Fragmentation of Ukraine
The greatest rejection of the official Kiev is the point of the Minsk agreements, demanding the granting of special status to Donbas, with its fixation in the Constitution.
Initially, Poroshenko tried to simply ignore this point, insisting that Kiev should first establish its control over the insurgent regions, as well as over the border of the DPR / LPR with Russia, and then some indefinite special status, for some indefinite time may be granted a separate law, the reference to which will be included not even in the body of the Constitution, but in transitional provisions.
It is not necessary to be an outstanding politician or diplomat to understand that “status later” would rather impair the rights of the population of “separatist regions” rather than confer additional powers to local authorities. In general, until October, 2015, the dates of the “Norman Four” in Paris, Kiev openly tried to interpret the special status of Donbass not as autonomy, but as a concentration camp.
Having seen in Paris and during the visits to Kiev by Biden and Nuland that followed in December 2015 and in the first months of 2016, the idea of distorting the essence of the Minsk agreements will not be supported by the West, due to the objective discrepancy between the tactical interests of Kiev and its partners from Washington, Berlin and Paris, Poroshenko chose a new tactic - sabotage tactics. Referring to the sentiments of the Rada deputies and the “general public”, he began to convince his Western friends that he would like to fulfill Minsk, but in no way. The deputies, they say, are not ready to vote, and the public may rebel at all and arrange an unauthorized maidan in response to an attempt to grant special powers to Donbas. To confirm this version, Nazi volunteers were periodically recruited, arranging colorful performances in Kiev with marches of "ATO veterans", burning tires and threatening to disperse the authorities if she decided to end the war.
Perhaps Peter Alekseevich would have managed to convince “friends and partners” in his version, but, as luck would have it, the entire second half of 2015 and the first half of 2016 of the year, local authorities of Kiev-controlled part of Ukraine came out with demands to change the relationship between Kiev and the regions, which absolutely fit into Minsk points. Almost half of Ukraine officially wished various forms of "decentralization" (according to Kiev terminology), but essentially federalization. And almost half of the speeches of local authorities came in April-May 2016 of the year.
In total for 2015-16. made:
* With the proposal for the redistribution of powers between the Cabinet and regional authorities - four regional councils (Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Odessa and Khmelnitsky), moreover, the Vladimir regional council of the Rivne region demanded to transfer amber mining issues to the local jurisdiction;
* With the requirement of electing governors - two regional councils (Kiev and Cherkassy) and two city councils (Volochansky, Kharkiv region and Pavlograd, Dnipropetrovsk region);
* With the requirement of special status - two regional councils (Zaporizhzhya and Zakarpattia);
The Odessa City Council demanded the granting of Odessa free-port status to Odessa.
These requirements were supported by a total of 604-I deputies of local councils and 104-I deputies of the Verkhovna Rada (25% of the total), among which about 25% at the national level and more than 30% at the local level were members of the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko and "Batkivschyna" (Yulia Tymoshenko).
If we sum up the deputies from all political forces that supported the 2014 coup and the beginning of the punitive operation in the Donbass, then they constitute a stable majority of supporters - more than 60% at the national level and more than 75% at the regional level.
These data not only leave no stone unturned on Poroshenko’s version of “insurmountable resistance” to Minsk in politics and society, but also allow us to draw three more important conclusions.
At firstIn general, the idea of the federalization of Ukraine (albeit under a different name) has serious support from the status political forces formally loyal to the Kiev regime.
Secondly, regional level politicians support this idea as a whole more actively than central level politicians, which is natural, since it is in favor of the former and to the detriment of the latter that the powers should be redistributed. However, at the central level, the idea enjoys strong public support. Moreover, supporters of federalization (“decentralization”) are much more active and organized than their opponents.
Thirdly, in the spring of 2016, the supporters of federalization became significantly more active and began to speak out in a coordinated manner, as evidenced by identical requirements addressed to Kiev by several regional councils at once.
In the 2015 year, each of the local authorities that approached Kiev regarding the granting of additional powers to it, put forward its own project, focused on a single region. Today we are talking about general constitutional changes that redistribute the power of the center in favor of the regions throughout the country.
In order to fully analyze the positions and possible actions of the parties in this game, we should pay attention to three more events that occurred during the last week:
1. Nadezhda Savchenko, who returned to Kiev, unexpectedly proposed to start direct negotiations with the Donbas, recognizing the status of Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky to be similar to the status of people's deputies of Ukraine. For this, she was subjected to obstruction by the authorities and politicians focused on Poroshenko. At the same time, despite the direct demands of Pyotr Alekseevich’s supporters to the Batkivshchyna leadership to determine their position regarding Savchenko’s statements (whether they are a personal initiative or a party position), no direct answer was given.
2. Already after this proposal, Savchenko publicly negotiated with Yarosh on cooperation. That is, at least for some of the Nazis, Savchenko’s proposals do not look “treacherous,” in this environment she remains a handshake.
3. The armed forces of Ukraine began shelling cities of Donbass from large-caliber artillery systems that are not in service with the Nazi volunteers. Thus, Kiev demonstrated that attempts to disrupt the truce come from the top leadership of the country, since it was possible to order the relocation and use of heavy artillery systems only from the level of the General Staff. In this case, Poroshenko cannot hide behind the "initiative" of uncontrolled Nazis or front-line commanders of the lower echelon who do not understand the intricacies and nuances of high politics.
Considering these three events in the context of the above activation of federalist sentiment among regional elites, we arrive at the following conclusions:
Tymoshenko, who views Poroshenko as a major obstacle on her way to a higher power, is not averse to using federalist sentiments to weaken her opponent’s positions altogether. It takes into account the peculiarities of the Ukrainian party building, when “dear people” in the regions buy their places in party lists and positions at the local level ad hoc, based on the actual prospects of a particular political force. In the future, since the money is paid, they feel bound by party discipline just as much as a party leader is able to force them to “walk in order”, under the threat of causing unacceptable damage to business and political interests. In all other respects, they perceive themselves as people who have bought a mandate for feeding from a certain territory, on the condition of sending fixed tribute to Kiev. If the central government violates the unwritten rules governing the procedure for levying and the amount of tribute and does not have sufficient power and authority, they consider themselves entitled to do so with the authorities as the Drevlians did in 945 year with Igor the Old tribute "with a small retinue."
Since Tymoshenko claims to be the supreme central authority, she does not want to officially unite with federalism. To update the topic in the information space, she uses the uncontrollable Savchenko, which can relatively easily and imperceptibly for her to give the desired motion vector, to the dark, especially if you do not stint on gifts and promises to people she trusts (close relatives and beloved friends).
Therefore, “Batkivschyna” does not prevent Savchenko from coming up with “peaceful” initiatives that go far beyond the borders of Minsk and are absolutely unacceptable for Poroshenko, but that are peacemaking, not federalistic. Since the world in Donbass a priori presupposes federalization, Savchenko's initiatives objectively play into the hands of federalist sentiments in the regions, but, firstly, officially “Batkivshchyna” has nothing to do with it, secondly, tomorrow Savchenko, Tymoshenko and “Batkivshchyna” can officially come forward against federalization with no less fervor than today advocate peace.
* In fact, for Poroshenko (which has already lost its popularity) a new front opens up - demands are put forward that will find support in society, but which he cannot realize, if only because he does not recognize DNR / LC as subjects of the negotiation process. A further erosion of Poroshenko’s public support delegitimizes his power (from the point of view of “activists of the Maidan) and facilitates his peaceful, or not quite, elimination in favor of Tymoshenko.
* Since neither Tymoshenko nor the “Batkivschyna” have personal guards in the form of Nazi battalions, and the official security forces are formally controlled by Poroshenko, Savchenko (also in the dark) is used to establish contacts with the Nazi leaders who lose (possibly temporarily) the internal Nazi struggle for the right to become the only All-Ukrainian Fuhrer.
If Biletsky, who created a military-political structure on the basis of the Azov regiment, trying to cover the whole of Ukraine and, after overthrowing oligarchic power, becoming the center of the Nazi centralized state assembly, is not interested in supporting the federalists, the less successful Fuhrer (Yarosh is the most famous of them , but not the only one) turned out to be ousted to the regions and are objectively interested in the autonomization of their food supply, in order to ensure it from the encroachments of neighbors and central authorities. They also cannot formally declare their commitment to federalization (this term has been compromised both as a whole by the Maidan activists and especially among the Nazis), but they are quite capable informally (under the specious pretext of “fighting the treacherous policies of Poroshenko) authorities.
* If necessary, or after use, Savchenko can be thrown out of politics and information space or eliminated physically. If, besides aspirations, Poroshenko succeeds in suppressing a creeping rebellion against his power, then the official Tymoshenko structures and she herself also has nothing to do with it. Poroshenko personally claimed that the release of Savchenko and her return to Ukraine was his merit. So he should be responsible for her actions.
* Peter Alekseevich, in turn, does not have a rich toolkit to fight against his political opponents. Therefore, he uses a template, but not once rescued his method. Poroshenko is going to aggravate in the Donbass in order to shout about “the need to rally to repel the aggressor” and “the inadmissibility of destabilizing the situation during the war”, to receive conditional support from activists and the Maidan media to combat “treason”. I emphasize that his rating is likely to become just as low, but within the framework of the "lesser evil" theory, the target audience will be ready to support repression against his political opponents from the same camp, so as not to "rock the boat." Then Poroshenko’s business is to carry out repression or not. It would only be rational to threaten them, to reduce the informational and political activity of opponents and to release the pair they have created into a whistle, but Poroshenko is extremely vindictive and therefore may well turn the flywheel of repression.
* This tactical scheme has two breakdowns. First, it does not take into account the possibility of a harsh reaction of the DPR / LPR, with the informal support of Russia and the refusal of the tired West of the diplomatic struggle to preserve the regime. Secondly, the Ukrainian society is really tired of the war, and the mechanism to intensify the hostilities to strengthen the position of power has been repeatedly used and, if the situation in the Donbass is out, out of the control of Kiev or unplanned harsh reaction of the western "partners", Poroshenko can get the opposite of the expected effect.
* The main Nazi leaders who control the most powerful and branched groups have not yet determined their attitude to the intra-oligarchic conflict in the capital. There is reason to believe that they will take the position of the “wise monkey”, who from a high mountain watched two tigers fight in the valley, and then descended and finished off the wounded and exhausted winner.
* It is not excluded that Western "partners" will also take a neutral position. They were weary of the inability of the Ukrainian elite to engage in any constructive activity, beyond the limits of the power struggle in the format of banks with spiders. They would need the stability of the Poroshenko regime at least until the American elections, but not at any cost. The West has too many problems besides Ukraine to actively intervene in support of Poroshenko if the crisis overcomes the undercover stage and splashes out onto the streets.
Finally, they repeatedly explained Poroshenko openly that federalization was his only chance to stay in power. Federalization dramatically reduces the value of the central government in general and the presidency in particular. The center of gravity of the domestic political confrontation moves to the level of the struggle of regional financial-political groups (Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Zaporozhye, Odessa, Transcarpathian) to divide the material resource residues. The complex interweaving of property relations and economic interests promises an exciting war of all against all, with the conclusion of the most unimaginable alliances "for an hour", followed by treachery to race. Under these conditions, Poroshenko would have his own Vinnytsia domain, reinforced by Kiev and the formal all-Ukrainian supremacy, and could try to claim the role of an arbitrator in inter-oligarchal fighting, entering into temporary alliances with one or the other grouping.
* However, this state of affairs is unacceptable for Poroshenko due to his mental organization. He did not go to the sole presidential power and did not take responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity in order to negotiate something again with the regional barons. He wants to be the only absolute master of Ukraine and the material resource, which is shrinking like shagreen leather, only pushes him to strengthen this position. That is why Poroshenko (as well as Tymoshenko) will fight for individual power, and any of their flirting with regional federalists and the struggle for peace will be only short-term tactical moves.
In connection with the above, we can state the growth of irreconcilable contradictions between the central government of Ukraine and its regions. These contradictions are exacerbated by the lack of a sincerely organized political force at the central systemic political level, which is ready to lobby regional interest in federalization. The reason is trivial - the regional elite barely have enough of the remaining material resources for themselves - for the maintenance of Kiev (giving nothing, only taking) nothing is left. If Kiev allows the redistribution of powers to control material resources in favor of the regional elite, the central elite will simply self-destruct.
The second problem is the contradiction between the central oligarchic power and organized Nazi militants, most of whom focus on the regional feed base and objectively is the power support of the federalists (since their economic interests coincide).
At the same time, the Nazi leaders, who claim to create a centralized Nazi Ukrainian state under their own leadership, control no more than 5% of the total number of Nazi militants (and the marginal armed rabble adjacent to them) and do not have the material resource for a significant expansion of their own influence. Therefore, Poroshenko is also objectively the main goal for them, because if it is impossible to establish control over the country at the grassroots level (due to the subordination of all the Nazi militants and individual gangs), then the only way that gives a chance for success is to seize power in Kiev by organizing a coup.
As we see, any development of events, according to any of the possible scenarios, guarantees us the fall of the current government, the fragmentation of Ukraine and the emergence in its individual regions, including Kiev, of “independent” Nazi governments. Kiev will claim to be all-Ukrainian in character, but will not have sufficient resources (including international recognition) to realize these ambitions. The only question is whether these events will occur in the short term (before the New Year) or in the medium term (in 2017) term.
Anyway, any Kiev cataclysm leads to the final separation of the Donbass (and in the administrative borders of the regions). The regions of Greater Novorossia have good chances, after a short period of armed struggle with small local (and more dangerous visiting) Nazis, to be under the control of local financial and political groups, which, in order to stabilize their situation, will have to enter into an alliance with local anti-fascist forces. and economic aid will be declared a quasi-Russian, but in fact a “multi-vector” policy in the style of Yanukovych and the late Kuchma.
These regimes will be fragile politically and economically unstable, but until Russia is ready to integrate these regions or actively intervene in state-building processes in a given territory, we cannot expect more from them. The problem is the same as that of Poroshenko - a critical lack of resources. In fact, how difficult are the processes of state-building, even with the comprehensive support of Russia, we see the example of DNR / LC. Yes, and the adaptation of the Crimea and Sevastopol, immediately received the status of the subjects of the Russian Federation and faced with much less difficulty, there is a lot of problems.
For Kiev, the Nazis will hold their teeth, since it is precisely the possession of the capital that conditionally legitimizes their claims to the whole of Ukraine. Without this, they are not able to retain power even in Galicia.
In the near future, due to the lack of alternativeness for all forces of the inter-oligarchic conflict of the union with the Nazis, as with the only armed organized force capable of supporting them in the internecine struggle, as well as in the framework of the cleansing of the regions for the creation of quasi-federalist local oligarchic-Nazi regimes, we should expect increased repression (especially in Kiev and key regional centers) against the anti-Nazi forces and giving them a wider character (outside of traditional anti-Sovietism and Russophobia).
- Rostislav Ischenko, President of the Center for Systems Analysis and Forecasting.
Noticed oshЫbku Highlight text and press. Ctrl + Enter