Blitzkrieg as a technology of war

Blitzkrieg, "lightning war." It is believed that the main role in this aggressive Wehrmacht strategy played Tanks. In fact, the blitzkrieg was based on a combination of advanced achievements in all areas of military affairs - in the use of intelligence, aviationradio communications ...

July forty-first. The tank armada of Kleist, Goth, Guderian, crossing the border, rush into the depths of Soviet territory. Motorcyclists, machine gunners on armored personnel carriers and tanks, tanks, tanks ... Our tanks are better, but they are too few. The units of the Red Army, which cannot recover in any way after the sudden attack of Hitler, heroically hold their defenses. But what can machine guns and rifles do against armor? Grenades and bottles with a combustible mixture are used ... This continues right up to the approaches to Moscow, where a handful of infantrymen, 28 Panfilov's heroes, stop the German tanks ...

Maybe this picture is somewhat exaggerated. But not only Soviet propagandist historians portrayed the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in this way, but also writers and filmmakers — in general, it was this image of war that entered the mass consciousness. All this is not very consistent with the numbers.

By 22 June 1941, the group of Soviet troops on the western border numbered 15 687 tanks. On the other side of the border, an invasion army was preparing for attack, having ... an 4 171 tank, and this number included assault guns. The advantage of the USSR was in the aircraft. But here everything is clear - the Luftwaffe pilots seized dominance in the air due to the destruction of a significant part of the Soviet Air Force by a sudden attack on airfields. And where did the Soviet tanks go?

Not in tanks

Take a look at history a little deeper. May 1940. The tank group of the same Guderian cuts the allied troops and goes to the sea. The British are forced to quickly evacuate from Northern France, while the French are trying to establish a new line of defense. Soon, not wanting to turn Paris into ruins, they would declare their capital an open city and surrender it to the enemy ... Again, everything was decided by the tanks.

Meanwhile, it was the French army that was considered to be the strongest in Europe before the Second World War! Maybe France did not have tanks or they were worthless? It turns out that there were more French tanks than German ones, and they were not so bad. Do not forget that in 1940, the German tank forces looked even less impressive than in 1941. Much of them were light Pz. II, armed with 20-millimeter cannon. The combat units were machine guns Pz. I, who were generally designed for educational use only - however, they got on the battlefield (and they fought in Russia too).

In the history of the victorious breakthrough of the Panzervawe to the English Channel, there is an episode when a column of German tanks was suddenly attacked by the British. The German tankers saw with amazement that their shells were bouncing off the armor of the British Mk like peas. II Matilda. Only by calling dive bombers, managed to cope with the situation. A year later, the story repeated itself - the shells of German tank guns could not penetrate the armor of the Soviet KV and T-34 ...

Consequently, they conquered almost the whole of Europe and reached Moscow troops ... armed with mediocre tanks, which, moreover, were few. Yes, they had an excellent tactical training and a blitzkrieg strategy. But what is a blitzkrieg? Deep breakthrough tank wedges. Will tactics help if the defending side has stronger tanks and more of them? Will help. Paradoxically, but a fact - the German tank divisions were indeed the best tool of the mobile war at that time, despite their bad tanks and a small number of them. Because the blitzkrieg was not just a strategy, but also a new technology of the war - which until 1942 did not have any belligerent state, except Germany.

Blitzkrieg in Russian

There is a saying that the military is always preparing not for a future war, but for the past. Of course, in all countries there were those who assessed the newly emerged armored vehicles as an independent means of achieving decisive success in the war. But the majority of European head thinkers (including in Germany) in the 1930s operated with categories of positional warfare, based on the experience of the first World War. They believed that tanks should be used only to support infantry units.

Only in the USSR they relied on the experience of civil war - and they believed that the future war would also be maneuverable. The fact that in Germany they would call it a “blitzkrieg” was developed in the USSR! Only here we called it the "Theory of Deep Offensive Operations." “Tanks, without getting involved in a long battle, quickly and defiantly penetrating the enemy’s marching orders, bring disorder into the enemy’s ranks, sow panic and disrupt the control of the troops deployed for battle ...” This quote perfectly describes the essence of blitzkrieg, taken from Guderian’s famous book “Attention, tanks!”, And from the Soviet textbook on tactics of tank units 1935 of the year of publication.

Produced in the USSR and technology, ideal for blitzkrieg. These are the famous BT tanks, they could move both on caterpillars and on wheels. The top of the development of this type of combat vehicles was the BT-7М with a 500-powerful diesel B-2 (speed 62 km / h on tracks and 86 km / h on wheels - no worse than any other car of that time). If we take into account that the Soviet marshals were going to fight "in low blood and in a foreign land", where the roads are better than domestic ones, then you can imagine how famously these tanks could walk through the enemy's rear ... And, of course, our BTs were much better suited for deep tank breakthroughs than even the most modern German tanks Pz. III and Pz. IV (with their maximum speed on the highway about 40 km / h). In the USSR, the ideas of crushing the enemy with the help of powerful tank wedges since the 1920-s have been maintained at the highest level.

What are good tanks?

But in Germany, the enthusiast of tank troops Heinz Guderian had to overcome the resistance of the staff officers for a long time. Otto von Stülpnagel, inspector of the Reichswehr’s motorized units, said to him: “Believe me, neither you nor I will live to see the time when Germany will have its own tank forces.” Everything changed after the Nazis came to power. At the top of the new leadership, the ideas of Guderian found complete approval. Having broken with the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany could produce tanks and other equipment. Advanced military thought from different countries was studied.

In 1934, Ribbentrop named the best French technical expert "Colonel de Gaulle". In fact, the future head of the Resistance was not a colonel at the time. In the General Staff he was so bored with his articles and projects that his 12 years were marinated with the rank of captain ... But Charles de Gaulle offered approximately the same thing as Guderian! At home, they did not listen to him, which predetermined the future fall of France.

De Gaulle called for the creation of specialized tank divisions, and not to distribute tank brigades among infantry formations. It was the concentration of moving forces in the direction of the main strike that allowed them to overcome arbitrarily strong defenses! The First World War was mainly of a "trench" character. Although at that time they knew how to smoke enemy soldiers from trenches and shelters, to destroy minefields and wire barriers — this required a long, sometimes several days, artillery preparation. But she showed where the blow would be struck, and while the shells plowed up the front edge of the defense, the enemy’s reserves hurriedly to the site of the attack.

The appearance of mobile troops, whose main force was tanks, made it possible to act completely differently: to secretly transfer large forces to the right place and to advance at all without artillery preparation! The defensive side did not have time to understand anything, and its line of defense was already broken. Tanks of the enemy rushed to the rear, hunting for staffs and trying to surround those who still held their positions ... To counter, we needed moving units with a large number of tanks in order to react to the breakthrough and organize countermeasures. Broken through tank groups are also extremely vulnerable - no one covers their flanks. But some adventurous blitzkrieg inactive opponents could not be used for their own purposes. That is why Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia fell so quickly ... Yes, France had tanks, it could not use them correctly.

And what happened in the USSR? It seems that our military leaders thought in the same categories as the German ones. The structure of the Red Army was even more powerful compounds than the German - mechanized corps. Maybe the case in a sudden attack of Germany?

How the strategy works

“I have never used the word 'blitzkrieg' because it is completely idiotic!” Said Hitler once. But even if the Fuhrer did not like the word itself, we must not forget who exactly served the strategy of the “blitzkrieg”. The Nazi state attacked without declaring war, and the sudden invasion became an integral part of the Blitzkrieg. However, it is not necessary to reduce everything to surprise. England and France were at war with Germany from September 1939 of the year, and before the spring of 1940, they had the opportunity to prepare for German strikes. The USSR was attacked suddenly, but it is impossible to explain by this that the Germans reached Moscow and Stalingrad.

It is all about the technical equipment and organizational structure of the German divisions united in tank groups. How to hack the enemy defenses? You can attack in the place that the higher superiors have mapped out. And you can - where the enemy has the weakest defense. Where will the attack be more effective? The trouble is that from the headquarters of the front or the army vulnerable defense spots are not visible. The division commander needs autonomy to make decisions — and information so that the decisions are correct. The Wehrmacht implemented the principle of "potato strategy" from the film "Chapaev" - "the commander in front of a dashing horse." True, the horse was replaced by an armored personnel carrier, but in the mobile units the place of commanders was always in the attacking order. The importance of this, not everyone understood in Germany. Chief of the General Staff Beck asked Guderian: “How will they lead the battle without having a table with cards or a phone?” The famous Erwin Rommel, who fought in North Africa, was thrown together ... right in the open Horch car! A telephone connection replaced the radio.

The radiation of the German tank divisions is a factor that is often underestimated. Such a division was like an octopus, groping for the enemy's position with tentacles, which were played by mobile reconnaissance units. The commander, receiving from them radio messages, had a clear idea of ​​the situation. And in the place of the decisive attack, the German general was present personally, with his own eyes watching the development of events. He clearly knew the location of each unit: the radio gate kept in constant contact with them. Encrypting Enigma machines helped to make orders inaccessible even if the enemy intercepted them. In turn, the platoon of radio intelligence, listened to the talks on the other side of the front line.

The representative of the Luftwaffe, who was in the advanced units of the attackers, maintained constant radio contact with the aircraft, directing the bombers to the targets. “Our task is to attack the enemy in front of the shock wedges of our armies. Our goals are always the same: tanks, cars, bridges, field fortifications and anti-aircraft batteries. The resistance in front of our wedges must be broken in order to increase the speed and strength of our offensive ”... - as the pick-up officer Hans-Ulrich Rudel describes the first days of the war with the USSR.

That is why the relative weakness of the German tanks did not interfere with the strike power of the tank divisions! Effective aviation support made it possible to weaken the enemy before the fight with him, and intelligence (including air) revealed the most vulnerable places suitable for attack.

Antidote

And what about our mechanized corps? The Germans in the tank division were all motorized units — infantry, sappers, repair brigades, artillery, fuel and ammunition services. Our tanks were faster, but the rear of them all the time lagged behind. It is difficult to penetrate the T-34 armor, but without shells, fuel and spare parts, it turns into a fixed armored box ... The tank commander controlled his tanks by flag signaling, the headquarters sent "communications delegates", and not having a radio station the reconnaissance fighter could only tell intelligence information airfield (while they were needed by army commanders). The lack of reliable radio communications led to the "loss" of regiments, divisions and even corps. In addition, the immediate commanders were deprived of any independence in the decisions. Here is a typical case ...

The axiom of a tank war - parts must be entered into battle after full concentration, attacking the enemy with all his might. This, of course, was also known to the commander of the 8 th mechanized corps Dmitry Ryabyshev. His body had more than 800 tanks, including KV and T-34. A huge force that could play a decisive role on the scale of the whole front!

In the early days of the war, obeying conflicting orders from above, the corps performed a series of meaningless maneuvers, losing equipment, wasting fuel and exhausting people. But finally, the moment of the counteroffensive came, which could cut off the German tank wedge at the base ...

Ryabyshev waited for all his divisions to arrive, but at that moment a member of the Front Military Council Vashugin arrived (in other words, a front-line party commissar). Not one arrived - with the prosecutor and the commandant's platoon, threatening to shoot Ryabyshev on the spot if the offensive does not start right now: “You, the traitor to the motherland, will be heard by the field court. Here, under the pine, we will listen and shoot at the pine ... ”I had to send those who were close at hand to the battle. The first group (armored division with reinforcement), which launched the offensive immediately, was cut off and eventually left the encirclement on foot. So 238 tanks were lost! Characteristically, there was only one radio station in the group. Yes, and the group commander Nikolai Poppel managed to contact only with ... a German radio intelligence officer, who in Russian tried to find out the location of the headquarters, posing as Ryabyshev ...

It was the same everywhere - so you shouldn’t be surprised at the colossal losses of Soviet tanks. And yet, it was precisely such poorly organized and often suicidal counterattacks at the beginning of the war that ultimately predetermined the collapse of the blitzkrieg. In France, the 4-I tank division commanded by Charles de Gaulle, which by this time had reached Colonel, delivered successful counter-attacks to the Germans. We attacked all. Blitzkrieg defense to cope was impossible! The constant counterattacks of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1941 might have seemed meaningless - but they were the ones who forced the Germans to waste their forces at the first stage of the war. Of course, the victims of the Red Army were even more serious at the same time, but they made it possible to prolong the war until the autumn thaw, when the "lightning speed" of German tanks instantly faded.

“You shouldn’t fight the Russians: they will respond to any of your cunning with their stupidity!” Bismarck warned at the time. In smart Europe, antidotes against the cunning German Blitzkrieg have not been found. And the way they tried to resist him in Russia, the Germans considered stupid. But the war, however, ended in Berlin ...

Comments

[parusnik]

The equipment ideally suited for the blitzkrieg was also produced in the USSR. ..Here it somehow smelled particularly rezunovschinoy ... Yes, and in some other paragraphs ..

[igordok]

Quote: parusnik

It somehow smelled particularly rezunovschinoy ... Yes, and in some other paragraphs ..

I agree. What do you want from an American magazine?

Popular Mechanics is an American popular science magazine published since 1902 in English and from 2002 in Russian. It contains news of science and technology: new technologies, science, weapons, aviation, space, cars.

[Stas57]

Quote: parusnik

The equipment ideally suited for the blitzkrieg was also produced in the USSR. ..Here it somehow smelled particularly rezunovschinoy ... Yes, and in some other paragraphs ..

there is such a thing, especially since the BT was just making its way not only with the German anti-tank missile and anti-tank missile, but also with a simple heavy bullet from M98

[AK64]

BT made its way not only the German VET and PTR, but also a simple heavy bullet from the M98

Let's say, not "simple" but armor-piercing.
But he made his way, like the T-26 (not to mention the floats).
However, BT not only made its way - it is unpleasant but not fatal - it also burned

[Operator]

BT was developed as part of the capabilities of Soviet industry in the early 1930's.

At the end of the 1930's, industry capabilities (in terms of casting, rolling and welding armored steel, engine building and optics) were sharply increased and the T-34 and KV-1 were developed. Their only drawback was the relatively short-barreled 76-mm gun, which had a negative effect in the 1942-43 years. But in the 1941 year, this gun was full of German and other European tanks, armed with the Wehrmacht, without exception.

The reason for the short barrels of the 76-mm gun (as well as the 37-mm and 45-mm) was the lack of machines capable of deep drilling, processing and cutting in the barrel blanks of guns. Attempts to make trunks using roundabout technology led to mass rejects. At the end of the 1942 of the year, the corresponding American machine tools were delivered to Lendlis, and starting from the 1943 of the year, the Red Army received the long-barreled 37-mm (anti-aircraft), 45-mm (anti-tank), 57-mm (anti-tank), 76-mm (tank and field) , 85-mm (tank), 100-mm (self-propelled guns) and 122-mm (tank) guns.

[AK64]

BT was developed as part of the capabilities of Soviet industry in the early 1930's.

Uh-huh. Exactly. American Christie developed his T-3 (aka BT) "within the scope of Soviet industry of the early 1930s "
That is how it was.

In the late 1930s, the capabilities of industry (in terms of casting, rolling and welding armored steel, engine building and optics) were sharply increased and the T-34 and KV-1 were developed.

/ viciously spat and did not read what is lower /

[alicante11]

/ viciously spat and did not read what is lower /

You put the washers on the monitor, or something.

Uh-huh. Exactly. American Christie developed his T-3 (aka BT) "within the framework of the capabilities of Soviet industry in the early 1930s."

But to think is not fate?
Maybe we knit a tank that suited the capabilities of the Soviet industry in the 30's? And why he turned out to be so is the third question.

[AK64]

But to think is not fate?
Maybe we knit a tank that suited the capabilities of the Soviet industry in the 30's? And why he turned out to be so is the third question.

Oh yes - why know, the vyunosh "thinks". And you don't need to know.

After all, I wrote to you in Russian: go read, the key words for you are "Khalepsky Commission"

And your fantasies, which you mistakenly take for "thoughts", are of no interest to anyone.

[alicante11]

And your fantasies, which you mistakenly take for "thoughts", are of no interest to anyone.

Well, judging by our +/- ratios, your "knowledge" is not interesting to anyone :).

[AK64]

Well, judging by our +/- ratios, your "knowledge" is not interesting to anyone :).

But does it characterize me? And not you? And not a template?

If you look at the replicas of the most "positive" ones, what is the conclusion?

Well, and that’s what: I’m an adult, I don’t play tic-tac-toe. And the kids ... whatever the child would have fun.

[Uncle VasyaSayapin]

BT as well as the tank industry of that time were developed by the United States. The optics on the first T-34s were almost transparent. And long guns, despite the absence in the USSR of equipment for their production, were not needed in the 41st year. It is a fact. The smallest from plus mynus, ignorance of a member of the military council of the front and the scientific popularity of the American magazine.

[Operator]

In connection with the start of production of the world's first anti-shell tanks equipped with a large-caliber gun and diesel engine (T-34 and KV-1), the Red Army began to form mechanized corps from tank and mechanized divisions. They included the complete replacement of BT-7 bulletproof gasoline tanks with a small-caliber 45-mm cannon, burning like matches in Spain and the Far East.

The planned date for the re-equipment of the mechanized corps was set for the middle of the 1942 year, based on the capabilities of the industry.

By the same time it was planned to fully equip the mechanized corps with personnel, artillery and auxiliary equipment, train and rally the personnel. After that, the Red Army could implement the plan of the General Staff for conducting mobile defense, counterattacking the aggressor and transferring hostilities to enemy territory.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht correctly assessed the development trends of the Red Army, therefore the Germans promptly reoriented the direction of their main attack from Britain to the growing USSR and launched a strike not in the 1942 year (after the occupation of the British Isles and the elimination of the threat of war on two fronts), but in the 1941 year.

[AK64]

In connection with the start of production of the world's first anti-shell tanks equipped with a large-caliber gun and a diesel engine (T-34 and KV-1)

laugh or cry?
Or just put in an emergency - so as not to be upset by the general level of the Russian population?

in the Red Army began the formation of mechanized corps from tank and mechanized divisions.

This clinic is already ... To speak with such is useless: Only in an emergency.

But before entering the emergency, I’ll ask:
(1) Is it nothing that the mechanized corps of the 1940 arr. 90% consisted of BT and T-26?
(2) and it’s nothing that the mechanized corps of the first formation were back in 1932 (!!!)

I give 30 minutes to read and put in an hour.
Not out of spite - but in order not to get distracted by such "experts"

[AK64]

uhhhh ... brought it.
/ and sighed in relief /

And why do some write so much instead of reading a lot?
After all, now it’s not the 80s, after all IS ONLINE!

PS: And after all, this "connoisseur" also put some cons to me --- here's the villain, eh ?!

[alicante11]

Not out of spite - but in order not to get distracted by such "experts"

And so as not to upset others with their "knowledge". Do not forget to add me to this wonderful list, then you will immediately become on the same level with the "professor". Well, by this very - which is Jewish here on the site.

[AK64]

Yes, and you would have to. But you still do not annoy me so much.

Also, of course, you confuse your fantasies with knowledge, but at least the volume of texts is smaller.

You need to know, not fantasize.

[Alex]

Quote: AK64

Yes, and you would have to. But you still do not annoy me so much.

What a gentle one you are with us ... Oh, what am I doing now and they will bring me into this terrible emergency ...

[Stas57]

Quote: Alex

What a gentle one you are with us ... Oh, what am I doing now and they will bring me into this terrible emergency ...

huh

Put this artist in the emergency, or what? And then he has a lot of noise, but there is not a drop of information ...

He brought: there is still no information from him, but at least there is more than rudeness

97036-nalichie-snaryadov-probivayuschih-bronyu-kv.html
what kind of impact measure is this? before here they did not indulge in such a shnyaga

[AK64]

huh

What "hmm"? There are 65 comments on this article, and there will be more. If you remove those who always and everywhere only pour water, then at least the tape will be shorter. Direct benefit.

And to remove the comments of those who only grind their teeth (like this avt or whatever it is, with a shark on the avatar) and God himself simply ordered. Not from evil, but in order not to waste time on emptiness.

what kind of impact measure is this? before here they did not indulge in such a shnyaga

Well, yes, well, yes - here they "indulge" bypassing. Well this is necessary, to run on topics with the aim of not reading minus the participants ... "Balovniki".
Are these adults?

[Stas57]

Well, you’re an adult, if you have something to say, you need to say, if there’s nothing to keep silent, I’m silent about the fleet, or about Armata and I’m not worried about the minuses.

[AK64]

Well, you are an adult, if you have something to say, you need to say, if there is nothing, to be silent

I do just that.
But sometimes I clean the tape, at my convenience, Removing those who are completely not interesting to me: the tape is long, and not every participant is equally useful. Better less is better.
And I don’t understand why people are offended by this: if, in my observation, the main occupation of the same avt is trolling, then why is he surprised when he ... is transferred to the passive part?

and not worried about the minuses

So I'm not worried. I am surprised that there are comrades who spend time jumping on topics and minus, minus, minus ...

I would understand the minus in one answer, which you think is incorrect, but objection to laziness. But frankly, the answer is not the answer, but the participant.

[Operator]

The problem of the Red Army (in addition to the readiness of mobile units planned for the middle of the 1942 year) was including the late transition to universal military service in the 1939 year and the beginning of large-scale training for commanders, starting from the platoon level and ending with the commanders of armies and army groups).

At this point, Germany already had a deployed army, a system of military service and several graduates of non-commissioned and officer schools. In the remaining 22 on June 1941, the Wehrmacht only widened the gap in this regard from the Red Army. Plus, the Wehrmacht personnel gained combat experience in conducting combined arms operations in the east (Poland) and the west (France).

Parts of the Red Army as of June 22 of 1941 in their entirety represented a crowd of untrained and unified people around a pile of undeveloped weapons. In this mass, drowned were those with non-core experience of participating in the Spanish Civil War, local conflicts in the Far East and the offensive in Finland.

[Operator]

The main reason for the defeat of the Red Army was a gross error of the high command: in the conditions of achieving combat readiness of the overwhelming majority of military units and formations of the western military districts, only by the middle of 1942 did the high command (I. Stalin, S. Timoshenko, G. Zhukov) go on an adventure in 1941 - prepared in advance envelopes with orders to commanders of all levels at the moment "H" to go over to active defense - counterattacks against the aggressor. The commanders could not fulfill the order, since their military units and formations as man-machine systems on June 22, 1941 existed only on paper.

This adventure was aggravated by the inexperience of the high command in organizing large-scale military operations with the participation of several million people, as well as a misunderstanding of the very foundation of active defense - the presence in its rear of a stable positional defense (front line), which insures against errors in the actions of mobile connections in the near field.

The aggravation of relations with Germany occurred a year before the June 22 of the 1941 year after the end of the Soviet-Finnish War, the Soviet demands were put forward on Moldova and Bukovina (satisfied by Germany with a creak), as well as on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles (not satisfied with Germany). After that, the High Command of the Red Army had a carriage and a small time cart to bury what military units and formations in the form of a layered position defense with the deployment of rear support forces.

The entire population of the western regions of the USSR, where there was not a single significant defense enterprise, could act as diggers. Moreover, a focal defense system in the form of the Stalin line on the old border has already been created as the basis of the future front line over the past two decades.

Nevertheless, an adventurous strategy was chosen based on the assumption that Hitler would attack the USSR only after the occupation of the British Isles. When the high command of the Red Army in May 1941 realized that the Germans had correctly orientated themselves in the situation, it was too late to correct anything, no one wanted to admit their mistake, and the Red Army, by order from above, climbed into the loop of detours, boilers and an unorganized retreat.

Only the patriotism of the people, the presence of a large mobilization contingent and military-technical potential saved the USSR from military defeat.

For the first time, a realistic military policy was implemented only during the counteroffensive near Moscow. Nevertheless, the high command of the Red Army tried to continue the adventurous policy of active defense in the 1942 of the year (Kharkov, Crimea, Rzhev). The defeats finally discouraged adventures and the counterattacks near Stalingrad and Kursk were already organized with mandatory support for positional defense.

The achievement in 1944 of the full combat readiness of units and formations (experience, training, coordination, a set of weapons) made it possible to switch to the classic offensive during Operation Bagration.

[Andrey Zh]

By the way, the USSR saved from the military defeat and, albeit small at the initial moment, but growing over time, HELP ALLIANCE on the AGK!

[Witness 45]

In the initial period of the war until late fall, this help could not have a significant role, it was the resistance of the Red Army, albeit with great losses for it, for well-known reasons, that saved the USSR from military defeat, and after the defeat of the Wehrmacht near Moscow the further course and outcome of the war .

[voyaka uh]

for Operator:
Bravo! I can completely agree with your post.
Very mature and well laid out analysis.
Know when you want !

[overb]

Quote: Svidetel 45

1. it was the resistance of the Red Army, albeit with heavy losses for it for well-known reasons, that saved the USSR from military defeat
2. and after the defeat of the Wehrmacht near Moscow
3. the further course and outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion

1... There was resistance, but the main factor in the failure of the 1941 German company. was their rejection of the Barbarossa plan. And without a plan, an army, not an army, but a large crowd of armed men.
2. I do not remember such a defeat. I remember the failure of the offensive operation. And I don’t remember the defeat.
3... A foregone conclusion. If the allies had not suddenly changed their minds to "be friends". And if they changed their minds, then the exact opposite outcome would most likely have been predetermined.
The largest item of Lend-Lease supplies from 01.07.42/12.05.45/01.10.41 to 30.06.42/XNUMX/XNUMX. there were food supplies. Yes, and from XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX. on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX it was the second largest.

Quote: Operator

1. 37, 57 and 85-mm guns with barrel lengths up to 55 calibers were actually produced before the war, but up to 90 percent of the barrels went into marriage, which is why they were super expensive, which forced Marshal Kulik to stop their production in 1941.
2. In 1943, after receiving special machines for lendlization, the Soviet industry mastered the production of long-barreled guns with low barrel waste, including the 85 mm ZIS-S-53 with a barrel length of 55 calibers

1. You need to do something with yourself, otherwise you are talking nonsense.
There were no problems with the production of barrels for the 37 mm gun. Just because it was short enough.
85 mm anti-aircraft guns were produced at a specialized factory in Podlipki, and there were no problems with their production. But there was no way to increase their release, because The plant worked in 3 shifts.
The 57 mm ZIS-2 gun was discontinued in January 1942. Kulik has nothing to do with this, because then it was already nikago and GAU had no.
2. ZIS-S-53 mastered production only in the fall of 1944. And by the spring of 1944. mastered the production of the S-53 gun. These are slightly different guns, let it be known to you. At the end of 1943 in small quantities did 85-mm guns D-5T and D-5C. This one was very bad, in the tower of such a T-34/85 only 2 people were placed.

[zenion]

Well done! Learned to write in other words. Either V. Suvorov, or Solonin.

[Suhow]

maybe out of place (about stupidity), the same Bismarck said, Russians harnessed for a long time, but drove quickly ... And as far as I remember in the 40s, the Union started rearmament of the army, however, Comrade the Operator said this before. The Germans successfully poked .. .at the beginning.

[sibiryouk]

One of the main reasons for the short barrels of tank guns is the demand of military customers who feared that the tank would scoop up the earth with a gun muzzle. In tact.technical requirements, the barrel solution in calibers was indicated and, as a rule, the barrel did not protrude beyond the front housing dimension. After more powerful guns were required during the war, the position of military customers changed, they saw more and more long-barreled guns at the enemy. And there were all kinds of machine tools in the USSR, including for processing long barrels, like serial guns, for example, F-22, USV and etc. Grabin and the new 85mm and 107mm guns were designed with rather long barrels.

[AK64]

One of the main reasons for the short barrels of tank guns is the demand of military customers who feared that the tank would scoop up the earth with a gun muzzle. In tact.technical requirements, the barrel solution in calibers was indicated and, as a rule, the barrel did not protrude beyond the front housing dimension. After more powerful guns were required during the war, the position of military customers changed when they saw more and more long-barreled guns at the enemy.

The F-34 cannon on the T-34 began to put on February 1941. And TZ on the ZiS-5 gun was discharged in the summer of 1940.

And there were all kinds of machines in the USSR, including for processing long trunks, like serial tools, for example, F-22, USV, etc. Grabin and the new 85mm and 107mm guns were designed with rather long barrels.

There were. True in one factory, in Podlipki.

[Andrey Zh]

Since about 1940, the technical specifications for tank guns required the anti-aircraft ballistics of these guns, and the short barrel and anti-aircraft ballistics - one contradicts the other, agree! ...

[overb]

Quote: V.ic

1. But Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin succeeded / for some reason! /
2... Read "Weapon of Victory". By the way, you can freely download it on the "Internet". I remember that there was even mentioned such a tool as "broach".

1. That's just what Grabin basically failed. First with the F-22, and then with the ZIS-2. arr. 1941 These are well-known facts and it's silly to argue with them. And the fact that the plant produced bypass technology in pilot production is not a series.
2. I heard a ring, but did not know where he was. 40 klb. three inches were quite affordable on old equipment. The main thing is that the length of the threaded part of the barrel does not exceed 100 inches (in reality, taking into account the 5% guarantee margin, they did up to 104 inches).

Quote: Operator

1. Interestingly, if the war had begun according to the plan of I. Stalin in June 1942, the Red Army would have managed to get the modernized T-34
2. The assignment was given to the USSR State Academic Technical University for the development of an enhanced modification of the tank under the designation T-34M with the following differences
3. In April 1941, the visiting committee of the GABTU recommended stopping the production of the T-34 and proceeding to the production of the T-34M. The decision of the SNK and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of May 5, 1941 established a production plan for the 2nd half of 1941 in the amount of 500 T-34M.

1. Yeah. From a dead donkey's ears. It was the USSR. Huge plans, something about zero on the exhaust.
2. Lord, there were a million of these assignments. Only they really were not interested in anyone. T-34M (and even just T-34T) did not exist even in the form of a layout.
3... It is convenient to tell these passions to the "bourgeois". They are gullible and believe everything. And it makes no sense to tell former fellow citizens about it. Just ordinary Soviet paperwork. Some pretend that they are in charge, others that they work. Everything is in business.

Quote: figvam

1. BT light tanks were needed to quickly move to Czechoslovakia
2. But Poland did not give permission for the passage of Soviet troops through its territory and threatened to declare war on the USSR, after which the west gave Germany part of Czechoslovakia.

1. Right. And small amphibious tanks were needed to force the Pacific Ocean and attack Paraguay from the rear.
2. Who else would defend the USSR.

Quote: alicante11

BT light tanks were needed as reconnaissance and advanced units.

There have never been any BT light tanks. Simply because there were no light tanks during the time of BT. BTs were called "operational tanks". And according to the idea of ​​the then strategists, they were supposed to serve as something like Budyonny's cavalry, but not on horses and for armor. Analogues of BT existed in the armies of all states. The T-50 was planned to replace the BT, but already in 1941. it became clear that the army did not need such tanks. And the concept of their application is "left".
Reconnaissance in the Red Army were small tanks and BA.

[V.ic]

Quote: Operator

was in the absence of machine tools capable of deeply reaming, processing and cutting in the barrel blanks of guns.

But Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin succeeded / for some reason! /.

[AK64]

But Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin succeeded / for some reason! /.

So did he drill? And on what?

[V.ic]

Quote: AK64

So did he drill? And on what?

Read "Weapon of Victory". By the way, you can freely download it on the "Internet". I remember that there was even mentioned such a tool as "broach".

[AK64]

Read "Weapon of Victory". By the way, you can freely download it on the "Internet".

I am out of the age when they read fairy tales, even if they are "free on the Internet"

I remember that there was even mentioned such a tool as "broach".

I ask again - did he "hold out" himself?
Yes or no?

At the same time, you can tell and tell what exactly Grabin "held out" in the barrel. (I recommend to see what a "broach" is)

[V.ic]

Quote: AK64

I ask again - did he "hold out" himself?
Yes or no?
At the same time can and tell what exactly Grabin was "holding out" in the barrel. (I recommend to see what a "broach" is)

I am not obliged to read the course "Technology of mechanical engineering" for you personally, although, after prepayment, I agree to explain how the groove differs from the broach. Graduated from the Ufa Aviation Institute in 1980. Okay, "baby EG"?

[AK64]

I am not obliged to read the course "Technology of mechanical engineering" for you personally, although, after prepayment, I agree to explain how the groove differs from the broach. Graduated from the Ufa Aviation Institute in 1980. Okay, "baby EG"?

That is, the hysterical boor once again got into a puddle

[V.ic]

Quote: AK64

That is, the hysterical boor once again got into a puddle

You are so self-critical, it touches!

[KVIRTU]

"..in Russia, such a gun (a 3-pounder rifled gun) was created by engineer Yakov Zotin at the Nizhneisetsky plant.
Zotin organized work on the forging of the tool, using hammer forges and water hammers "with steel weld". A vertical drilling machine was used to drill the barrel bore, and a lathe was used to process the outer surface of the barrel. By May 1812, the cannon was ready. "
If in 812 there was something to drill ...
For specialized enterprises, the barrel length is not critical. The question is the duration of the process - and the front needed a lot now.
For repurposed ones - yes, with a lengthy problem in the absence of suitable machines.

[Operator]

Everyone succeeded, but until January 1943 of the year with a large percentage of marriage.

It is interesting that if the war had begun according to the plan of I. Stalin in June 1942, then the Red Army would have managed to get the modernized T-34 - in 1940, according to the results of military tests, the design bureau of the USSR NPO was given the task of developing the reinforced modification tank under the designation T-183M with the following differences:
- increase the thickness of the armor of the forehead of the hull and turret to 60 mm;
- install a solid (under pressure) tower with a commander's cupola;
- apply the chassis with torsion bars and rollers of reduced diameter instead of Christie's spring suspension;
- instead of 4's high-speed gearbox, install 5-high-speed gearbox;
- install mounted bulwarks above the upper branches of the tracks.

In April 1941 of the year, the GABTU visiting committee recommended to stop the production of T-34 and go to the production of T-34М. The decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from May 5 of May 1941 established a plan for the release of 2 T-1941M for the 500 half-year of the 34 year.

[zenion]

He worked in Sverdlovsk at one factory and the factory was sponsored by a tank school. Somehow, the guys deployed the trunk in a bottleneck and bent it. They brought him to the workshop where I worked. In the forge shop, the workpiece was forged, inserted into the drilling machine and the drill got out from the side. Thus spoiled several more forgings. Then they remembered one specialist who was doing this during the war, a master multi-station operator. They brought him to our workshop. He went to the machine and spat, who installed? Chief! I spat again. In general, they brought the forging still hot. He ordered it to be annealed, then screwed up one eye and looked into the tailstock hole where the drill was to be inserted, corrected it a little. Drag the blank. Installed it in the cartridge and holder. I checked the cooling flow and turned on the drill. Yes, at first he made a punch and heavily tilted the blank. Then at low speeds I drilled a start. Then he turned on more revolutions and the cooling supply. For half an hour he did a through drilling. Order - to the lathe. In a lathe, in the centers, they quickly ripped off the barrel on the surface and sent it to the thermal train. In the morning he came and set the trunk on a broach. They extended the barrel several times and again sent to the heat train. Then they made a finish on the surface and again in the heat. Then the machine began to stretch the cutting. Again in the termichka. Then the final broach, slightly, for polishing and grandfather said - done. What was the tank I do not remember. But he was healthy and scary, and I was still in front of the army, the middle of the 60s. Then he was dragged to the test site, where they checked the gun and brought the scope under it. So the grandfather said that during the war he worked on five more machines and there were many more of them, but nobody used to have fun with the heat, there was no time. Only did the sighting and that’s it!

[overb]

Quote: Operator

1. Their only drawback was the relatively short-barreled 76-mm gun, which had a negative effect in 1942-43.
2. The reason for the short barrels of the 76-mm gun (as well as the 37-mm and 45-mm guns) was the lack of machine tools capable of deeply drilling, processing and cutting in the barrel blanks of guns.

1. Yes? Where does this information come from? Just a gun of any model in 1941. the weak point of the T-34 and KV was not exactly, because armor penetration 30 and 40 klb. models differed slightly. At the end of 1941 30 klb. guns were no longer put on tanks. Of course, 40 klb. model at the end of 1941. It was more appropriate, especially since this affected the cost of the gun slightly.
Problems were identified in 1942. and just when already 40 klb. serial guns. And in 1943. and they were already inappropriate on tanks. And above all, not because of the short trunk, the table could have been lengthened. And because of the weak cartridge, rooted in the beginning of the 20th century. But the release of such T-34/76 tanks continued until mid-1944.
2. There was no problem for the 37 and 45 mm machine guns. But there was a problem with ancient and weak cartridges. Forty-five, it was altered altogether from the 47-mm sea gun of Hotchkiss arr. 1885 Moreover, the cartridge case remained the same. Of course, in 1941. this was already not enough.
The three-inch models had a problem with the equipment for long-barrels. But she was not very sharp. But the problem was in the heads of the "Soviet strategists". It is associated primarily with the weak development of the chemical industry in the USSR. But there were no problems with the smelting of pig iron and steel in the USSR. Therefore, they tried to shoot "economically". Those. to make the barrel more authentic (and very often too thick, "ingenious designers" very often did not know how to count the strength of materials in the USSR), and put less gunpowder.
I won’t particularly discuss this topic, here you can write a book, but the biggest mistakes were made in 1937-39. It was the adoption in those years of knowingly incompetent and incapable samples of Soviet artillery (and not only) that predetermined its weakness throughout the Second World War.
In general, in the late 30s, early 40s, the red army often received disgusting weapons. Apparently, therefore, later, in order to get him out of the fire of criticism, it was passed off as "legendary." And what is the demand from the legend?
Nevertheless, the problem of field and tank artillery could be solved as early as 1937-39, and quite simply.
New 45 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 (53-K) and tank gun mod. 1938 (20-K) had to be done at the technological maximum, i.e. as 45-mm PTP M-42 mod. 1942 And best of all, they should have been replaced by something 57-63 mm (but not ZIS-2) with a "divisional" sleeve.
And the new 76-mm cannon F-22USV mod. 1939 should have been on an "anti-aircraft" cartridge (possibly with an incomplete charge). By the way, the shoulder strap of the KV-1 tank was designed specifically for such a cartridge, since at first a cannon with anti-aircraft ballistics 3-K was planned there.

[Operator]

overb (1) - you are a complete d..beel ("cartridge" is only in small arms, in artillery and tank guns they use the term "shot") in all questions in which you climb to argue, picking your nose.
Bye Bye

[overb]

Quote: Operator

overb (1) - you are full of d .. beat ("cartridge" is only in small arms, in artillery and tank guns they use the term "shot") in all questions in which you climb to argue, picking your nose

Ah ah ah. What a hysteria incompetent boor out of the blue. And after all, there are only one wrong around, one right Operator. So the GAU is completely unaware of what the Operator is babbling about here. Therefore, he actively uses the "incorrect term" cartridge "in his ammunition manuals.
See attached scan, strategist couch.

Quote: Operator

1. equipped with a large-caliber gun and a diesel engine (T-34 and KV-1)
2. BT-7 tanks with a small-caliber 45 mm gun
3. in the late transition to universal military service in 1939
Parts of the Red Army as of June 22, 1941, in their entirety, represented a crowd of untrained and unified people around a pile of undeveloped weapons.
4. in conditions of achieving combat readiness of the vast majority of military units and formations of the western military districts only by mid-1942.
5. The commanders could not fulfill the order, since their military units and formations as man-machine systems on June 22, 1941 existed only on paper.
6. as well as the Bosphorus and Dardanelles (not satisfied with Germany).
7. After that, the High Command of the Red Army had a carriage and a small time cart to bury what military units and formations were already in the ground

1. The 76,2 mm caliber is not and has never been large-caliber.
2... Small-caliber guns do not exist today. This is a term from the middle of the last century. At the same time, 45-mm guns were not considered "small-bore". However, they later became "small-caliber".
3. Is it that, for as many as 2 years of the general military service of a soldier in the army, they have not taught anything? Then what is so big + of this very general conscription? What kind of science is this so heavy, military soldier?
I am writing for you personally, in peacetime the RKKA / SA were not focused on ensuring the country's defense as the main task. This was an important task for them, but not their main one. Therefore, we did not have time. Because they were doing something else.
4. What nonsense. The army should always be ready, and not by a specific date. And based on this principle, a system of its functioning is being built. It is only couch strategists who can easily assume that in June 1942. the army will still be combat-ready, and in July 1942, it is already fully combat-ready.
5. Enchanting nonsense. Mr. Operator apparently suggests that the high command of the Red Army consisted of mentally disabled people. However, this is not so, there is a suspicion that they would put a few more such Operators in the belt.
6. Did you come up with this yourself? It seems like that. What for?
7. Now I understand why. Was the car of time after your notion? It’s ridiculous.

[overb]

Quote: Operator

1. At the end of 1942, the appropriate American machine tools were delivered to Lendliz, and starting in 1943, the Red Army received long-barreled 37-mm (anti-aircraft), 45-mm (anti-tank), ... 76-mm (tank and field),
2. In connection with the start of production of the world's first anti-shell tanks
3. The High Command of the Wehrmacht correctly assessed the development trends of the Red Army, so the Germans promptly reoriented the direction of their main attack from Britain to the growing USSR and launched a strike not in 1942 (after the occupation of the British Isles and the elimination of the threat of war on two fronts), but in 1941.
4. The problem of the Red Army (except for the readiness of mobile units planned for mid-1942) was also the late transition to universal military service in 1939

1. 37 mm (anti-aircraft) arr. 1939 g? And why did she need this equipment?
45 mm (anti-tank) mod. 1942? And why should she? The "royal" coped perfectly.
76 mm (tank and field), apparently, respectively, arr. 1941 and 1942. And why did they need new equipment? "Tsarskoe" was enough.
2. It’s ridiculous.
3. What nonsense. It is perfectly known that the presence of new Soviet tanks was a surprise to the Germans. And they struck their blow regardless of the actions of the Soviet leadership. Proceeding ONLY from your reasons.
4... The problem was the presence of "Soviet power" on the territory of former Russia. And it's not about terms. Although this cunning term by the beginning of the Second World War hid the absolute power of the mustachioed katso with the slave-owning mode of production established by him (he himself called his regime "socialism" and should not be confused with the later "developed socialism", the essence of which is the feudal OEF). This method of production has historically lost not only the so-called. "capitalism", but even the so-called. "feudalism". Therefore defeat Mustache Katso was predetermined in advance. It happened closer to the fall of 1941.
And then, without a break, another war began, formally from 01.10.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX. A war in which the role of "the country of victorious socialism" was NON-leading, NON-independent and UN-enviable. This is clearly seen in the post-war division of trophies. There was no need to pay money for Lend-Lease, yes. But it was not free either.

Quote: Stas57

just BT penetrated not only the German VET and PTR, but also a simple heavy bullet from the M98

And even the arrow of a Mongol archer.
Do not fantasize. Models BT-7 arr. 1937 and 39 years were quite tolerant for the beginning of the Second World War. And approximately corresponded to the German Pz.Kpfw. 35 (t) (they were used on the Eastern Front until the end of 1941). BT-7 produced 3453 units, of which about 22.06 ~ 3200 units. were combat ready.
If you have decided to impress us with your "foreign", then write G98. Since they did not have anything under the M98 code.

[overb]

Quote: AK64

Well, Koshkin and the Kharkiv design bureau racked their heads on how to modernize the BT, and somehow it didn't work out very well for him. Then Koshkin was ordered derectively to "forget about the wheeled caterpillar - just do it on the tracks!" Koshkin actually tried to argue, but only by the end of 39 something appeared.
The Putilovites were an alternative design bureau and factory. They themselves developed (!!!) the T-28 - an excellent tank for its time. But you also need to understand: in the first series there was a "minder" who sat outside the armor, above the engine, and lubricated the engine. Have you presented?
Well, only the Kirov Plant could produce T-28s in the USSR, and it came out expensive.
So there was nothing corny what to replace BT.
Already there is not enough evil for such "experts".
They "know" everything ...

1. For starters, the T-28 was not an alternative to the T-34. Because it was developed back in 1932 and began to be produced in 1933.
2. The story about the "lubricator dvigla" is cool. But, a lie. There was an ordinary M-17T, and there was nothing to lubricate in it in the direction of travel. In 1942. such motors were installed in a small batch on the T-34 in Gorky (Sormovo freaks).
3. The story about the "enterprising Koshkin", who took the wheel drive and refused the wheel drive, which exists in Runet, is really funny. Because the T-32 tank (the predecessor of the T-34), it not only changed the type of drive and the gun in the turret. He changed the concept. And from an "operational tank" it turned into an "infantry tank" (tank for direct support of the infantry). Those. As a result, in the T-34 troops, it was not the BT, but the T-26 that had to be replaced. No Koshkin, even with Myshkin, can do this. Therefore, Koshkin has a somewhat distant relationship to the T-34. He made the T-20, a tank that really replaced the BT. But it is not known who further altered it into the T-32. Although it is known that the hands of Koshkin and his comrades. The same unknown, but certainly influential author pushed the T-34 further, despite numerous pre-war decisions to stop its production.
And instead of BT decided to make a new tank. Although at first it was planned to produce the Koshkin T-20 at the STZ, but then they changed their minds. It was supposed to be the Leningrad T-50. But already in 1941. realized that there was no need for such a tank and never would be. Therefore, nothing replaced BT in the Red Army.
It is also interesting that the T-34 as a result of the T-26 did not change. Him since 1943. in the army replaced the self-propelled guns SU-76.
And the T-34 became something like the "main tank" of the Red Army. Although, to be honest, he never pulled this role both in the form of the T-34/76 and in the form of the T-34/85. But there was nothing else.

Quote: Svidetel 45

The 57 mm anti-tank gun, as well as the 85 mm anti-aircraft gun, was manufactured as early as 41, long before deliveries via the land lens, but then, at the end of 41, its production was discontinued, since the highest ranks, if I am not mistaken, Marshal Kulik, considered her power excessive

Runet’s tales should not be repeated. They could not master it by mass production. Therefore, they removed so as not to interfere.
And it was not Kulik who removed it from production, then he was no longer the head of GAU. Ascension, if not mistaken.
The 85-mm anti-aircraft gun was produced behind the factory in Polypki and he did not engage in tank guns in general. Equipment, like the gun itself (the future famous 88), was purchased in the early 30s in Germany. The gun was reassigned to a caliber of 76 mm, and then 85 mm. There were no more medium-caliber long-barrel factories in the USSR before the Second World War.

[Witness 45]

The 57 mm anti-tank gun, as well as the 85 mm anti-aircraft gun, was produced back in 41, long before the lend-lens supplies, but then, at the end of 41, its production was discontinued, since the highest ranks, if I am not mistaken, Marshal Kulik, considered its power excessive, and the production of expensive, for which later paid for with the appearance of the Germans in 42, a modernized T-4 with frontal armor of 80 mm and "tigers" and "panthers" in 43.

[Operator]

37, 57 and 85-mm guns with barrel lengths from 55 to 73 calibers were actually produced before the war, but up to 90 percent of their barrels went to marriage, which is why they were super expensive, which forced Marshal Kulik to stop their production in 1941.
Instead of them, the T-34 and KV-1 tanks were equipped with the F-34 gun with a barrel length of 41 caliber. In 1943, after receiving special machines for lendlization, the Soviet industry mastered the production of long-barreled guns with low barrel waste, including 85-mm ZIS-S-53 with a barrel length of 55 calibers, which was installed on the T-34-85.

For reference, the barrel length of the German 88-mm anti-aircraft / tank gun Flak-41 / KwK-36 was 56 calibers.

[figwam]

BT light tanks were needed to quickly move to Czechoslovakia, in case of a threat from Germany, as the USSR signed an agreement with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935. But Poland did not give permission for the passage of Soviet troops through its territory and threatened to declare war on the USSR, after which the west gave Germany part of Czechoslovakia.

[alicante11]

BT light tanks were needed to quickly move to Czechoslovakia, in case of a threat from Germany,

Light tanks BT were needed as reconnaissance and forward detachments. Their speed allowed them to outstrip their slower counterparts. They could also act in a breakout to capture certain points and disorganize reserves. Attacking a prepared defense against tanks in general should be a task in the form of an extremely rare exception, and this task is generally contraindicated for light tanks. The Nazis already knew about this from the battles near Mokra and Mlava. In principle, ours were also aware, at least after the Finnish campaign, and they could remember from Spain. But ... there was no way out. The tanks had to take the rap for both artillery and infantry, which simply lagged behind due to the lack of mobilization and incompleteness in the formation of new mobile units. As a result, they "hammered nails with microscopes." It's good that they sang a lot of these "microscopes".

[AK64]

BT light tanks were needed as reconnaissance and advanced units. Their speed allowed them to get ahead of their slower brothers.

/ spat in disgust /

[figwam]

Quote: alicante11

BT light tanks were needed to quickly move to Czechoslovakia, in case of a threat from Germany,

Light tanks BT were needed as reconnaissance and forward detachments. Their speed allowed them to outstrip their slower counterparts. They could also act in a breakout to capture certain points and disorganize reserves. Attacking a prepared defense against tanks in general should be a task in the form of an extremely rare exception, and this task is generally contraindicated for light tanks. The Nazis already knew about this from the battles near Mokra and Mlava. In principle, ours were also aware, at least after the Finnish campaign, and they could remember from Spain. But ... there was no way out. The tanks had to take the rap for both artillery and infantry, which simply lagged behind due to the lack of mobilization and incompleteness in the formation of new mobile units. As a result, they "hammered nails with microscopes." It's good that they sang a lot of these "microscopes".

What intelligence! These tanks were equipped with entire tank corps.

[AK64]

BT light tanks were needed to quickly move to Czechoslovakia, in case of a threat from Germany,

BT light tanks were not needed by anyone.
There was simply nothing to choose from: the USSR was able to buy licenses only for the T-26 (Vickers 6 tons) and BT (Christy T-3). There was nothing to choose from.

[alicante11]

There was simply nothing to choose from: the USSR was able to buy licenses only for the T-26 (Vickers 6 tons) and BT (Christy T-3). There was nothing to choose from.

Yeah, only BT was released a few modifications, really did not decide and what to replace? Here are pests, enemies of the people.

[AK64]

Yeah, only BT was released a few modifications, really did not decide and what to replace? Here are pests, enemies of the people.

And what? WITH WHAT?

What, was there something to "replace"?

Probably the projects were heaps and crowds?

Tell us about these heaps of projects, huh? And we will listen ...

Already there is not enough evil for such "experts".
They "know" everything ...

Read the words "Cholepsky's commission", maybe you will understand what, "expert"

[alicante11]

What, was there something to "replace"?

Well, could the armor be increased? Or was the "Slavic-Jewish genius" not enough for that?

Already there is not enough evil for such "experts".
They "know" everything ...

And you do not spit and do not get angry.
After all, judging by your expression, you are not even the same "expert", but even more. Would I say "guru" who read one book?
Do you distinguish between the concept of a tank and its upgrades? If, according to your words, light tanks did not justify themselves due to too weak reservation, then the reservation should be increased. This is an engineering decision. If strengthening the armor is impossible, then you need to abandon some of the technical solutions that interfere with this. If this is a "wheel drive", then it is necessary to abandon it (as was done later), if it is engine power, then it must be increased, etc. At the same time, it is not at all necessary to throw everything into the trash immediately. Leave suspension, transmission, etc. So new models are born from prototypes. For this, it is not at all necessary to take ready-made other solutions in the West.

[AK64]

Well, could the armor be increased? Or was the "Slavic-Jewish genius" not enough for that?

Yes ma ...
/ went and drank a glass of water /.

And how to do this, huh?
Well, they took Vickers 6 tons. That is, they wanted 12 tons of Vickers - but the British refused, and sold only this flea of ​​6 tons.
Well, they took these 6 tons - since there is no choice. Since ALL attempts to build a tank on their own somehow did not lead to anything. (Surname Grotte to you for study.)
Well, they put on a flea a more or less normal turret with a cannon --- the weight grew by almost 60%. The load on the transmission and chassis has grown. And the flea stopped dancing.

Also with BT - the Christie T-3 tank generally weighed 7 tons, and was machine gun. His weight and so lifted to the limit of his chassis and transmission. And then everything, the reserve is exhausted. Need a new project.

So Koshkin has been tormented by this "new project" since 1936. Moreover, Before On 1936, tankers demanded another tank: Pavlov, the same Pavlov, returning from Spain, fought his head against the walls, proved the inadequacy of the BT and T-26.

Well, Koshkin and the Kharkiv design bureau racked their heads on how to modernize the BT, and somehow it didn't work out very well for him. Then Koshkin was ordered derectively to "forget about the wheeled caterpillar - just do it on the tracks!" Koshkin actually tried to argue, but only by the end of 39 something appeared.

The Putilovites were an alternative design bureau and factory. They themselves developed (!!!) the T-28 - an excellent tank for its time. But you also need to understand: in the first series there was a "minder" who sat outside the armor, above the engine, and lubricated the engine. Have you presented?

Well, only the Kirov Plant could produce T-28s in the USSR, and it came out expensive.

So there was nothing corny what to replace BT.

Already there is not enough evil for such "experts".
They "know" everything ...

Do you distinguish between the concept of a tank and its modernization? If, according to your words, light tanks did not justify themselves due to too weak a reservation, then the reservation must be increased. This is an engineering solution.

No. it not An "engineering" solution is a decision of a humanist, or a journalist: for humanities and journalists, everything is always simple.
And the engineer understands that if you increase your armor, you will increase weight. And with increasing weight, the load on the engine, transmission, and chassis increases. And the tank begins to crumble.
That is, we need a NEW TANK, a new project.

If strengthening the armor is impossible, then you need to abandon some of the technical solutions that interfere with this. If this is a "wheel drive", then you need to abandon it (as they did later),

And so they did: from 35th to 39th - four years old. And "by the pike's command" only zhurnalyugs succeed. And in real life - 4 years old.

if it is engine power, then it is necessary to increase it, etc.

When reading people like you, I just feel that one of us has eaten fish soup.

In your opinion: "I wanted it - I increased it." With a wave of your magic wand, right? And the fact that ALL global firms and design bureaus, in the WHOLE WORLD, beat their heads against the walls for the power of aircraft engines - that's so ... details. Looks like "wanted a little"?

In general, this is the most typical view of the humanitarian who, in his miserable life, did not even design a program for sale or according to the statement of work.

I didn’t read the rest - so as not to get very angry.

You raise my pressure, that's what.

[alatanas]

I want to add that replacing the cannon in the tower with another also creates many technical problems. If the gun is much longer than the previous one, its front end weighs much more than the breech. This imbalance needs to be compensated, which increases the weight of the tower along with the gun. As the caliber increases, the projectile charge becomes larger, the barrel rollback also increases, that is, the load on the entire tank, in addition, the course of the breech with the same tower dimensions. There are many technical problems and in the end it turns out that a completely new tank is needed

[figwam]

Quote: AK64

BT light tanks were not needed by anyone.
There was simply nothing to choose from: the USSR was able to buy licenses only for the T-26 (Vickers 6 tons) and BT (Christy T-3). There was nothing to choose from.

For 1933-35, these tanks were normal, the alleged opponents (Germany, Japan) were even worse.

[AK64]

For 1933-35, these tanks were normal, the alleged opponents (Germany, Japan) were even worse.

(1) In 33-35, Poland was the "supposed enemy". ("Attention! in alliance with Germany ")
(2) Nevertheless, the military was not satisfied with these tanks even then. For example, Khalepsky tried to buy a license for Vickers 12 tons (analogue of the T-28), and not at all 6 tons. 6 tons had to be bought because 12 tons were not sold.

[Alex]

Quote: AK64

In 33-35, Poland was the "supposed enemy".

Which had the same "Vickers 6-ton" in a different guise. At the beginning of the 30s, light tanks were practically the only technical solution used in the army. There were some hard ones, but not enough. But with the average, workhorses of the war, it did not work: it turned out to be an overweight light, then weakened heavy. In general, everything has its time.

[AK64]

Which had the same "Vickers 6-ton" in a different guise.

Yeah - as many as 100 pieces. (Specially looked - 132 pieces released)

At the beginning of the 30s, light tanks were practically the only technical solution operated in the army. There were heavy ones, but few. But with the average, workhorses of the war, it didn’t work out: it turned out to be a heavyweight, then a weakened heavy. In general, everything has its time.

This is not true.
Viikkers 16 tons, please. Soviet T-28. In general, they were average, they were.

It is not a matter of technical feasibility / impossibility, but of the concepts of application and (in the case of the USSR) the ability to buy a license. Vickers 6 tons in general was originally developed by the British as a "tank for the natives", that is, for sale.
And Christie's tank was not "light" but "cavalry" - that is, again, different tasks.

In general, it’s not a matter of technical difficulties, but of concepts. Moreover, it was in the USSR, as well as in Germany, that they wanted the average. (In Germany, this is "Grosstraktor", late 20s. And they made the lungs just as a temporary stopper, as a palliative.)

[Alex]

You know, I won’t argue. As for me, you said almost the same thing. And as for Poland, the point is not in the quantity, as you know, but in the characteristics of the tanks of the likely enemy. So LT is a completely natural stage in the development of BTT. And then, as you rightly noted, the point is in the concepts. There is already a strategy, but I won’t discuss it: my military education (and self-education) is not enough for this.

[Andrey Zh]

When light tanks "BT" were being developed, there was no talk of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania or Bolivia! ... Look at the year of their development.

[Real stalinist]

It somehow smelled particularly rezunovschinoy ... Yes, and in some other paragraphs ..

The article was written in 2005. Then even professional historians could not really decide who they were: smart or beautiful! :)
That is - then the thesis was actively exaggerated: whether the Soviet Union was going to conquer Geyropa or was preparing for defense.
The same rezun-devil greatly confused the minds with its pseudo-facts.
What can we say about ordinary history buffs?
Now, of course, we figured it out ...;)

[parusnik]

Real stalinist..Article written in 2005 year...Here, here ... The question is, why, such a shabby, slightly darned material .. to place ..

[Stas57]

Quote: parusnik

Real Stalinist .. The article was written in 2005 ... Here, here ... The question is, why, such a shabby, slightly darned material ... to post ...

the article of norms, "for children of secondary school age" (c) just the hostel had to be refreshed a little when placing and not stupidly ctrl-c / ctrl-v

[AK64]

The same rezun-devil greatly confused the minds with its pseudo-facts.

Cheered ...

What "minds" confused? Is it that those who have no mind?
What do historians have to do with it? The ravings of a rezun for historians are just a matter of shrugging off their hands --- "he's FOLDING Lying!"

Rezun could only "confuse" very fragile minds.

[Witness 45]

And there is nothing surprising in the fact that Rezun's opuses could embarrass someone, for example, young men starting life, and not even young men, after all, not everyone is to be professionals in the field of strategy, tactics and military equipment, military history, someone needs other mortal do things, or do you think such people should not "poke their nose" where they should not, this area is only for "celestials" like you, such gurus, indulgently and even with such ambition giving out the ultimate truth? If you know more, persuade with facts, and spitting on every comment you think is wrong is not good, ethical, or hygienic.

[gladcu2]

Witness

In my opinion, the article is positive. The author correctly described the situation and his opinion can be trusted based on logic.

Comparing with Rezun is generally not right. Because the reason did not rely on logic, but on facts.

But the facts are operable, and you can suck out a finger.

But the problem of most commentators in VO is that they have not grown to logic. They trust only the facts.

[gladcu2]

parusnik

And what are you developing intrigues?

The USSR did not hide the preparation of preemptive strikes. Therefore, the concentration of troops was at the border.

During defense, you need to withdraw troops to the tactical (strategic) depth, in anticipation of the enemy’s actions. And later it was criticized. Since the concept of the Soviet Army does not comply with state policy. On the one hand, politics is peaceful, and on the other hand, the army is offensive.

For a long time the politicians of the USSR, at one time "pulled the bull by the horns". But in my case, criticize, do not carry bags. And so sorry.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

12 MK - Corps headquarters and corps parts - Soltsy. As of 8.741, we have all killed, wounded and missing in the corps:
Commanding officers of 755 people
Junior commanders 1 213 people
The rank and file of 9 973 people
Total 11 941 people
Among the missing there are whole groups taken at the front from the units by separate orders of senior commanders.
Hull headquarters and hull parts - Soltsy.

[Altona]

In yesterday’s articles, the tactics of counterattacks of the Red Army were criticized, so understand. Each observer writes his own vision of events. But nevertheless, one thing is clear that poor communications equipment is expensive on the battlefield. The Germans equipped our captured tanks with communications and surveillance devices.

[gladcu2]

Altona

The answer is this.

The army of the USSR was offensive. Preventive stroke concept. But the international politics of the USSR were friendly, and therefore defensive.

This discrepancy was the reason for the debate about the defeats of the first months of the war. Just frankly declaring that the armament of the USSR at that time was offensive was difficult. Not ideologically. There is a gap of concepts.

Then they won back, thank God even so. I mean the construction of fortified areas. Kiev fortified area. As well as the preparation of platforms for the transfer of enterprises from the European part of the USSR, beyond the Urals.

[Revolver]

Member of the Military Council of the Front Vashugin (in other words, a party commissioner of a front-line scale)

Here's the reason. Not the main one, but nonetheless. If the commissars of the front line - company, battalion, maybe regimental, it is clear what they did - conducted political work by personal example "For the Motherland, for Stalin, for me!", Then large-scale party bosses, such as this Vashugin, were clearly at least useless, and as a maximum ... Khrushch's involvement in the defeat near Kharkov in 1942 is not advertised, but because of this, the Germans reached Stalingrad. And the notorious Mekhlis has done things in the Crimea. Yes, the mere fact that the commanders were forced to look back at these members of the military council forever, in itself did not very much combine with the principle of autocracy. In general, an ambiguous role.

[alicante11]

There you have a reason. Not the main one, but nonetheless.

I am begging you. The problem of the counterattacks of our MK was incl. and that they were applied too late. When the direction of the strike was already occupied by the infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht with a strong AT. Competently organized by the commanders-5 counterattack in the last days of June came just right along the gap between the TD and the AP of the fascists and penetrated deep into the rear of the enemy. But the corps were recalled because the order to withdraw to the "Stalin line" was already in force. So, while Ryabyshev would have been waiting for the concentration of his forces, he would have faced all those “characters” who later kept Poppel's group surrounded. And so, starting the attack in advance, he managed to intercept the supply routes of the 11th TD, which for several days trampled without fuel and a w / n at Ostrog under the blows of Lukin's group and the South-Western Front aviation, which came off in full on the fascists, judging by their memories. I had to supply it by air. So Vashugin was completely right in kicking Ryabyshev in the back.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: alicante11

So Vashugin was completely right in kicking Ryabyshev in the back.

Yeah. And then he shot himself from awareness of his innocence and strategic genius.
Ryabyshev did not need to be adjusted at all. The Germans did not know about the concentration of the 8MK, so a day there would not have changed anything. But if Ryabyshev were allowed to concentrate and reinforced with rifle divisions located nearby (which, for some reason, eventually deployed where the Germans had no intention of hitting at all), then the Germans would have gotten really serious problems, right up to stopping the offensive from the word "in general" ... I’m already silent about the fact that MK 8 should have been supported on the other side of the German breakthrough - there were forces for this.

[AK64]

If the commissars of the front edge - company, battalion, well, maybe regimental, it is clear what they did - they conducted political work by personal example "For the Motherland, for Stalin, for me!"

You will certainly not believe it, but political work, and even more so an "example", was, as it were, not the THIRD task. And the first is party control.

then large-scale party cones, such as this Vashugin, were clearly at least useless, but at most ...

Vyshugin actually turned out where more useful Kirponosa (who generally fell into a coma and was for furniture). Vyshugin was not very literate military, but at least energetic and brave. In whom did not fall.
And here is Kirponos, Zhukov’s appointee Kirponos ... The handsome was Kirponos: form like a glove, handsome, handsome ... Beautiful furniture.
Energetic and active Vyshugin wins by comparison

[gladcu2]

Revolver

Without this Vashugin, with the commandant's platoon, there would have been no company or battalion political instructors. He performed his role as "the main scarecrow".

And the fact that he was forced to follow up on the orders of his superiors. So he completed the task.

But the article doesn’t strangely mention the link that political officers carried out tasks on working with personnel, and, on the basis of this motivation, the composition followed orders. But they did not intervene in command and control until the time the commander was directly involved in command and control. In the absence of such a command, a senior in rank or position took over.

By the way, in the army, the priority has always been a position, not a rank.

Even in the Soviet Army of the 80s, I can tell a bang when a sergeant from conscripts pronounced penalties to a major and even to a lieutenant colonel. Because he was obliged to do so. And the officers understood that listening to troubles on the part of the sergeant was much more acceptable than getting harshness from the direct superiors. Another thing is that not all sergeants respected the rank. At least I limited myself to the tone of the conversation.

It was so.

[Parsec]

Quote: gladcu2

Even in the Soviet Army of the 80s, I can tell a bang when a sergeant from conscripts pronounced penalties to a major and even to a lieutenant colonel. Because he was obliged to do so. And the officers understood that listening to troubles on the part of the sergeant was much more acceptable than getting harshness from the direct superiors.

You are raving.

[k174oun7]

This Vashugin shot himself after one of his "strong-willed" orders that led to the encirclement of the compound.

[Mikhail Matyugin]

By the way, the article is very correct! It emphasizes the COMPREHENSIVE AND CLOSE INTERACTION of various branches and even individual units of the troops, which became the key to Blitzkrieg.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

But everything is clear here - the Luftwaffe pilots seized air supremacy thanks to the destruction of a significant part of the Soviet Air Force by a sudden attack on airfields.

This is another error of the author and the result of propaganda. In reality, truly colossal air battles took place during the THREE MONTHS of the summer of the 41 year, and precisely by their results, when the Red Army air forces were literally destroyed during absolutely thoughtless actions, the Luftwaffe seized air supremacy.

The Luftwaffe representative, who was in the advanced units of the attackers, maintained constant radio communications with the aircraft, directing the bombers at the targets.

Yes, yes, that's it! And the Soviet troops learned in this way to interact with attack aircraft in fact only in the 1944 year !!!!! Think about it, after three years of war! Even in the 43 year near Kursk and Ukraine, the interaction was still very bad, but what about the 41-42 years?

[alicante11]

when in the course of absolutely thoughtless actions of the Red Army Air Force were literally destroyed, the Luftwaffe seized air supremacy.

Hmm, well, you can’t call thoughtless actions of the Red Army Air Force. Rather, erroneous. Our ignored the fight against fascist airfields. What allowed the fascists to operate in greenhouse conditions. While the backlashes, especially at the beginning, focused precisely on the airfield network. But our pilots had an excusing circumstance. With the weakness and isolation of the infantry and artillery from the tanks, only the Air Force could help the tankmen in their suicidal but necessary counterattacks. However, this assistance was also ineffective due to poor interaction. Therefore, more aircraft operated on roads and stationary targets like the 11-th TD near Ostrog.

[Stas57]

Quote: alicante11

Hmm, well, you can’t call the actions of the Red Army Air Force thoughtless. Rather, erroneous. Our ignored the fight against Nazi airfields

there was a very difficult choice - either to hit the train stations / airfields, roughly speaking "for tomorrow"
or to hit on the advancing mechcolumns - "for now"
made two decisions, it’s clear to us on the couch now, and not everyone needs it, but then the answer was not very obvious.

[AK64]

there was a very difficult choice - either to hit the train stations / airfields, roughly speaking "for tomorrow"
or to hit on the advancing mechcolumns - "for now"
made two decisions, it’s clear to us on the couch now, and not everyone needs it, but then the answer was not very obvious.

No need to be clever - your ancestors were no dumber than you.
Air Force month fought with airfields - causing huge losses. But attracting the same to the backlash, by the way - in the first month of the war, the Luftwaffe lost 700 aircraft, this is their highest monthly loss in the entire war, they lost less than a month in the battle for Britain.

Well, the columns also acted, no fantasies needed.

And only a month later, as a result of huge losses, they gradually "went over to the defensive."
But in the second month of the war, the Luftwaffe still lost 400 aircraft --- which is also very much.

Such losses are just evidence of the struggle for air supremacy.

So the ancestors do not consider suckers to be: they could have fought like that.

[alicante11]

made two decisions, it’s clear to us on the couch now, and not everyone needs it, but then the answer was not very obvious.

So am I arguing? I told you that. Another thing is how effectively implemented the solution? Without communication, the efficiency was very low.

[AK64]

Hmm, well, you can’t call the actions of the Red Army Air Force thoughtless. Rather, erroneous. Our ignored the fight against fascist airfields.

Why are you lying? MONTH they fought precisely with airfields. MONTH!

I didn’t read further

[Mikhail Matyugin]

Quote: alicante11

Hmm, well, you can’t call the actions of the Red Army Air Force thoughtless. Rather, erroneous.

You know, I read the military magazines, and the description of the battles from the German side is just some kind of arctic fox. So fluffy, white. It is thoughtless.

[AK64]

You know, I read the military magazines, and the description of the battles from the German side is just some kind of arctic fox. So fluffy, white. It is thoughtless.

You did not read Tolstoy? War and Peace?
Absolutely wonderful book on its psychologism (the graph was observant, albeit a mason)

Well, do you remember there was a German Berg, who after Austerlitz gave "a description of the battle from his own, German side"?

This is what I mean: no matter how much I read these "reports from the German side", I constantly remembered this Tolstoyan Berg --- exactly the same thing.

And moreover, even communication with modern Germans, especially from those that are simpler, somehow all boils down to Bergovism.

They see such a national feature: Berg, Munchausen ... Munchausen, Berg ....

Notice, Berg didn’t lie. But what a vision!

[AK64]

/ yawning /

The argument is ridiculous.
And there is no subject for dispute.

We should start with the fact that this term, "blitzkrieg", is understood as a minimum THREE DIFFERENT things.

What most people write about here is "operational art". While "blitzkrieg" was primarily understood as "fast war".

I will explain what the matter is:
(1) Germany could not wage a protracted war
(2) The WWII showed with all the clarity that Germany could not win a protracted war.
(3) Well, if so, then the war should be on smash, and very quick crush. Hence this essentially propaganda term.

Next, the factors and conditions for a quick war of crush begin. There is nothing new here:
(1) surprise.
(2) anticipation - a quick strike with the most concentrated forces
(3) prevent the enemy from turning around
Here are the strategic components of lightning war.

A level below - nothing new: for a quick victory it is necessary to disable the enemy's "nervous system" - that is, the targets are not the mass of infantry, but command centers, communications, and communication nodes. Nothing essentially new.

Something new appears only on the level below: mobile (tank) formations as a tool. Here, I must say, the Germans greatly benefited from the fact that the massive armies of that time were "ridiculous" --- 80% of the traditional infantry, Napoleonic times. The Germans concentrated the remaining 20% ​​in mobile units - mobile corps and groups of corps. The painting became oil: a puncture at the front, thrown into the breakthrough of this mobile unit, which crumbles the nerve nodes in the depths of the enemy's defense. And the mass of infantry ... and this mass, which remained without control, is then collected in captivity with a hat.

And everything else that has been written here ... These are the details.

[V.ic]

Quote: Mikhail Matyugin

This is another error of the author and the result of propaganda. In reality, truly colossal air battles took place during the THREE MONTHS of the summer of the 41 year, and precisely by their results, when the Red Army air forces were literally destroyed during absolutely thoughtless actions, the Luftwaffe seized air supremacy.

You saw the plane only at the airport, having passed control and loaded on the ladder. Read your own words about the "three months", precisely those months when the infantrymen, artillerymen and tankmen left the forward positions and airfields that were no longer rear. The plane needs to be serviced, refueled with everything necessary and also so that it has resource balance... An aircraft without accompanying infrastructure is a "submarine in the steppes of Ukraine." If the link has a full-fledged radio (reception / transmission) only for the flight commander, and the rest have only receivers, then its controllability is directly proportional to the radio availability. This is where the Luftwaffe had no problems.

[Mikhail Matyugin]

Well, why be rude? They ran in, broke into the discussion - and right away? Do you have a corporate style of communication?

Quote: V.ic

An aircraft without accompanying infrastructure is a "submarine in the steppes of Ukraine."

And what about the Air Force of the Red Army there were no other airdromes other than front-line ones, eh?

Quote: V.ic

If the link has a full-fledged walkie-talkie (reception / transmission) only at the link commander, and the rest have only receivers, then its controllability is a value directly proportional to the radio frequency

You are clearly exaggerating, the reality was much worse - the majority didn’t have walkie-talkies at all and those who had radios themselves threw them out due to their extreme technical unsuitability due to poor-quality production)

Most were generally guided simply by the host and everything, without any walkie-talkies there, not to mention radio compasses and other eccentricities.

[V.ic]

Quote: Mikhail Matyugin

Well, why be rude? They ran in, broke into the discussion - and right away? Do you have a corporate style of communication?

Well, if he inflicted a blood grievance, then at least find out why? So tell the general public: what positions they served in aviation, what type of equipment they operated. Here, for example, for my studies Mi-21F13 (specifically TsD-30TPM), and for service in the ranks of helicopters: Mi-2, Mi-6, Mi-8, 80IV, Mi-24V, Mi-24P, Mi-24RHR, but it ended 15 years ago. Quartz from RSIU-3 6 years ago threw it into the trash ... So it would not be worth driving a blizzard about the three-month beating of the Red Army Air Force. Not a single plane has hovered in the sky. The aircraft needs an airfield and airfield infrastructure. The slogan was even "Victory in the air is forged on the ground."

[AK64]

Well, if he inflicted a blood grievance, then at least find out why? So tell the general public: what positions they served in aviation, what type of equipment they operated. Here, for example, for my studies Mi-21F13 (specifically TsD-30TPM), and for service in the ranks of helicopters: Mi-2, Mi-6, Mi-8, 80IV, Mi-24V, Mi-24P, Mi-24RHR, but it ended 15 years ago. Quartz from RSIU-3 6 years ago threw it into the trash ... So it would not be worth driving a blizzard about the three-month beating of the Red Army Air Force. Not a single plane has hovered in the sky. The aircraft needs an airfield and airfield infrastructure. The slogan was even "Victory in the air is forged on the ground."

N-yes ... There are no words ...

These people are shocking ...

Here's what amazes me about the forum participants: at first they are rude. When they politely remark that they are a boor, they get round eyes: "How, me? Yes, I twisted my tails with helicopters for two years!" When they are answered in their own manner, that is, they are harshly beaten on their playful hands, they immediately run to the administration to tattle about: "Hooligans are depriving them of sight!"

But it was so "in the order of the meeting".
Well, on the topic of what was said: from the words ... uh-uh ... our dear .... uh-uh ... chief expert on helicopters, in the losses of the Air Force in the summer of 1941 to us it should be blamed ... for aviation technicians: they did not forge victory on earth, enemies.
Funny what.

[V.ic]

Quote: AK64

Funny what.

As I was weaned from your "che" during the period of service as a "two viper", it was just in passing noticing that "che" in Chinese "zad.ny.tsa" / remember the corresponding four-letter Russian word starting with the letter "Ж "(jeh Russian alphabet).

Quote: AK64

Well, on the topic of what was said: from the words ... uh-uh ... our dear .... uh-uh ... chief expert on to helicopters, in the losses of the Air Force in the summer of 1941 we should blame ... aviation technicians: they did not forge victory on earth, vzviny.

The ability to juggle is by no means equivalent to the ability to conduct a discussion within the framework set by the regulations and the transition to personalities. Shkolota, she is also a shkolota in Africa. I introduced myself to a participant in the discussion, as it should be for a retired officer; logically, you would also need to "submit your track record for consideration." The cook is possibly capable of running the state / I won't wake up the ghost of "Lukich" /, but who will put her at the helm? / although you would bet, I believe.
Neither you nor your opponent have proved and will never prove to anyone except YOU that aviation can exist without an airfield infrastructure. By the way, about aviation technicians (who, in your opinion, are obliged to "forge victory on the ground"), their duty is to carry out all the necessary work due to the technical operation regulations and to launch the aircraft into flight, but when all the "birds" have already taken off and at this airfield never will land ... Search the Internet about the extreme take-off from the Moonsund archipelago, when the cooks and the serving men were taken out by the last planes to the rear, and all the technical equipment went into the trenches to repel the Germans, although neither the sailors, nor the tankers, nor the infantrymen asked them about it ... And here are the cooks and waiter no doubt had greater value than aviation technology.

Quote: AK64

then they immediately run to the administration to sneak: "hooligans are depriving them of sight!"

Are you among the moderators or are you sure that I have included you in the so-called. "black list"? So for the "naughty little hands" it would be time for you "a little bit".
By the way, I have no doubt that you and your opponent only read or heard about aviation and did not even stand nearby. Further on your nonsense, which is by no means bread, I do not consider it necessary to comment. If you want to get a reasoned answer to your nonsense, this is, please, "in a personal", so as not to take up the resource and not create a bloated rating for you.

[AK64]

Of course, of course, continue to hysteria, Mr. hysterical boor.

[V.ic]

Quote: AK64

Of course, of course, continue to hysteria, Mr. hysterical boor.

Listen, maybe. You are ... well, how is Cochita Wurst ?. Then your hormonal breakdown is understandable, although not excuse. Here you personally, I in no way "cheated", you are exactly the opposite. Is there not enough intelligence or determination to communicate "in a personal"? Dare, young man, and you will be rewarded.

[Basil50]

The author described the event and everything, repeating everything that was required. No * blitz * is possible without outright betrayal, which was confirmed in France in the SOVIET UNION. What became known in the Belarusian military district only confirms conscious wrecking. Despite the direct order, the troops were not put on alert. That the RED ARMY was armed with everything necessary, and there were also enough weapons for the reserve units, but the Germans got the whole warehouses. A lot of what was needed for the defense has not been done, and to convince yourself that this is by chance not possible. SO shit in almost all western districts can only be with a common leadership and an agreed plan. But Khrushchev’s followers will never tell the truth about the traitors in 1941, nor about the military coup of 1953, about how they poisoned AND IN STALIN and killed L P Beria.

[Stas57]

Quote: Vasily50

The author described the event and everything, repeating everything that was required. No * blitz * is possible without outright betrayal, which was confirmed in France in the SOVIET UNION. What became known in the Belarusian military district only confirms conscious wrecking. Despite the direct order, the troops were not put on alert. That the RED ARMY was armed with everything needed

stop using hard drugs already.
All the same, this combat readiness did not give anything.
there was no betrayal, there was an ordinary mess, there was an unpreparedness at the stage of reorganization, there was a loss of control, inability to manage such masses, complete ignorance of such an instrument as MK, and there was no need to cover real jambs with fabulous traitors. With the German traitors, they would definitely have taken Moscow by October.

[alicante11]

What became known in the Belarusian military district only confirms conscious wrecking

Yes, there was no betrayal. Kirponos, no better than Pavlov, prepared his district for war. He was just lucky that the main blow did not fall on him and he had enough strength, since his district was considered the main one. If the Wehrmacht generals had listened to Hitler and struck at Ukraine, then they would have shot not Pavlov, but Kirponos.
In general, it all came down to a simple guessing game. The Fashi postponed the date of the attack so many times that the commanders were simply tired of bringing troops into the battlefield. So they decided, they’d say, they’ll still advance again. And it, once at a time is not necessary.

[AK64]

Yes, there was no betrayal. Kirponos, no better than Pavlov, prepared his district for war. He was just lucky that the main blow did not fall on him and he had enough strength, since his district was considered the main one. If the Wehrmacht generals had listened to Hitler and struck at Ukraine, then they would have shot not Pavlov, but Kirponos.

(1) You are in vain comparing them: Pavlov was adequate, much more adequate than Kirponos.

Kirponos could lead any military district - but only IN PEACE TIME. In the war, he was virtually inactive.

(2) No "generals" GAVE Hitler any advice about "attacking Ukraine" - these are fairy tales, and they are absolutely ridiculous.
(3) They could not give such advice - it is impossible for a military man to strike at Ukraine: there between the Carpathians and Polissya there is a corridor only 150 km wide. Only 30, many 35 divisions can be put there. So what is the "main blow" in such and such conditions?

In general, it all came down to a simple guessing game. The Fashi postponed the date of the attack so many times that the commanders were simply tired of bringing troops into the battlefield. So they decided, they’d say, they’ll still advance again. And it, once at a time is not necessary.

No guessing game.
First, the Germans had to postpone Barbarossa because of Marita: unexpectedly for them.
They believe that "tired of bringing" is also impossible: the troops were dragged to the border with all possible in peacetime speed (that is, so that the national economy also does not paralyze)

[alicante11]

(2) No "generals" GAVE Hitler any advice about "attacking Ukraine" - these are fairy tales, and they are absolutely ridiculous.

Read carefully. Not generals to Hitler, but Hitler to generals.

They could not give such advice - an attack on Ukraine is impossible for a military man:

Yes, yes, from Romania the second blow is not destiny? And take the whole SWF in ticks. In real life there was the 11-I army almost completely infantry. And if there was, say 3-I TG?

First, the Germans had to postpone Barbarossa because of Marita: unexpectedly for them.

And they might not have postponed it. Yugoslavia was not a danger to Germany.

[AK64]

Read carefully. Not generals to Hitler, but Hitler to generals.

And Hitler did not "advise" this either.
Because, I repeat for you:

They could not give such advice - an attack on Ukraine is impossible for a military man:

Yes, yes, from Romania the second blow is not destiny? And take the whole SWF in ticks. In real life there was the 11-I army almost completely infantry. And if there was, say 3-I TG?

You, the humanities, are all simple: to fight on paper. And there are ravines, and walk on them.
But it’s real in Romania only passage. It is proctically impossible to supply a group of normal size there - that’s what they brought into battle is almost the maximum.

In 44, the "genius" tried to invade Poland through Ukraine - well, how did it work out? They occupied the bridgehead on the Vistula - and everything, everything stopped. Because through that passage between the Carpathians and Polissya, it is impossible to supply any more or less grouping.

But the humanities do not understand this: they don’t have anything, I drew an arrow on the map - and “let them advance like this”.

In reality, the German military would like to send all four tank groups into battle to the north of Polesie. But there was no longer room for them. But after reaching the "Dnepr-Dvin" line, the place was already there - they could easily withdraw the 1st TGr from Ukraine and transfer it to the Baltic States, with very serious consequences.

And they might not have postponed it. Yugoslavia was not a danger to Germany.

It only seems so to you, because instead of the question "why is this?" You start multiplying your fantasies.
Yugoslavia naturally did not represent - but Britain did. The British landing in the Balkans created very serious problems. Especially in the case when the Wehrmacht is connected in the USSR.

[Fitter65]

Without communication, there is no control, without control there is no victory.
In the summer of 1941 they asked one general: “Well, how so, you are such a competent commander, an excellent tactician and could not defeat the Germans. Well, why?”
answer: yes the connection failed ..
spring 1945. The same general. Correspondent: -How did you famously beat the Germans, smash them in the tail, and in the mane ...
General: - Well done, our fighters, but if it weren’t for the disgusting connection, we would thrash the Germans into three ...
The signalman in the army is always extreme ...

[Mikhail Matyugin]

Quote: Fitter65

General: - Well done, our fighters, but if it weren’t for the disgusting connection, we would thrash the Germans into three ...
The signalman in the army is always extreme ...

Nothing like that, the general was right! The level of interaction and provision in terms of logistics and communications of the Red Army was barely adjusted by the 1944 year and became at least at a relative level only in the 1945 year. Unfortunately, our troops were inferior to the crests ... the Yankees and the Germans in this regard, much ...

[AK64]

Quote: Fitter65
General: - Well done, our fighters, but if it weren’t for the disgusting connection, we would thrash the Germans into three ...
The signalman in the army is always extreme ...

Nothing like that, the general was right!

You might think that this general knew how to use communications.

In the 41st, the generals FORBIDDEN to use radio communications because they thought that the Germans had terrible direction finders that their valuable headquarters, together with their valuable skin, were bearing.

Fact.

[Taoist]

Blitzkrieg is not tanks or aircraft or weapons in general ... Blitzkrieg is primarily logistics, communications, engineering support and planning ... And the performance characteristics and the number of weapons used in the "deep operation" are absolutely secondary.

[Operator]

Like - you give out more GAZ-AA, radio stations, bulldozers and Shaposhnikovs along with the M-1 tanks "Freedom fighter Comrade Lenin" and the Red Army ends the war in 1941 in Berlin

[Tsoy]

BT of course was an awesome tank. He even had an aerodynamic hull shape. Speed ​​and maneuverability are also very high. But of course the defense was limping. Not like a counter-spar, some bullets pierced.

And the blitzkrieg of course depended not so much on the weapons, as on the train, supplies and other services of the second line. A breakthrough in itself will not mean anything if your armored vehicle gets up without fuel and ammunition.

[Stas57]

At the General Staff Building, he was so fed up with his articles and projects that he was pickled for 12 years as a captain ... But Charles de Gaulle offered roughly the same thing as Guderian! At home they did not heed him, which predetermined the future fall of France.

Well, we have used what Heinz, and?
the main thing is not the idea that was in the air, the main thing is how it was implemented, how it was balanced, how the interaction was fine-tuned, and the Germans could, yes, ours could not earlier than 42, and we could do the same, our mobile mechanical units repeated the "reverse blitzkrieg" at 44-45.

Consequently, they conquered almost all of Europe and troops reached Moscow ... armed with very mediocre tanks, which were also few.

The main thing is that the tank had 3 main conditions:
-high crew training
-communication in each car
-large range

at 41 we had problems with all this, alas.

What in Germany will be called the “blitzkrieg” was developed precisely in the USSR!

there is such a thing

That is why the relative weakness of the German tanks did not interfere with the strike power of the tank divisions! Effective aviation support made it possible to weaken the enemy before the fight with him, and intelligence (including air) revealed the most vulnerable places suitable for attack.

Further, the author correctly indicates the strengths that made it possible to make a blitzkrieg-dense aviation interaction, communication, direct control.
but there is another factor, the ability to quickly put together BTG for a specific task.
and this BTG from different parts did not crumble.
or point enhancement factor by heavy artillery.
or a point amplification factor by sapper divisions.
all this was supported by a powerful rear.

generally simple and fundamentally true article

[AK64]

What in Germany will be called the “blitzkrieg” was developed precisely in the USSR!

there is such a thing

There is no such thing.
Fudge it.
If we mean Triandafilov's "deep operation", then German mechanized operations and operations in Triandafilov's understanding are completely different things.

If we talk about the origin of the mechanized operation, then this is John Fuller, "Plan 1919"

[AK64]

Again some juice of the inflamed mind laid out ....
What for?!

[Sars]

By the number of tanks, the author is not quite right. For four thousand German tanks we had under one hundred thousand of all models !!! From two tower T-26 to
Five-turret T-35. KV and T-34 under two thousand. Theoretically, only with these two models could Fritz be piled on.
By the number of weapons, the Leningrad military district had a three-fold superiority over the Germans.
Seventy-five years have passed, and we are still arguing about the causes of the forty-first disaster.

[AK64]

For four thousand German tanks we had under one hundred thousand of all models !!!

N-yes ... This is a clinic.

[Mikhail Matyugin]

Quote: Stas57

lavish that the tank possessed 3 my main conditions:
-high crew training
-communication in each car
-large range
at 41 we had problems with all this, alas.

In tanks, of course, the situation was poor, but in aviation the situation was even worse, quite disastrous. Soviet pilots in fact were not able to conduct combat operations in the air, they ... barely knew how to fly ... German pilots were really fucking awhile because there were no anti-destructive maneuvers, they only bombed on the lead, they kept order so sometimes they crashed themselves into the ground and so on. .P.

In general, without highly trained personnel, no equipment would be a good weapon. The problem was a system ...

By and large, I personally am very glad that the Russian army finally overcame all such diseases - although even in the Georgian war of the 2008 of the year there were still problems (in terms of interspecific interaction and communication).

[tiaman.76]

Well, what was basically basically .. tactical art was replaced as heroism, self-sacrifice as they could .. that’s why such losses at the beginning of the war ... the French didn’t have enough

[ALEA IACTA EST]

Wars are won not in trenches, but in headquarters and on the roads.

[overb]

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

Our tanks are better, but too few

Of course. After all, the Germans had as many as 4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns. And in the Red Army only 26 thousand.
besides, it would be curious to clarify which ones and the better.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

German tanks are stopped again by a handful of foot soldiers - 28 Panfilov heroes ...

SHO, AGAIN?

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

But everything is clear here - the Luftwaffe pilots seized air supremacy thanks to the destruction of a significant part of the Soviet Air Force by a sudden attack on airfields.

Destroyed miserable crumbs, which would not be worth mentioning. If not for the need to somehow explain the absence of Soviet aviation.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

But where did the Soviet tanks go?

Dropped, basically. Somehow they did not realize in the USSR that such a breakthrough in tanks and aircraft needed a breakthrough in fuel. Therefore, basically thrown without fuel. Like airplanes. After which the myth was born of their destruction from the air by a sudden blow.
For reference, 79% of Soviet purchases in the United States from 22.06 to 30.09.1941. (it was not a lend-lease yet, these were purchases for money) was gasoline.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

(moreover, they fought in Russia too)

Nope. These were training machines. Sometimes they were used for police operations in the rear.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

shells of German tank guns could not penetrate the armor of the Soviet KV and T-34 ...

The rumor about this is somewhat exaggerated. The Germans pierced T-34 armor easily and easily. Even with mallets. They just didn't hit me in the forehead, that's all.
But with HF they had obvious problems, yes.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

armed with very mediocre tanks, which were also few

Nonsense. In the Wehrmacht on 22.06 there were 1300 tanks of the Pz.KpfW.IV Ausf.E / F1 models. Pz.KpfW.III Ausf.H / J and Pz.KpfW.38 (t) Ausf.E / F. These were good modern cars for various purposes.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

Blitzkrieg in Russian

Soviet style. And these are not synonyms.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

They believed that tanks should be used only to support infantry units.

Yes, everyone thought so. And they let out such tanks. The Germans produced Pz.KpfW.IV, in the USSR they released T-34/76 (before them T-26). By the way, the tactics of using tank forces in the USSR before the war itself changed.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

Only in our country it was called the “Theory of Deep Offensive Operation”

And then. And there was a "prominent theoretician", Tukhachevsky, after whom Triandophilov "wrote down". And he even applied this experience once, in the Polish campaign. Remind the result?

[overb]

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

Only in the USSR relied on the experience of civil war - and believed that the future war would also be maneuverable.

It's cool, of course, about exclusivity. But the Germans thought so. For maneuvering warfare, they released Pz.KpfW.III and Pz.KpfW.38 (t). And in the USSR, this role was intended to BT-7, which were supposed to replace the T-50.
As for the Civil War, it generally did not enrich and could not enrich the combat experience. Because such wars, they are specific. And their experience is better not to consider.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

But Charles de Gaulle offered about the same as Guderian! At home they did not heed him, which predetermined the future fall of France.

Funny.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

De Gaulle called for the creation of specialized tank divisions, and not to distribute tank brigades between infantry formations.

Yo-ka-le-me-ne. "The genius de Gaulle" has already got it. In fact, the tanks, as they were distributed between the infantry units (since 1943, the Germans replaced them with assault guns), and created from them tank divisions. The tanks were just different.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

Yes, France had tanks, it was not able to use them correctly.

What kind? This is the main question.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

The structure of the Red Army had even more powerful formations than the German ones — mechanized corps.

That's the trouble. In 1941 The Red Army permanently broke up into brigades. And even divisions were essentially brigades. This was the ceiling of the “commander’s art” of the Soviet military leaders. And then, right up to the very end, they “grew”. At the cost of a lot of blood.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

and until the spring of 1940 had the opportunity to prepare for German strikes

They didn’t even think about it. They were so sure of their superiority. The same applies to the USSR in 1941.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

The famous Erwin Rommel, who fought in North Africa, was put together a table ... right in the open Horch car! A telephone was replaced by a radio.

Soon we will learn much more about Rommel. For example, the fact that he is the first astronaut. And led the battles on the far side of the moon.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

T-34 armor is difficult to penetrate

Of the gun? From a pistol is difficult. And from the "mallet" was quite possible.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

and spare parts, he turns into a fixed armored box ...

The number of spare parts per tank is very important. If it is beyond, then there is nothing and no one will help.

Quote: Yuri Vetrov

The lack of reliable radio communications has led

Actually, this is more than an important factor. Defining, one might say.

[andj61]

Quote: overb

Quote: Yuri Vetrov
Yes, France had tanks, it was not able to use them correctly.
What kind? This is the main question.

At VO there was already such information. And the Wehrmacht made excellent use of captured French tanks. https://topwar.ru/28438-trofeynaya-bronetankovaya-tehnika-vermahta-franciya.html

[overb]

Quote: andj61

used captured French tanks

In the army of the invasion of Yents, there were already 74 of them. incl. 24 flamethrowers.

Quote: sibiryouk

1. One of the main reasons for the short-barreled tank guns
2. changed the position of military customers who saw the enemy more and more long-barreled guns
3. And there were all kinds of machines in the USSR, including for processing long trunks
4. as serial guns for example - F-22, USV
5. Grabin and the new 85mm and 107mm guns were designed with rather long barrels.

1... There was no such problem in 1941. The equipment of the "accursed autocracy" coped well at that time. The problem appeared ONLY in 1942. And in 1943. she was already standing tall.
2. The Germans had a different tank layout. Therefore, long barrels for Soviet guns were not very good.
3. Line with 2. Maximum, this is 40 klb three-inch. And for long-barrels in the USSR there were 2 plants, and, for medium-caliber, in general, 1 (he made 85-mm anti-aircraft guns).
4. Read what forces and costs did the F-22. And why it was removed from service. And SPM, this is the usual 40 clb three-inch. The ballistic cannon is slightly better than the ancient cannon of the early 20th century.
By the way, the same applies to the "legendary ZIS-3". Also the same ancient sucks, only with diesel fuel and this makes it easier. And the "legendary F-34" does not have diesel fuel at all.
5. A favorite venture in the USSR was the design of what it was impossible to produce there at a normal price. This applies primarily to the F-22. And also ZIS-2, the production of which in 1941. for technological reasons it was never mastered. The production of the 85 mm transported guns were mastered only in 1946. This required a "trifle", a victory over Germany and the removal of equipment from there for their production.

Quote: parusnik

Here, it’s somehow particularly rezunovshchina

And why are you not happy with Rezun’s assumptions? Do you not like them? This happens. But they are very similar to the truth. And they explain a lot more convincingly than agitprop.

Quote: Choi

BT of course was an amazing tank

The usual junk level of the 30s.

Quote: SarS

1. we had under a hundred thousand of all models
2. only with these two models could Fritz be piled on

1. Trim the pike. 26 thousand, not including cannon ba.
2. Could, probably. In theory. But they could not always move, besides there was a shortage of fuel and ammunition for them. Yes, and the T-34 was rather weak, and the advantages in quantities at times (T-34 and KV), as later, in 1941. did not have.
And most importantly, the Red Army in 1941. in fact, self-dissolving into segments the size of a brigade, and it was hard for them to act against German divisions.

[andj61]

Quote: overb

Quote: Yuri Vetrov
But where did the Soviet tanks go?
Dropped, basically. Somehow they did not realize in the USSR that such a breakthrough in tanks and aircraft needed a breakthrough in fuel. Therefore, basically thrown without fuel. Like airplanes. After which the myth was born of their destruction from the air by a sudden blow.

Here you are wrong - not for this reason they left!

The main reason for the Germans' weak interest in captured Soviet armored vehicles was the high losses of Germany in their own combat vehicles and the associated enormous workload of repair and evacuation and restoration services. There was simply no time for trophy tanks. As a result, by October 1941, only about 100 Soviet tanks of various types were in the German forces. The rest, Soviet armored vehicles thrown on the battlefield, having stood in the open air in the winter of 1941/42, could no longer be restored. During this period, the Wehrmacht received from repair enterprises only a few T-26 (Pz.740 (r), BT-7 (Pz.742 (r) and T-60. Most of the machines, primarily T-34 (Pz. 747 (r) and KB (Pz.753 (r), used by the front-line units, were captured in good condition, immediately put into operation and operated until they were knocked out or out of order for technical reasons. Https: //topwar.ru/28546-trofeynaya-bronetankovaya-tehnika-vermahta-sssr
.html

[Mikhail Matyugin]

Quote: overb

For reference, 79% of Soviet purchases in the United States from 22.06 to 30.09.1941. (it was not a lend-lease yet, these were purchases for money) was gasoline.

And I’ll add - mostly aviation.

Quote: overb

As for the Civil War, it generally did not enrich and could not enrich the combat experience. Because such wars, they are specific. And their experience is better not to consider.

Well, why? For example, revived the cavalry as a branch of the army for another 20 years! Special units appeared - machine guns on carts, the achievement of the Civil.

[dchegrinec]

We wanted Blitzkrieg, but got Zugzwang!

[dionis]

Another great article. Thank you so much! Now you better understand why their blitzkrieg brought such startling breakthroughs and encirclements of our troops at the beginning, why we could not resist enough of them. In general, it is amazing how our command could miss such an important moment as radio communications on tanks.

[k174oun7]

And not only radio stations on tanks, as in the well-known army joke, but also radio stations as such. While the need for good radio communications was evident, the industry was unable to meet this need. Our illegal scouts, arriving at the place of the assignment, had to assemble a radio station for themselves on the spot from local parts, so to speak. For example, Sorge's assistant, a German radio engineer, lamented that it was impossible to buy good radio components in Japan. The Soviet ace A. Pokryshkin appreciated a good radio station on his "Aircobra" no less than a powerful weapon. We did not come across data on whether the lend-lease was delivered and in what quantity of radio communications. Sometime during my service, I came across an ancient field telephone. At first I thought it was TAI-43, but it was arranged differently, and inside the diagram and inscriptions were in Angian. Means the means of communication were supplied. The lack of due attention to modern communication has always pursued both the Soviet and Russian armies. It seems like the situation is improving now. Equipping with modern equipment is in progress. It is good that his capabilities are skillfully implemented and used in command and control of troops.

[Mestny]

Quote: AK64

And the engineer understands that if you increase your armor, you will increase weight.

Who will grow up? Surname?

- And how to spell, surgeon or herurg?
- Well, it depends on which doctor.

Engineer...

[Romin]

What is the saving then on vital "little things" in the form of communications (radio stations) on tanks and units, and on aerial reconnaissance and target designation.
So now the infantryman does not have situational awareness of the battlefield, he does not have his own alien system. There is no interspecific interaction via radio communication (it takes up to an hour to request air support, fighters from one battalion cannot transmit data to another battalion). There is no target designation in the required volume (drones), there is no effective system of rapid target suppression (no attack drones), systems such as there are no "whalers" for mortars, only in the pictures, in the active forces in Syria. There is no system for the use of high-precision art systems, both barrel and reactive. In Syria, only in areas, do not work on request and coordinates and laser targeting. There is no effective "golden hour" system for providing specialized medical care for a wounded soldier, and there is no evacuation system in the "golden hour" system.
21 century! And face it, we are not technically and systemically ready for today's challenges. There are single units equipped with a incomplete range of current weapons and systems. This is what really worries me. It seems that we are following all the innovations that are vital for the effective maintenance of the database with a lag of 1-2 generations, and then we are in no hurry to introduce, and not just to create some kind of acceptable system. Still work and work. Only somehow slowly, criminally slowly ...
It's like a walkie-talkie in a tank ... In each of 41 Germans, or 1 per company of tanks and flags! As a result, 5000 mostly light and medium "make" 15000 heavy, medium and light.
In the interaction of aviation and infantry at 41m, look at what the Germans did, and what we do ... We also have it now ... For 15 years we have been talking about drones alone ... the enemy has already thousands, and we have on paper, yes Israeli copies ...
I am ashamed of the state and gagging! And then questions arise, as in 41m ... Well, how about ... we are ... Higher is faster all stronger ...
And by the way, the T90 is a great tank, but here's the marketing ...
Remember in the 39-41m films are black and white where BT also jumped like that ... But in the end !? Without walkie-talkies and effective protection. It's me that we invented active defense, but only the Israelis brought to mind! They put on the tanks and we? Oh ...

[Altona]

Quote: gladcu2

The army of the USSR was offensive. Preventive stroke concept. But the international politics of the USSR were friendly, and therefore defensive.

-------------------------------
The Russian army is also offensive ...