Much has been written about the 705 submarine. They wrote everything - scientists, submariners, builders of ships. A common leitmotif is a major one, although sometimes the thought of alleged difficulties in exploitation appears. No more.
It is interesting, but in the description of the military equipment of the Cold War period there is always a comparison with similar systems of a potential enemy, usually the United States.
NPS project 705 "Lear"
In the materials about 705-m is not. As a rule, the authors describe the possibility of submarine withdrawal from the American torpedo MK-48 due to the high maneuverability qualities of the ship and its power plant. This beautiful legend was born because of the proximity of the speeds of 705 and MK-48. In combat realities, this sweet maneuver is unlikely for one simple reason - the range of detection of our submarines by American times exceeded our capabilities. Therefore, the American commander will not allow the dueling situation, and taking advantage of his advantage, he will take a position on the stern of the attacked submarine and produce a volley.
So why is there no comparison? For two reasons.
First, what to compare? Design, construction and transmission cycle the fleet (as they said earlier: the transfer of submarines to the treasury) dragged on for twenty years. Unprecedented.
Therefore, if we compare at the time stage of the beginning of the design, the object of comparison on the part of the United States will be the submarine of the small series Skate, Sargo, and perhaps also the Triton.
If we turn to the stage of transferring the boats of the 705 project to the fleet (the end of 1970), then the object of comparison is the Los Angeles submarine.
Let us assume that, in anticipation of the duration of the construction, the designers laid down in the project the possibilities of modernization in terms of armament and, most importantly, in secrecy and during construction - the realization of the mentioned possibilities ...
It was not this! There are no such precedents in the practice of world shipbuilding.
Thus, based on the timing of the start of the design (the end of 1950-x and the start of 1960-x) of the submarine of the 705 project should be attributed to the second generation of the Navy submarine of the USSR and compared with the American Skipjack and Tracher.
It is difficult to get rid of the question: why did the ships of this project build so persistently for so long? Try to answer below.
We now turn to the second reason. If we exclude the method of comparison in time and analyze the main features of the project, it turns out that there is nothing to compare with. There was no, no and is unlikely to appear in the US Navy a series of submarines: with liquid metal coolant, a small crew, integrated automation, a titanium case, high-speed and high-frequency electrical equipment and uninhabited compartments, but with tremendous speed and noise. The Americans are building boats for the war, taking into account meaningful national and international experience, the US military-industrial complex does not weigh on the Navy.
Long-term construction of the project has many reasons. For understanding, it is advisable to compare the American and Soviet history of the construction of nuclear submarines.
FROM WHAT THE US NUCLEAR FLEET HAS BEGUN
The US Navy officer (we emphasize this), a native of eastern Poland, Heim Rickover, initiated the construction of nuclear submarines in the United States. In 1954, the first American submarine Nautilus was launched. The epochality of the event was outlined by the commander of the "Nautilus" Andersen, giving an open light a light-chart - "I am going on atomic energy, the nautilus." In this case, the Americans did not fight for the construction of a series of "Nautilus", and in every way tested a new boat. The active participation of the new ship in the fleet exercises, repeated trips to the Arctic zone showed the vitality of the idea and the potentially high combat capabilities of the new technology. Planned the construction program of the nuclear fleet and strictly followed it.
Nautilus First US Submarine
For the "Nautilus" was followed by the construction of a small series of submarines (head - "Skate"). In parallel, there was a search for the type of power plant. For this purpose, a "SiWulf" was built with a nuclear power plant (NPP) on a liquid metal sodium coolant, whose operating experience showed the preference of a water-to-water type. Installation "SiVulfa" replaced and more to this issue did not return.
Experimental "Nautilus" was built double hull and bristle, like its predecessors - DPL. The experience gained in its operation, and, above all, the possibility of a long underwater course at high speeds, set the task of creating a new architecture of the buildings of future submarines. For this purpose, an experimental single-shaft diesel-electric submarine "Albacore" was built, the test results of which allowed to form the basic principles for the construction of hulls of promising submarines. At the same time, having convinced of the reliability of a nuclear power plant of a water-to-water type, they abandoned two-reactor and two-shaft power plants.
New cases almost the entire length had a single-frame design, which made it possible to reduce the noisiness of the flow and the level of interference with the work of their own sonar facilities.
At the same time, the buoyancy margin decreased to 14 – 18%. The hulls received a rubber anti-hydrolocation coating (GWP) and a spindle shape with a ratio of length to diameter within 8 – 10. Propeller as far as possible away from the hull, again to reduce noise. In everyday life, the corps was named Albacorovsky.
Already later, and again to improve the working conditions of the gas, torpedo tubes were transferred to the middle part of the body, at an angle to the center plane of the submarine. They did not pursue speed, rightly believing that acoustic stealth and range were more important. Yes, and the resulting thirty knots is enough to solve most tactical tasks. For completeness of the description of the hull, you should add an increase in the diameter of the screw and reduce its speed, again to reduce noise and reduce the cavitation zone.
The next, already full-fledged series of multi-purpose US submarines was built on Albacor technology. The lead ship was called Skipjack. It should be noted that during this period our opponents were also looking for the type of the main engine, for which they built the Tulibi nuclear submarine on full electric propulsion.
The next step of their shipbuilding program is simply elegant, and, again, epochal. Our opponents cut a forty-nine-meter-long missile section with sixteen vertical mines into the Skipjack corps, providing an underwater launch of ballistic missiles. By connecting the submarine, transport nuclear power and a ballistic missile with a nuclear charge, the United States received the third component of the nuclear triad, the most secretive and stable. Already in the fall of 1960, a new missile carrier, named "George Washington", began to carry out systematic combat service in the northern Atlantic and eastern Mediterranean, from where its missiles "took out" the Kremlin. In the future, as new samples appear weapons and armaments, without departing from the Albacorean principles, our likely adversary built new series of submarines, while decommissioning.
NPS "George Washington"
One more circumstance deserves attention, again initiated by Rickover, but already by the admiral. This is a differentiated payment for the component equipment to supplier companies: the lower the noise level, the higher the cost.
And completing a brief analysis of the American program, we note once again a fact important in our consideration: the initiator of the construction of the nuclear fleet was an ordinary officer of the US Navy, a low rank, a representative of the engineering, not the command corps of the officers of the US Navy.
Is this possible with us?
And WE WILL GO OUR WAY ...
It all began under Stalin at the suggestion of Soviet nuclear scientists. We emphasize - not at the initiative of the Navy. The latter was kept in ignorance for a long time and only later was connected to the project. Scientists have gone so far that they offered not only nuclear power facilities, but also weapons. A torpedo with a thermonuclear charge more than twenty meters long and two meters in diameter was proposed.
The weapon forms the tactics of its use, which was presented by the authors (among them was A. Sakharov) something like this. The boat approached the coast of the enemy and released a torpedo-monster that was controlled programmatically, approached the coast (preferably to the port) and was undermined, creating giant tsunamis as the main striking factor.
We started designing submarines under the code "project 627".
Project 627, submarine "Leninsky Komsomol"
The gradual connection of the Navy led to the adjustment of the project: the monster machine was replaced with six conventional torpedoes, located in the bow. The letter “A” was added to the code of the project and it became 627А.
Unlike the Americans, Albacores were not built, so it turned out how it happened. The bow tip of the non-stem type is almost Albacor, and the stern tip is completely copied from the two-shaft diesel-electric submarines (project 651). Stern crowned two high-speed screws of small diameter, located in close proximity to the body. The boat was double-hulled along the entire length, the floating stock - more than thirty percent, which adversely affected the noise.
Having a limited operating experience of nuclear power plants (coastal stand), following the principle of “how would something happen”, the installation was made two-shaft and two-reactor.
They started building a series right away. Our first K-3 submarine of the 627 project was launched in the 1957 year, three years after Nautilus. The construction of submarines of the 658 and 675 projects began almost simultaneously. The first one was armed with three ballistic missiles with a surface launch, the second with eight cruise missiles, and, again, with a launch from the surface position. The surface launch determined the architecture of the hulls - both were joint ones. The feed did not differ from the 627A project, except that the 675 project screws were in a protective shell to protect against ice.
At the end of the 1950-s, the design of the second-generation submarines began. Designed three ships. The 667A missile submarine, armed with sixteen submarine-launched ballistic missiles (APLRB), the 671 multi-purpose submarine of the 670 project and the XNUMX APLRK, armed with eight submarine-launched cruise missiles.
The submarines of the second generation turned out to be very successful ships that bore the brunt of the confrontation in the Cold War. All three types were handed over to the fleet on the eve of the Great October Revolution, i.e. autumn 50 of the year. With all the success of the projects, they all clearly lagged behind the US submarines in terms of secrecy and range.
In parallel with the design of the second generation, the design of the 705 project began. It was initiated by a small group of young designers from the Malakhit design bureau, recent graduates of LCI. Everything, as in the case of the 627A project, began without the participation of the fleet.
Shipbuilders conceived a miracle weapon - a small displacement submarine submarine (up to 1500 tons) with a speed of more than 40 nodes, a small crew (no more than 15 people).
The main criteria for the effectiveness of the design were considered high speed and survivability, a great depth of immersion. Constructive support of secrecy was given secondary importance. It was believed that this property provides the fact of immersion.
The author will allow himself to deviate a little from the main topic, devoting a couple of theses to the main tactical property of the submarine - stealth.
Following the release to the ocean, the opposition of the USSR and the USA submarines began. The superiority of the other side came to light quickly. It was provided with less noise and superior sonar weapons. As always, began to catch up. Catch up, upgrading the submarine of the second generation. Given the superiority of the United States in mechanical engineering, they went their own way - by suppressing noise along the propagation paths, and did not disregard its source. In general, fled after more than 25 years. Equalized, taking the third generation nuclear submarines in the fleet, but most importantly - changed the design thinking.
Let's return to the 705 project. Preliminary studies showed the unreality of what was intended in the proposed displacement.
The design balance took place at a displacement of about 3500 tons. In this case, the hull should be titanium, NPI - with high specific energy characteristics, the electrical system should be high-frequency (it was believed that this will reduce the weight and size characteristics), and the crew should not exceed two dozen submariners.
The reduction of the crew required the development of automatic control of the submarine in general and its systems in particular, which led to the emergence of uninhabited compartments. Control over their condition (except the central post) was given to automation and television. The MIC went so far that the designers were exempt from the fulfillment of a number of requirements of the TPLP operating at that time (requirements for designing submarines). Began designing. At the same time, the military industrial complex bit off sweet again - it was designed, in fact, two similar projects 705 and 705К. They were distinguished by the type of NPU and automatic control complex.
Let's leave 705 for the time being and try to understand why the design schools, ours and the American, went in so different ways (which is obvious to the same goal). There can not do without a brief insight into geopolitics and again a brief analysis of the Soviet decision-making procedures for the fleet.
About geopolitics, which explains that civilization develops in dual unity. One part of the nations and the states formed by them are marine, while the others are continental. The first - more passionate, pragmatic. The social ethics of these countries is mobile, the main goal of society is enrichment. Continental countries are less dynamic, the development of society is ahead of the ethical norms of public life.
There is a constant struggle between the parties of dual unity, taking different forms.
Without a doubt, the leading maritime power is the United States, and Russia is firmly on the list of continental powers, despite its political structure. Sea powers are constantly fighting for possession of the ocean, as a transport artery and a source of resources, therefore they are carriers of marine and naval experience, and the mentality of their citizens is marine in nature. Sea nations are capable of quick reaction in cases fraught with the loss of ocean domination. This happened in the battle for the Atlantic in 1939 - 1943. Germany began the war with 43 submarines, of which only a third were simultaneously in a combat position. Forcing their construction and improving the tactics of use, the Germans reached the target by the end of 1942 - they drowned monthly up to 600 thousand tons of trade tonnage. The scale of success will be clear if we recall that at that time a ship with a displacement of 10-15 thousand tons was considered large. England, owning a powerful surface fleet based on a global basing system, could not cope with the German submarine fleet operating alone without any support from other branches of the Navy (surface ships and aviation) Deprived of a systematic supply of raw materials, England was on the verge of a catastrophe.
The English saved two circumstances. First - the Germans began the war with a small submarine fleet. And second, the US entry into the war (December 1941 of the year) with their powerful mobile economy.
If the Germans started a war with a couple of hundreds of boats and capture Iceland (to base them), world history would take a different route (by the way, the Germans did not have naval aviation). But this could not happen, and only for one, but a very weighty reason: the German thinking, including the military one, is strictly continental.
Germany for the war built more 1100 submarines, of which more than 700 died. None of the species (genus) of the armed forces of the country suffered such losses (39 thousands of dead from thousands of 45 operating).
The anti-submarine defense of the Anglo-Saxons was built quickly, they did not spare the means and efforts. In the interests of the antisubmarine defense, escort ships were built, including aircraft carriers, aircraft short-wave radar, new anti-submarine weapons and hydroacoustic stations were created. Intensively developed anti-submarine aircraft and an airfield network based on two continents of the theater. For the first time started installing bottom speakers. Forced the construction of commercial tonnage. Improved tactics antisubmarine defense. Allied intelligence revealed the German submarine communications system.
Due to these efforts, German submarines in the 1943 year were extruded (but not destroyed) from the central Atlantic to the peripheral maritime theaters, including the northern - the Soviet theaters. England resisted, and the Anglo-Saxons - the sea nation, understood the power and capabilities of the submarine fleet, as well as the importance of the means of struggle with a submerge.
And now (attention!), With the advent of the APRB, anti-submarine defense actually acquires the status of US missile defense from the ocean. The current US anti-submarine defense is a large system (in terms of cybernetics), covering space, the ocean and land.
In the postwar period, its buildup went at the expense of the space and bottom segments. Positional means of illumination of the underwater situation are located on the ocean floor, covering vast areas and, above all, torrential zones. The system is crowned by several electronic information processing and control centers for anti-submarine defense forces. Moreover, there is an assumption about the active capabilities of these systems. For example, creating acoustic noise, acoustic curtains, activation of minefields, etc. This is not a fantasy, as a nation with a sea mentality solves the issues of ocean ownership and defense from the oceanic direction.
WHICH FLEET CAN BE READ OCEAN?
The answer is simple, if you understand the basis of the power of the US Navy. And there is no doubt that their fleet is oceanic.
Probably, it will not be a big mistake to consider three factors as the basis of American naval power:
- national maritime mentality, multiplied by American pragmatism;
- the global world-wide system of basing of fleet forces;
- air supremacy in the ocean zone at the expense of ship-based and ground-based aviation.
The remaining components of the fleet are also significant. For example, ship crews, force management systems, supply logistics excellence, etc. But, being updated and improved in time, they rely on the three-factor field indicated above — the basis of the power of the US Navy.
These three factors are the American challenges that the Soviet Union was to respond to when it began to build the Cold War fleet as opposed to the American one. And only having solved this problem, our fleet could become oceanic.
Now a little about the first factor and its connection with the object of our research - the nuclear submarine of the 705 project.
In the first half of 1980, the author accidentally came across a report by Admiral Rickover on the required level of automation of submarines. The essence of the report was the idea of the harmfulness and inadmissibility of excessive enthusiasm for this process. The appearance of the report itself illustrates the presence of discussion in the US Navy on this topic.
The subsequent appearance of the Trident-type APRLB with a crew of more than one and a half hundred souls is evidence of Rickover’s views.
Earlier it was stated that the consequence of the deep automation of the 705 was the emergence of uninhabited compartments and the abandonment of local control posts, a number of important systems and mechanisms. With the start of operation, the wildness of the decision became apparent, and above all - to the crew of the submarine. They began to treat, for which three midshipmen were introduced into the crew - a shift watch, which was called wandering or mobile. The watchman moved through the compartments, assessing their condition visually and organoleptically, that is, did what was before him - several generations of submariners, and what could not be performed by automation and television. Automation is certainly needed, but only where it solves the problem faster than a person, with less expenditure of resources and operations, and also does not create a zone of information uncertainty. The widespread introduction of automatic control systems (automatic control systems) into the project imposed on the fleet by the military-industrial complex had many allies, even in the Naval Academy. In general, visiting 705 was very active. Each visitor (necessarily at a management position) offered something. Class political fighters were amazed at the absence of the political officer and promised to resolve the issue in Moscow (the crew of the boat did not have a political officer in terms of habitability).
Somehow a professor from the Academy Automation Department arrived with a proposal to automate the process of ascent. The assembled ships' commanders explained to the professor that the ascent is an individual maneuver, and, with external similarity, two are not the same. He was offered to automate the search for a part of the network with reduced isolation. But the professor considered the problem of little significance. But this very isolation was the cause of the fires that claimed the lives of many submariners!
There are more examples of the absurdity of deep and non-selective automation. Incomprehensible design concept for the struggle for survivability in light of the same deep automation. We are interested in something else: the American maritime mentality did not allow such a lurch in its underwater shipbuilding, as it happened with us. By the way, on the deceased "Komsomolets" the aft compartments in which the fire started were inspected by the mobile watch, and the fire in the eighth compartment began in the absence of the watch.
Analyzing the first factor it is impossible not to affect the personnel policy of the opposing fleets. The personnel policy of our Navy is practically no different from the royal, which took the established form during the sailing-steam clippers. The main categories of deck service then, with the king, and in Soviet times were officers, sailors, conscripts and warrant officers (non-commissioned officers, conductors). The officers were divided into two groups: command and engineering. The Soviet period added another group - political workers. The lowest caste was engineering, due to limited career opportunities (with the king - on the fact of origin). The damage to the engineering group was particularly evident in the nuclear submarine fleet, where officers-engineers constituted half of the officers. Quite typical was the situation when, through 7 - 8 years of service, a command profile officer reached the posts of a senior assistant, or even a commander, while his contemporary engineer remained at the primary level. This gave rise to a tendency among the engineering staff to leave the deck service and the device ashore. Among other things, the service engineers on the submarine proceeded harder than the officers of the command profile.
The severity of service officers of different categories on board the submarine well characterizes the choice of sailors entering the naval schools from the fleet. The vast majority sought to political workers, someone chose a command profile. The author, who had the opportunity to observe this process for nineteen years, does not remember the case of the arrival of sailors of the sub-melt at the Navy engineering schools.
The compulsory (recruiting) nature of the rank and file service was in clear contradiction with the ever-increasing ship technology. The situation was aggravated by a period of shortened service life.
A significant role in the crews was played by superconsistent servicemen (midshipmen and foremen), who are the bearers of the most valuable experience of the subfloat - cutoff (from the word compartment). Having reached 33 - 35 years of retirement age (a year after two), they left the sub-melt, taking away the most valuable experience.
There was no meaningful motivation system combining moral and material incentives for the crew of submarines.
The emergence of political divisions in the formations somewhere in the middle of the 1970s only strengthened the separation of officers, closing one of the career loopholes for engineers - the transition to political work.
One of the consequences of the mindless work of the personnel bodies of the Navy of the USSR was the accident rate inherited by the Navy of the Republic of Ingushetia.
Analyzing the personnel policy of the fleet, it is impossible to pass by the monoprofessionalism of command-line officers. We will explain. Command profile officers are not rotated between the branches of the Navy, that is, the submariner has never served and will not serve on a surface ship, and vice versa. This "achievement" of the Soviet personnel agencies was rotated in the tsarist fleet. It is difficult to assess the harm caused by such a policy.
By the way, in the US Navy, former pilots command aircraft carriers. In addition, caste artificially lowers the number of candidates for the position of commander of the ship - the central position of any fleet.
Thus, by inertia, personnel work in the USSR Navy led by the commander-in-chief of the ocean fleet was rolling.
The new commander-in-chief, who had previously commanded the Northern Fleet, started a noisy company to increase the prestige of the seafarers, and then it turned out, as always ... The company’s material wake was a badge “surface ship commander” observance of some conditions. I do not know whether this situation has survived to the present.
How this process takes place in the West can be illustrated with the example of a service odyssey of British admiral Woodward.
John F. Woodward (John Forster Woodward), Admiral
In the Navy - with 13 years. The first officer post - on the basis of submarines. Then - the junior navigator and watch officer of the cruiser in Indochina. Next - courses of logic, administration and business writing. At the end of the course - a miner on diesel-electric submarines in the Mediterranean. After some time, he was appointed as a participant in the courses of submarine commanders, and at the end he was appointed to the commander’s position of a new project under construction. Gains experience with the industry and entering into the line of the new ship. Next - a year of study at the Academy in Greenwich, crowned with a diploma in the design of a nuclear submarine reactor. Then - the submarine commander. The next stage is the head of training courses for submarine commanders. Then transferred to the central unit of the Navy, where he is engaged in planning the development of the Navy. From London, she is transferred to Portsmouth by the commander of the destroyer Sheffield, who is in charge of its commissioning. Again service in the central office of the Navy. In the 1981 year, he is appointed commander of the operational connection of surface ships (at the age of 49 years) and becomes an admiral. Under his command, England won the Falklands War in 1982. So the sea nation prepares shots for war at sea.
The topic can be continued, but the conclusion is already obvious. The American maritime mentality is a safeguard against incompetent intervention in the construction of the country's Navy.
Russia needs a law (or several laws) that exclude the creation of conditions for exclusive management of the construction of the Navy.
Now about the second component of the US naval power - the US Navy's basing system, which includes several dozen naval bases and bases. Moreover, being the leader of NATO, the United States potentially owns the system of air and sea bases of the countries of the vassal members of the alliance.
The largest naval base of the US Navy Norfolk
The presence of a base in a theater of military operations, if we turn to army terminology, means the pre-emption creation of a fortified area. Long-term basing allows you to master the area (a theater of military operations or part of it), carry out its equipment by means of various purposes, and create the necessary reserves. That is, to do in peacetime what the enemy will be forced to perform in the conduct of hostilities in the theater. An alternative to a land based system was (is) a floating rear. Historical experience shows its ability to fulfill its mission in peacetime. In wartime, it is destroyed by the enemy as a matter of priority.
If you carefully analyze the events of the Second World War in the Pacific, all of its main goals (ownership of supply and commodity markets, as well as transport accessibility) resulted in the struggle for ownership of the ocean-based naval forces and assets. Everything else - the battles of carrier strike groups, the actions of ships and submarines, landing operations - just a form of this struggle.
Emphasizing the importance of the system, one cannot pass by national experience. In 1904 - 1905, the Second Russian Pacific Squadron made an unprecedented transition from the Baltic to the Far East. At the same time, the floating rear solved the minimum task (in the absence of enemy opposition) - the squadron reached Tsushima without loss, but lost (or did not acquire) combat readiness. The result is a national tragedy, the Tsushima defeat.
Now subjunctive. Imagine that Russia would have bases somewhere in the southeastern part of the Asian continent (like England, France and Germany), allowing the squadron to restore combat readiness, to replenish with ships of the first squadron, which broke from Port Arthur after the battle in the Yellow Sea. The threat factor emanating from the new squadron could have led Japan to peace by that time. This did not happen, but the experience remained - our national, Russian, sea and bloody, which the whole world uses ... Except us.
After 60 years after Tsushima, we again played on the old harps - our “ocean fleet” (5-I OPESK) was provided with a floating rear, the ships and vessels of which followed to the provided squadron through three torrential zones controlled by NATO member countries.
And in general, what opposed the Mediterranean OPESK?
Fleets of five states, members of NATO, washed by the Mediterranean Sea, not counting the sixth fleet of the United States, which consists of two - three carrier strike groups. The theater is provided with national navigation systems and the most developed aerodrome network of the world.
What could our squadron do in the event of a full-scale war with non-nuclear means: do some damage to the enemy and replicate Varyag - no more. Who would allow her to engage in antisubmarine activity in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially since in 1970 and 1980, the areas where the American (British, French) APLRB combat service spread to the entire ocean due to the increased range of missile systems.
Did the commander in chief understand all the potential dangers of the current situation? Judging by the further development of our ocean presence, I understood, and a confirmation of this was the appearance in the Navy of the heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers of the 1143 project and, finally, the full-fledged aircraft carriers Riga, Brezhnev and Kuznetsov.
Why is the author constantly returning to the figure of the commander in chief in the topic about the boats of the 705 project? Gorshkov, as a commander-in-chief and an extraordinary person, quickly grew into a sea mentality. Much faster than any figure of the power layer standing above him. By building a fleet, he overcame not only the inertia of land sectarianism, but also ideological dogmatism.
In the list of dogmas of the time: aircraft carriers - the tools of the aggressive militants of the West; military bases in foreign territories are a legacy of colonialism, etc. The commander of the 1955 sample - 1962's and he mid-1970-x - as if different faces. Probably, the “late” commander in chief would not start building the submarine of the 705 project. For him, the time of surrogates has passed.
And, finally, about the third component of US naval power - aviation. Its impact potential manifested itself already in the First World War. Few people know that Russian hydroplanes (prototype aircraft carriers) participated in the attacks of Turkish ports, the adjustment of naval artillery fire and performed other tasks. The Second World War unequivocally confirmed aviation in the status of the main striking force of the fleet. Suffice it to recall the deaths of Bismarck, Hud, Prince of Wales, the Pearl Harbor drama, the air blockade of Sevastopol ... In the post-war period, the United States significantly expanded its combat capabilities. Naval aviation includes aircraft carrier, ground and naval infantry aviation. To understand the strike power of carrier-based strike groups, it is enough to imagine that the depth of its core defense reaches 400 - 500 kilometers, and the area occupied by it with declared dominance is equal to the area of Bulgaria. The aircraft carrier carries aircraft and helicopters for various purposes - from fighters to AWACS. The air group is prepared for the destruction of sea (submarine and NK) and ground targets, as well as solving air defense and missile defense tasks. AUG is the basis of the shock connections implementing tactics "fleet against the coast" at distances of several thousand kilometers. The importance of naval aviation in armed struggle is so obvious that the author considers the further narration about it to be superfluous.
WHEN NOVELTIES GO IN HARM
The foregoing was a necessary basis for understanding the circumstances and conditions in which it was conceived, designed, built and operated by the submarine of the 705 project.
In the world practice of design, there are at least two well-established patterns of international character:
- any new design is based on a prototype, that is, a previously existing machine, structure or device;
- in the designed object, no more than 10-20% subsystems are updated. This is done under the terms of security and for economic reasons.
The abundance of novelty delays the commissioning of the entire volume, leading to a significant loss of liquidity at the construction stage. The second entirely relates to the submarine of the 705 project, which is striking in the number of innovative solutions in the design of the ship.
In addition, the organization of the crew service and the form of maintenance were subjected to a drastic change. Innovations have set new tasks for accessory companies, of which there were over a few hundred. All this was the main reason for the protracted project.
In the course of the advance project, we were faced with the impossibility of fulfilling the flooding requirements of the Navy, which directly depends on the buoyancy margin. The Navy demanded to provide surface flooding in the flooding of one compartment and two adjacent tanks. With a small number of compartments (a variant of a three-compartment submarine with the same number of main ballast tanks was originally considered) this is impossible. The output was found in the six-sectional version with an increase in the number of tanks to 11. At the same time, the buoyancy reserve retained more than 30%.
What is so bad a large reserve of buoyancy? The larger it is, the greater the amount of water between the hulls, figuratively speaking, “lucky” submarines underwater, spending part of the engine power to move it. This circumstance is quite tolerant on diesel-electric submarines with their low speeds underwater. With an increase in underwater speed (with the advent of a nuclear submarine), a large reserve of buoyancy, structurally implemented through a two-hull structure, leads to an increase in the noise of the body flowing by the oncoming flow of water, vibration excitation of light hull structural elements, and, no less important, interferes with the operation of its own acoustic systems .
In the USA, starting with Skipjack, they went to the single-hull version without being confused by the loss of a buoyancy margin of up to 12 - 14%, that is, without having secured surface and underwater flooding.
Far from the originally conceived, but still relatively small displacement achieved due to:
- replacements of case steel with titanium alloy;
- NPI installation of high specific power (149 MW) with liquid metal coolant;
- crew reduction due to deep automation and centralization of the management processes of nuclear power plants and submarines as a whole;
- transfer of electrical systems to a higher frequency (400Hz);
- reduce the energy intensity of the backup source of electricity;
- simplify the system of immersion - ascent;
- refusal to duplicate the responsible systems;
- lack of local control posts;
- combining traditional separation systems;
- transition to direct-flow shut-off valves instead of the traditional one.
Therefore, it is far from a complete list of innovations, it is clear how the designers and customers deeply ignored the international design experience. The result is known: they started designing in the 1958 year, and received the first boat of the Navy in the 1977 year (K-123 705K). Total - 19 years! The appearance of "K-64" (the head of the 705 project) in Western Person in 1971 in the year cannot be called a transfer to the fleet - the submarine was in disrepair.
Now more about the innovations. The case of titanium alloy posed several rather difficult problems. Titanium is electrochemically passive, therefore any metal, black or colored, in seawater together with it plays the role of a protector. The first titanium submarine (K-222 of the 661 project) quickly "ate" the steel melt pier due to electrochemical corrosion.
To get out of the situation, the pier was replaced, and ocean fenders and zinc protectors were installed between the boat and the pier.
For fifty days of combat service in the North Atlantic (water temperature not more than 2 ° C), titanium managed to completely “eat” the metal braid of outboard cables, steel protectors. There was a leak of the steel periscope stem. Titan easily identified factory marriage. It should be noted, and the complexity of the welding of titanium - only in an inert gas environment, which, of course, complicated the repair work, including inside a solid case.
Shipbuilding is an integrating industry. Often, by their own demands, it is necessary for estimators to master new technologies and materials. The titanium industry, which now supplies the aviation industry, including the foreign one, is obliged to melt under its own birth. Sitting in a Boeing or Airbus, remember that he relies on a chassis made from Russian titanium.
From positive it should be noted the absence of rusting.
Now about nuclear power plants with liquid metal coolant and steam generators with multiple forced circulation.
Both installations differed by the increased complexity of the thermal circuits and the composition of the component elements. Usually, the declared advantage of such a technological solution is the ability to set up a quick access to power from the storage position. How this “storage” looks like is somehow silent. In any position of a NPP - working or deactivated - an alloy, the crystallization temperature of which is about one and a half hundred degrees, must be in a liquid state. In the workplace, it is understandable, and in the removed state, maintaining its temperature was provided in one of three ways: by dividing the reaction, by steam from the base, or by operating an electric boiler with a capacity of several hundred kilowatts. They tried everything, but stopped at the fission reaction, as the least dependent on coastal sources of steam and electricity. This meant the actual keeping of the watch in the database and the unproductive consumption of the resource of the installation itself.
The arrival of K-123 to the place of permanent deployment revealed a blatant unpreparedness of the base. Of all that was needed, there was the possibility of supplying electricity at the required frequency. The problem of steam supply from the base was solved on the move with the help of a concrete floating bar with two boilers. Boilers themselves are a serious and potentially dangerous structure in the hands of amateurs.
Parking Submarine Ave 705
The coolant of the contour of the alloy was capricious. Reacting with hydrogen and oxygen, the alloy formed oxides, which changed the conditions of heat removal from the fuel elements, which led to the destruction of the active zone. The source of hydrogen and oxygen in the alloy circuit was oxides of the structures and the water of the secondary circuit, which gets there through leaks, since the pressure in the secondary circuit exceeds the pressure of the alloy.
In 1968, for this reason, a severe nuclear accident occurred at K-27, the first Soviet nuclear submarine with a liquid-metal coolant.
The submarine was disabled, nine people died of radiation sickness. Surprisingly, after this accident, the submarines of the 705 project under construction at that time were not provided with instrumentation or laboratory monitoring devices for the quality of the coolant.
Restoration of its quality was carried out only under basic conditions; the process itself was called high-temperature regeneration. The operation was carried out not even by industry, but by science in securing the fleet. The process involved the circulation of the alloy with an inactive reactor, so steam was supplied from the “fifty kopeck” boilers (the 50 project guard), the feedwater leaks of which were simply amazing.
The nuclear accident at K-27, the appearance of the second generation nuclear submarines and the construction of the 705, which were clearly identified at the end of the 1960, could have served as a basis for the collapse of the project. Moreover, they had information about the refusal of the Americans from "SiWulf." But the construction did not stop. Why? There was a responsibility, but who needs it? The leadership of the fleet is clearly not, the generals from industry and science all the more! The expenditure of funds and resources of various kinds is simply colossal, and the grandfathers of the party control commission are still charged by Stalin. In order to avoid a scandal, they went the "natural" way: they reduced the series, put the boats under construction, and the boats seemed to have grown old and went to needles. And the sheep are fed and the wolves are whole.
Turbine delivered no less trouble. The relatively short length of the main steam lines and the high temperature of the steam led to a breakdown of the main valve gaskets (due to insufficiently thought out compensation for thermal expansions). Gasket replacement is a tremendous job associated with dismantling valves and associated equipment.
The struggle to minimize displacement led to the replacement of the usual turbine oil for aviation, which has a high rate of circulation. Aviation oil in anaerobic conditions turned out to be toxic. Turbinists have skin problems. Some big naval doctors came: they measured, discussed, were surprised, were indignant and ordered that they would not remove respirators in the turbine section.
The lack of regular service personnel in the crews and a long stay in isolation from active units visibly changed attitudes in the officer corps, reducing the usual distances.
Originally planned crew somewhere in the 14 - 15 submariners. Life made adjustments, and the boats went to sea, having a crew in 32 man. At the same time, the need for an increase existed, but could not be realized according to the conditions of habitability, since possibilities of electrochemical regeneration of the air environment have been exhausted.
The crews of the project were distinguished by their originality, especially those that were formed first and staffed with the best graduates. The service was conceived on a velvet model: a town somewhere on the Karelian Isthmus, then a helicopter, a plane, again a helicopter, and finally - a board of a miracle ship, exchange of signatures with a technical crew, two months of ocean ownership and then everything is in the reverse order. We studied for a long time in various design bureaus and institutes, being in status if not cosmonauts, then somewhere close. Gradually life landed. Yesterday's fellow students at the school went up the corporate ladder, and the end of the construction of the boat was not seen. Career went out, children grew up. Change the location of the service is not allowed. True, for the first crews, all officers were promoted to a higher level. Calmed, but not enough. It is not clear why, but the officer positions were called not by the statute, but by themselves. The commander of the group was called the engineer. The division commander is also an engineer, but senior. The commanders of combat units are deputy commanders. Why this was done is not clear, except in the name of innovations as such.
Anyone, somehow connected with the subdivision, is clear and obvious the importance of the watch engineer-mechanic. The organization of the service on the analyzed project of this figure did not provide - too much. Like, automation will replace everything. It is interesting how the authors thought the submarine control, for example, in the surface position, when the watch officer on the bridge and is completely occupied by the surface situation?
Automatics did not provide the tactics adopted and determined by the current leadership in the struggle for survivability and, moreover, introduced information uncertainty in the assessment of the emergency. For example, in one of the uninhabited compartments the starter coil will burn (ordinary situation) with significant smoke without increasing the temperature in the compartment. How does the central post identify the very fact of the fire and the degree of danger of the situation? Either smoke will be detected on the ship's TV, or a mobile watch (initially not at all conceived) at the entrance to the compartment will detect and report on the fact of smoke. Other information just will not. The room is uninhabited. The central post is obliged to launch a fire extinguishing system, and then organize reconnaissance, ascend, and provide ventilation to the atmosphere. This increases the likelihood of loss of stealth, and in wartime - death. With the combat effect, according to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the flow of water, the occurrence of fires is possible ... Only vigorous actions of the emergency party allowed to quickly localize the situation and save the ship. A huge role in efficiency is played by the psychological factor, for which it is necessary to maintain communication between the emergency compartment and the central post. The absence of a constant watch in the nuclear submarine compartment (at any level of automation) creates an information vacuum that does not allow promptly localize an emergency situation and minimize its consequences. The game of automated uninhabitation - one of the main causes of the tragedy "Komsomolets".
The authors of the idea of being uninhabitable can only be understood under one condition - the submarine of the 705 project was originally designed as a disposable ship. There is no other logical explanation.
And the last one about the automation of the struggle for survival process. It can not be automated. Need to go the other way. By creating an effective toolkit to help staff. Under the toolkit should be understood diagnostic systems, computerization of calculations of the current state of stability, buoyancy and much more.
Increasing the frequency of the current electrical system is one of the main differences of the analyzed project. Neither before nor after the world practice of shipbuilding is not aware of this. Innovators believed that by doing so they would reduce the weight and size characteristics of power electrical equipment, including by abandoning the mass of transducers supplying weapons and armament complexes.
On the basing, stealth and reliability of the electrical complex, the designers did not know or did not consider the design object.
Two types of drive motors were used on the boat - the AFM and DFV series. The parametric series of the AFM series covered the power range from 15 kilowatts and above. The DFV series has been used in the low power range. The AFM engines had water cooling in the stator zone, so that all the mass and weight savings were quite conditional, increasing due to the pumps, fittings and heat exchangers of the cooling system. Drive motor speeds increased to 6000 revolutions (synchronous). The increase in speeds has dramatically affected the reliability of the bearing assemblies (especially for drives with axial loads) due to the failure to take any constructive measures to improve their reliability.
There were no devices for diagnosing the state of bearing assemblies. The node failed an avalanche in an hour and a half: from the appearance of the first personnel diagnostics available (mobile watch) for signs of abnormal work to its sintering (hardening). As a rule, it was not possible to use the puller without dismantling the engine, and more often, the associated equipment. Later, experience came, the replacement of bearings was simplified, but the problem remained until the redemption of the miracle ships. Significantly increased the mass of the reversible converter due to the multipolarity of the synchronous machine. Bearings did not get rid of the ills of their predecessors.
New was the blower of the system of mechanical mixing of the electrolyte, allowing not to use medium pressure air and, therefore, not to create excessive pressure in the edema. It was very noisy, so it was rarely used. There were failures of voltage correctors of autonomous turbine generators associated with cracking of the epoxy casting array. The complete surprise was the explosions of onboard power connectors from the shore due to internal short circuits. Attempts to avoid short circuits by separating the phases of the connectors led to the heating of the robust case due to uncompensated high-frequency magnetization reversal.
Natural ventilation of the battery was not provided due to the presence of the downstream section of the exhaust duct. The low-power DC fan was absent, so an AC fan was used continuously. VDK consisted of a static frequency converter (400 V ~ IF, 50 Hz) and two asynchronous propeller motors located in nacelles on the ends of the horizontal tail unit. Both HELL (100 kW) worked on two-blade propellers of fixed pitch - "stop" and "move". Spread blades carried ship hydraulics. HED had frequency regulation speed. Under the HED and the exhaust flow of the circulation routes, the boat developed a course of up to five knots (with a flap on the exhaust, the jet could be directed perpendicular to the board, the "stop" position).
The inverter was a massive water-cooled installation, rather unreliable. The smooth adjustment of the revolutions of a sufficiently low-power HED wore a far-fetched character; it could have been completely replaced by a two-speed asynchronous motor.
Instrument information of the control panel of the electrical system was quite peculiar. The megohmmeter, for example, showed values in the range from 0 to 200 kOhm, which did not allow to reveal the tendency of isolation change and to take timely measures to increase it. An interesting was the decision on the remote control of feeder machines of the main switchboard.
A low-power static converter was used to power general-purpose household consumers (electric razors, film sets, etc.).
It should be noted that the increase in the number of revolutions of autonomous turbogenerators and powerful drive motors made the vibroacoustic characteristic of the submarine of the 705 project very individual and greatly simplified the identification of the enemy. Thus, the transition to an increased frequency proved to be unjustified. Could personnel have done anything besides increasing the acoustic culture actively introduced into the practice of the sub-basement in the 1970s and 1980s?
If we take into account that the military-industrial complex has achieved 300% overhead in the production of many types of military equipment, then you can imagine how much the cost of implementing the high-frequency idea of the power grid of the project turned out.
Eh, where were the grandfathers-Stalinists from the party control commission at the Party Central Committee ?! And if they also understood the problems of the sub-basement, like cavalry ...
The itch of innovation has not bypassed rebar designers. Instead of the usual and long overdue stage of childhood diseases, a new, so-called direct flow appeared. Now the valve stem was not perpendicular to the flow of the working environment, but parallel. As a result, the rare valve provided a medium cut-off. In order to estimate the scale of the consequences, we will present the procedure of any repair in the campaign. Well, for example, replacing gaskets on some steam line. Preparing tools, materials, personnel. But the main thing is that all the repairs and the disconnections (switching) associated with it do not lead to a loss of travel, disruption of the operation of weapons and armament complexes. And this happened, and often. Finally a solution is found. In especially difficult situations, combat (training) anxiety is declared. The execution starts and it turns out that the working environment does not turn off due to the valve's leakage (valve, clinker) ... Everything begins anew, often according to a potentially dangerous scenario.
The lowest level of reliability of the 705 submarine technical equipment, most of which did not pass the life test, doomed the small crew to endless repairs, making the service difficult, especially in the electromechanical warhead. No less burden fell on the technical crew. About him in more detail.
The adoption of an aviation model for servicing 705 boats is another contrived innovation. It was thought that the entire inter-stepping period to restore the combat readiness of ships engaged in technical crew, and the crew of the boat (in the naval jargon - swimmers) in this period is resting, and then restores skills in the training center. The idea was not justified for a number of reasons, so 705-I was transferred to the second crew, the carrier of linearity, who, together with the technical crew, implemented inter-forward stage activities, providing a given combat readiness. The technical crew was a large separate military unit with its own number and seal. Long formed, and in the absence of ships unoccupied with the main purpose, it turned into a source of work force and inexhaustible traveling reserve for superiors.
With the advent of the ships, the technical crew switched to performing basic functions, and then its structural mismatch manifested itself - the lack of personal attachment to the ships, mediated responsibility and much more, which is always the result of flaws at the design stage. In fact, the manual and the electromechanical service of the connection controlled the manual technician, leaving him in charge of the issues of everyday life and socialist competition. Understanding the need to restructure it came quickly. It was planned to divide the technical equipment by the number of boats and deprive the status of a separate military unit. The first succeeded, the second - did not take place because of the unwillingness of personnel bodies. But this is another story.
SEVEN NANNER ...
Interest in the project at the command of all levels quickly evaporated. The boats of the project, by virtue of the previously stated circumstances, could not master new areas of combat service, introduce something new into the tactics of confrontation with a likely adversary, and be in ice-fishing for a long time. They were used in the North Atlantic, closer to the base.
The apotheosis can be considered 1981 the year when the mass rewarding of the epic participants took place. On the compound, which bore the brunt of the project, "fell" a little more than a hundred award signs (9%).
Then began a smooth sunset. At the beginning of the 1990-x all boats, except for K-123 (was under repair), were decommissioned. Operation of the 705 project by the fleet has developed a persistent allergy to nuclear power plants with a liquid-metal coolant. This is the main lesson of more than thirty years of the epic. What Americans have come to in a few years, we walked for three decades. Now it is again proposed to use liquid metal as a coolant. Danaans, carrying this idea, assure of the problems solved. Well, for example, biological protection will become a heat accumulator, and therefore, they say, buyers (fleet) will not have problems with basic support, etc.
At the same time, the design and implementation of such a complex engineering structure as the submarine of the 705 project should be considered as an undoubted achievement of the Soviet scientific and design schools, high potency of the Soviet defense industry. There is no fault of the engineers that their efforts were directed by officials away from common sense. The analyzed project should be considered encyclopedic already because its operation by the fleet has confirmed or refuted various kinds of design and organizational ideas that have previously only a theoretical justification.
Another lesson of the epic: extraordinary weapon systems (such as the 705-I submarine) must be designed in complex with the elements of the basic support. The latter should be built and developed proactively.
For the crews, the development of the project was a real engineering school, which taught many to solve complex non-standard engineering tasks.
From the position of the present, the low status of the Navy as a state institution in the 1950-1960-s of the last century is obvious. The latter was unable to form and defend the holistic concept of the necessary boat, and in many respects he went on about the various structures of the military-industrial complex, which proposed a miracle weapon. Or was it necessary for someone?
I stress once again: the strength of the fleet is not in some kind of miracle weapon, but in the interconnected use of its forces to achieve a real goal.
Let's go ahead and ask ourselves a question: was a submarine under construction for twenty years a surrogate or a full-fledged warship?
Reply impossible. Her life cycle began and ended in the interwar period. However, it is necessary to ask this question for one simple reason - so as not to repeat the epic of the 705 project. Without losing the meaning, but moving away from the term surrogate (if someone is offended), the question can be put differently. And is military hardware a full-fledged one, which takes two decades to build in an environment where a generation change of IT occurs every three to five years? The answer is for the reader.
Today the recovery in matters of attitude towards the fleet is obvious. There were a lot of different movements in support of the fleet, as a rule, led by former political workers, the media are filled with reports of new naval weapons. How to be a fleet?
The old conventional wisdom that obsolete military theories are worse than obsolete weapons now, at this crossroads, is again relevant. Will the lessons of building the ocean fleet of the USSR be taken into account, and if so, which ones? Will the obvious tactics of NATO fleets against the "coast" that have become typical in recent decades be taken into account?
A few words about the lessons of the Soviet Navy.
First of all, as already noted, it is necessary to adopt a legislative framework for the fleet precluding incompetent decisions at the state level.
The personnel policy of the fleet needs revision and updating. It should be understood that in this direction laid a huge potency of the fleet combat readiness. The change in personnel approach will require changes in naval education and the status of the crew.
The high accident rate of the fleet during the Soviet era was simply blunted. The fight against accidents was an imitation, and its forms sometimes became anecdotal. For example, the line from the socialist duties of any sailor sounded like this: not to have accidents and breakdowns of the material part of the headquarters through their own fault.
Emergency never engaged seriously. Back in 1980-s, the term “social” sounded dissident, but the roots of accidents are social and it does not matter at what level - the design, command or operational conditions will be created, the consequence of which will be an accident or a disaster.
Accident product of the activity (inaction) of people. It is inherent not only to the fleet, but also to other high-tech industries - energy, aviation, etc. Accident is international. Fighting it is one of the main areas of operation of engineering systems.
Thousands of scientists - candidates and doctors of science worked in various research institutes, schools and instances of the fleet. If you try to find at least one dissertation work on accidents, you will be disappointed - you will not find. Why?
A serious analysis of the causes of accidents inevitably led to system defects, that is, to the zone of ideological taboos. The lack of a scientific approach to the study of the phenomenon of accidents led to the replication of emergencies in the Soviet fleet.
It is impossible to ignore the behavioral motivation of the personnel of the submarines and the headquarters of the formations. Its essence is infinitely simple - to hide the fact of an accident (accident, breakdown), and if this is not possible, then in the report to reduce the negative consequences. On this wave followed the General Staff of the Navy and the optimistic reports of the commanders of emergency submarines, which are clearly inappropriate to the situation. Rare information on any accident corresponded to the actual course of events. At best, it was a half-truth.
The recovery of state institutions that took place, the appearance of financial resources for the country's defense institutions again raises the question: what should the fleet be like?
In fact, this is a shipbuilding program. In our history there were several. Particularly memorable are post-Susum and Soviet.
Any shipbuilding program is always very costly and long-term. It should take into account geopolitical forecasts, the current state of the fleet, the level and forecasts of the development of science and economics, and a host of other factors. In the current situation, under these other factors, we, first of all, should understand the fact that our fleet is long, or rather 70 years old, did not take part in hostilities. This is the danger of influencing the formation of the program of the Soviet admiral corps, brought up in peacetime on the idea of the "ocean" fleet of the USSR. The situation, in our opinion, is aggravated by an inadequate understanding of the nature of the fleet as one of the national defense institutions on many floors of government. The combination of these factors, multiplied by the appetites of the MIC, will give such a synergistic effect that we will lose both the fleet and the treasury. The call has already sounded: after the refusal of France to transfer "Mistral" media filled with messages about the design of a nuclear aircraft carrier for the Navy. MIC launched a marketing attack. The authors of the idea are far from understanding what needs to be done in order for the carrier strike group to be ready to solve any military tasks based on this aircraft carrier. Significant investments will require the space, aviation and ground segments to ensure its activities. The ship composition of the aircraft carrier defense zones must be equipped with nuclear power, in order to possess a single tactical property, otherwise high-speed tankers must be introduced into the group. The provision of air defense and missile defense will require the creation of DRLO complexes deck-based and so on ...
The question arises, do we need aircraft carriers? Are we going to regain Alaska? Protect the colonial territories? Have you resolved a set of issues for guaranteed protection of patrol areas of submarines armed with ballistic missiles? We built positional systems in the torrential zones of our inland seas that exclude the actions of a potential enemy there? We want to disrupt the shipping of the enemy in the Atlantic?
Do we have the potential capability of the USSR economy and bring the number of carrier-assault groups to the American indicators?
The author does not know how the shipbuilding program of the renaissance of the Russian fleet is formed, but he is well aware that in the absence of a sea mentality at the top of state administration, the low authority of the Navy command, the extremely high activity and adventurism of the military-industrial complex, the shipbuilding program, to put it mildly, may not be the same which the country needs.
It is desirable that the developers of the program took into account several circumstances:
1. It is necessary to develop and establish, in accordance with the established procedure, a set of legislative measures to protect the Navy from incompetent decisions of any level;
2. The ocean zone is inhabited for a long time and very solidly by a probable adversary. Trying to compete with him means doing another imitation;
3. The need for a steady build-up of naval strategic nuclear forces. Ensuring the complete inaccessibility of enemy patrol areas;
4. The fleet is not only the ship structure, aircraft, and the BRAV and MP. These are also active bottom passive positional systems;
5. Establishment of the defense zone of the hospitality zone in the sea (ocean) and its continuous increase as the program stages are implemented;
6. The organization of the missile defense system (air defense) ship-based on rocket-prone areas Its integration into the missile defense system of the Ministry of Defense;
7. Reorganization of personnel policy of the Navy.