Shock wave of terrorism
The tragic events in the city of Aktobe, without any doubt, shook the whole of Kazakhstan. And it's not just that the country has already begun to gradually forget about the equally tragic incidents of 2011-2012 in the same Aktobe, Taraz and Almaty. Still, the bad is quickly forgotten, and the state has learned from those events. It rather tightly controlled supporters of radical movements, many of whom left Kazakhstan..
It seemed that the situation was under control, and against the background of large-scale terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, Pakistan and other countries, Central Asia as a whole and Kazakhstan in particular looked like a kind of island of calm. But the last outing of the radicals in Aktobe 5 June showed that today no one can be insured against it.
Unlike in previous cases, the blow in Aktobe turned out to be extremely large-scale. A large group of people participated in the raid.
At the same time, they tried to capture the military unit of the National Guard and gain access to arms. Last time, the radicals did not make such attempts. Their actions were directed against the authorities. In particular, in Taraz, the gunman shot the policemen until he was killed. In the Aktobe region, the object of attack was also the police. At the same time, militants killed tourists in the Almaty region, who witnessed their sojourn in the highlands near Almaty.
This time many people participated in the attack, and according to official information, they could theoretically capture a military unit if it were not for the actions of the duty officer and the guard. Hence so many dead and injured among the military. They fulfilled their duty.
But the main question is what the militants counted on. Most likely, their goal was to cause a shock to the state and society. If they succeeded in strengthening themselves in a military unit with seized weapons, then they would be knocked out for a long time.
Actually,
Then the militants of local Ingush and Chechen descent, disguised as police officers, stopped the cars in the city and shot the representatives of law enforcement bodies. They clearly did not expect to seize the city, they wanted to demoralize the security services as state representatives. Subsequently, it was said that this action was a response to pressure from the special services on representatives of the non-traditional for the North Caucasus Wahhabi (Salafi) trend in Islam. However, this also explains the many attacks of militants in Dagestan.
Lessons from the Chechen wars
Here we must bear in mind that since the 1990s in the Russian North Caucasus, there has been a sharp conflict between local Sufi religious authorities and supporters of Wahhabism (Salafism). In fact, this is a real war. For example, one of the reasons why the mufti of Chechnya, Akhmat Kadyrov, and prominent field commanders, the Yamadaev brothers, went over to the Russian side in the second Chechen war, was due to the fact that the Chechen leadership of that time supported the Wahhabis more. It is believed that Vice-President Yandarbiyev and famous field commander Basaev adhered to this position. While Kadyrov was the leader of the Sufi tariqat, Qadiriya, influential in the Caucasus. In the Sufi tradition, such leaders are called a feast or a murshed (teacher). Murid is, respectively, a student.
In Dagestan, a split between the Sufis and the Wahhabis took place in many localities. After the invasion of Basayev’s militants from Chechnya and the end of the second Chechen war, the Dagestan Wahhabis were defeated. The local Islamic community has since been dominated by Sufis. Wahhabis wage war against them from the underground. For example, in 2012, a suicide bomber Alla Saprykina (Aminat Kurbanova) from Wahhabi converts to Islam blew herself up at a reception at Said Chirkei, one of the most influential religious authorities of Dagestan. He was the feast of the Nakshbandiya tariqah, which is very influential in the North Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Although, of course, it all depends on the situation. And Sufis are radical and sometimes lead holy wars. We can recall Imam Shamil, who, with his murids, waged a holy war against the expansion of the Russian Empire. The Afghan Taliban also had close ties with the Sufis.
In even more ancient storiesFor example, in North Africa, the Almohad and Almoravid movements, which relied on Sufi traditions and organizational structures called Zawiya, left a rather gloomy memory of themselves in terms of religious extremism.
Who are Wahhabis?
It is worth emphasizing the ideological differences between Sufis and Salafis (Wahhabis). Sufis rely, on the one hand, on the mystical component in religious practices. They advocate the possibility of an independent approach to the knowledge of faith. The Sufi must go this way along with the teacher (the Murshed). Hence the Sufi practices - loud and quiet zikr. A typical example of loud zikr is collective dances in a circle among the mountaineers of the North Caucasus. On the other hand, Sufis have an organizational structure based on the loyalty of the student (murid) to the teacher (murshed).
In addition, Sufi practices were very flexible with respect to local traditions, which they encountered in the process of spreading Islam to new lands. They often adapted them to Islamic dogma. This is characteristic of the cult of saints (in Kazakh aulie). Due to the fact that Sufis respected their murshes and feasts, as well as in connection with mystical practices, it was quite logical for them that, after death, people can be part of the tradition. Hence, mausoleums like Khoja Ahmed Yassawi, who was the feast of the tariqah of Yassawiya and many other mazars of the saints, widespread in Kazakhstan, the North Caucasus, Afghanistan and even Pakistan.
Salafis believe that Sufi practices are heresy. First, the worship of the graves of saints (aulie) from their point of view is the sin of polytheism (in Arabic shirk). Islam is strictly monotheistic religion. Secondly, from the point of view of the Salafists (from the Arab Salafia - ancestors, predecessors), all that has been introduced into Islam over the centuries of its spread throughout the world is the so-called forbidden innovation (in Arabic bidat). Accordingly, all the traditions that go beyond the Koran and the Sunna are not recognized as Wahhabis corresponding to the so-called "pure Islam".
Islam in Kazakhstan annoys Wahhabis
Salafi practices are becoming more widespread in the Islamic world. This is facilitated, on the one hand, by the fact that
On the other hand, these ideas feed on the dissatisfaction of the “Muslim street” in different countries with a variety of circumstances, including the influence and domination of the West. In addition, the “Muslim street”, especially in the cities, is seriously dissatisfied with its own political elites. From this arose the idea expressed by the famous theologian Qutb that the modern Muslim states are in a state of jahiliyah (in Arabic ignorance). In such a state were the Arabs before the advent of Islam.
The paradox is that the first supporters of a return to "pure Islam" opposed the domination of conservative Muslim clerics (ulama), who from their point of view interfered with progress. They called for a return to the original values in order to overcome the backlog from the West.
Enemies of the state
But especially actively increasing the influence of Salafism occurs where there are no stable traditional religious institutions and, accordingly, traditions.
For more than 70 years they have been cut off from the processes in the Islamic world. Accordingly, it is almost a “clean board” on which you can create a new version. This is much easier to do than where there is a strong influence of traditional institutions.
For example, in Pakistan and India there is a very radical Deoband movement, named after an Islamic university. To him belonged the Afghan Taliban. After the start of Islamabad’s confrontation with its own Islamists, Deoband split into two parts. Some supported the struggle against the state, others came out strongly against it. There have been cases when the radicals from Deoband blew up their more moderate comrades.
And they see the state as their main opponent. In this regard, the question arises what to do to the state in this difficult situation.
What to do now in Kazakhstan with the threat of terrorism?
It is clear that there are examples of Chechnya, where for a long time there have been no large-scale actions at all, only isolated speeches. There are still examples of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where today it is unlikely in the situation of tight police control over society. But all these are extreme measures that may have adverse consequences for the development of the country.
In response, it increases the level of effectiveness of its intelligence services, but without changing the usual way of life. This is a very pragmatic point of view. Terrorist attacks cannot be completely avoided. Accordingly, it is necessary to do so in order to maximally prevent their manifestations using the methods of special services, minimize damage, increasing the level of readiness of the military and police to respond to the acute situation that has arisen. And it is worthwhile to work out the algorithm of informational notification of the population.
After the terrorist attack in Aktobe, many opinions and opinions were expressed. The Internet today provides great opportunities for this. Some said that the main reason was unemployment and poverty in Aktobe. Others say that there is no legal opposition in the country, so there is no one to stop the protests.
Poverty is, of course, a big problem, as is social inequality. But
Therefore, the judgment that having an active political opposition would allow introducing protest into a civilized framework is clearly erroneous. In Kazakhstan, the entire political opposition is secular and for the most part liberal. She has no chance to express the interests of religious-radical groups. To let or not to let religious radicals into politics is a very dangerous and complicated problem. Many Muslim countries are trying to solve this difficult question with different results.
How do we act in Kazakhstan, where there are already quite a lot of people who are simply religious, much more than they used to be, but most of them are still mostly non-religious?
despite the fact that many who received education in the arab world consider it archaic. Should the state now see the enemy in all Salafis or should it seek agreement with their moderate part? And is there any moderate Salafism?
The events in Aktobe gave an extra reason to think over the whole situation, try to understand its internal logic and try to see the perspective. In any case, who is forewarned is forearmed.
But, alas, we are also part of the overall processes in the world and this must be treated accordingly. No need to panic, it is necessary to learn the lessons and first of all the state.
It seemed that the situation was under control, and against the background of large-scale terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, Pakistan and other countries, Central Asia as a whole and Kazakhstan in particular looked like a kind of island of calm. But the last outing of the radicals in Aktobe 5 June showed that today no one can be insured against it.
Unlike in previous cases, the blow in Aktobe turned out to be extremely large-scale. A large group of people participated in the raid.
video from one of the surveillance cameras showed ten to fifteen people armed with hunting rifles
At the same time, they tried to capture the military unit of the National Guard and gain access to arms. Last time, the radicals did not make such attempts. Their actions were directed against the authorities. In particular, in Taraz, the gunman shot the policemen until he was killed. In the Aktobe region, the object of attack was also the police. At the same time, militants killed tourists in the Almaty region, who witnessed their sojourn in the highlands near Almaty.
This time many people participated in the attack, and according to official information, they could theoretically capture a military unit if it were not for the actions of the duty officer and the guard. Hence so many dead and injured among the military. They fulfilled their duty.
But the main question is what the militants counted on. Most likely, their goal was to cause a shock to the state and society. If they succeeded in strengthening themselves in a military unit with seized weapons, then they would be knocked out for a long time.
Actually,
this action in Aktobe partly resembles an attack on military units and police stations in Russia in the city of Nazran in 2004
Then the militants of local Ingush and Chechen descent, disguised as police officers, stopped the cars in the city and shot the representatives of law enforcement bodies. They clearly did not expect to seize the city, they wanted to demoralize the security services as state representatives. Subsequently, it was said that this action was a response to pressure from the special services on representatives of the non-traditional for the North Caucasus Wahhabi (Salafi) trend in Islam. However, this also explains the many attacks of militants in Dagestan.
Lessons from the Chechen wars
Here we must bear in mind that since the 1990s in the Russian North Caucasus, there has been a sharp conflict between local Sufi religious authorities and supporters of Wahhabism (Salafism). In fact, this is a real war. For example, one of the reasons why the mufti of Chechnya, Akhmat Kadyrov, and prominent field commanders, the Yamadaev brothers, went over to the Russian side in the second Chechen war, was due to the fact that the Chechen leadership of that time supported the Wahhabis more. It is believed that Vice-President Yandarbiyev and famous field commander Basaev adhered to this position. While Kadyrov was the leader of the Sufi tariqat, Qadiriya, influential in the Caucasus. In the Sufi tradition, such leaders are called a feast or a murshed (teacher). Murid is, respectively, a student.
In Dagestan, a split between the Sufis and the Wahhabis took place in many localities. After the invasion of Basayev’s militants from Chechnya and the end of the second Chechen war, the Dagestan Wahhabis were defeated. The local Islamic community has since been dominated by Sufis. Wahhabis wage war against them from the underground. For example, in 2012, a suicide bomber Alla Saprykina (Aminat Kurbanova) from Wahhabi converts to Islam blew herself up at a reception at Said Chirkei, one of the most influential religious authorities of Dagestan. He was the feast of the Nakshbandiya tariqah, which is very influential in the North Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Although, of course, it all depends on the situation. And Sufis are radical and sometimes lead holy wars. We can recall Imam Shamil, who, with his murids, waged a holy war against the expansion of the Russian Empire. The Afghan Taliban also had close ties with the Sufis.
In even more ancient storiesFor example, in North Africa, the Almohad and Almoravid movements, which relied on Sufi traditions and organizational structures called Zawiya, left a rather gloomy memory of themselves in terms of religious extremism.
Who are Wahhabis?
It is worth emphasizing the ideological differences between Sufis and Salafis (Wahhabis). Sufis rely, on the one hand, on the mystical component in religious practices. They advocate the possibility of an independent approach to the knowledge of faith. The Sufi must go this way along with the teacher (the Murshed). Hence the Sufi practices - loud and quiet zikr. A typical example of loud zikr is collective dances in a circle among the mountaineers of the North Caucasus. On the other hand, Sufis have an organizational structure based on the loyalty of the student (murid) to the teacher (murshed).
In addition, Sufi practices were very flexible with respect to local traditions, which they encountered in the process of spreading Islam to new lands. They often adapted them to Islamic dogma. This is characteristic of the cult of saints (in Kazakh aulie). Due to the fact that Sufis respected their murshes and feasts, as well as in connection with mystical practices, it was quite logical for them that, after death, people can be part of the tradition. Hence, mausoleums like Khoja Ahmed Yassawi, who was the feast of the tariqah of Yassawiya and many other mazars of the saints, widespread in Kazakhstan, the North Caucasus, Afghanistan and even Pakistan.
Salafis believe that Sufi practices are heresy. First, the worship of the graves of saints (aulie) from their point of view is the sin of polytheism (in Arabic shirk). Islam is strictly monotheistic religion. Secondly, from the point of view of the Salafists (from the Arab Salafia - ancestors, predecessors), all that has been introduced into Islam over the centuries of its spread throughout the world is the so-called forbidden innovation (in Arabic bidat). Accordingly, all the traditions that go beyond the Koran and the Sunna are not recognized as Wahhabis corresponding to the so-called "pure Islam".
Islam in Kazakhstan annoys Wahhabis
Salafi practices are becoming more widespread in the Islamic world. This is facilitated, on the one hand, by the fact that
Wahhabism is the ideology of the richest and most active countries in the Arab world - Saudi Arabia and Qatar
On the other hand, these ideas feed on the dissatisfaction of the “Muslim street” in different countries with a variety of circumstances, including the influence and domination of the West. In addition, the “Muslim street”, especially in the cities, is seriously dissatisfied with its own political elites. From this arose the idea expressed by the famous theologian Qutb that the modern Muslim states are in a state of jahiliyah (in Arabic ignorance). In such a state were the Arabs before the advent of Islam.
If the state does not meet the requirements of supporters of "pure Islam", then it must be changed
The paradox is that the first supporters of a return to "pure Islam" opposed the domination of conservative Muslim clerics (ulama), who from their point of view interfered with progress. They called for a return to the original values in order to overcome the backlog from the West.
the call for "pure Islam" is more perceived as a return to medieval practices
Although for many, especially neophytes, it is more important that this is a more strict adherence to the Islamic tradition, more substantiated and appropriately correct than the popular Islam to which everyone is accustomed. Salafis usually call it archaic and see their mission in getting Muslims back on the right path.
Although for many, especially neophytes, it is more important that this is a more strict adherence to the Islamic tradition, more substantiated and appropriately correct than the popular Islam to which everyone is accustomed. Salafis usually call it archaic and see their mission in getting Muslims back on the right path.
Enemies of the state
But especially actively increasing the influence of Salafism occurs where there are no stable traditional religious institutions and, accordingly, traditions.
Kazakhstan, like many other states with a Muslim population, was in a difficult situation after the collapse of the USSR
For more than 70 years they have been cut off from the processes in the Islamic world. Accordingly, it is almost a “clean board” on which you can create a new version. This is much easier to do than where there is a strong influence of traditional institutions.
For example, in Pakistan and India there is a very radical Deoband movement, named after an Islamic university. To him belonged the Afghan Taliban. After the start of Islamabad’s confrontation with its own Islamists, Deoband split into two parts. Some supported the struggle against the state, others came out strongly against it. There have been cases when the radicals from Deoband blew up their more moderate comrades.
The last attack in Aktobe shows that radical Salafis, if they were, of course, can go to extreme measures for the sake of their idea.
And they see the state as their main opponent. In this regard, the question arises what to do to the state in this difficult situation.
What to do now in Kazakhstan with the threat of terrorism?
It is clear that there are examples of Chechnya, where for a long time there have been no large-scale actions at all, only isolated speeches. There are still examples of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where today it is unlikely in the situation of tight police control over society. But all these are extreme measures that may have adverse consequences for the development of the country.
It is more logical to follow the experience of Europe, which is faced with very tough terrorist attacks.
In response, it increases the level of effectiveness of its intelligence services, but without changing the usual way of life. This is a very pragmatic point of view. Terrorist attacks cannot be completely avoided. Accordingly, it is necessary to do so in order to maximally prevent their manifestations using the methods of special services, minimize damage, increasing the level of readiness of the military and police to respond to the acute situation that has arisen. And it is worthwhile to work out the algorithm of informational notification of the population.
After the terrorist attack in Aktobe, many opinions and opinions were expressed. The Internet today provides great opportunities for this. Some said that the main reason was unemployment and poverty in Aktobe. Others say that there is no legal opposition in the country, so there is no one to stop the protests.
Poverty is, of course, a big problem, as is social inequality. But
in this case, it looks more dangerous that we are dealing with ideological people. Their motivation is clearly ideological.
Therefore, the judgment that having an active political opposition would allow introducing protest into a civilized framework is clearly erroneous. In Kazakhstan, the entire political opposition is secular and for the most part liberal. She has no chance to express the interests of religious-radical groups. To let or not to let religious radicals into politics is a very dangerous and complicated problem. Many Muslim countries are trying to solve this difficult question with different results.
How do we act in Kazakhstan, where there are already quite a lot of people who are simply religious, much more than they used to be, but most of them are still mostly non-religious?
What to do with the so-called "popular Islam"? He adheres to most of the Kazakhs,
despite the fact that many who received education in the arab world consider it archaic. Should the state now see the enemy in all Salafis or should it seek agreement with their moderate part? And is there any moderate Salafism?
The events in Aktobe gave an extra reason to think over the whole situation, try to understand its internal logic and try to see the perspective. In any case, who is forewarned is forearmed.
For many years we thought that all bad things would pass us by.
But, alas, we are also part of the overall processes in the world and this must be treated accordingly. No need to panic, it is necessary to learn the lessons and first of all the state.
Information