deleted.
  6. BISMARCK94
    BISMARCK94 25 June 2016 09: 21
    -3
    Read the book "Stalin. The Secret" Scenario of the "Outbreak of War". The book is interesting, supported by documentation. It tells about all the actions of world intelligence services from the moment of signing the 21st directive to June 22, 1941.
  7. avia12005
    avia12005 25 June 2016 09: 28
    +2
    Objectively. On the shelves. Clearly. Thank.
  8. unknown
    unknown 25 June 2016 09: 32
    0
    On the issue of betrayal: Tallinn crossing, which many call "Baltic Tsushima".
  9. AK64
    AK64 25 June 2016 09: 32
    0
    In fact, Stalin correctly determined not only the date, but also the direction of the main blow: it will be delivered in the KOVO zone with the aim of occupying Ukraine.


    And it is clear that you can not read
  10. AK64
    AK64 25 June 2016 09: 33
    +1
    By the way, if someone wants to look for traitors --- I recommend Mukhin, about Tymoshenko and Zhukov
  11. AK64
    AK64 25 June 2016 09: 36
    +1
    The main groupings of troops were concentrated in the Bialystok and Lviv ledges, which, according to the plan of the General Staff, were


    Rezunovschina again? There were no "gangs" on the ledges. Not at all!
  12. AK64
    AK64 25 June 2016 09: 40
    +1
    I read it all the same. Utter nonsense
  13. Aleksander
    Aleksander 25 June 2016 09: 49
    +3
    We must not forget about betrayal. Before the war, many scouts went over to the enemies. These are illegal residents of Ignacy Reis (Nathan Poretsky), Walter Krivitsky (Samuel Ginzburg), Alexander Orlov (Leiba Feldbin). Among defectors there was also the head of the NKVD of the Far Eastern Territory, Heinrich Lyushkov.


    Lyushkov is not a deserter, he is a "runaway". The most faithful dog and servant of the regime, a sadist and executioner since the Odessa Cheka in 1918, the most unique example of the regime's owls of that time. 1937-38 zealously executed decisions on the Great Terror, sending thousands of innocent uncondemned people to death and exile. Then, on the hints and arrests of those around him, I realized that the system, as Yagoda's henchman, would clean it out. Knowing perfectly what will happen to him, he fled to Manchuria.
    He is unique in that he knew all the ins and outs of the crimes committed by the regime from the inside, he himself organized and executed them and his testimonies — one of the few testimonies of the highest-ranking executioners who was able to express them frankly, without the risk of being immediately destroyed:

    I was involved in the following cases:

    The case of the so-called Leningrad terrorist center at the beginning of 1935.
    The case of the terrorist center about conspiracy against Stalin in the Kremlin in 1935.
    The case of the so-called Trotsky-Zinoviev joint center in August 1936
    Before the whole world, I can certify with full responsibility that all these imaginary conspiracies never existed and all of them were deliberately fabricated.

    Along the way, this garbage gave the most important information on the defense of the Far East.
    Abomination, not a man, shot in 1945
  14. Streich
    Streich 25 June 2016 11: 54
    +1
    It would be so long ago. Now it’s clear that he was so eager for Khrushchev’s Power with his idiots.
    1. Andrey Zh
      Andrey Zh 26 June 2016 18: 23
      +2
      N.S. Khrushchev was one of the organizers of the repressions of 1934-38. in (in) Ukraine, so he, sorry, was eager for power after the war, destroying both Stalin and Beria! Guilt for miscalculating the summer of 1941 is definitely on Khrushchev! Yes, and on Zhukov too !!!
  15. rumatam
    rumatam 25 June 2016 14: 35
    0
    Gaspada "historians", no need to pour nonsense about the Black Sea Fleet, on the contrary, he met the war without losses. The Danube Flotilla occupied the territory of Romania and withdrew after the withdrawal of the Odessa Military District.
    1. Alf
      Alf 26 June 2016 09: 27
      0
      Quote: rumatam
      flotilla occupied territory

      Flotilla occupied the territory? Well, well ... I didn’t know that in the 41st year we had ships capable of moving on land. Now I know.
  16. Alexander Greene
    Alexander Greene 25 June 2016 16: 11
    +6
    Thanks to the authors for giving the real reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of World War II, otherwise all the cones went to Stalin. Stalin did everything (both from a military point of view, both political and international) to prepare both the country and the army for war, but the generals were not up to par. There were bungling and treason, and it was unfortunate that Stalin did not have time get to the bottom of it. As for the fact that Stalin was not a military specialist, it is absolutely wrong. As commander in chief, he led the USSR to victory over European fascism. Not a specialist could not do this.
    1. Svidetel 45
      Svidetel 45 26 June 2016 14: 44
      +3
      As a military specialist, he showed himself back in the civil war during the defense of Tsaritsyn, although he used the experience of advisers, former tsarist officers, and the 1st Cavalry Army, where he was, if memory serves, the representative of the VRS came out safely from Polish campaign, in contrast to the army of the commander of "all times and peoples", as the liberal democrats write, Tukhachevsky.
  17. esaul1950
    esaul1950 25 June 2016 19: 34
    +5
    Gentlemen "experts" do not have to carry nonsense, everything is much more complicated. The article is interesting, although somewhat contradictory, but the main thing is that it is as stupid to blame J.V. Stalin for the first defeats of the USSR, as it is to claim that Zhukov won the Great Patriotic War.
    1. Kenneth
      Kenneth 26 June 2016 20: 44
      +1
      Stalin's contribution to the defeat of the outbreak of war is as great as Zhukov's contribution to victory.
  18. russkiy redut
    russkiy redut 25 June 2016 21: 29
    0
    Thanks to the authors for the article! The work of competent historians is immediately visible!
  19. Uncle Murzik
    Uncle Murzik 26 June 2016 08: 40
    0
    The article is interesting, I put a plus!
  20. zenion
    zenion 26 June 2016 17: 48
    0
    How could it be if she was. My wife’s grandfather was telling. That in Yampol, Vinnytsia region, messengers ran through the yards and called everyone to the draft board. Whatever the thrill, announced on the radio. They gathered them in the courtyard of the military registration and enlistment office and put them on trucks and sent them to the railway station, from where the train headed for Vapnyarka, where they were to be equipped. But the warehouses were closed, and the workers of these warehouses could not be found. When the warehouses were opened, there was nothing there. Again they put on a train and sent to Zhmerynka. There they were taken to a bathhouse and issued uniforms, but there were no weapons. From Zhytomyr, they were already driven under bombs to Kiev. Finally, in Kiev they were fed and taken to the places where they were supposed to give out weapons. They opened arsenals, and there all three-rulers were without shutters. Warehouse employees could not be found either. Somewhere in the dark corner they found a part of the shutters and gave them to the youngest. And those who were older were left without everything, it’s good that they gave at least flasks. Given a supply of food. And they went to dig trenches. Several days passed and they were again sent already near Moscow. It’s good that at least there was water. There was no food on the way to Moscow. Somewhere near Moscow they were dropped off, and they lectured that it had begun. Then the bombing began. Then they were thrown in all directions. During one attack, he was seriously injured in the leg. They wanted to demobilize him and send him to a reserve regiment. But he was a man of war and so entrenched in sappers. So in sappers ended the war. Had rewards. But the most important thing for him was - Gratitude from the Supreme Commander. That's it. And this is not a fairy tale. When he told this, tears flowed. About the hostilities did not say a word. He just said - war is very bad!
  21. Kenneth
    Kenneth 26 June 2016 20: 32
    +1
    That's what I never understood. Italy is located in Europe. The landing in Italy was in 1943. Why did the second front open in 1944.
  22. Kenneth
    Kenneth 26 June 2016 20: 39
    0
    I wonder why the author believes that the Germans overstepped KiUR. Kiev was taken by a flank strike. And actually from the front the Germans were stopped and stuck in pillboxes, which were defended under the leadership of Kirponos.
  23. Kenneth
    Kenneth 26 June 2016 20: 42
    -2
    It seems to me that Stalin’s guilt lies in the fact that, not being any professional in military affairs, instead of a general leadership, he climbed in particular from accepting and putting into service new models to the orders of his commanders.
    1. Alexander Greene
      Alexander Greene 28 June 2016 19: 56
      +1
      The accusation is completely unfounded. First, Stalin read a lot of special literature on military affairs, on military equipment, etc. Secondly, before making a decision, he consulted with specialists.