Military Review

Forewarned - does not mean armed

93
Stalin soberly assessed the capabilities of the Red Army


The theme of the heavy defeats of the Red Army in June-July 1941 remains one of the most relevant and controversial. Doctor historical Yuri Rubtsov believes that the root cause of the beginning of the war, which was tragic for the Red Army, is that the Soviet leader became a victim of disinformation carried out by the German special services ("Duck" in Berlin "). In my opinion, this version is wrong.

Stalin, Rubtsov believes, believed the German explanations that the large-scale transfer of German divisions to the Soviet-German border that began in May on the 1941 was carried out to disguise the planned invasion of England (Operation Sea Lion). As a result, "until the last day forbade bringing the troops of the border districts on alert."

Intimidation is half the battle


Firstly, the assumption that Stalin pecked on the Goebbels department’s misinformation contradicts the nature and life path of the Soviet leader. He didn’t trust much even to his comrades, and even more so for his enemies. Stalin never had any illusions about Hitler’s intentions, and all the more in 1941. In particular, at the extended meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) at the end of May, 1941 said: “The situation is getting worse every day. It is very likely that we may be attacked by fascist Germany ... Everything can be expected from such adventurers as the Hitlerite clique. ”

Secondly, “already in the beginning of March 1941, the Soviet government learned through intelligence channels that Hitler had abandoned plans to invade the UK”, states Oleg Vishlev (“Stalin and Hitler. Someone deceived whom”) based on the documents. Therefore, the attempts of the Germans, who were trying to present the buildup of their troops on the border with the USSR as a preparation for Operation Sea Lion, could not be misled by Stalin.

Third, in the spring and early summer of 1941, Stalin took large-scale measures to strengthen border districts. Yuri Rubtsov attributed this to the action of "intimidation" of Hitler. Yes, in part this is the case: calling 793 of thousands of reservists, hidden transfer from internal districts to western seven armies (66 divisions), putting 63 reserve divisions into combat readiness and their advancement by night marches into the covering armies, bringing them into battle readiness and hidden redeployment to places the concentration of 52 second-tier divisions, the withdrawal of the first-tier divisions of the covering armies to the fortified areas. But orders to build urgently front field command posts, to disperse and disguise airplanes at airfields, warehouses and bases, to bring all long-term firing structures and fortified areas into battle readiness do not fit into the goal of “intimidation”. Yes, and the early release on the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of 14 in May 1941, of all schools with the direction of young officers in the western border districts in the logic of "deterrence" does not fit. These are all measures of preparation for repelling an attack.

Political maneuver


Yuri Rubtsov's confidence that "Stalin forbade any actions to bring the troops into the necessary degree of combat readiness ..." only "out of fear to give the Germans even the slightest reason for aggression" relies on an analysis of Soviet-German relations in May-June 1941. But the actions of Stalin and Hitler on the eve of the war cannot be considered in isolation from the world around them. In 1941, there were other players in the international arena. The Soviet leadership took this into account and believed that preparations for war should include not only measures to repel possible aggression, but also foreign policy maneuvers. This was twice stressed by Stalin in a speech to graduates of military academies 5 May 1941. He first said: “It’s not enough to have good equipment, organization, you need to have more allies,” and then again returned to this topic: “In order to prepare well for war, it is not only necessary to have a modern army, but it is necessary to prepare the war politically. What does it mean to politically prepare a war? .. It means to have enough reliable allies and neutral countries. ”

With the allies in the prewar years it was bad. The reason is obvious: the USSR and the rest of the European countries had opposing social systems and did not trust each other.

In 1940-1941, the Soviet leadership made great efforts to have as many allies and neutral states as possible by the beginning of the war. Something succeeded. The main achievement - on April 13, 1941, a Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty was concluded in Moscow, which greatly weakened the axis of Rome - Berlin - Tokyo and minimized the probability of a war on two fronts for the USSR. But this was perhaps the only major success of Soviet diplomacy. On the whole, the situation remained very alarming: most European countries were accustomed (as it was in the 1941th century under Napoleon and as is the case in our time under Obama) to Hitler, who was the strongest at that time. As the USSR’s allies, by the spring of 25 he could count only on England and the USA. But at that time, these countries did not show any sympathy for Soviet Russia. Bourgeois public opinion in England and the USA did not distinguish between the USSR and Germany, considering them to be "totalitarian countries." Even after the attack on the Soviet Union, the Wall Street Journal wrote on June 1941, 1941: “The American people know that the fundamental difference between Mr. Hitler and Mr. Stalin is determined only by the size of their mustache. An alliance with any of them will be paid for by the prestige of the country. ” The British press was full of similar statements. Relations with London in the spring of 10 were strained - in May, the British even returned to plans for bombing Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus. The situation was completely complicated after the arrival of Hitler’s deputy Hess to England on May 1941, 11, which could really lead to the conclusion of a separate peace between Berlin and London (from May XNUMX, German aviation stopped mass raids on the cities of Great Britain).

Under these conditions, Britain and the United States could become allies of the USSR only in one case - if Hitler was the obvious initiator of the war. That is why, in order not to give Germany the slightest reason to accuse the Soviet Union of aggressiveness, Stalin refrained to the last from officially bringing the troops to full combat readiness. The correctness of this policy has been confirmed. On June 22, 1941, no one in the world doubted that Hitler had started the war. Public sympathy between Britain and the United States turned towards the Land of the Soviets: Winston Churchill already on June 22 spoke on British radio with support for the USSR, and on July 9, US President Franklin Roosevelt, in a message addressed to M. I. Kalinin, wrote: “The American people hate armed aggression (emphasized me. - V. L.). The Americans are bound by close ties of historical friendship with the Russian people. Therefore, it is natural that they watch with sympathy and admiration the titanic defensive struggle that the Russian people are now waging. " Stalin's subtle policy in May-June 1941 subsequently led to the formation of a powerful anti-Hitler coalition.

For objective reasons


Yuri Rubtsov believes that the Red Army paid a "very high price" for the belatedly due to Stalin’s fault to bring the troops of the western districts into full combat readiness. This is an excessive exaggeration of the moment of bringing the troops into full combat readiness for the outcome of border clashes. Indeed, the defeat of the main forces of the three special military districts (118 divisions) did not occur on June 22, but during the oncoming battles of June 24 – 30, when the troops were already fully operational. In this regard, the American historian Roger Reese in the book "Stalin's soldiers involuntarily: the social history of the Red Army. 1925 – 1941 ”rightly observes:“ The element of surprise helps explain why the military units at the border were initially confused, which put them at a disadvantage. But this does not explain in any way why the corps and the army advanced from the rear, which had weeks to prepare, failed in the battles. The suddenness can explain why the German Air Force caught hundreds of aircraft on the ground and destroyed them on the very first day of the war. But this doesn’t explain why the Soviet planes were captured on the ground on the third and fourth day of the war. ” By the way, Stalin did not attach much importance to the moment the directive was issued to bring the troops into full combat readiness. According to the recollections of the heads of the Soviet government, Y. E. Chadayev, on June 22 and 1941 of the year, Stalin, after a telephone conversation with the commander of the Western Special Military District, Army General D. G. Pavlov, said: “Pavlov knows nothing concrete about what is happening on the border! It has no connection even with army headquarters! It refers to the fact that a directive was late for the troops ... But shouldn't an army be on alert without a directive? ”

Forewarned - does not mean armed


The secondary experience of the moment of bringing the troops into full combat readiness for the outcome of the batches confirms both modern experience: both the authorities of Yugoslavia and the leadership of Iraq knew the exact dates for the start of wars against them, did everything to bring the troops into full alert, but this did not save.

To successfully repel an attack, the presence of forces and means, their necessary concentration and skillful use in the directions of the main attacks of the aggressor, the training of personnel and combat coordination of subunits and units, the moral and political condition of the army and the people, and the readiness for the sacrificial struggle are more important.

In 1935-1941, much work was done in the USSR to increase the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The Red Army was transferred to the cadre base, and in September 1939, universal military duty was introduced. Serial production of a new generation of weapons and military equipment (tanks, guns, aircraft), the number of military formations increased from 98 to 303 divisions; in the border districts, cover armies were created and deployed with a strength of 186 divisions (taking into account 16 divisions of the second strategic echelon that arrived in the cover army before the war). The preparation of the Western theater was carried out: airfields, fortified areas, roads. In the last months before the war, additional measures were taken to strengthen the border districts.

As a result of the tremendous efforts of the people and the Soviet government by June 1941, the Red Army possessed the necessary forces and means to repel Hitler’s aggression. It was not inferior to the Wehrmacht in terms of the total number and equipment of the combat means of the troops, and even surpassed it in some types of military equipment (tanks, aircraft).

The moral and political state of the army and the people was high. In the book The Epoch of Dictatorships. 1918 – 1947. ”P. Thibault writes about the atmosphere in the USSR:“ The unity of the nation was strengthened before the war by all possible (and impossible) means and was stronger than ever, while the whole world, misled by the purges and repressions of 1936– 1938's, believed that the USSR was on the verge of collapse. Only 22 June 1941, when Hitler attacked Russia, the real power of this country was revealed to the world. ”

But with the necessary concentration of forces and means, their skillful use in the directions of the main attacks of the aggressor, with trained personnel and combat coherence, the situation was bad. Despite the great efforts of the Soviet government to strengthen border districts in March-June 1941, their command failed to organize effective reconnaissance in its area of ​​responsibility. As a result, troop intelligence did not reveal the real order of battle of the Germans and on the directions of the main attacks the Wehrmacht forces had a multiple advantage. With such superiority, the degree of bringing the combat-ready state of the Soviet troops, who took the first blow, did not really mean anything.

The matter is different - the Red Army was significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in mobilization, and this was due to objective reasons. The USSR in preparation for war lagged behind Germany by about four years: Hitler declared universal military service from March 1 to 1935, and the USSR economy made it possible to do this only from September 1 to 1939. In the 1939, the Wehrmacht numbered 4,7 a million people, and the Red Army - in 2,5 times less (1,9 million). During 1939 – 1941, the number of the Red Army increased threefold (to 5,8 million by 22 in June of 1941). During this period, it was simply physically impossible to learn it for waging a modern maneuver war with an experienced adversary. Stalin soberly assessed the capabilities of the Red Army. At a meeting of the 17 commanding staff on April 1940 of the year devoted to summarizing the experience of hostilities against Finland, he noted: “We have no cultural, qualified or educated commanders or units ... We need well-knit and skillfully working headquarters. We don’t have them yet ... Then modern warfare requires well-trained, disciplined fighters, initiative ones. Our fighter lacks initiative. He is individually underdeveloped. He is poorly trained ... ”That is why Stalin sought to delay the start of the war. He believed that the Red Army would be able to fight the Wehrmacht on equal terms not earlier than the middle of the 1942 of the year. In 1941, the enemy was objectively smarter, stronger, more skillful. By the way, foreign military experts then had a very low opinion of the combat power of the Red Army. US naval minister Franklin William Knox said: “Hitler will get rid of Russia for six weeks to two months,” and War Minister Henry Lewis Stimson informed the president: “Germany will be thoroughly busy for at least a month, and as much as possible for three months defeat of Russia ".

But the situation changed, and by the middle of 1943, the combat capability of the opposing sides had leveled off, and with 1944, soldiers, officers and generals of the Red Army had already surpassed the enemy in the art of war.

Yuri Rubtsov writes that Stalin was "in the illusions that he was playing the game in the Soviet-German duet." In fact, Hitler was in illusions. Life has convincingly proved that the war ended in Berlin.
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  1. avvg
    avvg 10 June 2016 15: 34
    +24
    In my opinion, it will still hurt all Russophobes and falsifiers for a long time that our Grandfathers adequately met the enemy and won, not like the French or other peoples of the West.
    1. tiredwithall
      tiredwithall 10 June 2016 15: 42
      +14
      The reasons for the defeats of 1941 were not Stalin's miscalculations or his illusions. The main reason is the inept command and the underestimation of the potential of large tank formations. But about a "dignified" meeting 41, somehow the language does not turn into such a formulation. Rather, the "guests" were carried out with dignity.
      1. Verdun
        Verdun 10 June 2016 16: 04
        +10
        Quote: tiredwithall
        The reasons for the defeats of 1941 were not in Stalin's miscalculations or his illusions.
        It is impossible to justify what happened in 1941 with just one reason. That is why the analysis of the events of that time can in no way fit into either a brief comment or a concise article. Historians sometimes disagree even regarding one event, one battle, one act. A lot of things happened in a short time. To assess what happened, you first need to familiarize yourself with the large number of diverse reliable information. And this is not even one book, but whole volumes. Otherwise, any search for causes will be superficial, and the conclusions will be erroneous.
        1. tiredwithall
          tiredwithall 10 June 2016 16: 29
          +4
          Quote: Verdun
          Quote: tiredwithall
          The reasons for the defeats of 1941 were not in Stalin's miscalculations or his illusions.
          It is impossible to justify what happened in 1941 with just one reason. That is why the analysis of the events of that time can in no way fit into either a brief comment or a concise article. Historians sometimes disagree even regarding one event, one battle, one act. A lot of things happened in a short time. To assess what happened, you first need to familiarize yourself with the large number of diverse reliable information. And this is not even one book, but whole volumes. Otherwise, any search for causes will be superficial, and the conclusions will be erroneous.

          You are right that a deep analysis is needed and not within the framework of one article. There is another aggravating aspect - many stakeholders and organizations. But today you can already identify the main reasons. I will refer to the beginning. headquarters 3 gene army Sandalova (stationed in 41 - Brest), who in his memoirs wrote about the failed command quite frankly. Generals of a higher level 41 diligently shaded their failures. And the significance of tank units is evidenced by the history of De Gaulle. He was defended from the General Staff to the periphery for defending the need to form tank formations with the rank of colonel on the eve of the war. And in May 40, after Dunkirk, they gave the general a command and put him in command of all the mobile forces that they could pull off. His counterattack on the flank of the Germans north of Paris caused a lot of panic at the headquarters of the Germans and delayed the delivery of the city for a week. In addition, there are other reasons for the failure of the Allies in the first stage of the war, but these two are most significant.
          1. V.ic
            V.ic 10 June 2016 18: 52
            0
            Quote: tiredwithall
            evidenced by the story of de goлI am.

            Charles Andre Joseph Joseph de GoLL(Fr. Charles André Joseph Marie de Gaullis...
            https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Де_Голль,_Шарль
            ASNekrasov "The Adventures of Captain Vrungel". As you name the boat, so it will float.
        2. The comment was deleted.
        3. Dryuya2
          Dryuya2 10 June 2016 19: 28
          0
          Events of the spring of 1941
        4. Shadowcat
          Shadowcat 11 June 2016 09: 15
          +3
          Victory has many fathers and mothers, only the defeat of the orphan.
          If we draw an analogy between the three systems and headquarters (unfortunately I am weakly savvy in the headquarters of the Allies), then how is defeat or hushed up (we must remember that the Allies merged all of Asia in Japan, the whole Eurolep of Germany, and in Africa they picked a finger in one place for five years), but as Victory came, the different names of the great military leaders immediately entered the first line.
          In Germany, when, thanks to the actions of Hitler first of all, they threw all Europe to his feet - He and the Generals were in chocolate, but barely went defeat, it was only he who was to blame, but not the Generals. But sorry - it was Adolf with tough actions on the General Staff (having repressed almost all of him) that kept the Eastern Front from collapse in the 41st when we were given the Wehrmacht along the faces of Moscow and they started a drum march. Near Leningrad in the 42nd. But the plans of defense and attacks did not bring the bird. Is it funny
          Yes, and I now more and more consider the theory I named "Broken Phone" in honor of the game of the same name. The most valuable thing is information, but humanity does not swarm where one knows and the owner. Therefore, information is pulled along many links to the owner. And what if several links "rotten" and drive me to get on? The owner does not know about this until a certain time and acts on the basis of the information provided.
          You know the joke that the Luftwaffe destroyed the USSR Air Force 7 times and therefore exists. And judging by the headquarters of the Wehrmacht and their reports, they did the same with the land Red Army.
          The same is true in the Red Army - the top, fearing that the ass will burn, they did not report everything, only sending "Everything is good, beautiful marquis"
      2. Revolver
        Revolver 10 June 2016 16: 31
        +2
        Quote: tiredwithall
        The main reason for the inept command

        Or maybe on the contrary, some commanders knew what they were doing? Not for nothing because they shot Pavlov. And at the levels below, right up to the divisional commanders, there were more than one such Pavlov and Vlasov.
        1. Revolver
          Revolver 10 June 2016 17: 38
          +7
          Minushers, of course, I understand, "noble indignation", "muddy the glorious heroes" ... But think about why the planes were lined up in lines, wing to wing, and at the same time not refueled, and the pilots in the field camps underwent physical training? Why were panoramas taken from the guns and sent to warehouses for storage, so you had to aim along the bore? Why did they drive tank units in strategically or tactically inexplicable marches until the motor resource was completely depleted? I bet there will be those who accuse Stalin of "decapitating the army" by purges. But in fact, it looks like he did not clean it up, judging by the actions of some steep-shaven bosses with stars on their buttonholes in 1941.
        2. alstr
          alstr 10 June 2016 18: 12
          +6
          In fact, at all levels there were many weak commanders. This is just a fact.
          But there was another reason: fraud. Because of which, many decisions were made incorrectly.
          After all, if the commander of a tank division reports that he has everything in stock and is ready to carry out the order, the higher commander expects that he has a division of tanks, but in fact it turns out that half of the tanks are not combat ready. Here forgive me, no one will be able to complete the task of the intended division.
          This is on the one hand. On the other hand, all commanders are (practically) not that any marches will be conducted under the dominance of enemy aviation and practically no air defense. Accordingly, sending the division in the daytime and hoping that it would arrive at its destination with minimal losses, but this could not happen in such conditions. Hence also the failure of the task.

          But again, it all comes down to the training of soldiers and commanders. This also implies interaction with other parts.

          Unfortunately, we only learned this by the end of 42 at the minimum acceptable level. But even on the Kursk Bulge, the interaction between the compounds gave significant failures. After all, there were cases of friendly fire between entire units. Yes, even the famous tank guard - this is also a failure of interaction.


          Well, of course, big questions remain regarding the behavior of some of the top commanders (the same Pavlov). There is great suspicion that this was a betrayal.
          1. nimboris
            nimboris 14 June 2016 05: 03
            0
            I didn’t remember when he was rehabilitated, but in my opinion in the 60s. Although he is undoubtedly to blame, those who appointed him are also to blame.
        3. gladcu2
          gladcu2 10 June 2016 20: 27
          0
          Revolver

          Your logic matches statistics. People expressing correct but not perceived opinions, in an exceptional minority.

          Correctness is expressed in the progressive consequences of an event.


          This, incidentally, is the paradox of democracy. The minority is subordinate to the majority. But smart people are always due to many circumstances in the minority.

          Therefore, Lenin said his phrase "study, study and study again."

          But this is a departure from the article, just by the way.
        4. Belgorod
          Belgorod 11 June 2016 00: 25
          +1
          By the way, during the defense of Kiev and Moscow, Vlasov recommended himself well
      3. avt
        avt 10 June 2016 16: 36
        +3
        Quote: tiredwithall
        . The main reason is the inept command and underestimation of the potential of large tank formations.

        The author very accurately noticed!
        The thing is different - the Red Army was significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in mobilization, and this was due to objective reasons. The Soviet Union in preparation for war lagged behind Germany by about four years: Hitler declared universal military service on March 1, 1935, and the Soviet economy made it possible to do this only on September 1, 1939. In 1939, the Wehrmacht totaled 4,7 million people, and the Red Army - 2,5 times less (1,9 million). During 1939-1941, the number of the Red Army tripled (up to 5,8 million on June 22, 1941). During this period, it was simply physically impossible to learn it for a modern maneuver war with an experienced opponent. Stalin soberly assessed the capabilities of the Red Army. At a meeting of the commanding staff on April 17, 1940, dedicated to summarizing the experience of military operations against Finland, he noted: “We don’t have a cultural, qualified and educated command staff or there are units ... Well-knit and skillfully working headquarters are required. We don’t have them yet ... Then, for a modern war, well-trained, disciplined fighters, initiative ones are required. Our fighter lacks initiative. He is individually underdeveloped. He is poorly trained ... ”That is why Stalin sought to delay the start of the war.
        Quote: tiredwithall
        But about a "dignified" meeting 41, somehow the language does not turn into such a formulation.

        Rather, unlike France, they took a hit and managed not to fall, but survived, with incredible efforts, with monstrous tension and mobilization.
        1. NDR-791
          NDR-791 10 June 2016 17: 27
          +1
          Look again carefully at the table from the article. The direction of the main blow is clearly traced. And I think the word "WARNED" in the title of the article is inappropriate. The thing is that Pavlov fulfilled the directive or did not fulfill this is now a secondary question, but the fact is that it was BEFORE THE WAR !!! And also the fact is that the concentration of troops was either NOT DISCOVERED, or MUST NOT. And I'm afraid that we will never know about this !!! Who then led our intelligence? Kulik? (Unfortunately I don't remember the dates of appointments and withdrawals on the fly). At the same time, I understand perfectly well that such (even a simplified) table in 41 was not real. But troop transports were monitored - trains with tanks are not a pound of raisins. And there were much less real roads for transportation than now. I am a purely civilian, and I understand that if enemy tanks are concentrating in the western direction, then what kind of.pip .. are our tanks doing in the south? So I consider everything that happened first of all to be a school of intelligence - either the wrong organization of work, or intent, or fear of reporting the truth.
          1. user3970
            user3970 11 June 2016 10: 28
            +1
            At the beginning of the war, the GRU was led by General Golikov. And the GRU at the beginning of the war was subordinate to the General Staff, whose chief was the beetles.
      4. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 10 June 2016 17: 19
        +1
        Quote: tiredwithall
        The main reason for the inept command and underestimation of the potential of large tank formations

        Not certainly in that way. The potential was just appreciated - which proves the disbandment of old-style mechanized corps incapable of independent actions (too little infantry and artillery) and the formation of the MK 1940 model.

        The problem was that the optimal OSH of large tank units is forged in battles. And not immediately - so, the Germans, already having the experience of marches in Austria and Czechoslovakia and fighting in Poland, still continued to optimize the structures (so, according to the results of France, they reduced the number of tanks in their TDs). And ours took as a model the German structure during the French campaign. Moreover, not the one that was actually, but the one that the intelligence reported. And then they filled it in accordance with the capabilities of domestic industry and domestic personnel.

        It turned out a huge clumsy colossus MK-40 - with a multi-type of tanks, a shortage of vehicles, tractors and special equipment, a shortage of infantry and artillery, a practical lack of communication and normal intelligence, staffed with recruits with the education of 2/3 of them from 7 classes and below, and experiencing an acute shortage sergeants and commanders. Moreover, it is often based in stables, prisons, synagogues and even "in homes and outbuildings within a radius of 50 km from headquarters". smile

        It was not for nothing that the GKZh, following the results of the 1940 exercises (according to which Khatskilevich reported that MK did not even theoretically fit into the breakthrough lane and clog all roads in the rear of the army), decided - as soon as the industry could fully equip one MK, and l / s would finish coordination - in the fall of 1941, conduct exercises to determine the capabilities of the MK in defense and offensive. And according to the results - to change the OSH.
      5. Red_Hamer
        Red_Hamer 10 June 2016 17: 51
        0
        Just about the first 4 hours of the war https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvHADxBk9R8
      6. Baloo
        Baloo 10 June 2016 21: 15
        +1
        Troop control, communications, and interaction between units probably influenced to a significant degree.
        1. Baloo
          Baloo 10 June 2016 21: 23
          +3
          Remember how Mozdok fell? Abwehr lieutenant German with Russian aristocratic roots in the form of a captain of the NKVD drove up with a dozen soldiers dressed as NKVD and directly to headquarters. Immediately he shocked the general with a statement that soon the Germans would be here, he was entrusted with organizing the evacuation and the general believed !!! He showed all the cards. Further, the chief in the same way traveled all parts, warehouses, demoralized and literally escorted everyone from Mozdok. And that’s all, everyone was urgently evacuated, the units advanced from Mozdok in a marching step, and yet he could survive until victory.
          This is what it means to lose contact and destroy interaction.
          I am not a military historian, I know firsthand the case. It would be interesting to know this story as presented by more competent people. hi
      7. Belgorod
        Belgorod 11 June 2016 00: 02
        0
        underestimation of the potential of large tank formations.

        How many tanks were there in the TC in the state in 1941? Take an interest. And also how much time was allocated to the TC according to the standard for a march of 100 km throw
      8. user3970
        user3970 11 June 2016 10: 10
        0
        I apologize for interrupting the turn ... I just want to remind you that Marshal Tymoshenko Yu was the Minister of Defense of the USSR at the beginning of the war and beetles were the chief of the general staff.
      9. russkiy redut
        russkiy redut 11 June 2016 23: 44
        0
        Our soldiers are heroes! Met very dignified due to personal courage and perseverance. The reasons for the failures were the shortcomings by the generals of our troops, they reported to Stalin embellishing the events, and sometimes they did not even know the real state of affairs, since there was no connection with the units and those who were surrounded, due to their fault and due to objective circumstances.
      10. Skif83
        Skif83 12 June 2016 09: 09
        0
        I agree to all 100%. And here it is:
        Yuri Rubtsov believes that the Red Army paid a "very high price" for the belatedly due to Stalin’s fault to bring the troops of the western districts into full combat readiness. This is an excessive exaggeration of the moment of bringing the troops into full combat readiness for the outcome of border clashes.
        .
        Nonsense!!! Let the author read the documents, the directive on bringing troops to full battlefield was June 18, and Zhukov later tried to attribute this to himself as his own initiative. And there are still the diaries of Budyonny. The film was shown once closer to midnight, apparently so as not to disturb the liberals !? There Budyonny wrote that Stalin had already announced at the meeting on 21.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX - tomorrow the war! Yes, and not one or two documents proving that Stalin knew, but the country, as he did not try, was not completely ready for war.
        Someone scored for the war, like the same Pavlov.
        Why was the Black Sea Fleet ready for the database, why did the border guards meet the war in the trenches? Probably because their superiors had something else ?!
    2. Aaron Zawi
      Aaron Zawi 10 June 2016 15: 56
      0
      Quote: avvg
      In a word, our Grandfathers worthily met the enemy and won, not like the French.

      The French fought very dignified, just look at the losses of the German Air Force And I liked the article. Undoubtedly, one of the most difficult problems of the spacecraft from September 1, 1939 was the training of ordinary and sergeant personnel, but also of command personnel from the joint platoon to the regiment. Making a commander of a regiment a division commander is much easier than making a full-fledged comrade from yesterday’s cadet. And from Kompory Kompolka. And to avoid this, given the avalanche-like growth of the army, it was not possible.
      1. 3officer
        3officer 10 June 2016 16: 04
        +16
        Quote: Aaron Zawi

        The French fought very dignified



        But not for long .. They distinguished themselves more in the "heroic" resistance of the Jacques of the red poppies Ko-ko, they bravely pasted leaflets, fed the German invaders with low-quality cheese and sour wine, the French madmuzels infected the German warriors with bad diseases and thereby undermined the combat capability of the Wehrmacht and played a major role in the defeat of Hitler angry
        1. sherp2015
          sherp2015 10 June 2016 22: 08
          +4
          Quote: 3officer
          the French madmusels infected German warriors with bad diseases and thereby undermined the Wehrmacht's fighting efficiency and played a major role in defeating Hitler

          Inventively and Mudrenko))
          The latest at that time methods of guerrilla warfare guerrilla warfare)))
      2. Dazdranagon
        Dazdranagon 10 June 2016 16: 24
        +4
        Quote: Aron Zaavi
        The French fought very dignified
        - but they are dumb like a cork. They made the same mistake as in the First World War - they did not expect the Germans from Belgium ...
      3. Sharapov
        Sharapov 10 June 2016 16: 40
        +13
        I did not understand who the French were fighting with ???
        Having declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, France did not start it until May 10, 1940. And I waited ...
        On May 10, Hitler attacked, and on June 17, 1940, France had already capitulated ....
        Do you know that the French volunteer legion since the fall of 1941 took part in the German war against the USSR in the Moscow direction and was the only non-German unit that took part in this operation?
        1. The comment was deleted.
      4. avt
        avt 10 June 2016 16: 43
        +5
        Quote: Aron Zaavi
        . And to avoid this, given the avalanche-like growth of the army, it was not possible.

        Even the rehabilitation of the officers from the camps, from under house arrest and simply thrown out of the army, could not physically replenish the command staff of the newly formed units, and they still had to train the personnel and somehow carry out the coordination of the units themselves. As one, I do not remember the name, a military historian figuratively put it, the war again found Russia with his pants down ..... rude, but the fact is, the pants were able to pull up to the Moscow battle, and refueled in uniform only near Stalingrad and Kursk. Then they did with the Germans practically what they did with us in 41.BUT, unlike the Nazis, they did not fiercely with civilians.
      5. Thomas 1989
        Thomas 1989 11 June 2016 15: 52
        +1
        yes it is worthy! According to various estimates, during the entire Second World War, 80 thousand people participated in the French resistance, including sympathizers in the restaurant. but the SS served 300 thousand French, voluntarily! And how many shells "made in france" killed our grandmothers and grandfathers ...
    3. CORNET
      CORNET 10 June 2016 15: 59
      +2
      Quote: avvg
      In my opinion, it will still hurt all Russophobes and falsifiers for a long time that our Grandfathers adequately met the enemy and won, not like the French or other peoples of the West.

      Army, army, but the partisan movement played a huge role nevertheless ... Well, OUR rear and the slogan "EVERYTHING FOR THE FRONT, EVERYTHING FOR VICTORY!"
      Now it feels like the 41st is on the nose again ... We’ll manage to rearm the Army and the Navy, maybe it will blow! And the main work is done, of course, by our special services and diplomacy (we don’t know much) Hold on to Putin, I hope you have good and sober, smart advisers (as long as you do everything right and Russia is for you!)
      1. Alf
        Alf 10 June 2016 22: 56
        +3
        Quote: CORNET
        Hold on Putin, I hope you have good advisers

        The advisors are amazing! This is evidenced by the "brilliant" state of our economy.
        She is naebullina and the gref of what are worth.
        1. Cat man null
          Cat man null 10 June 2016 23: 12
          0
          Quote: Alf
          The advisors are amazing! This is evidenced by the "brilliant" state of our economy

          - Do not tell me, but what is still wrong with the economy?

          Quote: Alf
          She naebullina One Nabiullina and a Gref

          - you have grammar bearings there, I took the liberty of correcting
          - Nabiullina is the Central Bank. What did the Central Bank do to you?
          - Gref is Sberbank. What has Sberbank done to you?
          1. Alf
            Alf 11 June 2016 16: 51
            -1
            Quote: Cat Man Null
            - Do not tell me, but what is still wrong with the economy?

            Growth rates are "inspiring." They can't find the bottom.
            Quote: Cat Man Null
            - you have grammar bearings there

            No, the surname is just right, judging by the results of the work, it is written.
            Quote: Cat Man Null
            What did the Central Bank do to you?

            The fact that it was stated that we will not pour money into the economy, this will accelerate inflation. We pump up the banks with money. (Let them weld up, but the factories ... Yes, the factories will be able to come up, but no, there are less problems).
    4. Major Yurik
      Major Yurik 10 June 2016 16: 13
      +7
      Nobody will know what Stalin thought and thought before the attack, and everyone knows what the country did after the Nazi mud. True, many began to forget, a brain reboot is required. Interpreters of the history of Russia as dogs of uncut, they remind the tearful virgins from time to time telling about the loss of the hymen, and each time in a different way. Calm down already! hi
      1. Verdun
        Verdun 10 June 2016 16: 58
        +1
        Quote: Major Yurik
        True, many began to forget, a brain reboot is required

        I agree with you with the exception of this point. Rebooting the brain is not possible. Alas, not a computer! And it is also impossible to correct, since it is not a joint. I have to endure!
    5. gladcu2
      gladcu2 10 June 2016 20: 18
      +1
      avvg

      What do you care about Russophobia. History is a necessity for the people. This is a form of unity. This knowledge is important for the state and the country.

      The capitalists do not need this knowledge. This is not their area of ​​interest.
  2. Engineer
    Engineer 10 June 2016 15: 41
    -1
    Somehow the "historian" writes something modestly about Stalin: Svidomo "historians" know that Stalin roared, huddled under the table in his office, out of fear. And only on July 3, 1941 he was able to lure him out of there and persuade him to read an appeal to the Soviet people from a piece of paper.
    1. avt
      avt 10 June 2016 16: 45
      +4
      Quote: Engineer
      a: Svidomo "historians" know that Stalin was roaring, huddled under the table in his office, out of fear.

      Aha - Khrushchev was sitting on that table and writing everything down in a notebook for future memoirs, which his second son, Sirozha, now an American citizen, leaked to the US.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 10 June 2016 17: 33
        0
        Quote: avt
        Aha - Khrushchev was sitting on that table

        Not sitting - hopak dancing. smile
  3. The comment was deleted.
  4. Eugen
    Eugen 10 June 2016 16: 00
    +4
    Yes, all of a sudden. Perhaps ours at that time were late a bit with a preemptive strike. Everyone had to learn to fight in a new way, from a soldier to a higher composition. The result is WIN! and heaped not weak! Only if you look at the quality of new types of weapons in 4 years, where you started and how you finished it off.
    1. engineer74
      engineer74 10 June 2016 16: 44
      +8
      I apologize wildly, but after delivering the "preemptive strike" we would almost certainly get the "Anti-Stalin Coalition"! I think one can guess about its composition, under the slogan "Let's save the world from the barbarians!" hi
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 10 June 2016 17: 50
        +6
        Quote: engineer74
        I apologize wildly, but after delivering the "preemptive strike" we would almost certainly get the "Anti-Stalin Coalition"!

        For starters, we would get a rout.
        If only because air dominance would remain behind the backlashes:
        1. The airfield network was opened by about 20%.
        2. The bulk of the backlash appeared at the border airfields only 1-2 days before the attack.
        3. It was not possible to provide fighter cover for attacks on most of the airfields of constant-based backlash (combat radius I-16 - about 130-150 km).
        the second departure of bomber aircraft, inflict a ular on the enemy airfields and bases located in the second zone to the line of Koenigsberg, Marienburg, Thorn, Lodz. For this purpose, airplanes of the SB, PE-2, and AR-2 type can be used, of which we have 122 links; to solve this problem, 132 links are required, 10 links are missing. Fighter aircraft cannot accompany bombers when performing this task, their range of action does not allow

        4. The level of training of the flight personnel of the air forces of the RRKA was extremely low - for example, 90% of the crews in the border districts were trained to work only in the afternoon at PMU.

        And this is not theoretical speculation. The Red Army Air Force, in practice, once tried to inflict a preemptive strike on enemy airfields - 25/26.06.41/2/3, in Finland. In a situation similar to the hypothetical "preemptive strike on backlash", our pilots were able to find only XNUMX or XNUMX airfields. Most of them worked for spare purposes - factories and stations. At the same time, the accuracy of the bombing was extremely low - and the bombs were laid in urban buildings.
        Since the bombers did not have fighter cover, when they met with the Finnish fighters, they suffered sensitive losses.
        1. Thomas 1989
          Thomas 1989 11 June 2016 15: 59
          -1
          we still have the air force in this state, who covered the su-24? Who covered the Tu-22 in Georgia? Whatever the theory, the great planes, if DPMU in a circle ....
      2. V.ic
        V.ic 10 June 2016 19: 30
        0
        Quote: engineer74
        after delivering a “preemptive strike” we would almost certainly get the “Anti-Stalin Coalition”! About its composition, under the slogan "Save the world from the barbarians!", I think you can guess ...

        The brains of the "children of EG" are not yet mature enough!
      3. Aleksander
        Aleksander 11 June 2016 00: 00
        0
        Quote: engineer74
        but after delivering a "preemptive strike" we would almost certainly get the "Anti-Stalin Coalition"! About its composition, under the slogan "Save the world from the barbarians!", I think you can guess


        Wouldn’t get anything! Germany was a recognized aggressor and occupier of Poland. And the blow would have been precisely against the occupier of Poland with a view to its liberation. And who will defend the occupier? But England, which had already suffered terrible losses from Hitler, could not be able to rebuild at 180 degrees.
        1. Alf
          Alf 11 June 2016 17: 03
          0
          Quote: Aleksander
          Wouldn’t get anything! Germany was a recognized aggressor and occupier of Poland. And the blow would have been precisely against the occupier of Poland with a view to its liberation. And who will defend the occupier? But England, which had already suffered terrible losses from Hitler, could not be able to rebuild at 180 degrees.

          That's it.
          On July 1, 1940, the Channel Islands were captured by Germany, which held a small garrison here until May 9, 1945. The possessions of Jersey and Guernsey became the only British possessions occupied by Germany during the Second World War.

          The capture of the islands meant that Britain could not have peace with Germany. But Britain in this case would gladly accept the USSR as allies.
      4. overb
        overb 11 June 2016 00: 52
        0
        Quote: engineer74
        after delivering a "preemptive strike" we would almost certainly get the "Anti-Stalin Coalition"! About its composition, under the slogan "Save the world from the barbarians!", I think you can guess ... A preemptive strike would be a disaster for us, this, by the way, is written in the article

        Enchanting nonsense. Apparently, the fact that Britain (and with it the USA, but in disguise) fought with Germany, passed by you.
    2. Mordvin 3
      Mordvin 3 10 June 2016 18: 45
      +3
      Quote: Eugen
      Only if you look at the quality of new types of weapons for 4 of the year where you started and how you finished it off.

      In quality, everyone made a breakthrough. War is the engine of progress. Just like laziness.
  5. Mestny
    Mestny 10 June 2016 16: 01
    +5
    Quote: tiredwithall
    The reasons for the defeats of 1941 were not Stalin's miscalculations or his illusions. The main reason is the inept command and the underestimation of the potential of large tank formations. But about a "dignified" meeting 41, somehow the language does not turn into such a formulation. Rather, the "guests" were carried out with dignity.

    The main reason is that the German army was not just stronger than the Soviet one. She was probably stronger than everyone else combined. Oddly enough, ours was also nothing. Otherwise, the blitzkrieg would have been completely successful. Read carefully the story, memories, memoirs. The language does not turn to say that they did not fight, and there was a continuous mess.
    They fought, and how. So, like no other army except the Soviet could in principle.
    Another thing is that to win it was necessary to do it even better, and much better.
    Well, they could, no matter what.
    1. avt
      avt 10 June 2016 16: 46
      +4
      Quote: Mestny
      The main reason is that the German army was not just stronger than the Soviet one. She was probably stronger than everyone else combined.

      Let’s clarify - together with other European armies and a lot of volunteers in the invasion forces. Well, you write off Italians, Romanians and other Hungarians and Slovaks, relying on the WHOLE industrial potential of Europe and .... Turkey with its chrome ore.
    2. tiredwithall
      tiredwithall 10 June 2016 16: 47
      +3
      Yes, they fought everywhere. Partly good. But only in places. Most of the equipment was lost on the roads. Tanks drove rokadno, philosophizing at headquarters without understanding the real situation. The main reason for tank losses in June-July 41 is a broken gearbox. Everyone knows about aviation. One hooding is worth it.
      The strength for the war was accumulated enormous, more German. But by September, she left zilch.
      And the fact that "Like no other army except the Soviet could in principle." I absolutely agree with you. I will also add from myself that without the mobilization of the country by the party, everything would have gone to dust.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 10 June 2016 17: 58
        -1
        Quote: tiredwithall
        The main reason for tank losses in June-July 41 is a broken gearbox.

        Hmm ...
        for example, in the 10th Panzer Division mentioned above, the distribution of T-34 losses for their reasons was as follows. In the column “Broken down and burned down on the battlefield” there were twenty “T-34s”, one tank failed during the combat mission and remained on the territory occupied by the enemy, three tanks did not return with crews from the battlefield after the attack, one “T -34 ”was destroyed at the assembly point of emergency vehicles (that is, it was most likely hit in battle, but did not burn out) due to the inability to evacuate when leaving, six tanks were left during the departure due to technical malfunctions and the inability to recover and evacuate, and, finally, one tank was stuck with the inability to remove and evacuate. In this way, of the 32 T-34 tanks lost by the division, nearly two-thirds were casualties. Of course, the loot / drop ratio varied from compound to compound, but overall about half of the losses were due to the enemy’s successful defeat of “invulnerable” tanks.
        © Isaev
      2. Bayonet
        Bayonet 10 June 2016 20: 17
        +1
        Quote: tiredwithall
        The main reason for tank losses in June-July 41 is a broken gearbox.

        And how much was lost simply due to lack of fuel and ammunition ...
    3. The comment was deleted.
  6. Buffet
    Buffet 10 June 2016 16: 05
    -2
    Again transfusions from empty to empty. Winners are not judged. Yes there were mistakes, and they are taken into account.
  7. Alexey M
    Alexey M 10 June 2016 16: 07
    +11
    Again, Stalin and Hitler are compared.
    You look better from the other side, the USSR is communism, socialism. All the capitalists were driven out, the national economy, equality, factories to the working land of the peasants, etc. And we take the rest of the world of capitalism, man-to-man. Poverty Germany, the rich get rich, the poor get poorer, great depression, etc. And here, for no reason, Germany begins to raise its head. In violation of the Versailles peace and other agreements, Germany is reviving its army and navy. And it is even running in Spain. The whole world is silent? Why. Yes, because the communist the threat is worse than the threat of world war. And then Hitler got out of control and attacked Europe. Or didn’t attack? The First World War lasted 3-4 years, but then they won everybody in six months. And they wanted to attack England. Or didn’t they want to? I think it’s not very difficult to land a naval landing there, the distance is only 40 km. So why did you stop, there was no command?
    In my opinion, Hitler was created to fight for the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons, and to destroy the USSR and Russia.
    And Stalin understood everything perfectly. Stalin understood that the world was on the verge of a new crusade against the USSR. And Stalin knew perfectly well that we would fight off Germany, but if all Europe throws itself at us, it will be much harder to fight back. USSR-Russia is a bone in the throat of everything capitalist world and sooner or later come for us. And they came ...
    They came in 1918, he came in 1941, they came in 1991, their methods of action are different, and the goal is the destruction of Russia.
  8. Yuri Y.
    Yuri Y. 10 June 2016 16: 14
    +1
    I remembered this point of view (in the majority, by the way, I agree) when Minsk-2 was concluded.
    1. Yuri Y.
      Yuri Y. 10 June 2016 17: 28
      0
      If something is not about Rubtsov, but about what is stated in the article. In my opinion they understand this there too. Therefore, now there is no war or peace.
  9. kepmor
    kepmor 10 June 2016 16: 18
    +4
    Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side!
    Especially after 70 years ...
    We have the right and even the obligation to analyze and draw conclusions from the heroic and tragic past of our country, so as not to repeat it in the present and future.
    BUT ... ONLY a generation of our grandfathers and fathers - warriors, home front workers, has the right to reproach, blame, and even more so condemn someone and for anything made mistakes and miscalculations!
    Only the "winning generation" has the right to do so!
  10. Rezident007
    Rezident007 10 June 2016 16: 22
    +5
    Eternal memory to the fallen fighters in battles for the Homeland.
  11. cap
    cap 10 June 2016 16: 30
    +4
    Quote: Verdun
    . To assess what happened, you first need to familiarize yourself with the large number of diverse reliable information. And this is not even one book, but whole volumes. Otherwise, any search for causes will be superficial, and the conclusions will be erroneous.


    Stalin, like his ashes resting on Red Square, does not let everyone who dreams of revenge in the confrontation with Russia sleep peacefully.
  12. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 10 June 2016 16: 32
    +2
    Monthly Red Army strength:

    At 1 December 1939 years - 3 273 400 people.
    At 1 January 1940 years - 3 851 700 people.
    On February 1 1940 of the year - 4 229 954 people.
    On April 1 1940 of the year - 4 416 600 people.
    On 1 of May 1940 of the year - 3 990 993 people.
    On 1 June 1940 years - 4 055 479 people.
    At 1 September 1940 of the year - 3 423 499 people.
    On October 1 of 1940 of the year - 3 446 309 people.
    By January 1941 - 4 people [200].
    On 22 June 1941 years - 5 080 977 people.
    By July 1, 1941 - 10 380 000 people [11].
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Mavrikiy
      Mavrikiy 10 June 2016 18: 36
      -5
      voyaka uh IL Today, 16:3
      What did you mean, sickly?
    3. masiya
      masiya 10 June 2016 21: 21
      -4
      Do not score the head on these minusculers, these are sick people, they are looking for something, and somehow, they’re spoiling like dirty skunks ...
    4. Alex_59
      Alex_59 10 June 2016 22: 08
      +3
      Quote: voyaka uh
      Monthly Red Army strength:

      He doesn’t say anything at all. For a country like Russia - even more so. All 5 million people stood on a chain along the western border on June 22? Or were there units in the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East? And did units in the Far East mobilize and become more numerous?
      Even if the entire Red Army had at least 20 million people, if they were distributed, even if not throughout the country, even in the European part, this in no way solves the problem of the "first attack". Because the attacker, having the initiative with a formally smaller payroll, can easily create a superiority in manpower and equipment at least 30 times in the place of a breakthrough. The division will simply put pressure on the battalion - and a breakthrough is guaranteed. And behind it is the collapse of the front and the need to urgently patch it up with something. What if the enemy is faster than you? For example, does he work exclusively as motorized infantry on armored personnel carriers and kübelwagens, while your infantry walks on foot? All your attempts to quickly parry a breakthrough will be preempted by a faster enemy. At least kill yourself. And what if this enemy has won several years, gained experience, self-confidence, and has a well-adjusted management? Even if you have at least 20 million people and thousands of T-34s with KV-2s, you will not do anything about it. Defeat is inevitable. So our grandfathers did a great feat and a miracle - the war did not end in 41 in Moscow.
  13. antivirus
    antivirus 10 June 2016 16: 39
    +1
    Undoubtedly, one of the most difficult problems of the spacecraft from September 1, 1939 was the training of ordinary and sergeant personnel, but also of command personnel from the joint platoon to the regiment. Making a commander of a regiment a division commander is much easier than making a full-fledged comrade from yesterday’s cadet. And from Kompory Kompolka. And to avoid this, given the avalanche-like growth of the army, it was not possible.
    Without reading all the coms, I agree with this
    BUT GL mentality.
    3 generations were supposed to live in the USSR-Ros empire in the conditions of socialism-capitalism.
    And only this would give: social ties, orientation in the big cities of peasants (what happened in 50-60 years (the transition from balalaika harmony to dancing at dance floors, working in industry and moving thousands of kilometers to a post of residence).
    And not a latrine, which was probably considered a service in the Red Army. Then the fighter returned to the village and again 1 tractor (how much for what?)
    We came to this only in the late 70s, in particular in terms of the number of doctors per 100 inhabitants, as compared to Europe
    FEAT!!!! JUMPING ABOVE THE HEADS OF 4 YEARS.
    And now, social relations, due to density and railway and highway, and communication of multilingual races, are weaker than in the surrounding world.
    But autonomy, the reverse side of isolation, has helped us survive.
    And then we will be tormented by developing the sixth sense
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 10 June 2016 18: 07
      +2
      Quote: antivirus
      Undoubtedly, one of the most difficult problems of the spacecraft from September 1, 1939 was the training of ordinary and sergeant personnel, but also of command personnel from the joint platoon to the regiment. Making a commander of a regiment a division commander is much easier than making a full-fledged comrade from yesterday’s cadet. And from Kompory Kompolka. And to avoid this, given the avalanche-like growth of the army, it was not possible.

      The problem was also that some of the commanders of the 30s did not even correspond to their current posts. The territorial-militia formations, which until the end of the 30s constituted the bulk of the Red Army rifle formations, were especially distinguished. For example, in one of the territorial divisions during the final inspection of the regiment’s chief of staff (from the permanent composition), he was unable to assign a combat mission to the battalion.
  14. mole
    mole 10 June 2016 16: 43
    +3
    My opinion Stalin was trying to prepare for war. Everyone heard about the sweeps in the Army, about many repressed officers in the period 37-38, but read
    http://topwar.ru/4026-mif-o-obezglavlivanii-armii-stalinym.html
    What other reasons could affect stripping? Put yourself in the place of Stalin ... The banal desire of the military leaders to do nothing, but to live well, i.e. almost modern corruption. Those who served will understand.
    The next question is why the NKVD USSR were ready for warand the Red Army - no? Not a single outpost not only surrendered, but also did not retreat. Is it because they were preparing? The Germans had an order, border guards and commissars to shoot on the spot.
    The answer is simple - the departments were different.
    Subsequently, Beria showed himself not as a driver with his hands, but as a manager who created the industry of the USSR, read about sharashka
    http://topwar.ru/19832-chernyy-mif-o-sharashkah.html
    And by the way, none of the listed designers and engineers, in this article, wrote bad things about Stalin in their memoirs, although they survived and could?
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 10 June 2016 18: 13
      +2
      Quote: Mole
      The next question is, why were the NKVD USSR PVs ready for war, but the Red Army not? Not a single outpost not only surrendered, but also did not retreat.

      I didn’t retreat without an order. In fact, border detachments and outposts departed - but by order.
      For example, the 105th border detachment:
      On the night of June twenty-second he never closed his eyes. Towards morning, Lieutenant General Bogdanov, the chief of the troops of the Belorussian Border District, phoned from Bialystok, inquired about the situation, and ordered him to prepare to repel possible aggression. Bocharov accepted the reports of the commandants of the plots and gave them the necessary orders. He ordered the chief of staff to prepare documents for evacuation. At exactly four o'clock in the morning the first bombs fell on Kresting, on the edge of which the headquarters and control of the detachment were stationed. The barracks of the third outpost were burning, which at that time already occupied a stronghold, a food warehouse and a stable. Glass flew out at the squad headquarters. Communication with the first and fourth commandant’s offices was immediately disrupted, and after half an hour it was interrupted with the rest of the units. Had to use messengers on horses. And yet Bocharov was able to clarify the tasks of the units: together with the appropriate units of the 10th Infantry Division, firmly hold strong points, depart only by his order, the gathering area by the end of June XNUMX was Salantai (a little northeast of Kretinga). Despite the heroic resistance of the border guards, by the end of the first day of the war they still had to retreat inland and take up the defense with the forces of a combined detachment on the southern outskirts of Salantai. To the head of the third outpost Leontyev [chief of the outpost, Lieutenant G.I. Petrashin, deputy head of the outpost for political affairs, junior political instructor N.N. Leontiev - BT.] Bocharov ordered an ambush on the Kretinga-Salantai highway. Its results exceeded expectations: an armored personnel carrier, a car and three motorcycles were shot down, six prisoners were captured. During the twenty-third of June, the combined detachment successfully repulsed several attacks, but was forced to retreat.
      1. mole
        mole 10 June 2016 21: 14
        0
        Whom did you post?
    2. Yuyuka
      Yuyuka 10 June 2016 20: 15
      +1
      And by the way, none of the listed designers and engineers, in this article, wrote bad things about Stalin in their memoirs, although they survived and could?

      I will add that the soldiers did not say bad things about Stalin either, the grandfather of distant relatives said about the detachments, "We could not resist when such a colossus is a pearl." This was said in the 80s ... then it seemed wild, but now you understand that it was a cruel necessity, because sometimes a few alarmists are enough for everyone to run, especially at a time when we still did not have the experience of victories ...
      1. mole
        mole 10 June 2016 21: 24
        0
        Quote: Yuyuka
        And by the way, none of the listed designers and engineers, in this article, wrote bad things about Stalin in their memoirs, although they survived and could?

        I will add that the soldiers did not say bad things about Stalin either, the grandfather of distant relatives said about the detachments, "We could not resist when such a colossus is a pearl." This was said in the 80s ... then it seemed wild, but now you understand that it was a cruel necessity, because sometimes a few alarmists are enough for everyone to run, especially at a time when we still did not have the experience of victories ...

        I respect your point of view, but did not say a word about the detachments. The sane will understand, not in the detachments of strength, strength in spirit and truth! Just please, do not attach my comment to the current political and economic situation.
        1. Yuyuka
          Yuyuka 11 June 2016 10: 18
          0
          Quote: Yuyuka
          And by the way, none of the listed designers and engineers, in this article, wrote bad things about Stalin in their memoirs, although they survived and could?

          I will add that the soldiers did not say bad things about Stalin either, the grandfather of distant relatives said about the detachments, "We could not resist when such a colossus is a pearl." This was said in the 80s ... then it seemed wild, but now you understand that it was a cruel necessity, because sometimes a few alarmists are enough for everyone to run, especially at a time when we still did not have the experience of victories ...

          I respect your point of view, but did not say a word about the detachments. The sane will understand, not in the detachments of strength, strength in spirit and truth! Just please, do not attach my comment to the current political and economic situation.


          I just wanted to show all the ambiguity of that period and the personality of Stalin, the attitude towards him on the part of those who fought ... sometimes those who were pitiful in the first battle, then became heroes, because the detachments were more of a psychological tool. But! if it were not for the strength of spirit of our people, no detachments would help! hi
          1. overb
            overb 11 June 2016 13: 10
            0
            Quote: Yuyuka
            those who fought

            Parts of those who survived.
            And you won’t ask many millions of dead.
            You will not ask the dead in captivity.
            Do not ask those shot by the same detachments.
            And it's all fought too. And they make up the majority.
            Therefore, the opinion of part of the minority, it is ... interesting.
          2. The comment was deleted.
  15. Yak28
    Yak28 10 June 2016 16: 50
    +3
    The theme of the heavy defeats of the Red Army in June-July 1941 remains one of the most relevant and controversial ... There is nothing controversial, everything is clear as a white day wink Before attacking the USSR, the German army captured more than one country, German soldiers were ideological, experienced blood-tasting fighters. And this battle-hardened, experimental army invades the territory of the USSR. The soldiers of the Red Army were simply frightened (this is a normal human phenomenon), hence the mass of prisoners of war Red Army soldiers, a bunch of abandoned equipment in good condition and defeat on the fronts. Of course there were pockets of serious resistance where the soldiers showed heroism, but that did not change the overall picture of the battle. Later, the Red Army recovered from knockdown and began to surrender as an adult. I’ll add that at that time any army in the world would be crushed by the Nazis with a complete loss of combat effectiveness. And only the Red Army withstood such a blow, and ultimately won.
    1. vv3
      vv3 11 June 2016 12: 55
      -1
      The reasons for the defeat are clear. This is the policy of the Stalinist elite and his personally towards the top commanding staff of the Red Army. The high command, starting with the commanders of the regiments, was almost completely destroyed, and the rest was intimidated and completely deprived of initiative and independence. This process went in waves for several years and did not even turn into At the beginning of the war, the arrest and execution of the high command of the Air Force began in early June 1941 and continued until February 23, 1942, when the last group of commanders was shot. Ordinary pilots did not receive orders and threw their planes either immediately or after the first flight to alternate airfields. The planes were destroyed on the ground by German ground units during the first weeks, and not by aviation in the first hours of the treacherous attack, as they say everywhere. At the same time, the pilots remained alive and scuffed with their legs ... Hero Admiral Oktyabrsky, who was laid to rest in the Kremlin wall, forbade all aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet to take off for several weeks after the start of the war. There were no instructions from above. By the way, he was responsible for the death of hundreds of thousands of defenders Sevastopol, which were abandoned without ammunition and without command and all died or were taken prisoner. But, as he wrote denunciations, everyone knows. And he did not find time to develop a plan for the evacuation of the defenders of Sevastopol, there was no such plan. All the defenders of Sevastopol died, except early and taken out in the initial period of defense. And there was no one to return. And who received the medal "for the defense of Sevastopol" is generally unclear. There are many such examples. Mehilis shot more generals than all the Germans in the entire war. And where does his ashes lie? ..Stalingrad was made by Marshal Timoshenko, who ditched his front completely in the Barvenkovo ​​offensive operation at the beginning of 1. The General Staff and Stalin approved this offensive operation, Zhukov said nothing. Of the 1 armies, practically one remained, completely bled, and 1942 were destroyed by the Germans along with headquarters and even flags. Before Stalingrad there were no cadres left ... And why Tymoshenko was shot? But he just abandoned the front in the most critical situation. They were looking for him for 3 days, and he was fishing at a picnic ... Here are examples of the personnel policy of wise Stalin. And there are dozens of such examples, and each of them is a sea of ​​blood of our soldiers ... It is worth noting that those few units where the commanders survived fought with dignity and no worse than the Germans, and did not expect the command to retreat ...
  16. cedar
    cedar 10 June 2016 16: 52
    +1
    The beginning of the World War was motivated by the Versailles "peace", let's not forget the training of pilots, tankers, command personnel of Germany in the USSR. And the Russian units of the Wehrmacht, they went to liberate their homeland from which they were expelled as exploiters of the working people by the new power, a prominent representative, which was Leiba Bronstein, the organizer of the October Revolution and the Red Army, and a meeting with the flowers of the invaders in Ukraine and Belarus. And this is far from the entire hidden underwater part of the BEGINNING of the Great Patriotic War, and war is life in another dimension. All this and much more tells us how important it is to be not only armed with various types of effective weapons, but also to be able to choose the right one in the array of information flows, eliminating the piled chaos of uncertainties on which the life of the people and the state depends.
    Only the unbending, political will of the Leader is capable of this. armed with clear political goals and ideas!
  17. Yak28
    Yak28 10 June 2016 17: 27
    0
    Quote: Mole
    Not a single outpost not only surrendered, but also did not retreat

    Where do the crowds of captured Red Army soldiers and abandoned tanks come from in the military chronicles? After all, as you say, "Not a single outpost has surrendered" And the meeting of the Nazis in Ukraine, where local residents themselves tore portraits of Soviet leaders from buildings, there, too, did not betray or gave up?
    1. mole
      mole 10 June 2016 17: 42
      +1
      Read the BORDER STAND correctly, not the RED ARMENIANS! The border guards did not have tanks. The outposts were only intensified by the Red Army units. Or even the Red Army units were nearby. Do not confuse the Red Army Red Army with the NKVD border guards.
  18. Antiprogressor
    Antiprogressor 10 June 2016 17: 33
    +8
    Nevertheless, a strong Czech Republic merged into five minutes without a fight. Strong Poland killed in 2 weeks. The most powerful France, together with the giant Britain, lost outright. And if Hitler had not tripped over the Union, the United States would have been paralyzed in the Atlantic and the Pacific.
    And "Stalin is to blame" and "the barbaric Russian" ... The homosexual essence of European "values", perversion of thinking, cowardice and the search for a strong political pimp — this is the whole centuries-old truth of Europe.
    And the thousands of our politicians and leaders who have adopted these values, who sent their offspring to study in European ways, are that fifth column that was not finished in the 1930s. The resistance of the Trotskyists was strong. And now the Trotskyists essentially rule Europe and partly America. They need a world revolution, freedom of love and renunciation of the simplest values ​​of preserving the race. We can say that those who admonished Trotsky in America, a hundred years later, EXACTLY !!! May rejoice: victory is near. Global world with obedient zombies.
  19. potapych
    potapych 10 June 2016 17: 52
    +1
    the Red Army was tactically and technically unprepared for the war. instead of studying the materiel, the composition of the units was engaged in agriculture, the command personnel did not correspond to the posts, equipment from 40 to 60% required repair. the lack of radio stations and the complete disregard for war trends led to the collapse of 1941 and the summer of 1942
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 10 June 2016 19: 23
      0
      Quote: potapych
      the composition of units instead of studying materiel was engaged in agriculture,

      This is in the 30s.
      Before the war, the f / s of the western districts were engaged mainly in the arrangement of permanent deployment points. And fiercely envied those who got the old RPD or the Polish barracks.
      The situation with the barracks and technical facilities was so awful that divisions were stuffed in the RPD of the former brigades. Stables with bunks in 3 tiers were used to accommodate l / s. Some units were even pushed into former prisons or placed on billets in peasant households.
      It was the shortage of the barracks fund that gave rise to the same terrible overcrowding in the Brest Fortress - they were stuffed into it not because of any "aggressive plans" there, but simply because there were barracks, boxes and other infrastructure.
      Quote: potapych
      the command staff did not correspond to the posts

      You cannot but know that we do not have the Hindenburgs in reserve. ©
      Quote: potapych
      complete disregard for war trends

      First of all, at the grassroots level. When the order "to bypass and take by storm" is understood as "to storm head-on." When the tanks go on the attack alone - because the rifle division commander put on the approved offensive plan and sent the battalion assigned to escort the tanks to another sector ... and the divisional artillery did not receive the plan at all. When a tank brigade commander chooses a bare height right in front of them for reconnaissance of enemy positions, the assembled commanders are covered with mortar fire and riflemen.

      In short, everyone is fighting in their war. Infantry does not follow tanks, tanks detach from infantry and do not suppress machine guns, artillery fires at the plan table and it is extremely difficult to switch it to a suddenly discovered target, infantry causes corps calibers to fire at open firing points and even at single enemy soldiers, aviation .. Aviation is circling somewhere in the sky. sad
  20. APASUS
    APASUS 10 June 2016 18: 04
    0
    Of course, the loss of the Red Army in 1941 was due to a number of reasons, I want to name only one. The foresight of the leadership and directly to the highest level. The same Budeny was sure that the cavalry would reach Berlin and, on the recommendation of the Soviet command in the summer of 1941, began to form new cavalry divisions, by the end more than 80 light cavalry divisions were additionally deployed in the year.
    Sawing tanks and machine guns equipped with machine guns failed.
    1. ftgad
      ftgad 10 June 2016 18: 31
      +3
      and you probably don’t have shoulder straps to read about the actions and tactics of the cavalry divisions.
      In a country where by that time at least half of the population could ride in the saddle, this "ersatz-variant" of mobile infantry was not so bad as they try to imagine
      1. APASUS
        APASUS 10 June 2016 20: 11
        0
        Quote: ftgad
        and you probably don’t have shoulder straps to read about the actions and tactics of the cavalry divisions.

        With a saber on tanks - I recognize the Chapaevch rush!
        The Germans relied on a machine gun for one moto crew, and we their caps ........
        1. Alex_59
          Alex_59 10 June 2016 22: 17
          +3
          Quote: APASUS
          With a saber on tanks - I recognize the Chapaevch rush!

          You will probably be in shock, but the cavalry units were also in the German army. And they didn’t have any drafts. Like ours. Moreover, half the traction in the German army was equestrian. It was only in the advanced tank divisions that everything was motorized, and behind the tanks they slowly and completely non-Blitzkrieg occupied the area and finished off the remnants of the boilers to the infantry divisions. With horses.
          The cavalry combat units that they have, that we had infantry — machine-gunners and arrows on horses. They had their own artillery, horse drawn, etc. They moved quickly, did not require a fuel supply. They dismounted in battle and fought like ordinary infantry. By the end of the war, the number of cavalry units even increased.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 10 June 2016 19: 31
      +3
      Quote: APASUS
      The same Budyonny was sure that the cavalry would reach Berlin

      Do you want to say that the cavalry did not reach Berlin? wink

      The WWII cavalry is the motorized infantry for the poor. Instead of a hundred horses under the hood - one under the saddle. Fight - dismounted, movement - mounted. Fight on horseback - only as an exceptional measure, in a favorable tactical situation (when the enemy was caught "with his pants down"). In the late summer of 1941, when almost all the mechanized formations of the Red Army on the ETVD were reduced to zero, the cavalry was the only way to give the Red Army at least some mobile units.

      At the end of the war, cavalry units approached even closer to the motorized infantry, having their own tanks and self-propelled guns. Uv. Y.Pasholka laid out the docks even on the use of trophy "Panthers" by cavalrymen (and they served them for quite a long time - for trophies).
  21. CORNET
    CORNET 10 June 2016 18: 39
    +1
    The theme is hackneyed already ....! Soaked Germany with Europe all over! Now it’s more difficult, but you can repeat it again ... The main thing was then won, almost the whole georope fought with us from the factories of France in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy ... Goofy Europe fell in May 1945 Before the devastated and almost destroyed country SOVIET UNION, it was called and the Soviet people! There is no longer in history such a heroic country like the USSR! Russia, we are trying to honor what was and maybe repeat .. hi
    1. ssf2257
      ssf2257 10 June 2016 19: 11
      -1
      In the end I would like to add -.... what was and maybe we will repeat .. Importantly, do not write in your pants before the time.
  22. Denis Skiff
    Denis Skiff 10 June 2016 19: 36
    0
    Stalin, Rubtsov believes, believed the German explanations that the large-scale transfer of German divisions to the Soviet-German border that began in May on the 1941 was carried out to disguise the planned invasion of England (Operation Sea Lion). As a result, "until the last day forbade bringing the troops of the border districts on alert."
    But how could the Nazis attack themselves? they will still show their bestial muzzle.
  23. Signaller
    Signaller 10 June 2016 20: 18
    +1
    When the "Domoklov sword" hangs over the head of the commander, and the NKVD bodies can at any time be held accountable for non-observance of a bad order, independence and initiative "command a long life." The system of repression, although it was already a little softer in 41, people remembered what it was in 37-38. No one wanted to risk it. So we got what the country's leadership wanted. UNINITIATED HEADS OF THE ARMY. And in the army it’s not so in principle,
  24. sogdianec
    sogdianec 10 June 2016 23: 27
    +1
    Quote: Balu
    Troop control, communications, and interaction between units probably influenced to a significant degree.


    A.L. Shepelev, who started the war as the chief engineer of the 17th Air Army, also notes in his memoirs that radio communication was practically not used in organizing combat operations of the front air force. He writes: "The enemy often violated our telegraph and telephone lines with his bombing strikes. And radio communication with the air units was not maintained at that time: there was not enough radio equipment. Even the frontal air force headquarters did not have a remote control center. It was possible to equip it only at the end of 1941. But also after that it was used only by General AA Novikov with a small operational group. The rest of the Air Force command and control staff were in their pre-war building throughout the war, where a stationary communications center was equipped. "

    ... As noted by the Russian historian A.I. Utkin, with reference to the chief of communications of the North-Western Front, T.P. Kargapolov, officers of the front staff for a long time after the outbreak of the war continued to consider the telephone as the main means of communication. The line break for them was often tantamount to a loss of communication with subordinate troops. The potential of radio communications for organizational and technical reasons in the Red Army was far from being fully utilized.


    ... The absence of radio communication equipment on Soviet fighters practically deprived the commanders from the command line and above the ability to control the combat operations of the pilots subordinate to them. The inability to maintain radio communication between themselves and command posts forced the pilots to ignore modern tactical methods of warfare and, contrary to everything else, fly in dense groups, within the scope of visual signals. Neither suddenness, nor consistency, nor attacks from vulnerable directions — fly in a heap, a step to the left, a step to the right is the loss of control, exit from the battle, disruption of the mission, or even death. What kind of coordination of their actions can we talk about? ...

    http://www.warmech.ru/war_weapon/radstationavia.html


    ORDER TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION WORK IN THE RED ARMY
    No. 0243 July 23, 1941
    ... Underestimation of radio communications as the most reliable form of communication and the main means of command and control of troops is the result of the inertia of our headquarters and their lack of understanding of the importance of radio communications in mobile forms of modern combat.

    In violation of all the rules, operational negotiations are being conducted by telephone, parts, formations, their tasks and locations, last names and ranks of commanders are called openly. Thereby, top secret information falls into the hands of the enemy.

    Also, in violation of all the rules, our headquarters from top to bottom do not use simple communication tables and an encoded card over the communication line. All telegraphic correspondence goes through cipher agencies working with a large overload. In the sea of ​​all kinds of documents, often without operational significance, the most important orders, directives and orders are drowning. They are very late, for 8 - 10 hours, fall into the subordinate headquarters and often the intended operation breaks down ...

    http://bdsa.ru/%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B7%D1%8B-%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%BE-%D0
    %B7%D0%B0-1941-%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4/256-164
    1. Alf
      Alf 11 June 2016 17: 11
      0
      Quote: sogdianec
      ... The absence of radio communication equipment on Soviet fighters practically deprived the commanders from the command line and above the ability to control the combat operations of the pilots subordinate to them. The inability to maintain radio communication between themselves and command posts forced the pilots to ignore modern tactical methods of warfare and, contrary to everything else, fly in dense groups, within the scope of visual signals. Neither suddenness, nor consistency, nor attacks from vulnerable directions — fly in a heap, a step to the left, a step to the right is the loss of control, exit from the battle, disruption of the mission, or even death. What kind of coordination of their actions can we talk about? ...

      The fact is that aircraft designers did not voluntarily put radio on planes. The reason is as simple as lowing - in the USSR, radio electronics was developed, to put it mildly, not much. And, again, this is not the fault of the Stalinist system, but a common problem. The fact is that in tsarist Russia radio stations were not broadcast at all and, accordingly, Soviet Russia did not inherit anything and was forced to start from scratch. And, considering that they managed to create their own radio industry from scratch in some 20 years, this can be considered a giant leap forward.
  25. Aleksander
    Aleksander 11 June 2016 00: 23
    +1
    In these conditions, England and the United States could become allies of the USSR in only one case - if Hitler is the clear initiator of the war. That is why, so as not to give Germany the slightest reason to accuse the Soviet Union of aggression, Stalin until the last refrained from officially bringing the troops into full combat readiness


    I note the author, the war at that time ALREADY was going TWO years (WWII) and its universally recognized initiator and aggressor a long time ago Hitler had already been recognized. Who is that Germany, which has just despicably defeated a bunch of countries, accusing them of "aggressiveness" would listen? And if the next (tenth), so far potential, victim of the aggression of the USSR did something to defend himself, no one would say a word, because this goes without saying, given what Hitler did with the previous victims. Allied-non-allied English defined their benefit and did not depend on Germany's non-accusations.
    Therefore, Stalin was cruelly mistaken, to the last refraining from bringing the troops into full combat readiness.
  26. shubin
    shubin 11 June 2016 09: 14
    +1
    I will express my personal opinion. The fact that the initial period of the war turned into a catastrophe for the Soviet Union, a large part of the blame lies with Stalin, as the head of state, and the Supreme Commander.
    Hitler’s plans were known in advance, enough time to prepare for defense. If by the morning of June 22 the infantry was in the trenches,
    artillery and tanks with full ammunition were in position, and the planes at the airfields were ready for immediate take-off, even taking into account the weaker training of the personnel and the technical backlog of the Red Army, the start of the war would be completely different. Stalingrad was supposed to start a year earlier. What was needed was an order that did not follow.
    1. Alf
      Alf 11 June 2016 17: 14
      0
      Quote: shubin
      Hitler’s plans were known in advance, enough time to prepare for defense. If by the morning of June 22 the infantry was in the trenches,

      Yes, it was known about Hitler's DESIRE to attack the USSR. But! Specific deadlines? Beginning in January 41st, a variety of numbers appeared in intelligence reports. Who to believe? Even the German General Staff itself constantly postponed the deadlines.
    2. overb
      overb 11 June 2016 17: 40
      0
      Quote: shubin
      Hitler’s plans were known in advance, enough time to prepare for defense. If by the morning of June 22 the infantry was in the trenches,
      artillery and tanks with full ammunition were in position, and the planes at the airfields were ready for immediate take-off, even taking into account the weaker training of the personnel and the technical backlog of the Red Army, the start of the war would be completely different.

      Quite possible. At least, the fact that Germany will attack the USSR in the near future could have been predicted up to 100% on 11.05.41. When the British declared Hess not a parliamentarian, but a prisoner of war. The Germans understood the meaning of this message, in the USSR, it is difficult to say. But the time for the preparation of defense and counterattack the Red Army had a car.
      But the last word in all matters in the USSR was for the mustachioed katso. This "great strategist" (without a military education) never wanted to believe that the Germans, with such an overwhelming advantage of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht in armaments, would attack the USSR. And he never wanted to believe that "the Germans, taught by WW1 experience, would fight on two fronts." Therefore, apparently, no one really prepared for the defense.
      He simply could not understand one thing, the Germans did not consider the USSR and the Red Army as a real front. And the level of armament of the Red Army did not interest them. A couple of months (13-17 weeks according to Barbarossa's plan), that's all. They are on the line Arkhangelsk-Kotlas-Kazan-Astrakhan along the North. Dvina and Volga. And, strictly speaking, they were right in many ways. If already on July 11 they had not canceled Barbarossa (switched to directive planning, which meant the big "father Makhno") and would have strictly followed this plan, then the probability of their success in 1941. would approach 100%.
      No, on September 11 they returned to the Barbarossa plan. But the loss of these 2 months decided everything for them.
  27. user3970
    user3970 11 June 2016 15: 28
    +1
    How sad it is for us to admit, but Hitler, as a politician and military leader, was a genius. The idea of ​​practical application of BLITZKRIG in Europe and at the initial stage of the Second World War is a brilliant confirmation of this. And the more honorable that the genius of I.V. Stalin outplayed (if I may say so) the European genius A. Schicklgruber. I also want to give an answer to the question: why Stalin "overslept" the beginning of the attack ... The famous TASS appeal of June 14, 1941 was addressed to US President Roosevelt. Because in 1937 Roosevelt said, and in April 1941, the American Congress decided that if Germany attacked the USSR, then the USA would help the USSR. And if the Soviet Union attacks Germany, then the United States will help Germany. And further ... The most important thing ... THE MILITARY POTENTIALS AT THAT MOMENT WERE SUCH: GERMANY - 14,4%; USSR - 14,6%; BRITISH EMPIRE - 10,2%; USA - MORE THAN 40%. IMAGINE THAT THE USSR GIVES THEMSELVES TO BE SPECIFIED: IT GETS AGAINST HITLER GERMANY (WITH WHICH THE BRITISH EMPIRE PAYS WITH) AND THE USA. IT IS CLEAR THAT TURKEY AND JAPAN ARE JOINING HERE. This concerns Stalin as a politician. and now about Zhukov, as a military leader ... When in 1941. The GRU presented to the newly appointed General Staff General of the Army Zhukov a detailed report: "On the Franco-German War of 1939-1940", which analyzed in detail the reasons for the lightning-fast defeat of the Anglo-French troops by the German Wehrmacht. And the future marshal dashed off a resolution: "I don't need this." And if we add to this the certification of Zhukov by Rokossovsky, at that time his former chief: “He cannot be appointed to staff and teaching work - he organically hates it.” The rout of the Red Army and the German advance to Moscow convinced Stalin to finally remove Zhukov from the post of chief of the General Staff ...
    1. overb
      overb 11 June 2016 16: 57
      0
      Quote: user3970
      It is not regrettable for us to admit this, but Hitler, as a politician and military commander, was a genius.

      Hitler was no genius. The usual pragmatist. Germany did not possess the resources for a long war, and therefore she practiced blitzkriegs.
      Exactly the same is the concept of Tukhachevsky "with little blood and on foreign territory", this is the same blitzkrieg, only in Russian words.
      And the reasons for these two concepts of blitzkrieg were the same, these countries did not have the resources for a long war.
      Quote: user3970
      outplayed (so to speak) the European genius A. Schicklgruber

      Hiring the Anglo-Saxons, is it "outplayed"? After giving them all the tidbits of Europe after the war, did he "outplay" it? Then Chiang Kai-shek also "outplayed" the Japanese. Only the "grateful Chinese people" didn't tear him to pieces for such a "replay" after the war, he fled to Taiwan in time. And Dzhugashvili, as a result, did not even try to break it. Amazing.
      Replayed, this is when starting on 22.06.41/1941/1941. by the end of July XNUMX entered the occupied part of France, and by the fall of XNUMX. went to British Gibraltar, simultaneously defeating Franco. And also landed on about. Sicily from the mainland. That would be called replayed. And what was, it’s not that, it’s different.
      Quote: user3970
      And if the Soviet Union attacks Germany, then the United States will help Germany.

      Don't make up "facts". Are you interested in writing nonsense?
      Quote: user3970
      MILITARY POTENTIALS AT THIS TIME WERE SUCH: GERMANY - 14,4%; USSR - 14,6%; BRITISH EMPIRE - 10,2%; USA - MORE THAN 40%

      What nonsense. The numbers themselves invented? The British Empire, the most powerful country in the world before WW2, supposedly had less potential than Germany (!!!!) and the USSR (!!!!!).
      This is PPC.
      Quote: user3970
      USSR GIVES HIMSELF TO PROVIDE: IT GETS HITLER GERMANY AGAINST HIMSELF (WITH WHICH THE BRITISH EMPIRE IS PERMISSING) AND THE USA. It is clear that TURKEY AND JAPAN JOIN HERE TO THEM.

      And also aliens arrive from Alf Centauri, and march in formation on shaggy legs to Moscow "to overthrow socialism." Paraguayans, again, would catch up with Puerto Ricans.
      No, well, where do you come from? Just amazing nonsense. Outstanding, I would say. With such analytical skills, you should go ventriloquist well. Predict the future of grandmothers in the markets. They would get rich.
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