Military Review

The reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war (a brief overview). Part of 2

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The reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war (a brief overview). Part of 2



In the second part of the article, we turn to the consideration of the main, in the author's opinion, reasons that led to the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war.

Error in determining the direction of the main strike

In this question, this reason is considered perhaps the most important. Like, if they knew where the Germans would strike, then everything would be in order. About whether they knew or not, there are different points of view. Some authors believe that Soviet intelligence did not have any documentary data on the operational plans of potential opponents. [Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War, c.274]. Others say exactly the opposite: everyone knew, everyone saw [A.A. Martirosyan The tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or treason? C.38]. But the majority of authors and researchers (A. Vasilevsky, M. Zakharov, P. Bobylev, A. Shubin, and others) stop that the Soviet leadership simply made a tragic mistake in certain main directions of impact. Consider everything in order.

The version that intelligence did not know anything at all, does not hold water. What, then, is the basis for the development of plans for the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces?

On the other hand, they could not know everything. The intelligence that the GRU and the Foreign Ministry received contradicted each other, they constantly needed to be checked and clarified.

We will not go deep into the depths of intelligence, but we will proceed from the plans of the USSR that existed on the eve of the war. The main such plans are “considerations on the basics of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East for 1940 and 1941” from September 18 1940, and its updated version from March 11 1941.

The 1940 plan was developed by B. M. Shaposhnikov (who, unfortunately, did not report it to 1940 in September to I. Stalin in connection with his transfer to the post of Deputy Commissar of Defense), and the plan for 1941 was developed by S. Tymoshenko and D . Zhukov.

These plans are almost the same, but there is one significant difference in the 3 paragraph “Opponents’ probable operational plans ”in relation to Germany. The 1940 plan says that Germany is likely to deploy its main forces north of the r. San with the aim of delivering the main attack from East Prussia through Lithuania in the direction of Riga, Kovno and further to Dvinsk or Kovno and further to Minsk. Further, it is said that the possibility of concentrating the main forces of the German army in the south, in the Sedlets area, Lublin, is not excluded to deliver the main attack in the general direction of Kiev [Zyuzin E. I. Did the USSR prepare a preventive strike? C.25]. That is, according to this plan, it was proposed to deploy the main forces of the Red Army in the strip from the coast of the Baltic Sea to Polesie.



B.M. plan Shaposhikov, 1940


The 1941 plan already states that “Germany is likely to deploy its main forces in the south-east from Siedlce to Hungary in order to take a blow at Berdichev, Kiev to seize Ukraine. This blow, apparently, will be accompanied by an auxiliary blow in the north from East Prussia to Dvinsk and Riga or by concentric attacks from Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk, Baranovichi. ” [Makovsky V. B. Covering the state border on the eve of the war]. That is, on the eve of the war, the southwestern direction was considered the main [Zhukov G. K. Memoirs and reflections. T.1, c.282]. The General Staff believed that south of p. Zap. Bug Germans will concentrate up to 110 divisions, plus Hungarian and Romanian, and north of r. Zap. Bug no more than 30-40 [Veremeev Yu.G. Strategic deployment plan of the Red Army from 11 March 1941 g.].



Strategic deployment plan of the Red Army, proposed by Zhukov and Tymoshenko, 1941


It is not here that the reason is that the General Staff concentrated the large forces on the south-western direction. Such a concentration of large forces of the Red Army in the southwestern direction caused the weakness of the forces of the Western Front, multiplied by the extremely unsuccessful configuration of the Belostok projection, plus the unreadiness of the URs at the new border, and the disarmament of the fortified areas that began on the old border. So this is a miscalculation of the General Staff?

Yes, it was a big strategic miscalculation of the General Staff, which determined the whole further course of the war. And this is recognized by G. Zhukov himself. But the paragraph below he shifts the blame from the General Staff to Stalin. According to Georgy Konstantinovich: “I. Stalin was sure that the Hitlerites ... would try first of all to take possession of Ukraine, the Donets Basin ... "[Zhukov G. K. Memoirs and reflections. T.1, c.282]. And this confidence, according to M. Zakharov, was gradually strengthened by Stalin, especially in the spring of 1941, when Germany moved to the Balkans [Zakharov, MV The General Staff in the Pre-War Years, c.220]. But S. Shtemenko and A. Vasilevsky do not quite agree with G. Zhukov and M. Zakharov. The first in his memoirs writes that Stalin "expressed the opinion that Germany can direct its efforts not in the western direction ... but in the south-western ..."[Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war years, c.17]. A. Vasilevsky says the same thing, relying on the memories of K. A. Meretskov. According to the latter, discussing the likely directions of the main attack, Stalin expressed his point of view, which was that Germany would try to direct its efforts not in the center of the Soviet-German border, but in the south-west. [Vasilevsky, A. M. The Matter of Life, c. 102]. But it was only a point of view, which could be discussed, given that before that there was a plan of B. Shaposhnikov, in which the western direction of a probable blow was defined as the main [A.A. Martirosyan The tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or treason? C.240-241].

An interesting version in such a change of plans is the “Kiev trace”. It is expressed by M. Zakharov in his memoirs. Its essence boils down to the fact that, since the summer of 1940, key positions in the General Staff have been occupied by specialists in the South-Western direction (KOVO): People's Commissar of Defense S. Tymoshenko - before that the commander of KOVO; First Deputy Chief of the General Staff N. Vatutin - before that KOVO Chief of Staff; Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov - until February 1941 Commander KOVO; Chief of the General Staff Operational Directorate G. Balandin - until March 1941, Deputy Chief of Staff of KOVO [Zakharov, MV The General Staff in the Pre-War Years, c.221].


G. Zhukov and S. Timoshenko at the teachings of the KOVO units


Thus, these workers, by virtue of their previous service, continued to attach great importance to the South-Western direction. Consequently, this method of recruiting employees of the General Staff can not be considered successful. And if you add here and very frequent changes of chiefs of the General Staff (three for one year), then the picture emerges sad.

But to hang all the sins on Stalin or G. Zhukov is still not worth it. They were to some extent right, in general they guessed Hitler’s intentions. But they could not have foreseen that the generals would convince the Fuhrer and insist that the main blow should be applied to the Minsk direction.

At the same time, modern “strategists” have completely lost sight of (or maybe they are simply cunning?) That Hitler was of the opinion that it was one of the main attacks on Kiev, and precisely for political and economic reasons. He believed that, having lost a powerful economic region, the USSR would not be able to continue the war. [Koval V. The first and second versions of the plan "Barbarossa", c.55].

The developers of the “Barbarossa” plan from the German General Staff of the ground forces proceeded from the directly opposite thesis. They believed that the rapid strikes on Moscow and Leningrad would lead to the disorganization of state administration, the military defeat of the Red Army and the death of the Soviet state. At the same time, all the riches of Ukraine, and not only that, will go to the Germans for nothing [Dashichev V. I. Strategic Planning of Aggression against the USSR, p. 16].

There was a sharp controversy between the supporters of one and the other strategy. What option will be chosen, did not know the German leaders themselves before the outbreak of war. Hitler stubbornly adhered to his opinion and retreated only under the combined onslaught of his generals. This happened 17 March 1941. [Koval V. The first and second versions of the plan "Barbarossa", c.56].


The German command in thinking about the direction of the main attack


Even with a map in front of him with exactly the German armies inflicted on it (which Stalin did not have and could not have, although A. Martirosyan believes the opposite [A.A. Martirosyan The tragedy of 22 Jun, c.38]) and seeing that two tank the groups are located on the flanks of Army Group Center, it is impossible to predict the direction of the main attack. For example, the left-flank 3TG of Army Group Center could be both the right-flank fist of Army Group North and have a direction to Leningrad. By the way, Hitler believed that the second blow should be on Leningrad, so that connecting with the Finns, and finally cutting off the USSR from the sea (thereby completely destroying the Baltic Fleet), hang over Moscow from the north and even from the northeast. The right-flank 2TG of Army Group Center could actually be the left-flank strike fist of Army Group South and act in a southeast direction, bypassing Kiev from the north. After all, one phone call from OKH to the headquarters of the army group is enough to reassign one or another tank group and the job is done. And the transfer to the main sections of the 47 divisions of the Wehrmacht was carried out literally in recent weeks, when it was already impossible to change anything in the arrangement of the Red Army divisions.

Say more. After the outbreak of war, taking advantage of the fact that after the Smolensk battle, the Army Group Center exhausted itself and was forced to stop the offensive in the second half of August, Hitler still insisted on his opinion and forced 25TG Guderian to turn (August) 26ТG to Ukraine [Halder F. War Diary. Volume 3: In two books. Book One, c.300-303].

The question of the work of intelligence is very closely connected with the question of the main direction. After all, intelligence was supposed to reveal the direction of the main attack.

I. Pykhalov, A. Shubin believe that Soviet intelligence could not determine the direction of the main attack of the enemy and miscalculated the number of German troops on the western borders of the USSR. This theory is based on the fact that the data that intelligence received was inaccurate and incomplete. In addition, as A. Shubin writes, in Germany important objects of reconnaissance penetration, such as Hitler’s immediate entourage, the top leadership of the National Socialist Party, the Wehrmacht, and special services, in which intelligence could receive information, remained without sufficient covert cover [Shubin A.V. The World on the Edge of the Abyss, c.480]. As a result, information about Hitler’s intentions was incomplete, mixed with misinformation and reached Stalin late. Information received, for example, in April 1941, led to the conclusion that the Germans will try to establish control over Ukraine from the causes of the food crisis. Such conclusions were made with reference to Count Gaschen, who worked on the grain planning and interior committee committee of Germany and who was close to Goering [Makovsky V. B. Covering the state border on the eve of the war, c.37].

In support of this, a photo of the document “List of reports on military training against the USSR in January –June 1941” has been posted below, where reports about plans for attacking the USSR are described.



In addition, from the analysis of intelligence, a picture emerged that confirmed the option of strategic “ticks”: “Murmansk, Vilna, Bialystok, Chisinau should be the targets of the first strike ... the German command will try ... from the north, from Eastern Prussia, and from the south, from Romania, create ticks, which will gradually close in order to surround the Red Army, located on the border " [Shubin A.V. The World on the Edge of the Abyss, c.482].

The data on the number of German divisions on the border with the USSR was very contradictory. On 4 April 1941 against the USSR stood 72-73 divisions [Zhukov G. K. Memoirs and reflections, c.291], and, according to G. Krivosheev, there were only 54 (on 10.04.41), but after 15 in May their number is rapidly growing: 111 divisions on 5 June, 163- on 18 June, and finally 190 - on 22 June [Krivosheev G.F. On the eve, c.42]. V. Kolkovsky speaks about 170 divisions at the beginning of May [Kolkovsky V. Roosevelt vs. Stalin, c.58], and according to the reports of P. Golikov (the head of the GRU) at the same time they were 103-107. Of these, against the Kiev district 34, and against the West - 29 [Zhukov G. K. Memoirs and reflections, c.291]. According to the latest data, Germany on 22 June 1941 had 180 divisions and 16 brigades against the USSR (excluding SS troops) [History West European armies, c.297].

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that the data on the number of Wehrmacht were underestimated, which could not but influence the decision of the General Staff and top management of the USSR. The reasons for such miscalculations by the General Staff A. Vasilevsky explains by the fact that there was some isolation of the Intelligence Agency from the staff of the General Staff. Thus, the head of the Intelligence Agency, being the Deputy Commissar of Defense, considered it “preferable to report intelligence directly to Stalin”, thereby bypassing the Chief of the General Staff. And if G. Zhukov, according to A. Vasilevsky, were aware of all the important intelligence information, he "could have made more accurate conclusions ... and more authoritatively submit these conclusions to Stalin and ... to some extent influence Stalin's convictions " [Vasilevsky, A. M. The Matter of Life, s.114].

A. Martirosyan argues in his study that intelligence worked very well. And already 20 in March The 1941 report of the GRU contained three options for possible actions by the Wehrmacht, and it was the third option that was closest to the Barbarossa plan. Although it criticizes the GRU for the fact that the intelligence officers did not insist and did not focus attention on the third plan, having all the reasons for it, but simply provided options like that they all deserve attention. Later, however, the GRU increasingly focuses on the grouping of Wehrmacht troops in Poland and report this to Golikov. And that only "skeptical grinned" [A.A. Martirosyan The tragedy of 22 Jun, c.202]. The latest concentration adjustment of the German forces relates to 19 and 20 June. It already speaks about the greatest concentration of German troops on the Baltic and Belorussian directions. [Vasilevsky, A. M. The Matter of Life, s.217]. Unfortunately, in the time that was left, it was impossible to transfer thousands of people and tens of thousands of military equipment to a threatening area.


Three Wehrmacht options filed by the GRU in March 1941.


On the mobilization and strategic deployment of the Soviet divisions

From the above, the following questions arise: why, given the availability of such data, mobilization and the transfer of troops to a state of full alertness were not carried out? What were waiting for? What were you afraid of?

But the Soviet government was not idle. Only did everything slowly and carefully.

First, mobilization is a complex process, which includes a call to the service of reservists, a large number of recruits, and their further distribution in parts; all this must be coordinated with the supply weapons, technology, requires the restructuring of transport schedules and the withdrawal of a large number of vehicles from the farm to the needs of the army: only some cars had to be handed over 298 thousand. [Zakharov, MV The General Staff in the pre-war years, c. 229]. That is, mobilization requires the restructuring of all economic activity. In other words, this is the last step to war. And here two factors are important: the first is to know for sure that you will be attacked (with this, as we found out, everything was fine), and the second is to know the exact date of the attack. But with the date there were certain problems. The Soviet leadership did not know the exact date at least until 21 June 1941. And in one day full mobilization is impossible.



On the other hand, the advance transfer of troops to a state of alert can cause no less harm than being late with it. From the hostile policy of a neighbor to war, the path is sometimes very long. And all this time, to keep the troops militant is very burdensome for the state, because it requires a large concentration of all the resources of the country.

Secondly, some steps were taken in this direction. With 13 May begins the nomination of the rifle divisions and 28 army directorates to the border districts of 4 (16, 19, 21, 22 armies) [Romanycheva N. The Red Army is the strongest? C.13]. After lengthy conversations with Stalin, the General Staff is allowed under the guise of mobile camp fees to make a hidden mobilization. It was strictly ordered to carry out these activities with great care, using the means of operational secrecy. As a result, at the beginning of June, thousands of people were called up from 793,5. [Zakharov, MV The General Staff in the Pre-War Years, c.263]. But these forces were not enough.



Such caution is due to the fact that Stalin did not want to provoke Germany, tried in every way to delay the war. He understood, according to G. Zhukov, that "we were late ... with the rearmament of troops ... with the reorganization of the armed forces ... and with measures to defend the country ..." Therefore, Stalin did not allow to deploy troops near the border. And when Tymoshenko and Zhukov 14 June recommended to take more vigorous measures, Stalin replied: “You are proposing to mobilize the country ... It's a war!”

Yes, it is a war. Evidence that Germany was ready to attack was abound. It was necessary to deploy the division. And it would not be worthwhile to fear that in the West there will be a fuss about the aggressive aspirations of the USSR. Because the country by the will of circumstances approached the Rubicon of War. And it was necessary to firmly take a step forward. That was what the interests of the country demanded at that time. Because the defense engagement of the first echelon armies of covering the border gave the aggressor less reason to attack (here I am, try to attack now!) Than pushing reserves from the depth, or deploying field control points that started on 14 — 19 June [Drobyazko S. Savchenko I. The Second World War 1939-1945, c.16]. In this case, it is obvious that it is much easier to hide the exit to defense positions than the march from the rear of large reserves and headquarters. And it was Stalin's mistake.

No less significant error was the erroneous view of the military leadership of the country at the beginning of the war. It was believed that with the outbreak of hostilities in the border area, small forces would be involved on both sides for 10-15 days. During this time, the main forces of the Red Army should complete the mobilization and continue to deploy under cover of the first operational echelon (covering armies). According to this concept, it is not necessary to keep a lot of troops in the covering armies. From here and the big stretching of the last on the front (in one echelon), and as a result low operational density of troops. So, in PriboVO, they were about 40 km per division, in ZOVOVO - 36 km, and in KOVO - up to 60 km [Romanycheva N. The Red Army is the strongest? C.13]. And according to the 1939 Field Regulations (with which the Red Army entered the war), the division could defend normally in the 8-12 km zone.



This meant that the density of the battle formations of the Soviet divisions was small: approximately 0,1 — 0,16 soldier per meter of front. The Germans had this number on the order of 4, and on the main lines of attack and up to 10 soldiers per meter of front, and the German offensive range was about 4 — 6 km. Those. the troops were not ready in advance to carry out the tasks assigned to them. And even more to countries, it looks like the background of the war in Poland, where Germany fully deployed its forces, and even more so against the background of Tymoshenko’s closing speech at the December 31 1940 meeting [Zyuzin E. I. Did the USSR prepare a preventive strike? C.19]. At the meeting, the Commissar of Defense, speaking about the nature of the modern offensive operation, emphasized that the main type of offensive operation is a breakthrough, which is carried out by concentrated forces of several armies on a relatively narrow sector of the front with the aim of “making a dent and then widening it ... deliver a powerful, crushing blow with concentrated forces ... "In words everything is true, but in deeds ... What is this? Negligence? Unprofessionalism? Or some kind of a game of giveaway with the enemy?

So, the Wehrmacht ahead of the Red Army in a strategic deployment. If the aggressor at the end of June 21 was fully mobilized, then the Soviet troops were in such a state that they could neither attack nor defend. The main reasons for this are as follows.

First, the Wehrmacht began deploying troops in February 1941, i.e., in 3,5 months. earlier Soviet troops.

Secondly, the throughput of the enemy’s railway was twice as high as in the USSR. In addition, Germany from 25 May transferred them to the schedule of maximum movement, and the Soviet railway worked (within the framework of secrecy) before the war as usual [Kiselev V.N. Stubborn Facts of the Beginning of the War, c.16].

Third, the Soviet leadership, following the instructions of Stalin and trying not to give Hitler a reason for war, acted extremely cautiously. And this caution led to the hesitant nature of preparing the troops of the western districts to repel an attack. Many examples can be cited when units were advanced to the border, occupied their own defense lines, and then were diverted to the rear. So it was with 87cd KOVO, which was taken 20 June from the border to the camp almost 250 km [Romanycheva N. The Red Army is the strongest? C.16].

Finding out the reasons for the defeat of spacecraft in border battles, I would like to draw attention to strategic operational games on maps in January 1941. We believe that it was precisely at these games that one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war was laid. It was in these games that the variants of the future actions of the Red Army and its adversary (that is, the main provisions of the country's defense plan) were tested, it was here that the top military leadership had to get some experience in conducting front-line and army operations. And at the same time it was the games that were supposed to show the level of operational-strategic skills and skills of top-level commanders.

The idea of ​​holding such games with the highest commanders of the Red Army was approved by the People’s Commissar of Defense S. Tymoshenko as 11 of October 1940 in October. It was planned to be bilateral in the north-west direction on the theme “Offensive operation of the front with a breakthrough of the fortified areas”. The game was supposed to be from 17 to 19 on November 1940. Later, the dates were postponed in connection with the December meeting of the higher command personnel of the Red Army. After this meeting, it was decided to hold two games: the first 2-6 in January 1941 in the north-west direction; January 2nd 8-11 Southwest [Bobylev P.N. Rehearsal of a catastrophe, c.15].

The development of an operational-strategic game in the south-western direction is connected with the September plan of strategic deployment of the Red Army on the western borders. According to this plan, as we found out above, it was in the south-west direction that the Soviet leadership decided to concentrate the main grouping of Soviet troops in case of war with Germany. Therefore, the development of a second, more ambitious game was necessary. At the same time, the first game (in the north-west) from the “blue” ones was now considered as an offensive in the interests of the main operation conducted in the south-west direction. [Zakharov, MV The General Staff in the Pre-War Years, c.240].

The games were held under the general direction of the USSR Commissar of Defense Marshal Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko.

In the operational tactical games on the cards in January 1941, the ideas that were expressed at the December meeting of the Red Army high command personnel found their practical embodiment [Bobylev P.N. Rehearsal of a catastrophe, c.16]. Most of their participants had to solve problems on the side of the “Western” and on the “Eastern” side. The higher command of the Red Army received practice in decision-making in difficult conditions, in planning and material and technical support for front-line and army operations, in managing large mobile formations in cooperation with aviation.

From the point of view of getting top commanders of the practice of command and control in operations of the game, they achieved their goal. But at the same time, they showed that many senior commanders do not yet have the necessary operational and strategic horizons, the art of troop control in the dynamics of operations Bobylev P.N. Rehearsal of a catastrophe, c.33].

If we talk about checking plans to repel possible aggression by Germany and its satellites, in this regard the games have brought little benefit.


Red Army Action Card in the first game


Firstly, their most significant drawback was that the operations of the initial period of the war were completely excluded from the rally, although under the terms of the game the “Westerners” attacked the “Easterners”. In the first game, the "Western" who invaded the territory of the "Eastern" 23-25 July reached the Osovec, Skidel, Lida, Kaunas, Shulya line (70-120 km east of the state border), and then, before 1 August, were rejected to the state border to the original position. And already from this position further actions of the parties were played out.

In the same scenario, the war began in the second game: after the invasion of the “eastern” territory to the depth of 50-70 km, the “western” under the blows of the “eastern” were rejected to the depth of 90-180 km to the west of the state border Bobylev P.N. Rehearsal of a catastrophe, c.32].]. But the question remained open: how was it possible for the "eastern" not only to drop the enemy to the state border, but also in some places to transfer military operations to the territory of the enemy. In both games this question was not disclosed.


Red Army Action Card in the second game


Thus, neither at the meeting in December, nor in the games did they even attempt to make out the situation that may arise in the first operations in the event of a German attack.

The groups of troops of the parties created in the games corresponded to the views of the Soviet leadership approved by 1940 in the fall, according to which Germany would be able to concentrate the main forces (110-120 divisions) in the south in the Sedlets, Lublin region, to strike in the general direction of Kiev to seize Ukraine. An auxiliary strike may be inflicted from the North Prussia by forces of 50-60 divisions. [Zyuzin, E. I., Did the USSR Prepare a Preventive Strike, c.25]. In the documents of the first game, it was stated that the Northeastern and Eastern fronts of the “Western” will act in the interests of the main attack, which is carried out south of Brest, and where the main forces of the “Western” are deployed - before the 150 divisions Bobylev P.N. Rehearsal of a catastrophe, c.16].].

But the beginning of the war showed that in January 1941, the operational-strategic link of the Red Army commanders played on this cards a variant of military operations that was not carried out by real “Western” ones.

Another significant drawback of the games was that the overwhelming majority of the participants in the game led the associations in it, regardless of which associations they headed at that time. With almost the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, almost none of them had to act where they acted in games. In the first game, none of the commanders of the armies of PribOVO and ZAPOVO performed the duties of commander of at least one of the five armies of the “Eastern” North-Western Front. The commanders of 3, 8, 10 and the 11 armies of these districts acted as chiefs of army headquarters. [Zakharov, MV The General Staff in the Pre-War Years, c.243]. In the second game, from the seven armies of the Southwestern Front of the “Eastern”, only one was led by the commander of the post, I. Muzychenko, and in the direction where 6А was located before him. Bobylev P.N. Rehearsal of a catastrophe, c.34].]. In the main, the army in both games was headed by the commanders of the Arkhangelsk, Trans-Baikal, Transcaucasian, Leningrad, Moscow, Odessa, Volga, North Caucasus, Ural military districts and the Far Eastern Front. They all received the practice of command and control in modern operations.

But the big mistake was that those who did not need it in the first place, the commanders of the armies on the western borders of the USSR, did not receive such a practice.

Of course, the results of the games gave some rationale for reflection and conclusions. Probably, not without influence of the conclusions from the first game, in which the “Eastern” did not fulfill the tasks set for them to encircle and destroy the “Western” in East Prussia, the following provision was made in the plan of strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in March: “Deployment of the main forces The Red Army in the West ... against East Prussia and on the Warsaw direction raises serious concerns that the struggle on this front could lead to protracted battles ” [Zyuzin E.I. On the strategic deployment of the Red Army, c.22]. Note that in addition to this addition, no other measures have been taken. And above all, G. Zhukov as the Chief of the General Staff. No analysis, no adequate measures, although he, G. Zhukov, showed in the first game how the Red Army can lose. It turns out that the guilty of destroying the Western Front is not so much the fault of D. Pavlov (although he is also guilty), namely G. Zhukov, as the Chief of the General Staff. And one more thing, despite the fact that in the first game G. Zhukov beat D. Pavlov, Stalin remained, according to A. Shubin, pleased with the game of both commanders [Shubin A.V. The World on the Edge of the Abyss, c.471]. Why? After all, the Red Army actually lost. Why did Stalin not draw conclusions, but continued to strengthen the southern flank?

During the games another mistake was made. This is a miscalculation with the creation of a favorable balance of forces of the parties. The advantage in the strength of the infantry troops in both games were on the side of the enemy. This allowed the “Westerners” in the first game to gather a large grouping to strike in the direction of Riga, Dvinsk and win the operation. Game developers explain this, according to M. Zakharov, by the fact that when developing the tasks they proceeded from the fact that the Soviet division was 1,5 times more powerful than the German one. And therefore, with a smaller number of connections, the advantage in manpower and technology was on the side of the Soviet divisions [Zakharov M. V. General Staff, c.250]. A. Martirosyan also speaks of this, relying on the December report of the Chief of the General Staff Meretskov. The latter asserted that “... our division is much stronger than the German one and will surely crush it in a head-on battle. In defense, our division will immediately strike the enemy's 2-3 divisions. In the offensive, one and a half of our divisions will overcome the defenses of the enemy's division ” [A.A. Martirosyan The tragedy of 22 Jun, c.300]. The last sentence seems strange at all, given that the onset of the balance of power should be 3: 1. That is, three advancing divisions against one in defense.

As you can see, the General Staff believed that the enemy had no numerical advantage. And this is a big mistake that led to a variety of reasons for defeat. Therefore, to underestimate the strength of the enemy is unacceptable negligence.

Consequently, the restriction of the goals of the games mainly to the top commanding staff of the preparation and conduct of an offensive operation by the front and the army, the wrong orientation of participants on a number of important issues (about the possible direction of the main attack of the enemy, about the initial stage of the war, which was absolutely successful, etc.) Not the last role in how the USSR Armed Forces were prepared to repel aggression in the six months that remained before the war.

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History of Western European armies / V.N. Bogdanov, S.V. Ermachenkov, etc. - M.: Eurolynts, Kuchkovo Pole, 2003. 464 with.
Kiselev V.N. Stubborn Facts of the Beginning of the War // VIZH. - 1992. - №2.
Kolkovsky V. Roosevelt vs. Stalin: US Victory. The defeat of the USSR. - M .: LLC Publishing AST, 2004. - 202 with.
Krivosheev G.F. On the eve // ​​VISH. - 1991. - №6.
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  1. Igor39
    Igor39 22 June 2016 06: 28
    +2
    I also believe that Stalin and the General Staff are completely to blame for the tragedy of June 22.
    1. Kenneth
      Kenneth 22 June 2016 06: 52
      +6
      And you write down Hitler among the guilty. Although of course you and the author are right. The mistakes of the leadership of the country, the army and industry are undeniable.
      1. Simpsonian
        Simpsonian 22 June 2016 07: 03
        -6
        Quote: Kenneth
        I also believe that Stalin and the General Staff are completely to blame for the tragedy of June 22.

        The NKVD did not catch all the spies before the start of the war.

        And for the "green" were aliens to play? Who are the ones who let this hellish adik off the chain?
        1. Kenneth
          Kenneth 22 June 2016 07: 25
          +2
          Respected. Learn to use quoting first to answer whose words you spend
          1. NIKNN
            NIKNN 22 June 2016 12: 23
            +8
            Although, of course, this dump of articles on the causes of the defeat of 1941 was already fed up. But I won’t say anything against it. It is necessary to raise this topic, and not only on the eve of June 22. I hope that VO is read not only by professors, but also by young people who are prepared to pass the exam, and it’s so useful for them to know a history wider than software.
            In addition to the article, I will throw in a highly controversial thought (not mine and I do not remember the source).
            Firstly, the training of a small number of fighters really wanted to be better (spring and even the previous call, therefore camps and training camps with the aim of putting them into operation as soon as possible).
            And finally, one of the reasons for the weak defense and the unpredictable surrender at this stage of the war is the presence of conscripts from western Ukraine and the Baltic ...
            God forbid me if I put this rebuke to all nationality, but the moral and ideological preparation of the newly affiliated left much to be desired ...
            1. Mikado
              Mikado 22 June 2016 13: 54
              +2
              Quote: NIKNN
              And finally, one of the reasons for the weak defense and the unpredictable surrender at this stage of the war is the presence of conscripts from western Ukraine and the Baltic ...
              God forbid me if I put this rebuke to all nationality, but the moral and ideological preparation of the newly affiliated left much to be desired ...

              You are probably right in many ways. hi
              There were cases when the Latvians, with entire battalions, transferred to the Germans in the first days. Everything was. I do not justify anyone, but they, it turns out, the people split in two. But in Liepaja it was the people themselves who created the first popular militia in the war, and the Latvians heroically defended this city. But the head of the Liepaja Naval Air Defense School, General Blagoveshchensk was captured, began to collaborate with the Germans, became the main propagandist of the ROA and was hanged with Vlasov. And Arnold Mary, and the Estonian corps!
              I highly recommend reading, shedding light on the psychology of Estonians in the Red Army, a good book "I died in the first military summer": http://militera.lib.ru/prose/russian/peegel/index.html
            2. Stas57
              Stas57 22 June 2016 14: 32
              +1
              Quote: NIKNN
              And finally, one of the reasons for the weak defense and the unpredictable surrender at this stage of the war is the presence of conscripts from western Ukraine and the Baltic ...

              there were no draftees from western Ukraine and the Baltic states, the first draft was planned for October 41
              where do you even take all this nonsense from?
              On November 6, November 1940, the People’s Commissar of Defense issued a directive to register from January 5 to February 15 on February 1941 the enlistment offices of citizens of 1922 year of birth, people with completed secondary education, and students of 10-x classes of secondary schools and graduation courses of technical schools of 1923 year birth, not attributed to older citizens and persons 1920 — 1921 years of birth in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. The registration in the Baltic states, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was to be carried out later
            3. Monarchist
              Monarchist 22 June 2016 19: 41
              0
              The facts confirmed that most surrendered from the western regions. This was often slipped into the memoirs of war veterans and memoirs. In my opinion, Smirnov spoke about this in a book about the defenders of the Brest Fortress.
              1. Stas57
                Stas57 22 June 2016 19: 52
                +1
                Quote: Monarchist
                The facts confirmed that most surrendered from the western regions. This was often slipped into the memoirs of war veterans and memoirs. In my opinion, Smirnov spoke about this in a book about the defenders of the Brest Fortress.

                facts say there was no conscription in new territories
                1. Simpsonian
                  Simpsonian 23 June 2016 11: 07
                  0
                  Quote: stas57, Kenneth et al.
                  Respected. Learn to use quoting first to answer whose words you spend

                  but about the German spies,
                  Quote: The Cat
                  in order to make airfields to the border itself, to accumulate unmasked equipment there.

                  who also gave the order to remove weapons not only from aircraft but also from bunkers (for transfer to new lines of defense), took away air defense units from equipment that was parked in parks and airfields, and disorganized the movement of ground traffic flows,

                  Of course we will forget the topic ... bully
        2. Aleksandr72
          Aleksandr72 22 June 2016 08: 09
          +20
          The article is, to put it mildly, "muddy." The country's top leadership, the General Staff of the Red Army and personally I.V. Stalin, of course, was to blame for such a catastrophic beginning of the war for the USSR, "missed" Hitler’s active preparations for the invasion, failing to determine the exact date of the attack, the direction of the main strike of the Wehrmacht and other, other ... But could they do this, at least with the date of the attack - it is already well known that, for example, Hitler rescheduled the date of the attack on France 37 times! And France, already at war with Germany, could not adequately respond to the "sudden" Wehrmacht strike.
          Hitler several times postponed the start of Operation Barbarossa, and only on June 21 the date and time of the attack on the USSR was finally determined and the corresponding directive sent to the troops. Further:
          Irrefutable documentary evidence was received from the role of the intelligence service of the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR on June 15, 1941 that the process of nominating the Wehrmacht troops to their initial positions for the attack was resumed from 4.00 on June 18, 1941. On the same day, Stalin ordered the aviation forces of the Western Special Military District to organize thorough aerial reconnaissance for the final establishment and documentary evidence of the Wehrmacht’s aggressive preparations for an attack, and border guards were supposed to assist the pilots. On June 18, during daylight hours, a U-2 aircraft flew from south to north along the entire border line in the ZAPOVO strip, piloted by the most experienced pilot and navigator, who landed a car every 30-50 kilometers and wrote another report right on the wing, which was right there border guards took.

          The pilots clearly recorded that an avalanche-like movement of the Wehrmacht armada towards the border line began. Then, on June 18.06.41, 18.06.41, Stalin ordered the troops of the first strategic echelon to be fully operational. However, this same directive dated XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX could not be found in the archives. It is unclear whether this directive was or not.
          The author repeats the old cartoon about disarming fortified areas on the old border (the so-called "Stalin line", although it never bore such a name, as well as the notorious "Molotov line" on the new western border). On the so-called “Molotov lines” were supposed to be 5807 structures, of which 880 were active at the beginning of the war, and 4927 were under construction. On the “Stalin line” there were 3279 structures built between 1928 and 1939, and another 538 remained incomplete. The unforgettable Nikita Sergeyevich came up with the tale of disarming fortified districts on the old border, and the illustrious Marshal Zhukov repeated that no one had found orders to disarm or even destroy fortifications. But even if all these fortifications were completed, armed and equipped with garrisons, and the foreground was occupied by field troops, this would not have decided anything. The Wehrmacht, when the need arose, easily broke through the much more powerful fortifications of the Maginot line. And acting only with infantry, combat engineer units and artillery.
          Questions, questions ... and not one comprehensive answer. Whether we will ever learn the whole truth about this bitter war for us, ending in one undoubted Victory for all of us, is unknown.
          The main thing is that we remember the war, remember those who, at the cost of their lives, gave us all the opportunity to live, to discuss the war relics, including here on this site. In the West they say about us so that we celebrate Victory Day so that as if the war ended only yesterday ... And while they will talk about us like that, our country is invincible.
          1. Stas57
            Stas57 22 June 2016 08: 47
            -1
            Quote: Aleksandr72
            The article is somehow "muddy" to say the least. The country's top leadership, the General Staff of the Red Army and personally I.V. Stalin, of course, are to blame for such a catastrophic start of the war for the USSR, having "missed" Hitler's active preparation for the invasion,


            The leadership's mistakes turned out to be not only the defeat of the Red Army in the initial course of hostilities, the loss of a significant part of equipment and weapons depots, the occupation of the territory of the USSR with a huge part of industrial enterprises, but also the deaths of millions of Soviet citizens during battles, starvation, cold, destruction in concentration camps and executions by police units.


            and no one denied
            “Lenin left us a great country, and we pissed it off,”

            but I must say why there were such mistakes, and for example, even knowing how everything will not see a way out of the situation, the first round was doomed in any case. victimization
          2. yehat
            yehat 22 June 2016 10: 17
            +1
            I will add that after the flight of the U-2 the next day I duplicated, flying along a significant border line, some commander on the I-15 and fully confirmed the diagnosis
          3. Serg65
            Serg65 22 June 2016 12: 36
            +4
            Quote: Aleksandr72
            Questions, questions ... and not one comprehensive answer. Whether we will ever learn the whole truth about this bitter war for us, ending in one undoubted Victory for all of us, is unknown.

            You are right Alexander, some questions! Memoirs of military commanders are corrected and constantly corrected, archival documents at the time of Khrushchev were thoroughly cleaned up. Shigry games are certainly right and interesting ..... but here's how to explain the memories of my own uncle, an ordinary 9-th outpost of the 91-th Rava-Russian border detachment, that there were nails in the boxes instead of cartridges, that almost all of the ammunition, except the duty officer, was handed over to the warehouse.
            A miscalculation in the direction of the main blow is of course a big mistake ... but not a tragic one, why were the border units themselves not ready, that is the question? if on Sundays they sang the song "If tomorrow is war," why did some of the command staff end up on vacation? Questions, questions ...
            1. Monarchist
              Monarchist 22 June 2016 19: 50
              +2
              Why were there nails instead of cartridges? There is only one answer - treason! By the way, Martirosyan also cites curious cases of "mistakes, the command" ZOVO
            2. overb
              overb 23 June 2016 19: 54
              -2
              Quote: Serg65
              instead of cartridges there were nails in the boxes,

              Enchanting nonsense. Another "facts".
              Quote: Ivan Tartugay
              It follows that the army general, Hero of the Soviet Union Zhukov back in December, i.e. six months before the war, he knew exactly where and how, and in what directions the Wehrmacht would strike on June 22, 1941.

              And then. Like all other generals in the memoirs. However, none of them for some reason until 22.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. I didn’t tell anyone about it.
              Quote: Alexey RA
              The point is not to distract the tanks from the main task - the fight against enemy infantry.

              It turns out the main task of the tanks is the fight against infantry? Enchanting. Then maybe tell me what forces? The cannons of the tanks are mostly dead (in the USSR, mainly forty-five), the infantry hides from machine guns in trenches.
              Actually support for his infantry was part of the tasks of the pre-war "infantry" tanks. But by the middle of the Second World War, they ordered to live long and were replaced by assault self-propelled guns (from the Germans). Or something like SU-76 (in the USSR).
              Quote: Alexey RA
              The established practice of opposing our enemy’s tank attacks and getting involved in tank battles is wrong and harmful.

              Now, who told you that? And what was the Soviet infantry like in 1944, when the T-34/85 tank became the only normal means of anti-theft defense in the USSR?
              AT guns for the entire Red Army made a little more than 2,5 thousand, and T-34/85 made 10,5 thousand. What then could be "tanks with tanks do not fight"?
              Quote: Alexey RA
              And the vast majority of shells in it OFS.

              OFS tanks were not given for infantry firing, but for firing at gunners. Those. this is a tank defense weapon.
              Quote: Alexey RA
              failed shell design; even with quality workmanship, it collapses on cemented armor.

              There was a normal shell. The usual Soviet quality. Those. normal times came across.
              The problem was different, the 45-mm cannon, which in 1930. was a "bomb", by the beginning of the 40s it was already hopelessly outdated. And nothing could save her, in 1938. it should not have been "modernized" but written off. The continuation of the release of forty-fives during the Second World War is a strange activity, smelling of treason.
              Quote: Alexey RA
              76 mm tank gun - no armor-piercing shells. NKBP thwarted all production plans, and in the border districts in the BC of tanks as armor-piercing was "shrapnel for a blow".

              And why do tank guns need armor-piercing shells? You wrote a little higher that "we must fight and infantry." And anti-tank artillery must fight tanks.
              Contradict yourself.
              And nobody planned a three-inch for the VET. It was believed that the regular forty-foot will cost. After all, there were them in the Red Army, like a stray dog ​​fleas.
              1. Serg65
                Serg65 24 June 2016 05: 50
                +1
                Quote: overb
                Enchanting nonsense. Another "facts".

                Maybe, maybe .... a person spent 4 years in concentration camps and for some reason I believe him what
                Quote: overb
                And how was the Soviet infantry in 1944, when the tank became the only normal means of anti-theft defense in the USSR T-34 / 85?

                My friend, the T-34 / 85 tank was adopted by the Red Army on 23 on January 1944 years, and we are discussing 22 June 1941 year! Hi your sick fantasy bully .
          4. Cro-Magnon
            Cro-Magnon 22 June 2016 20: 13
            +4
            The directives on improving combat readiness and preparations for repulsing the offensive were not only on June 18 ... but also on June 17,16 and June 15 ... They were in the archives before the maize and those marshals of koi came to power and missed the war and failed ! Then the archives were cleaned up and the IVS was declared the main culprit ... But the misfortune happened ... the references and references to these directives remained in the case of the leadership of the ZOV (the case of Pavlov and the company) ... it was in this case that the defendants were charged as one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Western Front!
      2. Igor39
        Igor39 22 June 2016 07: 13
        +2
        The leadership's mistakes turned out to be not only the defeat of the Red Army in the initial course of hostilities, the loss of a significant part of equipment and weapons depots, the occupation of the territory of the USSR with a huge part of industrial enterprises, but also the deaths of millions of Soviet citizens during battles, starvation, cold, destruction in concentration camps and executions by police units.
        1. Cro-Magnon
          Cro-Magnon 22 June 2016 20: 21
          +1
          And yes ... you forgot to clarify that Stalin was personally to blame for the Germans' failure to comply with the Geneva Convention ... which the USSR did not sign because it did not comply with the USSR constitution and the charter of the Red Army and the Germans signed ... and MUST BE OBSERVED! It’s true how the abovementioned concentration camps and police firing squads relate to this ... I did not understand!
      3. yehat
        yehat 22 June 2016 10: 14
        +3
        mistakes are inevitable.
        Would you honor Guderian when he criticized Barbarossa's performance
        Do you think the Germans were not mistaken? They could not even continue to fulfill their plan! It’s hard to believe for many, but after 20 days of fighting, the German command issued orders according to which about half of the troops in Belarus went forward and the other half back
        and a huge empty zone was formed, where, if desired, the retreating and surrounded Red Army soldiers could completely block the supply of the advancing units.
        Quite a few German commanders were killed moving through this territory out of armor from shelling from "greenery" and Guderian even issued a special order forbidding the command staff to stick out on the march.
    2. xetai9977
      xetai9977 22 June 2016 11: 31
      +3
      I read the memoirs of Tippelskircha, a prominent German military scientist, general. His "History of the Second World War" was published in the USSR back in the 50s. The author writes in one of the chapters that in the initial period, the Germans were faced with the blatant illiteracy of the Soviet commanders. The Soviet command threw soldiers into the attack with bayonets at the ready in an open field, directly at the German machine guns. They were literally mowed down with chains. An hour later, a new attack with the same result and the same scenario. Sometimes 5-6 attacks per day with the same result. They acted according to a template, leading to monstrous losses.
      1. Igor39
        Igor39 22 June 2016 11: 54
        +2
        I read about Rzhev here, very well described, about everything.http: //rshew-42.narod.ru/rshew_history.html
        Team of authors:
        Larisa Sorina - Head of the Archival Department of the Administration of the Tver Region, Honorary Archivist
        Oleg Kondratyev - Director of the State Archive of the Tver Region
        Pavel Karintsev - editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Rzhevskie Novosti"
        Nikolay Smirnov - candidate of historical sciences
        Evgeny Ozhogin - member of the Union of Journalists of Russia
    3. The comment was deleted.
    4. Alekseev
      Alekseev 22 June 2016 18: 35
      +2
      Quote: Igor39
      I also believe that Stalin and the General Staff are completely to blame for the tragedy of June 22.

      Guilty, of course.
      But the question lies much deeper. Rulers of the USSR (and every nation at this historical stage deserves its rulers request ) failed to comprehensively prepare the country "entrusted to them" for such a large-scale test.
      Only a naive comrade who is extremely far from war and the army might think that only "correct" plans and maps with correctly drawn arrows are the main thing in preparing the country for war.
      They are, of course, necessary.
      But ... For the plans to be successfully implemented, a combat-ready army is still needed, which means a trained, experienced, well-to-do army, which means the officer corps must be impeccable both in moral and business. And so that it is such, it must be grown, not repressed.
      Equipment and weapons are not only modern, but also reliable, reliable and mastered by 100 in the army.
      And civil administration without stupidity, and the economy is not quantitative, but qualitative, etc.
      G.K. Zhukov, in my opinion, in a conversation with K. Simonov (for obvious reasons, such judgments were not included in his "Memories and Reflections"), still quite accurately described the reasons for the defeats.
      “It will be necessary to finally face the truth and, without hesitation, to say how it really was. We must appreciate the German army, which we had to deal with from the first days of the war. We didn’t retreat a thousand kilometers before the fools, but before the strongest army in the world. It should be clearly said that the German army at the beginning of the war was better than our army, better prepared, trained, armed, psychologically more prepared for the war, drawn into it. She had the experience of war, and, moreover, a victorious war. This plays a huge role. We must also admit that the German General Staff and the German General Staffs then worked better than our General Staff and our General Staffs, the German commanders at that time thought better and deeper than our commanders. We studied during the war, and learned, and began to beat the Germans, but it was a long process. And this process began with the fact that the Germans had an advantage in all respects.
      We are embarrassed to write about the instability of our troops in the initial period of the war. And the troops were unstable and not only retreated, but also fled, and fell into a panic. The tendency is in the unwillingness to admit this: they say that the people are not to blame, only the authorities are to blame. In general terms, this is true. In the end, this is indeed so. But, specifically, at the beginning of the war, we fought poorly, not only above, but also below. It is no secret that divisions fought near us, of which one fought well and stubbornly, while the one next to it fled, having experienced the same enemy strike. There were different commanders, different divisions, different measures of resilience ... We should talk and write about this all, I would say that this has a pedagogical side: the modern reader, including young people, should not think that everything depends only on the bosses. No, victory depends on everyone, on each person, on his personal stamina in battle. Because we know how, under the same conditions, some people behaved stubbornly, while others did not. And this cannot be ignored. ”
      Zhukov also quite clearly characterized the suddenness of the German offensive.
      Here he also puts the question deeper. Sudden for the leadership of the country and the army, it turns out, was not the very fact of the start of the war, but the force of the blows of the German troops and the inability of the Red Army to repel them, to deliver successful counterattacks against such a strong enemy, the inability to make the right decisions both in the government, high headquarters, and earth ".
      1. Alekseev
        Alekseev 22 June 2016 18: 59
        +2
        The grandiose counterattack of the tank and mechanized corps near Dubno is also indicative in terms of surprise, when it turned out that despite the huge number of tanks it was not possible to overthrow and defeat the German troops, the losses were huge.
        And this inability of the troops to complete the task was "sudden". As well as the inability of the headquarters to successfully lead them.
        The encirclement of the Southwest Front troops near Kiev.
        Yes, Zhukov, Budyonny and other military leaders suggested withdrawing troops and thereby avoid encirclement.
        But for Stalin it was "sudden", that is, quite unexpected, that the Bryansk Front, whose commander Gen. Eremenko had promised "the scoundrel Guderian, would certainly be defeated, was himself defeated by Guderian, and Eremenko almost died and lost control of the troops. And the command of the Southwestern Front. also promised to hold Kiev ... Almost all of it died while trying to get out of the encirclement ...
    5. cast iron
      cast iron 22 June 2016 22: 33
      0
      I’m sure that an intellectual like you would have done much better in 1941 than the entire General Staff)))
    6. Petr petrov
      Petr petrov 18 December 2016 09: 43
      +1
      Rave........!!!!!!!
  2. Kenneth
    Kenneth 22 June 2016 06: 50
    +10
    I wonder why the author does not use more modern sources. Publications of the 90s openly sinned in the search for sensations to the detriment of analysis. In addition, much more primary sources are now open, the collections of which would also be nice to use in an analytical article.
    1. qwert
      qwert 22 June 2016 08: 04
      +6
      Quote: Kenneth
      90x publications openly sinned by seeking sensations to the detriment of analysis. In addition, much more primary sources are now open, the collections of which would also be nice to use in an analytical article.

      I completely agree. In those years, even an article about the English bomber "Lancaster" in an aviation magazine could not do without mentioning the GULAG. That would seem how, but such was the installation "from above", I think. Therefore, all the literature of the late 80s and early 90s was not engaged in analysis, but stupidly tried to dirty both the USSR and Stalin. Now, by the way, the situation is somewhat better. Of course, Svanidze and Radzinsky also remained, but there are also serious sources.

      And by the way: G. Zhukov. Memoirs and reflections: In 2, T. T. 1 is also the same source of information. It was not in vain that after the first edition Zhukov was invited to the officer’s court of honor, because of the inversion and obvious distortion of the facts in his speeches and books.
    2. Serg65
      Serg65 22 June 2016 12: 40
      +4
      Quote: Kenneth
      I wonder why the author does not use more modern sources.

      Here Konstantin, I completely agree with you!
  3. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 22 June 2016 06: 52
    +9
    I would add that it is important not only to search for the causes of defeat at the initial stage in the strategic and geopolitical terms, but also to analyze the state of the army starting with a simple infantryman, the state of materiel, the state of mind of junior command personnel in the field. At one time, I wrote to my cousin a work on the history of the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army at the initial stage of the war. She went with a bang. So, personally, in my opinion, important omissions were also shortcomings in the interaction of combat arms, the practical absence of radio communication at the level of squads, platoons, and what can I say, the devil sometimes lies in the details. The Germans themselves admit that by 43 the Russians HAVE LEARNED TO FIGHT (!). So it is not only the blunders of the leadership at the strategic level that are to blame here, but the banal lag in the organization and ability of the army to fight. After all, shooting at the enemy is one thing, but shooting wisely is another level. request
    There is no time to fully open thoughts - it's time to work. smile
    hi
    1. avt
      avt 22 June 2016 08: 35
      +4
      Quote: Rurikovich
      So, personally, in my opinion, important shortcomings were shortcomings in the interaction of the combat arms, the practical lack of radio communications at the level of detachments, platoons, and what can I say, the devil sometimes lies in the details. The Germans themselves admit that by the year 43, the Russians had learned to fight (!).

      Where did the interaction of units, formations, and even more of the branches of service come from, if the newly created units and subunits were not even staffed with equipment and personnel? And in the first place, the commanding officers - well, even graduates from schools were stupidly lacking! Here is from the memoirs of Semyon Krivoshein, well, the same corps commander 25, who is credited with the parade in Brest .-, Our army ... carried out a wide reorganization, rearmament of all branches of the armed forces with the most advanced equipment. Old, well-trained brigades had just been deployed into tank divisions. They were to be armed with medium tanks T-34 and heavy KV. In other words, well-trained tank brigades were disbanded, but the divisions were not created; the crews were routed to all regiments, but they did not have time to teach the new ones; new excellent tanks did not arrive in the new divisions, the crews do not know them; only old vehicles remained in the tank units, and even those are scanty. "This is how he wrote about his 25th mechanized corps. ...
      1. captain
        captain 22 June 2016 09: 16
        +1
        So the fact that tank brigades were disbanded almost simultaneously in all districts and the formation of tank divisions began, is Hitler or our military leadership to blame?
        1. creak
          creak 22 June 2016 11: 14
          +2
          Quote: captain
          tank brigades were disbanded, almost simultaneously in all districts, and the formation of tank divisions began


          This was not quite the case, the formation of the tank divisions had already been completed and they were part of the formed or already formed mechanized corps, of which there were only 8 in the KOVO ...
          True, not all mechanized corps managed to get new KV and T-34 tanks, nevertheless, there were 278 KV-1,498 T-34s and other tanks of earlier releases in the okrug.
          The mechanized corps included two tank divisions, a motorized division and units and units of corps subordination, so that tank brigades were disbanded and tank divisions were formed.
          For example, the 8th mechanized corps was armed with 100 T-34 and 71 KV tanks, and the 4th mechanized corps was completely re-equipped with new tanks ...
          The problem was how these mechanized corps were used, there was no established interaction, and blows instead of one armored fist were applied with spread fingers (losing the border battle of Lutsk-Brody-Rivne). First of all, people fight, not technology ...
          This is one of the main, but not the only reason for the defeats in the initial period of the Second World War ...
          1. Stas57
            Stas57 22 June 2016 11: 22
            -1
            Quote: ranger
            The problem was how these mechanized corps were used, there was no established interaction, and blows instead of one armored fist were applied with spread fingers (losing the border battle of Lutsk-Brody-Rivne).

            and why would they fight well if the command never used the MK in practice in its entirety?
          2. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 22 June 2016 16: 50
            +2
            Quote: ranger
            This was not quite the case, the formation of the tank divisions had already been completed and they were part of the formed or already formed mechanized corps, of which there were only 8 in the KOVO ...

            The formation was completed only on paper. In fact, in 2/3 of the MK there was no combat coordination, there was either no equipment, or it was worn out, the personnel were busy arranging permanent deployment points - because divisions at best squeezed brigades into the RPM, and at worst - into hastily adapted civil buildings and just peasant houses. Most divisions did not have training grounds, classes, or allowances.
            At uv. Shein had wonderful reports of MK commanders - one of the buildings fought for six months with the rear of the district for ... a boiler for the kitchen.

            More or less combat-ready can be considered only eight MC "first wave" - ​​the formation of autumn 1940. The rest of the MK are incapable of combat.
            Quote: ranger
            For example, the 8th mechanized corps was armed with 100 T-34 and 71 KV tanks, and the 4th mechanized corps was completely re-equipped with new tanks ...

            Was not 4 MK completely re-equipped with new tanks - only half.
            As of June 22.06.41, 101, it had 313 KV, 34 T-10s and 40 T-75s. And in addition to them - 28 T-290, 7 BT-103 and 26 T-XNUMX.
            Quote: ranger
            The problem was how these mechanized corps were used, there was no established interaction, and blows instead of one armored fist were applied with spread fingers (losing the border battle of Lutsk-Brody-Rivne).

            You can also remember the battles at Rassenyay, where in a couple of days the German 6th Panzerdivision on antique "Czechs" managed to knock off fifty KV 2 TD 3 MK.
        2. avt
          avt 22 June 2016 13: 54
          -1
          Quote: captain
          So the fact that tank brigades were disbanded almost simultaneously in all districts and the formation of tank divisions began, is Hitler or our military leadership to blame?

          Not just a military leadership, but quite the apologists of Marshal Misha, the first creator of the tank hordes. This is how the first attempt was able to repulsively argue, quite proving to himself that the proposed organizational structure of the corps and divisions is difficult to manage, but not amenable to control. We came to the brigades, then a new tank approach of gigantomania not calculated either in terms of providing equipment, or in terms of qualified personnel and ... again with such a structure that it was again impossible to control. Shaposhnikov wrote reports, but ..... a multi-million army was deployed and with such trifles the new leadership of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army decided not to bother. The result - a lost tank battle in Ukraine, the loss of equipment and .... return to the brigades with the formation of larger tank and mechanized effective units already only to Stalingrad. Now, if briefly.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 22 June 2016 17: 01
            +1
            Quote: avt
            We came to the brigades, then a new tank approach of gigantomania not calculated either in terms of providing equipment, or in terms of qualified personnel and ... again with such a structure that it was again impossible to control.

            This is not gigantomania. This is the result of our experience of the Khalkhin Gol, the Polish campaign and the SPF + fragmentary intelligence data on the German panzerdivies from the time of France.

            The fact is that in 1939 it suddenly became clear that:
            - tank brigades of the old type are not suitable for independent operations (there are practically no infantry and artillery, there are no rear lines) and can only be used to accompany infantry.
            - The SD tank battalions are in terrifying technical condition, moreover, infantry commanders do not know how to use them.
            - the old mechanized corps (yes, the mechanized corps were before 1939) are weakly controllable and not optimal in structure.

            It was decided: to take away tanks from the infantry, disband old MKs, reorganize tank brigades into divisions and add infantry and artillery to them. In the end, they wanted to get something like the German panzerdivisia in the summer of 1940.

            If we had at least another year to prepare, it would probably have come to a normal FCS MK. But the war started earlier.
            Quote: avt
            The result - a lost tank battle in Ukraine, the loss of equipment and .... return to the brigades with the formation of larger tank and mechanized effective units already only to Stalingrad. Now, if briefly

            Before. Tank corps began to form in the spring of 1942. And the first of the tank armies - the third - at the end of May 1942.
            Directive No. 994022 on the formation of the 3rd Panzer Army was issued by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May 25, 1942 at 21 hours 20 minutes.
            1. avt
              avt 22 June 2016 22: 08
              0
              Quote: Alexey RA
              - the old mechanized corps (yes, the mechanized corps were before 1939) are weakly controllable and not optimal in structure.

              So am I about that! And by 1941, nothing radically changed until 1942, but it only got worse in terms of technology and spraying personnel.
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 23 June 2016 11: 21
                0
                Quote: avt
                So am I about that! And by 1941, nothing radically changed until 1942, but it only got worse in terms of technology and spraying personnel.

                Well, how - "has not changed"? The old-style mechanized corps is many, many, many tanks (at first - 220 tanks per brigade), a bit of infantry, a pinch of artillery (11 MK had 4 76,2 mm and 4 122 mm guns) and scanty rear.
                Here, for example, the number of MK in the state of 1935:
                In this state, the corps should have had 8200 personnel (6475 in peacetime), 24 BT-7A, 310 BT, 8 BT PTOs, 60 T-37s, 36 BHM-3s, 18 BHM-4s — a total of 456 tanks, 4 122 mm and 4 76 mm guns, 1500 vehicles.

                456 tanks for 8200 l / s! What balance of the OSH can we talk about? But in fact, the rifle and machine gun brigade in the corps could be absent - and then it became very bad with the infantry.

                But to infinity and beyond - and according to the state of 1938, the former MK became TK, tank brigades received another tank battalion, so that there were already 560 tanks in the corps.

                MK arr. 1940 with twice as many tanks already had 36000 people l / s. And with the infantry, artillery, and, especially, the rear in it was better.
      2. overb
        overb 22 June 2016 11: 17
        -4
        Quote: avt
        well, the same corps commander 25, who is credited with the "parade" in Brest.

        Those. photo and video chronicles of this "event" do not affect you in any way. Maybe then "a face similar to Krivoshein"?
        Quote: avt
        In other words, well-trained tank brigades were disbanded, but divisions were not created; tank crews were routed to all regiments, but they did not have time to teach new ones; new excellent tanks did not arrive in new divisions, the crews do not know them; only old vehicles remained in tank units, yes and those are scanty. "

        This is called "bullshit bullshit". The fact that new vehicles and crews did not arrive does not mean at all that the "old, well-trained brigades" have lost their combat effectiveness. They did not acquire the combat capability of divisions, yes, but they did not lose their own, brigade, in any way. It's just that the old brigade combat capability was not at all "good", as the author claims, but below the plinth.
        However, as a military leader, i.e. the person responsible for this fighting capacity, the author came up with another reason convenient for him. To the emergence of which he is not involved. That's the whole "secret".
        Quote: lukmag
        we made the Germans defeat near Moscow

        Explore the meaning of the term "defeat of the troops". The first real defeat of the German troops was at Stalingrad in 1943.
        Quote: iouris
        The reason for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war is also that if the USSR began to win, then Stalin would be declared an aggressor, and Germany would receive military assistance from the USA.

        And so until 1943? Why in 1943? didn’t they redirect it?
        But what about Britain? Her then in 1941. also deprived of help? She fought with Germany.
        stop
        1. avt
          avt 22 June 2016 12: 20
          +2
          Quote: overb
          Those. photo and video chronicles of this "event" do not affect you in any way. Maybe then "a face similar to Krivoshein"?

          For especially gifted common people, a first-person quote from Semyonv Moiseevich to Heinz Guderian - “At sixteen o'clock, units of your corps leave the city in marching order, with standards in front; my units, also in a marching column, enter the city, stop in the streets where the German regiments are passing by, and saluting the passing units with their banners. The orchestras perform military marches. -a-aneshno common people who equate Nazism with communism, no difference. ”The parade and all-ee.
          1. overb
            overb 25 June 2016 13: 24
            0
            Quote: avt
            de German regiments pass, and salute the passing units with their banners. The orchestras perform military marches. "So it was decided. Well, where is the joint parade of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army here, as later in Berlin with Zhukov and Eisenhower?

            In Karaganda. Watch the video chronicle and do not invent "facts". And study the meaning of the term "military parade".
            Quote: avt
            orchestra guard

            You will soon agree to hell. Come up with something more believable.
            Quote: avt
            Parade and all-eee.

            That is exactly what happened. Watch newsreels.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            How can brigade experience help commanders who suddenly have completely different units under their command - for example, a heavy tank regiment?

            Why not a bomber? Or fighter? We need to fantasize on a larger scale. Boldly.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Everything else needs to be developed again.

            And then. If you bought yourself new shoes, then you need to learn to walk again. I do not argue with you.
            Quote: avt
            Do not bother to read the above quotation comcor 25 Krivoshein

            Its price is about a penny. There are video and photo documents. And the rest is nonsense. Empty words.
            Quote: avt
            For the "especially gifted"

            You are constantly writing for the gifted. What for? Particularly gifted and without you in the know of everything. They have nothing to tell you, it is better to listen.
            Quote: avt
            old brigades weren’t. since their crews

            Ah ah ah. Shot everyone?
            Oh, those cotton dreamers for me.
            Quote: Serg65
            The T-34/85 tank was adopted by the Red Army on January 23, 1944, and we are discussing June 22, 1941!

            I am amazed at your erudition. But we discussed the phrase:
            Quote: Alexey RA
            The point is not to distract the tanks from the main task - the fight against enemy infantry.

            And also how she looks in the light of the situation with the PTO RKKA in 1944.
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 22 June 2016 18: 01
          +1
          Quote: overb
          This is called "bullshit bullshit". The fact that new vehicles and crews did not arrive does not at all mean that the "old, well-trained brigades" have lost their combat effectiveness. They did not acquire the combat capability of the divisions, yes, but they did not lose their brigade

          And how can brigade experience help crews pulled from old battalions to new regiments? How can brigade experience help commanders who suddenly have completely different units under their command - for example, a heavy tank regiment?
          The only thing that the old experience can help is the training of individual crews. Everything else needs to be developed again.
        3. avt
          avt 22 June 2016 22: 04
          0
          Quote: overb
          This is called "bullshit bullshit".

          The bullshit in this particular case is being performed by you, without bothering to read the above quote from Corps Commander 25 Krivoshein, who wrote about the state of his corps, the command of which he took over. For those who are especially gifted, I will single out and chew it again, but you will not swallow all one thing on a campaign.
          Quote: avt
          . In other words, well-trained tank brigades disbanded

          Clear ? Now it’s clear that no such
          Quote: overb
          The fact that new vehicles and crews did not arrive does not mean at all that the "Old, well-trained brigades" have lost their combat effectiveness.

          old brigades weren’t. since their crews
          Quote: avt
          . In other words, well-trained tank brigades were disbanded, but they did not create divisions; tank crews were distributed throughout all regiments, but they did not have time to teach new ones;
    2. Alex_59
      Alex_59 22 June 2016 09: 29
      +5
      Quote: Rurikovich
      So it’s not only blunders of the leadership as a whole at the strategic level that are to blame, but the banal lag in the organization and ability of the army to fight. After all, shooting at the enemy is one thing, and shooting with the mind is another level

      A very sensible idea. I always try to voice it to those who compare the number of tanks or the thickness of the armor. In general, this is our national character trait - to think about big things, I completely ignore small things. But this "small" is often more important. A quick glance at the pre-war Red Army - an absolutely unbalanced army. There are tanks - there are no optics, radio stations, there are no landing craft and minesweepers in the fleet, there are no proximity fuses for mines and torpedoes, there are no EM trawls (and they were needed in the first place!), Radio control is not debugged in aviation, the infantry has no armored personnel carriers, the artillerymen have no self-propelled artillery, no engineering and repair vehicles. A bias in favor of the number and creation of "main" weapons to the detriment of secondary ones.

      And most importantly - self-confidence and quality of preparation, coordination of actions, interaction. This is generally a mystery for our historians and couch strategists, since these are some "virtual" non-measurable things that are simply ignored for this reason. But this is half the success. After all, no one is surprised why the Israeli army, acting in a minority and using the worst (according to a number of parameters) technique, drives the Arabs. Well, somehow they can do it. A Jewish miracle ... Is it a miracle? Alignment, preparation, interaction, self-confidence, experience! The pedantic Germans had all this, and traditionally all this was secondary in relation to the quantity and other "convenient" indicators.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 22 June 2016 17: 43
        +1
        Quote: Alex_59
        I always try to voice it to those who compare the number of tanks or the thickness of the armor. In general, this is our national character trait - to think about big things, I completely ignore small things. But this "small" is often more important. A quick glance at the pre-war Red Army - an absolutely unbalanced army. There are tanks - there are no optics, radio stations, there are no landing craft and minesweepers in the fleet, there are no proximity fuses for mines and torpedoes, there are no EM trawls (and they were needed in the first place!), Radio control is not debugged in aviation, the infantry has no armored personnel carriers, the artillerymen have no self-propelled artillery, no engineering and repair vehicles. A bias in favor of the number and creation of "main" types of weapons to the detriment of secondary ones.

        And most importantly - self-confidence and quality of preparation, coordination of actions, interaction. This is generally a mystery for our historians and couch strategists, since these are some "virtual" non-measurable things that are simply ignored for this reason. But this is half the success. After all, no one is surprised why the Israeli army, acting in a minority and using the worst (according to a number of parameters) technique, drives the Arabs. Well, somehow they can do it. A Jewish miracle ... Is it a miracle? Alignment, preparation, interaction, self-confidence, experience! The pedantic Germans had all this, and traditionally all this was secondary in relation to the quantity and other "convenient" indicators.

        Exactly, word for word good drinks I agree with everything smile
        That's when, starting from the Kursk Bulge, a certain semblance of what the Germans had in the 41st began to appear in us, then they broke. But not forgetting the usual numerical superiority. This is the usual harsh truth that you have to agree with and not to step on the same rake later hi
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 23 June 2016 11: 28
        0
        Quote: Alex_59
        there are no landing ships and minesweepers in the fleet

        So in the Navy and the Marine Corps almost none.

        As for the minesweepers, then here again not so simple. For the magic word mobilization applied to the fleet. The fleet was supposed to receive part of the TSC precisely by mobilization - former trawlers, tugboats and various small boats.
        1. Alex_59
          Alex_59 23 June 2016 22: 27
          0
          Quote: Alexey RA
          So in the Navy and the Marine Corps almost none.

          Also a jamb. They failed to predict the nature of the future war and the significance of the MP in it.
          Quote: Alexey RA
          As for the minesweepers, then again, not everything is so simple. For the magic word mobilization also applied to the fleet.

          The magic word "mobilization" showed that seiners, trawlers, etc. with civilian crews have an extremely low combat value. The minesweepers are highly specialized professionals. You cannot prepare them quickly, unless, of course, you adequately assess the mine situation. If we assume that the mines are contactless. How is a former seiner captain supposed to suddenly be able to deal with magnetic mines after mobilization? It's like starting to recruit fighter pilots on call ...
    3. yehat
      yehat 22 June 2016 11: 47
      +3
      One of the main management problems was the archaic organization of communications.
      These are bulky unreliable radio stations, and poor quality of telephone equipment and cables, and poor work in the direction of cryptography, and the lack of compact devices - intercoms for tanks, ships and radio stations for fighters. There were a lot of organizational problems. For example, the order to put on alert before the war even in 3 days did not reach all parts of the Red Army. There were also difficulties with the organizational structure of the troops — somewhere there were excessive units, somewhere insufficient.
      Intensive work on logistics and controllability of troops just led to the fact that by the year 43, the resources of units began to be used efficiently. However, this was only the local level of the regiment. At the operational level of divisions and armies, the interaction of the arms of the armed forces there were still problems and they were resolved normally only by the year 44.
  4. Korsar4
    Korsar4 22 June 2016 07: 05
    +3
    The low density of our troops is one of the key points. It is necessary to analyze. And to guess what would happen if ... - to no purpose. Do not replay.
  5. antivirus
    antivirus 22 June 2016 07: 44
    +3
    “So it turns out that not so much D. Pavlov is to blame for the destruction of the Western Front (although there is also his fault), namely G. Zhukov, as the Chief of the General Staff. And one more thing, despite the fact that G. Zhukov beat D. Pavlov, Stalin remained, according to A. Shubin, satisfied with the game of both commanders [Shubin A. V. The world is on the edge of the abyss, p. 471]. Why? After all, the Red Army actually lost. Why Stalin did not draw conclusions, but continued reinforce the southern flank? "
    THIS IS MAIN ??? OR IMPORTANT !!!
    haying until grass is completely exhausted
    Even now we are lagging behind the West in terms of economic potential (throughput and load of tons per 1 axis. Number of cranes and platforms for loading-unloading, number of sanatoriums and etc. for an overnight stay, sq. Meter \ living space for 1 person, GDP (this is the number of cash desks in stores and the number of chairs in cafes throughout the country (catering) - where are Soviet canteens with aunts at stoves and boilers), an understanding of who and what to do and where to wait (no worse wait and catch up) - Is this mobilization and the first stage of what? (Emergency? Or?) Is Moscow or Minsk ready for Rudnya now? 75 years and even 102 years have passed.
    AND WE WILL JUDGE THAT AND AS BREZHENEV OR STALIN OR NIKOLAI the second should
  6. parusnik
    parusnik 22 June 2016 07: 48
    +2
    In simple terms ... a game of soccer, or hockey, whoever makes the most mistakes during the game will lose ... The war is not football .. But there were enough mistakes on the part of the USSR leadership ..
  7. Kenneth
    Kenneth 22 June 2016 08: 25
    +1
    The author began a detailed analysis of the reasons with the wrong choice of the direction of the main blow by the enemy. A poor choice to start analyzing the causes of the defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war. It’s almost impossible to actively use air reconnaissance to choose the direction of the GU without being able to conduct reconnaissance operations behind enemy lines. Another question arises. And another mistake. And why did the troops, besides the non-mobilized ones, place so close to the border, and since the troops are then stockpiles of equipment. They immediately forgot their own theories about the foreground, crossed out their own line of URs. This is a mistake that could have been avoided. And why did it. And because military science as such did not pay any attention to the actions of the Germans at the beginning of the war, and even to their own theoretical developments on the first blow. So they decided that they would be given time to mobilize, that the cover forces would be able to keep the enemy, giving the rest time to turn around.
    1. yehat
      yehat 22 June 2016 11: 55
      +1
      the main miscalculation was not in the direction of the strike, but in underestimating the scale of this strike.
      I am absolutely sure that no one even allowed the idea that the Germans could put up a 5 millionth army at the borders (plus satellites - about 70 divisions!)
      That is why a whole series of stupid things happened, including putting out inadequate covering forces, weak fortification, etc.
  8. Aleksander
    Aleksander 22 June 2016 08: 45
    +1
    And the transfer to the main sections of the 47 Wehrmacht divisions was carried out literally in recent weeks, when it was already impossible to change anything in the arrangement of the Red Army divisions.


    But did the Wehrmacht also interfere with mine-explode strategic bridges (captured in the very first hours), and mine at least tank-hazardous directions-highways (along which the avalanche of equipment went deep into the country from the first minutes)?

    The political and military leadership of the country is to blame for the tragedy of 41: the fighters were excellent and the equipment was not bad and in sufficient quantity, but to dispose of it all is competentfailed. They are responsible.
    1. yehat
      yehat 22 June 2016 12: 03
      0
      mining is a tactical decision
      blaming this bet is at least ridiculous.
      1. Aleksander
        Aleksander 22 June 2016 15: 58
        0
        1. There was no bet yet, it was created AFTER the capture of bridges.
        2. Mining and destruction of STRATEGIC BRIDGES is a strategic decision. It’s ridiculous to think that such a decision can be made by someone below the Bet level, at least.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 23 June 2016 11: 49
      0
      Quote: Aleksander
      But did the Wehrmacht also interfere with mine-explode strategic bridges (captured in the very first hours), and mine at least tank-hazardous directions-highways (along which the avalanche of equipment went deep into the country from the first minutes)?

      And they mined and blew up - in the same Baltic states. But if the enemy had engineer-sapper units with experience of a real war in France, and also not included in the lists, but really working in the frontline, of numerous divisions of militarized construction organizations such as RAD or the Todt department, this did not help much.
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 23 June 2016 11: 50
      +1
      Quote: Aleksander
      The political and military leadership of the country is to blame for the tragedy of 41: both the fighters were excellent and the equipment was good and in sufficient quantity, but they could not manage it all competently.

      As I understand it, you did not read the documents of the pre-war period ... smile
      From the KOVO Arms Verification Act for the 1940th year:
      In parts of 97 SD rifles manufactured in 1940. , which were on hand for no more than 4 months, up to 29% are reduced to a state of rust in the barrel, machine guns "DP" manufactured in 1939 to 14% also have a deterioration of the barrel channels.

      139 cn: The command staff does not dare to carry out a complete disassembly of the rifles to remove dirt and rustsince the battle of rifles has changed.
      496 cap: Does not know the purpose of the cutouts at the blade of a screwdriver, does not know in what cases and how alkali is used. The schedule does not provide for the study of small arms.
      97th RD: The commanding staff of the units does not know the optical sight for the Maxim machine gun, the optical sight for the sniper rifle and other types of new types of weapons. Some of the company’s commanders do not know how to remove a bayonet from a rifle arr 1891 / 30g.
      The knowledge of the junior commanding staff is weak, but nevertheless, the weapons in the unit know better than the commanding staff.
      The knowledge of ordinary cadets is low.
      They are completely unaware of automatic weapons and can only carry rifles and pull the trigger. Extremely poor knowledge of the materiel of small arms, and besides, the gunners do not know at all the names of the parts of the DP machine gun and revolver. Machine gunners do not know the name of the parts and the rules for disassembling the rifle. To the great shame and chagrin, cadets of regimental schools have knowledge of small arms below the knowledge of the Red Army, and yet despite this they are issued by junior commanders.

      And here are the results of training ZapOVO troops for the winter of 1941:
      As a result of all these activities, the operational training of senior officers significantly increased and evaluated mediocre.
      Infantry.
      Conclusion: the units and formations of the district, fulfilling your requirement to coordinate companies and battalions, are quite ready to solve simple combat missions.
      Artillery:
      The preparation of mortar units and subunits is mediocre, with the exception of 24 ombi, the preparation of which is poor. The preparation of 45 and 76 regimental artillery is mediocre.
      Conducted artillery firing and viewing exercises showed that the division’s artillery of the District to perform combat missions in the main types of combat prepared mediocre.
      The training of ARGK regiments is mediocre, with the exception of 311 popes and 318 hap RGKs, whose training is poor.
      Etc. - as many as 70 pages mediocre and poor preparation.
      4 months left before the war ...
  9. strannik1985
    strannik1985 22 June 2016 08: 54
    +1
    Dear Author, the large training camps of 1941 were not any hidden mobilization; SNK allowed mobilizing 45 horses and 57 motor vehicles from the national economy for 500 days. For example, to mobilize the deployment of a 1/680 state division (4 units as of June 120, 106), 22 vehicles, 1941 horses, 400 assigned personnel, 2-000 days in time are needed. For example, 6000 thousand horsemen were mobilized for the 20 military bus, 30 cars, 1939 674 tractors.
  10. bakhshiyan rachik
    bakhshiyan rachik 22 June 2016 09: 14
    -2
    all to blame
    1. yehat
      yehat 22 June 2016 12: 01
      +1
      why? What are the aces from the Leningrad Air Defense Forces or collective farmers from Kazakhstan to blame for?
      do not smack nonsense, it squeals too loud what
  11. unknown
    unknown 22 June 2016 09: 41
    +6
    Of the professional historians, only Meltyukhov approached the causes of the tragedy of the beginning of the war most objectively in his monograph "Stalin's Lost Chance". The Thunderstorm plan to liberate Europe actually existed.
    But even if the USSR had managed to get ahead of Germany and attack first, all the same, there would have been little chance. And here Martirosyan was absolutely right: the Trotskyist conspiracy in the army existed, and in the year 37 was not completely revealed, which came back at 41.
    In addition, one should not forget that during the period from the Zionist coup of 17 to the beginning of the Second World War, the USSR failed to raise professionals either in the army, or in industry, or in science. General lack of professionalism in all spheres of public life. And in the army too. Higher officers without special education, the rank and file cannot master a self-loading rifle. The industry is also good: the new heavy machine gun was removed from production at the beginning of the war as unusable, the new tanks are completely "raw". The KV had serious problems with the transmission, the T-34 had a tight "blind" turret, a small service life. On the mastered BTs, with which there should be no problems anymore, they put engines written off from aviation with exhausted service life. And so on, you can go on and on.
  12. Stas57
    Stas57 22 June 2016 10: 11
    0
    soviet event textbooks

    History of the USSR. Textbook for 10 high school class. Ed. Acad. A.M. Pankratova. 21 ed. M., 1962. C. 249-250.

    The retreat of Soviet troops at the beginning of the war. In the first period of the war, the Nazi armies were able to achieve major successes and force the Soviet troops to retreat inland. There are several reasons for this. The armed forces of fascist Germany were fully mobilized and equipped in large numbers with the latest weapons and military equipment. They also had two years of modern warfare in Europe. Nazi troops were concentrated and deployed in battle formations on the Soviet borders to deliver powerful strikes in the main strategic directions.

    The Soviet Army was not mobilized and concentrated near the borders to repel a possible attack by the enemy. In the border districts there were only 42 divisions against 190 enemy divisions. The troops stationed in the border areas were not put on alert in a timely manner, despite the clear threat of an attack by Germany. The preparation of new defensive lines was not completed, and weapons from long-term structures on the old border were withdrawn.

    One of the reasons for the situation was that the head of the Soviet government, Stalin, who alone made decisions on the most important state and military issues, made a serious mistake in assessing the international military-strategic situation. He believed that Germany would not dare to violate the non-aggression pact concluded with the USSR in the near future. Therefore, he hesitated with the holding of defensive measures, believing that this would give the Nazis a reason to accuse the USSR of violating the non-aggression pact and attack our country. This explained the fact that the Soviet troops were not ordered to deploy their combat forces in advance and to occupy defensive lines along the western state borders. Therefore, the powerful blow of the enemy armies for the Soviet troops was sudden. Captured by surprise, our troops immediately suffered heavy casualties in people, weapons, aircraft and tanks.

    Further. At the time of the Nazi attack, the reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces and their equipping with the latest technology were not completed. Powerful Soviet industry was not timely rebuilt in a military fashion. And as a result of this, the mass production of the latest models of tanks and aircraft was not deployed. In the initial period of the war in the army there were mainly obsolete models of tanks and aircraft, which were inferior to the German in their combat qualities.

    All this, taken together, as well as the enemy’s occupation of significant Soviet territory, the destruction and seizure by him of a large number of Soviet aircraft at airfields, tanks, artillery, arms depots and ammunition, led to an unfavorable balance of power for the Soviet country in the first months of the war.

    //paul-atrydes.livejournal.com/47450.html
  13. Stas57
    Stas57 22 June 2016 10: 12
    0
    History of the USSR (1938-1976 gg.). Tutorial for 10 class. Ed. M.P. Kim. Ed. 6 M., 1977. C. 36-37.

    Causes of temporary failures of the Red Army. At the beginning of the war, an extremely unfavorable situation developed for the Red Army, for the Soviet country as a whole. With the connivance of the ruling circles of the Western powers, fascist Germany unleashed the Second World War, captured many European states, and then treacherously attacked the USSR.

    The Soviet Union had to repel the strongest onslaught of the troops of the Nazi coalition. At the same time, he was forced to keep significant armed forces in the Far East to firmly cover the border with Manchuria, where at that time the Japanese militarists, preparing to attack the USSR, concentrated a powerful Kwantung army. It was also necessary to cover the southern borders from Iran and Turkey, whose governments, although formally declared their neutrality, actually openly pursued a pro-fascist policy.

    In the struggle against the Soviet Union, the Nazis used temporary advantages: the militarization of the economy and the whole life of Germany; lengthy preparations for an aggressive war and experience of military operations in the West; superiority in modern weapons and the number of troops concentrated in advance in the border areas. At the disposal of fascist Germany were the military-economic resources of almost all of Western Europe. The metal, electricity and coal mining capacities that Germany possessed were approximately 2-2,5 times greater than those of the Soviet Union. By defeating France, ceasing air raids on England and not conducting military operations in the West, Germany was able to throw almost three-quarters of its entire army against the USSR.

    The failure of the Red Army at the beginning of the war was due primarily to the surprise attack of the enemy. In the first battles, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses in personnel, military equipment and weapons. Thousands of Red Army soldiers, commanders and political workers were killed. The western front has lost almost all artillery depots, in which more than 2 thousand ammunition wagons were stored. The enemy for a long time received a quantitative superiority in forces and means.

    Prior to the war, the construction of engineering defenses on the new western border was not completed. With the outbreak of hostilities in an extremely difficult situation, the Soviet troops could not fully repel the aggressor’s most powerful blow and create a stable defensive front. The frequent loss of command and control due to the lack of reliable communications did not allow the effective use of available forces and equipment. The lack of experience of the Soviet troops in conducting major military operations in a maneuver war also affected.
  14. Stas57
    Stas57 22 June 2016 10: 13
    -1
    Soviet textbooks about the beginning of the war

    History of the USSR. Textbook for tenth grade high school. Ed. 2 M., 1986. C. 30, 32.

    The Communist Party and the Soviet government were well aware that the threat of war was growing rapidly. 170 divisions (almost 3 million soldiers and commanders), more than half of all military equipment were concentrated in the western border military districts. However, the divisions were not yet fully staffed. There was a lack of transport, communications. Many tank, motorized and air units were in the process of reorganization and formation. New types of tanks and planes here accounted for only about 20% and were only mastered by personnel.
    ...
    The suddenness of the attack allowed the Nazi army to obtain significant, albeit temporary, advantages. In the directions of the main attacks, the enemy had a threefold and even fivefold superiority in strength. As a result of massive raids by bombers and tank breakthroughs, the enemy managed to advance deep into Soviet territory and inflict a serious blow to airfields, capture many military equipment and ammunition depots, and paralyze communications between headquarters and military units.

    There is no question about the reasons for the failures.

    ****

    History of the USSR. The era of socialism (1938-1939 gg.) A trial textbook for the X class of high school. M., 1981. C. 38-39.

    The Communist Party and the Soviet government were aware of the growing military threat. 170 divisions (almost 3 million soldiers and commanders), more than half of all military equipment were concentrated in the western border military districts. However, the divisions were not yet fully staffed. There was a lack of transport and communications. Many tank, motorized and air units were in the process of reorganization and formation. New types of tanks and aircraft in the border districts accounted for about 20% and were only mastered by personnel.

    When it became apparent that an attack by fascist Germany on the USSR was inevitable, on the evening of 21 on June evening a directive was sent to the border districts signed by People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov. It said that "during the 22-23.6.41, a sudden German attack is possible ...", and it was proposed to take up firing positions, to bring all units to a state of alert. This directive did not manage to reach many units and formations or reached when the war had already begun.
    ...
    The suddenness of the attack allowed the Nazi army to obtain significant, albeit temporary advantages. In the directions of the main attacks, the enemy had a threefold and even fivefold superiority in strength. As a result of massive raids by bombers and tank breakthroughs, the enemy advanced deep into Soviet territory, dealt a serious blow to airfields, seized many military equipment and ammunition depots, and paralyzed communications between headquarters and military units.

    In the section "Questions and Tasks" to the 5 paragraph, "Attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR" there is a question "What are the causes of temporary failures of the Red Army?" (S. 42).
  15. iouris
    iouris 22 June 2016 11: 11
    0
    The reason for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war is also that if the USSR began to win, then Stalin would be declared an aggressor, and Germany would receive military assistance from the USA.
    1. falcon
      falcon 22 June 2016 11: 57
      +1
      Quote: iouris
      The reason for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war is also that if the USSR began to win, then Stalin would be declared an aggressor, and Germany would receive military assistance from the USA.

      Well yes! Apparently, this deepest geopolitical message
      firmly stuck in the heads of l / s - from an ordinary fighter, to
      commander and held back the offensive impulse of the Red
      The army.
      Dear, well, nonsense - why post?
      1. iouris
        iouris 22 June 2016 12: 40
        +1
        The "geopolitical message" did not "sat" in the heads of the Red Army men. All decisions were made by Stalin alone, who understood this very deeply.
        Find the numbers, what was the volume of production in the USA before WWII: something about 40% of the world. Moreover, it was all high-tech products. Remember the statement made by Harry Truman of 1941, who became the president of the USA by May 9, 1945, the meaning of which is that we will help them (Germans and Russians) to kill each other. Draw conclusions.
        1. falcon
          falcon 22 June 2016 13: 47
          -2
          Quote: iouris
          All decisions were made by Stalin alone, who knew this very deeply.

          That is, if I correctly understood your idea, failures
          Red Army in the initial period of the war organized
          Stalin, in order to prevent American eco-assistance
          Germany? Deep thought, however!
  16. Andy_Ha
    Andy_Ha 22 June 2016 12: 21
    +1
    The Soviet army had poor tactical training. The initiative was welcomed at the level of the battalion commander. The Germans, especially in combat units, had the initiative at the half-separation level.
  17. Andy_Ha
    Andy_Ha 22 June 2016 12: 24
    0
    Tactical doctrines multiplied by the experience of war among soldiers gave a great effect.
  18. Ivan Tartugai
    Ivan Tartugai 22 June 2016 13: 08
    0
    Quote from the article:

    But most authors and researchers (A. Vasilevsky, M. Zakharov, P. Bobylev, A. Shubin, and others) dwell on the fact that the Soviet leadership simply made a tragic mistake in certain main areas of impact.


    From an interview with Zhukov Simonov about the command and staff game, which took place in December 1940:
    "... taking real initial data and enemy forces - Germans, I, commanding the "blue" (those. the Wehrmacht), developed operations precisely in those areas in which the Germans then developed them. Applied his the main blows where they then applied them. Groupings were like this how then they developed during the war. The configuration of our borders, the terrain, the situation - everything prompted me precisely such decisions, which they then prompted to the Germans.»

    It follows that the army general, Hero of the Soviet Union Zhukov back in December, i.e. six months before the war knew exactly where and how, and in what directions the Wehrmacht would strike on June 22, 1941.
    However, being at the post of chief of staff of the Red Army he, together with the People's Commissar Tymoshenko, is reworking Shaposhnikov’s BM plan and already indicates a different direction of strikes by the Wehrmacht, and accordingly the General Staff of the Red Army led by Army General Zhukov, the author of the revised plan, is deploying troops.

    So is that stupidity or betrayal?
  19. alicante11
    alicante11 22 June 2016 14: 27
    +4
    Add my "five cents".
    The main problem of the Red Army in 1941 was that the army was in the process of reorganization. Based on the results of the "Polish campaign" and the "Finnish war", as well as studying the actions of a potential enemy, it was decided to transfer mobile formations from a brigade to a divisional organization. If in the Polish campaign the main striking force of the mobile troops was represented by the cavalry mechanized group (KMG), which included several command centers (KK) and several tank brigades, then in 1941 the basis of the mobile forces was the mechanized corps. This was explained by the fact that the KMG, the closest analogue - the tank army (only with horse-drawn infantry), turned out to be poorly controlled, on the second day of the offensive, various assault and forward detachments had to improvise due to lack of fuel, which they did not have time to bring up. As a result, the mobile units were downsized and created analogues of German tank and mech divisions. The only problem was that they were creating formations of the model of the Polish campaign. Those. overloaded with tanks with insufficient infantry and artillery support. The Nazis came across with such an organization near Mokra and in the Mlavsky direction. But our command was mesmerized by the fact that the German tank division was near Warsaw after 8 days of war. Completely disregarding the fact that this division "fell through" into the Czestochowa gap, for a long time without having an enemy in front of it.
    But the problem was not even in the organizational structure of the TD and MK. The problem was that they stupidly did not have time to properly form and put together ("12-tank" 12th MK, for example). They did not even have time to equip them with trucks for transporting shells and spare parts and refuelers, not to mention tractors for evacuating tanks. As a result, using the example of the T-35 "land dreadnoughts", a significant part of the tank fleet simply did not reach the battlefield, remaining on the roads with empty tanks and minor breakdowns during marches. And those who arrived found themselves without infantry and artillery support and were shot by the German anti-tank gunnery, and the survivors were finished off with anti-aircraft guns and howitzers. Moreover, without any participation of German tanks.
    Thus, having destroyed the old structure of mobile troops, which was not particularly successful in the offensive, however, which could have allowed counterstrikes, relying on border bases and warehouses, they did not have time to create a new one, according to plans, the 30MK had to be brought to mind only by the middle of 1942. ... The timing was taken taking into account the time for the defeat of France. Well, no one could have thought in the winter and spring of 40 that the most powerful army in Europe would be destroyed in a month. So the French, with their quick defeat, gave us a HUGE pig. After which nothing could be done. The old units were disbanded, incl. and part of the CD. So it only remained to play for time. That is what the IVS tried to do. Well, "Plan B" is an exhausting war with total mobilization and full straining of forces, which the USSR withstood, but the fascists did not.
    1. Ze Kot
      Ze Kot 22 June 2016 19: 25
      0
      Quote: alicante11
      Add my "five cents".
      The main problem of the Red Army in 1941 was that the army was in the process of reorganization.



      If you have an army in the process of reorganization, why are you bringing airfields, warehouses, hospitals to the very border? Why are you amassing more "unreorganized" personnel near the border with practically no weapons?


      In general, the article did not like. They could not decide on the main blow ... What snot to chew? There are intelligence reports, there is an accumulation of enemy manpower and equipment at the borders.
      There are only two options:
      1. strike first.
      2. dig, dig, dig ... mine, mine, mine ...

      If you are not going to attack, then divert funds and forces from the border, from under the first blow. With 2 million people in the Red Army plus the Gulag, it was possible to dig up such a number of trenches, anti-tank ditches, and build up so many defensive structures.
      1. Stas57
        Stas57 22 June 2016 19: 34
        +1
        Quote: The Cat
        If you have an army in the process of reorganization, why do you take to the very border of the airfield

        as a doctor to a doctor, and what is the range of the fighter of the end 30x?

        If you are not going to attack, then divert funds and forces from the border, from under the first blow. With 2 million people in the Red Army plus the Gulag, it was possible to dig up such a number of trenches, anti-tank ditches, and build up so many defensive structures.

        Well, the French dug up and?
        1. Ze Kot
          Ze Kot 22 June 2016 23: 03
          0
          Quote: Stas57
          as a doctor to a doctor, and what is the range of the fighter of the end 30x?


          Not so small as to make airfields to the border itself, to accumulate unmasked equipment there.

          Quote: Stas57
          If you are not going to attack, then divert funds and forces from the border, from under the first blow. With 2 million people in the Red Army plus the Gulag, it was possible to dig up such a number of trenches, anti-tank ditches, and build up so many defensive structures.

          That is, in your opinion, no defenses are needed?

          And if you do not know, then the French line of defense was bypassed.
          Well, the French dug up and?
          1. Stas57
            Stas57 23 June 2016 10: 36
            0
            Quote: The Cat
            Not so small as to make airfields to the border itself, to accumulate unmasked equipment there.

            100 km, and now we see how many kobrin from the border
            1. Ze Kot
              Ze Kot 23 June 2016 23: 01
              0
              Quote: Stas57
              100 km


              Where did you find such nonsense?

              I-16 - 400-680 km depending on version
              MiG-1 - 580 km
              Yak-1 - 585-760km depending on version
              LaGG-3 - 610-1100 km depending on version
          2. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 23 June 2016 12: 27
            0
            Quote: The Cat
            And if you do not know, then the French line of defense was bypassed.

            17 May 1940, 2-W 210-mm guns opened fire on the fortress La Ferre (La Ferté), 18-th garrisons of two casemates retreated. 19-th captured all the fortifications, German assault groups began to seize one fortification after another. From 20 to 23 in May, the Germans eliminated 4-fortifications.

            After that, the Wehrmacht conducted the operations “Tigr” and “The Bear” - on June X the Wehrmacht broke through the Saar fortified area, and by the 14 they had reached the rear of the Metz fortified area. In the fortified region, the Lauter Wehrmacht broke through between Beatsham and Lemback.

            In addition, 15 June, the Germans began to force the Rhine. The Rhenish fortifications tried to repel the attackers, but the old weak caponiers were unable to resist the fire of the 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. Wehrmacht troops captured the first line of fortifications and went to the second. The field units of the French were ordered to retreat. Rhine fortifications fell.

            "Tiger" and "Bear" are just breakouts of the Maginot Line itself, in its central part.
            1. Ze Kot
              Ze Kot 23 June 2016 23: 15
              -2
              So read your text carefully. The Germans broke through the fortified areas after the French retreated.

              If there was a positional war in the WWII, everything was dug up in the trenches. And if a Red Army of 5 million people, with 20000 tanks, 75000 guns, 7000 aircraft would have gone into defensive defense, then the Germans would hardly have broken through.
              Moreover, the main strike force in the blitzkrieg is tanks. Having removed the ability to freely use tanks, the blitzkrieg would have already choked.
              1. Two handed
                Two handed 24 June 2016 05: 20
                0
                Ahahahahaha, i.e. it was necessary to collect the entire Red Army in a western direction, then dig in a thin line 2000 km long? This is a flight of strategic thought! I have not heard such insanity for a long time. This is a recipe for the complete defeat of the entire army and, accordingly, defeat in the war. Let's imagine this situation. With complete freedom of hands and full command of the initiative, the enemy freely moves troops along the front line and possesses complete superiority in the number of people, equipment and aircraft break through defense sections with boilers and a repetition of the summer of 41 only in a light version, without repelling tank attacks and defeating the whole of Krasnaya The army. Total Germans go to Moscow, but there will be no Siberian divisions. And will Japan look at the bare border with the USSR? With the level of military thought and technology of the 30s, no positional warfare and stationary defense were already possible, as 1939-1941 proved it. and 1944
      2. disgraced shooter
        disgraced shooter 23 June 2016 03: 06
        0
        Quote: The Cat
        Quote: alicante11
        Add my "five cents".
        The main problem of the Red Army in 1941 was that the army was in the process of reorganization.



        If you have an army in the process of reorganization, why are you bringing airfields, warehouses, hospitals to the very border? Why are you amassing more "unreorganized" personnel near the border with practically no weapons?


        In general, the article did not like. They could not decide on the main blow ... What snot to chew? There are intelligence reports, there is an accumulation of enemy manpower and equipment at the borders.
        There are only two options:
        1. strike first.
        2. dig, dig, dig ... mine, mine, mine ...

        If you are not going to attack, then divert funds and forces from the border, from under the first blow. With 2 million people in the Red Army plus the Gulag, it was possible to dig up such a number of trenches, anti-tank ditches, and build up so many defensive structures.

        I completely agree that several armies would hobble alongside the 21 Stalin UROM ,,, and all) the Germans would certainly not pass there.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 23 June 2016 12: 19
          0
          Quote: Disgraced Shooter
          I completely agree that several armies would hobble alongside the 21 Stalin UROM ,,, and all) the Germans would certainly not pass there.

          In our reality, it took the Germans 203-2 days to break through the "Stalin's Line" SD, which had infantry filling and artillery up to 3 mm. They also broke through the more powerful SD - in Belgium and France.
          1. Ze Kot
            Ze Kot 23 June 2016 23: 17
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            They and more powerful URs broke through - in Belgium and France.



            They retreated. With competent defense, the full availability of personnel and equipment, they would not have broken through.
      3. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 23 June 2016 12: 16
        +1
        Quote: The Cat
        If you have an army in the process of reorganization, why do you bring to the very border of the airdromes,

        Because these are the aerodromes of army aviation - more precisely, mixed air divisions. part of the cover armies. And where else should they be located. if not in the band of their armies.
        And if we take into account the fact that the combat radius of I-16 is only 130-140 km, and he needs to cover the bombers working on German army rear areas, then there is nowhere to put airfields especially from the border.
        Quote: The Cat
        warehouses, hospital

        As for the warehouses: in the borderland there were only warehouses of 4 categories - small advanced warehouses. The main warehouses of the districts were located beyond the old border, in the deep rear.
        The location of the warehouses can be judged even by the fact that:
        The artillery depots of the border districts were dispersed along the front and layered in depth. The first line of warehouses located 50-75 km from the state border was advanced warehouses, usually small ones (4th category). On the second line, 300-400 km away from the state border, warehouses of 3-nd and partially of the 2nd category were located, and on the third (rear) line were the most powerful warehouses (of the 1st and 2nd categories). The total depth of the separation of the warehouses reached 500-600 km.

        Of the total number of district warehouses 10 were built in the pre-Soviet period, 20 were organized in 1941 in the territories of the Baltic Republics, Western Belarus and Ukraine on the basis of military warehouses already existing there, 13 were equipped in the open air, and the rest 68 warehouses were created during the Soviet era, mainly in 1930-1940.

        You understand that before 1940, building warehouses near the new border was somewhat problematic. smile

        As far as hospitals are concerned, as I understand it, "the district hospital in Brest" will now emerge. But the "district" in its name is not the size, but the level of subordination: this hospital was subordinate to the district. In terms of size, the 2396 military hospital had only 50 beds - the minimum capacity for a hospital.
        1. Ze Kot
          Ze Kot 23 June 2016 23: 19
          0
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Quote: The Cat
          If you have an army in the process of reorganization, why do you bring to the very border of the airdromes,

          Because these are the aerodromes of army aviation - more precisely, mixed air divisions. part of the cover armies. And where else should they be located. if not in the band of their armies.



          So why did they bring the army to the borders?

          Quote: Alexey RA
          As for the warehouses: in the borderland there were only warehouses of 4 categories - small advanced warehouses. The main warehouses of the districts were located beyond the old border, in the deep rear.


          Why, in the early days of the war, so many "small" warehouses were lost that the soldiers did not have ammunition, and the equipment had fuel?
    2. disgraced shooter
      disgraced shooter 23 June 2016 03: 17
      0
      all armies are in one way or another in the process of reorganization, some are smaller than others. Something is becoming obsolete, and something new is coming into the army ,,,, and so on all the time. So your arguments are not wealthy. The judging by the facts was more motorized, ,,,,,,, and the Wehrmacht was mainly horse-drawn.
  20. Ivan Tartugai
    Ivan Tartugai 22 June 2016 16: 10
    +2
    Quote from the article:

    An equally significant mistake was the erroneous view of the country's military leadership on the outbreak of war. It was believed that with the outbreak of hostilities in the border strip, small forces from both sides will be involved within 10-15 days.


    From the report (Materials of a meeting of the senior leadership of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940), Army Commander of the Kiev Special Military District Army General G.K. Zhukov:
    “The defeat of Holland, Belgium, the English expeditionary force and France is characterized primarily by its surprise and power of blow to the entire depth of the front-line operation».
    Again from the speech of Zhukov:
    “Poland was defeated in 18 days (the average daily advance of the Germans is 30 km), Holland, Belgium and Northern France, in 20 days, which equals [pace of advance] 20 km per day. The defeat of France - in 18 days, which is [at the rate of advance] 16 km per day, while the MMC reached 100-120 km. "
    As well as other top military officials of the Red Army made similar views. Those. none of the military leadership thought and believed that with the start of hostilities in the border zone, small forces will be involved from both sides within 10-15 days.
    It fiction of modern counterfeiters.
    All the top military officials of the Red Army saw that Poland disappeared from the World map in 18 days, even in 17 days. What kind of warm-up can be here for 10-15 days in the border strip.
  21. Koshak
    Koshak 22 June 2016 18: 04
    +3
    In short, victory has many parents, and defeat is always an orphan.
  22. Evgenijus
    Evgenijus 30 June 2016 17: 11
    +1
    Author for the article - thanks! Loved the stuff. What is interesting, when I was a cadet of a military school (1975 year), I remember - we were not given in such detail the history of the Second World War. And the reasons for the defeat in the first period of the war were absent altogether. Throughout political historians blamed the insidious Hitler.