In the first part of the material “How Russia ″ unnoticed ″ has deployed anti-missile defense” told about the oddities in the location and specifics of Russian long-range warning stations and targeting missile launches. We found out that, probably, besides the officially declared functions, they perform some more. Saying "A", you need to say and "B." What are these functions that are talked about so much, but about which so little is known?
I will make a reservation right away, all that will be written below is the author’s free discussion on the possible construction of a promising Russian missile defense system based on scarce available information and common sense. He does not have any insiders on the subject, and therefore all coincidences with reality are random patterns ... of the author’s sick imagination. In this material there will be practically no performance characteristics, names and photographs. The author will try to deal with the possible concept of missile defense.
Splitting a task into parts
Any engineering problem comes down to finding its optimal solution. That is, the cost / efficiency criterion should be at the forefront. You can ruin the country and build an impenetrable missile defense, but at the same time it will have nothing to protect, etc. I think this is understandable. That is why many super-innovative solutions of missile defense tasks are far from always justified.
For example, I have always been amazed by American mania persistence in certain things. Such as inconspicuous flying irons, or super-accurate warheads that hunt for the initial part of the trajectory of the Russian missiles. A masterpiece of engineering (no, really) and stupidity. But the conversation is not about them now ...
To begin with, it is necessary to determine the range of tasks facing the Russian ABM. It is obvious that the main task facing it is to protect the main strategic points of the country from a nuclear / non-nuclear strike in order to maximize its weakening. And it is obvious that the main "client" for her will be the country's nuclear shield, consisting primarily of the ground component. That he is the main goal of the first strike from the enemy. Without it, everything else will be easy prey, but only later.
Today, an attack on them is possible with the help of cruise and ballistic missiles. In the future, and hypersonic atmospheric missiles. We will not touch the latter for the time being in view of the paucity of information about them, but dwell on the threats that exist today.
So, today there are two types of threats that Russia's missile defense system must address: cruise missiles (KR) and ballistic missiles (BR). Both of these types of weapons can be used to deliver both disarming and general strike.
To prevent or minimize the threat from the Kyrgyz Republic, not only active methods of combat (missile defense itself), but also passive ones are used.
Let's look at the map of Eurasia.
As we know, the main part of the Russian nuclear strategic potential is located in a strip: either in the Moscow region (in the broad sense of the word - Vypolzovo, Yoshkar-Ola, Teikovo, Kozelsk), or a narrow strip along the southern border of Russia from the Saratov region to Irkutsk. This arrangement is not accidental.
The range of any US armed forces currently in service (BGM-109 "Tomahawk", AGM-86B) is less than 3 000 km. At the same time, they all have either air or sea basing. If we look at the map, we will see that all the objects, except for the “Moscow Region” bases of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, are beyond the reach of strikes on them by the CD.
The European part of Russia is quite reliably blocked by military air defense / missile defense systems. In any case, an attack on them by the Kyrgyz Republic is possible only in two directions: from the waters of the Black and Baltic Seas.
At the limit of the range you can get some of the bases of the North or Mediterranean seas. But this is if the rocket’s route is straight, like an arrow, which makes it much easier to intercept.
That is why any ship with the Kyrgyz Republic on board in the waters of the Black and Baltic Seas is under the vigilant supervision of the RF Armed Forces and will be destroyed on command from the center in a matter of minutes.
That is why they are always "met" and make training attacks.
Naturally, there are other targets on the territory of the Russian Federation that can be used to strike the KR. And first of all, these are the missile defense systems themselves, pushed forward. Meanwhile, it is very important not only to take them as far away from the protected objects as possible, but also, if possible, to transfer the battle with the enemy’s missiles over the sea.
The fact is that the interception of any atmospheric targets over the sea is much easier. New Russian over-the-horizon radar "Sunflower", for example, the export version of which has a range of 450 km, can reliably cover the naval base and the points of deployment of missile defense systems in these areas. They are specifically designed to work on low-flying targets. Surely the same capabilities will be in the radar "Mars", which will be the "ears and eyes" of the air defense / missile defense system C-500.
So, the first conclusion. The missile defense system of Russia dramatically increases its effectiveness and at the same time reduces threats in the event it is brought to the frontiers, and it is foolish not to use this:
- in the north - Novaya Zemlya, Franz Josef Land, Severnaya Zemlya, Novosibirsk Islands;
- in the east - about. Wrangel, Chukotka, Commander Islands, Kuriles;
- in the west - Kaliningrad region, Crimea, Belarus.
South for now leave alone. About him a little later.
Thus, only thanks to the location of the nodes of its missile defense system, can Russia dramatically reduce the load on its components.
The first line of missile defense
We have dealt with the CD, now that concerns ballistic targets. The United States has two types of missiles: the ground-based ICBM “Minuteman-3” and the sea-based ICBM “Trident-2”. Given the specificity of the use of the marine component in the case of a preventive nuclear strike, the number of SSBNs from which a simultaneous strike can be inflicted is no more than 5-6.
Simply, if the base leaves at the same time more than usual, the number of boats, and they can deliver their blow only from strictly defined points, then this will already be a signal to Russia to be number one in readiness. Theoretically, a strike is also possible from their bases, but the reprogramming of dozens of missiles will also not escape reconnaissance and will become a signal that the enemy should avoid until the last (by indirect evidence, which in this material does not make sense to speak in detail).
So, these can be 2-3 boats from the central Atlantic area and 2-3 boats from the Pacific area. The option from the Indian Ocean can also not be excluded, but then the number of strike forces will be reduced due to the increased deployment time of the boats in this region (and as we remember, in order not to frighten off the enemy, the number of boats on the campaign cannot be more than 5-6). But we will consider all possible options. Each boat contains 24 Trident 2 missiles, which means that each boat can have up to 240 warheads.
It is necessary to take into account the special feature of the Trident-2 missile. All warheads are bred in turn. That is, if they are 10, then it will take quite a significant amount of time (more than 300 km will fly over a minute for a warhead, and it will take at least 5-7 minutes to divorce the entire filling). But even divided, the warheads are flying quite well and can be destroyed by one successful nuclear explosion in space.
At the same time, a strike from the Atlantic is possible on the highways: acceleration from the central Atlantic, separation of warheads in the region of Morocco-Spain and further through the Crimea.
When struck from the Pacific: start and acceleration from the central region, the division of warheads in the region east of Japan and further through Vladivostok - Sakhalin or Manzhuria.
When struck from the United States: acceleration over the territory of the United States and Canada, the separation of warheads in the region of the pole and beyond.
In general, an interesting picture emerges. If you create the first echelon of missile defense at sea: one point is the area west of Gibraltar, the second is the area east of Japan, then you can try to intercept a significant part of the warhead before they are divided or at the time of separation. Here an effective missile defense system based on the 1000-1500 km missile, controlled from space by a single space system. In this case, the ship must have on board a powerful radar.
And how can one not recall the Leader’s plans to build atomic destroyers ... I do not insist that it will be so, but the thought itself gets into my head. In general, the announced plans for the construction of an atomic destroyer consisting of seven units (just such numbers are voiced) seem redundant fleet Of Russia. But if they are part of the country's missile defense system, then everything falls into place.
Of course, it can be destroyed, but it will also be a signal for an attack, which will make a disarming blow from the United States meaningless.
In the north, things are a little more complicated. "Minuteman-3" have individual warheads, which complicates the interception task, given their size. But on the other hand, there are no limitations on the saturation of missile defense - the land has a slightly larger area than the deck of the ship.
One more thing. A strike at missiles that start and are on the initial inertial part of the trajectory with a nuclear explosion does not have a significant impact on their radars, which are still many thousands of kilometers away.
The second point is why the MS should be nuclear. Cost, effectiveness. Kinetics: one rocket - one goal. However, the result is far from guaranteed. To be honest, I am sometimes amazed by the naivety of the Americans, who believe that they will be able to intercept Russian missiles before the split of their warhead.
The USA, even in the conditions of work on the middle part of the trajectory, with the kinetic head part along the old SCADs, with the help of GBI missiles, achieve success of 50 / 50.
But this will be possible only with the deployment in full of a single space system (CEN) tracking rocket launches and trajectories. The first satellite has already been launched. The rest promise until the end of 2018.
But God forbid, to manage until the end of 2020 year. The first one was launched six months ago, and it’s good if the second one is in the current one. Total need ten. Term of manufacture of the satellite - 1,5 year, if that.
What rockets can be the first echelon? This is probably either the so-called long-range missile missile defense system of the C-500 complex, or the A-235 "Nudol" complex. Although it seems to me, it will eventually be the same rocket.
Because the required characteristics are the same.
The characteristics of these missiles must allow the rocket to rapidly accelerate to cosmic velocities (7-10 km / s) in order to bring the warhead to the area no more than 3-5 minutes after launch. As we understand, special precision during the operation of a nuclear warhead is not required.
It should be understood that, taking into account Russia's geographical features, not one, but several frontiers of the first echelon of the Russian missile defense system are possible. In the north - the island, and then the coast of the continent along the line Murmansk-Arkhangelsk-Vorkuta. Given the versatility of the C-500 complex, the second frontier will at the same time solve the tasks of covering distant radars and important defense facilities with missiles of other classes. It would be logical to place a similar second frontier along the Vladivostok-Sakhalin-Kamchatka line in the east of the country.
In the West, as an option, you can think about the border Kaliningrad-Brest-Crimea. But he seems to be already in the depths, which means that his effectiveness will be worse.
In general, of all the directions, the western for the missile defense system of Russia is the worst. Too many threats and too inconvenient lines of defense.
In the south, the safest, on the one hand, direction. An unexpected attack is possible only with a SSBN, but on the other hand, without having reliable bases in the Indian Ocean, it will be extremely difficult to secure the first line of defense. To reliably block the direction with the help of the Navy, you need to have two (Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal) groups. But at least one in the Arabian Sea. This means that it is necessary to keep at least 3-4 groups in the sea. And one or two - at a great distance from the bases.
Second echelon missile defense
The second echelon takes the blow of those warheads that managed to break through a distance of less than 1000 km to the object of destruction.
All the time of the flight, they are monitored by the Voronezh-DM radar. What for? The fact is that today each station can calculate several hundreds of warhead trajectories with an accuracy of up to 1-2 km. Obviously, if the drop point is far from an important object, then it is likely that this MS will either complete the maneuver and lie down on the combat course, or go astray (was hit by the first echelon of the missile defense, or a technical malfunction occurred) and therefore potentially harmless .
By the way, wonderful things were happening in the Donbas in 2014 year. OTR "Point", which the Ukrainian Armed Forces quite often allowed in the direction of "terrorists" (well, such features in Ukraine of anti-terrorist operations), by "pure chance" never even got into one strategically important object. If far from the object, then they fell, but never into the object itself. I say, miracles, and only.
The warhead can maneuver only in space, when it can accurately calculate its trajectory. Having even entered the upper layers of the atmosphere and having warmed up in them, it will be extremely difficult to track your location, and therefore precisely maneuver. No, this can be done, but the volume and weight of this equipment will replace the warhead, and who needs such a warhead?
Also on the middle segment of the trajectory of the missile defense system, using special algorithms, they try to specifically calculate fake targets and remove them from the "slot of the sight" of anti-missile complexes. As we can see, this part of the missile defense task is no less important than the defeat of the enemy’s military units. That is why she gets so much attention.
The radar operation algorithms are constantly being improved, changes are made to them, dissertations are defended on them, awards and titles are obtained. In general, life goes on.
Thus, by the time the target enters the second echelon area of responsibility, a strictly limited and heavily thinned number of warheads should fall on each object. Even for Moscow, it should be a maximum of several dozen goals.
A small calculation. At the same time, the first wave can have a maximum of 1 900 warheads (6 * 24 * 10 + 450). Taking into account that they should not start at the same time, since in this case the first echelon will work as efficiently as possible and there will be nothing to “build on success”, then no more than half of this number.
A breakthrough of at least half of the first-wave warheads will be an unequivocal success for the enemy. That is, the real-time maximum of 400-500 may fall on the second echelon. For a disarming strike, the number of targets in Russia is at least 30-40. That is an average of 10-15 pieces per target. The Moscow missile defense system at this turn will consist of 50-60 second tier interceptors, plus almost as many third. Plus C-500 batteries deployed around the perimeter. For Moscow, you can not worry too much. But what will be on the periphery? Roughly speaking, one C-500 regiment per area, taking into account the multifunctionality of the tasks to be solved, will give about 16 second echelon anti-missile in constant combat readiness.
Two divisions of eight PU. Of these, at least four launchers for long-range missile defense systems. Total 16 rockets.
Particularly important areas hide behind a large number of divisions, which accordingly increases the firepower.
Given that the maneuver of warheads on this site is almost impossible, that is, it makes sense to use both kinetic warhead and high-explosive fragmentation directional action (here is a question for specialists, which I do not intend to replace). Nuclear warheads here will give flare to radar, which will blind her for quite a long time, and therefore, probably, it will not.
Third tier - These are rockets operating at a distance of up to 100 km and an altitude not higher than 30 km. Atmospheric interception by such Gazel anti-ballistic missiles is well developed, and judging by the fact that many good old Soviet anti-missile units have been re-launched, its upgraded version will become at least the third Moscow missile defense boundary, and perhaps its ideology will be used in C systems as well. 500 for close combat (but for now it’s too early to talk about it).
Here, it is likely that only the kinetic principle of action will work (direct hit). The distance and accuracy of the Mars radar will allow to achieve the desired probability of hitting the enemy's warheads that have broken through.
In general, when all components of the new Russian missile defense system are on combat duty, the likelihood of a nuclear strike on its territory will drop sharply. Understanding this, the most likely opponents of the Russian Federation not only interfere in every way with its deployment, but also try to create "weapon of the future "- hypersonic long-range atmospheric missiles. So far unsuccessfully. When they create it, then it will be worth talking about the ability of the created Russian missile defense system to solve this task. As the military themselves say, the conceptual possibilities of this are being worked out.