"General's case"
However, apparently, this idea appeared after de-Stalinization, when Stalin was accused of all possible and impossible sins. In reality, the generals were not without sin. Highlighting the ugly side of some representatives of the Soviet generals and other representatives of the Soviet elite after the Victory of the Red Army over Nazi Germany, no one wanted, it was much easier and more convenient (taking into account the internal and external order) to blame Stalin for the bloody tyrant.
prehistory
As you know, during the war, the USSR began to collect trophies, which was a necessary condition for the destroyed economy. 5 in January 1943. The Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. Stalin signs the Decree of the State Defense Committee “On the Collection and Removal of Trophy Property and Storage”. In accordance with this decree, in February 1943 began its work the Central Commission for the collection of captured property. Marshal Budyonny was appointed chairman of the commission. Lieutenant-General Vakhitov was appointed head of the trophy board. It is clear that even before 1943, the Red Army was collecting trophy property, but during the 1941-1942 period. the collection of trophies was not centrally organized, and individual trophy teams subordinate to the front commanders of the fronts were guided in their work on the basis of the relevant orders of NGOs.
During the second half of 1942 and 1943, the city of GKO will issue 15 orders regarding the organization of the collection, accounting, storage and export of captured property and scrap metal. In addition, in the 1943, the GKO will approve a plan for the delivery of non-ferrous scrap and waste. Trophy management will be transferred to the base of the Office of Material Funds of the NPO of the USSR, and representatives of the trophy management who were sent to all fronts received clear instructions specifying the tasks of registration, collection, temporary storage and export of captured and damaged domestic weapons, as well as scrap metal and valuable property from army rears and liberated territories. I must say that in addition to the military, to the collection of trophy weapons and property was attracted and the civilian population living in the liberated territory. The locals had a great help in collecting trophies, as they watched the Nazis retreating and knew where the Germans threw or hid weapons and equipment they could not or did not manage to take out.
In April, the Central Commission 1943 was reorganized into a permanent Trophy Committee under the State Defense Committee. When the front departments formed trophy teams. Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov was appointed head of the Trophy Committee. Trophy brigades, battalions and companies were formed in the army units, the personnel of which were mainly represented by fighters of the older age group. By the summer, a clear structure of the trophy bodies of the Red Army was formed: the Trophy Committee at the State Defense Committee; Trophy weapon control; Front-line controls of captured weapons (from 1945. Separate captured controls subordinate to the commanders of the fronts); army divisions captured weapons. Control over the work of the captured parts was entrusted to the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence SMERSH.
According to the reports of the Trophy Committee for the period from 1943 to 1945. captured parts collected 24615 broken German tanks and self-propelled guns; more than 68 thousand artillery pieces, 30 thousand mortars, 257 thousand machine guns, 3 million rifles; more than 114 million shells, 16 million minutes, more than 2 billion various rounds, etc. The total weight of the “recyclable” ferrous metal was 10 million tons, including 165 tons of non-ferrous. Part of the equipment was repaired and returned to the troops. So, for example, in the period 605-1943. the Red Army’s car fleet was replenished with more than 1945 thousand vehicles due to various captured vehicles, which amounted to 60% of the total number of the Red Army’s fleet.
The war ended with the defeat of Germany, and the USSR’s right to reparation was fair and recognized by other victorious powers. Established under the State Defense Committee, the State Commission determined the amount of material losses of the USSR from the war with Hitler Germany in 674 billion rubles. The issue of reparation was discussed during the work of the great powers at the Yalta Conference. The Soviet side proposed to fix the total amount of German reparations in 20 billion US dollars. At the same time, the USSR was supposed to - 10 billions, Great Britain and the USA, taking into account their victims and an important contribution to the victory - 8 billions, to all other countries - 2 billion. However, as is known, Churchill began to object to fixing the exact number of reparation obligations. London was interested in the de-industrialization of Germany.
According to the reports of the Trophy Committee for the period from March 1945 to March 1946. for reparations imposed from Germany in favor of the Soviet Union in Germany were dismantled and exported to the USSR: 1) Equipment 29 ferrous metallurgy plants worth 10 billion rubles. at state prices; 2) equipment of machine-building plants (214300 of various machines and 136381 of different power of electric motors); 3) ferrous, non-ferrous and other metals in industrial form 447 741 tons worth 1 billion. 38 million rubles; 4) equipment 96 power plants, etc.
However, the USSR not only exported, but also contained Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe. Starting in the fall of 1945, the Soviet Union began to “feed” the countries of Eastern Europe: as early as June 1945, Hungary and Poland requested food assistance; in September - Romania, Bulgaria, then Yugoslavia. In the 1945 year, only Czechoslovak authorities tried to cope with food difficulties on their own, but a year later they turned to the USSR for help. In the same year, 1946 required grain for Finland. The USSR also provided food aid to the Chinese Communist People’s Liberation Army. And this is due to the extremely difficult food situation in many areas of the Union itself. In addition, since May 1945, the Soviet Union was forced to take on the decision of the food supply of the population of large cities in Germany.
It is clear that even before entering the territory of Germany, soldiers and officers of the rear parts of the spacecraft often resorted to searching and “preserving” various trophies in their favor. After the Victory over the Reich, a formal decision was made by the TK, which Stalin allegedly approved verbally allowing the fighters to send home the received trophies no more than one 5 kg package, and middle-level officers no more than one 10 kg package per month. Senior officers (in the rank of major and above) were allowed to send two parcels of 16 kg per month. For this, in each of the military units, commandant's offices, hospitals, etc. commissions were created whose task was to check the contents of the parcels sent home. Weapons, items made of precious stones and metals, antiques and various other things related to the Nazi regime were not allowed to be sent to the home in the packages. However, these commissions are usually purely formal. And the parcels of senior officers were practically not checked.
Later measures were tightened. By order of G. K. Zhukov, the personnel of the commandant's offices were obliged to stop transport and military personnel to inspect the property and select items from them that were forbidden to be removed according to the list approved by the June order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG). The list included cars, motorcycles, furs, etc. However, despite all the steps taken to tighten, many things from the forbidden list still very quickly appeared on the territory of the USSR. "Trophy peak" fell on the period 1946-1947. It is clear that the military counterintelligence simply did not have the ability to track down and prevent all that was in the handbags, trunks, and the suitcases of soldiers and officers returning from Germany to the Union to be exported.
It should be noted that in relation to the marauders in the Red Army acted tough. The soldier or officer who was caught after the looting immediately surrendered to the military tribunal, and his sentence in the war and post-war period was unequivocal - execution. Therefore, in the Red Army, the relevant agencies and the command very quickly extinguished the usual “war of lawlessness” in the defeated country (aimless executions, looting, violence against women, etc.). For comparison, in the armies of the allies there was no such austerity.
Novikov case
15 March 1946. By decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the people's commissariats were transformed into Ministries. NKGB changed its name to the MGB. 4 May 1946 was appointed Colonel-General V.S. Abakumov as Minister of State Security. It was Abakumov who, at the beginning of his work in the ministerial chair, had to face a “wave” of various post-war crimes. The war ended, but there were still a lot of problems, it was necessary to eliminate the “forest brothers” in the Baltic States and suppress ukronatsistov in Ukraine, bring down the wave of ordinary banditry (the crime took advantage of the war to increase its influence on society), etc.
In the spring of 1946, personnel changes took place at the Ministry of Armed Forces of the USSR (USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs). People's Commissar aviation Industry A. I. Shakhurin, Air Force Commander, Chief Marshal of Aviation A. Novikov, Deputy Commander - Air Force Chief Engineer A. K. Repin were arrested during the investigation of the so-called "Aviation business." Colonel General K. Vershinin was appointed to the post of commander of the USSR Air Force. Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the USSR MVS.
30 on April 1946. Minister of the Ministry of State Security Abakumov sends Novikov’s statement to Stalin. In it, the former commander of the Air Force declared “sabotage”, in concealing “anti-state practice in the work of the Air Force and the NKAP.” Novikov admitted that “he himself cultivated servility and subservience in the Air Force apparatus. All this happened because I myself got into the morass of crimes related to the adoption by the Air Force of defective aircraft. I am ashamed to say, but I was also too much involved in the acquisition of various property from the front and in the arrangement of my personal well-being. My head was spinning, I imagined myself a big man ... ”.
Novikov also accused Zhukov of "politically harmful conversations with him that we had during the war and until recently." Allegedly, Zhukov, as "an exceptionally powerful man and a narcissist," "knocks together people around him, brings them closer to him." According to Novikov: “Zhukov is very cunning, subtle and cautious in his conversation with me, as well as among other people, trying to diminish the leading role in the war of the Supreme High Command and at the same time Zhukov does not hesitate to exaggerate his role in the war as a commander and even states that all the basic plans of military operations are developed by him. Thus, in many conversations that took place over the past year and a half, Zhukov told me that the operations to defeat the Germans near Leningrad, Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge were developed according to his idea and he, Zhukov, prepared and conducted them. Zhukov told me the same thing to defeat the Germans near Moscow. Thus, “Bonapartism” of Zhukov manifested itself, a line of military conspiracy for the purpose of a coup d'état emerged.
After Stalin’s death, Novikov will become almost the main witness at the trial of Abakumov and the main prosecutor Rudenko will put all his efforts to prove that the arrest of the chief air marshal was groundless, and his testimony was beaten out by torture and torture. This version, voiced during the start of the “Khrushchev thaw”, that is, de-Stalinization, will be further replicated and will become the main one during the “perestroika” and “democratization” of Russia in the 1980-1990's.
Zhukov case
1 June 1946 The case of Zhukov was considered at the Supreme Military Council in the presence of all nine marshals of the Soviet Union, each of whom expressed his opinion on the personality of G. K. Zhukov. The Council, with a collegial decision, made a proposal to release Marshal Zhukov from the posts of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces, the Soviet occupying forces and the Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. 3 Jun. The USSR Council of Ministers approved these proposals. Georgy Zhukov was appointed commander of the Odessa Military District, which for him meant disgrace.
However, Zhukov’s problems did not end there. 23 August 1946. Minister of the Armed Forces N. Bulganin sent a report to Stalin in which it was reported that 7 cars with furniture boxes in 85 were detained near Kovel. When checking the documentation, it turned out that the furniture belongs to Marshal Zhukov. According to the inventory of property arriving from the city of Chemnitz, the 7 carriages contained: 194 pieces of furniture for the bedroom, living room, office, kitchen, etc. Particularly distinguished furniture for the living room, made of mahogany. Stalin’s response to this incident is unknown, but soon events occurred that went into historyas a "trophy case."
"Trophy case"
It is obvious that the unrest created in the Red Army, despite its rapid reduction, greatly disturbed Stalin. It was necessary to restore order, especially among the higher commanders. Otherwise, the Soviet Union could easily become a victim of the United States and Britain. Traction to the material led to the rebirth of the Soviet elite, turning it into a bourgeois class with the philistine psychology. The Soviet project was based on building a society of creation and service, and here the beginnings of a consumer society appeared. After the elimination of Stalin, it is the rejection of the pursuit of the ideal of a society of creation and service and an orientation toward the material will lead to the fall of the Red Empire. Two "restructuring" - Khrushchev and Gorbachev, will destroy the essence of the red (Soviet) project, the program to create an "ideal" society. The Soviet Union will lose its goal of existence, which will cause a geopolitical catastrophe 1991.
After all, corruption struck even the KGB authorities. For example, the head of the counterintelligence department of the 1 of the Belorussian Front, A. A. Vadis, created the management of an “illegal warehouse of captured property”, from which he gave gifts to the deputy heads of the SMERSH NN Selivanovsky, I. I. Vradiyu and others high-ranking security officers. Vadis did not forget himself either - valuable property was sent to the family by an official plane from Germany to Moscow, and his wife Vadis speculated on them. The very same from Berlin brought the car furniture and other things, as well as a car. Then Vadis brought trophies acquired during his work in Manchuria (served as the commander of the SMERSH Trans-Baikal Front) —fur, silk and woolen fabrics, and so on. Subsequently, Vadis reached the Deputy Department of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, but in January 1952 was excluded from the party for not providing measures to eliminate the OUN underground, excessive drinking and excessive love of trophies (A. Teplyakov “On corruption in the NKVD-NKGB-MGB-KGB of the USSR”).
To be continued ...
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