The history of the Israeli tank "Magah-3" in Kubinka
At the end of May 2016, information was published in a number of Russian media that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on returning to Israel tankcaptured by the Syrian forces during the First Lebanon War, and on June 4 on the "Military Review" came out an article that caused a lot of controversy: Steel grave: why the Israeli tank from Kubinka will go home. Unfortunately, this article contains a number of technical inaccuracies, and story the capture of the Israeli tank by the Syrians is superficially illuminated.
In this publication, relying on available sources of information, an attempt is made to objectively understand what an Israeli tank is and to illuminate the history of its appearance in the Tank Museum in Kubinka (Moscow Region). Apparently, we are talking about the return of the Magah-3 tank to Israel - a seriously modernized and adapted to the local specifics of the American M48. Deliveries of M48 tanks to Tel Aviv began in the early 60s, since at that moment the Americans formally supported weapons embargo against Israel, had to go to tricks. Tanks were not transmitted directly from the United States, but from the tank fleet of the Bundeswehr. By the beginning of the Six Day War, the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) had about 250 M48 tanks of various modifications. In battle, Israeli tanks had to deal with the Egyptian T-34-85, IS-3M and Jordanian M48. Thanks to high professional skills, courage and heroism, Israeli tankers often at the cost of serious losses managed to come out victorious in battles more often. So, only Jordan left about 100 of its M48s on the battlefield, a significant part of these machines was subsequently restored and entered service with the IDF.
Following the results of the fighting, in order to increase the combat and operational characteristics, a decision was made to upgrade M48. The upgraded tank received the name "Magah" (Heb: מגח, eng. Magach), most often "Magah" is translated as - "a battering ram." First of all, tanks of early modifications were subjected to modernization, it was about increasing firepower, increasing the power reserve, mobility and technical reliability. M48A1, modernized in Israel, received the designation “Magi-1”, M48A2C - “Magi-2”, the most radical and the largest in number of converted machines was “Magi-3”. Apparently, such a tank is still in Kubinka.
The American 90-mm gun was replaced by the British 105-mm L7, the bulky commander's turret became a low-profile Israeli production. The gasoline engine was replaced by a diesel - Continental AVDS-1790-2A with a capacity of 750 l. with. The previous General Motors CD-850-4A transmission was replaced with a new Allison CD-850-6. Non-flammable liquid was used in the hydraulic system. The upgraded tank received new sights and more advanced Israeli-made radio stations. To combat the enemy’s infantry, additional Belgian-made machine guns were installed on the turret.
Tank "Magah-3"
By the beginning of the Doomsday War, there were 445 tanks “Magi-3” in six IDF brigades of the IDF. Israeli tank losses during this war were very significant. During the week of fighting Israel lost 610 tanks, more than half of them were modernized M48, Egyptians lost 240 tanks, mainly T-55.
According to Israeli data, Egypt captured about 200 tanks, some of which were to be restored. With the increased power of 48-mm guns in comparison with the base M105, the Magah-3 armor could not withstand the guns of the Soviet SAU SU-100, TY-3М, T-54, T-55 and T-62 tanks.
Israeli tanks downed at Sinai
Israeli tank crews were plagued by anti-tank infantry vehicles: RPG-7 and Malyutka ATGM. Arabs practiced anti-ambush and fire bags. For example, the Israeli 401 Brigade, having been ambushed by the 18 of the Egyptian Infantry Division, lost the 81 tank from 104. Israeli tank crews called the ATGM operators “tourists” because of the suitcase (container) to carry and launch the ATGM.
ATGM "Baby"
In general, the tanks "Magah-3" for security and firepower were equivalent to the Soviet T-55. The outcome of the battle in dueling situations, as a rule, was determined by the positional advantage, the level of crew training and the moral and psychological qualities of the tank crews.
According to the results of the use of the “Magi” tanks in the Doomsday War, a number of improvements were introduced. The most notable innovation, which was supposed to reduce the vulnerability of Israeli tanks to cumulative weapons (ATGM and anti-tank grenades) was the reactive armor (dynamic protection) of the ERA BLAZER.
Israel, having experience of large-scale battles using tanks and suffering heavy losses in the 1973 war of the year, was the first to equip its combat vehicles with dynamic protection (DZ), although research in this area in the 50-70s was conducted in the USSR, the USA and the FRG. But in the countries that are "trendsetters" in the field of tank building, they decided to do all kinds of screens and combined multi-layered armor from materials of different densities.
Elements of the Israeli DZ
The official priority in the field of remote sensing, protected by patents, belongs to the United States. In 1967, the Americans were the first to file an application for the design of dynamic protection. Element DZ of the first generation consisted of two metal plates and a thin layer of explosive between them. Containers DZ "Blazer" hung on top of the main armor of the tank. When a cumulative munition hit, the explosive in the container detonated, and the outer plate under the effect of the explosion products flew at an angle towards the cumulative jet. Thus, the cumulative jet was destroyed, and the main armor of the tank did not penetrate. After the additional reactive armor was installed, the weight of the vehicle increased by 800-1000 kg, but the vulnerability from light infantry anti-tank weapons became significantly less.
6 June 1982 of the year Israel intervened in the civil war, which had already been raging in neighboring Lebanon for a long time. The operation of the Israeli armed forces received the name "Peace for Galilee." In it, in addition to other armored vehicles, tanks were used "Magah", equipped with dynamic protection. By the time the Magah-3, in addition to the 105-mm guns, were armed with three machine guns of the caliber 7,62-mm and 52 or 60-mm auxiliary mortars. It should be said that the placement of mortars on the towers of tanks was Israeli "know-how." With the help of mortars, it was possible to launch lighting flares and fight the manpower behind the folds of the terrain.
The ground operation was attended by about 90 thousand Israeli soldiers, 1240 tanks and 1520 armored personnel carriers, which many times exceeded the number of Syrian and Palestinian forces in Lebanon. The main goal of the Israeli army in the course of this company was the destruction of the bases of the PLO and the containment of the influence of Syria. After the IDF units took Beirut, the PLO armed forces left the country and moved to Tunisia. Despite some success, Israel in that war suffered significant losses by the standards of this small country and was unable to achieve all its goals. After the invasion of Lebanon, Israel’s international reputation has deteriorated. This was mainly caused by casualties among the peaceful Lebanese population. The Syrian armed forces never left Lebanon, and the PLO’s place was taken by the Hezbollah organization, created with the support of Iran.
The fighting in Lebanon in 1982 was carried out on a large scale, with large forces of tanks, artillery and aviation. Despite the fact that in Israel itself the operation “Peace for Galilee” was not considered a war, in terms of its scale, it certainly was. According to Israeli data, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the loss of the IDF killed 654 people. In various sources, the loss of PLO and Syrian troops killed is estimated at 8-10 thousand people, several thousand more civilians died from artillery shelling and bombing. The losses included several Israeli tankers who went missing at night from June 10 to 11, 1982. Then the Magakh-3 tanks of the 362nd tank battalion of the 734th IDF tank brigade, moving towards the intersection, south of the Sultan-Yaakub settlement, ran into superior Syrian forces due to ineffective reconnaissance and command misses. It is worthwhile to dwell in more detail on what the 734th tank brigade was and why it suffered losses.
The final mobilization of the 734 Tank Brigade, staffed by reservists, was completed only on June 8, when the IDF units had already entered Lebanon. In large part of the team was staffed by students of religious schools - "contractual yeshiv." According to the agreement concluded between the yeshiva and the army, the army sends students to the yeshiva, who for three years combine studying Torah with military training, and after graduating from the institution serve in combat units for a year and four months. Usually, graduates of military yeshivas serve in separate units, where the daily routine takes into account the hours of prayer.
Israeli operations in the east
At the beginning of the operation, the 734 Tank Brigade was in reserve in case of the start of large-scale military operations against Syria. It was planned that the brigade would attack the main positions of the Syrians in the area of the Beirut-Damascus highway. In the afternoon of June 9, one of the battalions of the brigade began to advance in this direction, but was attacked by Syrian anti-tank Gazelle helicopters. At night, the position of the battalion was hit by the Grad MLRS. Other brigade battalions were still in reserve. On June 10, the brigade in the vanguard of the advancing forces of the 880 Division began to advance north of the village of Kefar-Meshkhi. In the evening of June 10, the commander of the 362 th battalion, Ira Efron, was ordered to push his tanks northward and set up barriers south of Sultan Yaakub. In addition to the Magah-3 tanks, there were several M133 armored personnel carriers in the convoy, and mortar shells, signalmen, infantry, and reconnaissance personnel from the brigade reconnaissance company moved into them.
Israeli tanks 734-th tank brigade nominated for Sultan Yakub
Because of the rush and uncoordinated actions of the command, no one warned that another Israeli battalion had gone to the east (that is, to the right of them). As a result, the tankers of the two Israeli battalions took each other for the enemy and opened fire. This led to the loss of 2 tanks, five tankers were killed and two were injured. At this point, the commander of the 734 Tank Brigade, Michael Shahar, in the conditions of a lack of intelligence information, decides to send the 362 th battalion to monitor positions in the 3 km south of the turn to Ayta al-Fuhar.
Having received a new order, the commander of the 362 Battalion, Ira Efron, continued to move northwards, being firmly convinced that there was no enemy in this area. In fact, the road along which Israeli tanks and motorized infantry were moving was controlled by the vanguard of the 3 Syrian division.
When advancing to a given area, Ira Efron around 01: 30 local time made a grave mistake, he slipped the desired point and went deep into the territory occupied by the Syrians. The disoriented commander of the 362 Battalion missed the turn he needed on Kamed El-Luz and headed for the turn on Ayta El-Fuhar. During the passage of the fork, the Israelis came under fire ATGM "Baby" and RPG-7. Apparently, the hit got a few head tanks, but due to the presence on them DZ "Blazer" serious damage was avoided.
Not realizing that he is already at the entrance to Sultan Yakub and having taken what happened as a usual ambush, Ira Efron decides to slip it. He reports on radio about the “ambush” to the brigade commander and orders the battalion to advance at maximum speed. The first two companies skip the fork and freely pass 1,5 − 2 km. The third company and part of the infantry, having fallen under heavy shelling and having lost one tank, occupy the defenses in the ruins of an abandoned village. Soon, two Israeli companies, plunging into the Syrian defense, came under fire from tank guns and, having also lost one tank, were forced to stop at the foot of the village of Sultan Ya'akub. Here for the Israelis began a real hell.
Here is what Avi Rat, one of the tank crew survivors in this battle, recalls:
After moving a few kilometers, we found ourselves surrounded by Syrians from all sides. It was already quite late at night, and then the most difficult hours of my life began. Suddenly at the same time dozens of missiles fired at us from various distances struck us. I saw a Syrian commando lying 20 meters from the road and igniting our 200 tank meters in front of me. Hellfire was fired at us from all sides. We could not immediately understand where they were shooting from. We found ourselves in a valley with elevations to the left and right and the village in front of us. At first, the shooting was carried out only from the village and on the right, but then we found fire on the left and behind. We did not notice each other (it was 01: 30 nights) and did not understand what was happening. After only a few minutes of confusion, we began to recover. We hear shouts on the radio: “Where are you? ..., and where are you? Signaling me a flashlight ... "- complete chaos.
Says Harel Ben-Ari, motorized infantry gunner:
Suddenly, shells start to explode around, and I notice behind us our tanks, which have been defeated. We must continue to move. I hear orders on the radio and try to understand them. I still do not know what death looks like. We continue to advance, firing at the sources of fire, we go around the wrecked enemy tanks. I notice near our armored troop-carrier three running, but not shooting, Syrian soldiers. I do not shoot at them - I still do not know how to shoot people from such a short distance. A few minutes later the tank behind us gets defeated and lights up, illuminating everything around. I notice more Syrians lying in a ditch near the road. Now I shoot without a doubt. It is necessary to think quickly and efficiently, pushing feelings into the background. In those seconds, something changed in me - I'm not the same person.
Israeli tankers and infantry managed to repel the first onslaught of the Syrians and even destroy several BMP-1. Combat Ira Efron did not understand that his battalion was in the depths of the Syrian defense, and still took what was happening for an ordinary ambush. However, it soon became clear that this was not an ambush, it took another half hour, and the fire only intensified, and losses grew. The attempt to unite with the forces of the third company failed and the battle formations of the Israelis mixed up. Under these circumstances, Ira Efron ordered the tank commanders to organize themselves into groups based on location (the tanks were mixed up and it was not possible to act in the initial platoon and company composition) and take all-round defense to prevent Syrian infantrymen armed with RPG-7 from a distance of an aimed shot. Due to the fact that Ira Efron incorrectly determined his location, the brigade command misjudged the incident. Kombrig Michael Shahar was firmly convinced that the battalion could not encounter major Syrian forces, and ordered Ira Efron to "Pull yourself together and stop the tantrum." At that time, the 362 Battalion lost at least three tanks.
Finally heeding the insistent requests of the battalion commander, Michael Shahar agreed to send him help. He ordered the commander of the neighboring battalion 363 to take one company with him and go to Ira Efron to “bring him to a normal state”. Not realizing the seriousness of the situation, the battalion commander of the 363 th battalion with a detachment consisting of a tank company and five M113 armored personnel carriers, was ambushed. The detachment was opened heavy fire, and several tanks were hit. As a result, the forces of the 363 Battalion, who had advanced to the aid of Ira Efron, themselves fell into a difficult situation and were fragmented. Part of the tanks found shelter in the ruins of the village, where surviving infantrymen and tanks of the third company of the 362 battalion were already hiding. They had to repel the attacks of the Syrians, who did not abandon attempts to destroy Israeli tanks and armored personnel carriers from the RPN-7, wedged in their defense.
After the help sent by the 362 battalion itself was in a difficult position, the brigade commander Michael Shahar realized the seriousness of what was happening and reported to the division. The division commander, Lev Giora, immediately subordinated the battalion directly to the division and personally dealt with the problem. But at that moment the main forces of the 880 division were in the battle with the 3 Syrian division. With the dawn, it finally became clear that the 362 battalion was surrounded by large Syrian forces, and with every minute the chances of escaping from the environment decreased. Due to the fact that the shells and cartridges ended, the battalion under the command of Ira Efron could simply not have time to wait for help. In the current situation, Deputy Commander Michael Shahar and the Combat Ira Efron, after consulting, decided to break through on their own. At this point, the Syrian troops launched another attack. During the battle, the tank squad Zohar Lifshits gets a direct hit into the tower. At the same time, Zohar Lifshits died, and gunner Yehuda Katz was seriously wounded. The charger left the tank and was picked up by another tank. But the tank itself remained on the move and did not catch fire. When other fighters from the company tried to help the wounded gunner, the unforeseen happened - the lost driver Yehuda Kaplan led the tank and rushed south to the exit from the valley. Seeing on his way another shot down Israeli tank - he came to himself and left the damaged car, joining the tankers hiding near the road. The bodies of the two remaining fighters in the tank were lost (the body of Lifshits was returned by the Syrians, and Katz is still considered missing). By this time, the Israeli battalion had already lost 5 tanks.
After the understanding came to the command of the 880 division that the position of the soldiers of the 362 and 363 battalions in the Sultan-Yaakub area was hopeless, they received artillery support. Having fallen under massive artillery fire, Syrian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles were forced to leave their positions. At the same time, units of the 880 division began to break through to help the blocked Israeli battalions, but they met on their way the barriers of the Syrian "commandos" with light anti-tank weapons. After the loss of two tanks and three armored personnel carriers, the command ordered Ira Efron to break through independently under the cover of artillery fire. To provide artillery support in the area was concentrated around 100 guns caliber 105-155-mm. They placed a continuous curtain of fire between the Syrian forces and the Israelis who were leaving the encirclement.
Says Avi Rath:
We received orders to pack up on the road and drive south. This was a mad ride, I pulled the throttle to the end. Just to get out of here, and I'm trying to squeeze the last drop of speed out of the tank. So all the tanks - click and fly. They shoot at us and we shoot everything that remains. This was a short trip - just 3 − 4 km, but it seemed to us that there was no end to the road.
Despite powerful artillery support and maximum speed, several vehicles were hit and two more Israeli tanks were lost. In 09: 15, the last Israeli tank left the valley, and in 11: 00, all the surviving brigade equipment went into the division’s location outside the range of the Syrian anti-tank weapons.
According to official Israeli data, the IDF in the battle for Sultan Jaakub lost killed: 5 fighters of the 362 battalion, 3 fighter of the 363 battalion and 10 fighters from the 880 division. The 7 battalion 362 tanks, the 1 363 tank battalion and the 2 880 tank from the 4 division, the Magah-3 XNUMX tank were lost by the Syrians. Three Israeli soldiers: Zechariah Bomel, Yehuda Katz and Zvi Feldman were missing. The losses of the Syrian army are unknown. Capturing four Israeli tanks, capturing and missing several Israeli soldiers in the Sultan Jaakub area was one of the saddest events for Israel in the First Lebanon War. The corps commander, General Avigdor Ben Gal, took full responsibility for the failure.
After the end of hostilities in November 1983, Israel exchanged 4700 captured militants for six Israeli soldiers. In June, 1984, in exchange for three captured Israeli soldiers, three Israeli citizens and 5, the bodies of soldiers Israel handed over to Syria 291 a Syrian soldier, 74 the bodies of Syrian soldiers and 13 to Syrian citizens. In May 1985, Israel released 1150 to Palestinian militants in exchange for three Israeli soldiers who were captured by Ahmad Dazhabil’s group. One of the soldiers was captured during the battle at the cross of Sultan Yakub.
It is noted that due to reactive armor, the Blazer was able to avoid much more serious losses. Many Israeli tanks that participated in this battle received several hits of Malyutka and RPG-7 missiles. Subsequently, Syrian-captured Israeli Magah-3 tanks with mounted DZ were displayed in Damascus, and one vehicle was transferred to the USSR.
In the Soviet Union, the captured tank, and in particular the containers of dynamic protection, were extensively studied. In the "Magah" was not spent all the ammunition and from it at the site conducted shelling T-72. As a result, the forehead of the T-72 case was decided to be urgently reinforced with additional armor plates. It is believed that it was after a thorough study of the Israeli DZ similar protection appeared on Soviet tanks. For Soviet specialists, mounted dynamic protection against cumulative ammunition was not something new. Work on this topic was carried out from the end of 50-x and natural samples of the Soviet DZ were created, which successfully passed the tests. But the top commanders of the Soviet armored forces that went through the war on the T-34, strongly opposed "hanging on the armor of explosives." Only after reading the reports of the Soviet advisers in Syria and the tank “Magah-3” their inertia was broken, and in 1985, the complex adopted the Soviet army. In terms of its characteristics, DZ "Kontakt-1" in many respects surpassed the "Blazer". Unlike the Israeli “reactive armor” 20 standard sizes, the 4 – 20 dynamic protection unit is unified for all the main tanks that existed at that time. Sovetskaya DZ "Kontakt-1" was lighter and had a significantly smaller area of weakened zones.
During Soviet times, the Israeli "Magah-3" was in the "closed", inaccessible to the general public of the tank collection in Kubinka. After the museum opened its doors to everyone in 1996, and organized excursions began to be led there, it was reported that Israeli soldiers were allegedly in the Israeli tank received from Syria. As it turned out later, this was local folklore, with which, in all seriousness, jokes were introduced to museum visitors. But the relatives of the Israeli soldiers who went missing in 1982, took it very seriously and began demanding that the IDF command and the Israeli leadership return the tank, which is the "grave". According to a statement released by the Israeli Prime Minister’s press service, Benjamin Netanyahu raised this issue during a meeting with the Russian president in Moscow. Israel received official notification from the Russian side that the request was granted and the tank would be returned.
The press service of the Israeli prime minister said that at the moment, in order to agree on a return procedure and technical details, an IDF delegation is in Moscow. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the head of the IDF General Staff Lieutenant-General Gadi Aysenkot, citing the request for the return of an Israeli tank, expressed the opinion that "this combat vehicle has historical value, including for relatives of servicemen who went missing in that battle." The fate of three Israeli soldiers who went missing on the night of 10 on 11 on June 1982 of the year: Zachariah Baumel, Yehuda Katz and Zvi Feldman is still unknown. It is noteworthy that for information about each of them, Israel offers a cash premium of $ 10 million dollars. The relatives of the missing servicemen were officially notified of the return of the captured tank.
The fighting vehicle transmitted by the Syrians at the beginning of the 80's for a long time was one of the most interesting museum exhibits in Kubinka near Moscow. The value of the Israeli tank "Magah-3" consists both in its combat biography and in the fact that there are no other machines with dynamic protection "Blazer" in the museum collection in Kubinka. It is clear that Vladimir Putin took this step, wanting to demonstrate the friendliness and openness of Russia. It remains to hope that the leadership of the state of Israel will adequately assess the gesture of goodwill and will find an opportunity to compensate for the gap that has formed in the exhibition. It seems that in Kubinka the Israeli main battle tank “Merkava” would have looked very well.
The author is grateful to Oleg Sokolov for his help in preparing the publication.
Based on:
www.waronline.org/IDF/Articles/sultan-yakub.htm
http://www.newsru.co.il/israel/29may2016/tank_710.html
http://riafan.ru/525967-stalnaya-mogila-pochemu-izrailskii-tank-iz-kubinki-otpravitsya-na-rodinu
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