Military Review

Stalin was preparing to defeat?

33
Stalin was preparing to defeat?Interest in stories War has always been great, and so much has been written on the subject of its beginning that the question arises involuntarily: what can be said about this new? Meanwhile, there are still questions that for various reasons have not received a clear explanation. For example, there are still disputes over whether the Soviet Union was ready for war or a German attack took him by surprise.


It would seem that the question is clear, and V.M. Molotov, in his historic speech at noon 22 on June 1941, stated that the attack was unparalleled treachery. On this basis, the conviction of historians has grown up that the attack, of course, was sudden and even for some time caused a certain confusion of leadership.

True, in recent years, the leadership is no longer talked about confusion, but the thesis of surprise still has widespread acceptance.

Only it is impossible to agree with him. It’s not even the point that the USSR was preparing for war, that the inevitability of war was in the air, that intelligence reports were coming in, etc. Numerous facts indicate that the beginning of the war was not entirely unexpected, not only for the military in the border districts, but even for the rear areas located far from the borders. There, already in the first days of the war, vigorous mobilization activities unfolded.

In the literature, the reaction of the people to the announcement of the beginning of the 22 war on June 1941, is drawn exactly the same way: a silent meeting at the loudspeakers, then a short rally, after which the people go to besiege enlistment offices in large numbers, demonstrating a great patriotic impulse.

Alexander Yakovlevich Chalkov, a metallurgist at the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant, recalls how he was going to go fishing on Sunday, but this peaceful occupation was interrupted by the news of the war. After listening to Molotov's statement, the following happened: “And the first thing that we, the steelworkers, did, it was a complete avalanche, moved to the party committee to sign up for volunteers. Hundreds of my comrades have already drawn up documents in the military registration and enlistment office for sending to the front. I was among them. ” Further, Chalkov recalls that they turned the statement over and left it at the Martin, for steel, as is known, is extremely important for war.

But if we add a few important details to these memories, the whole picture of the spontaneous mobilization of the Kuznetsk metallurgists is changing dramatically. First, Molotov's statement was transmitted to the whole country without a recording, and if in Moscow it sounded at noon, then in Stalinsk (as it was then called Novokuznetsk), it was listened to at 16 hours of local time. Since they usually go fishing in the morning, the message about the beginning of the war obviously could not prevent Chalkov from fishing and then listening to Molotov's speech.

Secondly, a crowded spontaneous rally of metallurgists only at first glance seems commonplace. But at a second glance it is clear that he had a different background.

Then the law of 26 June 1940 of the year on the transition to the eight-hour working day and seven-day working week, which promised for an absenteeism without a good reason 6 months of correctional labor at work with retention 25% salary.

Seriously punished for being late for work. KMK as an enterprise of continuous cycle worked around the clock. So the metallurgists could not quit their work spontaneously. In addition, the metallurgical plant will not abandon the furnace and blast furnace unattended, which is fraught with an accident with all the ensuing consequences. From here it is quite obvious that the metallurgists rally was prepared in advance so that both the people gathered and the equipment needed to keep the minimum necessary supervision.

But if this rally and enrollment in the army organized a party committee, then everything falls into place. It is clear that this was not improvisation, but in advance, even before the start of the war, prepared by action. Metallurgists, who did not work on the shift that day, were warned in advance so that they did not disperse about their business and come to the plant on demand. That is why Chalkov did not go on the planned fishing.

The city committee of Stalinsk and the party committee of the KVM could learn about the beginning of the war approximately after 10 hours of local time (in Moscow it was 6 in the morning when they received information about the beginning of the war; no doubt the military and party leaders began to notify the local authorities all over the country by telephone). The party organizer of the combine had time to gather workers, to organize a rally by the time Molotov spoke.

Such facts can be found tens and hundreds. In Vladivostok, for example, people listened to Molotov's speech at the local time at 19 at a loudspeaker hung on the building of the regional committee of the party. At this time in the cinema "Ussuri" was showing a film. The session was interrupted by the announcement: “Men! All the way out. First of all - the military. " Five hours later, at midnight local time, the radio meeting began.

A powerful wave of mobilization began throughout the country. And 22 of June, and in the following days, many people, primarily workers of large enterprises, for some reason, massively threw work, completely unafraid of the punishment laid down by the current laws, went to the military registration and enlistment offices and submitted applications to the front. Hundreds and even thousands of skilled workers left the enterprises, although it was strictly forbidden by law to arbitrarily leave enterprises and institutions, and despite the fact that production was put at risk of being stopped. This could only have happened if this mass mobilization had been prepared in advance, even before the war, in every detail, and was carried out at the direction of the party trade. If you carefully read the reports on the mass submission of applications to the front in the first days of the war, they clearly show the firm, organizing hand of the party.

And about the strange behavior of metallurgists in the early days of the war. On the night from 23 to 24 June 1941, the People's Commissar of Ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR I.T. Tevosyan called the chief engineer of the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant L.E. Weisberg also offered to urgently organize the production of armor steel in ordinary open-hearth furnaces, motivating this decision by the fact that the factories producing it were in the combat zone. Weisberg promised to think, and by morning he called Tevosyan, saying that it was possible in principle. And then he received permission to re-equip open-hearth furnaces.

This conversation is mentioned in a number of books, but none of the authors asked a simple question: how could this be? How did this 23 quality steel production plants in June find themselves in a combat zone? The fighting then went practically along the border, in the territory of the former Poland, where there were no metallurgical plants. For example, the Red October Stalingrad Plant, one of the main enterprises producing high-quality steel, was located more than 1400 km from the front line. To Stalino (Donetsk), it was also not far, about 800 km. With the onset of 50 km per day, the Germans would need 16 days to get to it. Leningrad 23 June was also still far from the front line. Why was there such a rush?

This remarkable case reveals a veil of silence about the reasons for such a quick and massive mobilization on the very first day of the war. This could happen only if the party leadership, that is, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and Stalin personally, believed that the German attack could lead to a very quick defeat.

This conclusion may seem controversial to many. However, if we do not include post-knowledge and do not evaluate the beginning of the war from the point of view of subsequent victories (of which, of course, nothing was known about 22 June 1941 of the year), then such a calculation was quite reasonable.

The Soviet leadership carefully studied the actions of the German army in Poland in 1939, in Denmark, Norway and France in 1940. It was clear: in the first hours of the war the Germans would collapse with all their might and would rush forward.

Even the French army, which was considered to be the strongest in Europe before the war and relied on a powerful system of long-term defense, could not stand against the Germans. The Red Army, which was experiencing a large-scale and painful process of reorganization, occupied a theater of military operations that were very poorly prepared for war, and had weak communication lines, could also not withstand this first, strong blow. This option, as seen from the actions on the first day of the war, was considered the most likely and, at the same time, the worst.

It should be noted here that the whole character of the mobilization begun by June 22 was such as if the Red Army had already been defeated, and the Germans were marching towards Moscow. At the same time, the situation at the front of 22 and even 23 of June was far from clear even for the General Staff. There was no connection with many armies, the Germans for 22 June broke through 40 – 50 km deep into Soviet territory only on the main lines, and the next day they planned counter-counterstrikes. Based on the current situation of the first day of the war, it was too early to draw such far-reaching conclusions. The threatening situation took shape only a few days later, when it became clear that the counterattacks had failed and the Germans were coming. So the mobilization initiated by the party organs of 22 June definitely came from the firm conviction developed even before the war that if the Germans attacked, there would inevitably be a big digression.

But, unlike the French government, Stalin and his comrades were not going to give up.

If the Red Army cannot stop the onslaught of the enemy, then it is necessary without a buildup, in the very first hours and days of the war, to begin a general mobilization in order to create a new army, to begin evacuation and transfer industry to military production. In this spirit, apparently, instructions were issued to all party bodies and committees in the field, with orders to take action immediately after the first announcement of the beginning of the war, without waiting for the official announcement of mobilization.

Moreover, as can be seen from many facts, the volunteer impulse covered mainly the communists and the Komsomol large enterprises. It should be noted here that no one canceled the class approach. The workers were considered the most reliable and staunch pillar of the party, and if the Red Army was beaten, then it was the workers who were to form the core of the new armed forces. Workers must arm themselves and stop the onslaught of the enemy even at the cost of a sharp drop in production. The main thing, as they apparently believed in the Politburo, was to stop the Germans at any cost in the first days and weeks of the war, and then how it would turn out. For this, they were even ready to call on the most skilled workers, who took many years to grow and which could not be replaced.

In addition, apparently, there were certain doubts about the reliability and resilience of the Red Army, at least many of its units, created according to general conscription, once in the first days of the war they decided to create separate units and even militia armies, the core of which was times the workers of large enterprises with a powerful party stratum. In principle, these doubts were not unfounded. There were enough units and connections with weak discipline in the Red Army, and this sometimes resulted in serious problems. On the contrary, units and formations made up of workers were distinguished by high stamina and excellent fighting qualities, such as the famous “Black Knife Division” - the 30 of the Urals Volunteer Tank Corps, the selected workers of the Urals formed in 1943.

Sometimes things are much more eloquent than words. The party mobilization launched by 22 on June 1941 of the year in the very first hours of the war is an outstanding organizational achievement. However, the point of view adopted during the war prevented the widespread announcement of this, that the enemy attacked unexpectedly and treacherously. She had a great political significance. People had to explain simply and intelligibly why the enemy was stronger and achieved so much success. It is now possible to write a plump monograph, and put everything on the shelves. In the course of the war, short explanations were necessary, which were understandable to everyone.

If it were said that the party had organized mobilization, very carefully and comprehensively thought out, then this would contradict the thesis of a surprise attack. Notify the party committees, gather people, organize rallies with incendiary speeches and oaths, create a multitude of collection points, and even prepare paper for thousands of applications to the front — all this required at least a preliminary discussion and drawing up at least the most minimal plan. And this wave of mobilization swept across the country, to the very suburbs, swept decisively, uniformly and without much disruption.


Anyway, this planning discussion took place before the start of the war, which was not expected. It would have been absurd: the war was not expected, and the party already had a big mobilization plan. Therefore, the thesis about the patriotic impulse of the masses came to the fore, while the party modestly withdrew into the shadows.

Today, when passions have subsided somewhat, we can pay tribute to this party plan. He, of course, made a significant contribution to the victory. The Germans could not even have imagined that the mobilization in the USSR would spin so quickly and so decisively. As Major General George Thomas, head of the economic department of the Wehrmacht High Command, writes in his memoirs, they quite seriously planned to be able to seize Caucasian oil a month after the start of the war. At least it was very desirable for them. This is how low they evaluated the fighting capacity of the Red Army, although I must say, they had some reason for this in the form of the experience of the French campaign. The whole plan of the war against the USSR was based on the fact that the Wehrmacht would smash the Red Army in the first week or two of the war, and then go almost marching, almost without resistance. Party mobilization became an unpleasant surprise for them, since it turned the French-style blitzkrieg into a stubborn, protracted and ultimately losing war for Germany.
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http://www.stoletie.ru/versia/stalin_gotovilsa_k_porazheniju_995.htm
33 comments
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  1. avvg
    avvg 19 June 2016 06: 24
    +10
    Everything turns out logically, in the first days of the war the local communists were on top.
    1. xtur
      xtur 19 June 2016 12: 24
      +8
      > This could only happen if the party leadership, that is, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and Stalin personally, believed that a German attack could lead to a very quick defeat.

      either logical absurdity, or tongue-tied. Prepared not for a quick defeat, but for big losses.
      1. Akuzenka
        Akuzenka 24 June 2016 22: 16
        0
        The article does not smell like logic. I can make completely different conclusions from the one given in the article, for example: quick mobilization is just .... a well-prepared mechanism. It is strange that the author did not understand this.
  2. Simpsonian
    Simpsonian 19 June 2016 06: 50
    +20
    "The fighting then went on practically along the border, on the territory of the former Poland, ...

    Why not "on the territory of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine"?
  3. Dart2027
    Dart2027 19 June 2016 06: 56
    -21%
    In favor of the fact that the USSR was preparing for probable defeats, it also speaks of how quickly the transfer of industrial capacities from the occupied territory took place. In a matter of days, you can leave the equipment in cars, but you can quickly deploy production to a new place only if the infrastructure and technological chains are prepared.
    1. overb
      overb 19 June 2016 08: 16
      -15%
      Quote: Dart2027
      how quickly was the transfer of industrial capacity from the occupied territory

      Indeed, they managed to evacuate something. But only one thing, and nothing more. Tank-building KhPZ, STZ, Kirovsky plant, all this was not evacuated. And it actually died. And this can be said were the main enterprises for the USSR during the war. Therefore, we can safely assume that "a perfectly organized mass evacuation" is a common myth. And the production of tanks of the USSR was deployed not on sites in the forests, as shown in the movies, but on the basis of real-life heavy engineering enterprises even before the war. By the conversion method.
      1. bocsman
        bocsman 19 June 2016 08: 36
        +33
        Quote: overb
        Indeed, they managed to evacuate something. But only one thing, and nothing more. Tank-building KhPZ, STZ, Kirovsky plant, all this was not evacuated. And it actually died. And this can be said were the main enterprises for the USSR during the war. Therefore, we can safely assume that "a perfectly organized mass evacuation" is a common myth. And the production of tanks of the USSR was deployed not on sites in the forests, as shown in the movies, but on the basis of real-life heavy engineering enterprises even before the war. By the conversion method.


        Learn history! KhTZ was evacuated in a very organized way. So, until the last days, it was producing products from the "reserve" left, and the last echelon with the remains of equipment left a few hours before the arrival of the Germans. And to their deep disappointment they saw empty workshops!
        The Kirov plant was also evacuated, part of the equipment and personnel was left to meet the needs of the front. The name "Ural Kirovsky Zavod" does not mean anything ?!
        No need to repeat the delirium of pseudo "historians" bought in the West! And also in the public domain there is a number of new enterprises built in the east of the country, how many have been reprofiled. And what an outstanding role the Railroad played in organizing the evacuation of enterprises from west to east!
        But of course it’s easier to believe any loud stuff than to search for reliable information yourself!
        1. overb
          overb 19 June 2016 18: 39
          -3
          Quote: bocsman
          Learn the story

          This is what concerns you first of all.
          Quote: bocsman
          HTZ was evacuated in a very organized manner

          The decision to evacuate KhTZ was made on September 12.09.41, 24.10.41. A 5g. Germans entered Kharkov. The last week can not be considered, backlashes also did not just eat their bread. Do you think that in 5 weeks you can dismantle, pack, load and take out one of the largest enterprises of the USSR? Why then they were built for years. and the equipment was mounted for months? If everything is so simple, XNUMX weeks, that's all.
          And then. Where did KhPZ go in evacuation? Gone Merged into the Uralvagonzavod, on the basis of which UTZ was formed. Of course, there was something from KhPZ, no one argues. But not all, therefore, it was no longer KhPZ.
          Quote: bocsman
          So, until the last days, it was producing products from the "reserve" left behind, and the last echelon with the remnants of equipment left a few hours before the arrival of the Germans.

          A lovely fairy tale. Apparently backlash in October on strike.
          Quote: bocsman
          The Kirov plant was evacuated the same, some equipment and personnel were left to meet the needs of the front.

          Yes Yes. All this, of course, was conceived in advance by wise leadership. Agitprop drives.
          In 1940 They considered it more profitable to quarrel with the whole world, to go to the outcasts, but to move the border from Leningrad onward. And in 1941 it turned out that for a penny of time, the enterprises of Leningrad can be easily and simply evacuated. Miracles of propaganda, what to say.
          Quote: bocsman
          The name "Ural Kirovsky Zavod" does not mean anything ?!

          Actually, the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant (CHKZ). This is ChTZ, in which parts of LKZ and a number of enterprises have joined. ChTZ was supposed to begin production of KV tanks back in 1940. But in fact, the release was started in 1941. And not at all thanks to the LKZ, the ChTZ pre-war plan for 1941. 200 KV tanks with full capacity launch in the 4th quarter of 1941 and what a coincidence. It was in the 4th quarter that ChTZ (ChKZ) was launched at full capacity.
          According to the pre-war plans of the Wehrmacht, ChTZ was listed among them as being subject to destruction by bombing. After completing the Barbarossa plan.
          And here the equipment with LKZ could not play a role. But it was not LKZ.
          Quote: Dart2027
          They evacuated.

          Even the Bolsheviks and Communists did not insist that the STZ was evacuated under fire from the Germans (they were already in Stalingrad). Therefore, they wrote vaguely: "Everything that was possible to evacuate was taken out, and the rest was flooded."
          Quote: ignoto
          The Kirov plant during the war released about 700 tanks.

          The evacuated enterprise is not able to produce finished products. Evacuation, this is not cloning.
          Quote: ignoto
          Enterprises were evacuated to pre-prepared doubler sites before the war.

          Only these sites in a strange way coincided with the existing heavy engineering plants. Where the equipment that managed to evacuate simply poured.
      2. Dart2027
        Dart2027 19 June 2016 09: 46
        -5
        Quote: overb
        not deployed on platforms in the forests, as shown in the movies

        Actually, I wrote that
        Quote: Dart2027
        It is only possible to deploy production to a new location if the infrastructure and technological chains are prepared.
        that is, not at sites in the forests, but at pre-prepared locations.
        Quote: overb
        Kirov Plant
        He was not completely evacuated, because he was needed for the defense of Leningrad, supplying equipment.
        Quote: overb
        Tank-building KhPZ, STZ
        They evacuated.
    2. Griboedoff
      Griboedoff 19 June 2016 09: 11
      +9
      The USSR was preparing for war almost from the very beginning of its existence. The presence of a vast territory allowed the active use of evacuation, and the Bolsheviks understood this. And they were preparing for war with the world bourgeoisie. And the fact that this bourgeoisie in total has a very powerful army forced the Bolsheviks to be ready for war on their territory. In the 20s and 30s, the USSR had the most elaborated evacuation plans and plans for organizing partisan movements. You do not need to discover America for this - books have been written about it. The fact is that shortly before the war, much less attention was paid to evacuation plans. They began to prepare, mainly for the war on the territory of the enemy.
      1. Talgat
        Talgat 19 June 2016 10: 25
        +12
        in fact, it is a miracle that the USSR was able to arrange it in such a way that it did not turn out to be one on one with the united west - after all, the US crusade of England, Germany and all of Europe against us was very real

        And then the result would be unpredictable

        Stalin somehow managed to break up the Western coalition, albeit at a high price, but as a result he won geopolitically - he had to fight only with Europe. Without England and the USA. Even some help was later received from the arrogant Saxons and Amers.

        The lesson for all of us is that it is dangerous to remain face to face with the united west (which unfortunately is now being drawn). And the capitals and strategic industries must be kept away from the western border.

        Maybe our Nazarbayev is right - offering the capital of the EAC in Astana
        1. Dart2027
          Dart2027 19 June 2016 10: 33
          +4
          Quote: Talgat
          Stalin somehow managed to break up the Western coalition

          And therefore, liberals, human rights activists and universal people howl with anger when they hear about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and shout that Stalin began WWII.
  4. viacheslav77
    viacheslav77 19 June 2016 06: 59
    +19
    The author has a fat minus for the invention of the bicycle and ignorance of the organization of mobilization work.
    1. Mordvin 3
      Mordvin 3 19 June 2016 07: 33
      +12
      Quote: viacheslav77
      The author is bold minus

      Similarly. They go fishing not only in the morning. And why couldn't the workers gather for a rally on a legal weekend? And as for the transition to the issue of armor, the author generally mocked. What is there to be surprised at? As for the telephone conversation about the capture by the Germans of steel mills in the west of the country - let it be kind to provide a link. Turbidity, not an article.
      1. Aleksandr72
        Aleksandr72 19 June 2016 08: 05
        +10
        I don’t know what about the phone call and the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant, but in Magnitogorsk they made armored steel in ordinary open-hearth furnaces, having mastered a new technology:
        The Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine played an important role in providing the military industry with metal. The residents of Magnitogorsk were among the first to start smelting armor steel in ordinary large open-hearth furnaces, adapted for melting "peaceful" (ie, ordinary) metal. Without special rolling machines, Magnitogorsk residents simultaneously set up the production of armor plates on blooming. This daring idea belonged to the deputy chief mechanic of the plant N.A. Ryzhenko. In ten days, the necessary preparation was carried out and on July 23, 1941, the first armor plate was issued.

        It was a very difficult task, which at the same time had to be solved as quickly as possible - the front needed tanks.
        Due to the lack of special furnaces, high-quality steels had to be smelted in ordinary open-hearth furnaces, which required modernization of the furnaces, installation of additional equipment and changes in production technology. Eastern metallurgists in a short time introduced forced heating of open-hearth furnaces, increased their durability, established a special thermal regime and careful control over the melting process, changed and replenished the stock of molds, ladles and other devices, as well as rebuilt the entire organization of production in steelmaking workshops. As a result of these efforts, the smelting of high-quality steels in open-hearth furnaces was successfully mastered.
        The rolling mills evacuated from the southern factories were installed and operated at an accelerated pace, large thermal workshops with furnaces equipped with special control and measuring equipment were built, and heat treatment of armor was mastered. The production capacities of eastern metallurgy for the production of armored steel expanded significantly. Armor steel was also smelted in large open-hearth furnaces. In this case, armor steel was smelted by a direct open-hearth process, bypassing the previously accepted duplex process, which almost halved the productivity of open-hearth furnaces. As a result, in 1942, the share of high-quality rolled products in the total volume of production of rolled ferrous metals increased by 2,6 times, and that of ordinary rolled products decreased by 2 times.
        Thanks to the measures taken, the eastern metallurgical plants were able to fully satisfy the requirements of the tank builders for armor as soon as possible.

        Book: Chadayev Y.E. - The economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)
    2. bocsman
      bocsman 19 June 2016 08: 19
      +11
      Quote: viacheslav77
      The author has a fat minus for the invention of the bicycle and ignorance of the organization of mobilization work.


      Some kind of amateurish and untrue conclusions. Vinaigrette of facts and empty conclusions. Any "losharik" (there was such a cartoon character) understands that the party then played a leading role in all areas of life, but this did not cancel the noble impulse of the Soviet people to go and defend their homeland. And this applies to all strata of the population, from peasants and workers to workers in science and culture. Apparently the fall of morals in the nineties obscures the eyes of the author. Well, there weren't so many bastards then! And it is quite clear that despite the fact that then the doctrine "To fight with little blood and on foreign territory" prevailed, there were enough people who understood the war would be difficult and not for one year.
  5. parusnik
    parusnik 19 June 2016 08: 03
    +3
    But, unlike the French government, Stalin and his comrades were not going to give up...And that should have ... smile
  6. overb
    overb 19 June 2016 08: 06
    +3
    Quote: Dmitry Verkhoturov
    So the mobilization begun by the party bodies on June 22, quite definitely proceeded from the firm conviction developed even before the war that if the Germans attacked, a great retreat would inevitably be.

    Nonsense is complete. Normal mobilization.
    Quote: Dmitry Verkhoturov
    they quite seriously planned that they could capture the Caucasian oil a month after the start of the war.

    Nothing like this. Read Barbarossa. By this time they still had to be on the Zap line. Dvina-Dnepr.
    Quote: Dmitry Verkhoturov
    The whole plan of the war against the USSR was based on the fact that the Wehrmacht would defeat the Red Army in the first week or two of the war, and then it would go almost in a marching order, almost without resistance.

    And again, nonsense. And again read Barbarossa.
    Quote: Dmitry Verkhoturov
    Party mobilization was an unpleasant surprise for them

    The mobilization was military. And party mobilization is different.
    Quote: Dmitry Verkhoturov
    “And the first thing that we, the steelworkers did, was a continuous avalanche in the party committee to sign up for volunteers.

    Indeed, a strange statement. The army decided to enlist in the military enlistment offices.
    Quote: Dmitry Verkhoturov
    the party leadership, that is, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) and Stalin personally, believed that the German attack could lead to a very quick defeat.

    It would be nice for the author to know the location of the troops of the Red Army and equipment before the war. If the calculation was for a quick defeat, the troops and equipment would not be so disposed.
  7. Stas57
    Stas57 19 June 2016 08: 34
    +4
    Yesterday the monarchist drove, today the journalist, the editorial staff on vacation?
    True, in recent years, the leadership is no longer talked about confusion, but the thesis of surprise still has widespread acceptance.

    Only you cannot agree with him.

    surprise is, first and foremost, a Prevention in mobilization and deployment.
  8. atos_kin
    atos_kin 19 June 2016 08: 39
    +2
    For the author, the "afterbirth" turned the article into an aftertaste.
    1. vlad.vm
      vlad.vm 20 June 2016 15: 32
      0
      in the office to his master. so answer.
  9. Dimon19661
    Dimon19661 19 June 2016 09: 49
    +2
    The article is ambiguous, there are a lot of blunders, inaccuracies, and speculations. But it was interesting to read the comments, so I put + winked
  10. Tanya
    Tanya 19 June 2016 10: 13
    +7
    And on June 22, and the following days, many people, primarily workers of large enterprises, for some reason massively quit their jobs, completely unafraid of the punishment prescribed by applicable laws, went to the military commissariats and submitted applications to the front.

    Interesting logic from the author. If, God forbid, a war begins, and instead of work I go to the military registration and enlistment office, then my behavior will look strange ... should I be afraid of dismissal ??? belay
  11. midshipman
    midshipman 19 June 2016 10: 18
    +11
    Dear readers of "VO", in the article it would be advisable to provide data on the evacuation work in the country, starting from June 22, 1941. And do not indulge in general reasoning.
    I published the article "Staff exercises in industry" in VO. There he showed the organization of the transfer of industrial enterprises to the East. Museums were also transferred. What kind of surrender to the fascists of our country could we talk about. Evacuation trains had to pass but 500 km per day, if this was not ensured, the tribunal. Places of resettlement were prepared for the civilian population, there was hot water and some food at the stations.
    Such articles should be published in order to show the heroism of the people in the fight against fascism, and not justify the traitors. I have the honor.
  12. Basil50
    Basil50 19 June 2016 11: 37
    +5
    The author describes the events in a manner - * he thought *, * he wanted *. In the spirit of the Svanidzians and other advocates of * democracy *. I didn’t want to crawl according to * ideas * AND IN STALIN and the party committee of the plant, what was done in reality was enough for me.
  13. Ivan Tartugai
    Ivan Tartugai 19 June 2016 14: 28
    +5
    Quote from the article:
    "At the same time, the situation on the front of June 22nd and even June 23rd was far from clear even to the General Staff."


    In the initial period of the war, the General Staff, led by Army General Zhukov, was completely unable to establish contact with the troops in order to receive information from the troops and make an adequate decision to the situation. The troops were without a full central and frontal command. The persons responsible for communication, namely the chief of communications of the Red Army General Gapich, the chief of communications for ZAPOV General Grigoryev and others deliberately suspended themselves from their duties. The generals explained the lack of communication with the troops by the actions on its networks of a huge army of enemy saboteurs.
    Shtemenko SM in his memoirs confirms that indeed the military connection of the General Staff and the headquarters of the fronts with the troops was very bad, in the initial period it was completely disorganized, but at the same time he notes that civilian communication lines worked very well up to the occupation of civilian communications centers by the Wehrmacht, and in some cases even in the rear of the Wehrmacht. It turns out that saboteurs did not work on civilian communication lines. And this is noted not only in the memoirs of Shtemenko SM, but also in the memoirs of many other participants in the Second World War.
    Without traitor generals from the red army such a breakdown of military communications in the initial period of the war was impossible.
  14. Backfire
    Backfire 19 June 2016 14: 52
    +4
    Nothing is clear from this article, the author simply does not know what he is writing about.
  15. unknown
    unknown 19 June 2016 14: 56
    +4
    Quote: bocsman
    Quote: overb
    Indeed, they managed to evacuate something. But only one thing, and nothing more. Tank-building KhPZ, STZ, Kirovsky plant, all this was not evacuated. And it actually died. And this can be said were the main enterprises for the USSR during the war. Therefore, we can safely assume that "a perfectly organized mass evacuation" is a common myth. And the production of tanks of the USSR was deployed not on sites in the forests, as shown in the movies, but on the basis of real-life heavy engineering enterprises even before the war. By the conversion method.


    Learn history! KhTZ was evacuated in a very organized way. So, until the last days, it was producing products from the "reserve" left, and the last echelon with the remains of equipment left a few hours before the arrival of the Germans. And to their deep disappointment they saw empty workshops!
    The Kirov plant was also evacuated, part of the equipment and personnel was left to meet the needs of the front. The name "Ural Kirovsky Zavod" does not mean anything ?!
    No need to repeat the delirium of pseudo "historians" bought in the West! And also in the public domain there is a number of new enterprises built in the east of the country, how many have been reprofiled. And what an outstanding role the Railroad played in organizing the evacuation of enterprises from west to east!
    But of course it’s easier to believe any loud stuff than to search for reliable information yourself!


    The Kirov plant during the war released about 700 tanks. The plant was within the reach of German artillery, but was not destroyed by it. Enterprises were evacuated to pre-prepared doubler sites before the war. For the war, Stalin (or Felix Nikolaevich Elston-Sumarokov, as you like), began to prepare from the end of the 20s.
  16. Dora2014
    Dora2014 19 June 2016 15: 54
    +1
    Bullshit. The purpose of this delirium is to defile our leaders, distort history, take away from young people justified pride in their country and its history. In a word, the State Department is not asleep, its fighters of the ideological front are boldly attacking Voennoye Obozreniye. All to protect our HISTORY!
  17. Alexander Greene
    Alexander Greene 19 June 2016 17: 01
    +5
    Stalin was not preparing for defeat. He was simply a pragmatist and understood that it was not possible to stop the accumulated power of the German army in border battles.
    In addition, it could not have done: either not without gagging, or not without betrayal. The concept of Marshal Shaposhnikov of active defense and the subsequent offensive was replaced by the chief of the general staff Zhukov with the assistance of Tymoshenko with the concept of a counter strike. Moreover, contrary to intelligence reports, they expected the main blow of the German troops to Kiev, and not to Minsk. At that time, General Pavlov did not comply with the directive of June 18, 1941 on bringing the district troops on alert, and his subordinates released the unit commanders on vacation, poured gasoline from planes and tanks, carried ammunition to the depots, removed guns and machine guns from planes, So our pilots who managed to take off to go to ram.

    Read a very good analysis of the causes of the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 and 1942 in the book:
    Martirosyan A.B. June 22 tragedy: Blitzkrieg or treason? True Stalin.-M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2006.- 784 p. - (war and we)

    It can be found on the website:

    http://publ.lib.ru/ARCHIVES/M/MARTIROSYAN_Arsen_Benikovich/

    Martirosyan_A.B._Tragediya_22_iyunya. (2006). [Djv-fax] .zip
  18. Aviator_
    Aviator_ 19 June 2016 17: 32
    +5
    The name is extremely tendentious. Stalin was not preparing for defeat, but for a difficult and bloody war, considering all the options. It is not necessary to take seriously the media that propagated the future war as fast and on foreign territory. These thoughts, of course, are true, only the enemy also wants to end his quick victorious war on foreign territory. As the leader of the USSR, Stalin knew perfectly well that the war would be difficult, and therefore began to evacuate enterprises from June - July 1941.
  19. V.ic
    V.ic 19 June 2016 17: 50
    +5
    As a politician, J.V. Stalin "made" Hitler's policy back in June 1941. The united anti-communist front of the united West / l / a did not take shape. As a business executive, he managed to "take away from under the noses" of the Germans most of the necessary defense enterprises and material reserves, which made it possible, during 1942, to organize the production of military products on the basis of the evacuated enterprises. Already in 1943, using, among other things, Lend-Lease supplies of materials and equipment, the production of weapons and equipment for the Red Army provided the newly formed divisions and compensated for the current losses of equipment and weapons. Hitler did not get the Caucasian oil, looted on the territory of the USSR in 1941-1943. enough only to support the Wehrmacht underpants. The Stalingrad defeat and the Kursk defeat of Germany opened the eyes of the "allies" that it was necessary to make concrete contacts between Churchill and Roosevelt with "Uncle Joe", which was done in Tehran. And the top military leadership took care of the preparation of the Anti-Hitler putsch and the organization of the assassination attempt on the "Fuhrer of the great German nation" in 1944.
  20. karavay82
    karavay82 19 June 2016 21: 04
    +2
    This is the height of cynicism in expressing one's opinion.
    Someone spoke that would not allow the "rewriting of the Second World War."
    Really complete disrespect for those of our compatriots who have fulfilled their duty to the country.
    This is a mockery of the memory of their feat.
    It is written so shyly - the workers left their jobs, with an anguish - went to an organized meeting, and began to break into military commissariats.
    Or a scene from life - there was a session, they asked for the exit of all the men, and first of all the military men.
    Derogatory - the workers had to form the backbone against the backdrop of morally unstable parts of the Red Army.
    And quite vile - the Politburo believed that at the expense of the workers it was necessary to stop the Germans at the expense of the LEVEL of PRODUCTION.
    It’s just for all our compatriots who died ... I can’t even pick up such a word.
    And this is against the background of the "Immortal Regiment".
    The author of the article really longs for the glory of exaggerating the feat of the Soviet people, or rather, trampling into the mud.
    These words are not for the author of this article, it is for people who have not forgotten how to think.
    Any state carries out mobilization, I emphasize any, and not because any part of the Germans must be stopped or replaced, but because it is a law of war, the belligerent parts must be replenished, reserves must be created, forces must be built up for a breakthrough.
    As if now in the event of war there will be no mobilization ... But the question is whether people will break into military commissariats.
    Yes, it was the workers in those days who were the main class from whom they mobilized, but because the country was industrial, and now they will mobilize MANAGERS, because the country has become buy-sell.
    And the mobilization carried out is a bounty of control, an attack at 4 o’clock, and in the late afternoon, the mobilization has already begun.
    And so for reference in the First World War, Germany miscalculated the terms of mobilization in the Russian Empire.
    And then, first of all, communists and Komsomol members went to the front, while at that time it was the color of the nation. And then the party was not hiding, but now I wonder who from Okhotny Ryad will go to the recruiting station.
    And the editorial board of Voenniy Obozreniye - your site turns into "yellow".
  21. 094711601
    094711601 19 June 2016 23: 25
    0
    Outright nonsense, not an article! What is the new term - "Party mobilization"? The author has probably forgotten that very serious people were at the helm of the state and their duty was to calculate all the options for the development of events. The mobilization plan in the General Staff has been adjusted almost every day since 39, based on the information received. The man wanted strategic thinking at the fishing level! You can't publish this .... just illiterate!
  22. vlad.vm
    vlad.vm 20 June 2016 09: 48
    0
    Uh. how famously twisted! Reread Suvorov in the 90s. There you will understand who is ready and who is just on the side.
  23. AKKUL
    AKKUL 20 June 2016 20: 55
    0
    And what does Felix Nikolaevich Sumarokov Elston have to do with it?
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