Military Review

The reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war (a brief overview). Part of 3

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The reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war (a brief overview). Part of 3



Did the Red Army learn to defend?

One of the most common opinions about the reasons for the failure of the Red Army in the border battle is the assertion that the Red Army in the future military clashes with the West will only attack. Therefore, they say, the troops in the USSR taught only offensive actions, without giving any attention to defense [Kiev Red Banner: Essays stories. 1919-1988 with .142]. And so, when Germany struck first, the Soviet army did not know how to conduct defensive battles, began to suffer one defeat after another.

So still taught the Red Army defense or not?

Let's leave the military regulations aside. They have always been, among other chapters, "Offensive" and "Defense". Let us dwell on current policy documents. Every year, in November — December, an order was issued to NGOs in which they summarized the results of combat training in the last academic year and set tasks for the new academic year. In the second part of the order, tasks were set for the next academic year. It is indicated (for each branch of service and service) that it is necessary to work out first of all, what to pay special attention to. The themes, terms and number of military exercises from regimental to exercises on the scale of districts are painted.

Below we submit two such orders in abbreviated form (only that in relation to defense).

ORDER NKO USSR №0120 from 16 May 1940.

“The experience of the war at the Karelian-Finnish theater revealed the largest flaws in combat training and education of the army ...

... 7. All-arms commanders to study the combat properties of the armed forces ... skillfully set them the tasks, organize and maintain interaction with them in all types of combat ...

... 1. Over the summer period 1940 to work out: a) attack and defense of the UR by a rifle regiment; b) an offensive battle (reinforced by sp, kp, sd, cd) with overcoming the obstacle line ... d) a defensive battle with the equipment of the obstacle line; ...

…INFANTRY

1. The basis of infantry training put mastering melee every fighter and unit. Teach all fighters to quickly navigate the terrain, skillful use of a shovel, rapid short dashes, crawling, disguise, skillful combination of fire and movement on the battlefield, decisive bayonet strike and accurate aiming shot. To train soldiers and subunits to immediately dig in at all stops, the second echelons are to develop the trenches made by the previous divisions, bringing them to full profile ...



... 5. Teach the commanders and units to counteract the environment through careful reconnaissance, decisive, bold strikes in the flank and rear of the enemy, which carries out a detour. Teach commanders and units the ability to get out of the encirclement and surround the enemy themselves.

6. In all tactical exercises, train fighters and units in the skills to fight in the trenches and the message moves both in offensive combat and in defense ...

... XIII. ENGINEERING TRAINING.

1. All branches of the army practically learn:

1. Skillfully and quickly dig in under enemy fire ...

4. Strengthen defensive areas. ... In addition, the engineering troops to work out ... setting up of minefields and surprises, and overcoming them, masking defensive structures and works, equipment of escarpment on the ground ...

... XVII. The defense of the fortified area.

1. Work out the following topics: a) defense of a stronghold (company area) and a defense unit (battalion area) until the approach of field troops; b) defense of UR by troops of the fortified area; c) the defense of the reinforced rifle battalion in the UR and a counterattack by the rifle battalion of the enemy that broke through the release; d) defense of the area of ​​the UR: rifle regiment - 2 exercises, rifle division - 2 exercises. 50% of all exercises to spend in the conditions of the night, smoke and long-acting agents.

Work out: a) control of the battle of the dota and a group of dots of field troops and in cooperation with the field troops; b) reconnaissance, combat support, combat in front of the front edge and deep in the defense of the UR and evacuation of the sick and wounded during the battle; c) operation of the internal equipment of the facilities and the procedure for its restoration; d) the communication scheme of its area of ​​defense and the latent control of troops in the SD ... " [Veremeev Yu.G. Did the Red Army learn defense?

So, we see that the new People's Commissar Tymoshenko demanded to pay serious attention to the training of troops on the conduct of defense.

ORDER NKO USSR №30 from 21 January 1941 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for 1940 year and tasks for 1941 g.".

“... IV. General training.

... 2. In the current year, to work out the following combined-arms themes (each topic on a regimental, division, and corps scale):
- a defensive battle in winter and summer conditions with the organization of obstacles in the assault; ...

... 5. The military councils of the districts (front) and the armies plan to conduct:
- joint command and staff exercises of combined arms headquarters with the headquarters of special combat arms (artillery RGK, tank, aviation and etc.); - combined arms exercises for the winter and summer periods, given that by May 15, 1941 there should be a well-coordinated battalion-division and a tank company in a defensive and offensive battle ...

... 8. In defense, to teach infantry in the selection of terrain, the organization of the fire system, the production of engineering works, the correct disguise and the stubborn defense of their positions. To teach how to fight tanks ...

... XII. ARTILLERY.

... 2. Artillery units and units to teach:
- in defensive combat: flexible maneuvering with concentrated fire in preparing the enemy for attack and in repelling it ...



... XVII. ENGINEERING TRAINING

... 2. Teach all kinds of troops:
- to build barriers together with engineering and chemical parts, to explore and overcome them in summer and winter conditions;
- to build the simplest shelter from the cold (tents, huts, dugouts)

- skillfully and quickly dig in, build trenches in any soil, in the snow and mask them ...

... XXII. The defense of the fortified area.

... 2. In parts of the SD hold:
- in April — June — one tactical doctrine with combat shooting as part of a dota garrison and a reinforced rifle platoon; one defense exercise of the UR stronghold together with a reinforced rifle company; one exercise on the defense of the unit of the UR together with a reinforced rifle battalion;
- in July — September - two tactical exercises with live firing in the group of pillboxes (strong point) and a reinforced rifle company; two exercises on the defense of the SD unit in conjunction with a reinforced infantry battalion; one teaching on the defense of the UR unit together with the reinforced rifle regiment ... ” [Veremeev Yu.G. Did the Red Army learn defense?



So, the army learned to defend. The question here is different. As can be seen from the document, the basic exercises for coordinating the actions of units and subunits were planned for the summer — autumn 1941. In the spring of 1941, this needs to be taught to new recruits and by the summer to teach them to fight is unrealistic. Therefore, only by the autumn the Red Army could reach a certain degree of combat readiness.

Secondly, if you were able to conduct a defensive fight well, then with an opponent’s advantage over 5-6 [Statyuk I. Defense of the Baltic States. 1941, c.6] , and on the main directions sometimes in 10-12 times [A.A. Martirosyan The tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or treason? C.306] , with a low density of troops per kilometer of the front (see above) and under the domination of enemy aircraft in the air, this will be difficult for you. Let's add here another retreat of your neighbors on the right or left, and the likelihood of the enemy entering the flank - very few people want to fight in an environment. In addition, it should be noted that Directive No. XXUMX prescribed to keep a stable defense (and this in the absence of artillery and tank support in the first days), which in that situation led to the fact that the Soviet units simply dismantled or destroyed in a short time. It would be better to act according to the plan of B. Shaposhnikov, in which the defense should have been active, with a maneuver, including a departure to more advantageous positions. This was facilitated by the lack of a solid front in the initial period of the war.

And the last - on the technical and educational level of the soldiers of the Red Army and combat experience. Two thirds of the population of the USSR lived before the Second World War in rural areas, and the level of education and skills in handling recruits from villages and villages was depressingly low in most cases. Talk about the experience of driving a motorcycle or car did not have to.

Thus, initially only due to a more competent and technically trained soldier, the Wehrmacht had a significant advantage over the Red Army. The Soviet leadership was well aware of these problems, and before the war, literacy classes were organized, and the soldiers along with military training were taught to read and write. By the way, this was partly due to the extraordinary popularity of the Red Army among young people, who not only did not seek to "retract" from military service, but were eager to serve!

Despite the titanic efforts to eliminate the illiteracy of the Red Army soldiers, it was still very far from the average literacy of the German army. German superiority also grew due to a higher discipline, individual training and a well-thought-out training system, originating in the “army of professionals” - the Reichswehr.

This was aggravated by the fact that at first the junior commanders were absent from the Red Army as a class. In other armies, they were called non-commissioned officers, or sergeants (and the Russian tsarist army was no exception). They were like the “backbone” of the army, the most disciplined, stable and efficient part of it. In the Red Army, they did not differ at all from the rank-and-file soldiers neither in their education, nor in training, nor in experience. It was necessary to attract officers to perform their functions. That is why in the management of the Soviet rifle division before the war there were three times more officers than in the German infantry division, and the latter had 16% more personnel on staff [Romanycheva N. The Red Army is the strongest of all?].

As a result, in the prewar year, a paradoxical situation developed in the Red Army: despite the large number of commanders (in June 1941, 659 thousand), the Red Army constantly experienced a large shortage of command personnel relative to the state. For example, in the 1939, for one commander in our army there were 6 soldiers, in the Wehrmacht - 29, in the English army - 15, in the French - 22, and in the Japanese - 19.

In 1929, 81,6% of cadets enrolled in military schools came only with elementary education in the 2 — 4 class. In infantry schools, this percentage was even higher - 90,8%. This was explained not only by the low average level of education in the USSR, which, though slowly, but thanks to a consistent state program continued to rise. The negative role played by the practice of providing benefits for admission "by origin." The lower the social status (and, consequently, the level of education) was from the parents, the more willingly they took to the officer courses of the Red Army. As a result, illiterate cadets had to teach elementary things (reading, writing, addition, subtraction, etc.), spending for this very time that a German cadet spent directly on military affairs.

In the army, the situation was no better. On the eve of the beginning of the Second World War, only 7,1% of the command and commanding staff of the Red Army could boast of higher military education, the average was for 55,9%, accelerated courses were for 24,6%, and the remaining 12,4% did not receive any military education at all. In the "Act of admission of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR" to Comrade Tymoshenko from Comrade. Voroshilov said: "The quality of the training of commanders is low, especially in the company-platoon link, in which up to 68% have only a short-term 6-month training course for junior lieutenant." [Beshanov V. We were not quite ready yet ... S. 77]

And of the registered 915 army reserve commanders and fleet 89,9% had only short-term courses behind them or had no military education at all. Even among 1076 Soviet generals and admirals, only 566 received higher military education. Moreover, their average age was 43 years, which means they did not have much practical experience. The situation was especially sad in aviation, where out of 117 generals, only 14 had higher military education. None of the commanders of air corps and divisions had it [On the elimination of illiteracy in the Red Army].

The first bell rang during the Winter War: during the Soviet-Finnish war, the mighty Red Army encountered unexpectedly stubborn resistance from the Finnish army, which could not be considered strong either in quantity or in equipment or training level. Immediately surfaced significant flaws in the organization of the training of personnel of our army. The scourge of the prewar Red Army remained mediocre discipline, constant detachments of personnel from military training for economic and construction work, frequent regrouping of troops over great distances, sometimes to unprepared and not equipped areas of deployment, weak training and material base and inexperience of commanders. Simplification and formalism of training flourished, and even a banal deception (as they said, “fraud”) during inspections, exercises and live firing. But the worst thing is that all this was flooded out already in the conditions of the outbreak of World War II, when the Wehrmacht, in front of the whole world, including the leadership of the USSR, defeated much stronger opponents than the Finns. Against the background of these victories, the results of the Finnish campaign, frankly, looked very pale.

It seems that it was precisely by the results of the Soviet-Finnish war that great changes occurred in the Defense Commissariat. 14 May 1940 New Commissar S. Tymoshenko issued an order No. 120 "On the military and political training of troops in the summer period of the 1940 school year." This order clearly stated the identified shortcomings in the Red Army:

“The experience of the war at Korelo-Finnish theater revealed the biggest shortcomings in combat training and education of the army. Military discipline did not stand at the proper height ...

The training of commanders did not meet modern combat requirements.

The commanders did not command their units, did not hold tightly in the hands of subordinates, losing themselves in the total mass of fighters. The authority of the commanders in the middle and junior link is low. The weakest link was the commanders of companies, platoons and departments, which, as a rule, did not have the necessary training, commanding skills and professional experience. ” Tymoshenko was well aware that a big war was not far off, and emphasized: "Training troops to bring closer to the conditions of combat reality." In the order number 30 "On military and political training of troops for the 1941 school year" from 21 January 1941, this wording becomes extremely tough: "To teach troops only what is needed in war, and only as done in war" [Beshanov V. We were not quite ready yet ...]

But there was not enough time for such studies. Our army had to grasp the basics of military wisdom under bombs, in the course of a fierce struggle with a strong, skillful and ruthless adversary who did not forgive even the slightest mistake and severely punished each of them.

A few words about the combat experience. The presence of combat experience is an essential component of the combat capability of the troops. Unfortunately, the only way to acquire, accumulate and consolidate it is to directly participate in hostilities.



The fired soldiers know how to perform their tasks under enemy fire, and the fired commanders know exactly what to expect from their soldiers and what tasks to set for their units, and most importantly, they know how to make the right decisions quickly.

Of course, the Red Army had a fresh combat experience. However, he could not be compared with the military experience of the Wehrmacht in European wars. The scale of the battles on the CER, at Lake Hassan and the campaign to Poland was small. Only fights on the river. Khalkhin-Gol and the Finnish campaign provided an opportunity to "fire" a number of Soviet commanders. But, let's face it, the experience gained in Finland was very, very ambiguous. First, the battles were fought in the very specific conditions of the North-West theater, and even in winter. Secondly, the nature of the main combat tasks faced by our troops was very different from what they had to face in 1941. Of course, the Winter War made a big impression on the Soviet military leadership, but the experience of breaking through the fortified defenses of the enemy was not useful soon. , only at the final stage of the Second World War, when our army entered the territory of Germany with its pre-war stationary lines of fortifications. Many important moments in the “Winter War” remained untested and had to be studied under German strikes. For example, the concept of using large-scale mechanized compounds remained completely untested, but it was precisely the mechanized corps that were the main shock power of the Red Army. In 1941, we paid the price for this. [http://www.istpravda.ru/bel/artifacts/5677/]



conclusions


Based on the foregoing, we can draw the following conclusions about the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in border battles in the summer of 1941.

First. One of the main reasons is the strategic miscalculations of the highest military and political leadership in certain areas of the main attack. As we noted above, the Soviet leadership, with the beginning of 1941, began to lean toward the idea that the main blow would be delivered through Ukraine. And in general, this was true, but only until 17 in March of 1941. On this day, Hitler decided that the main blow would be delivered in the center of the German-Soviet front, in Belarus. For two weeks, Soviet intelligence, based on new data, also began to consider this area as the main one. But considering does not mean knowing all 100%. And, as it were, it would still not be possible to transfer additional forces to reinforce Zapov. In addition, the blow in the center did not fit into the Soviet plans, which were designed for flank attacks - the option of "ticks". And a strong blow in the center would be a perilous dispersal of forces, an absolute gamble. Unfortunately, this adventure was a success.

Second. Errors in operational and strategic calculations based on the confidence that war will begin with border battles and only after that will the main forces of the enemy be brought into battle. In fact, the enemy fully deployed his troops and immediately began large-scale offensive operations with the concentration of large forces in narrow sectors. The strikes were delivered to the entire depth of the operational structure of the troops using aircraft and mobile units — tank and motorized. This made it difficult for the Soviet troops to organize a stable defense.

The third. An unacceptable miscalculation was made in determining the timing of bringing the Soviet troops on full alert. Directive No. XXUMX was received late by district headquarters, and the troops in most cases received corresponding orders already when they were fighting. Although some commanders, at their own peril and risk, arbitrarily brought units to combat positions on the border. But there are few such whites. And it is not known what would have happened to them if it were not for the war. By the way, the directive itself contained certain inaccuracies. So, in the second paragraph it was said - not to succumb to any provocations. But try to understand when they are shooting at you, when shells are torn around - either this is a provocation, or already a war. Therefore, by the beginning of the war, the troops of the border districts were not ready to repel the German strike.

Fourth. The very plan of repelling German aggression was counter-offensive. It was based on the idea of ​​a powerful retaliatory strike with the subsequent transition to a decisive offensive on all fronts. Conducting a strategic defense and other options for action have practically not been considered. We were convinced of this when we considered operational-strategic games on the maps. In games, the initial period of the war was defined as beneficial for the Soviet side. For such self-confidence and had to pay in the summer of 1941.

The fifth. Serious miscalculations were made by the Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff in assessing the real balance of forces between the parties. Recall the intelligence reports, where the data on the number of German divisions did not correspond to reality: their 103, or 120. Actually the divisions were 191. Also these are miscalculations in determining the content of the initial period of the war, in creating a group of troops to repel aggression. At the initial stage, according to plans to cover the border, it was planned to repel the enemy’s attack with a sturdy defense and prevent it from entering Soviet territory. But with the number of troops that were at the border, it would be better to lead not resistant, but active, maneuverable defense. As a result of the grouping of troops created, the divisions held a defense in one echelon, which, with a powerful attack, easily broke through, while the second echelon troops were located in 150-300 km from the border and could not come to the aid in time. This gave the enemy the opportunity to beat the Soviet troops in parts.



The sixth. The defeat of the Soviet troops in the border battles in that situation was inevitable due to the numerical superiority of the enemy in most areas, not to mention the main ones. The tragedy was that the Soviet divisions in the first echelon were much smaller than the German ones (with their almost equal opportunities). So, in PribOVO in the first echelon there were only 7sd versus 21 German divisions. That is 3: 1. Classic option. And despite the fact that the German division is stronger than the Soviet division, on average, 1,6 times, the advantage is almost 5 times. And here we are concerned with the issue of the ability and ability of the Soviet troops to defend themselves. So, no matter how you defend yourself, no matter how brave your soldiers are, without the presence of reserves with such an advantage to the enemy, you will not be able to do it well. Because any breakthrough on the flank or in the front line of a neighbor inevitably leads to withdrawal - at best. And just to leave you, too, will not give.

And the last. The failures of the Soviet troops at the beginning of the war were caused by the presence of a number of temporary, but serious advantages of the German fascist army. This advantage primarily consisted in the fact that the enemy concentrated on the western borders of the USSR a fully mobilized, large army, which had a wealth of experience in waging a modern war. Hitler's military machine used the human and material resources of many European states. At the same time, the Soviet Union did not put its armed forces on high alert for repulsing aggression. All this happened mainly as a result of the miscalculation made by Stalin in assessing the military-political situation (think of the possibility of war between England and Germany, Stalin’s desire to delay the war at least until 1942), he believed that the existence of a non-aggression pact guarantees the USSR the near future from the war with Germany. As a result, all necessary measures to strengthen the country's defense, and especially to bring the border districts to alert, were not taken in a timely manner.

Stalin had reliable information about the concentration and deployment of the fascist German army on the Soviet borders and its preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union. But he regarded them as contradictory, inaccurate, provocative. He was aiming not to push the Soviet government to take such steps, which could be used by the fascist clique to break the non-aggression pact. For this reason, Stalin, who single-handedly resolved the most important military issues, in early June, 1941 prohibited the commanders of the western border districts from withdrawing troops to fortified areas and putting them on high alert. Those measures that were taken in this direction on the eve of the war turned out to be insufficient or belated. Although it should be said about the directive from 18 June 1941, which obliged district commanders to bring troops into combat readiness. 19 June issued a directive of the General Staff on the withdrawal of front-line directorates on field points, on masking airfields and so on. In both documents, the date of execution was indicated: 21-22 June 1941. It turns out that Stalin and his entourage were warned about the war in four days . And the directives seemed to have begun to act ... But proper alertness did not happen.

The initial successes of the Germans turned out to be possible because the Soviet troops were not deployed in the border areas and put on alert, despite the aforementioned directives. Therefore, they failed to create a steady solid front of defense and repel the onslaught of the enemy. His tank groups, with the support of aviation, were rapidly moving forward. The Soviet units, advanced from the depths towards the enemy, could not stop him and were forced to retreat.

As a result of a powerful first strike, the enemy inflicted substantial losses on the Soviet troops and in the first days of the war reached a considerable superiority in forces and assets on the entire Soviet-German front. Having seized the initiative and having achieved dominance in the air, the enemy put the Soviet troops in extremely difficult conditions of the armed struggle.

Appendix A

The state border cover plan from 11.03.1941 (abbreviated).
Especially important
Top secret
Only personally
The instance is unique.

Central Committee of the CPSU (b)
Tov. Stalin
Tov. Molotov

In connection with the large-scale organizational events being held in the Red Army in 1941, I am submitting for your consideration an updated plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East.

I. Our probable opponents.

The current political situation in Europe forces us to pay exceptional attention to the defense of our Western borders.

A possible armed clash may be limited only to our western borders, but the likelihood of an attack from our Far Eastern borders from Japan is not excluded.

An armed German attack on the USSR could involve Finland, Romania, Hungary and other German allies in a military conflict with us.

In this way. The Soviet Union must be prepared to fight on two fronts: in the west - against Germany, supported by Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland ...

Ii. Armed forces likely opponents.

Germany.

Currently, Germany has deployed 225 infantry, 20 armored and 15 motorized divisions, and a total of up to 260 divisions, 20 000 field guns of all calibers, 10 000 tanks in 15000 aircraft, including 9000-9500 combat weapons.

Of the specified number of divisions, 76 divisions, of which up to 6 tank and 7 motorized at the present time are concentrated on our borders and in 35 divisions - in Romania and Bulgaria. If the war with England ends, it can be presumed that of the existing 260 divisions, Germany will leave at least 35 divisions in the occupied countries and up to 25 divisions in the interior of the country. Thus, before the 200 divisions, of which up to the 165 infantry, 20 armored and 15 motorized, will be oriented against our borders.

Finland will be able to put up against the Soviet Union 18 infantry divisions.

Romania currently has up to 45 infantry divisions and 700 combat aircraft, of which we can expect that not less than 30 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions will be used against the Soviet Union, up to 2700 guns of all calibers, 400 tanks and 600 aircraft.

Hungary will be able to set up 20 infantry divisions, 2 moto brigades, 850 guns, 350 tanks and 500 combat aircraft against the USSR ...

Iii. The likely operational plans of the enemy.

The General Headquarters does not have documentary data on the operational plans of the likely adversaries both in the West and in the East.

The most likely assumptions of the strategic deployment of possible opponents can be:

In the West.

Germany is likely to deploy its main forces. in the southeast of Sedlec to Hungary, in order to strike at Berdichev, Kiev to seize Ukraine.

This blow, apparently, will be accompanied by an auxiliary blow in the north from East Prussia to Dvinsk and Riga or by concentric attacks from Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk and Baranovichi.

... In the south, it is possible to expect a simultaneous transition with the German army in the offensive in the general direction of Zhmerinka by the Romanian army, supported by the German divisions.

With the allegedly stated variant of Germany’s actions, the following deployment and grouping of its forces can be expected:

- North of the lower reaches of the river. Zap Bug to the Baltic Sea - 30-40 infantry divisions, 3-5 tank divisions, 2-4 moto-divisions, 3570 guns and up to 2000 tanks.

- South of the city. Zap Bug to the border with Hungary - up to 110 infantry divisions, 14 tank, 10 motorized, to 11500 guns, 7500 tanks and most of its aircraft.

The possibility is not excluded that the Germans will concentrate their main forces in East Prussia and on the Warsaw direction, so that through the Lithuanian SSR they can inflict and deploy the main attack in the direction of Riga or on Kovno, Dvinsk.

At the same time, it is necessary to expect auxiliary concentric attacks from Lomza and Brest with their subsequent development in the direction of Baranavichy, Minsk ...

The most likely actions of enemy navies are:

German fleet:

a) blockade in the Baltic Sea,

b) the provision and landing of assault forces in the area of ​​Libau and in the fortress of the Moonsund archipelago;

c) the desire to break into the Gulf of Finland and force our fleet to go east;

d) in the North Sea, Germans may develop cruise operations and submarine operations by blocking our ports in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.

The Italian fleet will strive to transfer its main operations to the Black Sea ...

Iv. The foundations of our strategic deployment.

If necessary, the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union on two fronts, our main forces should be deployed in the west.

The rest of our borders should be covered with minimal forces ...

To conduct operations in the west and on the Finnish front are appointed:



V. Basics of our strategic deployment in the west.

The deployment of the main forces of the Red Army in the west with the grouping of the main forces against East Prussia and on the Warsaw direction raises serious concerns that the struggle on this front may lead to protracted battles.

I report the basics of our strategic deployment in the West and in the East, asking for their consideration.

Applications:

1. Deployment pattern in the West on the 40 map ver. in 1 dm.
...

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union
__________________ S. Tymoshenko.

Chief of General Staff K.A.
army General
__________________ G. Zhukov.

Executor
Major General _______ Vasilevsky.

November 11.3.41, XNUMX

Sources:
Beshanov V. We were not quite ready yet ... / Great Patriotic Catastrophe II. 1941 year. Causes of the tragedy: Collection. - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2007.
Veremeev Yu.G. Did the Red Army learn defense // http: // www.armor. Kiev.ua/army/hist/obor-ne%20umel.shtml).
Red Army: what is stronger? // http://www.liveinternet.ru/ users / 4126312 / page1.shtml.
Red Banner Kiev: Essays on History. 1919-1988 / I. A. Gerasimov, P. G. Osipov. 3-ed. and add. - M .: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1989. - 543 with.
Martirosyan A.B. The tragedy of 22 Jun: blitzkrieg or treason? - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2006.
On the elimination of illiteracy in the Red Army // http://www.nauteh.ru/index.php/conference-cnf-2012-03/112-a.
Workers and Peasants Red Army. Changes in the organization of SD. 1939-1941 years // http: // www.rkka. Ru / org / str / chng-41.html.
Workers and Peasants Red Army. SD on defense // http: // www.rkka. Ru / docs / real / pu39 / 10.html.
Romanycheva N. The Red Army is the strongest? // visage - 1991. - №12.
Statyuk I. Defense of the Baltic States. 1941. - M .: Exprint, 2005.
http://www.istpravda.ru/bel/artifacts/5677/.
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  1. ammunition
    ammunition 23 June 2016 06: 06
    +13
    The author has done a great job.
    -----------
    But. In the summer of the 1942 year, a similar catastrophe occurred to the south. So by the fall of the situation became desperate again.
    Yes. In 42, we already learned to retreat in an organized manner. But still ..
    So there are some .. unaccounted for reasons in the article.
    ------------------
    Still - an article plus. Thank!
    1. Mahmut
      Mahmut 23 June 2016 07: 56
      +8
      It would be better to act according to the plan of B. Shaposhnikov, in which the defense was to be active, with a maneuver, including a withdrawal to more advantageous positions.

      But in 1940, instead of the experienced Shaposhnikov, they put Zhukov - impudent, but not having a higher military education. His experience was limited to offensive actions. Where Zhukov, there is an offensive. The best tactics awaiting a strike for the USSR would be the tactics of Mannerheim, a defense in depth, the creation of ditches, extensive mine and wire fences, the modernization and strengthening of the Stalin line. But these actions ruled out Shaposhnikov’s plan for maneuvering in defense. Well, Zhukov chose the worst of all options. To count on successful counterattack in the conditions of half-empty tanks on tanks and the inability of the red commanders to use radio communications is insane.
      As for the references to the technical illiteracy of the younger personnel, the information is greatly exaggerated. More than a million young people attended the DOSAAF school before the war. And they knew how to handle not only motorcycles.
      1. Alexey T. (Oper)
        Alexey T. (Oper) 23 June 2016 09: 54
        +14
        Defense is certainly good. There was a sheer smallness: to determine where the enemy would not be easy the main blow and where to concentrate the troops to repel it. What for the front, the length of 3,5 thousand kilometers, the task is far from trivial.
        1. disgraced shooter
          disgraced shooter 23 June 2016 17: 18
          -6
          Quote: Alexey T. (Opera)
          Defense is certainly good. There was a sheer smallness: to determine where the enemy would not be easy the main blow and where to concentrate the troops to repel it. What for the front, the length of 3,5 thousand kilometers, the task is far from trivial.

          It was necessary to sit on the Stalin line then and there would be nothing to determine
          1. Stas57
            Stas57 23 June 2016 21: 19
            +6
            Quote: Disgraced Shooter
            It was necessary to sit on the Stalin line then and there would be nothing to determine

            France sat and?
            1. disgraced shooter
              disgraced shooter 23 June 2016 23: 57
              -3
              Quote: Stas57
              Quote: Disgraced Shooter
              It was necessary to sit on the Stalin line then and there would be nothing to determine

              France sat and?

              Quote: Stas57
              Quote: Disgraced Shooter
              It was necessary to sit on the Stalin line then and there would be nothing to determine

              France sat and?

              I found something to compare, we have a completely different situation and territory, their FIGs will go around like a maginot line. And between the UROF army to bury in full profile, so as not to come up and not go around, and for counter attacks. wire and all sorts of anti-tank bullets and ditches. And long-range aviation will bomb them every day, and freshly mobilized millions of troops rush to our aid.
              1. AK64
                AK64 24 June 2016 00: 04
                +5
                I found something to compare, we have a completely different situation and territory, their FIGs will go around like a maginot line. And between the UROF army to bury in full profile, so as not to come up and not go around, and for counter attacks. wire and all sorts of anti-tank bullets and ditches. And long-range aviation will bomb them every day, and freshly mobilized millions of troops rush to our aid.


                And dig a moat, from the sea to the sea. 100 meters. No, 200 meters wide. And in the moat to crocodiles. And two. No, better than three battleships.

                So it will be more reliable.
                1. stalkerwalker
                  stalkerwalker 24 June 2016 00: 18
                  +4
                  Quote: AK64
                  So it will be more reliable.

                  "... You shouldn't laugh at sick people ..." (c)
                2. Stas57
                  Stas57 24 June 2016 00: 22
                  +1
                  like a panama canal!
                3. disgraced shooter
                  disgraced shooter 24 June 2016 02: 37
                  -4
                  And dig a moat, from the sea to the sea. 100 meters. No, 200 meters wide
                  The width of the moat is only 5 meters. And not everywhere, but only in tank-dangerous directions, and even with mines all over. Yes, and then the Wehrmacht’s tanks were only light, and the artillery would do well with them.
                  1. Predator
                    Predator 24 June 2016 11: 02
                    +5
                    Dig 3.5 thousand km?! So only for your ditch you need to throw out 52,5 million cubic meters of land (at a depth of 3 meters). Mine, let's say 100 meters with 20 minutes each, total 700 million minutes, and where to get people and mines ?!
                    Here, one explosive needs 3.5 billion kg. Is this real?! That is, if for fun, then while the enemy is developing an operation on the map, we are changing the landscape?! Yes, and this troops pit with min fields also needs to be covered by troops ..... Wehrmacht walked across the rivers and didn’t sweat much, but then the pit is damn ....
                    And adjusted for the direction where it will be ?!
                    1. disgraced shooter
                      disgraced shooter 24 June 2016 11: 56
                      -3
                      Quote: Predator
                      Dig 3.5 thousand km?! So only for your ditch you need to throw out 52,5 million cubic meters of land (at a depth of 3 meters). Mine, let's say 100 meters with 20 minutes each, total 700 million minutes, and where to get people and mines ?!
                      Here, one explosive needs 3.5 billion kg. Is this real?! That is, if for fun, then while the enemy is developing an operation on the map, we are changing the landscape?! Yes, and this troops pit with min fields also needs to be covered by troops ..... Wehrmacht walked across the rivers and didn’t sweat much, but then the pit is damn ....
                      And adjusted for the direction where it will be ?!

                      And who said that 3,5 km oooh? It was written on dangerous directions that a maximum of 100 km in different sections ,,,,, and they would have stopped without ditches, they didn’t have armadas of heavy tanks going there, but pathetic 3,5 light tanks.
                  2. Severomor
                    Severomor 25 June 2016 01: 12
                    +5
                    Quote: Disgraced Shooter
                    but only in tank-hazardous directions, and even impose everything with mines. Yes, and then the tanks at the Wehrmacht were only light

                    Have you studied with a rezun?
                    1. disgraced shooter
                      disgraced shooter 25 June 2016 02: 00
                      -1
                      Quote: Severomor
                      Quote: Disgraced Shooter
                      but only in tank-hazardous directions, and even impose everything with mines. Yes, and then the tanks at the Wehrmacht were only light

                      Have you studied with a rezun?

                      Quote: Severomor
                      Quote: Disgraced Shooter
                      but only in tank-hazardous directions, and even impose everything with mines. Yes, and then the tanks at the Wehrmacht were only light

                      Have you studied with a rezun?
                      I read something, and from this I read a lot of people and what, you just need to look at the problem from different angles, so it will be better understood. And if the tanks did not reach 20 tons without any additional body kit there in the form of any additional armor there, these are light tanks.
                  3. The comment was deleted.
              2. The comment was deleted.
            2. stalkerwalker
              stalkerwalker 24 June 2016 00: 27
              +3
              Quote: Stas57
              Quote: Disgraced Shooter
              It was necessary to sit on the Stalin line then and there would be nothing to determine
              France sat and?

              Hi Stas!
              I will give an extraordinary excerpt from the novel by I. Boyashev "Tankman" (black humor + fantasy)
              ... In the 41st, Soviet tanks crawled in uncertain crowds, whining like puppies, blind and stupid - merry German artillerymen slowly clicked their whole heaps.
              In 42-43 there were attempts to maneuver - they made up armies from the unfinished mechanized corps by order of the leader. But the "boxes" were still thrown into the jaws of the "tigers" without any intelligence. The commanders hand and foot were tied by indefatigable "special officers", and above and below they shied away from the most timid, embryonic initiative, Mehlis was more afraid of the rollicking "Dast Reich", again, to the joy of the German "eight-eight" preferring to attack with a clumsy forehead herds - of course, all that time the found-sky was zealously filled with new iron martyrs.
              Insolence and calculation, the desire to drive and cut for the first time showed the amazed Model the iconic 44! They deliberately scooped up the German rear, at first hundreds, and then thousands of cars. Repairmen and households barely kept up with the tanks. Nevertheless, spare parts, fuel and various "blanks" were delivered without fail. The result was not slow in waiting: the tankers, as if in a fairy tale “hit the ground,” became excitable, like casino players. The most sophisticated fortified areas, before which a front would not even have thought a year ago, the "thirty-fours" were now trotting around without looking back, and, not surprisingly, without previous losses, "giving glory to the infantry." Where on the move, where again with a maneuver, the hulls swallowed crossings and intersections. The count of prisoners immediately went to tens of thousands. Turning around, growing every month, every week, finally, every day and hour, the whistle of speed, coupled with shells, caterpillars and armor, created the very famous "order" in the troops so insecure before. Bogdanov and Rotmistrov no longer looked back at the unarmed battered Wehrmacht wandering to the rear. The few who escaped slavish fate, the Panzervaffe veterans bit their patched elbows, desperate to observe such obvious (and no doubt bordering on genius) variations on the theme of their home-grown “blitzkrieg”. "I'm a complete asshole" finally stopped reinventing the wheel; they brazenly stripped away the main principle of lightning war - a breakthrough and the inevitable "ticks", but, as always, they added the main trump card to it - complete, stunning unpredictability, from which strategists now troubled in Zossen. What happened happened: the quantity finally finally and irrevocably turned into quality; and everything that tried to resist was inevitably crushed, washed away and splashed around. But even that grandiose, meaningful, embodied pressure on the gap in the 44th did not compare with the spring spurt of the 45th! ...
        2. Alekseir162
          Alekseir162 25 June 2016 12: 15
          +2
          There was a sheer smallness: to determine where the enemy would not be easy the main blow and where to concentrate the troops to repel it.

          That's all right. By the way, the Germans in the same way were unable to determine the direction of our main attack in 1944, which ultimately led to the defeat of Army Group Center and the release of the Red Army into operational space. It's a shame, of course, that we were beaten in 41 and 42, but, firstly, in these defeats, our army gained invaluable experience, albeit at the cost of huge losses (for which a low bow to our soldiers), and secondly, he is not mistaken who does nothing.
          1. disgraced shooter
            disgraced shooter 25 June 2016 14: 32
            0
            the army gained invaluable experience, albeit at the cost of huge losses
            The army could gain experience without enormous losses. But what happened happened.
      2. creak
        creak 23 June 2016 10: 51
        +10
        Quote: Mahmut
        As for the references to the technical illiteracy of the younger personnel, the information is greatly exaggerated. More than a million young people attended the DOSAAF school before the war. And they knew how to handle not only motorcycles.


        As for the ability to manage not only motorcycles and DOSAAF - at a meeting on May 17, 1941 convened by Stalin, the Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force Zhigarev said that there are more than 30 thousand pilots in the combat structure of the Air Force, but less than 10 thousand were retrained in new machines ..
        In the reserve there were 90 thousand pilots, but they knew how to fly only on the U-2.
        Zhigarev could not get past the state of discipline - only in the incomplete quarter of 1941 there were 71 catastrophes and 15 accidents in which 141 people died. and 138 planes were crashed ... The average flight time when retraining for new machines was 2-3 flights to the zone, 2-3 flights to the training ground and 2-3 flights to group flight.
        Therefore, for many pilots, the first sortie was the last and the DOSAAF reports are one thing, but in reality the picture, as we see, is drawn completely different ....
      3. alstr
        alstr 23 June 2016 11: 34
        +2
        Shapshnikov removed Stalin. It is possible - this was dictated by the fact that even then Stalin knew about Shaposhnikov’s disease and wanted a healthier person to wage the war. At the same time, Zhukov was well aware that he was not a staff officer. He performed the duties of the Chief of the General Staff to the best of his abilities.
        Unfortunately, although much has been written about the level of training of soldiers and officers, but the results of this reason are not indicated. Although it also plays a significant role. Probably no less than miscalculations of the strategic plan.

        In addition, there is another reason: this is the institution of commissars and the eternal search for enemies of the people.
        Unfortunately, very often the commissars were not professional military men and often were random people, but at the same time they had power. This also negatively affected the combat effectiveness.
        Although there was a significant number of commissars who were able to lead and competently fight (or simply did not have the mind not to intervene).
        By the way, we note that with the abolition of the institute of commissars in the autumn of 42, victories gradually began to appear.

        Well, the eternal search for the enemy and saboteurs, also played a role since killed a healthy initiative.

        In principle, the main cause is not miscalculations in determining the place of the strike, its time, namely, in the training of troops. Those. even if we reliably knew where and when there would be a blow, all the same, in conditions of 41, we would have lost the border battle, because the training of personnel at all levels (from a soldier to the chief of the General Staff) was low. Of course, in this case there would be less loss, maybe the Germans would be further from Moscow, but the Germans would certainly have reached Leningrad too, to Smolensk.

        If we take into account that in fact the Red Army began to form for 38 years (the moment of the beginning of a sharp increase in the number of spacecraft from 1,5 to 4 million people in two years) and the reorganization of 40-41 years, then the picture of the level of training will not be happy at all.
        1. AK64
          AK64 23 June 2016 12: 43
          +1
          . At the same time, Zhukov was well aware that he was not a staff officer.

          Zhukov did not "realize" anything and could not "realize" anything. He was unconscious.

          Unfortunately, although much has been written about the level of training of soldiers and officers,

          Ordinary and middle commanders were much closer to the level of competency than generals - the higher the level, the lower the competence. (However, of course, the requirements for competence will grow exponentially from levels)

          In addition, there is another reason: this is the institution of commissars and the eternal search for enemies of the people. Unfortunately, very often the commissars were not professional military men and often were random people, but at the same time they had power. This also negatively affected the combat effectiveness.

          If you look at how many Soviet generals were captured in the 41st, and HOW they behaved there, then perhaps you will change your mind on this issue.

          By the way, we note that with the abolition of the institute of commissars in the autumn of 42, victories gradually began to appear.

          Just those who would like to surrender - by that time they had already surrendered. So the need to control disappeared.


          In principle, the main cause is not miscalculations in determining the place of the strike, its time, namely, in the training of troops.

          Private training was more or less adequate.
          Once again: at the ordinary level, the level of competence was much closer to what was desired than at the level of colonels. The higher the level, the greater the incompetence.

          If we take into account that in fact the Red Army began to form for 38 years (the moment of the beginning of a sharp increase in the number of spacecraft from 1,5 to 4 million people in two years) and the reorganization of 40-41 years, then the picture of the level of training will not be happy at all.


          The Germans managed to deploy their Wehrmacht out of 100 thousand Reichswehr somehow, didn't they? And they didn’t complain somehow.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 23 June 2016 13: 26
            +1
            Quote: AK64
            Private training was more or less adequate.
            Once again: at the ordinary level, the level of competence was much closer to what was desired than at the level of colonels.

            Judging by the 1940 KOVO inspection, competency levels were roughly the same.
            In parts of 97 SD rifles manufactured in 1940. , which were on hand for no more than 4 months, up to 29% are reduced to a state of rust in the barrel, machine guns "DP" manufactured in 1939 to 14% also have a deterioration of the barrel channels.

            Not bad, but - in 4 months to bring almost a third of new rifles to rust in the barrel.
            Junior command staff is not better:
            The knowledge of the junior commanding staff is weak, but nevertheless, the weapons in the unit know better than the commanding staff.
            The knowledge of ordinary cadets is low.
            They do not know automatic weapons at all and are only able to carry rifles and pull the trigger. Extremely poor knowledge of the materiel of small arms and besides the gunners do not know the names of the parts of the machine gun "DP" and the revolver. The machine gunners do not know the name of the parts and rules for disassembling the rifle. To great shame, and chagrin, cadet regiment schools have lesser knowledge of small arms than the knowledge of the Red Army, and yet despite this they are issued by junior commanders.
            There is no need to talk about the rules, cleaning weapons, and their inspection by younger commanders.
            This situation should be, since the commander, having no knowledge of small arms, cannot transfer them to his subordinates and demand knowledge from them when he himself does not know him.

            By the way, in the same district there was found an epic junior commander, whose "Nagan" was found during a check, uncleaned from last year's shooting - with shells in the drum.
          2. Stas57
            Stas57 23 June 2016 13: 49
            +1
            “The rank and file. People entered the division from all parts of the KOVO and even from other districts. Sending units to the division of people, contrary to the instructions of the OU KOVO, they sent dropouts ... 15 and 10 tank divisions, according to the manning plan, were to send the first 679 and the second 239 to the division. cadets for staffing the training units of the division from among the Red Army soldiers of the 1940 draft of the year, and the directive of the OU KOVO indicated that the divisions before screening people to us would drop out of school units unfit for training and would send out only fit ones. Upon the arrival of people, I found that among the sent people were sent not only unsuitable for staffing. units, but also for service in tank units. So among the sent 15 etc. were 25 people. illiterate and illiterate, 17 people sick ... This is confirmed by the commander of the 15 division, who, having received people from us, sent them to the garrison commission, as a result of which 4 people laid off from the army, 7 people admitted to the hospital, the rest were found fit for non-military service. Similar cadets were sent by 10 etc. among the 47 people returned to her. there were 26 people ill, illiterate, illiterate, do not speak Russian and cannot be in the school. divisions ... As a result of such manning, there are currently hundreds of people in units of the division entrusted to me by their physical condition, literacy and knowledge of the Russian language that are completely unsuitable for service in tank units and are actually ballast, namely:

            Natives of nat. non-Russian republics 1914 people or 23.2% Of these, 236 people who do not speak Russian at all ...

            Illiterate - 211 people, illiterate 622 people, with the formation of 3 – 4 groups of 3571 people.

            Old Ages (26 – 30 years) 745 people

            Formerly tried and convicted - 341 people ...

            Unfit for combat service at the conclusion of the garrison medical commission 81 people Unsuitable for service in the tank units and for combat service according to the conclusion of the medical commission of the unit, but have not yet passed the garrison commission - 418 people ... "


            something like that
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 23 June 2016 18: 56
              +2
              Quote: Stas57
              something like that

              What a familiar picture ... quote the incredibly scandalous work of the historians - defilers Andreas and Dimitros “Is faith strong? Where did the children of God the Emperor go? ”? wink
              Mikhail Efimovich, by the way, and according to the command staff sent to him, he walked:
              “The commanding staff. The state employs 1342 people, there are 584 people. or 43%. The situation is especially bad with the staffing of staffs of all degrees ... At the headquarters of regiments ... there is no one to plan and control combat training. The division is staffed by 25% with medical staff ... The sapper companies are not fully equipped with the top staff. There are not enough 25 signalmen to the staff, no chemists in any part ... Tank commanders 72% are incomplete ... The same situation is with motorists ... Some of the personnel assigned to the division do not correspond in their qualities to the posts they are assigned to ... From the 8th tank. division arrived ml.politruk B., expelled from the CPSU (b) District Party Committee back in September 1940 ... Politruk K. OPP 8 tank. divisions presented material for dismissal from the army and at the same time seconded it to us in the division. Now K. is transferred to the reserve ... Also with the political staff, who arrived from 10 tanks. divisions. As can be seen from these examples, parts of the Okrug did not select proportionally the personnel for the acquisition of our division, but a real dropout.
          3. strannik1985
            strannik1985 23 June 2016 20: 10
            0
            4 years from the moment of deployment, while Germans had to search with the police when troops were sent to the Rhine region, they got lost. During Anschluss in Austria, up to a third of the technology of mobile connections stood on the side of the road. Polish troops were in the deployment stage (48,5%), 1 versus 000.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 24 June 2016 10: 06
              0
              Quote: strannik1985
              Polish troops were in the deployment stage (48,5%), 1 versus 000.

              At the same time, the Poles began imagining as early as March 1939:
              The hidden mobilization deployment of the Polish forces, which began on March 23, 1939, affected 4 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry brigade, formations in several districts were strengthened, and the directorates of four armies and one operational group were created. These events were based on the mobilization plan “W” of April 1938, which provided for secret mobilization in peacetime. On August 13-18, another 9 units were mobilized, and from August 23, a hidden mobilization of the main forces began. The regrouping of troops envisaged by the strategic deployment plan began on August 26, when an order was received to advance the mobilized formations to the intended concentration areas. The order to the armies and operational groups of the first echelon to occupy the starting position was issued on August 30. The Polish leadership carried out measures to mobilize the army secretly from its Anglo-French allies, who feared that these actions of Warsaw could push Germany to war. Therefore, when they were about to begin open mobilization in Poland on August 29, England and France insisted that it be postponed until August 31. Nevertheless, thanks to the hidden mobilization, by the morning of September 1, the mobilization plan was completed by 60%, but the deployment of the Polish troops was not completed - only 46,8% of the troops were in the areas of destination, but they did not manage to fully occupy their positions. By the morning of September 1, Poland had deployed 22 2/3 infantry divisions, 3 mining divisions, 10 cavalry and 1 armored brigades at the border (see table 16). In addition, in the central regions of the country, 3 infantry divisions (13th, 19th, 29th) and the Vilna cavalry brigade were concentrated, the rest of the formations continued to mobilize or were in motion by railways.
        2. Azitral
          Azitral 23 June 2016 13: 56
          +2
          "In addition, there is another reason: this is the institution of commissars and the eternal search for enemies of the people ..."
          In principle, I agree, but the phenomenon itself is broader. The point is that our style of government gravitates towards bureaucracy in the most difficult form. And after any perturbation faster than a pig's squeal, it returns to it. The bottom line is that Bigger bosses hate hassle. He hates it when something is wrong, but he is worried. A good subordinate is the one who he is, the bosses do not bother him, and the reports are successful, smooth. Here is the logic: since you are bad, you are to blame, we will remove you, put the one who will be good. At least according to reports. And so from top to bottom! I think that the picture came to Comrade Stalin covered with several layers of varnish. No one was interested in bad reports, and over time, one way or another all control services agreed, and control over control. And since everything is fine, then you don't need to do anything! So they didn't, or they did one-tenth of what was necessary. And the kamissars are a particular: instead of being accused of being incompetent and filmed, as usual, they will be declared an alarmist and a defeatist, they will be put under investigation. Do we have many brave ones to speak under such and such circumstances? Yes, there are no such people, because everyone in our country knows from the mother's womb: the Russian authorities are absolutely merciless, and to those who blather, so purely. Here are the defeats. What's in the RYAV, what's in 1941. Because how to fight without having a real idea of ​​the true capabilities of your army? And knowing them for real, one could have fought better! The art of war also consists of two more sections. Everyone knows the first: this is the ability to fight not by numbers, but by skill, to beat the "countless hordes" of the enemy with a small army. But the second is somehow not remembered: this is the art of fighting with a large number of bad troops against a smaller, but much better quality army. The ability to convert quantity into a victory over quality. This also happened, and there are examples of this particular side of the art of war.
          1. Azitral
            Azitral 23 June 2016 14: 26
            0
            "In addition, there is another reason: this is the institution of commissars and the eternal search for enemies of the people ..."
            In principle, I agree, but the phenomenon itself is broader. The point is that our style of government gravitates towards bureaucracy in the most difficult form. And after any perturbation faster than a pig's squeal, it returns to it. The bottom line is that Bigger bosses hate hassle. He hates it when something is wrong, but he is worried. A good subordinate is the one who he is, the bosses do not bother him, and the reports are successful, smooth. Here is the logic: since you are bad, you are to blame, we will remove you, put the one who will be good. At least according to reports. And so from top to bottom! I think that the picture came to Comrade Stalin covered with several layers of varnish. No one was interested in bad reports, and over time, one way or another all control services agreed, and control over control. And since everything is fine, then you don't need to do anything! So they didn't, or they did one-tenth of what was necessary. And the kamissars are a particular: instead of being accused of being incompetent and filmed, as usual, they will be declared an alarmist and a defeatist, they will be put under investigation. Do we have many brave ones to speak under such and such circumstances? Yes, there are no such people, because everyone in our country knows from the mother's womb: the Russian authorities are absolutely merciless, and to those who blather, so purely. Here are the defeats. What's in the RYAV, what's in 1941. Because how to fight without having a real idea of ​​the true capabilities of your army? And knowing them for real, one could have fought better! The art of war also consists of two more sections. Everyone knows the first: this is the ability to fight not by numbers, but by skill, to beat the "countless hordes" of the enemy with a small army. But the second is somehow not remembered: this is the art of fighting with a large number of bad troops against a smaller, but much better quality army. The ability to convert quantity into a victory over quality. This also happened, and there are examples of this particular side of the art of war.
      4. AK64
        AK64 23 June 2016 12: 17
        +2
        Zhukov - impudent, but not having a higher military education.

        More precisely, no education at all. Thank God that he knew how to read. (I already had problems with "writing".)

        The appointment of Zhukov to the beginning of the General Staff is not a mistake - this is already madness ("genius" Stalin?)
        His experience was limited to offensive actions.

        At that time Dukov had no "experience" at all. All his "experience" is one corps-scale operation. (Yes, even that was not planned and prepared by him - it was not for nothing that Zhukov did not mention the name of his chief of staff!)

        Where Zhukov, there is an offensive.

        Moreover, the unsuccessful and bloody
        The best tactics awaiting a strike for the USSR would be the tactics of Mannerheim, a defense in depth, the creation of ditches, extensive mine and wire fences, the modernization and strengthening of the Stalin line.

        This is the PATTERN. That is not counted.
        Mannerheim had THREE personnel, somehow armed brigades, which the Finns deployed into 12 brigades. And the Red Army had 25 tanks. To speak of any "Mannerheim's plan" in such conditions seems somehow ridiculous.
        Not?

        Well, Zhukov chose the worst of all options.

        He did not "select" anything and could not choose according to his position - this kind of choice is outside the competence of Us General Staff.

        To count on successful counterattack actions in the conditions of half-empty tanks on tanks and the inability of the red commanders to use radio communications is insane.

        Quite the opposite: the initiative to some extent compensates for the shortcomings in experience and management.


        As for the references to the technical illiteracy of the younger personnel, the information is greatly exaggerated. More than a million young people attended the DOSAAF school before the war.

        \ quietly exhausted \
        Would you find statistics on commonplace literacy recruits, huh?
        The Russians were half illiterate, even in the sense of "reading." But there were also non-Russians who could not only “read”, but also banal “understand orders”.
        1. V.ic
          V.ic 23 June 2016 12: 57
          +1
          Quote: AK64
          The Russians were half illiterate, even in the sense of "reading." But there were also non-Russians who could not only “read”, but also banal “understand orders”.

          Let's start at the end. As for the "half" illiteracy, it depends on the quality of your brains. My grandfather was drafted into the army in 1913 and had four classes in a parish school. My father graduated from the pedagogical college in 1938, and in 1939 he served in the Barabash-Levada KDVO. Now the illiterate / functional / seems to be no more than when Comrade. Stalin!
          Quote: AK64
          And the Red Army had 25 tanks. To speak of any "Mannerheim's plan" in such conditions seems somehow ridiculous.

          Is this according to fascist statistics? Well, what practical "hit" was in the Red Army in 1941? How many hours per year? How many individual crews were fired on? How much gasoline was released for crew training in 1941?
          Quote: AK64
          Quite the opposite: the initiative to some extent compensates for the shortcomings in experience and management.

          Helpful d.rak worse than the enemy!
          Quote: AK64
          He did not "select" anything and could not choose according to his position - this kind of choice is outside the competence of Us General Staff.

          So tell us about YOUR GSH.
          Quote: AK64
          His experience was limited to offensive actions.
          At that time Dukov had no "experience" at all. All his "experience" is one corps-scale operation. (Yes, even that was not planned and prepared by him - it was not for nothing that Zhukov did not mention the name of his chief of staff!)

          Read, finally, about the correlation of forces and means at Khalkhin-Gol! On both sides .... Case scale pa-a-no-ma-a-sh!
          Quote: AK64
          More precisely, no education at all. Thank God that he knew how to read. (I already had problems with "writing".)

          Did you take exams from him personally? No.
          1. AK64
            AK64 23 June 2016 13: 06
            +1
            Let's start at the end. As for the "half" illiteracy, it depends on the quality of your brains. My grandfather was drafted into the army in 1913, had

            Stop-stop-stop --- "Your grandfather" is a statistic? Does he do all the statistics?
            You give the STATISTICS, just climbed to object.
            And the statistics are such that my grandfather was illiterate (he died from a wound in August 45th, after the war, that is - and there is no pension for the children who were EIGHT)

            four classes of church parish school.

            You probably think that this is a lot?
            Well, the Germans have almost EVERYTHING - with an average.
            Estimate the difference.

            Father in 1938 graduated from a pedagogical college, in 1939 he served in Barabash-Levada KDVO.

            Is this "statistics"? On one person?
            By the way, what was your father rank? Usually, with a technical school, kubari received immediately. Or not immediately, but a little later.

            Now illiterate / functionally / as if no more than with Comrade. Stalin!

            It is clear - there’s nothing to talk about next. It is obvious. Typical coma

            Goodbye, you are ignoring.
          2. Stas57
            Stas57 23 June 2016 13: 51
            +1
            Quote: V.ic
            Let's start at the end. As for the "half" illiteracy, it depends on the quality of your brains. My grandfather was drafted into the army in 1913 and had four classes in a parish school. My father graduated from the pedagogical college in 1938, and in 1939 he served in the Barabash-Levada KDVO. Now the illiterate / functional / seems to be no more than when Comrade. Stalin!
            Quote: AK64

            Firstly, I gave statistics for only one division above:
            Natives of nat. non-Russian republics 1914 people or 23.2% Of these, 236 people who do not speak Russian at all ...

            Illiterate - 211 people, illiterate 622 people, with the formation of 3 – 4 groups of 3571 people.


            not to say that apart from the German school sch was glad
      5. Chiropractor
        Chiropractor 23 June 2016 12: 19
        -1
        The length of the Mannerheim Line?
        And the length of the border of the USSR in 1941?

        Someone was building the Atlantic Shaft. Broken in a day ...
        1. AK64
          AK64 23 June 2016 12: 58
          +1
          Someone was building the Atlantic Shaft. Broken in a day ...


          Do we not take into account the outfit of forces for this breakthrough?
      6. Azitral
        Azitral 23 June 2016 12: 26
        0
        Isaev’s book about Stalingrad. Maneuverable battles in the steppe turned out to be the best way to quickly be left without troops for the weaker side. Divisions disappeared almost without a trace in a day or two. So Shaposhnikov would have failed.
      7. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 23 June 2016 15: 31
        +2
        "It would have been better to act according to B. Shaposhnikov's plan, in which the defense had to be active, with a maneuver" ////

        I totally agree with you.
        Mobile defense would be the best way to stop the blitzkrieg.
        Massive frontal counterattacks over and over again led to the boilers.
        1. AK64
          AK64 23 June 2016 15: 44
          +1
          Mobile defense would be the best way to stop the blitzkrieg.

          Well, it was, and the point?
          Counter-strike of Boldin's group, please, as an example: in full compliance with the "One-Two-Three Directives", Pavlov organized a counter-strike on Suwalki, with the forces of two microns and one kk, quite right to the rear of Gotu. And what is the sad result?
          Or the same counterattack in the Rivne-Dubno region: as many as four mk. And they fought a lot?

          That is: they tried to move, but something went wrong.
          Massive frontal counterattacks over and over again led to the boilers.

          In real life, passivity (both one's own and that of others) led to boilers. And where they fought actively - there were no boilers
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 23 June 2016 17: 13
            +1
            "And where they fought actively, there were no boilers" ////

            I read the opposite things: German generals prayed,
            for the Russians to attack, and the larger, the better.
            The Wehrmacht used the perfect Tatar-Mongol tactics: began
            "retreat", "losing" trucks, guns ... dug in, went on the defensive, ... and closed the encirclement on the flanks. And so - over and over again at 41.
            1. AK64
              AK64 23 June 2016 18: 35
              +1
              I read the opposite things: German generals prayed,
              for the Russians to attack, and the larger, the better.

              Yes, you can read anything you want.

              But here are the facts - they are as follows:
              (1) The first large boiler, in Belarus, is the result of the fact that Goth Did NOT Encounter resistance (on June 22, no one just had time) of resistance and immediately seized the bridges across the Neman (as many as three). That is, notice, did not have time - there was no activity to mean. And they could have exploded ...
              They could not stop the breakthrough of Goth. The result - 330 thousand prisoners
              (2) The second is Uman. The reason IMHO is the passivity of Ponedelin. He was entertaining ... They shot him in the 50th already. Well, the truth was rehabilitated in the 56th.
              (3) Next is Smolensk. They were not passive there, but they didn’t go on the attack either. But since they were not passive, somewhere around 200 thousand they managed to get out of the boiler. However, there are 150 prisoners. And if they were active where necessary, then they would leave everything.
              (4) Well, Kiev. Again - the result of IMHO passivity, not activity ...

              Well and so on: everywhere kraz kaz passivity ended with environments.

              Where "activity" led to disasters, this is already in 42, this is Crimea, Kharkov, and 2UdA. 33A again. But here, in each case, the problem was not activity in itself, but the activity in the performance of the d-k (as they say in the army, “only a d-k with initiative is worse than a d-k). That is, in each case (except perhaps 2UdA) there is also a doctor responsible for this.

              The Wehrmacht used the perfect Tatar-Mongol tactics: began
              "retreat", "losing" trucks, guns ... dug in, went on the defensive, ... and closed the encirclement on the flanks. And so - over and over again at 41.


              Nah: not a single razik did that.
              And indeed it is extremely difficult, even for the Germans, you described the type of battle.
              1. Azitral
                Azitral 24 June 2016 08: 35
                0
                Interesting. In general, during the "war period" of the twentieth century (1914-1950), the art of strategic retreat was truly mastered only by the PLA. The others didn't have enough time. Somehow we all forget that the Chinese have had the greatest continuous military experience - such is the paradox. They resorted to a deliberate strategic retreat as a form of military action, and knew how to do it for real. By the way, this is how they broke the "heroic" MacArthur in Korea. A contribution to the tactical art of the Chinese Communists was the night combat of infantry units. Mao, unlike Kim, was not at all a mediocre military man, he was not a bad theorist at all.
      8. Andrey Zh
        Andrey Zh 23 June 2016 17: 53
        +1
        Personally, I am not a professional historian, but thinking that if "according to the instructions of the wise Shaposhnikov" we continuously retreated in 1941, then Moscow would have surrendered, and the Red Army, perhaps, met the new 1942 in the Kamchatka region, surrendering the whole country to the Germans! .. .Not in Shaposhnikov's plan !!! I think that in the summer of 1941 we simply did not have enough resources and intelligence. Well, and - real combat experience, which the Wehrmacht already had.
        1. disgraced shooter
          disgraced shooter 24 June 2016 12: 33
          -1
          Quote: Andrey Zhdanov
          Personally, I am not a professional historian, but thinking that if "according to the instructions of the wise Shaposhnikov" we continuously retreated in 1941, then Moscow would have surrendered, and the Red Army, perhaps, met the new 1942 in the Kamchatka region, surrendering the whole country to the Germans! .. .Not in Shaposhnikov's plan !!! I think that in the summer of 1941 we simply did not have enough resources and intelligence. Well, and - real combat experience, which the Wehrmacht already had.

          We did not have enough time, not experience, which was not less than German but even more.
      9. Andrey Zh
        Andrey Zh 23 June 2016 17: 53
        0
        Personally, I am not a professional historian, but thinking that if "according to the instructions of the wise Shaposhnikov" we continuously retreated in 1941, then Moscow would have surrendered, and the Red Army, perhaps, met the new 1942 in the Kamchatka region, surrendering the whole country to the Germans! .. .Not in Shaposhnikov's plan !!! I think that in the summer of 1941 we simply did not have enough resources and intelligence. Well, and - real combat experience, which the Wehrmacht already had.
      10. Alex_59
        Alex_59 23 June 2016 22: 51
        +1
        Quote: Mahmut
        The best tactics awaiting a strike for the USSR would be the tactics of Mannerheim, a defense in depth, the creation of ditches, extensive mine and wire fences, the modernization and strengthening of the Stalin line.

        How is it in Belgium, huh? In how many hours was such a super-defense hacked by the Germans? And it’s better not to recall the Finns - their defense was also broken, it is only a matter of time. Not a single war in defense history has been won. Any defense is revealed. The attacker can always choose the time and place of the strike, having created such a concentration of his troops in a narrow section of the front that no defense can stand it. And then - the front of the defenders will collapse like a house of cards.
        1. AK64
          AK64 23 June 2016 23: 11
          +1
          Not a single war in defense history has been won.


          Yes?
          Second Punic
          1812-th
          First World War
          Yes, in fact, the Second World War, too, Otia you will not understand this
    2. fsps
      fsps 23 June 2016 10: 02
      -1
      http://edgeways.ru.mastertest.ru/public/index.php?doc=134
    3. fsps
      fsps 23 June 2016 10: 02
      0
      http://edgeways.ru.mastertest.ru/public/index.php?doc=134
      1. captain
        captain 23 June 2016 11: 05
        +4
        The author indicated to 7 the main reasons for the defeat of our army in 41. I think that it is necessary to indicate one more important reason for our defeats in the initial period of the war. This is a large number of people who were offended by the Soviet regime. At that time, our country was mainly peasant in its social composition, and Lenin was able to draw the majority of the population to his side with his slogans. He solved the land issue by expropriating the land from large landowners and distributing it to the peasants. The result is a victory in the Civil War. Subsequently, the surplus appraisal, the tax deduction and, ultimately, the seizure of land in favor of the state appeared. Collectivization played a not very positive role in this matter. As a result, a large number of peasants felt deceived. The major uprisings of the Tambov, West Siberian, Chapan war in the Samara province, a number of other provinces were suppressed very severely and a wave of repression swept through the country. As a result of these repressions, some social groups were limited in their rights. They did not have the right to hold public office, they did not have the right to take part in elections, to serve in the army, etc. An interesting point; the worker’s voice was equated to several peasants. And this is in accordance with the Constitution of Soviet Russia. In 1939 alone, restrictions were lifted from some social groups. As a result, about 41 million Soviet soldiers and commanders surrendered to 3.5, according to various estimates. I believe that the main reason for the surrender of so many soldiers and commanders was the internal policy of the Communist Party. And it’s not so easy in 41 whether our leaders and the church remembered Alexander Nevsky and Dmitry Donskoy.
    4. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 23 June 2016 15: 27
      0
      "In the summer of 1942, a similar catastrophe occurred in the southern direction" ///
      "So there are some .. reasons not considered in the article." ////

      One of them - only at the end of 42, finally, an adequate Genshab with Vasilevsky, Antonov was formed ...
      They expelled Zhukov, Mertskov, who ... did not understand anything in what was happening.
    5. The comment was deleted.
    6. Pathos
      Pathos 19 January 2017 16: 19
      +1
      And let's not forget that many branches of the army remained horseless (tankmen, artillerymen, etc.) were used for other purposes, i.e. remained horseless scales in the infantry, there in the first years of the war and laid down their heads trained cadres, their blessed memory. It took 2 shouts from Stalin. All horseless trained personnel were to be withdrawn to the rear for re-formation and additional formation of the units of the Red Army that were left without equipment. (V. Karpov "Generalissimo".)
  2. Cartalon
    Cartalon 23 June 2016 06: 07
    +3
    Everything is true except talking about the main blow, if the main forces could not repulse the blow in the southwest, if they were deployed in the western district it would only get worse.
    1. AK64
      AK64 23 June 2016 13: 33
      +3
      Everything is true except talking about the main blow, if the main forces could not repulse the blow in the southwest, if they were deployed in the western district it would only get worse.


      Not obvious, not at all obvious.
      There are two points:
      (1) The commander of the KOVO, and then the SWF, the Kirponos gene was not very competent. Kirponos is a military official, his level of competence is to command a military school. (By the way, Zhukov's protege - Zhukov put forward FaithfulAnd not capable) It is from here that the problems of the SWF are.
      (2) In its sector of responsibility, the Western Front held up remarkably well. (well, in comparison, everything in comparison, of course). The Western Front collapsed as a result of Goth's "cavalry raid". But Gotha's breakthrough is already the direct fault of planning, that is, the General Staff (that is, all the same Zhukov). Goth crossed the border in factually empty place, and immediately captured 3 bridges over the Neman from 4 available. Actually, nothing stood against him. And this despite the fact that if Goth hit the southeast (instead of strictly east, as it actually happened), an anti-tank artillery brigade located there would have turned up against him. So it was this unshielded section with bridges that became the catastrophe of the ZF.

      So ... one could plan better, one can.
      1. creak
        creak 23 June 2016 16: 14
        +1
        Quote: AK64
        In its sector of responsibility, the Western Front held up remarkably well. (well, in comparison, everything in comparison, of course). The Western Front collapsed as a result of Goth's "cavalry raid". Goth crossed the border in a virtually empty place, and immediately captured 3 bridges across the Neman from 4 available. So it was this uncovered area with bridges that became the Polar Division's disaster.


        I didn’t want to interfere in a dispute replete with such categorical statements, but okay ...
        Goth’s cavalry raid, as you say, (commander of the 3rd Tank Group) occurred in the strip The Northwest Front, and like the capture of three bridges across the Neman in the area of ​​Alytus and Merkine, is Lithuania, not Belarus.
        Thus, the breakthrough of Gotha in the St. Zap.F.nu band could not in any way become the cause of the disaster of the Western Front, which opposed the Wehrmacht in Belarus, there were reasons for it ...
        1. AK64
          AK64 23 June 2016 16: 36
          +1
          Quote: AK64
          In its sector of responsibility, the Western Front held up remarkably well. (well, in comparison, everything in comparison, of course). The Western Front collapsed as a result of Goth's "cavalry raid". Goth crossed the border in a virtually empty place, and immediately captured 3 bridges across the Neman from 4 available. So it was this uncovered area with bridges that became the Polar Division's disaster.



          I didn’t want to interfere in a dispute replete with such categorical statements, but okay ...
          Goth’s cavalry raid, as you say, (the commander of the 3rd Tank Group) occurred in the strip of the North-Western Front, and like the capture of three bridges across the Neman in the areas of Alytus and Merkine, this is Lithuania, not Belarus.
          Thus, the breakthrough of Gotha in the St. Zap.F.nu band could not in any way become the cause of the disaster of the Western Front, which opposed the Wehrmacht in Belarus, there were reasons for it ...


          Honestly, as you sat "without interfering" - you would have continued to sit.
          Goth (indeed, the 3rd TGr.) "Broke through" (more precisely, "crossed the border", not showing any resistance at all) in the area of ​​responsibility of the PribVO. It was only after this that Goth went east between the Neman and Viliya, and for some reason ended up in the deep rear of the ZF. Maybe because the rivers flowed so? Or maybe it was in the plan?

          As a result, Goth ended up on the Minsk-Mlskva highway .. to the east (!!!) of Minsk, and he entered Minsk, respectively, from the east.

          This is precisely what turned out to be a verdict for ZF.

          That is, at its own site ZF managed with great difficulty but to hold on. Not a front to hold - it would be impossible - but not to let this front collapse.
          But a deep circumvention of Goth was a verdict.
          1. creak
            creak 23 June 2016 21: 38
            0
            Quote: AK64
            As you sat "without interfering", you would have continued to sit.


            Do not tell me what to do and I won’t tell you where to go ...
            1. AK64
              AK64 23 June 2016 21: 40
              +1
              another "smart guy" is included in the emergency
  3. Vega
    Vega 23 June 2016 06: 47
    -2
    To rewrite history is to pour from empty to empty. There were many shortcomings, both tactical and strategic. Deployment of forces and means on the western borders had a lot of shortcomings, the mistakes and shortcomings of the winter company did not teach anything, unfortunately.
    1. Mahmut
      Mahmut 23 June 2016 09: 17
      +1
      Yes there is nothing to rewrite there. There was no story - so, propaganda. Remember the scene from the work of K. Simonov when a war correspondent talks with a former general about the reasons for the failure in defense. After all, it seemed they were preparing, the whole country spared nothing for the army ... And then they decided, let the scientists of the future look and understand. So they are looking for reasons and have still not come to a final consensus.
  4. parusnik
    parusnik 23 June 2016 07: 50
    +3
    Good work, thanks to the author ...
  5. Beefeater
    Beefeater 23 June 2016 07: 56
    -8
    The reason for which no one said in 3 days. Departure from the tradition of the old Russian army, including from faith. Replacing religion with an ideological talking shop. Oblivion of the exploits of the great "royal" commanders. Then, already during the war, I had to return to this.
    1. gaura
      gaura 23 June 2016 08: 02
      +1
      How did WWII return to religion? belay
      Yeah, I remember the film "War in the Western Direction", how Mehlis said that Stalin's word would help defeat the enemy. Apparently, they returned.
      1. AK64
        AK64 23 June 2016 13: 42
        +2
        How did WWII return to religion? belay
        Yeah, I remember the film "War in the Western Direction", how Mehlis said that Stalin's word would help defeat the enemy. Apparently, they returned.


        On October 12 or 12, 1941, an airplane took off from one of the Moscow airdromes and flew around Moscow three times. And the next day, dirt first became, and then frost hit. German tanks stuck on the tower in the mud ... The Wehrmacht stood up ...

        Oh yes, the plane.
        The plane was carried by His Holiness, the Patriarch. And an icon. Which one, I don’t know. It seems the Mother of God of Kazan, but definitely not sure.

        The fact was.
    2. Stas57
      Stas57 23 June 2016 08: 58
      +5
      Quote: Beefeater
      Replacing religion with an ideological talk.
      you didn’t answer me, how could it be that from February to October there were 1.5 million deserters of the glorious Orthodox army?
      no, I understand that you have "the damned scoop of people drove to the slaughter," and no one wanted to fight for the "damned Stalin." but what about the above facts?
      1. White Guard
        White Guard 23 June 2016 13: 24
        0
        Quote: Stas57
        from February to October there were 1.5 million deserters

        Easy, Lieutenant!
        What events in February were read, what was happening in the country then, and that 1.5 million were not recognized.
        1. Stas57
          Stas57 23 June 2016 13: 53
          -1
          Quote: White Guard
          Easy, Lieutenant!
          What events in February were read, what was happening in the country then, and that 1.5 million were not recognized.

          firstly, there were 200 thousands a month, the war began to bother everyone, and secondly, sorry, it’s not the people who did not want to defend the power of the damned Bolsheviks
          1. AK64
            AK64 23 June 2016 14: 52
            +1
            the war began to bother everyone

            To whom?

            Please check what I’ll tell you right now (do not take my word for it - check it!)
            By the end of 1916, the tsvar had under arms .... 15 million people.
            Of these, only 4.2 million were at the front. And the rest? And in the rear, in reserves.

            So who is there and WHAT is "tired"? "Tired" of a pound of meat every day to eat poor fellows?
            After all, they deserted precisely from the spare regiments, not at all from the front. These people did not see the front at all!
            1. Stas57
              Stas57 23 June 2016 21: 29
              0
              Quote: AK64
              So who is there and WHAT is "tired"? "Tired" of a pound of meat every day to eat poor fellows?
              After all, they deserted precisely from the spare regiments, not at all from the front. These people did not see the front at all!

              Yes, everyone, at home with a woman a mile, than even in stock
              1. AK64
                AK64 23 June 2016 21: 34
                -1
                Yes, everyone, at home with a woman a mile, than even in stock

                It’s clear that even fees can get bored
                However, no problems were observed until February.
                1. Stas57
                  Stas57 23 June 2016 23: 24
                  0
                  Quote: AK64
                  However, no problems were observed until February.

                  norot not, he feels great power
                  1. AK64
                    AK64 23 June 2016 23: 33
                    0
                    norot not, he feels great power

                    Exactly.
                    Well, when some of them decided that they were smarter than the tsar, then a direct and fair question arose: "if you are smarter than the tsar, then why then am I not smarter than you? After all, I also want to try the lady, and the young lady too"

                    Everything is as always simple: breaking the rules of the game - do not complain
      2. AK64
        AK64 23 June 2016 14: 01
        +1
        you haven’t answered me, how is it that with February to October were 1.5 million deserters of the glorious Orthodox army?
        no, I understand that you have "the damned scoop of people drove to the slaughter," and no one wanted to fight for the "damned Stalin." but what about the above facts?


        So be it "from February to October".
        Give what happened before February - then this will be the argument.
        And all that after February... This is already a collapse. Canceled God in February.

        That is, your argument just proves Bifiter’s thesis ...
    3. avt
      avt 23 June 2016 09: 01
      +3
      Quote: Beefeater
      . Departure from the tradition of the old Russian army. Including faith. Replacing religion with an ideological talk.
      fool
      Well, something like that, only there wasn’t enough priests, and if fighters would have been given censers instead of grenades .... the Germans would have laughed and would have taken them all, so the war would have ended on June 22.
      Quote: Beefeater
      Then, already during the war I had to return to this

      They had to return for a completely prosaic reason for the stupor of propaganda in view of the fact that the "proletarian solidarity" of the proletarians of all Europe, who, when attacking the first declared proletarian state - the USSR, instantly stuck right beyond the Bug, at least, a bayonet into the ground, or even completely the bourgeoisie will be raised on bayonets, flew like plywood over Paris. As a result, taking into account the realities of life that the war in fact against the whole of Europe became Patriotic again, they made the right conclusion and reconfigured the propaganda machine. kept in the form of the same film, "Alexander Nevsky", understandable to the entire population of the country, but the priest Stalin has already begun to spin on the prospect of a southern direction towards the Levant. He finally scored on them when he failed to bring the Moscow Patriarch to the Ecumenical ones after the war.
      1. White Guard
        White Guard 23 June 2016 13: 25
        -3
        Quote: avt
        flew like plywood over Paris.

        Yes, all your lousy ideology and propaganda flew! Relax.
        1. avt
          avt 23 June 2016 15: 45
          +1
          Quote: White Guard
          Yes, all your lousy ideology and propaganda flew!

          How is it in 1917 for the faith, the king and the fatherland? What is the outcome of the First World War for Russia?
          Quote: Altona
          Can’t we forget the French bun?

          And what will you sing in a similar situation today? “The process has started" ,,, Forgive me Russians "? Or quietly rolls for acceptance in French to crackle in the impulse of joining the new "aristocracy" "For the Motherland! For Stalin," people then went to Berlin and eventually beat everyone along the way. But who, for our house Gazprom, will you raise to the Mannerheim Cavalry Division - we'll see.
    4. Altona
      Altona 23 June 2016 09: 14
      +2
      Quote: Beefeater
      The reason for which no one said in 3 days. Departure from the tradition of the old Russian army, including from faith. Replacing religion with an ideological talking shop. Oblivion of the exploits of the great "royal" commanders. Then, already during the war, I had to return to this.

      ----------------------------
      Can't we forget the French bun? Bon Appetit. Either the Germans, like the Jews, were the first to put the commissars out of action and immediately shoot them. What's so harsh about the "talking shop"? The priests were not touched for some reason, they even allowed the parish to open.
      1. avt
        avt 23 June 2016 09: 35
        +1
        Quote: Altona
        Can’t we forget the French bun?

        request "People of servile rank are real dogs sometimes, the more severe the punishment, the dearer they are, gentlemen."
        Quote: Altona
        Bon Appetit

        Did you wish him a whip at the stable? laughing
        1. Altona
          Altona 23 June 2016 10: 00
          +6
          Quote: avt
          Did you wish him a whip at the stable?

          -------------------
          I mean, there is no need to get involved in ideology, where it does not exist at all. People in 1941 went and enrolled in the militia en masse and died. Well, there was no experience of such large-scale battles, neither the privates, nor their commanders, many were lost due to instincts. The morale was high, the people wanted to fight back the enemy. It's just that further failures will throw anyone into confusion. All these "shiny epaulettes" and "young cavalry guards" also fled from the Crimea in 1920, pushing women and children at the gangway onto the last steamer. Only now, people's memory relays are selective, they switch in combinations "necessary" for someone.
          1. Olezhek
            Olezhek 23 June 2016 11: 39
            -4
            All these "shiny epaulettes" and "young cavalry guards" also fled from the Crimea in 1920, pushing women and children at the gangway onto the last steamer.


            Do you recall 1914-15?

            Horse Guards ...
            1. Altona
              Altona 23 June 2016 13: 15
              +2
              Quote: Olezhek
              Do you recall 1914-15?

              ----------------
              Remind. There, in the same way, the front collapsed in 1915. And in 1914, the king-father nevertheless fought with the Entente against the Triple Alliance. And Blitzkrieg’s tactics did not exist then, that the Kaiser soldiers were walking and on horses, that the Russians.
              1. White Guard
                White Guard 23 June 2016 13: 30
                -2
                Quote: Altona
                There, in the same way, the front collapsed in 1915.

                Let's define the "collapsed front". And it’s not clear why the whole war was fighting at the border, if "the front collapsed"?
                Quote: Altona
                And in 1914, the king-father nevertheless fought with the Entente against the Triple Alliance.

                But grandfather Soso also interfered, considering that both France and Great Britain were at war with Germany and were fighting with it BEFORE Germany attacked the USSR ?!
                1. Altona
                  Altona 23 June 2016 13: 36
                  +2
                  Quote: White Guard
                  Let's define the "collapsed front". And it’s not clear why the whole war was fighting at the border, if "the front collapsed"?

                  --------------------
                  Which border? Poland, Courland and Galicia were given. What are you talking about? Keep in mind that the Germans from the West were robust. The heroes of the Somme propped up.
                  1. overb
                    overb 23 June 2016 22: 18
                    0
                    Quote: Altona
                    Which border? Poland, Courland and Galicia were given

                    But didn’t that Galicia, before 1MB, was part of Austria-Hungary? Those. gave someone else's?
                    Yes, and Courland in Poland called Russian somehow strange.
                    Quote: Altona
                    in Africa, Rommel drove them.

                    Yes, I drove very much. True, the German-Italian troops eventually surrendered, and Rommel himself barely took his feet on the plane. But the tales of how he drove them all there, they warm the soul of the scoop. Those. drove about the same as Paulus. The only difference is that Paulus on the plane did not cut off.
                    Quote: Altona
                    The United States did not at all fight Germany until 1944.

                    In the dark. Enchanting. But nothing that is already in 1942. Americans fought in the North. Africa? But nothing that in early July 1943. was Sicilian, and in the early days of September and Italian operations? As a result of which already September 8, 1943. Italy capitulated.
                    You would at least read something sometimes. And then write that.
                2. Altona
                  Altona 23 June 2016 13: 44
                  +1
                  Quote: White Guard
                  But grandfather Soso also interfered, considering that both France and Great Britain were at war with Germany and were fighting with it BEFORE Germany attacked the USSR ?!

                  ----------------------
                  Well, what kind of "fighting"? From Dunkirk, yes, we got bravely. The British fought in the sky and on the islands, in Africa Rommel drove them. But any front lines on the continent itself were never drawn. The French surrendered the country and went to drink Burgundy with the enemies. The United States did not fight Germany at all until 1944.
                3. Forest
                  Forest 23 June 2016 14: 48
                  +1
                  [quote = White Guard]
                  Let's define the "collapsed front". And it’s not clear why the whole war was fighting at the border, if "the front collapsed"?
                  Show the Germans the motorized units in the 1915, which could go the day before the 100 km along with all the means of amplification. In the WWII, everything was determined by the speed of the infantry on the march, which before that went under the machine guns, took 2-3 trenches, dragged guns on itself.
            2. AK64
              AK64 23 June 2016 15: 00
              +1
              Do you recall 1914-15?

              And what is wrong with 1914-15? Everything is fine there. Losses of the Russian army at the end of 1916 --- less than 600 thousand killed. (Of course, plus the wounded and prisoners, but compare the mastheads!)
          2. White Guard
            White Guard 23 June 2016 13: 28
            -3
            Quote: Altona
            People in 1941 walked and enlisted in mass militias and died.

            Yeah. Walked along. Very massively, which is the most interesting, and so massively that whole divisions from Central Asia went to defend Moscow, and "militias" were recorded right up to 1945, all new and new coming.
            Apparently in line 4 years stood for each other.
            1. Altona
              Altona 23 June 2016 13: 40
              +2
              Quote: White Guard
              Yeah. Walked along. Very massively, which is the most interesting, and so massively that whole divisions from Central Asia went to defend Moscow, and "militias" were recorded right up to 1945, all new and new coming.

              --------------------
              From Central Asia? From yesterday's basmachi chtoli? Here you have "enlightenment in the brain." Have you even been in the army? You can imagine the percentage ratio by nationality, which was in the government and in the army. If I continue to talk with you like this, then I will not go into your parallel reality. I "God save the king" do not sing in the morning.
            2. avt
              avt 23 June 2016 20: 00
              0
              Quote: White Guard
              Very massively, which is the most interesting, so massively that whole divisions

              Quote: Altona
              Here you have "enlightenment in the brain." Have you even been in the army?

              What for? God forbid such a thing in the Russian army! It's h ... u ... before. even quietly in a rag about the "August catastrophe" is silent! And you want him to know something else about the divisions of the people's militia, that even from Vyazma the Germans were accepted and left the encirclement, but then they were transferred to the cadres! Moscow volunteers. When I see or read these newly-minted agistokats of the noble assembly of the Proletarsky district, I immediately remember Bulgakov, well, his General Chernota
              Well, Paramon ... I, a sinful man, would purposely sign up with the Bolsheviks to shoot you. He would have shot him - and instantly wrote back.
              the cavalry guards are self-regained - knowledge with gulkin horseradish, for which aplomb - Poles can be jealous of the clairvoyant.
    5. Forest
      Forest 23 June 2016 09: 34
      +3
      In terms of improving morale, the words of the political officers did not differ from the priests, only they also fought and called to fight not for an illusory god, but for their land and family.
      1. Olezhek
        Olezhek 23 June 2016 11: 40
        -5
        and they called to fight not for the illusory god, but for their land and family.


        And even less illusory Bolshevikoff
        1. V.ic
          V.ic 23 June 2016 13: 08
          0
          Quote: Olezhek
          And even less illusory Bolshevikoff

          VKP (b)? Very rash, shitty little you ours.
        2. Forest
          Forest 23 June 2016 14: 43
          +1
          Given the number of Communists in the army, it’s quite real. And then a membership card is a piece of paper of a modern bureaucrat, who joins the party for the sake of a warm place, obliged a lot.
  6. fa2998
    fa2998 23 June 2016 08: 03
    -2
    Where did our "analysts" at the beginning of 41 count the Germans with 10000 tanks and 15000 aircraft? Incorrect data on enemy forces lead to mistakes in their plans. yes hi
    1. avt
      avt 23 June 2016 09: 16
      -1
      Quote: fa2998
      Where did our "analysts" at the beginning of 41 count 10000 tanks and 15000 aircraft among the Germans?

      Summed up all the captured equipment. It was believed that the Germans would certainly re-convert the Wehrmacht to the same French.
  7. Aleksander
    Aleksander 23 June 2016 08: 03
    0
    the education level of conscripts from villages and villages was overwhelmingly low. were organized educational courses, and a soldier, along with military affairs, was trained read elementary and write.

    Ay yai yay what lies and slander to the Soviet regime: everyone knows that illiteracy and even illiteracy were eliminated in the USSR to 1934 year yes lol
    This was compounded by the fact that at first in the Red Army as a class there were no junior commanders. In other armies, they were called non-commissioned officers, or sergeants.

    Strange, in the Red Army there were foremen and sergeants: were these not junior commanders?
    1. Altona
      Altona 23 June 2016 09: 21
      +3
      Quote: Aleksander
      Ay-yi-yi, what a lie and slander against the Soviet regime: everyone knows that illiteracy and even illiteracy were eliminated in the USSR by the 1934 year

      ----------------------
      My grandfather (mother's father) had 4 classes of education in a church school, meanwhile he was even a quartermaster in a clothing warehouse after being wounded, holding a captain's position, being a foreman. On the collective farm I was even, as they say now, the head of the settlement and a deputy of some level, I don't remember. People in the village came and directly demanded: "Solve the problem, Vasily, you are in power here." And I had to decide, sometimes people were even more illiterate and in general, except for the village and the regional center, they saw nothing.
    2. Aleksandr72
      Aleksandr72 23 June 2016 09: 34
      +1
      Regarding the elimination of illiteracy and even illiteracy in the USSR by 1934:
      According to preliminary census data conducted in January 1937, there were 62 illiterate citizens and 521 literate people in the country. Apart from children under ten years old, the ratio turned out to be a little less frightening - 486% of USSR citizens could neither read nor write. I don’t think that 61 years before the war the situation changed for the better.
      Regarding the junior commanders, whom sergeants and foremen represented in the Red Army, then in the armies of other developed states before the war, non-commissioned officers became a professional well-trained military caste on which the army was supported (especially in Germany, where another experienced non-commissioned officer enjoyed great authority than a freshly baked loitnant, and in the USA a screaming sergeant (photos of which we all recently had the pleasure of seeing on Topwar) is still not only a scarecrow for recruits (m not only them), but also the core on which the whole preparation is based training of rank-and-file staff in the army, on which officers rely and who actually command units, following orders and instructions of the officers.
      In the Red Army, the situation with the preparation of the junior command staff (especially after the avalanche-like increase in the number of troops and in connection with the introduction of universal military duty) was much worse.
      For example, here is what is thoroughly stated in an official document characterizing the state of affairs in the Red Army in 1940 - the Act on the Admission of the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR Union, Comrade Timoshenko S.K. from comrade Voroshilova K.E. dated May 07, 1940 (the document is very interesting and in my opinion sheds light on many reasons for the catastrophic unpreparedness of the Red Army for the upcoming war):
      ACCESSORIES AND DEVICES
      1. The People’s Commissariat (defense) does not have the exact established actual number of the Red Army at the time of reception due to the fault of the Main Directorate of the Red Army, the account is in an extremely neglected state. The personnel of the troops consisted of personnel and military personnel; the plan for the dismissal of the enlisted staff is in the process of development ...
      3. The ordinary and junior command personnel of the Red Army are diverse in their training, due to the presence of people of different nationalities called up from the reserve and drafted into the army.
      When the army was staffed with individuals of certain nationalities, the western districts (KOVO, ZAPOVO, and the Far Eastern Military District) were oversaturated with people who did not know the Russian language, which made their training difficult.
      4. The provision on the service of ordinary and junior command personnel, published in 1931, is outdated, unsuitable for management and no one uses it. A new provision defining the order of service has not been drawn up.

      and further in the same place:
      STAFF STAFF
      The lack of staff in the army is 21 percent. to staffing.
      It has been established that annual graduations from military schools over the past decade barely covered the natural decline, without creating reserves to ensure the growth of the army and the formation of reserves.
      There is no detailed plan for coverage of incomplete. The quality of training of command personnel is low, especially in the platoon-company unit, in which up to 68 percent. have only a short-term 6-month lieutenant training course.
      The training of the command staff in military schools was unsatisfactory, due to the poor quality of the programs, the lack of organization of classes, insufficient classes, insufficient loading of training time and especially weak field practical training.

      There is still a lot of interesting things, but in one comment all this cannot be reflected.
      1. sibiryak10
        sibiryak10 23 June 2016 14: 10
        +1
        Quote: Aleksandr72
        Regarding the elimination of illiteracy and even illiteracy in the USSR by 1934:
        According to preliminary census data conducted in January 1937, there were 62 illiterate citizens and 521 literate people in the country. Apart from children under ten years old, the ratio turned out to be a little less frightening - 486% of USSR citizens could neither read nor write. I don’t think that 61 years before the war the situation changed for the better ...


        The 1937 census was declared defective. And depending on how this information is presented. You can write that the literate population in the country was 74%, but it is possible that 26% could neither read nor write.
        According to the 1926 census, 56% were considered literate.
        According to the 1939 census, already 87%.
        And this despite the fact that in 1933 the transition to compulsory 7-year education was announced. Historian Yuri Yakovlev said that the inhabitants of Germany were extremely surprised by the high level of education of the "eastern slaves" driven to them. And not only in technical matters, the Russian peasant has always thought about them, but also in the humanities. We even taught a foreign (German) language in rural schools; in Germany, a foreign language was not taught in rural schools.
        And the fact that the Red Army did not know the materiel well was not a problem of education, but the sloppiness of their commanders and foremen.
        1. lesnik1978
          lesnik1978 23 June 2016 14: 16
          +1
          I confirm your words. My grandfather graduated from the seven-year plan, then a vocational school. After the war, until his retirement, he was the best specialist in his organization.
    3. Stas57
      Stas57 23 June 2016 09: 36
      0
      Quote: Aleksander
      Ay-yi-yi, what a lie and slander against the Soviet regime: everyone knows that illiteracy and even illiteracy were eliminated in the USSR by the 1934 year

      Well, does he have an 4 class of school, and what will he immediately be able to do in SVT40 or a mechanical drive on T34?
    4. Kenneth
      Kenneth 23 June 2016 09: 59
      -1
      There was even a song about them.
      1. V.ic
        V.ic 23 June 2016 13: 11
        -1
        Quote: Kenneth
        There was even a song about them.

        Something you do not sing today obscene hymns, as the first article of this author. Let me remind you: "repetition = mother of learning."
  8. Stas57
    Stas57 23 June 2016 09: 22
    +3
    The third. An unacceptable miscalculation was also made in determining the timing of bringing the Soviet troops into full combat readiness.

    but it would not have spared anyway. repeatedly compared divisions "in underpants" (87th SD lasted more than a day) and divisions in full battlefield (about 125th SD), and it is not a fact that the latter were better. Much depended on the division itself and its command.

    Serious miscalculations were made by the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff in assessing the real balance of power of the parties. Recall intelligence reports, where the data on the number of German divisions did not correspond to reality: then there are 103, and then 120. In fact, the divisions were 191

    so who is to blame?
    intelligence or people's commissar?
    People’s Commissariat determined at least 180 of German divisions, with allies up to 240 (note by Tymoshenko and Zhukov from 15 on May 1941)
    and intelligence reported 120, but NGOs are to blame
    Sixth. The defeat of the Soviet troops in border battles in that situation was inevitable due to the numerical superiority of the enemy in most areas, not to mention the main ones. The tragedy was that the Soviet divisions in the first echelon were much smaller than the German (with their almost equal capabilities). So, in PribOVO in the first echelon there were only 7sd against 21 German divisions. That is, 3: 1. The classic version. And despite the fact that the German division is stronger than the Soviet on average 1,6 times, the advantage is obtained almost 5 times.

    cards must be posted, dear, cards and not pictures
    Note card not without blots.

    Stalin had reliable information about the concentration and deployment of the Nazi army on the Soviet borders and about its preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. But he regarded them as contradictory, inaccurate, provocative.

    howls again went, I wrote earlier, there was a powerful disinformation company.
    how was this sorted out?

    4 April 1941 of the year: “The start of hostilities should be preceded by an ultimatum to the Soviet Union with a proposal to accede to the Covenant of Three.”

    5 May: “Germany will be required from the USSR to speak out against England on the side of the Axis powers. As a guarantee that the USSR will fight on the Axis side to a decisive end, Germany will demand from the USSR the occupation by the German army of Ukraine and, possibly, also the Baltic states. ”

    May 9: “First, Germany will present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding wider exports to Germany and the rejection of communist propaganda ... An ultimatum will be preceded by a“ war of nerves ”in order to demoralize the Soviet Union.”

    9 June: "Germany will present to the USSR a demand for the Germans to be given economic leadership in Ukraine and for the use of the Soviet Navy against England."
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 23 June 2016 09: 34
      +1
      Stalin had reliable information about the concentration and deployment of the Nazi army on the Soviet borders and about its preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. But he regarded them as contradictory, inaccurate, provocative. His goal was not to push the Soviet government to such steps that could be used by the fascist clique to break the non-aggression pact

      again howls, I repeat, there was a powerful company of desa, including about ultimatums (see above), and about the number of divisions that intelligence did not open, and about the start date, which 3 times rescheduled. As a result of which the Soviet command had such an opinion, erroneous, as we all now know, but then it was not so obvious.
      1. avt
        avt 23 June 2016 09: 48
        0
        Quote: Stas57
        Stalin had reliable information about the concentration and deployment of the Nazi army on the Soviet borders and about its preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. But he regarded them as contradictory, inaccurate, provocative. His goal was not to push the Soviet government to such steps that could be used by the fascist clique to break the non-aggression pact
        again howls, I repeat, there was a powerful company of desa, including about ultimatums (see above), and about the number of divisions that intelligence had not opened, and about the start date, which had been postponed 3 times.

        request And what do you actually want ??? Indicate yourself
        Quote: Stas57
        as we all know now

        Here they are now, as small children, they are completely driving away from the brain
        Quote: Stas57
        but then it was not so obvious.
  9. Kenneth
    Kenneth 23 June 2016 09: 58
    0
    Better and better. This review can be considered quite professional. The only thing somewhat surprising is the use of Beschanov, who does not seem to me to be too addicted for the historian. And further. It is interesting whether the author will consider the reasons associated with industry and logistics. I think these reasons are no less important than military miscalculations
  10. avia12005
    avia12005 23 June 2016 10: 05
    +5
    In order to understand the truth about the summer of 41, you just need to watch the pre-war films. The most famous of them is "If there is war tomorrow." But there are many others, much less known - "Deep Raid", "Tankers" and others. So, these films were actually a methodological guide for preparing for the war that the USSR was waiting for. Brief summary:

    1. The war will begin with a surprise attack, and then with long battles and air strikes on border and border areas.
    2. There will be time to carry out mobilization and preparation for counterattacks.
    3. The enemy will have about the same forces as the Red Army.
    4. The level of training and technical equipment of the enemy is about the same as that of the Red Army.
    5. Germany was clearly recognized as a potential adversary.

    Thus, a simultaneous strike by strong groups with a massive use of tanks and aircraft on narrow sectors of the front was not supposed at all. Based on the pre-war ideas, the Soviet troops were stretched along all lines of the Soviet-German border. And the superiority of the Germans in the organization of communications and control on the battlefield, logistics and logistics, the mobility of the troops at the expense of better staffing with cars and horses immediately affected the course of combat operations. In addition, despite the cries of modern liberal historians about the alleged mass destruction of commanders before the war, looseness and sloppiness flourished in the Red Army, it is enough to read the pre-war orders of the People's Commissar of Defense.

    At the same time, starting from 22 June, separate units, formations, not to mention ordinary soldiers and commanders, showed mass heroism. It seems that there were many of these, but, unfortunately, historians are looking for this truth of the war much less; most prefer to engage in slander and slander the actions of the Red Army in the initial period of the war.

    It is obvious that if a division keeps defense on the assigned sector, then if at least one battalion of a regiment runs, and the enemy, taking advantage of the organization of intelligence, control and communications, immediately installs this section and throws solid forces there, then no the heroism of the remaining battalions and regiments no longer helps.

    Conclusion: in such a state, the Red Army defeats 41-th-42-th years were inevitable. Another question: was it possible to somehow minimize them?

    Eternal glory to the heroes of 41 ...
    1. avt
      avt 23 June 2016 10: 20
      0
      Quote: avia12005
      In order to understand the truth about the summer of 41, you just need to watch the pre-war films. The most famous of them is "If there is war tomorrow." But there are many others, much less known - "Deep Raid", "Tankers" and others. So, these films were actually a methodological guide for preparing for the war that the USSR was waiting for.

      Tell me the country in which films about their own defeat were then filmed and a deep defense with incredible losses was simply promoted. Well, the corresponding songs about complete and inevitable death and retreat were sung in which troops? This is how I had a chance to watch in the 90s the US pre-war film about the pilots of carrier-based aircraft, well, one to one "Fighters", only that Bernes does not sing songs even in English. blow up a bridge somewhere in New York, or some other San Francisco-Los Angeles, so it certainly had to collapse on an American battleship, in general - GlavPur is resting with a script.
      Quote: avia12005


      Conclusion: in this state of the Red Army, defeats of the 41st-42nd years were inevitable. Another question: was it possible to somehow minimize them?
      No way. Well, if only by transferring the Nazi attack for at least a year, as Stalin had hoped, or in general - the Germans would be afraid to attack, in short - you need to write fantasy.
      1. Altona
        Altona 23 June 2016 10: 35
        +7
        Quote: avt
        No way. Well, if only by transferring the Nazi attack for at least a year, as Stalin had hoped, or in general - the Germans would be afraid to attack, in short - you need to write fantasy.

        ---------------------
        But the blitzkrieg was still ripped off. Fierce battles in boilers, at Smolensk and Vyazma. Yes, it was difficult to fight, but the Germans approached Moscow only in October, having lost the summer as a favorable period for the offensive. Moreover, in the occupied territory all the same, centers of resistance were created. Our partisan detachments were professional, as the leadership included party workers from the former regional committee or district committee and security officials as organizers. In Europe, too, there were strong armies, numerous at least. Why did Poland and France surrender in a month? When attacking Poland, she could well count on French help. In total, they could very well fight back from the Wehrmacht. But the heroes of Verdun and the Somme somehow didn’t show themselves anymore, and the Pilsudski Reitars bravely plundered Czechoslovakia as they waned.
        1. avt
          avt 23 June 2016 10: 56
          +2
          Quote: Altona
          But the blitzkrieg was still ripped off

          Well, objective reality, given the feeling that grandfathers fought unlike
          Quote: Altona
          . In Europe, too, there were strong armies, numerous at least. Why did Poland and France surrender in a month?

          Moreover, they do not bother with calls for "depiludization" or some other kind of de ... zation.
          Quote: Altona
          But the heroes of Verdun and the Somme somehow didn’t show themselves anymore, and the Pilsudski Reitars bravely plundered Czechoslovakia as they waned.

          Here, just recently, at Babayan, a puffy Poles agreed that de Poland should have united with Hitler. And this .... here we were giving some students lectures! negative Moreover, a funny fact, which stubbornly doesn’t smell like its own principle, of signing a cooperation agreement with Hitler and JOINTing pan-Hitler’s territory with Czech Hitler, is silently silent.
          1. Altona
            Altona 23 June 2016 11: 07
            +2
            Quote: avt
            Here, just recently, at Babayan, a puffy Poles agreed that de Poland should have united with Hitler. And this .... here we were giving some students lectures!

            ---------------------
            But why are the Poles not quoting Pilsudski himself? He spoke very unflatteringly about the gentry and Polish officers. The Polish General Staff resembles a brothel, and each officer resembles the Mazovian Kurva, who immediately sells secret information to British, German and any other intelligence. Our headquarters are passage yards for foreign attaches, they smelled of cigars and cognac. About these words he described the Polish army.
          2. Altona
            Altona 23 June 2016 22: 23
            0
            Quote: avt
            Well, objective reality, given the feeling that grandfathers fought unlike

            ------------------
            By the way, my nickname Altona means the code word for the cancellation of the attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941, the code word for the attack was Dortmund and it sounded.
        2. Igor V
          Igor V 23 June 2016 16: 59
          0
          Poland could not, but had to count on France and B. Britain, according to two treaties. At the Nuremberg trials, General Halder (NSW of the Wehrmacht's ground forces until the 42nd year) said that if 100 Anglo-French divisions standing on the western borders of Germany had executed the treaty and attacked Germany, they would inevitably be defeated, since in the West German there were no troops.
    2. Stas57
      Stas57 23 June 2016 10: 38
      0
      Quote: avia12005
      Conclusion: in such a state, the Red Army defeats 41-th-42-th years were inevitable. Another question: was it possible to somehow minimize them?

      stop stop. But what about howling about betrayal around ?!
      I somehow remember these days who and what says
      1. Serg65
        Serg65 23 June 2016 10: 56
        +1
        Quote: Stas57
        I somehow remember these days who and what says

        laughing Stas, and you, I see a true follower of Mario Moretti! good
        1. Stas57
          Stas57 23 June 2016 10: 59
          0
          Quote: Serg65
          Mario Moretti

          only Renato Kurcho
          1. Serg65
            Serg65 23 June 2016 11: 24
            +2
            Quote: Stas57
            only Renato Kurcho

            About how! what Well then, I don’t envy the avia12005 revisionist .... somehow his deeds are bad!
      2. avia12005
        avia12005 23 June 2016 18: 36
        0
        Dear, I just said that this version has the right to be)))
  11. potapych
    potapych 23 June 2016 10: 21
    +1
    based on the foregoing, the Red Army was not ready for war
    1. AK64
      AK64 23 June 2016 15: 08
      -1
      based on the foregoing, the Red Army was not ready for war

      You were not part of the party committees? Just once I see a member of the party committee ....

      WHO, WHEN and WHERE is "ready" for war?
      So I will tell you a secret: no one, ever and never was ready for war.

      Given all the objective and subjective circumstances, I would rate the degree of preparedness for war at about 4. Which is VERY good.
  12. Tektor
    Tektor 23 June 2016 10: 55
    0
    It is necessary to add a little about the Stalin line, at the turn of which it was planned to stop the advance of the enemy. The Stalin line turned out to be absolutely useless, except for individual centers of resistance in the Kiev district, where it was planned to stop the main blow of the Germans. It turned out that against the tanks this line had nothing to hinder their advance: there were no anti-tank guns. Either they did not have time to install them, or they did not think of it. The Stalin line did not become the Mannerheim line, unfortunately. Well, against the long-term firing points and bastions, the Germans turned out to be very effective weapons - tanks and flamethrowers.
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 23 June 2016 11: 00
      0
      Quote: Tektor
      Either they didn’t have time to install them, or they didn’t come up with

      either she was not ready, because the equipment was removed for the Molotov line, but they did not put a new one.
      good to be rich and happy (c)
      1. AK64
        AK64 23 June 2016 15: 15
        +1
        either she was not ready, because the equipment was removed for the Molotov line, but they did not put a new one.


        Not a fact
        Artillery pillboxes were not initially envisaged on the "Stalin's line".
        This line was designed in the 20s, and against Poland. Machine-gun ddoty, and frontal fire (who in the know he understood).

        The degree of readiness by 1939 was 40 percent. Even where the structures were more or less completed, HUGE work was needed to clear the sectors, including dig-dig-dig, so that the glitches were smooth.

        In addition, the length of the TOI border was much longer than the borders of 1941, and accordingly the construction needed much more to cover the line with some reasonable density ...

        In general, it is unthinkable.

        Nevertheless, 30A near Kiev relied on the SD and stopped the Germans. Well, on the border with the Baltic states, we managed to slow down the villains a little. But there were simply not enough troops to put a more or less adequate "fence".
        1. disgraced shooter
          disgraced shooter 23 June 2016 18: 11
          -1
          Quote: AK64
          either she was not ready, because the equipment was removed for the Molotov line, but they did not put a new one.


          Not a fact
          Artillery pillboxes were not initially envisaged on the "Stalin's line".
          This line was designed in the 20s, and against Poland. Machine-gun ddoty, and frontal fire (who in the know he understood).

          The degree of readiness by 1939 was 40 percent. Even where the structures were more or less completed, HUGE work was needed to clear the sectors, including dig-dig-dig, so that the glitches were smooth.

          In addition, the length of the TOI border was much longer than the borders of 1941, and accordingly the construction needed much more to cover the line with some reasonable density ...

          In general, it is unthinkable.

          Nevertheless, 30A near Kiev relied on the SD and stopped the Germans. Well, on the border with the Baltic states, we managed to slow down the villains a little. But there were simply not enough troops to put a more or less adequate "fence".

          And the Germans at Rzhev so buried without any UROV there that until they themselves left they couldn’t knock them out for almost a year. And you speak so dismissively of Stalin’s unfinished line.
          1. AK64
            AK64 23 June 2016 18: 44
            +1
            And the Germans at Rzhev so buried without any UROV there that until they themselves left they couldn’t knock them out for almost a year. And you speak so dismissively of Stalin’s unfinished line.

            (1) I would strongly advise you to address strangers on "you"
            (2) How many kilometers of the front did the Germans buried near Rzhev? 50km? Or whole 100 km? So - the old border - "Stalin's line" - covered MORE than 1000 km.
            A pocket will not crack 1000 km of "Rzhev fortifications" to build? Which shih-shi? And how many troops do you need to plant there so that there would be "Rzhev density"?

            Why compare the incompatible?

            Well, in some places ... I wrote that 30A, relying on the Kiev UR, stopped the Germans. On the border with Estonia, in the old Ura, they were able to create problems a little bit (but there were not enough troops there).

            In general, rivers are better than any UR. And the rivers were: Bug, Neman. Further, Dvina, Dnieper (the Dnieper is the one in Belarus, not in Ukraine)
  13. Igor V
    Igor V 23 June 2016 11: 13
    +1
    Every time I want to remind you that only two military commanders transmitted the directive of 21.06.41/21.06.41/XNUMX on full combat readiness by a signal on the RADIO radio, the rest hoped to be delivered personally to the troops. Those forces that received an urgency signal turned around in time and rebuffed the enemy. It was Odessa OBO and KBF. The rest received when the war actually began. XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX at the meeting of the GKO all the commanders of the Special Military Command were present, they arrived in the troops by the beginning of the war, so in the first hours the chiefs of staff commanded.
    About education. Higher education institutions give higher civil and secondary military education, higher military education gives the academy. So it’s not clear what education was meant. For example, NPKamanin commanded a division, then a corps, had an academy, but did not get into statistics.
    1. Igor V
      Igor V 23 June 2016 11: 56
      +2
      I will add about education. After the civil war, talented commanders emerged with great ranks, but did not have the proper education. Someone was sent to the academy, but it was impossible to send everyone to study. Therefore, permanent academic courses "Shot" were organized, which ceased to exist quite recently. Zhukov, Rokossovsky, and many others were trained there. So, speaking about education, we must remember about these courses. Those with great ranks had to go through all lower positions. For example, Meretskov, the deputy commander of the Moscow Military District, was sent for six months as chief of staff of a division (then there were legends about him in this division), then as commander of the Red Banner Division to the Far East. Now ignorant historians are scratching their turnips, seeing such transformations, and they are devising what.
  14. Cartalon
    Cartalon 23 June 2016 11: 18
    +3
    Strange conversations, the mobilized army attacked the non-mobilized one and naturally defeated it, then the Germans had continuous superiority in the quality of troops, since we threw unprepared reserves into battle, we could minimize the damage by bringing the number of divisions of the western districts to wartime states, it seems that Zhukov said Simonov, but instead they formed a huge number of new compounds for which there were no personnel, no transport, no means of communication.
    1. AK64
      AK64 23 June 2016 15: 20
      +1
      Strange conversations, the mobilized army attacked the non-mobilized one and naturally defeated it.


      In-in. (+1) line - and that's it. And do not smear the snot on the table.

      But to understand this obvious fact, even here, where the public should more or less have to be prepared, it can be good if 10%.

      And USE scolded .... They would have looked at themselves.
  15. The comment was deleted.
  16. Jurkovs
    Jurkovs 23 June 2016 12: 58
    +3
    A hundred opinions are about the reasons for the collapse of the Red Army in 41 years. Once, on a completely foreign site, I read an opinion that actually killed me. The main thing is the difference in mass education in the USSR and Germany. In the USSR, at the beginning of the war, secondary education in the country was 4 classes, and Nazi Germany inherited the best education system in the world of the Weimar Republic at that time. German conscripts had 10 classes, plus they knew how to drive a car and knew radio business. The German mechanized troops did not feel the need for driver mechanics, and the junior command staff was able to creatively apply the provisions of the charters, and they never put manpower under attack. At the beginning of the war, the middle and highest command personnel surpassed ours by head. The essence of our feat lies in the fact that we have completed all universities on our own mistakes and by the beginning of 44 have confidently surpassed the Germans. The main thing is not just personnel, but trained personnel.
    1. Parsec
      Parsec 23 June 2016 14: 49
      +1
      Quote: Jurkovs
      German conscripts had 10 classes, plus they knew how to drive a car and knew radio business. The German mechanized troops did not feel the need for driver mechanics, and the junior command staff was able to creatively apply the provisions of the charters, and they never put manpower under attack. At the beginning of the war, the middle and highest command personnel surpassed ours by head.


      Wehrmacht Drocher?

      Where does the data on the polls 10 classes come from?

      "and the junior command staff knew how to creatively apply the provisions of the statutes" - here you are.
  17. The comment was deleted.
  18. Vadim2013
    Vadim2013 23 June 2016 14: 26
    0
    The article is interesting. It must be added that the tank and artillery units did not have the required number of vehicles to supply them with ammunition and fuel. The repair service of these parts was also weak.
  19. antivirus
    antivirus 23 June 2016 14: 36
    0
    "" And the last thing - about the technical and educational level of the Red Army soldiers and combat experience. Before the Second World War, two-thirds of the population of the USSR lived in rural areas, the level of education and skills in handling equipment of draftees from villages and villages in the overwhelming number of cases was depressingly low. There was no need to talk about the experience of driving a motorcycle or car.

    Thus, initially only due to a more competent and technically trained soldier, the Wehrmacht had a significant advantage over the Red Army. The Soviet leadership was well aware of these problems, and before the war, literacy classes were organized, and the soldiers along with military training were taught to read and write. By the way, this was partly due to the extraordinary popularity of the Red Army among young people, who not only did not seek to "retract" from military service, but were eager to serve!

    Despite the titanic efforts to eliminate the illiteracy of the Red Army soldiers, it was still very far from the average literacy of the German army. German superiority also grew due to higher discipline, individual training and a well-thought-out training system, originating in the "army of professionals" - the Reichswehr. ""
    I completely agree, this is my conclusion and now we are behind the Germans and the United States Jap in a simple, routine, measured and properly organized work
    And in 41-43 years and up to 45 g, they jumped above their heads at each line (dodging a bullet in the air) and won in defiance of the logic of the West.
    1. sibiryak10
      sibiryak10 24 June 2016 07: 22
      +3
      The myth of the intellectual superiority of the Aryan race and the primeval illiteracy of Soviet people before the Second World War was very firmly entrenched in some heads. And here are the facts:
      “Numerous reports indicate that the ostarbeiters sent to military enterprises with their technical awareness directly puzzled German workers (Bremen, Reichenberg, Stettin, Frankfurt an der Oder, Berlin, Halle, Dortmund, Kiel and Beireut). One worker from Beireut in this regard said: "Our propaganda always presents Russians as stupid and stupid. But I have established the opposite here. During work, Russians think and do not look so stupid at all. For me, it is better to have 2 Russians at work than 5 Italians" ...
      Many reports indicate that a worker from the former Soviet regions is particularly aware of all technical devices. So, a German on his own experience more than once made sure that an Ostarbeiter, who by doing the most primitive means when doing work, can eliminate any kind of damage in motors, etc. Various examples of this kind are cited in a report from Frankfurt-on-Oder: “At one estate, the Soviet military prisoner figured out the engine with which the German experts did not know what to do: in a short time he launched it and discovered it in the box transmission gear damage that has not yet been noticed by the Germans serving the tractor. "

      In Landsberg-on-Warta, the German brigade leaders instructed Soviet prisoners of war, most of whom came from the countryside, on the procedure for unloading machine parts. But this instruction was perceived by the Russians shaking their heads, and they did not follow him. They performed the unloading much faster and technically more practical, so their ingenuity greatly amazed the German employees.

      The director of a Silesian flax spinner (the city of Glogau), regarding the use of Ostarbeiters, stated the following: “Ostarbeiters sent here immediately demonstrate technical awareness and do not need more training than the Germans.”
      Ostarbeiters can still make something worthwhile from “all sorts of rubbish”, for example, from old hoops to make spoons, knives, etc. From one workshop, the matting reports that braiding machines, which have long been in need of repair, were brought to primitive means by ostarbeiters again. And it was done as well as if it was a specialist.

      From the striking number of students among Ostarbeiters, the German population concludes that the level of education in the Soviet Union is not as low as we often saw it.

      The German workers, who had the opportunity to observe the technical skills of the Ostarbeiters in production, believe that, in all probability, not the best of the Russians came to Germany, since the Bolsheviks sent their most skilled workers from large enterprises to the Urals.

      In all this, many Germans find a definite explanation for the unheard-of amount of weapons from the enemy, which they began to report to us during the war in the east. The very large number of good and sophisticated weapons testifies to the availability of qualified engineers and specialists. The people who led the Soviet Union to such advances in military production must have undeniable technical prowess. "
      Chief of Security Police and SD, Directorate III
      Berlin, 15 April 1943


      SV II, Prince Albrechtstraße, 8.
      Secret!
      Ex. N 74
      Personally - Report immediately!

      Messages from the empire N 376

      Source - Bundesarchiv Koblenz. Reichssicherheitshauptamt. R 58/182. Meldungen aus dem Reich Nr. 376
      Translation and first publication of Candidate of Historical Sciences Anatoly Yakushevsky, Source, N3, 1995
  20. antivirus
    antivirus 23 June 2016 14: 41
    0
    In 1929, 81,6% of the cadets admitted to military schools came there with only primary education in grades 2-4. In infantry schools, this percentage was even higher - 90,8%. This was explained not only by the low average level of education in the USSR, which, albeit slowly, but thanks to a consistent state program, continued to rise. - I have a "MONUMENT" of my grandmother born in 1902. written approx in the 60th year (already for the health of the elder brother 59 g). All my life and with such knowledge of spelling.
  21. antivirus
    antivirus 23 June 2016 14: 57
    +1
    Who knows how the quantity goes into quality?
    Amount of sweat and blood in the red flag above the Reichstag?
    Life to live is not a field to go over.
  22. Arkan
    Arkan 23 June 2016 15: 27
    0
    But the brilliant Potemkin also said that to make a soldier you need a man with a woman and a darker night. For an officer, give me time, money, knowledge ... V. Pikul "I have the honor."


    Education is the basis, the foundations of the State, and the Army, as its most important part. My grandfather had four classes of the Central Specialized School, as a competent soldier he was sent to a military school, where he received the specialty of artilleryman. He met the war as commander of an artillery platoon in anti-tank artillery and went through the whole war. There were a lot of people like my grandfather, it was they, though not very educated, who defeated fascism.
  23. samarin1969
    samarin1969 23 June 2016 17: 28
    +1
    The topic of the Red Army's defeats is complex. There is hardly anyone who will 100% agree with the author's arguments and conclusions. But in general - "+". There are many reasons, you can find 5, you can - 10,15,20. (as well as the reasons for the collapse of Napoleon)

    Of all the memoirs on both front lines, the following is evident:
    1) The fatal reason was unprepared manic "counterattacks" (... I do not share the enthusiasm for Smolensk); (the main reason).
    2) Poor tank crew training.
    3) I disagree with the author about the inability to "dig into the ground." German generals did not hide their irritation when they had to deal with prepared positions and noted the strength of the Russian artillery.
    4) I do not consider the level of literacy of ordinary personnel a significant factor. The savvy and courage of the Red Army partially made up for this shortcoming.
  24. Prince of Pensions
    Prince of Pensions 23 June 2016 19: 11
    +2
    Quote: qqqq
    Quote: No one
    That is, I want to say that if the Soviet generals met the requirements that were imposed on them, such a crushing defeat would not have happened - this is the main reason for the defeats.


    I support. Even if we had the Barbarossa plan with all the details, the result would be the same. Our generals were not ready for such a war. In all fairness, no country was prepared for a war against Germany.

    I support. There would be no trouble during the change of power, the readiness of the army would be different. Just did not have time.
    But the country was not given up as some.
  25. zenion
    zenion 23 June 2016 19: 24
    +2
    Of course, as the author suggests, it was necessary to concentrate more forces on the border, so that the Germans would not be tormented in catching up with the Red Army, but would shut it immediately into a mousetrap. Only the fact that the army was scattered over a large territory saved her. It made it possible to prepare reserves. And, of course, the strong resistance of the Red Army fighters spoiled the Nazis holiday. It remains only to connect the rear with the front and win the war, which Stalin did.
  26. gendir.grifon
    gendir.grifon 23 June 2016 22: 28
    0
    In the process, again, the bloody tyrant Stalin is to blame for everything ...
  27. Alexander Greene
    Alexander Greene 23 June 2016 22: 48
    +1
    One of the main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the 1941 year is the lack of radio communications in units, on airplanes, on tanks.
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 23 June 2016 23: 25
      0
      Quote: Alexander Green
      One of the main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the 1941 year is the lack of radio communications in units, on airplanes, on tanks.

      the connection is important, but there are two dozen such reasons
  28. Cosmonaut
    Cosmonaut 23 June 2016 22: 49
    +1
    Quote: No one
    I read the article and wonder, the author makes stupid mistakes. ... - this is the main cause of defeat.

    With all due respect, but why argue with the article ???! Go to the archive, read the available documents and maps! Then, immediately to the Academy, to the department of military history! Do not forget to tell what will be done there with you! wink
    PS. in fact, you’ll still encounter a problem on the threshold of the archive, incl. tryndet - this is not to get into the archive !!! request
  29. Cosmonaut
    Cosmonaut 23 June 2016 23: 37
    +1
    Quote: V.ic
    Quote: AK64
    The Russians were half illiterate, even in the sense of "reading." But there were also non-Russians who could not only “read”, but also banal “understand orders”.

    Let's start at the end. As for the "half" illiteracy, it depends on the quality of your brains. My grandfather was drafted into the army in 1913 and had four classes in a parish school. My father graduated from the pedagogical college in 1938, and in 1939 he served in the Barabash-Levada KDVO. Now the illiterate / functional / seems to be no more than when Comrade. Stalin!
    Quote: AK64
    And the Red Army had 25 tanks. To speak of any "Mannerheim's plan" in such conditions seems somehow ridiculous.

    Is this according to fascist statistics? Well, what practical "hit" was in the Red Army in 1941? How many hours per year? How many individual crews were fired on? How much gasoline was released for crew training in 1941?
    Quote: AK64
    Quite the opposite: the initiative to some extent compensates for the shortcomings in experience and management.

    Helpful d.rak worse than the enemy!
    Quote: AK64
    He did not "select" anything and could not choose according to his position - this kind of choice is outside the competence of Us General Staff.

    So tell us about YOUR GSH.
    Quote: AK64
    His experience was limited to offensive actions.
    At that time Dukov had no "experience" at all. All his "experience" is one corps-scale operation. (Yes, even that was not planned and prepared by him - it was not for nothing that Zhukov did not mention the name of his chief of staff!)

    Read, finally, about the correlation of forces and means at Khalkhin-Gol! On both sides .... Case scale pa-a-no-ma-a-sh!
    Quote: AK64
    More precisely, no education at all. Thank God that he knew how to read. (I already had problems with "writing".)

    Did you take exams from him personally? No.

    "... My grandfather was drafted into the army in 1913, had four classes in a parish school. (those. born circa 1893) if "Father in 1938 graduated from the pedagogical college, in 1939 he did military service ..." (c. 1919-1922)"
    No comments !!!! One question, V.ic, how old are you ??? !!! (my grandfather, born in 1913, went through two wars, left us at 86)
  30. alstr
    alstr 24 June 2016 12: 46
    +1
    Quote: AK64
    . At the same time, Zhukov was well aware that he was not a staff officer.

    Zhukov did not "realize" anything and could not "realize" anything. He was unconscious.

    However, he initially refused the post and was appointed by the willful decision of Stalin.


    Ordinary and middle commanders were much closer to the level of competency than generals - the higher the level, the lower the competence. (However, of course, the requirements for competence will grow exponentially from levels)

    Judging by the well-known fact of not mastering SVT, the competence was low. Which was confirmed by checks. And this is the infantry. About the fact that there was a lack of drivers for equipment and a massive tank failure due to poor training of driver mechanics on new tanks.
    So the competence was low for everyone. Just at a higher level, it is more noticeable.


    By the way, we note that with the abolition of the institute of commissars in the autumn of 42, victories gradually began to appear.

    Just those who would like to surrender - by that time they had already surrendered. So the need to control disappeared.

    Not only. Just commanding with an eye on someone nearby and without are two big differences.


    In principle, the main cause is not miscalculations in determining the place of the strike, its time, namely, in the training of troops.

    Private training was more or less adequate.

    Even if this is so, then I talked about the low training of the military. The troops consist not only of rank and file and commanders. But also their interaction.


    The Germans managed to deploy their Wehrmacht out of 100 thousand Reichswehr somehow, didn't they? And they didn’t complain somehow.

    Yes, from 34 g to 39 g the army increased from 100 thousand to 3 million, but there is a fundamental difference. In Germany, during this period, there was a crisis, and initially they were selected for the army by competition and it was considered prestigious to get into the army, i.e. there was a significant excess of those who wanted to serve. Accordingly, they (i.e., the most qualitatively selected) became commanders during the expansion.

    And we have the opposite. Serving was not considered prestigious, but there was a lot of work. There were no normal qualified personnel. Therefore, there was a significant percentage of those in the army who could not find a job elsewhere. If you remember, the Government had to introduce measures to increase the attractiveness of military service. Therefore, the purge of 37-38 was, to some extent, forced to remove the most incompetent. But at the same time, as Chernomyrdin said: "We wanted the best, but it turned out as always." Those. not all were removed, but even those who remained even from the normal commanders could not cope with the rapid growth.
    1. AK64
      AK64 24 June 2016 13: 00
      +1
      However, he initially refused the post and was appointed by the willful decision of Stalin.

      How do you know that?
      How can you know this?
      You DO NOT know this --- therefore a fairy tale.


      Ordinary and middle commanders were much closer to the level of competency than generals - the higher the level, the lower the competence. (However, of course, the requirements for competence will grow exponentially from levels)


      Judging by the well-known fact of not mastering SVT, the competence was low.

      Story. All fully mastered, no problem.
      The problems were not with "failed", but with the usual Russian slovenliness: the gas distribution regulator was corny opened to the full - hence the problems.


      Which was confirmed by checks. And this is the infantry. About the fact that there was a lack of drivers for equipment and a massive tank failure due to poor training of driver mechanics on new tanks.

      Was, was.
      But this is something else — if there are no mechvods — what can we say about divisional commanders? Or do you think that preparing a driver from scratch is easier than a divisor?
      The point is that the higher the level, the stronger the gap between "what is" and "what should be."


      So the competence was low for everyone. Just at a higher level, it is more noticeable.

      Нет!
      At a higher level - and the requirements are much higher. And the backlog of requirements is greater.

      Not only. Just commanding with an eye on someone nearby and without are two big differences.

      Once again, I propose: look at the number of generals captured in 1941 and their behavior in captivity. You look and understand why the commissars were in the 41st.

      Yes, the commissar interferes with a normal commander. But note that no one canceled the "members of the military council". Khrushchev continued to "fight".


      Even if this is so, then I talked about the low training of the military. The troops consist not only of rank and file and commanders. But also their interaction.

      Also more or less adequate.

      No need to wander in three pines:
      It has already been announced --- the unmobilized army is not combat-ready. And it's all. The clash between the mobilized and non-mobilized army can only end with the defeat of the second. The only question is the extent of the rout.
  31. Falcon5555
    Falcon5555 24 June 2016 15: 03
    +3
    I did not see anything in these orders about organizing ambushes against advancing advanced units (wedges), all kinds of hidden positions along the front or from the flanks in the direction of travel, from forest belts, etc., ambushes against their supply and rear transportation vehicles, ambushes with subsequent capture advancing into boilers (there, in orders, only about attacks on the flank and rear, but not about organizing the boiler), an ambush followed by a hidden retreat after the enemy convoy unfolds in battle formation, begins artillery preparation, and spends shells, time. Nothing about the massive waste of large parts with the evacuation of the population. Nothing about air defense, nothing about your aerial reconnaissance and the enemy, the need to take it into account and deceive, nothing about getting out of the bombing.
  32. alstr
    alstr 24 June 2016 15: 39
    +1
    [quote] [quote] However, the post was initially abandoned and appointed by the willful decision of Stalin. [/ quote]
    How do you know that?
    How can you know this?
    You DO NOT know this --- therefore a fairy tale.
    [/ Quote]
    This episode is described in Zhukov’s memoirs. And there really is no real evidence for this. But such a conversation could very well have happened.

    On this occasion, I found an interesting book (more precisely, a chapter).
    http://rutlib.com/book/4720/p/62
    In my opinion both are the most objective to this issue.
    But the fact remains. The decision to appoint Zhukov was made by Stalin.

    [Quote]
    Judging by the well-known fact of not mastering SVT, the competence was low. [/ quote]
    Story. All fully mastered, no problem.
    The problems were not with "failed", but with the usual Russian slovenliness: the gas distribution regulator was corny opened to the full - hence the problems.
    [/ Quote]
    This is exactly what they called not mastered. Because if mastered, then the regulator would be set correctly.

    [Quote]
    [quote] So competency was low for everyone. Just at a higher level, it is more noticeable. [/ Quote]
    Нет!
    At a higher level - and the requirements are much higher. And the lag behind the requirements is greater. [/ Quote]
    Not certainly in that way. The fact is that since a superior commander is heavily dependent on ALL subordinates (in the sense of providing information about the status of units), when making decisions, any error in any lower level at the upper level turns into a catastrophic error of the commander of this level (i.e., error accumulation effect).
    For example, if according to the papers and reports the commander had a tank corps (moreover, combat ready), but in fact there is half in repair, and the remaining half is not fuel or shells. It is clear that the commander makes a decision on the basis of reports and sends the tank corps, meaning a full-fledged tank corps, and not a pathetic stub. Accordingly, any task assigned to such a body will not be fulfilled, because the task was set for the corps, and not for the regiment in fact.

    This did not completely correct by the end of the war. Read how many orders there were to bypass strong points in the offensive - not one or two. And there were many such moments. Those. the option is when the commander gives a completely correct order, and execution at a lower level does not mean ignoring all the instructions. This was not uncommon with us.


    [Quote]
    Yes, the commissar interferes with a normal commander. But note that no one canceled the "members of the military council". Khrushchev continued to "fight". [/ Quote]
    Normal does not interfere, but it has consequences. For example, my grandfather served on the Sch-308. At the beginning of the war, under the command of Petrov, the U-144 submarine was sunk. Upon arrival in Leningrad (after participating in the Tallinn passage) according to the report of the commissar of the boat that the commander torpedoed his boat (the silhouettes of the boats are similar) he was condemned. A confirmation of the drowning was received later.

    And there were many such cases.

    There were of course reverse examples.

    [Quote]
    [quote] Even if this is so, then I talked about the low training of the military. The troops consist not only of rank and file and commanders. But also their interaction. [/ Quote]
    Also more or less adequate.

    No need to wander in three pines:
    It has already been announced --- the unmobilized army is not combat-ready. And it's all. The clash between the mobilized and non-mobilized army can only end with the defeat of the second. The only question is the scale of the rout. [/ Quote]
    [/ Quote]
    I would say that a mobilized army is stronger than a peacetime army (i.e. not mobilized). But to what extent the peacetime army is combat-ready and will determine whether it will be able to contain the blow (even retreating) or not. In our case, the spacecraft of peacetime could not contain the strike due to its low combat efficiency
    1. AK64
      AK64 24 June 2016 16: 30
      -1
      This episode is described in Zhukov’s memoirs. And there really is no real evidence for this. But such a conversation could very well have happened.

      Could not.

      The decision to appoint Zhukov was made by Stalin.

      Naturally - like all important decisions in general.
      Or are you about the fact that the bug could appoint itself?

      This is exactly what they called not mastered. Because if mastered, then the regulator would be set correctly.

      They knew how to - but were lazy.
      Because in war, in the absence of proteins and vitamins in the diet, you only want to eat and sleep.


      Not certainly in that way. The fact is that since a superior commander is heavily dependent on ALL subordinates

      (1) DO NOT make up
      (2) It is much harder to prepare a divisional commander than a driver. And the requirements for the material are much higher.
      EVERYTHING!


      I would say that a mobilized army is stronger than a peacetime army (i.e. not mobilized). But to what extent the peacetime army is combat-ready and will determine whether it will be able to contain the blow (even retreating) or not. In our case, the spacecraft of peacetime could not contain the strike due to its low combat efficiency

      (1) it doesn't matter at all what "you would say"
      (2) The UNMOBILIZED ARMY IS UNFITABLE. AMEN.

      And it is incapable of combat because divisions, corps and armies lack a number of "auxiliary" services, and first of all, rear services. There is no rear. Absolutely.
      Not "space behind" - but services.

      It is impossible to fight without rear services.

      In peacetime, divisions live in the township and are supplied from civilian supply systems, and soldiers are treated in civilian hospitals. But in the field of the latter, that is, urban supply systems, no. That is, someone must somehow provide a supply of water, food, and ammunition, as well as a health service.

      Here you go and provide at least the supply of ammunition.

      even taxes on divisional artillery in peace-picking divisions WAS NOT - it was assumed that the thrust would be obtained from the national economy on a mobplan.

      That is why DON'T FANTASY --- unmobilized divisions are not operational.

      And the fact that they somehow fought was a feat
    2. overb
      overb 24 June 2016 19: 29
      +1
      Quote: alstr
      This episode is described in Zhukov’s memoirs.

      You can not continue further. Memoirs are a specific type of literary genre.
      Quote: alstr
      This is exactly what they called not mastered. Because if mastered, then the regulator would be set correctly.

      Try to understand that it was impossible to use it correctly in combat conditions. Because to change the position of the regulator (when the delays go) it was necessary:
      1. To pick up a rifle using a special tool.
      2. Move the controller to another position.
      3. Pick up the rifle using a special tool.
      Who will bother this in battle? None. So they set it to the maximum, but nobody wondered how long the rifle would last. The foot soldiers lived a little.
      So the problem was not in the foot soldiers, but in the unsuccessful design. The automatic rifle (for some reason it was called a machine gun in the USSR) had a similar design and the DP-27. But there were fewer regulator positions, and more weight and margin of safety. The regulator, too, was basically not regulated by anyone, but due to the margin of safety, the DPs more or less managed. But SVT had a small weight, the structure was flimsy, so they fell apart.
      Quote: alstr
      But to what extent the peacetime army is combat-ready and will determine whether it will be able to contain the blow (even retreating) or not.

      I agree. And I absolutely do not understand hysterics like "the Wehrmacht was mobilized, but the Red Army was not." The army has units of different readiness. And to imagine that in peacetime any division is 1000 people, and after mobilization, 10000 people is silly. And in peacetime there are full-blooded divisions. It is they who must take the first blow and allow the mobilization to take place.
      At the same time, talk that the Red Army was not mobilized is ordinary fairy tales. Red Army on 22.06.41/5,1/5,3 was almost completely mobilized. Its number amounted to 11,0 million people. While at the time of the invasion of Poland its number was 11,4 million people. At the same time, the entire war its number was more than 01.01.1938-1,6 million. And in the states of peacetime (XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX), its number was XNUMX million people.
      And further. In peacetime, the USSR could not afford to maintain an army of 5 million mouths. He simply could not feed her.
      Quote: Alexander Green
      Stalin did not command the Red Army before the war, and there is no need to transfer the mistakes of the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the general staff onto it.

      Quote: gendir.grifon
      In the process, again, the bloody tyrant Stalin is to blame for everything ...

      Mustachioed Joe single-handedly commanded the country. He didn’t lead, namely, he commanded. And the puppets were the ones he appointed. And also alone. Absolute power also implies absolute responsibility. Therefore, their mistakes are his mistakes.
      1. Alexander Greene
        Alexander Greene 24 June 2016 22: 40
        +2
        [quote = overb] Mustachioed Joe single-handedly commanded the country. He didn’t lead, namely, he commanded. [/ quote
        Colleague, it only seems so to you.
  33. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 29 June 2016 17: 38
    0
    "First. One of the main reasons is the strategic miscalculations of the top military and political leadership in certain areas of the main strike."

    If you swap Zap OVO and KOVO on 22.6.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX would it be better or worse for the Red Army? I think that there will not be a big difference, but still it will be worse. More Soviet troops lose bistre to the west of the Dnieper. If he believes the German generals then Hitler still turned to Ukraine and then lost the war.
    "Second. Errors in operational-strategic calculations based on the belief that the war will begin with border battles and only after that the main enemy forces will be brought into battle."

    If there is no error, what should be done? Raise the main forces of the Red Army and bring them into border battles? I think then it will also be worse. More troops will be surrounded west of the Dnieper.
    The third. An unacceptable miscalculation was also made in determining the timing of bringing the Soviet troops into full combat readiness.
    The mechanization of the corps, the main force of the Red Army, was in the depths and no miscalculation at the time it was put on alert could prevent them from massaging counterattacks 2-3 days after the outbreak of war.
    Fourth. The plan itself to repulse German aggression was counter-offensive. It was based on the idea of ​​a powerful retaliatory strike, followed by a decisive offensive along the entire front.

    Here, of course, a reassessment of one's strengths. But who would have thought that the attack of the Soviet mechanized corps on the German infantry division would end with the loss of half of the tanks and the retreat of the Soviet corps? The combat potential of the troops is very difficult to know in advance.
    At the same time, the Soviet Union did not put its armed forces on high alert to repel aggression. All this happened mainly due to a miscalculation made by Stalin in assessing the military-political situation (we recall the possibility of a war between England and Germany, Stalin's desire to delay the war at least until 1942.

    There was no miscalculation. Germany has been in a state of war since 1939 and the Wehrmacht beat completely mobilized since September 1939. The capacity of German railways is 2-3 times better. So it was IMPOSSIBLE to beat the Red Army ahead of the Wehrmacht in strategic deployment. But the open mobilization of the Red Army, without attack, enabled Germany to represent the USSR as an aggressor, and this prevented the creation of a common front against Germany with the participation of the United States.
  34. Robert Nevsky
    Robert Nevsky 18 January 2017 23: 19
    +2
    The reasons for the initial defeats in the Second World War ... Because they fought with all of fascist Europe !!! Because they kept half our army in the east against fascist Japan !!!!
    Glory to Stalin! Glory to the Bolshevik Party! Glory to the Soviet people!
  35. Protos
    Protos 8 May 2017 19: 25
    0
    About another Suvorov-Rezun drew, sha he will tell us the truth in the uterus! laughing
    and then the tolls-singers-slipped into the topic - it’s all gone lol