Military Review

The devil wears the "Truth." Part of 6

Moving on to artillery ... The topic, of course, is not simple, but our faithful “conductor” Viktor Suvorov, as always, is with us: “Before World War II, special artillery was created in Germany: railway, anti-aircraft, anti-tank (worthless ), but in the field of pure field artillery, i.e. in the field of artillery, which solves the main firing tasks on the battlefield, since 1918, NO ONE cannon, not a single howitzer was created ”(p. 100); “Let's pay attention to the indices of the German guns, which formed the basis of the field artillery: FH-13, FH-18. FH is a field howitzer, the numbers 13 and 18 mean the years of adoption - 1913 and 1918 ”(on the same page).

As it often happens, Rezun fired at himself with his “arguments” ... A 105-mm light field howitzer of the 1918 type was created in the Weimar Republic in 1930. Its design and testing were carried out in an atmosphere of strict secrecy, since under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty the Germans were forbidden, inter alia, to develop their own artillery. In order to disguise the fact of creating a new artillery system, it was given the official name 10,5 cm leichte Feldhaubitze 18, or 10,5 cm leFH 18 for short. The howitzer was adopted by the Nazis in 1935. It was an effective means of fire support for infantry and tanks.

150-mm heavy field howitzer model 1918 of the year (15 cm sFH 18), which was developed in 1926-1929, was also “illegitimate”. Adopted in 1934 year. This gun, which had a range of fire 13325 m, was intended to fire the enemy's depth of defense and the destruction of long-term firing points. On 1 June 1941, the Wehrmacht had 2867 such howitzers.

Both offspring of German military engineering, who fooled the "guarantors" of Versailles (the French and the British), as well as Viktor Suvorov, were, strictly speaking, the basis of the field artillery of the Wehrmacht.

“Armed” with the indices of the German guns, the author of “Suicide” states: “This is another difference: the theory and practice of the Soviet deep operation consisted of two parts - a breakthrough and actions in depth. The German Blitzkrieg are actions in the depths ”; “Soviet theorists and practitioners believed that it was necessary to be able to crack the safe and clean it. And the Germans believed that we must be able to clean. But how to get into it? Answer: impudent, sudden attack when the safe is not locked ”; “Therefore, nothing was done in the field of field artillery. And how to break a defense without howitzers? The answer is standard: maybe she somehow breaks herself ”(all quotes are taken from page 133).

As for the “good-for-nothing” anti-tank artillery of the Wehrmacht, here Rezun is in a better position. Outdated 37-mm gun Pak 35 / 36 was powerless against the "thirty-four" and even more heavy tanks KV-1, for which he was nicknamed by the troops of the aggressor "beater". The Pak 38 anti-tank gun (the fact of its existence in the book is not affected), capable of striking T-34 tanks from medium distances, was not suitable for the fight against Klim. On 1 June 1941, the Wehrmacht had only 1047 such guns at its disposal.

But here we should recall the most famous example of German artillery during the Second World War - the heavy anti-aircraft gun FlaK 18 / 36, which became famous as a means of fighting tanks. During the Allied counterattack near Arras, the British offensive in Africa, repelling Soviet counterstrikes under Dubno, this weapon demonstrated a high effectiveness in a seemingly alien role for it. During one of the British attempts to unlock Tobruk, several FlaK 18 / 36 destroyed 64 from the 100 of the Matilda tanks involved in the operation. But in terms of armor, they were comparable to the Soviet KV-1!

To be continued ...
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  1. Penzuck
    Penzuck 16 June 2016 12: 17
    To the author + Thoroughly tasteful ...
    1. oldseaman1957
      oldseaman1957 16 June 2016 12: 22
      Quote: Penzuck
      Tastefully tasteful ...
      - The whole abomination of Rezun’s creations is in their apparent truthfulness and references to the originals, which, having believed the author’s word, rarely anyone read. Circulations were published in tens of thousands, and we swallowed them in packs, thinking that we know the TRUTH. This guy did not work in vain at the GRU, he knew how to grind his brains.
      1. Mahmut
        Mahmut 16 June 2016 12: 53
        But do not tell me which originals Rezun referred to. As far as I remember, in the very foreword of his book, Icebreaker stated that he could provide links to specific documents from secret archives, but he would not do it on purpose. And he will use only those facts that are well-known.
  2. Corsair0304
    Corsair0304 16 June 2016 12: 30
    And why in VO discuss Rezun's nonsense?
    Well, there was such a scout-beggar-traitor. Well, he wrote some books to erase (t - remove) the brains of the inhabitants in the 90s and 2000s. To be honest, I myself was honored to read "Aquarium", but that was all. Now is 2016, why should he (Rezun) debate?
    I don’t want to touch anyone, I’m just perplexed.
    1. oldseaman1957
      oldseaman1957 16 June 2016 12: 42
      Quote: Corsair0304
      Now 2016, why the hell (Rezun) to meditate?
      - The thing is that all his disinformation then went like clockwork. Many in the brains remained fragments. And such things - doubts, it is undesirable to keep in yourself, since sometimes conclusions can be made not the same. So it’s better to uproot these very doubts late, than to leave forever splinters in your memory.
      1. EvgNik
        EvgNik 16 June 2016 13: 26
        Quote: oldseaman1957
        so it’s better to start uprooting these very doubts late than leaving forever splinters in your memory.

        In addition, Rezun's books are still on the shelves in libraries, and are in demand.
        1. yehat
          yehat 16 June 2016 17: 06
          As a rule, Rezun is read by those who want to have an opinion about history, but are too lazy to collect Old from sources. One such figure could not believe that the Czech-38 was massively in service with the Wehrmacht. I did not believe it until I brought the official statistics from various sources with photographs from Poland and battles in the 41st with the Germans on this tank.
    2. bk316
      bk316 16 June 2016 13: 38
      Quote: Corsair0304
      Now 2016, why the hell (Rezun) to meditate?

      Right yesterday, during a discussion of an article about demography, a man, possibly out of pure motives, laid out a fake in a comment and claimed that a fact is a fact.
      The Internet is teeming with links to such "facts". Nobody specifically requires pruflinks, and it is the Internet that is now the main media.

      Unfortunately, the nonsense from Rezun has been reprinted so many times, rewritten, "creatively supplemented" that the brains are fundamentally for .. s.
      It's time to somehow clear the space from this shit.
  3. Maki Avellevich
    Maki Avellevich 16 June 2016 12: 31
    But in terms of armor protection, they were comparable to the Soviet KV-1!

    not. Matilda weight 26t; weight Kv-1 46t; the thickness of the armor was different on the sides, turret and stern in favor of Kv-1.

    despite the fact that the square was 20 (!) tones heavier, it had 9.49 hp / t against 6.56 for Matilda. maneuverability of the tank increases its survivability
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 16 June 2016 18: 16
      Quote: Maki Avellievich
      not. Matilda weight 26t; weight Kv-1 46t; the thickness of the armor was different on the sides, turret and stern in favor of Kv-1.

      In terms of the armor protection of the sides, the Matilda was slightly inferior to the KV: it had 70 mm at the top and 25 + 40 mm at the bottom - versus 75 mm for the KV.
      Towers "Matilda" and KV had 75 mm in a circle.
      The only place where the Matilda was inferior to the KV was in the armor protection of the stern.
      Quote: Maki Avellievich
      despite the fact that the square was 20 (!) tones heavier, it had 9.49 hp / t against 6.56 for Matilda. maneuverability of the tank increases its survivability

      Hehehehe ... not in vain I recently wrote that you can not believe the TTX tables.
      The tables usually indicate the power of the HF engine at the stand. But what happened when installing it in the MTO:
      During the summer tests of the tanks, it turned out that during prolonged driving in higher gears at an ambient temperature of +20 degrees, the temperature of the oil and water rises significantly and goes beyond the permissible limit. This forced during the movement to shift to lower gears and reduce the speed of the machine. So, when driving on the highway, the U-7 tank reached a maximum speed of 24,3 km / h, and "the ability to get higher speeds and make full use of engine power was limited by the temperatures of water and oil in the cooling systemreaching 107 and 112 degrees, respectively. "

      Test materials show that even with an existing engine with a power of 600 hp (which could not be removed completely due to a poor cooling system), the transmission and chassis operate at the upper limit and do not allow any options for increasing the mass and engine power, while the first is inevitable, and the second is necessary.

      Due to the insufficient efficiency of the cooling system (oil and water), the motor operates in increased thermal conditions, as a result of which it is impossible to remove the necessary power from it. So far, the plant has not done anything on this issue, while due to the last two defects, 8 motors have been disabled.

      That is, after installing a tank in the MTO, the engine could not develop full power due to insufficient cooling. Before the start of the war, LKZ did not solve this problem (and was not going to solve it - the design bureau was busy with work on new cargoes).

      But in addition to engine power, maneuverability is also affected by the transmission and gearbox. What is the use of having a large engine power if:
      Especially many shortcomings appeared in the transmission design, in particular in the gearbox, the reliability of which left much to be desired. During the tests, there was a breakdown of the gear teeth and their increased wear, difficulties arose in shifting gears during movement. In addition, it turned out that during prolonged movement of the tank in fourth gear, it and the second gear associated with it failed.

      KV gearbox does not have sufficient strength ... Introduced in August this year in the design of the gearbox, the lock fixing the position of the gears reduces the possibility of emergency breakdowns, however, the strength of the gearbox itself is still unsatisfactory. In October, the plant received an act of complaint from the military unit, which stated that in the tank No. 3622 (adopted by the military representative on September 3), the intermediate shaft of the gearbox was twisted and the tapered bearing was destroyed.
      1. Maki Avellevich
        Maki Avellevich 17 June 2016 08: 09
        Hehehehe ... not in vain I recently wrote that you can not believe the TTX tables.

        In this case, you can not believe the tables of TTX Matilda ..

        And is it possible now to generally believe in some kind of documents?

        If the TTX Tables which were subject to admission commissions cannot be trusted, how can you trust those who later wrote reports that completely refute the TTX Tables?
        It turns out. It remains for us to choose those results that are more suitable for us to taste at one time or another.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 17 June 2016 10: 58
          Quote: Maki Avellievich
          If the TTX Tables which were subject to admission commissions cannot be trusted, how can you trust those who later wrote reports that completely refute the TTX Tables?

          There is one small nuance: HF was adopted without testing. The first full tests of HF were carried out in June 1940, when the LKZ was already engaged in mass production of tanks. Just their results I quoted.
          Prior to these tests, the performance characteristics tables reflected only the factory "Wishlist", and not the real state of affairs.
          However, worried that the tank did not pass the full range of tests, ABTU RKKA demanded to conduct full-scale tests of the KV. In early June, two tanks arrived in Kubinka near Moscow. However, then, for some unknown reason, by resolution of the Defense Committee No. 885-330ss, the director of the Kirov plant was instructed to "test the KV tank to identify all defects."
          On June 10, 1940, in the Leningrad region, factory tests of the U-1 tank (with a 152 mm howitzer) began, on July 14-30 the U-21 machine (with a 152 mm howitzer) was tested, and on August 13-31, the U-7 tank (with 76 -mm gun). The chairman of the testing commission was a military engineer of the 1st rank Korobkov. But even despite the fact that behind the KV arms there were factory (and not military, unfamiliar with the new tank, as it would be when tested in Kubinka) driver mechanics, the design of the KV revealed many serious shortcomings.

          In general, the real state of affairs with the technical characteristics of the HF was that the representative of the military acceptance at the Kirov plant, a military engineer of the 3rd rank Kalivoda, sent a letter to Comrade Mehlis on August 12, 1940. Moreover, this letter directly stated:
          I believe that at the moment it is impossible to call the car combat-ready due to the above defects. It can only be sent to the army as a training one, and not as a combat one.

          In the same place, he wrote that the senior military representative, on the instructions of the command of the ABTU KA, receives obviously sky-ready tanks, which then go to the army.
          Comrade Shpitanov ... referred to the instructions of the ABTU KA command, in particular the commissar of the ABTU KA military engineer of the 2nd rank, Comrade. Makarov, who ordered: "Whatever happens, in no case slow down production." Despite the fact that this instruction runs counter to the order of the NCO - "the military representative is primarily responsible for quality and must supply the army with suitable products", on the part of Comrade Shpitanov, there are attempts by coercive measures to force him to accept defective products.
          There are not isolated cases when the presented products were rejected by grassroots workers of military acceptance and passed by the senior military representative. All this became part of the principle of work from the day Comrade Shpitanova. This situation led to the fact that the plant stopped taking into account the military acceptance workers and their requirements, declaring: "If you do not accept it, the senior military representative will accept or order to accept it."
          All this led to the fact that minor defects in the car were eliminated, and the main most serious defects and shortcomings were not eliminated, because senior military representative comrade Shpitanov was afraid - "to slow down production."
  4. yehat
    yehat 16 June 2016 12: 35
    it is worth adding that the Germans in the WWI possessed the best developments in field artillery
    and it was enough for them to work on ergonomics - mounts, sights, etc., so that the guns became modern.
    finally, the rhetoric about theft and the safe itself is already vile. Rezun’s works steadily spoil my mood simply because of the presentation style. He talks to the reader like cattle.
  5. Altona
    Altona 16 June 2016 12: 38
    As I understand it, during the war we learned from the Germans to break open the enemy’s defense by concentrating on a narrow section of the front a huge amount of field artillery. And there was nothing wrong with that. Fortunately, the Germans love the ordnung and do everything on schedule, even fight, which made many of their intentions predictable. In this case, the schedule of attacks. Why am I making such a conclusion? Because it seems to me that my grandfather in Budapest was cut by fragments of shells of our own artillery. The density of fire there was simply incredible.
    1. yehat
      yehat 16 June 2016 17: 03
      before the war we planned this in doctrine. The difference was in the consumption of ammunition and tactical nuances. Calculations appeared, Zhukov introduced new supply standards. The ideology of artillery divisions appeared. Hence the scale of the use of artillery.
  6. V.ic
    V.ic 16 June 2016 13: 06
    Well, nobly shame / Rezun / shit, because I’m still discussing his abominations.
  7. Arktidianets
    Arktidianets 16 June 2016 14: 56
    Rezun's "creativity" should be perceived as works in the genre of alternative history, which has nothing to do with reality.
  8. avva2012
    avva2012 16 June 2016 18: 31
    There is a feeling that Rezun has written out. This makes me happy.
    Western propaganda is stalled. Needless to say, "Icebreaker" is a killer book. To refute it, it took the involvement of serious scientists. "Suicide", a book by y-nai. Like, too, "y", but not that. Apparently, this channel will soon be closed. It remains to carry out the sentence.