Military Review

"The presence of shells penetrating KV armor ..."

63



Ditch stumbling for tanks

Most of the failures of the Soviet troops in 1941-1942. in one way or another, they are associated with sparse formation of formations, when divisions occupied bands much wider than statutory norms. The concomitant blunders in determining the direction of the strike of the enemy made the picture of events quite obvious and explainable.

The Crimean front represented to all this the exact opposite: its troops occupied defenses on a narrow isthmus and had (at least in terms of statutory requirements) sufficient means for defense. It was almost impossible to miss the estimate of the direction of the enemy’s strike on such a front. Accordingly, the defeat of the Crimean Front was most often associated with the activity of L.Z. Mehlis and D.T. Kozlov. The first was the representative of the Headquarters in the Crimea, the second - the commander of the Crimean Front.


The representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the Crimean Front army commissioner 1-rank L.Z. Mehlis.

Is it possible to confirm this version through 70 years after the war, having documents from both sides? Immersion in detail leaves more questions than answers in the outline of the version of too active LZ. Mehlis and the "non-Hindenburg" 1 commander D.T. Kozlov. As part of the traditional version, it is completely unclear how the Crimean Front was not defeated six weeks before the fateful May 1942. For some reason, then the Soviet troops quite successfully repelled the blow of the fresh 22 Panzer Division from France to France. Even then, she was assigned decisive tasks - to cut off the main forces of the Crimean front with a blow to the shore of the Sea of ​​Azov. The German counterattack ended with a complete failure and demands to understand him personally from Hitler.

The circumstances of the events were as follows. The next offensive of the Crimean Front began on March 13 of 1942, but no decisive result was achieved. After a week of fighting, the Soviet units were pretty battered and exhausted. On the other side of the front, the situation was also assessed without much optimism. The command of the 11 Army and personally the commander E. von Manstein considered the position of their troops extremely difficult. Upon arrival in the Crimea, she was fresh from the 22 Tank Division from the march, to complete concentration of the units she was thrown into battle early in the morning of 20 in March 1942. Counterstrike pursued ambitious goals by striking the main forces of the Soviet 51 Army through the village of Korpec to the north-east Crimean front.


The commander of the Crimean front, D.T. Kozlov.

Despite initial success, a massive tank attack (about 120 tanks at the same time - for the first time in the Crimea) forced the Soviet infantry to leave the position, then events began to develop in an extremely unpleasant scenario for the Germans. Crossing the offensive line of the division, the stream, which was considered by the Germans to be surmountable even for the Kübelvagen 2, turned out to be escarpment and turned by Soviet sappers into an anti-tank ditch. German tanks huddled by the stream came under heavy fire from the Soviet artillery. At that moment Soviet tanks appeared.

I must say that after a week of heavy and unsuccessful offensive, the tank forces of the 51 Army were not in the best condition. They were represented by the 55 Tank Brigade of Colonel M. D. Sinenko and the Consolidated Tank Battalion from the 39 Fighting Vehicles, the 40 Tank Brigades and the 229 Tank Separate Tank Brigade (8 KV and 6 T-60 on March 19).

By 5.00 20 March in the 55-th brigade there were in the 23 T-26 cannon formation, 12 X-ray flamethrower XT-133. This seemingly meager number of armored vehicles finally turned the tide of battle in favor of the Soviet troops. KV shot German tanks, lighter cars dealt with the infantry. As noted in the brigade's report on the results of the battles, "flame-throwing tanks were particularly effective, destroying the enemy’s infantry 3 running backwards. The 22 Panzer Division was put to flight, leaving an 34 tank of all types on the battlefield, partly operational. The casualties of the Germans amounted to more than 1100 people.


Soviet heavy tank KV, padded on the Kerch Peninsula. May 1942 d. German soldiers view through holes from 75-mm projectiles in the rear hull sheet.

The main reason for the failure was the unpreparedness of a fresh connection to the conditions of the war in Crimea. In a report to the High Command of the Ground Forces in hot pursuit of events, Manstein outlined its features with bright colors: "The high consumption of artillery ammunition, the constant attacks of very large forces aviation, the use of multiple launch rocket launchers and a large number of tanks (many of them are hardest among them) turn battles into a battle of technology, which is in no way inferior to the battles of World War 4. "It should be noted here that in the same harsh conditions the formations of the Crimean Front operated. If everything fit in the simple formula "Mehlis and Kozlov are to blame for everything", a cross would have been put on the Crimean front as early as the end of March 1942.

Preparation for "Hunt for bustard"


During the preparation of Operation Hunting for Bustard, the German command took into account all the lessons of the January-April battles of 1942. Bearing in mind the negative experience with the stream turned into a moat, detailed information was collected on the anti-tank ditch in the rear of the Soviet positions. Aerial photography, a survey of defectors and prisoners allowed to evaluate this engineering structure and find its weaknesses. In particular, it was concluded that the breakthrough through heavily mined (including sea mines) crossings through the ditch was completely hopeless. The Germans decided to build a bridge across the moat after a breakthrough to it aside from the crossings.

The main thing that was done by the German command was the concentration of forces and means sufficient to defeat the DT troops. Kozlov. One of the common misconceptions regarding the events of May 1942 in Crimea is the conviction of the quantitative superiority of the Soviet troops over the German assault force. It is the result of an uncritical assessment of the data of E. von Manstein, who wrote in his memoirs about an offensive "when the ratio of forces 2: 1 is in favor of the enemy" 5.

Today we have the opportunity to turn to documents and not conjecture with Manstein about the "hordes of the Mongols." As you know, by the beginning of the decisive battle for the Kerch Peninsula, the Crimean Front (with part of the forces of the Black Sea fleet and the Azov Flotilla) numbered 249 people800.

In turn, the 11 Army on 2 in May 1942 based on the number of “eaters” consisted of 232 549 (243 760 in 11 in May) military personnel in military units and formations, 24 (25) thousand people of Luftwaffe, 2, thousand people of Luftwaffe, 94,6, thousand people Kriegsmarine and 95 (7) thousand Romanian soldiers and officers350. In total, this gave more than 9,3 thousands of people in the total number of Manstein's army. In addition, several thousand people of the staff of the imperial railways, SD, the organization Todt in the Crimea and XNUMX thousands of collaborators identified in the German report as "Tatars" submitted to her.

In any case, there was no question of the numerical superiority of the Crimean Front over the troops of Manstein aimed at him. The gain went in all directions. The 11 Army was transferred to the VIII Air Corps, specially prepared to interact with the ground forces of the Luftwaffe air force. In early May, 1942 arrived in the Crimea on 460 aircraft, including a group of the latest Henschel-129 attack aircraft.

Another common misconception is the thesis of an offensive front grouping that supposedly prevented him from effectively defending. The documents now available suggest that the Crimean Front at the turn of April-May 1942, without any doubt, was on the defensive. Moreover, reasonable assumptions were made about the possible directions of enemy strikes: from Koy-Asan to Parpach and further along the railway and along the Feodosia highway to Arma-Eli. The Germans in the “Hunt for bustard” chose the second option and attacked 1942 in May along the highway to Armaly-Eli.


The main events on the Crimean front with the participation of tanks in February-May 1942.

Ammunition on fast rations

The long preparation of the operation allowed the Germans to choose a vulnerable sector of the defense of the Crimean front. It was a strip of the 44 Army of Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant-General S.I., adjacent to the Black Sea. Chernyak. At the direction of the planned main attack of the Germans was 63-I Mountain Division. The national composition of the division was motley. As of 28 on April, 1942 from 5595 people of junior commanders and privates had 2613 Russians, 722 Ukrainians, 423 Armenians, 853 Georgians, 430 Azeris and 544 people of other nationalities 8. The share of the peoples of the Caucasus was quite significant, although not dominant (for comparison: in the 396 th infantry division, an 7141 Azeri served with the total number of divisions in 10 447 people). On April 26, units of the 63 Division participated in a private operation to improve their positions; they did not succeed and only increased their losses. The situation was aggravated by a shortage of weapons. So, on April 25 there were only four 45mm guns and four 76-mm divisional guns, heavy machine guns - 29 units in the division. "Cherry on the cake" was the absence of a detachment in the division of the order (they appeared in the Red Army even before the order N 227 "Not one step back"). The division commander, Colonel Vinogradov, explained this by the small number of units.

Shortly before the German offensive, 29 on April 1942, General Staff officer in the 44 Army, Major A. Zhitnik, prophetically wrote in his report to the Chief of Staff of the Crimean Front: "You must either withdraw completely [division] ... to the second echelon (and this the best) or at least in parts. Its direction is the direction of the enemy’s likely strike, and as soon as he accumulates defectors from this division and becomes convinced of the low morale of this division, he will be strengthened in his decision to inflict 9. Initially, the plan did not envisage a change of division, only the rotation of the regiments within the formation, with the output to rest in the second echelon, 10. The final version, approved by 3 in May of 1942, suggested that the division be withdrawn to the second echelon of the 10-11 army in May, two days after the start of the German offensive11. Major Zhitnik was heard, but the measures taken were late.

In general, the 63-I Mountain Division was one of the weakest units of the Crimean Front. At the same time, it cannot be said that she was quite an outsider with regard to weapons. The weakness of 45-mm guns was a common problem of the Soviet troops in the Crimea, their number in the divisions ranged from 2 to 18 per division, on average, 6-8 units. Of the 603 state-of-the-art forty-fives, the Crimean front on 26 of April had only 206 guns of this type, of the 416 divisional 76-mm guns 236, of the 4754 state-supplied anti-tank guns 137212. The problem of anti-tank defense was somewhat mitigated by the presence of four regiments of 76-mm SPV guns in the Crimean Front, but they still needed to be in the right place at the right time. A massive enemy tank attack would be a big problem for any division of the Crimean front. It is also often forgotten that in 1942, the Red Army sat on a starvation ration, both in terms of weapons and ammunition. It was difficult to organize in Kursk in July 1942 in Crimea in May 1943 in the Crimea by four forty-fives and 29 Maximov.

To a large extent (and this clearly showed the 20 episode of March 1942), the anti-tank defense of the Crimean Front troops was provided by tanks. By 8 in May 1942, the tank front forces had 41 KV, 7 T-34, 111 T-26 and flame-throwing X-133, 78 T-60 and 1 trophy Pz.IV13 in the ranks. Total 238 combat vehicles, mostly light. The core of the Crimea Front armored forces were KV tanks. According to the plan, two brigades were deployed in the 44 Army band that had 9 KV deployed. In the event of an enemy attack, a plan of counterattacks was developed in several variants, including the enemy strike in the zone of the neighboring 51 army.


The tanks of the 22 Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht on the platforms. Crimea, March 1942. With the arrival of this compound, Manstein pinned his hopes on a dramatic change in the situation on the peninsula.

Trouble came from not having waited

It's time to turn to the folders with gothic font on the covers. Yes, theoretically, the Crimea Front could repeat the success of 20 in March of 1942 with a tank counterattack, but only if the quality composition of the enemy grouping did not change. It was she who underwent changes that had fatal consequences for the Soviet troops in the Crimea. The German command reinforced armored vehicles in the Crimea qualitatively. The 22 Tank Division received the 12 newest Pz.IV with the 75-mm long-barreled gun, the 20 Pz.III with the 50-mm long-barreled gun and the SAU Marder with the 76,2-mm gun in the anti-tank division, the 190-martial armor in their armor-in-line armor. ACS with 6-mm long-barreled instrument 75.

However, the German offensive began on the morning of 8 in May of 1942, not with a tank strike. It turned out to be atypical. From the artillery and aviation preparation of the attack the Germans refused. The infantry attacked after a fire strike of jet mortars, including with incendiary warheads. An assault submarine attack followed the seaside flank of the Soviet positions from the sea. It was the assault sapper boats used for crossing the rivers and building pontoon bridges. There was no opposition to the landing of small ships of the Black Sea Fleet, but they would blame Mehlis for the failure.

Only after the beginning of the offensive infantry artillery opened fire, and began attacking aircraft. As it was later noted in the report of the 11 Army on the breakthrough of the Parpach positions, “according to the prisoners, the enemy’s telephone network was damaged so much that the Russian command was confused” 15. The loss of communication due to massive artillery strikes was typical. Nevertheless, the 44 Army's tanks were brought into combat according to the plan. However, the opposition of the attackers turned out to be stronger than expected.

After overcoming the moat, the 22-I tank division struck north, repulsed tank attacks and closed the encirclement of the main forces of the 47 and 51 armies of the Crimean Front. This decided the fate of the battle. As indicated in the report of the 11 Army Headquarters following the breakthrough of the Parpach positions, "the successes of 22 in [ankov] d [ivizii] in breaking through the position of Parpach and the attack through Arma-Eli to the north were largely determined by the presence of weapons. Thanks to this weapon, the soldiers had a sense of superiority over the Russian heavy tanks "16. Soviet sources confirm the qualitative change in the situation:" Of the enemy’s new means, attention is paid to the presence of projectiles piercing the KV armor and setting it on fire. "17. later, with the widespread use of the latest 75mm guns on the Soviet-German front, they were more often used with cumulative projectiles (as they were called in the Red Army, “termite”) until 1943. Wehrmacht used the nickname most effective caliber armor-piercing projectiles.

The battlefield was left for the Germans, and they had the opportunity to inspect the wrecked cars. The conclusion was expected: "The bulk of the HF and T-34 was clearly destroyed by 7,62 and 7,5cm" 18. With regard to the impact on the Soviet tanks from the air, the Soviet data do not confirm the great success of anti-tank attack aircraft Hsh-129. All 15 tanks, mainly T-26 from 126-th separate tank brigade 19, became the victims of airstrikes.

Summarizing the above, it can be stated that the legend of the role of L.Z. Mehlis and D.T. Kozlov in stories Crimean front is somewhat exaggerated. The front troops suffered from common training and armament problems for the Red Army 1942. Favorable conditions for the defense of the narrow isthmus were fended off by the Germans by the massive use of new types of weapons and the general concentration of forces and means to crush the Soviet troops in the Crimea. Actually, it was the sharp change in the anti-tank capabilities of the German troops that became a big problem for the Red Army in the summer of 1942. Crimea became a testing ground for new equipment, which the Soviet troops were soon to meet on the entire front from Rzhev to the Caucasus.

* The article was prepared within the framework of the project of the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Foundation N 15-31-10158.



Notes

1. In response to a request from Mehlis to change Kozlov from the Kremlin, the answer was: "We do not have the Hindenburg in reserve."
2. Army passenger car on the Volkswagen chassis.
3. TsAMO RF. F. 224. Op. 790. D. 1. L. 33.
4. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). T312. R366. Frame 794176.
5. Manstein E. Lost victories. M .; SPb., 1999. C. 260.
6. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: Loss of the Armed Forces. M., 2001. C. 311.
7. Nara. T312. R420. Frames 7997283, 7997314.
8. TsAMO RF. F. 215. Op. 1185. D. 52. L. 26.
9. TsAMO RF. F. 215. Op. 1185. D. 22. L. 224.
10. TsAMO RF. F. 215. Op. 1185. D. 47. L. 70.
11. Ibid. L. 74.
12. TsAMO RF. F. 215. Op. 1185. D. 79. L. 12.
13. TsAMO RF. F. 215. Op. 1209. D. 2. L. 25, 30.
14. Nara. T312. R1693. Frames 141, 142.
15. Nara. T312. R1693. Frame 138.
16. Nara. T312. R1693. Frame 139.
17. TsAMO RF. F. 215. Op. 1209. D. 2. L. 22.
18. Nara. T312. R1693. Frame 142.
19. TsAMO RF. F. 215 Op. 1209. D. 2. L. 30.
Author:
Originator:
https://rg.ru/2016/06/16/rodina-krym-front.html
63 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. parusnik
    parusnik 25 June 2016 08: 04
    +6
    One of the bitter pages of the Great Patriotic War ...
  2. cth; fyn
    cth; fyn 25 June 2016 08: 53
    +6
    Without guns, probably sucks, which actually showed this episode.
  3. Aviator_
    Aviator_ 25 June 2016 09: 17
    +3
    A good analysis, and even more than 50 years, everyone repeated the opinion of the writer K. Simonov that Mehlis was to blame for everything.
    1. Terner38
      Terner38 25 June 2016 14: 42
      0
      Mekhlis subsequently proved his professionalism more than once. Stalin always directed him to the most difficult areas, where it was necessary to raise morale, most often by his example. Although I do not like "God's chosen people", there is a clear exception here.
      1. Beefeater
        Beefeater 25 June 2016 20: 06
        0
        Quote: Terner38
        Mekhlis subsequently proved his professionalism more than once. Stalin always directed him to the most difficult areas, where it was necessary to raise morale, most often by his example. Although I do not like "God's chosen people", there is a clear exception here.

        Stalin and Voroshilov with Budyonny sent everywhere. Tymoshenko with Khrushchov. Mehlis with Kozlov. Only there was no sense. School was needed. And it was available only on paper. So the army fled.
  4. Tihas
    Tihas 25 June 2016 09: 36
    +4
    Yeah.
    The absence of detachments as the main factor in the defeat (cherry on the cake). Why write about this, if this item was not reflected in the summary of the article?
    The topic of national composition is touched. The question has not been solved. How did this affect defense?
    Nasty feeling after reading.
    1. avt
      avt 25 June 2016 10: 21
      +17
      Quote: Tihas
      The absence of detachments as the main factor in the defeat (cherry on the cake). Why write about this, if this item was not reflected in the summary of the article?

      You know the functions of the detachments' barriers, well, except for identifying alarmists and stopping those retreating without an order? Look for and find quite specific reports from the commandant's offices in the Battle of Kursk, which stood behind the guards divisions. There it clearly and briefly describes how many fighters who were left without commanders were stopped and where they were later sent. If you are stupidly lazy, well, watch the movie "The Living and the Dead", well, that moment where Efremov, as a tankman, Ivanov's deputy for the rear, brings together practically marching companies from the retreating companies to replenish the brigade. We saw enough vomit a la "Penal Battalion" and and stupidly do not let the simple fact into the brain - the commandant's office barricades were not in order to mow down the retreating commissars from machine guns, the NKVD commissars, but to maintain discipline and controllability of units and subunits. A harsh measure, and sometimes cruel in relation to specific personalities, but there was such a time and circumstances, so the effectiveness has been proven by practice, and not only in the Red Army. And in this particular case, the absence of commandant's barriers is a huge minus in case of panic among the rank and file, no one could even to stop it by force and organize at least some meaningful, controlled retreat. Which, in general, is a complex form of combat maneuver, and not a dumb flight.
      The topic of national composition is touched. The question has not been solved. How did this affect defense?
      And it affected you - to put you at the head of 7 people who speak Russian poorly and understand, and who were also recruited almost yesterday from home without any significant preparation, so I would see how you specifically fought with the Germans from 1941 with such a unit, it’s likely that they would have taken Berlin with a mouse click.
      1. cth; fyn
        cth; fyn 25 June 2016 10: 42
        +1
        avt, you wouldn’t be so harsh, and then there’s nowhere tougher, although on business.
        1. avt
          avt 25 June 2016 12: 13
          +11
          Quote: cth; fyn
          avt, you wouldn’t be so harsh, and then there’s nowhere tougher, although on business.

          You know - got it. Well, okay in Soviet times - it was really difficult to collect information, but you can. And now they will hear two lines of some kind of "historian", fall in love and carry them selflessly. and we had weapons, someone would try us with machine guns. But what is characteristic - NOBODY said that order 227 was somehow wrong. But the deceased father, in Moscow as a boy in 227, really saw how those who fled in the fall from Moscow without an order from ,, responsible comrades, the NKVD officers on the Vladimir tract, the cars were taken away and things were thrown into a ditch, and they themselves, even on foot to the east, were not allowed to pass - they were wrapped up at a short address prescribed then in the order on martial law in Moscow, without sentimentality.
        2. cast iron
          cast iron 25 June 2016 19: 58
          +1
          And with illiterate young men, it is necessary to point out their illiteracy.
      2. Tihas
        Tihas 25 June 2016 11: 20
        -1
        The problem of lack of readability in posts is a problem not only on Military Review.
        1. The absence of detachments as the main factor of defeat (cherry on the cake). Why write about this, if this item was not reflected in the summary of the article?
        2. The topic of national composition is affected. The question has not been solved. How did this affect defense?
        Do you remember the title of the article? How does all this relate to each other?
        1. cast iron
          cast iron 25 June 2016 20: 02
          +4
          UUUUU here, we have not only a problem with knowledge of the facts, but also with logic. Watch your fingers:

          1. The detachments were necessary to raise the spirit and return to duty without the order of the departing detachments. And there were many.

          2. A motley ethnic composition is bedlam. Different languages. Difficulty understanding. Different mentality. It is very difficult to manage such a crowd. Moreover, some nationalities totally collaborated with the Germans, deserted from the Red Army and slaughtered Soviet citizens in the guise of bundles, for which they were evicted and deported by entire nations to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

          I hope now it has become clear.
          1. jjj
            jjj 26 June 2016 12: 42
            0
            Also the headquarters in Tbilisi ...
  5. Stas57
    Stas57 25 June 2016 09: 37
    +5
    Summing up the above, we can state that the legend of the role of L.Z. Mehlis and D.T. Kozlova in the history of the Crimean Front is somewhat exaggerated. The troops of the front suffered from problems common to the Red Army of 1942 with training and weapons.

    just in the subject matter, otherwise we were recently arguing about the "bloody Mehlis who failed the Crimea" and about the "stupid Kozlov who ruined everything"

    The infantry attacked after the firing of rocket mortars, including with incendiary warheads. An assault of boats followed from the sea, bypassing the coastal flank of Soviet positions. It was the assault sapper boats that were used to force rivers and build pontoon bridges.

    Gross flossaecke?
    cool,



    wanted to write an article about her; the boat was worthy

    Or about Sturmbot39?
    cool too
  6. Mikhail Matyugin
    Mikhail Matyugin 25 June 2016 10: 06
    +8
    In general, the "battle for the Crimea" and especially the "Hunting for the Bustard" in 1942 are quite beautiful military operations. And a very rare and interesting moment - on both sides at the head of the troops were commanders of Jewish origin.

    Erich von Manstein is actually née Erich von Lewinsky, who came from a Prussian-Jewish family and took the last name of his adoptive father, "possibly the best operational intelligence of the Wehrmacht." Strange as it may seem, but this man eventually received the title of Field Marshal of the Reich, not being a member of the NSDAP, being an opponent of Hitler and, to put it mildly, strongly disliked the SS organization. Oddly enough, this was possible in Germany.
    In fact, he gave permission for the actions of punitive detachments ("Einsatzgruppen") in the rear of his troops in southern Ukraine only after threats from Himmler and a call from Hitler with a direct order under the threat of a military tribunal.
    It should also be added that it was von Manstein-Lewinsky who was one of the German generals who stood for active cooperation with the USSR, he himself repeatedly visited the Soviet Union in the 1930 years and was well acquainted with many Soviet commanders, including Marshal Tukhachevsky.

    On the other hand, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, a Jew from Odessa, an active member of the Poaley Zion party in his youth, a professional economist, but who volunteered to go to the front in the First World War in the Russian Army, then decided to link his fate with the Bolshevik party, a real doctor of economics sciences and a talented organizer, but nevertheless turned out to be a worse commander than his opponent.
    1. avia12005
      avia12005 25 June 2016 12: 09
      +1
      How can you not remember Caesar Kunnikov ...
    2. Army soldier2
      Army soldier2 25 June 2016 13: 16
      +7
      In fact, no one ever called the Mehlis a commander. Yes, he didn’t have to. He considered himself an all-seeing eye and the leader's punishing right hand. And behaved accordingly. If the commander was strong (as, for example, Tymoshenko), then it was difficult for Mehlis to promote his amateurish ideas on command and control and development of operations. If not (as, for example, Kozlov), then Mehlis crushed such commanders for themselves.
      And the fact that he was a doctor of economic sciences did not deal with economics and did not want to do this. The fact that he was an excellent organizer is wonderful, but people were dust for him.
      I read, probably hundreds, if not thousands of memoirs. But I have never met a positive assessment of the Mehlis. Is everyone wrong?
      There is a wonderful book by Vladimir Karpov "The Commander" about General of the Army Petrov. It is also interesting to write about the role of Mehlis in Crimea.
      1. Terner38
        Terner38 25 June 2016 14: 49
        0
        There is also a good book "If it weren't for the generals". Read it - the view on Mehlis is completely different.
      2. avt
        avt 25 June 2016 15: 37
        +2
        Quote: Army 2
        . He considered himself an all-seeing eye and the leader's punishing right hand.

        So he had such a position and Stalin appointed him to it - the People's Commissar of State Control, reports exclusively to Stalin.
        Quote: Army 2
        And behaved accordingly.

        True truth
        Quote: Army 2
        If the commander was strong (as, for example, Tymoshenko), then it was difficult for Mehlis to promote his amateurish ideas on command and control and development of operations. If not (as, for example, Kozlov), then Mehlis crushed such commanders for themselves.
        good
      3. saigon
        saigon 13 November 2016 18: 24
        0
        They read the biography of Mehlis at their leisure, you will learn a lot of amazing things about the fighting affairs of this person.
        He had many fighting and team experience, he was extremely brave. He also gave army commissaries over the ears or on the snouts so they would not steal. In a word, a lot of new and entertaining.
    3. The comment was deleted.
    4. Idiot
      Idiot 25 June 2016 16: 44
      +7
      Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
      The Bustard Hunt in 1942 was a rather beautiful military operation.


      Manstein is an extremely controversial figure. First, he cannot be trusted. They say about such people "p ... t like Trotsky." Secondly, having created around himself the halo of a genius commander, the "best strategic mind" of the Wehrmacht, and of course a brilliant writer, he really created a cult of German worship not only among European historians, which is not surprising, but also among homegrown, certified specialists in dumping in the mud my country. Manstein began with the Ardennes, where he allegedly offered Hitler a plan of operation. Which is a lie. Stupid German generals appreciated his greatness and clapped their hands for joy that they stood nearby (he writes so). Then there was a rapid dash to Daugavpils. Here he modestly kept silent that, in addition to his corps, the entire German army had invaded the USSR, caring staff officers showed him the direction of the offensive, and the Brandenburg regiment captured the bridges across the Dvina. Then the Crimea, where, as the author of the article correctly pointed out, Manstein had a numerical advantage, although he always denied this and generally swore that he did not have a single tank in the Crimea. His 11A was extremely saturated with equipment: from aviation to subcaliber (that's right) ammunition. Actually, Hitler, for all his shortcomings, was well versed in people. He hated Manstein. But Manstein, like MacArthur in the US Army (abandoned the army in the Philippines, fled to Australia, but shouted to the whole world: “I'll be back!” Roosevelt had to keep his promise, although he had to put up against the wall), like Zhukov here (where Zhukov - there is a victory!), has already become a brand. By the way, when, after the resignation of Halder, Hitler was offered the candidacy of Manstein, he flatly refused, considering him an adventurer. Manstein always begged Hitler for everything and more, and the latter was very annoyed. But he did. And German military cemeteries grew on the vast Russian expanses, for the soldier Manstein, like the rest of the German generals, did not spare. Those. did not regret it at all. The Wehrmacht suffered colossal losses under his command, although this does not fit with his memoirs (see "first"). Then he "took" Sevastopol, suffering three times greater losses than his defenders (all in science). During the assault on the city, Hitler allowed him to pull into the Crimea almost all the monstrous siege artillery, which continuously, for two months, hammered the city, but it was only our military leadership that frightened it, which fled, meanly abandoning the Primorsky army. If Petrov and Oktyabrsky had not fled, and the fleet had fought, and had not hid in bases, the city would have survived. It's my personal opinion.
      1. AK64
        AK64 26 June 2016 16: 19
        0
        Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
        The Bustard Hunt in 1942 was a rather beautiful military operation.


        Manstein is an extremely controversial figure. Firstly, he cannot be trusted

        I would add that there was nothing beautiful in the Bustard Hunt: everything is so obvious ...
        The width of the Kerch Isthmus is 20 km in that place.
        At this place, 8 Soviet divisions stood in the northern half, and only 3 in the southern half. With minimal separation, and if it is impossible to hide at least something from the enemy. That is, everything is obvious.

        In this case, I would note that the situation of the Soviet troops in the Crimea was extremely difficult in any case: a bare even steppe, little space, the dominance of enemy aircraft, ...
        It is difficult to come up with something reasonable in the place of the Soviet command.

        And here is another 22dt at Manstein ... Don't be at least this td ...

        In general, everything is clear
        1. Andrey Zh
          Andrey Zh 27 June 2016 08: 51
          +1
          The width of the Kerch Isthmus in those places is about 20 km, and, by the way, the firing range of ship guns of the Black Sea Fleet of the Red Army reached 40-50 km. Hence the question: where was the fire support of the fleet? In the Baltic in besieged Leningrad, the fleet restrained the entire blockade of Germans and Finns, and in the Black Sea - was it weak ???
  7. max73
    max73 25 June 2016 10: 33
    +6
    the author is cunning, for he compares the strength of the Crimean Front and the army of Manstein ...) And the fact that Sevastopol was defended by the Separate Maritime Army, apparently, was forgotten? and the fact that at least 6 divisions of the 11th Wehrmacht’s army acted precisely against Petrov’s army also forgot .... Mehlis Kozlova deprived of initiative, what can I say ... another attempt to rewrite history. pah.
    1. AK64
      AK64 25 June 2016 10: 43
      +2
      the author is cunning,


      Yes, he does not "dissemble" but directly and blatantly lies.

      And the question that should be asked: a why is he lying After all for some reason he needs it...

      Apparently - Mehlis is in kindred, that's lying.
  8. AK64
    AK64 25 June 2016 10: 42
    +1
    Pretty funny.

    On the one hand, the author writes that on the southern sector of the front there was ONE poorly fighting division - and besides it there was nothing at all.
    Then the author writes that having broken through the miserable front of this division, the Germans committed bypass of the main forces Crimean front, which were located .... on the northern half of the front.
    And then he makes an exit - "no, no, not Mehlis is to blame."
    Then who?

    Funny ...

    That is, the events are described exactly as they have always been described everywhere - that is, the main forces of the front were concentrated on the northern sector of the front, and all are pulled to the front. there was no separation at all. As there was no normal defense of the southern section.

    but to blame .... it is not clear who. But not Mehlis, no-no !!

    Each error has a name, each.
    What was the Mehlis eventually removed for? Or Stalin, too ... Simonova had heard enough?
    1. Terner38
      Terner38 25 June 2016 14: 51
      +1
      The Mehlis was not removed, but sent to the Leningrad Front, he fought the whole war.
      1. AK64
        AK64 25 June 2016 15: 18
        +1
        The Mehlis was not removed, but sent to the Leningrad Front, he fought the whole war.

        Would you at least at the Wiki level get to know the question?
        According to the results of his activities on the Crimean Front, by Directive of Bet No. 155452 of June 4, 1942, Mehlis was reduced in rank to two steps to the corps commissar and was removed from the post of deputy commissar of defense and chief of the Glavpolitupr [6] [7].

        In fact, it was even more lowered: the real post of Mehlis DO Crimea was "Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief"
        1. Terner38
          Terner38 25 June 2016 19: 45
          0
          Vicki, of course, is a big argument. But it is only strange that Mehlis performed the same functions. as before, even having two steps less in rank.
          1. AK64
            AK64 25 June 2016 20: 26
            +1
            Wiki, of course, is a big argument.

            Yes, you didn’t look at it. What.

            But it is only strange that Mehlis performed the same functions. as before, even having two steps less in rank.

            Not true

            Before the war, Mehlis - head of the PU Red Army. This is somewhere on an equal footing with Voroshilov and then Tymoshenko. (Submission to the Minister is formal)
            Since July 1941 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (that is, Stalin!).
            In 1942, a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. That is, in essence, I would have to command a group of fronts, and coordinate their actions and the actions of the Black Sea Fleet.

            And after the Crimea, the Mehlis was NEVER to comparable heights.
            First, he is a member of the military council armies.
            And later - a member of the military council of fronts.
            The front, of course, is larger than the army - but never once did it rise to the level it was at.

            Moreover, all the fronts, of which he was a member of the military council, were essentially auxiliary.

            But I will not talk with you anymore - I am sorry for my time.

            If you were an honest person, you would just look at the biography of Mehlis on the Web, and would not spend someone else's time on meaningless disputes.

            Wake up to continue - I will put it in emergency without further warning (because senseless "disputants" are not interesting to anyone)
  9. vnord
    vnord 25 June 2016 11: 21
    +1
    Quote: Aviator_
    A good analysis, and even more than 50 years, everyone repeated the opinion of the writer K. Simonov that Mehlis was to blame for everything.

    Read the biography of Mehlis an extraordinary person with an interesting biography. He was not loved for honesty and straightforwardness. And in all memoirs they poured mud.
    1. AK64
      AK64 25 June 2016 11: 33
      +3
      Read the biography of Mehlis an extraordinary person with an interesting biography. He was not loved for honesty and straightforwardness. And in all memoirs they poured mud.


      Yeah ... Stupid cruel and smug Trotskyist.

      He devotedly served Stalin (that is, he served, and personally) --- but this is only because Stalin was the head of state. And so --- with the same dog devotion would serve both Trotsky and Hitler.

      Such a type ...

      Starinov describes his meeting, and his "conversation" with Mekhlis - this is ... something (if you understand it’s over, WHAT was in that conversation)

      Something good about Mehlis was written just and only ... Simonov ... (And it’s also clear why - unless of course you understand)
      1. avt
        avt 25 June 2016 12: 04
        +3
        Quote: AK64
        . Dumb cruel and smug Trotskyist.

        Another victim of de-Stalinization?
        Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
        Well, maybe we won’t be so harsh?

        Yes, there’s a clinical case, well, it’s like a campaign like that of Svanidze, who for the sake of relatives makes accounts with the dead man Stalin, well, that pipe is lower - only Mehlis. It is impossible to explain otherwise the existence of a living Trotskyist in Stalin’s inner circle. Alas, with whom Stalin really dealt with without any sentiment, it was with the supporters of his almost personal enemy — Trotsky. And what would he keep on the People’s Commissariat of State Audit of the stubborn Trotskyist .... here this approving person needs to urgently contact a specialized practitioner.
        Quote: Mikhail Matyugin
        "red inquisitor" is still the worst commander

        Well, as a commander, nobody actually ever appointed him anywhere, but the fact that working with him had to have a real will, so that he would not crush his restless energy, as it were, a fact.
        1. AK64
          AK64 25 June 2016 13: 47
          -7
          Put this artist in the emergency, or what? And then he has a lot of noise, but there is not a drop of information ...
          1. avt
            avt 25 June 2016 15: 41
            +5
            Quote: AK64
            Put this artist in the emergency, or what?

            bully Shall we point? As the PMC said during it, “They scared the woman with high-heeled shoes.” Fel, bring, like a mouse into the hole, a cockroach under the baseboard, and most importantly be proud - “How I did it!”
          2. AK64
            AK64 25 June 2016 15: 55
            -2
            He brought: there is still no information from him, but at least there is more than rudeness
      2. Terner38
        Terner38 25 June 2016 20: 09
        +1
        Simonov wrote about Mehlis from the words of Konev. Neither Konev nor Zhukov loved him, much less Vasilevsky. But no one mentions that Mehlis proposed withdrawing troops in advance by the rampart, and the order from the headquarters (Vasilevsky) came only on May 9, when the Germans took him already on the 10th. No one mentions the first operation won by the Red Army - Tikhvin, where Mehlis played far from the last role. You can discuss a lot, but it is better to receive information from different points of view. Mehlis, by the way, did not write memoirs, unlike the famous marshals.

        "The fighters are not to blame, the leadership ... We have disgraced the country and must be cursed" L.Z. Mehlis 1942.
        1. bakhshiyan rachik
          bakhshiyan rachik 26 June 2016 13: 33
          0
          they didn’t like the Mehlis for its honesty because they believed that they didn’t let it be stolen. It’s all the Mehlis’s fault that it turned too late to Stalin about the problems of the Crimean front
  10. Mikhail Matyugin
    Mikhail Matyugin 25 June 2016 11: 43
    +4
    Quote: AK64
    Yeah ... Stupid cruel and smug Trotskyist.

    Well, maybe we won’t be so harsh? wink Just a professional economist and a good administrator, and yes, the "red inquisitor" is still a worse commander than "possibly the best operational intelligence of the Wehrmacht"?

    As Stalin used to say, "We have no Hindenburgs, so we will fight those who are."
    1. AK64
      AK64 25 June 2016 13: 43
      -4
      Well, maybe we won’t be so harsh? wink Just a professional economist and good administrator

      "Soviet Economist"? Is it like Gaidar or what?

      Well, can you imagine what a "Soviet doctor of economics" is? Could it have anything to do with economics in general?

      What is Doctor of Science? If a person is seriously engaged in science, then he will have no time for anything else.

      Psychological portrait of Mehlis: he did not tolerate the opinions of his subordinates, but at the same time he always allegedly fulfilled the "will of his superiors". What do you yourself think, is this psychology similar to the psychology of a scientist? IMHO, no --- for a scientist it is unthinkable simply.

      So the "doctoral" Mehlis is highly doubtful to me. (As, however, and Gaidar)


      and yes, is the "red inquisitor" still a worse commander than "possibly the best operational intelligence of the Wehrmacht"?

      Yes, Mehlis was not a general at all. He would be a firing squad, a typical Trotskyist in his methods. Here is the murder of Pavlov and the officers of his headquarters - this is a typical activity of the Mekhlis: "to shoot everyone so that others can fight better."

      Did you see "conversation with Mekhlis" in Starinov's memoirs?
      I don’t believe memoirs at all, but when EVERYONE writes the same thing - maybe this is true?

      As Stalin used to say, "We have no Hindenburgs, so we will fight those who are."

      Stalin said a little differently: "There is no Ginsenburg in the reserve of the Headquarters. There is Comrade Kozlov in the reserve of the Headquarters!"

      Kozlov would be adequate to the task - but the sadist Mehlis clearly enjoyed the fact that he turned people into jellyfish. Nuivot ...

      By the way, Kozlov himself ex-facto accused Mehlis less than for example Oktyabrsky. (And IMHO claims to Oktyabrsky were fully justified)
      1. Idiot
        Idiot 25 June 2016 17: 44
        +1
        Quote: AK64
        Yes Mehlis was not a general at all. He would be a shooter, a typical Trotskyist by methods.


        Who do you think are Trotskyists? And why is the Mehlis a Trotskyist? And then who is Khrushchev?


        Quote: AK64
        By the way, Kozlov himself ex-facto accused Mehlis less than for example Oktyabrsky. (And IMHO claims to Oktyabrsky were fully justified)


        By the way, on the Leningrad front, Meretskov asked the Headquarters to leave Mekhlis when they wanted to transfer him to another front. Probably for the fact that Mehlis made a jellyfish from Meretskov. Oktyabrsky, in my opinion, is an outright coward and who handed over Sevastopol. If the command of the Primorsky Army had not been "evacuated" and the Black Sea Fleet had fought and had not hid in bases, the Germans would not have taken the city. General Petrov was in such a hurry to fight further that he did not forget to take the officer's son with him to the submarine. Probably so that the commanding dynasty is not interrupted ...
        1. AK64
          AK64 25 June 2016 21: 01
          +1
          Who do you think are Trotskyists? And why is the Mehlis a Trotskyist?

          Psychologically close because. The same methods, the same ideas about life.

          And then who is Khrushchev?

          You will laugh, but ... but Khrushchev has repeatedly been called just that, a Trotskyist.

          By the way, on the Leningrad Front, Meretskov asked Stavka to leave Mehlis when they wanted to transfer him to another front. Probably for the fact that Mehlis from Meretskov made a jellyfish.

          Meretskov was never on the Leningrad front. Volkhovsky.
          Medusa from Meretskov was made a little BEFORE. They said to him "why are you, Kiril Afanasyich, in front of THESE so ... crawling?" - and he explained "what".
          Meretskov was a jellyfish - he was afraid to show initiative in a panic. But then again - ALREADY been.
          I already wrote, in another place, that Mehlis TO Crimea, and Mehlis AFTER Crimea are two different Mehlis.

          Oktyabrsky, in my opinion, is an outright coward and who surrendered Sevastopol. If the command of the Primorsky Army had not been "evacuated" and the Black Sea Fleet had fought,


          About Oktyabrsky I can’t say anything, Not Copenhagen. What, unlike Golovko, the hero of October received, of course I am slightly surprised. (But this is more about Golovko than about Oktyabrsky.) The escape from Sevastopol, with a quarter of a million soldiers and commanders thrown behind, is also deeply disgusting to me. But I didn’t dig deep into Oktyabrsky, and therefore I have no opinion.

          But here is what Kozlov spoke about Oktyabrsky extremely negatively, and it was precisely Oktyabrsky (more than Mehlis) who blamed the rout of the Crimean Front - that's for sure.
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 27 June 2016 23: 45
            +1
            "Meretskov was never at the Leningrad front. Volkhovsky." /////

            Where he spent about a dozen completely failed stupid operations
            with losses of several hundred thousand people. In general, one of the weakest generals
            The Red Army.
      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. Andrey Zh
        Andrey Zh 27 June 2016 08: 57
        +1
        ... which of the Mehlis is a doctor of science?!? The most ordinary executioner of the NKVD, and nothing more! Then one of the guys correctly put it - such an equally faithful one would serve at least Nicholas II, at least Trotsky, at least Hitler, at least Roosevelt !!! I am not anti-Semite, but ...
  11. nnz226
    nnz226 25 June 2016 13: 04
    +2
    As Kaganovich said: "Every accident has a surname, a name, a patronymic!" So the disaster of the Crimean Front has the names Kozlov and Mehlis! Mekhlis was a very active figure, and he could have knocked out more guns for the front even through Stalin. And their doing nothing led to the horrors of the bombing of the troops and the population on the Crimean coast of the Kerch Strait, Adzhimushkaya, and then the tragedy of Cape Chersonesos in early July 1942 near Sevastopol. By the way, to these two names it is necessary to add Oktyabrsky (the commander of the Black Sea Fleet at that moment), who deservedly received a blow in the face from one of the Sevastopol soldiers at a conference in the 50s in the Sevastopol DOP.
  12. Lex.
    Lex. 25 June 2016 14: 39
    +5
    Alexey Isaev:

    Generally speaking, D.T. Kozlov was one of the most unsuccessful Soviet military commanders. I emphasize - it is unfortunate, and not mediocre and stupid. Of course, he was not the Hindenburg, but one cannot but admit that Dmitry Timofeevich was catastrophically unlucky. Each time he didn’t voluntarily find himself where German troops were strong on the ground and in the air. Instead of room for maneuver, or even a mask of forests protecting against the all-seeing eye of aerial reconnaissance, Kozlov was given an open, lifeless steppe on a narrow and dense positional front. It was as if he was pursued by the most powerful German air connection - VIII air corps. Both in the Crimea in May 1942, and near Stalingrad in September 1942, the planes of the VIII air corps appeared over the troops subordinate to D.T. Kozlov, inevitably bringing death and destruction. After Stalingrad, Kozlov managed to get under Manstein’s counterattack near Kharkov in February - March 1943. So, he formally turned out to be responsible for the surrender of Kharkov, which it was no longer possible to keep. This last episode overflowed the patience of the leadership, and D. T. Kozlov was exiled from the army in Transbaikalia. If he sat out the terrible 1942 somewhere far from the close attention of the VIII air corps - on the North-Western or Bryansk Front - he would have every chance to remain in the memory of his descendants as a completely successful military leader and even end the war in Berlin.
    1. Idiot
      Idiot 25 June 2016 18: 27
      -2
      Quote: Lex.
      Alexei Isaev: Generally speaking, D.T. Kozlov was one of the most unfortunate Soviet military leaders


      I read the comment and thought, somewhere I already read it. Looked above - a quote from Isaev. One can also say about this historian, as well as about his counterpart Kozlov: some unfortunate historian. It seems that there is a historical diploma, and the appearance is impressive, again the glasses, and it seems to be writing the right things, but think about it: some garbage. With Kozlov the same thing:

      Quote: Lex.
      I emphasize - it is unfortunate, and not mediocre and stupid.


      Isaev himself understood what he said? Those. in the Red Army there were some categories of commanders (incompetent, stupid and unlucky), because of whose leadership the army suffered heavy bloody losses. But unlucky apart, they are not to blame, as incompetent and stupid - they are simply unlucky. But if they were lucky, they would immediately become lucky and move to another category of commanders - lucky, but not in the category of gifted or smart. And maybe they would have gone there, if the Germans had not been confused under their feet. Or some kind of special category would be created, superman ... It's just that in the Red Army, as, indeed, in any other army, before the war, some people are in command, and during the war - others. The first make a career, while the others fight - they destroy the enemy, and the better they destroy the enemy, the less they incur losses. In my opinion, Kozlov is a typical representative of the former. Before the war, the state gobbled up, did not learn anything, was afraid of responsibility, like the devil of incense, he did not let those who wanted to learn to fight upstairs, because for him the command position was always a feeding trough. The war began, Kozlov got fucked up. He killed people. And who was Mehlis? Yes, Mehlis fought in the civil war, he was a fearless man, honest and principled, but he was not a military professional, he did not study military affairs, before the war he headed the Central Committee secretariat and party control bodies, if I am not mistaken. And Kozlov was a professional soldier, he was taught all his life how to fight, but where Kozlov was taught, unfortunately, Mekhlis did not teach. Did you see Mehlis that not everything is good in Crimea, that Kozlov does not correspond to his position? I saw and informed the Headquarters. But Stavka had a headache not only for the Crimean Front. Stalin therefore reacted this way (about the Ginderburgs), because he was annoyed. Being a purely civilian himself, Stalin was forced to delve into the essence of military affairs and, apparently, believed that Mekhlis, whom he greatly appreciated, should also delve into everything himself and not demand from him that he became the champion of everything in the world. And then something happened that should have happened. The Germans went on the offensive. By the way, almost simultaneously, Operation Blau began, where another unfortunate commander, Golikov, found himself in the path of the main offensive direction of the Wehrmacht. For those who are unlucky, let's cry for Golikov ... So, I suppose, it will not be objective to put Kozlov and Mehlis on the same level. It's like blaming the passenger sitting next to the driver for the accident. By the way, why was General Gorbatov not an unlucky commander? Or did he come across the wrong Germans throughout the war? PS L.I.Brezhnev, who is undeservedly considered a senile, was a kind, intelligent and decent person (who can say that he lived badly under him?). So, when, at some regular festive event, the question of the contribution of the Soviet generals to the victory was raised, he said: "The colonels won the war." They did not remember the generals anymore ...
      1. AK64
        AK64 25 June 2016 19: 13
        0
        I read the comment and thought, somewhere I already read it. Looked above - a quote from Isaev. One can also say about this historian, as well as about his counterpart Kozlov: some unfortunate historian. It seems that there is a historical diploma, and the appearance is impressive, again the glasses, and it seems to be writing the right things, but think about it: some garbage.

        Alexei does not have a diploma of a historian.
        He is not a historian by education.

        Therefore, his working methods ... are wrong for the historian. Though honestly plowing in the archives
        1. Stas57
          Stas57 25 June 2016 20: 01
          0
          Quote: AK64
          Alexei does not have a diploma of a historian.

          CIN with 2012
          1. AK64
            AK64 25 June 2016 20: 30
            0
            Seriously????! Did not know. I apologize to pft, fkb for dis ...

            I should congratulate ...

            But Alexey didn’t master the methods of historical science, he didn’t. Although plowing in the archives.
      2. Mikhail Matyugin
        Mikhail Matyugin 25 June 2016 21: 59
        +1
        Quote: pft, fkb
        Himself being a purely civilian person,

        Well, I would not call a professional terrorist fighter in his youth and an active participant in the Civil War "subugo civilian".

        Quote: pft, fkb
        Yes, Mehlis fought in a civilian, fearless was a man, honest and principled, but he was not a military professional, he did not study military affairs
        I already noted above - he was a professional manager and economist (of course, Soviet, but still). But do not tell me examples of his personal fearlessness?
        1. AK64
          AK64 25 June 2016 22: 41
          +2
          Well, I would not call a professional terrorist fighter in his youth and an active participant in the Civil War "subugo civilian".

          Good military men are hardly obtained from terrorists - the genre is different.

          I already noted above - he was a professional manager and economist (of course, Soviet, but still).

          And where did you get the idea that he was a manager, economist, and even more so a doctor of sciences?

          Education - 6 classes, moreover, a Jewish school (that is, I think a lot of time went to Tolmud)

          These 6 classes were later added to the "Institute of Red Professors" (that is, "Bukharin's school" - even the "education" itself is rather bad than good, they taught very "not that". Later this business had to be smashed.)

          As a manager ... Yes, he didn’t manage anything either.
          As the head of the Political Department of the RKKA, there was simply "Stalin's man" there: since before that there were entirely Trotskyists, with Gamarnik at the head, so Stalin put "his little man."

          ... as Smirnov recalls, Stalin began to laugh, clutching at his stomach and wiping his tears. “But is it possible to appoint Mehlis to creative affairs,” he said. - Here's something to destroy, smash, destroy - for this he is suitable. You need a positive decision ”(Repressed Science / Comp. A.I. Melua. Issue 2. St. Petersburg, 1994. P 77).


          But do not tell me examples of his personal fearlessness?

          But this is exactly what Simonov came up with. Well, maybe Mehlis thought he should be personally fearless, who knows. But Simonov himself did not cite an example of fearlessness.

          From the positive traits: Mehlis apparently was neither a swindler, nor a moroder, nor a scoundrel (although he wrote daily denunciations to Stalin - but not out of meanness but apparently because he saw this as his duty)
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 27 June 2016 23: 53
            +1
            "Mekhlis, apparently, was neither a swindler, nor a moroder, nor a scoundrel (although he wrote denunciations to Stalin every day - but not out of meanness, but apparently because he saw it as his duty" /////

            Villains and crimes are often committed out of a sense of duty, there is no contradiction.
            It is enough to read the interrogations from the Nuremberg trials.
            There, too, most of the criminals were not crooks, but active, responsible people
            with an increased sense of duty.
  13. Cartalon
    Cartalon 25 June 2016 21: 08
    +2
    The article immediately minus the calculated Tatars and the forgotten garrison of Sevastopol
  14. Raven
    Raven 26 June 2016 09: 28
    0
    there are soldiers, and there are soldiers
    there are generals, and there are generals
    there is a political officer, but there are political officers ...

    not everyone who has put on a military uniform and has become a soldier becomes or will ever become a Warrior ... not everyone who wears marshal epaulets are commanders and not everyone who is supposed to inspire, support and insure against mistakes can do it ...

    when one is unsuitable it’s still there, and when there are two of them unsuitable, a truly fat polar fox ...

    neither Kozlov nor Mehlis were able to compete with Manstein as a commander ...
  15. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 27 June 2016 14: 08
    +1
    "Most of the failures of Soviet troops in 1941-1942 are in one way or another connected with
    sparse formation of formations when divisions occupied a lot
    wider than the statutory norms "////

    To do this, there is intelligence and the General Staff - to determine the direction of the main attacks of the enemy
    and concentrate your forces there.
    And do not spread evenly along the border or front line. Otherwise ALWAYS building
    will be sparse, you will not accumulate divisions.

    Isaev’s recent childhood arguments ... sad
  16. Romin
    Romin 13 July 2016 00: 19
    0
    On the face of a miscalculation. How can Isthmus, the vital corridor, be held by a group of 25 thousand. Without reserves