New outcast. Who becomes the driving force of the revolution in the CIS
The revolutionary upheavals faced by hybrid regimes in the post-Soviet space are becoming increasingly different from what political science and the classical theory of democratization are used to. The middle class, the traditional mover of revolution, is gradually dissolving in the socio-demographic landscape of the post-Soviet regimes. The reason is, firstly, the permanent economic crisis, which does not allow a more or less dense core of the middle class to form. And secondly, the deliberate actions of the elite to gradually cooptate and transform the middle class into a bureaucratic apparatus, directly dependent on the state, and therefore incapable of presenting democratic demands.
Who then becomes the main conductor of social transformations? Are these people driven by the desire for greater freedom and democratic ideals, or something completely different? You can answer this question by trying to understand the attitudes of people who took part in the last Ukrainian revolution.
Social demography of the revolution
In his recently published book “Revolutions. A very brief introduction. ”American political analyst Jack Goldstone describes cultural, demographic and other reasons that can cause serious social transformations. For example, social elevators that often work poorly in authoritarian regimes, multiplied by stagnant labor market trends, can give rise to the phenomenon of unnecessary people, whose hearts will demand revolutionary changes. In addition, a sharp increase in population size and life expectancy have created a “youth bulge” in many countries in Africa and the Middle East. The “Arab Spring” was based precisely on young people who could not find a place in life because of the outdated structure of the economy.
The influence of such factors can be found in recent stories Russia. American sociologist Georgy Derlugyan, after analyzing the socio-demographic portrait of Caucasian separatism, came to the conclusion that there are two groups that played a key role in the events of the 1990-s. The first group is the intelligentsia, which, especially in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, felt deprived of its position and could not occupy leadership positions in the party, institutions of science and culture of that period. This was superimposed on the general overproduction of the intelligentsia in the USSR and the lack of social mobility. The symbolic capital accumulated by them could not be applied before the collapse of the USSR, but after the dictatorship was weakened from the center, it opened a window of opportunity for the Caucasian intelligentsia, throwing them into the frontline revolution.
Therefore, among the Chechen separatists we see the poet Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and the actor of the Grozny drama theater Akhmed Zakayev. Shakespearer Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who became president of Georgia, was soon deposed by modernist sculptor Tengiz Kitovani and film critic Jaba Ioseliani - and this list can be continued for a long time.
The second social group, which also clearly manifested itself during the crisis, is the underclass of the Caucasian and especially Chechen youth. Seeing no opportunity to get a decent profession, they assimilated the code of the street, which replaced them with normal institutions of socialization. Their perceptions and attitudes were articulated by the national intelligentsia, easily dropping the party elite at a crisis moment, but having failed to keep under-class representatives, who felt their strength, from further separatist actions.
Another example: in the middle of 1990, employees of power structures, who lost a significant part of their advantages and social status with the fall of the USSR, came to the fore of the post-Soviet space as “power entrepreneurs”, trying to literally monetize their symbolic capital. It was these people who took advantage of the state’s loss of the monopoly on violence, began to engage in racketeering, put pressure on entrepreneurs and turn it into their own business.
Group portrait
Trying to find the same social groups and assess their impact on the Ukrainian revolution, one must take into account the peculiarities of the post-Soviet regimes. In accordance with the general trend, the middle class of Ukrainian society is weak and remains in a permanent economic crisis. Those who first came to the Maidan in the fall of 2013 of the year can be partly attributed to middle class, civil and social activists formed by an intelligentsia layer. But soon they were joined by other social groups, changing the portrait of the Ukrainian revolutionary.
Who were these people and what were their goals? How much their attitudes were based on the requirements of democratization, and how much their social justice? What did they expect to gain from regime change: greater freedom or the opportunity to use the situation for personal gain?
These questions can be answered by examining the phenomenon of the Ukrainian volunteer battalions, whose participants were ready to defend their interests with weapons in hand.
Having arisen spontaneously, the battalions began to be quickly integrated into the existing state structures, while maintaining, however, sufficient independence. The social status of the battalions, their leaders and combatants grew rapidly due to their participation in hostilities in the south-eastern regions. By about the summer of 2014, the battalions had become one of the pillars of the Ukrainian statehood, along with other security agencies - the police, the army, but to a large extent they remained independent of the latter.
Similar processes took place in the territory of the self-proclaimed republics, where armed groups were also formed under the leadership of pro-Russian activists.
Our study of the volunteer battalion commanders on both sides of the conflict allows us to characterize the overall portrait of this social group.
At first, commanders on both sides can not be attributed to the intelligentsia or the bearers of the traditional emancipatory values of the revolution. Their level of education is low, most of them received diplomas of non-prestigious, regional universities. Among them there are almost no representatives of creative professions, they are completely different from the Caucasian leaders described by Derlugyan. A quarter of the commanders come from law enforcement agencies, about the same number of former small entrepreneurs among them, and even fewer employees and civil servants.
Secondly, among commanders there are no people with high material or social status. The career and life trajectory of most of them was not very successful. Nevertheless, for the formation and management of the battalion requires serious social skills, talent, which the commanders successfully demonstrated. Thus, commanders rather represent a kind of potential counter-elite of the Ukrainian society, which in other socio-political conditions would be able to claim a higher social status.
Thirdly, nearly half of the commanders before the 2014 events of the year had experience in political or social activities. But the nature of this activity is quite specific. The brightest examples are: the ataman of the Don Don Cossacks (Kozitsyn), the chairman of the Krivoy Rog urban organization of the veterans of the Airborne Forces (Kolesnik), the chairman of the council of the Federation of organizations of the peacekeepers of Ukraine (Gumenyuk), the regional leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Kokhanovsky). All of them are difficult to attribute to human rights, civil or democratic activists.
As a result, the Ukrainian and Novorossiysk commanders are, of course, not the social bottom of society, but also not the middle class. At best, this is a coalition of the lower middle class with representatives of the lower class. Speaking in terms of macrosociology, commanders are in their own way a talented social group, perhaps a potential counter-elite, which, having failed to find its place in the current political system, was able to take advantage of the window of opportunity that has opened and sharply improve its social status.
Cossack and veteran
Commanders of volunteer battalions and militia units are a great example of lightning social mobility. Yes, some of them died in battle, someone was killed as a result of internal clashes, someone after a few months returned to his former affairs, but someone became a member of parliament, minister or even the head of the unrecognized republic.
It is unlikely that commanders moved the goals of democratization and the attainment of greater freedom, resistance to corruption and nepotism. They probably saw in the revolution the opportunity to finally apply their own skills and jump over several steps in the social hierarchy. By this, the commanders are similar to the representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia, who played a key role in the revolutionary events of the 1990s.
The opening ceremony of the monument "They defended their homeland" in honor of the militia, who two years ago defended the cities of the LC. Photo: Taras Dudnik / TASS
The main paradox here is that in the conditions of the crisis, civil society in its classical sense — human rights activists, democratic activists — and representatives of traditional, more closed structures — organizations of veterans, Cossacks, and nationalists — go to the forefront, contrary to expectations.
In early May, a monument was opened in Lugansk “They defended their homeland,” which consists of four figures: a Cossack, a veteran of the Afghan war, a young militiaman and a woman guarded by them. This self-presentation once again confirms this new, unexpected portrait of a revolutionary.
The effectiveness of such closed public organizations in a crisis is explained by the fact that for the successful mobilization of a group, it is necessary not so much trust among all its members as a solid avant-garde activists, followed by the remaining majority. Inside the veteran or other traditional public organizations a clear hierarchical structure is built, there is a cohesive core of leaders. It is easier for them to agree among themselves on collective actions, and then to mobilize the rest of the group for them.
The use of such social groups, with low education, income, social status and often semi-criminal past, various windows of opportunities in the post-Soviet space is already beyond the borders of the Ukrainian crisis. The phenomenon of the private military campaign "Wagner", which operates in Syria, is a vivid example.
Judging by the available data, the socio-demographic portrait of the leaders and fighters of the Wagner PMC coincides with the portrait of the Ukrainian and Novorossiysk combatants. These are in their own way talented people whose career has not developed in a peaceful manner. For some time they found themselves on the periphery of social stratification, but in a crisis they find new uses for themselves. What will happen to them when the hybrid war turns into a smoldering conflict, and the state’s need for them disappears, is an open and very alarming question.
Wider ranks
The influence of such social groups on the landscape of the post-Soviet states will continue to grow in the future. In the region, serious overproduction of security forces. Not finding a job in their specialty, they are looking for alternative ways, but they do not always successfully find them. Therefore, the number of such frustrated young and middle-aged men who are trying to find a place under the sun, including risky actions during a crisis, will grow.
Even those security officials who work in their specialty are far from always satisfied with their position. Career of a serving person is common, but not very prestigious. In a crisis of statehood, this may give rise to a serious problem: instead of being the backbone of the state and regime, service people use the moment to advance.
For Russia, this problem is reinforced by the last reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the reduction of the Federal Drug Control Service, the number of personnel in the military, and so on, as well as the gradual attenuation of the conflict in south-eastern Ukraine and the return of fighters from there. Not understanding how to integrate into a peaceful life at home, ex-combatants will try to find an alternative use for themselves. The recently created All-Russian National Movement is only one of the possible reincarnations.
Finally, an increase in the number of dissatisfied and frustrated social strata is a trend peculiar to not only post-Soviet countries, but also to the rest of the world. Inequality can severely distort the socio-demographic structure of both developed and developing countries in the coming decades. The growing property and status gap, the uncertainty about the future of the enlarged lower segment of the middle class may cause more than one revolutionary transformation.
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