Harriers in battle: Falkland conflict 1982 g (part of 8)

So, dear readers, in front of you is the last article of the cycle. It's time to draw conclusions.

Conclusion 1 - Argentines could not realize the superiority in the number of combat aircraft, in fact, the British were confronted in the air with approximately equal forces.

I draw the attention of dear readers: the statistics were not taken for the entire period of the Falkland conflict, but only from the beginning of large-scale hostilities to the end of the fighting on the "bomb alley" - the British called the section of the Falkland Strait in the area of ​​the Bay of San Carlos, where May 21-25 the most fierce aerial battles for the entire campaign. The reason for this sample is that until May 1 there are some significant military operations with aviation was not conducted, but it was precisely on May 25 that the air war for the Falkland Islands was lost by the Argentines. Beginning May 26, the command of Argentina abandons the basic idea of ​​island defense - to prevent an English landing by inflicting an unacceptable level of English losses naval grouping and switches its aircraft to work on coastal targets. Moreover, its actions after May 25 were of an irregular, sporadic nature - if in 5 days of fighting on the "bomb alley" Argentine strike aircraft made 163 sorties, then for the entire period from May 26 to June 13 (19 days) - no more than a hundred.

It should also be borne in mind that the column of Argentine aviation sorties reflects only the actions of Argentine fighter and attack aircraft (in brackets - minus air sorties of light attack aircraft of the Squadron Pukara Malvinas). Departures "Mirages", "Daggerov" and "Skyhawks", which, in fact, posed a danger to British ships and aircraft, fully accounted for. Also fully accounted for known cases of search and / or attacks by the British forces of light aviation. But part of the aircraft light aircraft in the above statistics did not get - for example, it is known that 2 May Argentines raised the aircraft of the Falkland Islands to inspect the potential landing of the British. But what, how much and where it is unclear, therefore it is not possible to take into account such air travel. Also, the indicated column does not include reconnaissance aviation flights, tankers, PLO aircraft off the coast of Argentina, etc.

Therefore, the number of sorties shown in the "Argentine" column of the table above can be interpreted as this is the number of aircraft of fighter and attack aircraft undertaken to provide air defense of the Falkland Islands and attack British ships. In a similar “British” column, the number of sorties of only vertical take-off and landing aircraft is indicated — flights of Nimrod, Volcanoes, tankers and other UK aircraft are not included in it.

What immediately catches the eye? The Argentines, concentrating against the English no less than 75-85 "Skyhawks", "Daggers", "Mirage" and "Canberra" (this is already minus the technically faulty and "reserved" in case of a Chilean invasion of machines) and received from repairmen some more " Skyhocks ”during the conflict, could theoretically make daily 115-160 sorties of combat aircraft alone (1,5-2 departures on an 1 machine). But in practice, the maximum reached was 58 sorties (May 21). In total, for the 25 days of the hostilities that determined the military loss of Argentina, its aircraft more or less intensively used the 8 days during which the 244 was flown, ie even during these 8 days, on average, only 31 was flown a day. During the culmination of the struggle in the air - five days of fighting over the “bomb avenue”, the average number of sorties was 32,6 per day.

The British, having a much smaller number of aircraft, flew much more often. Unfortunately, in the literature available to the author there are no complete data on the sorties of the British VTOL, but Rear Admiral Woodworth in his memoirs indicates that May 22:

“Hermes’s and Invincible’s flight decks were the most intense place in the entire South Atlantic. We made about sixty sorties from them for airborne duty. This is ten more than we did on D-Day. ”

At the same time, D. Tatarkov indicates that the 23 of May 317s of the operational connection made 58 airplanes, of which 29 - to cover the bay of San Carlos. It turns out that the British for the three days of the battle on the "bomb avenue" made more sorties than the Argentines for all five. At the same time, such data correspond very well to the size of the British air group - on 21 May, there was an 31 aircraft on the decks of British aircraft carriers, which, given technical readiness over 80% (as they are written by A. Zabolotny and A. Kotlobovsky), just gives about 2 departure in day on one plane. On the other hand, it is completely unclear whether the “Harriers” of GR.3 were involved in air patrols. If not, then it turns out that the British 25 "X Harriers" (of which the 21-23 machines were combat-ready at any one time) carried out up to 60 sorties a day, i.e. almost 3 departure for one aircraft.

Of course, this was the peak load that the British could hardly withstand continuously - according to A. Zabolotny and A. Kotlobovsky, the British VTOLT made 1650 sorties in the combat zone. Even if you do not take into account flights made before 1 in May, ignore the fact that the planes flew even after the end of hostilities, and assume that all 1650 sorties were made between June 1 and June 13 (44 of the day), is still the average The number of sorties will not exceed 37,5 departures per day. Given that in some cases (such as battles on the “bomb lane”), the British flew more often, respectively, on “quiet” days - less often.

Probably it would not be a mistake to assume that on normal days the number of sorties by the British air group did not exceed 30-35, but during intense fighting the number of sorties could reach 60 per day, of which about half fell on the defense of the landing area and the second half was cover aircraft carrier group. It is worth noting that 2-3 air travel per day for one car is a great answer to anyone who believes that deck aircraft cannot operate with the same intensity as ground-based aircraft. During the “Storm in the Desert”, MNF aircraft made an average of 2 sorties per day. It should also be noted that if the Argentines were able to provide their aircraft with a level of combat capability comparable to the English (technical readiness ratio 0,85 and 2-3 departures per day), then Argentine aviation would carry out every day from 130 to 200 sorties. Obviously, the British air defense could not withstand such tension, and the British amphibious group would be defeated within 1-2 days.

But another thing is also interesting - provided that 2-3 carried out sorties per day per vehicle, the number of actually completed Argentine sorties could have been provided by an air group that consisted of approximately 38-40 combat aircraft at the beginning of hostilities - and this taking into account the losses they actually suffered ( i.e., by 21, the aircraft would have remained on the order of 30-32, etc.). Therefore, it is surprising, but it can be said that the British in the Falklands faced a roughly equal in number air enemy.

However, while paying tribute to the work of British pilots and technicians, we must not forget that the 25-30 aircraft departures a day to cover the disembarkation zone are 12-15 pairs of Sea Harriers during the day. Given the fact that the British aircraft carriers were located not less than 80 miles from the islands, it is unlikely that one pair could patrol for at least an hour. Which in turn means that the British aircraft carrier 2 were able to ensure constant airborne duty over their amphibious group of just one pair of Sea Harriers (sometimes increasing the patrol to two pairs).

Conclusion 2: Despite the comparable balance of forces in the air, the air defense task of the naval connections was a British carrier-based aircraft completely failed.

Over the entire period of May 1-25, Argentines 32 once tried to attack British ships, in which 104 aircraft took part. The British managed to intercept groups of attacking 9 aircraft once (before they launched an attack), but only 6 attacks (19% of the total) managed to thwart; All in all, from 104, the attacking aircraft 85 was able to attack British ships, i.e. "Sea Harriers" were able to thwart the attacks of all 18,26% of the total number of Argentine aircraft participating in them.

On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the two attacks that took place on 12 in May, in which eight Skyhocks took part, were deliberately missed by the British: Rear Admiral Woodworth was trying to figure out how strong the air defense could provide a combination of Sea Dart air defense system and "Sea Wolfe", substituting for the Argentines the destroyer "Glasgow" and the frigate "Brilliant". Therefore, to put these attacks in the reproach of "Sea Harriers" is not entirely correct. But, even having excluded these attacks, we find out that “Sea Harriers” were able to prevent 20% attacks, and 19,8% of the total number of aircraft that took part in them did not reach the British ships. For the “battle on the bomb lane,” this figure is even more modest - 26 (22%) are successful from 84,6 attacks, from 85 aircraft that participated in the attacks broke through to the 72 ships (84,7%).

Conclusion 3: Fighter aircraft alone (without external target designation) can neither achieve air supremacy, nor provide any reliable air defense of sea or land connections.

All in all, from 1 to 25 in May, there were 10 cases when “Sea Harriers” intercepted Argentinian planes before the last attack. In this case, nine cases of interception of strike aircraft were carried out according to external target designation, which was given by British warships. The only case where the C Harrier pilots were able to independently detect the target was the interception of the 1 “Mentor” link in May, but even this is not clear. it is not excluded that the Harriers launched the Sea King helicopter, which the Argentines were about to attack. On the same day, Sea Harriers became targets of Argentine fighter aircraft three times, and in at least two of the three Argentines, they were guided by the ground flight support service of the Falkland Islands.

4 output (which is perhaps the enhanced version of 3 output): The main reason for the ineffectiveness of the British carrier-based aviation in their air operations was the separate use of strike and fighter aviation without ensuring its operations by reconnaissance aircraft, airborne early warning systems, RTR, EW

The effectiveness of modern air war directly depends on the competent use of all the “combat arms” of aviation. Then a synergistic effect begins to operate, which clearly showed the complete helplessness of the British against the joint actions of the Super Etandars, the reconnaissance Neptune and the Argentinean tankers 4 in May, when the Sheffield was heavily damaged by a missile attack. The British had significantly larger forces, their carrier-based aircraft were supported by a very powerful naval defense, and the Sea Harriers were individually stronger than any Argentine aircraft. But none of this helped them. The same goes for the effectiveness of the Harriers when working on ground targets.

5 Conclusion: The main reason for the “off-system” use of the Harriers was the concept of aircraft-carrying vehicles of the VTOL aircraft, on which the DRLO, RTR and EW planes simply could not be based due to the lack of an ejection takeoff.

Thus, the Harrier fiasco at Falkland is not due to the fact that these aircraft are VTOL, but with the absence of aircraft in the aviation groups that support and support the actions of fighter and attack aircraft.

5 Conclusion: The merits inherent (or attributed) to VTOL aircraft did not affect the course of the hostilities.

A. Zabolotny and B. Kotlobovsky in the article “Falkland Harriers” write:

“Having discovered an Argentinean fighter or a rocket fired by him, the Harrier pilot changed the thrust vector of the engine, thereby dramatically slowing down. The rocket homing missile lost purpose, and the enemy fighter slipped past, and the Harrier was already in a position advantageous for firing. ”

Over the Falklands took place the entire 3 battle between fighters (all - May 1). In the first case (2 "Mirage" against 2 "Sea Harriors"), neither side was successful. Judging by the available descriptions, the Argentines attacked the British, they noticed the "Mirages" and turned towards them, after which the Argentines used missiles from the distance of the order of 20-25 km and left the battlefield. In the second case, the pair of “Mirage” tried to get close to the British on a head-on course, after which, skipping over the “Sea Harerami”, make a sharp reversal, and go to the tail of the British. The descriptions of what happened later differ, the most similar to the agile battle looks like this - the Argentines and the British, moving on converging courses, flew past each other, while the pilots of the Mirage lost the British mind. Then "Sea Harriers" turned around, went to the tail of the "Mirage" that did not see them and shot them down. In the third case, the Dagger of Ardiles was able to quietly attack the pair of Sea Harriers, his missile did not hit the target, and at high speed he jumped past the relatively slow-moving British air patrol (usually Sea Harriers patrolled at a speed not exceeding 500 km / h) and tried to leave, taking advantage of the superiority in speed - but "Sidewinder" was faster. In all other cases, "Sea Harriers" shot down attack aircraft, which tried to break through to the British ships, or, dropping bombs, tried to escape from "Sea Harriers". Consequently, if Sea Harriers had superior maneuverability, they could not realize it due to the lack of maneuvering battles.

However, in the above-mentioned article there is such a description:

“On May 21, on the day the main forces landed, the pilots of the 801 AE, Nigel Ward and Stephen Thomas, fought with the Daggers six. Dodging five missiles fired at them, the British shot down three cars, and the rest went to the side of the continent in the afterburner. ”

The only battle that fits this description is the destruction by the British patrol of one of two Dagger triples trying to attack the British ships at San Carlos. However, this episode in the description of A. Zabolotny and B. Kotlobovsky looks extremely doubtful. First of all, it is known that the second three of the Daggerov nevertheless entered the British ships (the Diamond frigate was attacked by it). Secondly, the Daggers of Argentina were equipped with either free-fall bombs or air-to-air missiles, but not both at the same time. And, thirdly, the British themselves describe this fight much more modest. Thus, Rear Admiral Woodworth writes in his memoirs:

“The Harrier pilots saw under them three Daggers, heading north to the British ships. The Argentine garrison in Port Howard opened a barrage of rifle fire on the Harriers. weaponswhen those at a speed of six hundred knots dove to the sea itself. Lieutenant Thomas's "Harrier" received three, fortunately insignificant, hits. The Harriers continued the attack, launched their own Sidewinders, and shot down all three Daggers. ”

That is, apparently, there was a detection and destruction of the three attack aircraft without a “dog dump” and a rocket fire.

6 Conclusion: The main factor behind the success of Sea Harriers in aerial combat was their use of the AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles.

This rocket gave the British a huge advantage, but not only because it allowed them to hit enemy aircraft in the forward hemisphere. The fact is that the effectiveness of these missiles was of the order of 80%, which practically guaranteed the defeat of the target when approaching it to the launch distance. Interestingly, the effectiveness of the "Sidewinder" was about twice as high as that of the C-Wolfe air defense system.

Rear Admiral Woodworth believed that the Argentines made a serious mistake by not trying to cover up the attacks of their strike aircraft with fighter aircraft. But in such tactics there was a reason: sending several groups of strike planes to the battle, the Argentines could well expect that at most one link would be intercepted, and even then not every time - which, by the way, constantly happened in practice. However, even if the link would be intercepted by the British, the pilots had good chances to run, using the low speed VTOL. But the pilots of the Mirage with their Shafriras, who were thrown into battle against the Sea Harriers with their all-rocket missiles, had a zero chance of survival. Accordingly, it was much more effective to send the Dagger link to attack the ships, allowing the pilots to flee in the event of interception, rather than equip this link with air-to-air missiles and almost guaranteed to lose it in a battle with Sea Harriers.

On the other hand, if the Argentines had at their disposal all-round missiles of similar quality, then the outcome of the air battles could have significantly shifted against the British.

Conclusion 7: The disadvantages of "Sea Harier" inherent to them as VTOL, markedly reduced their effectiveness.

The main disadvantages of "Sea Harriers" were:

1) Low speed, which very often did not allow them to catch up with the Argentine planes fleeing from them, as a result of which the list of downed "Sidewinders", "Daggers", "Skyhawks" and so on. much shorter than it could be. For example, if the British had Phantoms, it would be unlikely that at least one of the six Canberras, so imprudently sent to search for British ships on May 1, would have survived. VTOL aircraft managed to shoot down only one aircraft of this type
2) Insufficient combat radius, as a result of which one (rarely two) pairs of Sea Harriers could be on duty over the landing site. The same "Phantoms" could "patronize" the amphibious formation much more tightly.
3) Small ammunition load - 2 "Sidewinders", which is at least half as much as a horizontal take-off and landing fighter could carry. As a result, after intercepting the enemy flight, the British were forced to return in any case, even if there was enough fuel for further patrols - you won’t get much without missiles.

However, it should be noted that the absence of these shortcomings (i.e. if suddenly the C Harriers acquired magically the speed, ammunition and combat radius they needed) would somewhat improve the combat statistics of the British carrier-based aircraft, but would not dramatically improve their performance.

Conclusion 8: Despite all the above, it should be recognized that "Sea Harriers" were the best means of air defense of all that were available to the British.

Amazing isn't it? After so many swear words addressed to the VTOL aircraft, the author is forced to recognize them as the best ... but this is true. However, it should be understood that “Sea Harriers” became the leaders of the British air defense not because they were good in this role, but because the other air defense weapons turned out to be even worse.

From the table above, we see that in the period from 1 to 25 in May, the “Sea Harriers” shot down the enemy's 18 aircraft, and for the most part these were “Mirage”, “Skyhawk” and “Dagger”. The author didn’t count a “Sea Harrier” one “Mirage”, which was hit by 1 in May - the plane was damaged, but still had chances of an emergency landing. This plane is reflected in the column "Argentine anti-aircraft gunners," because it was they who killed him. As for the 3 aircraft destroyed on the ground, then we are talking about light attack aircraft, exterminated during the raids on the airfields of Gus Green and Stanley. In this case, the minimum figure was taken, it is possible that the "Harriers" destroyed, or brought to the end of the war during the raids on the airfields, more cars.

Accordingly, the share of VTOL aircraft can be recorded 21 destroyed aircraft, or almost 48% of their total number, killed 1-25 in May. The next best performers are SAS fighters with their 11 aircraft destroyed during a raid on Fr. Pebble These are 25% of the total, but still the success is leveled by the fact that the 5 aircraft were only light attack aircraft, and the rest of the six were completely stupid Mentors. The air defense missile system and the artillery of the ships are in third place, seven vehicles (19%). Of interest is the fact that for the Argentine aviation, their own anti-aircraft gunners were just as serious a danger as the British ones - both of them shot down Argentinian 2 aircraft. But here it is necessary to take into account discrepancies about the Skyhawk's downed 25 in May - the British believe that this plane hit the C Cat missile system from the Yarmouth frigate, while the Argentines are sure that it was the ground Rapier. The author credited this victory to Yarmouth, because the British probably had more opportunities to identify the deadly attack on the air defense system. And finally, the other losses are the Skyhawk, which, making an antimissile maneuver, fell into the sea during the attack of the frigate Brilliant 12 in May. In this attack, Xi Wolfe launched an 2 aircraft rocket launcher and it is extremely doubtful that a third rocket was fired, so with the 99.9% probability no one fired at the Skyhawk — the pilot reacted too nervously to the launch of the missiles that were not intended for him.

In the year 1982, the British sent a quick link to the Falkland Islands, which was clearly weak and unable to carry out modern sea and air operations. Fortunately for the British, the Argentine armed forces turned out to be a “paper tiger”. Without challenging the courage, heroism and martial art of individual warriors of this nation, we have to admit that the Argentine Air Forces turned out to be completely unprepared for a modern war, and in a terrible technical condition. At least 70-80 combat aircraft at the peak of combat readiness are not able to make 60 aircraft sorties a day, and, having lost a dozen aircraft, they "moved out" to 20-25 aircraft sorties - one flight on an 3 aircraft per day! But even from those cars that were able to lift into the air, sometimes up to a third of the cars came back for technical reasons.

But even the few Argentine links, attacking without any tactical design, without preliminary reconnaissance of targets, without clearing the airspace, without suppressing the air defense of ships, and even using non-explosive free-falling bombs, almost put the British fleet on the brink of defeat. Weak attacks by Argentines met with no less weak British air defenses, with the result that each side suffered sensitive losses, but still could inflict equally significant losses to the enemy. If the British had a full-fledged carrier group with a catapult aircraft carrier - the Argentine Air Force simply broke up on its air shield, so that the war would have ended without starting. If the Argentines had, instead of their 240, “military aircraft”, a modern air group of about fifty vehicles, including RTR, DRLO and EW planes, strike aircraft, and fighters equipped with modern guided weapons and equipment, and pilots capable of properly exploiting all this - the British The 317 connection would not last two days. But each side had exactly what it had, so the question was only who could bear the loss longer. The British were stronger - and won the conflict. Affected training, character and, of course, regularly suitable reinforcements. In the war of attrition, the Sea Harriers became the weapon system that was able to inflict the most casualties on the Argentines and played a key role in the Falklands conflict.

However, in the future there was a substitution of concepts. Just as the death of General Belgrano disguised the failure of the British operation to establish naval and air supremacy in the Falkland Islands 1-2 in May, so also underscore the exceptional role of Sea Harriers in the Falklands (which is to a certain extent true) retouched the inability of aircraft carrier ships of VTOL aircraft to support air defense formations and conduct effective air strike operations. Moreover, as has been repeatedly noted, the reason lies not in the tactical and technical characteristics of the VTOL aircraft, but in the absence of airborne early warning aircraft, RTR, EW aircraft and so on as part of the air group.

Interestingly, a similar situation exists with nuclear submarines, whose successes in the Falkland conflict were more than modest. Of course, Concaurus, aimed at the US satellite intelligence target, was not difficult to destroy the antediluvian General Belgrano. But later the submarines could not find the Argentine fleet during its movement to the Falklands, and when the APA ships pulled back to their native coast and the British submarines followed them, then ... the super modern ships were squeezed out of the coastal waters of Argentina within a matter of days.

History The Falkland conflict once again teaches us that no, even a very perfect weapon can replace and is unable to resist the systematic use of disparate forces.

At this, dear readers, I finish the series of articles "Harriers in battle: the Falklands conflict 1982." But on the topic of the Falkland conflict will be posted another, “non-cyclical” article with an alternative historical bias, in which the author will try to answer the questions: “Was it possible to replace British aircraft with newer air defense systems?”; “Could the British scrape funds for the ejection aircraft carriers, and what could the replacement of aircraft carriers carrier for VTOL aircraft have provided for the ejection aircraft carrier?”, “What would happen if the British sent the modernized battleship Vangard to the rescue? In any case, it is not necessary to simulate the results of armed clashes, based on the passport specifications of military equipment.

Thank you for attention!

PS During the discussion of the articles, many distinguished commentators have repeatedly expressed the idea of ​​some similarity of the Falkland conflict with a cozy medical institution, where the wards are soft, the orderlies are extremely polite and the injections do not hurt at all. Within the framework of this theory, I would like to note:

The gallant British BBC has at least three major countermeasures to the British military. The first time happened when they the news trumpeted that Task Force 317 of Rear Admiral Woodworth had joined the amphibious group. It was impossible to more accurately inform the Argentines about the impending landing. For the second time, following the results of the first battles “on the bomb alley”, journalists announced to the whole world that Argentine bombs did not explode. Apparently so that the Argentine services correct this misunderstanding as soon as possible. And finally, the third case - when the news reported about the impending assault on Darivin and Gus Green by British paratroopers, as a result of which the Argentines were able not only to prepare the forces they had there for the assault, but also to transfer substantial reinforcements to the defenders. Argentine admirals and generals after the war admitted that 90% of all intelligence information was kindly provided to them by the British press.

And further. Perhaps Rear Admiral Woodworth was not Nelson, but he still succeeded in an extremely complex operation, which for England was the return of the Falkland Islands. How did the Fatherland meet him?

From the memoirs of the admiral:

However, I would like to tell you about one of the first official letters I received upon returning to my office. It was from the Director of the Financial Management of the Navy and sent to me five days before my return from the south. It talked about the fact that the department conducted a quarterly check on my hospitality expenses and found that in the last quarter, during which I was a bit busy, I spent just 5,85 pounds. And in connection with this ...
... we have revised your representative money content accordingly, downwards by pounds per day for 1,78. Moreover, we recalculated this amendment from the date of your appointment in July 1981. It has been established that you have overpaid 649,70 pounds.
We would like to receive this amount in full and as soon as possible.

References
1. D.Tatarkov Conflict in the South Atlantic: Falklands War 1982
2. Woodworth S. Falklands War
3. V. Khromov Ships of the Falklands War. Fleets of Great Britain and Argentina // Marine Collection. 2007. №2
4. V.D. Dotsenko Fleets in local conflicts of the second half of the XNUMXth century.
5. A. Kotlobovsky The use of A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft
6. A. Kotlobovsky The use of Mirage III and Dagger aircraft
7. A. Kotlobovsky Not by number, but by skill
8. A. Kotlobovsky A. Zabolotny The use of attack aircraft IA-58 "Pucara"
9. A. Zabolotny, A. Kotlobovsky Harriers in the Falklands
10. A. Kotlobovsky, S. Poletaev, S. Moroz Super Etandar in the Falkland War
11. S. Moroz Super Etandar in the Argentine Navy
12. Y. Malishenko Combat debut of a veteran (Vulcan)
13. N.N. Okolelov, S.E. Shumilin, A.A. Chechin Aircraft carriers of the “Invincible” type. 2006. No. 9
14. Mikhail Zhirokhov Falklands 1982 Win Data
15. BATTLE ATLAS of the FALKLANDS WAR 1982 by Land, Sea and Air by Gordon Smith

Comments

[Good cat]

About financial management, very funny. Such is the nature of the Anglo-Saxons.

[EvilLion]

It’s like our falcons in Afghanistan, war is war, and the scheduled training flights fly off and do not care that you get out of the cab only eat and sleep.

[Stas57]

the peak of the crisis and the era of global economy, which incidentally reflected in the war

[Alex_59]

Article plus, like the whole cycle, many thanks to the author.

Essentially:

Conclusion 3: Fighter aircraft alone (without external target designation) can neither achieve air supremacy, nor provide any reliable air defense of sea or land connections.

It seems to me that this conclusion is somewhat outdated. Today, IA aircraft are equipped with highly advanced radars; they are theoretically capable of independently searching for targets. Just equipping the Harriers was very modest, even at that time, and even more so today. Although of course DRLO and RTR will not replace powerful fighter radars, but in the absence of an external control system, modern fighters will not be so blind and helpless as Harriers.

and why in no case do you need to simulate the results of the clashes based on passport performance characteristics of military equipment.

The main problem of theorists. It’s hard for people far from technology to understand that TTX is only a certain base, a technical foundation. And what the people who exploit this technology will achieve depends on them only. TTX is one of hundreds of components of success. Crew training, people's morale, weather, climate are no less important, and nobody takes them into account.

TTX in practice is when you walk through the mountains in the Crimea at + 35 with your lips dry and your back wet and at the 10 kilometer of the way you understand that the ideal TTX backpack rubs your left shoulder unbearably. And to go for a long time. And here you remember our grandfathers, who not only walked, but also fought, ran, jumped. And for them, probably, the most valuable TTX of a machine gun or rifle was that they didn’t rub their backs and weigh less than a kilogram, and not all these beautiful numbers on pieces of paper about the firing range and rate of fire.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Alex_59

The main problem of theorists. It’s hard for people far from technology to understand that TTX is only a certain base, a technical foundation. And what the people who exploit this technology will achieve depends on them only. TTX is one of hundreds of components of success.

It's not just about people. The main problem of theorists is that it is not clear what numbers are written in the tabular TTX: do they have anything to do with serial samples, are they completely given, etc.
For example, the same "armor penetration tables" are 99% theoretical values ​​calculated according to Jacob de Mar. Ideal shell for armor of unclear hardness. And then all sorts of diggers of archives come and pull out documents, according to which real guns with real shells only scratch theoretically pierced armor during tests.
Or take the tables of performance characteristics of tanks. The tabular power reserve of the T-34 is 300-400 km. In fact, on tests in 1941, the serial T-34s covered 165-185 km with full tank filling. Less than the "three" we tested. But the T-34 still had a power reserve, which the diesel was eating as if not into itself.

In short, tabular performance characteristics of military equipment should be taken with extreme caution.

[goose]

Quote: Alexey RA

Or take the performance tables of tanks. Tabular cruising range T-34 - 300-400 km.

As for the T-34 - I agree, but it was caused by the technical dampness of a particular series, which should not have been on the conveyor, because technical problems were eliminated BEFORE STARTING IN THE SERIES. But in a strange way, the first models came out as if there was no work on the bugs. And yes, not all errors have been fixed. For example, take the tracks. The correct manufacturing process was invented, tested and implemented in 1939 and tested on tracks for the T-26 with a guaranteed mileage of more than 1 thousand km. But for the T-34 in 1940, substandard tracks were produced with the wrong technology for hardening the tracks, which did not pass the warranty period.
However, in 1944, the T-34-85 blocked its tabular data on the resource, mileage, etc. They actually covered more than 500 km per march without breakdowns or refueling.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: goose

As for the T-34 - I agree, but it was caused by the technical dampness of a particular series, which should not have been on the conveyor, because technical problems were eliminated BEFORE STARTING IN THE SERIES. But in a strange way, the first models came out as if there was no work on the bugs.

Mayo sho mayo - You cannot but know that we do not have the Hindenburgs in reserve ©.
That the factory, which previously produced light BT-7s and manually assembled T-35s (6-15 pieces a year), was able to make cash frames and available machines - that was out of the gate. Yes, and the engine drivers got it: the real power of the B-2 in March 1941 was from 465 to 485 hp.
It was not for nothing that Kulik tried to stop the acceptance of the T-34 until the shortcomings were eliminated - for not only did the production vehicle not correspond to the technical specification, but also the plant stubbornly refused to eliminate the identified shortcomings, driving the "plan along the shaft".

That is why it is impossible to blindly trust the passport TTX, thoughtlessly transferring them to all the produced versions of all years of release.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Alex_59

It seems to me that this conclusion is somewhat outdated. Today, IA aircraft are equipped with highly advanced radars; they are theoretically capable of independently searching for targets. Just equipping the Harriers was very modest even at that time, but for the current day more

For those times, Bdyu Fox seemed not to be so bad, and the Argentinean Skyhawks had none at all.

Quote: Alex_59

o in the absence of an external control system, modern fighters will not be so blind and helpless as the Harriers.

If radarless machines like the Skaykhovs operating without the support of DRLO / REB / IA will operate against them, then yes. But if modern airplanes + AWACS / electronic warfare / electronic warfare are defeated against modern fighter jets, my IMHO is guaranteed.

Quote: Alex_59

TTX in practice is when you walk through the mountains in the Crimea at +35 with dry lips and a wet back and on the 10th kilometer of the way you understand that the ideal TTX backpack rubs your left shoulder unbearably

Yes :))) And then you don't really care that the backpack was created using the latest 3D modeling technologies, invisible in the radar and infrared ranges, that it almost completely fits the latest AMRAAM, that its pockets are controlled by the latest software version "block 44" and that when the backpack falls, it lands strictly vertically And even glasses that allow you to see through a backpack as if it does not please very little

[Simpsonian]

On the Skyhawks of the Argentine Navy there was a radar station, on most of the "army" ones - there was no one.

[Maegrom]

Thanks so much for the loop. It is very informative both in relation to a specific issue, and the general approach to analysis.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Please, glad I liked it :)

[Oprychnik]

Great work, Andrey, accurate, clear, in German, in some way, pedantic presentation of material. Here experts will find, understandably shortcomings. Liked.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Oprychnik

crisp, clear, german, in some way, pedantic presentation of material

Thank you! I strove for this.

Quote: Oprychnik

Here connoisseurs will find, understandably flaws.

Say thanks to them for that - they will make us smarter :)

[Alexez]

I enjoyed reading the entire series of articles, and to be honest, I was looking forward to the release of each sequel! Many thanks to the author. One small sentence: at the bottom of each table, put the line "TOTAL:" - otherwise you have to count every time)))

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Alexez

One small sentence: at the bottom of each table, add the line "TOTAL:"

TOTAL - this is "Only May 1-25", and "including on the" bomb alley "" this is including - they do not need to be added :)

[Simpsonian]

The most essential.

"Comparably" British aircraft were 5 or more times less, while they patrolled constantly, the Argentines, with such superiority, concentrated their forces wherever they wanted and when they wanted, flew in echelon and in waves.
Failure would have been the sinking of at least one dock-ship with a landing party, or AV Hermes, which did not happen. 21 in the morning the landing was already on the shore.
A pair of harriers in a patrol could intercept and bring down only ~ 5 aircraft, if a wave of 15 (one of many) is in its direction, then 10 cars will pass through a patrol ...
External guidance was needed by the Harriers in order not to shine their radar, because the Argentines tried to avoid meeting them.
There were 3-5 patrols, sometimes only 2 at night until the landing and carrier groups were divided. The islands area with docks and landing ships covered 2-4, aircraft carriers 1-2 and usually single-aircraft.
May 21-25 were the most concentrated raids on ships. Battles (attempts to attack the Harriers) were in early May.
GR3 took part in air defense patrols, although they were attack aircraft. He could also throw and throw cassette, KAB and the gun he had was a caliber like the A-10.
There were more fights, all maneuverable simply because Harrier could not fly at supersonic (where they are not conducted). All is not in favor of Argentina, or in a draw.
The speed of the Buccaneer is also low, which is not a VTOL aircraft, but will not catch up. If the Phantoms were without Harriers, they would all be shot down on May 1. An F-4 cannot fight without cover from ... Mirage (Blvd. East) or Crusader (Vietnam). This is a heavy deck interceptor Tu-16, and its anti-ship missiles. And then the Mirages and Daggers, who this time would not be on their side, would have killed the "ward" below, with thousands of victims ...
Harrier took off shortened and could carry 4 AIM-9s like the F-16, but two of his suspension units were occupied under the PTB to increase the patrol time. They made 6-4 sorties per day (Sea Harriers, GR3 less)
Argentinean victory in the air alone - Pukara shot down an English helicopter.
Numerous Argentine links to clear the sky from these few English intrusive apparatuses were not able to. It is impossible to establish complete dominance on a subsonic vacuum cleaner, but running from them is also not dominance in the air.
The approaching landing is when these connections are disconnected. At this time, all of these D.6. from BBS got drunk in the bar at the expense of Woodworth strong and sent to sleep ...

[voyaka uh]

"In 1982, the British sent an openly weak
and unable to carry out modern naval and air operations, the operational unit "////

I would have deleted this phrase. She does not fit with the whole article.

Well, cannot "frankly weak and incapable of conducting modern
naval and air operations "task force
to carry out a difficult landing
a naval operation thousands of kilometers from its bases in a stormy ocean.
The operation ending with the surrender of the enemy. And air support for Harriers -
and fighter and strike - a significant part of the success of this landing operation.

[Alex_59]

Quote: voyaka uh

Well, cannot "frankly weak and incapable of conducting modern
naval and air operations "task force
to carry out a difficult landing
a naval operation thousands of kilometers from its bases in a stormy ocean.

Powerful enough to defeat the Argentines, but not powerful enough to counter opponents of comparable strength. Those. in the food chain, Argentina is plankton, Great Britain is fish, and the USA and the USSR are sitting on the shore with echo sounders and electric fishing rods.

[voyaka uh]

"but not powerful enough to counter
comparable in power to opponents "////

Always the connection is allowed in accordance with the strength of the enemy.
Russia did not send all its ground forces against Georgia.
It was not necessary.
They send optimally strengths sufficient for superiority and victory.

[Alex_59]

Quote: voyaka uh

Always the connection is allowed in accordance with the strength of the enemy.

When the war for some kind of archipelago on the hell is on the pitches - maybe. And when it comes to survival in principle - they send everything that is. Could you really not know this in Israel?
Here the question is - if the British sent the best, then why such losses? If they sent not the best, then maybe it was worth sending the best to avoid such losses? And about the same thing - if everything was sent, then it turns out a little, but if not everything was - maybe it was necessary to send all that is to avoid such losses? And if the enemy were the USSR, and not Argentina, what would happen? If so flopped with some Argentina ...

[voyaka uh]

You, too, begin to reason: "if only."

British losses 255 killed, 775 wounded. A lot unless
for a long sea expedition and landing?

[Simpsonian]

All the Sea Harriers that were available were sent from the carrier-based aircraft. There were few C-Harriers because the aircraft was designed to collide subsonic Tu-142 and Tu-95RTs, based on "command cruisers with a solid deck" on which there were only 3 to 5 of them. We collected all the wings from the unfinished two "cruisers" of the three Illastries class (only Invincible fought with Hermes). And then they had to be strengthened with the "army" attack aircraft harrier GR.3

The most likely estimate of the warriors is 28 Sea Harriers and 14 GR.3, with only 20 at the beginning. Lost in flight accidents and from fire from the ground 10pcs.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: voyaka uh

Always the connection is allowed in accordance with the strength of the enemy.
Russia did not send all its ground forces against Georgia.

Well, England sent against Argentina the main forces of its fleet. In fact, the British sent into battle everything they could collect.

[goose]

Quote: voyaka uh

Well, cannot "frankly weak and incapable of conducting modern
naval and air operations "task force
to carry out a difficult landing

And if RCC were not 5 but 15?
If all the bombs exploded?
The connection would be defeated with minimal loss. Another thing is that the British did not consider themselves so weak.

[voyaka uh]

If yes, if only ...

[Simpsonian]

Well, if at the beginning of the conflict there were all 40 English cars and ships from which they could fly, and not just 20?

[Oprychnik]

As they say, although it is indecent: "If my grandmother had a member, she would be a grandfather!"

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: voyaka uh

I would have deleted this phrase. She does not fit with the whole article.

It’s good that you are not a moderator

Quote: voyaka uh

Well, cannot "frankly weak and incapable of conducting modern
naval and air operations "task force
to carry out a difficult landing
a naval operation thousands of kilometers from its bases in a stormy ocean.

Maybe Woodworth showed it.
The landing itself is organizationally and technically difficult, but for 1982 it was a routine operation, there are no technical problems there. Operations of this type were carried out in WWII (yes the same Madagascar). The whole question is what kind of opposition will the defenders provide, well, so the English compound with great difficulty and often showing heroism could land an assault with Argentina's frankly weak and absolutely untimely opposition.

[Simpsonian]

This trans-ocean landing has no precedent. They landed along and not across as in Algeria, and met resistance. When countering supersonic aircraft. There were no coastal bases like in D-Day, in Korea or in Vietnam. Numerically, enemy aircraft on the contrary exceeded.

[voyaka uh]

"It's good that you are not a moderator" ////

What are you, I am for freedom of speech.
I liked that during the writing of the series of articles you listened
to opponents. What influenced the overall result - more balanced,
than intermediate conclusions.
And it added value to the whole review. Thanks for the interesting stuff.
and discussions.

[Oprychnik]

Carlson, who lives on the roof against the Hedgehog in the fog ...)))

[Operator]

The conclusions are much more specific:
- The Argentines "won" the Falklands War by hitting bombs on many British ships;
- the British won the Falkland War, since all but three bombs did not explode (the winner’s laurels should rightfully belong not to Admiral Woodworth, but to the anonymous SIS chief, which was well known to the financiers of the central apparatus of the British Navy);
- the aircraft guarding the mast "Harriers" expectedly (see their flight characteristics) failed the task of providing air defense of the ship formation (see the number of bombs hitting ships);
- the only advantage of the British in air battles was associated not with fighters, but with aviation weapons - all-aspect air-to-air missiles, which was also known from their flight characteristics (with great success, piston Broncos with radars could be used as air defense fighters and Sidewinder on board).

No comprehensive use of the armed forces can ever bring victory if the weapon does not explode, blindly like a mole or has a meager range of use.

Therefore, thousands of well-coordinated Zulu and Sudanese with melee weapons at the ready lost outright to the single machine guns of Hiram Maxim. The same happened at the stage of the land part of the Falklands War - the British at night fired from afar with Milan missiles the defense of the Argentines, who did not even see where death was coming from, not to mention the fact that the range of small arms fire did not allow reaching the launch points missiles.

In general, glory to I. Stalin, N. Khrushchev and L. Brezhnev for our nuclear missile shield and sword.

[Simpsonian]

The flying torch of Milan can be seen very well from afar at night. This KAB dropped from Harrier is not visible at all. ATGM at the beginning of the conflict were in Argentina in no less quantities.
An ATGM calculation with a range of only 2 km can easily be reached by a cannon, mortar, or a recoil shot. She can also fly where she flew, does not have time.

[Simpsonian]

Multi-angle rockets were launched only 1-2 times in the forehead. AIM-9L was a missile from which it was easy enough to dodge even when launched in the tail. From the matra is more difficult. To let this in addition to the forehead when the enemy already knows about this trick is to waste rockets in the empty. When launched into the forehead, the GOS captured the target at a distance many times shorter than when launched into the tail.
The GOS she had was the same as that of the "Needle", on which ordinary heat traps did not work. And increased range so that no one has time to break away and get out of close combat on afterburner.

[iouris]

Highlighted two wonderful points:
how British journalists in the service of Her Majesty's politicians "sold" information to the enemy,
how British society met its military after the "job" was done.

[Raphael_83]

Excellent completion of an excellent cycle with a comprehensive debriefing. And the accessible mathematics, summarized in tablets, pleased - otherwise in a month I had already forgotten how it all started there , and the conclusions are quite indisputable in some places, but reasoned and logically arising from the considered material.
Andrei, please write again (even after a creative holiday, nevertheless).
From SW.

[Taoist]

Great article cycle. I think that hardly anyone would have done better on the existing base. Unfortunately, I cannot agree with some conclusions as a result of the article, but most likely because I still have the opportunity to "apply my line" of practical experience to the events described, which will accordingly change the interpretation of facts.

1) First of all, a question that is almost not considered in any way and is usually "overwritten" by more sonorous questions of combat use. But as experience shows, this is question number 1 in conditions of hostilities - it is he who determines the intensity of the combat use of aircraft. Namely, the ability of ground services to provide the required intensity of combat work. There are practically no data on Argentina, but "indirect" ones show that the work of ABATO and TEC on Argentine airfields was disgusting. (There can be many reasons)

2) The author draws conclusions about the low efficiency of ships with VTOL aircraft, starting from the generally completely unusable options (I personally cannot call the same Invincible a warship). The fact that the British went into battle on "samotopes" certainly does them credit, but also does not allow them to draw full conclusions ...

3) The author absolutely correctly points out the almost complete absence of combat control and centralized guidance by aviation with the British. But for some reason it draws the wrong conclusion that in order for this control to be provided, the AWACS planes were necessary. AWACS increase the effectiveness of such a system but are not its necessary component.

4) For some reason, the author believes that the possibility of suspension of only two side-drivers was determined by the low load capacity of the VTOL aircraft. This is, to say the least, not so. Another question is why Harrier had only two pylons allowing the suspension of such missiles. For example, on the same Yak, 4 pieces of P 60 were hung as standard (although Yak was never optimized for air combat)

5) The author considers "low speed" to be a serious drawback - although this is also not the case. In principle, the subsonic speeds of the cars are practically equal - which simply made the attack on the catch-up courses useless. But this is typical for all modern cars. Likewise, it was almost useless for Hornet to catch up with Backfire. You can work effectively only when intercepting. (And we have no guidance ...)

Well, in the sequel (alternative part) I can tell you what happened when trying on this conflict on equipment and weapons (and most importantly combat manuals) of the Soviet Navy of this period.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Taoist

2) The author draws conclusions about the low efficiency of ships with VTOL aircraft, starting from generally completely useless options (to call the same Invincible warship, I personally do not turn my tongue).

Hmm ... I'm afraid that if you make a suitable version of the VTOL carrier, you will get a ship with a price and size a little less than a small AB for normal aircraft (like the same "Clemenceau").
Actually, one of the main arguments of the VTOL supporters was precisely the possibility of basing on any ersatz ships. EMNIP, "Harrier" even on a ship the size of an EM wanted to thrust - with landing by the method of seizing a hanging aircraft by a landing manipulator installed on the ship.

Quote: Taoist

3) The author absolutely correctly points out the almost complete absence of combat control and centralized guidance by aviation with the British. But for some reason it draws the wrong conclusion that in order for this control to be provided, the AWACS planes were necessary. AWACS increase the effectiveness of such a system but are not its necessary component.

No, well, you can, of course, cosplay USN under Okinawa by exhibiting RLD ships in the most dangerous directions. The trouble is that the speed of aircraft since then has increased by 2-3 times - and to ensure centralized guidance, the perimeter needs to be expanded. Otherwise, the control center will simply be late - and the aircraft will not have time to react.
The trouble is that the number of ships is limited. And each RLD ship is minus one anti-aircraft defense ship. In addition, for RLDs, ships with strong air defense are needed - otherwise they are just floating targets (in real life, limes had to be put up in the RLD in general a couple of ships).
That is, in conditions of a limited number of ships, to ensure control and guidance of air defense aircraft, it is the AWACS vehicle that is needed. Otherwise, we simply don’t have enough ships of a direct escort (or in the early warning radar field around the junction holes will gap, as if inviting the enemy).
4 AWACS vehicles (24 * 7 duty outfit) would completely eliminate the need to dispatch RLDs, which would enhance the air defense of the DESO or the AV group and provide the IA and ship air defense systems with advanced missile defense systems.

It was not for nothing that limes were filmed Sea King HAS.1982 (AEW) on an emergency basis in 2. which, however, with all the haste with its development and creation, was still late for the war.

[Taoist]

Quote: Alexey RA

Hmm ... I'm afraid that if you make a suitable version of the VTOL carrier, you will get a ship with a price and size a little less than a small AB for normal aircraft (like the same "Clemenceau").
Actually, one of the main arguments of the VTOL supporters was precisely the possibility of basing on any ersatz ships. EMNIP, "Harrier" even on a ship the size of an EM wanted to shove - with landing by the method of seizing a hanging aircraft by a landing manipulator installed on the ship

well, let's still separate "cutlets from flies" ie "economic arguments" from the actual use of VTOL aircraft. It is no coincidence that we did not build "ersatz" and built Project 1143. Which, by the way, among other things, could well manage its air group normally even without AWACS aircraft. This is exactly the option with restrictions on the "escort" ... Because if we build a large AV with AWACS planes, then at least he will have to build the corresponding escort ... without options. And then "what for goat button accordion"?

1143 was made as a universal combat vehicle for low-intensity conflicts - a kind of "universal soldier". (By the way, at present, I think that such a ship would be in the subject for us - especially taking into account modern capabilities)

[Simpsonian]

It was then no coincidence that the Indians rebuilt it ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Taoist

well, let's still separate "cutlets from flies" ie "economic arguments" from the actual use of VTOL aircraft. It is no coincidence that we did not build "ersatz" and built project 1143. Which, by the way, among other things, could well manage its air group normally, even without AWACS aircraft.

As a result of building a normal AB for VTOL, we got:
1143 project:
Displacement: 31 tons (standard), 900 tons (full).

For comparison:
AB "Clemenceau":
Displacement: 32 tons (standard).

Quote: Taoist

Because if we build a large AB with AWACS planes, then at least he will have to build the corresponding escort ... without options.

So a normal AB with VTOL aircraft also needs an escort. So escort issues need to be addressed in both cases.

Quote: Taoist

1143 was made as a universal combat vehicle for low-intensity conflicts - a kind of "universal soldier".

If we replace "Invincible" with 1143 at the Falklands, it suddenly becomes clear. that this community also nowhere without an escort. Because 2 single-channel (target) medium-range air defense systems alone cannot provide normal air defense of the ship. And 1143.4 does not have an SD SAM system at all - only 4 four-channel (targeting) MD SAM systems.

[maximghost]

For comparison:
AB "Clemenceau":

Let's deal.
If we look at it in the future, then in the 90s the gyrfalcons are rearmament on the Yak-141, and the same clemenceau, as far as I know, could only operate with cruisers.
The air group of the ships is comparable, but on the cretto are heavy anti-ship missiles, air defense systems and a decent amount of anti-aircraft artillery.

Into the escort account. You can’t do without it, it’s a fact, but the number of escorts for TAKRA is less than for an aircraft carrier, all the more light (VTOL carrier).

Because 2 single-channel (for purpose) medium-range air defense systems alone cannot provide normal air defense of a ship.

If we take into account what Argentina had - an air defense of 11-43 mb would be enough, but against a normal opponent - yes you are right, there is no way anywhere without an escort ...

[Simpsonian]

Quote: maximghost

heavy RCC

If they did not stand, then before the appearance of the Yak-141 and the MiG-29, the MiG-23 could safely fly from it, which was a "failed carrier" for the Ulyanovsk
As part of the wing, the Chinese have a MiG-27.

[Simpsonian]

4 AWACS Argentines would simply skip concentrated concentrated high-altitude attacks from the coast one by one, especially with such a numerical advantage.

[Alex_59]

Quote: Taoist

3) The author absolutely correctly points out the almost complete absence of combat control and centralized guidance by aviation with the British. But for some reason it draws the wrong conclusion that in order for this control to be provided, the AWACS planes were necessary.

And about the fact that they can not be put on the VTOL aircraft carrier. Why not? You can - Ka-31 for example. The British did not realize, and such a helicopter could seriously affect the course of the war. Continuous radar coverage in the radius of 100-150 km. Almost the entire theater DB closes.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Greetings, dear Taoist!
Thank you for your appreciation.

Quote: Taoist

Unfortunately, I cannot agree with some conclusions as a result of the article, but most likely because I still have the opportunity to "apply my line" of practical experience to the events described, which will accordingly change the interpretation of facts.

Quite and very. Anyway, I’m a sofa admiral, I don’t have any personal experience.

Quote: Taoist

as experience shows, this is issue number 1 in combat conditions - it is he who determines the intensity of the combat use of aircraft

I agree. But I seem to have it :)))

Quote: Taoist

There are practically no data on Argentina, but "indirect" ones show that the work of ABATO and TEC on Argentine airfields was disgusting. (There can be many reasons)

Probably yes. But there may have been some other limit on tankers restricting the use of aviation. Personally, I believe that the problem is precisely in maintenance, but alas, I do not have the exact data.

Quote: Taoist

The author absolutely correctly points out the almost complete absence of combat control and centralized guidance by the use of aviation in the British. But for some reason it draws the wrong conclusion that in order for this control to be provided, the AWACS planes were necessary.

I don't see any other options. AWACS helicopters "do not roll", but in order to justify this, you need to write a lot, and the size of the article is limited. I thought to touch on this issue in an "off-cycle" article. With ships, planes are not very much controllable, which the Falklands have proven excellently. The British had ground observation posts. What else?

Quote: Taoist

For some reason, the author believes that the possibility of suspension of only two side-drivers was determined by the low load capacity of the VTOL aircraft.

A bit wrong - I still wrote

Small ammunition - 2 "Sidewinder",

The low carrying capacity interfered with them, too, but when working on ground targets.

Quote: Taoist

In principle, the subsonic speeds of the cars are almost equal - which just made the attack on the catch-up courses useless

But what would prevent a subsonic Skyhawks and Canberra from catching up with a supersonic Phantom?

Quote: Taoist

Well, in the sequel (alternative part) I can tell you what happened when trying on this conflict on equipment and weapons (and most importantly combat manuals) of the Soviet Navy of this period.

It will be very interesting!

[Taoist]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

But what would prevent a subsonic Skyhawks and Canberra from catching up with a supersonic Phantom?

Yes, everything too ... Limited opportunities for supersonic flights at low altitudes ... Well, the main thing is their absence ... I think everyone understands that if Britain had the opportunity to have a full-fledged aircraft carrier, the picture would be different ... But Argentina theoretically had it ... Did not help.

[Simpsonian]

There would be no picture, or it would be necessary to have 20 aircraft carriers and lose 5 of them. They could have bombed everything on the islands, and they landed and took them - vryatli. Or just a helicopter that would be dumped into the sea.
The F-4K is too non-flip and cannot withstand the coastal Mirage.

[Simpsonian]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

But what would prevent a subsonic Skyhawks and Canberra from catching up with a supersonic Phantom?

Supersonic Mirages that mutually knocked down the MiG-21, in front of which the F-4 was just a sheep ...

[Simpsonian]

The attack on the catch-up courses is done with a decrease, but with the planned wave-building, the enemy can be only one, and if there is an advantage over it in height.

Approximately as described here when the Yak-3 attacked the German Arado:

Quote: saturn.mmm

Quote: Aspeed

From the ground to 5000 meters, the unconditionally strongest air fighter. Fighter fighter.

Vorozheykin Arseniy Vasilievich.

"Arada" rushes towards. I have an altitude of 6000 meters. When the jet adversary is in front of me at an angle of 45 degrees, I will go straight down and there I will intercept him.

As always, the "Yak" easily, like a toy, turned over and went straight to the ground, quickly picking up speed. The enemy was behind. Why doesn't he contrive and hit me with 4 cannons, and maybe also with rockets? He has only to raise his nose, and he, having great speed, will immediately overtake me. And I sharply twist the car into a dive to see how the "Arada" reacts to me.

The plane is still flying low and will soon overtake me. This is where I must catch him. And I spin the car again. "Yak" obeys with difficulty, as if complaining: "Enough of me, test" - and rushes to get out of the dive. I hold him tightly, continuing to lose height. The speed gauge needle is already vibrating at the round and dangerous figure - "700". And my "Yak", as if having renounced life, lost its agility and no longer rushes up into the sky, but with cold doom it goes to the ground.

The car is not designed for such a high speed: it can fall apart. And if there is enough strength, it will not come out of the dive: it will suck in. With full muscle tension, I begin to withdraw. He listens hard, but obeys. True, the eyes darken from overload, but I know from experience that it will pass, you just have to release the pressure on the handle. A little more effort. If only "Yak" could withstand! Should ! So I want to. And I pull. Although there is night in my eyes, I feel that everything is in order.

"Yak" well done, survived! In the eyes it becomes clear, I see the horizon, sky, earth. There must be "Arad" somewhere here. There she is ! Nearby. Calculated successfully. And then something happened that I had already ceased to fear. There was an explosion, a blow to the head. I choked on something thick, cold. The eyes darkened again. Consciousness clearly noted: this is the last attack. A shell burst in the cockpit ... But why was it poured over with cold, not heat, and I did not feel either pain or burning fire? Was the plane scattered? .. However, before me again the sky, earth, horizon and "Arad". My Yak is intact. And the explosion, the blow? .. That's it - tore off the lantern from the cockpit, and the cold air whipped in the face. I am taking aim at Arad!

Here is a failure. Already far away, I may not get there. I shoot. Great! Cords of tracer shells and bullets caught up with the enemy and dug into his body. Sparks, fire sprang out from "Arada", thick smoke poured down, and the plane disappeared into the Berlin fire ... "

[Simpsonian]

The attack on the catch-up courses is done with a decrease, but with the planned wave-building, the enemy can be only one, and if there is an advantage over it in height.

Approximately as described here when the Yak-3 attacked the German Arado:

Quote: saturn.mmm

Quote: Aspeed

From the ground to 5000 meters, the unconditionally strongest air fighter. Fighter fighter.

Vorozheykin Arseniy Vasilievich.

"Arada" rushes towards. I have an altitude of 6000 meters. When the jet adversary is in front of me at an angle of 45 degrees, I will go straight down and there I will intercept him.

As always, the "Yak" easily, like a toy, turned over and went straight to the ground, quickly picking up speed. The enemy was behind. Why doesn't he contrive and hit me with 4 cannons, and maybe also with rockets? He has only to raise his nose, and he, having great speed, will immediately overtake me. And I sharply twist the car into a dive to see how the "Arada" reacts to me.

The plane is still flying low and will soon overtake me. This is where I must catch him. And I spin the car again. "Yak" obeys with difficulty, as if complaining: "Enough of me, test" - and rushes to get out of the dive. I hold him tightly, continuing to lose height. The speed gauge needle is already vibrating at the round and dangerous figure - "700". And my "Yak", as if having renounced life, lost its agility and no longer rushes up into the sky, but with cold doom it goes to the ground.

The car is not designed for such a high speed: it can fall apart. And if there is enough strength, it will not come out of the dive: it will suck in. With full muscle tension, I begin to withdraw. He listens hard, but obeys. True, the eyes darken from overload, but I know from experience that it will pass, you just have to release the pressure on the handle. A little more effort. If only "Yak" could withstand! Should ! So I want to. And I pull. Although there is night in my eyes, I feel that everything is in order.

"Yak" well done, survived! In the eyes it becomes clear, I see the horizon, sky, earth. There must be "Arad" somewhere here. There she is ! Nearby. Calculated successfully. And then something happened that I had already ceased to fear. There was an explosion, a blow to the head. I choked on something thick, cold. The eyes darkened again. Consciousness clearly noted: this is the last attack. A shell burst in the cockpit ... But why was it poured over with cold, not heat, and I did not feel either pain or burning fire? Was the plane scattered? .. However, before me again the sky, earth, horizon and "Arad". My Yak is intact. And the explosion, the blow? .. That's it - tore off the lantern from the cockpit, and the cold air whipped in the face. I am taking aim at Arad!

Here is a failure. Already far away, I may not get there. I shoot. Great! Cords of tracer shells and bullets caught up with the enemy and dug into his body. Sparks, fire sprang out from "Arada", thick smoke poured down, and the plane disappeared into the Berlin fire ... "

[Simpsonian]

If it was far away, the gun didn’t reach, then Sea Harrier let the Sidewinder in (if they remained after the attack on the previous wave). Induced separately from the ready-to-attack position, GR3 let out all its NARs after the Argentine, and even if not a single Argentinean usually surged with completely predictable consequences at such a low altitude.
NAR is not such a harmless weapon, and the Yak-3 pilot in the quote above was afraid of them, and most heavy bombers were shot down by the Me-262 with their use from a safe distance, not guns.

[exo]

Great article loop! Got a real pleasure from reading. Thank you!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

And thank you for your kind words!

[maximghost]

I don't see any other options. AWACS helicopters "do not roll", but in order to justify this, you need to write a lot, and the size of the article is limited.

At close range I do not understand why helicopters "do not roll." Yes, they are much less effective than aircraft, but they significantly expand the field of view of the compound + can be based on each destroyer.

Well, by the articles, they are gorgeous, but I do not agree with the conclusions on the VTOL carriers and the VTOL themselves. (although everything that you wrote is 100% applicable to harriers and invisibles, but only to them.), as well as underestimating Puqar and UBS, although they could only work on the British ground forces, they could suck, if properly applied, they could .

[Simpsonian]

Quote: maximghost

as well as the underestimation of pukar and UBS, although they could only work on the British ground forces, they could suck, if properly used, they could do it quite strongly.

The only awesome victory for Argentina - "Pucara" shot down the British helicopter "Scout".

[iouris]

This can be explained by the fact that the Argentines focused on strikes on ships, dodging air battles. It is reasonable.

[Simpsonian]

Their Pukara then why focused on a helicopter?

[Simpsonian]

This can be explained by the fact that they try not to get involved in battles when they cannot win in it. But you still need to fly and hit the ships.

[fsb_buzuk]

Great cycle! I looked forward to every article!

[surok12]

Great article loop. This has not happened for a long time. I enjoyed reading.

[Kir1984]

Thanks for the interesting work, almost like a detective read